# load packages, paths, and the macro plateform data
library(tidyverse)
library(data.table)
library(here)
library(kableExtra)
library(tidytext)
library(DT)
data_path <- "C:/Users/goutsmedt/Documents/MEGAsync/Research/R/projets/data/green_ecb_responsiveness"
source(here(path.expand("~"), "green_ecb", "function", "functions_for_topic_modelling.R"))
K = 120
# load the topics stats and gamma attributes
lda <- readRDS(here(data_path, "topic_modelling", paste0("LDA_", K, ".rds")))
lda_data <- readRDS(here(data_path,
"topic_modelling",
paste0("LDA_", K, "_data.rds"))) %>%
as.data.table() %>%
.[, period := case_when(between(date, "1998-11-20", "2011-11-08") ~ "Period_1",
between(date, "2011-11-08", "2021-09-01") ~ "Period_2",
between(date, "2021-09-01", "2023-02-01") ~ "Period_3")]
lda_proximity <- readRDS(here(data_path,
"topic_modelling",
"similarities_LDA.rds"))
data_year_subset <- lda_data %>%
filter(! is.na(period)) %>%
.[,`:=` (mean = mean(gamma),
st_err = sd(gamma)/sqrt(length(gamma))), by = .(topic, period)] %>%
.[order(period, desc(mean)),] %>%
distinct(topic, topic_name, inflation_topic, period, mean, st_err) %>%
.[, rank := 1:.N, by = period] %>%
pivot_wider(names_from = "period", values_from = c("mean", "st_err", "rank"))
topics_per_speech <- lda_data %>%
.[, gamma_speech := mean(gamma), by = .(topic, file)] %>%
select(topic, file, title, year, date, speaker_cleaned, gamma_speech, pdf_link, period) %>%
unique()
# Calculate top frex and lift value for the topic
beta_lda <- tidy(lda, matrix = "beta") %>%
group_by(topic) %>%
slice_max(order_by = beta, n = 15, with_ties = FALSE) %>%
mutate(rank_beta = 1:n()) %>%
select(topic, term_beta = term, rank_beta, beta)
frex_lda <- calculate_frex(lda, 15, 0.5, topic_method = "LDA") %>%
group_by(topic) %>%
slice_max(order_by = frex, n = 15, with_ties = FALSE) %>%
ungroup() %>%
select(term_frex = term, rank_frex = rank, frex)
lda_words <- beta_lda %>%
bind_cols(frex_lda)
# Most representative speech per period
top_speech_paragraphs_period <- lda_data %>%
select(topic, document_id, title, date, speaker_cleaned, period, pdf_link, paragraphs, period, gamma) %>%
filter(! is.na(period)) %>%
group_by(period, topic) %>%
slice_max(gamma, n = 5, with_ties = FALSE) %>%
mutate(title_link = paste0("[", title, "](", pdf_link, ")"),
paragraphs = str_trunc(paragraphs, 1500, "right") %>% str_squish(),
gamma = round(gamma, 3)) %>%
ungroup()
top_speech_period <- topics_per_speech %>%
select(topic, file, title, date, speaker_cleaned, period, pdf_link, gamma_speech, period) %>%
filter(! is.na(period)) %>%
group_by(period, topic) %>%
slice_max(gamma_speech, n = 5, with_ties = FALSE) %>%
mutate(title_link = paste0("[", title, "](", pdf_link, ")"),
gamma_speech = round(gamma_speech, 3)) %>%
ungroup()Topics that deal with inflation are displayed first. Within topics dealing with inflation and topics that deal with other subjects, topics are ranked from the most prevalent topic to the less prevalent one.
for(i in (1:K)[-99]){
topic_stats <- data_year_subset %>%
filter(topic == i)
################ Beginning of the template ######################
cat("## ", paste0("**Topic ", topic_stats$topic, "**: ", topic_stats$topic_name), "\n")
cat("###", "Describing Topics in general \n\n")
cat("The most common terms according to different indicators:\n\n")
print(kable(filter(lda_words, topic == i)) %>%
kable_styling(bootstrap_options = c("striped", "condensed", full_width = F)))
cat("\n\n")
cat("###", "Describing Topics for the 3 periods \n\n")
cat("We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:\n\n")
print(kable(filter(top_speech_paragraphs_period, topic == i) %>% select(title_link, period, date, gamma, paragraphs)) %>%
kable_styling(bootstrap_options = c("striped", "condensed", full_width = F), font_size = 12))
cat("\n\n")
cat("The most representative speeches:\n\n")
print(kable(filter(top_speech_period, topic == topic_stats$topic) %>% select(title_link, period, date, gamma_speech)) %>%
kable_styling(bootstrap_options = c("striped", "condensed", full_width = F), font_size = 12))
cat("\n\n")
}The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | model | 1 | 0.1004713 | phillips | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 1 | curve | 2 | 0.0616441 | phillips curve | 2 | 0.9996495 |
| 1 | phillips | 3 | 0.0485457 | model | 3 | 0.9994741 |
| 1 | phillips curve | 4 | 0.0474932 | slope | 4 | 0.9989484 |
| 1 | estimate | 5 | 0.0245711 | dsge | 5 | 0.9985093 |
| 1 | slack | 6 | 0.0226999 | curve | 6 | 0.9984210 |
| 1 | dynamic | 7 | 0.0162677 | keynesian | 7 | 0.9983352 |
| 1 | relationship | 8 | 0.0149812 | economic slack | 8 | 0.9978968 |
| 1 | economic slack | 9 | 0.0128761 | dsge model | 9 | 0.9977196 |
| 1 | slope | 10 | 0.0120575 | specification | 10 | 0.9974565 |
| 1 | base | 11 | 0.0111219 | slack | 11 | 0.9962243 |
| 1 | variable | 12 | 0.0107710 | nairu | 12 | 0.9960541 |
| 1 | keynesian | 13 | 0.0091338 | flat | 13 | 0.9951813 |
| 1 | unemployment | 14 | 0.0088999 | relationship | 14 | 0.9946386 |
| 1 | structural | 15 | 0.0078473 | policy analysis | 15 | 0.9945592 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jürgen Stark: Lessons for central bankers from the history of the Phillips Curve | Period_1 | 2008-06-16 | 0.375 | indeed, the great inflation episode was associated with the breakdown of empirical phillips curves, as equations estimated over the previous, more stable period lost predictive power and had to be adjusted judgementally by forecasters in policy institutions. the shifting nature of the unemployment-inflation relationship around the time of the great inflation is clearly apparent even to the naked eye from the bottom-right panel of figure 1. whereas from the second half of the 19th century up until mid-1960s inflation and unemployment had systematically negatively co-moved in both the united kingdom and the united states, around the time of the great inflation they started to move upward in lockstep. as pointed out by lucas and sargent in a paper presented in 1978 at a conference organised by the boston fed, 8 the inflation of the 1970s represented, under this respect, a sort of large-scale experiment for the old consensus. for lucas and sargent the verdict of this experiment was clear: the “halcyon days” 9 of post-keynesian macroeconomics, with its belief in the exploitability of the phillips trade-off, were gone for ever. over subsequent years, and until mid-1990s, the phillips curve essentially disappeared from frontier research. alienated by the disappointing performance of the phillips curve, and following the lead of kydland and prescott, 10 frontier researchers were preoccupied with building flexible-price general equilibrium models driven by technological impulses. w… |
| Jürgen Stark: Delivering price stability - benefits and challenges | Period_1 | 2007-12-04 | 0.215 | long term inflation and economic performance empirically, the relationship between inflation and economic performance in the long run has been extensively studied. simplifying, one could argue that the famous phillips curve has been rotating in the minds (and charts) of macroeconomists in the last 35 years or so. it was positively sloped when i studied macroeconomics: a little bit more of inflation was supposed to bring a little bit more of real income as a permanent effect. then, it became vertical, as rational expectations advocates belied the samuelson-solow consensus model and drew attention onto a principle that had long been discovered and forgotten: monetary neutrality. it is futile for a central bank to manoeuvre inflation in the hope of systematically stimulating growth, as this policy is doomed to failure in the end, and produces inflation as the only certain outcome. in more recent years the measured slope has bent to negative. many of the papers presented at this conference give indications that a negative phillips curve in the long run not only conforms to evidence, but is born out of general equilibrium micro-foundations. to be sure, at lower rates of inflation, the empirical long-term link between growth and inflation seems difficult to ascertain, at least on the basis of reduced-form, non-structural analysis. this might motivate the fact that for years – in the absence of data-congruent structural models – the slope issue was considered unsettled. i should … |
| Jürgen Stark: Lessons for central bankers from the history of the Phillips Curve | Period_1 | 2008-06-16 | 0.188 |
|
| Lucas Papademos: The science of monetary policy ¿ past advances and future challenges | Period_1 | 2007-09-24 | 0.187 | such model and data uncertainty is clearly warranted. model uncertainty suggests that further analysis of the robustness of the effects of monetary policy actions across a variety of models would be valuable. recent research has shown that central banks should moderate the responsiveness of their policy decisions to real activity when underlying data are known to be subject to measurement error. after all, a strong policy response to mismeasured data will induce unnecessary fluctuations in the economy. in view of this, the weight given to the individual information variables should depend on how precisely those variables are measured. this is especially applicable to variables that are not directly observable, but which are relevant for policy formulation, such as the potential output growth and the equilibrium values of the real unemployment rate and the real interest rate. it would therefore be not advisable for central banks to heavily rely in their policy decisions – and in the respective communication – on models or policy rules that place an inordinate weight on such unobservable parameters, which are difficult to measure in real time, and subject to considerable uncertainty of the underlying data. my final remark on model and methodological challenges concerns the fact that most macroeconomic models today are solved and estimated in linear form, essentially relying on the linear stochastic difference approach used in macroeconomics since the 1950s. again, this featu… |
| Jürgen Stark: Main challenges for monetary policy in a globalised world | Period_1 | 2008-03-31 | 0.170 | 5 galí and monacelli (2005) model a small open economy trading with an infinite number of other foreign economies. in the model’s phillips curve, they show that the more open the economy is and the more substitutable domestic goods are with regard to foreign goods, the lower the coefficient for the domestic output gap becomes. research conducted at the imf and the bis (imf (2006) and borio and filardo (2007)) finds supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the increase in international trade and production specialisation has increased the importance of global indicators of economic slack and inflation, relative to domestic indicators, in explaining domestic inflation in developed countries. ciccareli and mojon (2005) also argue that in a sample of oecd economies domestic inflation is driven by a global inflation process, which at short horizons is a function of global real developments. the robustness of such evidence remains controversial, however, as empirical estimates depend on the specification of the estimated phillips curve (ihrig et al. (2007)). 6 batini et al. (2005). 7 rogoff (2003) contends that globalisation may, in fact, have had the opposite effect on firms’ pricing behaviour, arguing that the increase in competitive pressures arising from globalisation means that the cost for firms of setting the price at the wrong level is much higher than it would be with less competition. hence, globalisation would lead to firms revising their prices more frequently and… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Understanding inflation dynamics and monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2015-11-10 | 0.410 | over-predicting inflation. for the euro area, the evidence from several new papers points to a relative steepening recently, following the previous flattening, (see e.g. oinonen and paloviita (2014), riggi and venditti (2015) and foroni and porqueddu (2015)). this development is especially marked in those countries which experienced deeper and longer recessions and made greater efforts to reform their product and labour markets. estimating the same specifications of phillips curves over two samples, one stopping at 2012 q1 (when we started systematically over-predicting inflation) and the other covering the full sample ending in 2014 q4, one finds evidence of an increase in the slope estimate. indeed, regime-switching estimates, accounting for parameter change due to state-dependency on various measures of the business cycle can help to explain the “excessive” disinflation since 2012. how much time variation is there in the slope of the phillips curve, and in which direction? let us take an agnostic view on the origins of the time-variation and estimate a hybrid nkpc for the euro area with time-varying parameters, similar to that in blanchard et al. (2015). over the sample period running from 1999 q1 to 2015 q2, the slope of headline inflation had a general tendency to decrease until 2011, after which it rebounded. for core inflation the upward shift started earlier. similar results have been obtained also using the structural new area wide model (nawm). in the nawm framew… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Past and future of the European Central Bank monetary policy | Period_2 | 2018-05-11 | 0.371 | right fork in the road of the post-1975 evolution, features an approach developed by kydland, prescott and sargent, and more recently by galì and gertler and others. inflation depends on forward-looking expectations, and expectations respond rationally to actual and expected changes in monetary and fiscal policy. this two-way game has no room for supply shocks or inertia”. this second approach produces what is called the new keynesian phillips curve (nkpc) that basically focuses on the output gap and expectations and is a crucial part of the dsge models, where the interest rate is all-powerful to control demand and therefore inflation. gordon and others forged ahead with the first approach, adding variables representing supply shocks (as prices depend on demand and supply factors), inertia represented by long lags of inflation and a time-varying nairu determined by a simple stochastic process. to this day, using this so-called “triangle approach”, gordon continues to obtain very good results in predicting inflation out-of-sample[30]. in 2013, gordon shows that his model “can estimate coefficients up to 1996 and then in a 16-year-long dynamic simulation, with no information on the actual values of lagged inflation, predict the 2013 value of inflation to within 0.5 percentage point. the slope of the pc relationship between inflation and the unemployment gap does not decline by half or more as in the recent literature, but instead is stable.” this last aspect is particularly … |
| Vítor Constâncio: Understanding inflation dynamics and monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2015-11-10 | 0.369 | the phillips curve as a vehicle to discuss inflation dynamics the current attention to the relationship between inflation and economic slack has led to an intense debate on the stability of the phillips curve and its power to explain the twin puzzle. an important consideration is that economic slack is a multidimensional concept that is not directly observable and choices must be made on how to estimate or measure it. the outcome is highly sensitive to the assumptions used for the decomposition of economic activity into trend and cycle. usual measures of slack can vary substantially across methods and variables included, although they tend to agree on the timing of peaks and troughs. the fact that economic activity is multidimensional suggests that there might be advantages in using multivariate dynamic models to estimate it. for instance, ecb staff uses a dynamic factor model that performs a trend/cycle decomposition of real activity and core inflation. 3 the model uses a single factor to capture common cyclical fluctuations and estimates the output gap as the deviation of output from its trend. different modelling assumptions, such as different sets of real activity indicators and different specifications of the trend components of the variables, lead to different estimates of the output gap. these differences are economically very relevant, with some models estimating an output gap that was close to zero in 2014 on average, and others estimating remaining slack of as mu… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Understanding inflation dynamics and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2015-09-02 | 0.332 | further, the standard hybrid new keynesian phillips curve includes agents’ inflation expectations, which are also difficult to measure. recent work by coibion and gorodnichenko (2015) uses expectations from surveys, with some practical success. it highlights that the choice of the measure of inflation expectations is crucial in understanding inflation dynamics in the united states, advocating the use of surveys of household inflation expectations rather than those of professional forecasters. naturally, expectations from surveys or professional forecasters are not microfounded. more generally, nkpc has had many problems to predict inflation even when embedded in a dsge model. as king and watson (2012) highlight when using the labour income share or unit labour costs the models do not capture that the last 15 years do not show a co-movement of inflation with the significant decline of those ulcs. gürkaynak, kisacikoglu and rossi (2013) also illustrate the subpar performance of dsge models to forecast inflation. in their encompassing survey mavroeidis, plagborg-møller, and j. stock (2014), also conclude that without rejecting the nkpc, “we are unable to pin down the role of expectations in the inflation process sufficiently accurately for the results to be useful for policy analysis”. finally there is the question of stability of phillips curve parameters, in the form of non-linearities or structural changes. as sudden decreases in forecasting ability are frequently associat… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Understanding inflation dynamics and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2015-09-02 | 0.316 | however, as policy makers we need more than just good inflation forecasts: we also need to understand the inflation process in order to better assess the role of monetary policy. we also need to be able to explain our reasoning to the public, as the management of expectations has become such an important monetary policy instrument. this is one more reason for continuing to use the phillips curve as a tool to discuss inflation dynamics. the current attention to the relationship between inflation and economic slack has led to an intense debate on the stability of the phillips curve and its power to explain the twin puzzle. empirical research, especially in the united states, shows that the slope of the phillips curve has varied over time, with a clear tendency to flatten over the years. for the euro area, the evidence from several recent papers points to a steepening in recent years (see e.g. oinonen and paloviita (2014), riggi and venditti (2015) and foroni and porqueddu (2015)). this development is especially marked in those countries which experienced deeper and longer recessions and made greater efforts to reform their product and labour markets, with an impact on nominal rigidities (see, for italy, riggi and santoro (2015) and, to a lesser extent, for spain, banco de españa (2013 and 2015). when analysing the excessive disinflation in the euro area since 2012, natural questions arise as to whether we are facing a new regime of low inflation (e.g. due to demographics, in… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.299 | flattened considerably over recent decades, a finding that continues to generate substantial debate in academia and policy circles (chart 7). chart 7 change in the slope of the phillips curve (x-axis: log percentage points, y-axis: percentage points) us data: 1980-2000 us data: 2000-2020 6 6 4 oo 4 - * we qo =< : of ao 0 ° so rs pene) dus s 0 ae so er is log = c a. o is “0 5 g ke ee soak) fe) o s b {op o 4 = 6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 6 4 -2 0 2 4 6 wo 4 model: 1980-2000 model: 2000-2020 = 6 6 o 4 8 4 -2 c-88 “ohs9, gp o fso ; o -2 = bsi — = 4 se) i 4 -6 -6 -6 4 “2 0 2 4 6 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 output gap source: costain, j., nakov, a. and petit, b. (2021), “flattening of the phillips curve with state-dependent prices and wages”, the economic journal, july. note: the top panels show scatterplots of the change in inflation and the output gap in us data over the periods 1980-2000 and 2000-2020, respectively. the bottom panels illustrate simulated data generated by a model of state-dependent price and wage setting (costain et al., 2021) for the same time periods. the analysis indicates that the model explains roughly half of the observed flattening of the phillips curve. according to the model, lower inflation in the second period (2000-2020) has reduced the frequency of price changes, implying a reduced transmission of demand shocks to the aggregate price level. such a change would have significant implications for the conduct of monetary policy. when inflation is below target, a flatter st… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.235 | macro evidence on the effects of policy rates one stream of the literature investigates the effects of policy rates using macro data, time-series econometric models and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (dsge) models. a broad consensus has emerged about the aggregate effects of interest rate policy. the econometric models, mainly structural vector autoregressions, show that policy rate changes have significant effects on both inflation and economic activity. maximum effects occur with a lag, with the impact on inflation taking somewhat longer to materialise than the impact on the real economy.[1] furthermore, at least at times when inflation is not too far from the 2% target, the models indicate that the effect on inflation tends to be modest relative to the effect on the real economy. in other words, the phillips curve is rather flat.[2] dsge models can replicate the effects of interest rate changes found in the macro data, shedding some light on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.[3] |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.199 | digging deeper into the micro evidence since the golosov-lucas paper was published, economists have been studying numerous micro price datasets from different countries. researchers have been busy constructing models that can match various features of the micro data, including the average frequency and size of price changes. in 2018 the european system of central banks established prisma – the price-setting microdata analysis network – to collect and study various kinds of micro data, aiming to deepen our understanding of price-setting behaviour and inflation dynamics. today, peter karadi will present the findings from a research project undertaken as part of the prisma network. in the paper, peter and his co-authors raphael schoenle and jesse wursten set out to measure the selection effect in micro data. to give you a preview of their findings in a nutshell, the selection effect is absent. the probability that a given price will change increases, to a certain extent, when that price is further from the optimum. however, the probability of price adjustment conditional on an aggregate shock does not seem to depend on the distance from the optimum.[6] the authors also discuss which models can match such price-setting behaviour. the promising candidates are state-dependent models with random menu costs and models of information- constrained price-setting.[7] in both classes of models, the selection effect can be weak: some prices fail to adjust even though the distance from t… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.187 | early micro evidence on the effects of policy rates with the advent of more and more granular data, research shifted its focus to micro data on prices. researchers documented how individual firms set prices, aiming at building models that would be consistent with both the price-setting behaviour at the micro level and the effects of monetary policy in the macro data. meeting these two objectives simultaneously proved challenging. when economists studied the micro data underlying the consumer price index in the united states and other countries, they found that individual price changes are infrequent but typically large in absolute terms, in the order of 10%.[4] in their famous paper “menu costs and phillips curves”, mikhail golosov and robert lucas investigated the implications of this evidence for the effects of monetary policy in a dynamic equilibrium model with idiosyncratic shocks and a fixed cost of nominal price changes. when calibrated to match the average frequency and size of price changes in the micro data in a low- inflation environment, the model predicted monetary policy having a strong effect on inflation and a weak effect on output – that is a steep phillips curve, in contrast to the relationship found in the macro data.[5] the key reason behind this result was the “selection effect”. in a menu cost model, after a change in the policy rate, prices further away from their optimum adjust sooner than others. in the golosov-lucas model, this selection effect is … |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.175 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | global | 1 | 0.1291946 | globalisation | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 2 | globalisation | 2 | 0.0906577 | international | 2 | 0.9987727 |
| 2 | international | 3 | 0.0697889 | globalise | 3 | 0.9987723 |
| 2 | domestic | 4 | 0.0422625 | global | 4 | 0.9985084 |
| 2 | economy | 5 | 0.0276672 | imf | 5 | 0.9983348 |
| 2 | imf | 6 | 0.0176809 | domestic inflation | 6 | 0.9982902 |
| 2 | factor | 7 | 0.0156324 | global economic | 7 | 0.9978973 |
| 2 | trade | 8 | 0.0146082 | international monetary | 8 | 0.9977196 |
| 2 | affect | 9 | 0.0126877 | financial globalisation | 9 | 0.9975424 |
| 2 | change | 10 | 0.0110233 | global inflation | 10 | 0.9971054 |
| 2 | influence | 11 | 0.0106393 | international financial | 11 | 0.9969288 |
| 2 | global economic | 12 | 0.0103832 | global factor | 12 | 0.9967989 |
| 2 | good | 13 | 0.0093590 | domestic | 13 | 0.9961340 |
| 2 | globalise | 14 | 0.0092309 | spillover | 14 | 0.9960552 |
| 2 | spillover | 15 | 0.0091029 | capital flow | 15 | 0.9957894 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo: Globalisation, macroeconomic stability and monetary policy at a time of financial turmoil | Period_1 | 2008-09-09 | 0.261 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The governance of globalisation | Period_1 | 2008-05-13 | 0.235 | conclusion the phenomenon of globalisation entails many important changes to the global macroeconomic, financial landscape. associated with this, it entails many policy challenges – both in terms of domestic macroeconomic policies and the international financial architecture. at the domestic level, a key challenge for monetary policy is to actively monitor changes in the inflation process, while continuing to solidly anchor inflation expectations. the strong relative price movements associated with globalisation make a firm focus on price stability is as essential as ever. at the same time, such a sound monetary policy framework can lay the foundations for fostering benign economic adjustment so that the euro area realises the many benefits associated with globalisation. of course, policy challenges do not stop here – notably, greater microeconomic flexibility would also be essential to both allow our economy to take better advantage of the opportunities provided by globalisation, but would also facilitate macroeconomic adjustment in the wake of shocks and improve the resilience of the economy. at the international level, looking at the implications for the governance of globalisation, i believe that a key contribution that the institutions and informal bodies and forums in charge of global economic and financial stability make to strengthen the resilience of the global financial system is to foster information-sharing and increase transparency. it is the access to informa… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The governance of globalisation | Period_1 | 2008-05-13 | 0.214 | the governance of globalisation at the international level as i have already alluded, to ensure that the process of globalisation occurs in an orderly manner, the international financial architecture plays indeed a crucial role. it is the institutional foundations of the global economic and financial system, which deserve credit for making sure that the tremendous benefits stemming from the integration of national economies clearly outweigh the also existing challenges. while each global financial turbulence is different and has different triggers and repercussions – think for instance of the asian crisis of the late 1990s and the very significant global financial market correction of today –, such events have in common that they are really global. as such, they require, in addition to appropriate policy responses at the national level, also determined policy cooperation at the international level. let me take a closer look at some key international governance structures and rules that provide mechanisms for crisis prevention and crisis resolution in the global economic and financial system. my first focus is on the surveillance activities of the imf – in particular its multilateral surveillance as well as surveillance over exchange rates and exchange rate policies – and current efforts to adapt them to evolving needs. i will then share with you some thoughts on how the international institutions and fora are responding to the present financial situation and related episod… |
| Jürgen Stark: Contribution to the session on “Implications for the conduct of monetary policy” | Period_1 | 2008-03-11 | 0.211 | john taylor has discussed a number of challenges to monetary policy-making in an era of globalisation. in my remarks, i will focus on the implications of globalisation specifically for monetary policy-making in the euro area. 1 globalisation may change the environment for monetary policy-making we all agree that globalisation offers great opportunities. it increases the scope for efficiency gains through specialisation since it allows economies to make better use of their comparative advantage in international production. this reduces production costs and expands the production frontier, generating gains which are passed on to consumers through lower prices for many goods. globalisation thus fosters economic prosperity and raises living standards. at the same time, the gains from globalisation may not be distributed evenly, as globalisation can affect differently the returns to different factors of production. 2 to monetary policy-makers, globalisation is important mainly for two reasons: • first, the process of globalisation itself can occasionally lead to economic disruptions, especially if markets lack transparency. increasingly-globalised and internationally-integrated financial markets, for example, if not sufficiently transparent, can at times be conducive to excessive risk-taking and contagion effects – a theme that rings particularly true in light of the current financial turmoil. • second, and more importantly, increasing global integration induces structural chan… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.210 | higher quality of life it brings about, with very similar words as those keynes used almost a century ago to describe the heydays of the “liberal international economic order” before world war i. 2 on the other hand, the sweeping and relentless demise of physical and man- made barriers to the mobility of goods and services, ideas and people, is criticised because it supposedly also does away with necessary protections for disadvantaged workers and households in poor and rich countries, the environment and cultural diversity. all these developments have put globalisation at the centre of international policy debates. the european union considers globalisation to be “one of the major challenges” it is confronted with and defines the phenomenon as “the increasing interdependence of the global economy and ever-growing competition on international markets.” 3 the increasing interdependence of the global economy is also of paramount importance for central banks as it possibly affects, among others, the formation of international good prices, the inflation process, the valuation of assets, the cross-border constellation of capital flows, and international financial stability. i will touch upon some of the consequences of globalisation forces for price stability, and the implications and challenges for monetary policy. monetary effects of globalisation were already a topical issue in 16th century spain, during the establishment of global colonial empires, when large influx of silv… |
| Mario Draghi: How central banks meet the challenge of low inflation | Period_2 | 2016-02-05 | 0.225 | 1 most empirical results that find ageing is disinflationary have focused on japan, as its transition from aging society to aged society is one of the fastest (see, for example, jong-won yoon, jinill kim & jungjin lee, 2014. “impact of demographic changes on inflation and the macroeconomy”, imf working papers 14/210, international monetary fund). however, a recent bis working paper by juselius and takats (2015) contradicts the prevailing view: looking at low-frequency correlations, they find that a larger share of young or old cohorts is associated with higher inflation, while a larger share of working-age cohorts is correlated with lower inflation. this highlights how difficult it is to quantify the impact of this structural factor on inflation. see mikael juselius & elod takats, 2015. “can demography affect inflation and monetary policy?”, bis working papers 485, bank for international settlements. 2 inflation as a global phenomenon has been documented e.g. by matteo ciccarelli and benoit mojon, 2010. “global inflation”, the review of economics and statistics, 92:524–535. |
| Mario Draghi: The international dimension of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2016-06-29 | 0.198 | 1 inflation as a global phenomenon has been documented e.g. by m. ciccarelli and b. mojon (2010), “global inflation”, the review of economics and statistics, 92:524–535. measures of global economic slack are good predictors of national inflation in advanced countries, as shown empirically e.g. by c. borio and a. filardo (2007), “globalisation and inflation: new cross-country evidence on the global determinants of domestic inflation” bis wp no. 227; and in new keynesian open economy models e.g. by r. clarida, j. gali, and m. gertler, (2002) “a simple framework for international monetary policy analysis,” journal of monetary economics 49: 879–904. 2 imf estimates. 3 see ecb (2015), “the impact of oil prices on euro area inflation”, box 3, annual report 2014. |
| Mario Draghi: The international dimension of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2016-06-29 | 0.193 | such spillovers are not necessarily all negative for the global economy. on the contrary, by securing economic and financial stability in their own jurisdictions, advanced economies also help stabilise other economies through trade and financial linkages. the empirical evidence suggests that the net spillover effect of the measures taken during the crisis has been positive, especially at times – such as after the lehman crash – when countries have faced common global shocks. 7 at the same time, monetary policy has inevitably created destabilising spillovers as well, especially when business cycles have been less aligned. the large exchange rates fluctuations between major currencies, and the pressures some emerging economies have experienced from capital flows, are testament to that. this is not so much a result of the measures central banks have employed 8, but rather of the intensity with which they have had to be used. these negative spillovers have led to a revival of interest in the topic of monetary policy coordination. 9 but formal monetary policy coordination is complex, for well-known reasons. 10 central banks have national mandates, not global ones, and are accountable to their domestic parliament. this does not mean, however, that we cannot achieve a better global solution than we have today. we have seen, for instance, how divergent monetary policies among major central banks can create uncertainty about future policy intentions, which in turn leads to higher e… |
| Mario Draghi: Global and domestic inflation | Period_2 | 2015-12-08 | 0.176 | 1 inflation as a global phenomenon has been documented e.g. by m. ciccarelli and b. mojon (2010), “global inflation”, the review of economics and statistics, 92:524-535. measures of global economic slack are good predictors of national inflation in advanced countries, as shown empirically e.g. by c. borio and a. filardo (2007), “globalisation and inflation: new cross-country evidence on the global determinants of domestic inflation” bis wp no. 227; and in new keynesian open economy models e.g. by r. clarida, j. gali, and m. gertler, (2002) “a simple framework for international monetary policy analysis,” journal of monetary economics 49: 879–904. |
| Mario Draghi: The international dimension of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2016-06-29 | 0.142 | others, on supporting private demand through more growth-friendly tax and regulatory policy, and of course through monetary policy. the relative stance of stabilisation policies will differ across countries depending on cyclical positions. but the sign of the effect on global demand needs to be positive. similarly, structural policies that aim at raising participation and productivity may take different forms in different places, but they need to achieve the same outcome, which is to increase long-term growth rates and raise equilibrium interest rates. 16 here fora such as the g-20 can play an essential role in bringing about the appropriate alignment of policies. it is key that what is agreed in those fora is translated in the concrete policy actions. the disappointing outcome of the g-20 commitment to raise global growth by 2% with structural measures is one example of how intentions and actions can diverge. it contrasts with the more successful example that was provided by coordinated global fiscal expansion in 2008–09. such fora of course cannot bind countries into specific actions. but mutual recognition of their common interest can act as a form of coordination device. that common interest today is a faster closing of the global output gap, more stable global inflation, higher long-term global growth and greater global financial stability. and such an improved policy mix would help reduce unwanted side effects of monetary policy, since the burden of stabilisation wou… |
| Isabel Schnabel: The globalisation of inflation | Period_3 | 2022-05-16 | 0.171 | 1 1. kamber, g. and wong, b. (2020), “global factors and trend inflation”, journal of international economics, vol. 122, january; bianchi, f. and civelli, a. (2015), “globalization and inflation: evidence from a time-varying var”, review of economic dynamics, vol. 18, no 2, april, pp. 406–433; mikolajun, i. and lodge, d. (2016), “advanced economy inflation: the role of global factors” , working paper series, no 1948, ecb, august; and attinasi, m.g. and balatti, m. (2021), “globalisation and its implications for inflation in advanced economies”, economic bulletin, issue 4, ecb. 2 2. ciccarelli, m. and mojon, b. (2010), “global inflation”, the review of economics and statistics, vol. 92, no 3, august, pp. 524–535; forbes, k.j. (2019), “has globalization changed the inflation process?” , bis working papers, no 791, bank for international settlements, june; and auer, r., borio, c. and filardo, a. (2017), “ the globalisation of inflation: the growing importance of global value chains”, bis working papers, no 602, bank for international settlements, january. 3 3. see, for example, bobeica, e., ciccarelli, m. and vansteenkiste, i. (2019), “the link between labor cost and price inflation in the euro area”, working paper series, no 2235, ecb, february. 4 4. deutsche bank research (2022), “extraordinary semiconductor cycle”, 5 may. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.126 | spillovers the deeply integrated nature of the global economy implies that our analysis needs to incorporate international monetary policy spillovers. for instance, changes in the interest rate locally affects domestic consumption and investment, which in turn affects the demand for imports from trading partners, and hence output abroad (“demand channel”). via the financial channel, changes in the interest rates of major central banks can propagate across borders via asset price spillovers to bond yields, corporate earnings expectations and financial risk premia. since the bulk of cross-border capital flows are denominated in us dollar, as the us dollar plays a dominant role, and as us monetary policy is a key driver of the global financial cycle, us interest rate changes have more pronounced repercussions on the rest of the world, including the euro area. [22] this is also reflected in ecb staff analysis, which indicates that a fed tightening elicits large contractionary effects on real activity and eventually inflation in the euro area. these contractionary effects are, in fact, as large as the domestic effects in the united states.[23] overall, given the open nature of the euro area economy, cross-border channels are crucial in evaluating how our policy stance transmits to the euro area, while also influencing global economic and financial conditions. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-21 | 0.114 |
|
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.108 |
|
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-21 | 0.095 | the changing environment one of the most important macroeconomic stories of the past 30 years has been the rising interconnectedness of the global economy and its implications for global supply and demand. china’s entry into the global economy led to a massive increase in global labour supply. global supply chains became more unbundled and efficient, lowering inventory levels and reducing costs. and energy markets changed fundamentally as new producers emerged, notably us shale oil and gas, making global oil and gas supply significantly more elastic.[1] at the same time, globalisation allowed growth to become less beholden to swings in domestic demand, as countries could rotate demand towards the rest of the world when faced with domestic slumps. this proved especially valuable for europe in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis: between 2010 and 2014, external demand as a share of euro area gdp more than doubled.[2] these two forces meant that inflation became unusually low and stable. a floor under demand meant that major busts in domestic demand resulted in less volatile inflation. and elastic supply meant that major booms, such as the one we saw before the great financial crisis, did not produce serious inflationary pressures. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | dynamic | 1 | 0.0578222 | percent | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 3 | range | 2 | 0.0493111 | range | 2 | 0.9992111 |
| 3 | percent | 3 | 0.0386723 | wide range | 3 | 0.9989479 |
| 3 | macroeconomic | 4 | 0.0372538 | wide | 4 | 0.9988609 |
| 3 | wide | 5 | 0.0345940 | inflation dynamic | 5 | 0.9985981 |
| 3 | force | 6 | 0.0308704 | dynamic | 6 | 0.9985962 |
| 3 | inflation dynamic | 7 | 0.0218274 | force | 7 | 0.9979836 |
| 3 | reinforce | 8 | 0.0216501 | reinforce | 8 | 0.9978965 |
| 3 | focus | 9 | 0.0186357 | macroeconomic | 9 | 0.9968390 |
| 3 | assess | 10 | 0.0177492 | assess | 10 | 0.9967119 |
| 3 | contribution | 11 | 0.0177492 | mutually | 11 | 0.9964455 |
| 3 | wide range | 12 | 0.0168626 | bis | 12 | 0.9964062 |
| 3 | include | 13 | 0.0165080 | contribution | 13 | 0.9963602 |
| 3 | account | 14 | 0.0150895 | bis central | 14 | 0.9963533 |
| 3 | require | 15 | 0.0122524 | post | 15 | 0.9962764 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2004-12-06 | 0.120 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The euro area and its monetary policy | Period_1 | 2007-09-11 | 0.093 | 7 see j.-c. trichet (2006), “activism and alertness in monetary policy,” lecture given at the conference on central banks in the 21st century, organised by the banco de espana (madrid, 8 june). i expounded the reasons for sluggish productivity growth in the euro area in a recent lecture. see j.-c. trichet (2007), “productivity in the euro area and monetary policy,” special lecture delivered at the 22nd annual congress of the european economic association (budapest, 27 august). 8 fresh evidence on the underlying factors explaining growth in the euro area and the us has become available in the so-called eu-klems growth and productivity accounts database, the first result of a two-year collaborative effort by researchers based on 16 institutions across the eu to produce long and internally consistent time series for output growth, employment, capital formation and total factor productivity at a disaggregated industry level. the dis-aggregation of output growth by source which results from this analysis indicates that the average contribution of capital to value added growth in the united states was 1 percentage point in the first half of the 1990s, increasing to 1.9 percent in the second half of the decade, and stabilising at 0.8 percentage point on average between 2001 and 2004. in the euro area – excluding belgium, greece, ireland, luxembourg, portugal and slovenia – the contribution of capital accounted for 1 percentage point in the first half of the 1990s and 1.4 percent … |
| Mr. Duisenberg elucidates the European System of Central Banks’ stability-oriented monetary policy strategy (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 10 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-11-20 | 0.066 | there is a clear need for the governing council to look at a wide range of other economic and financial indicators. consequently, in parallel with the analysis of monetary growth in relation to the reference value, a broadly-based assessment of the outlook for price developments and the risks to price stability in the euro area will also be undertaken. this assessment will systematically analyse all the other information about the economic and financial situation, ensuring that the governing council is as well-informed as possible when making its monetary policy decisions. outside the escb, some commentators have labelled this broadly-based assessment an “inflation forecast”. failure to publish “the” inflation forecast is seen by some as contrary to the principle of transparency. i am afraid that both views are flawed. allow me to explain why. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Charting a new global landscape ¿ the growing impact of emerging markets on the world economy | Period_1 | 2007-06-04 | 0.065 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy and asset prices | Period_1 | 2009-10-19 | 0.058 | third, the recent financial crisis has confirmed that a central bank’s inability to identify in real time the precise mechanisms through which financial imbalances evolve and to anticipate the exact timing of their unwinding does not mean it is unable to identify the build-up of imbalances. in the run up to the crisis several policy makers did identify the under-pricing of risk as a major source of concern. in this context, let me mention that recent research – including research conducted at the ecb – has reviewed more systematically the implications for monetary policy of a more explicit role for financial factors in macroeconomic models. 14 this stream of research is still under development, but it does account for an endogenous interaction between macroeconomic conditions and the demand for and supply of credit. the main policy implication of this research continues to be that monetary policy should pursue price stability as a primary objective. at the same time, however, it is acknowledged that financial imbalances can generate sizable macroeconomic costs at times of crisis, when they can produce undesirable economic fluctuations. this justifies a very close monitoring of financial conditions. these new models also show that financial conditions have an impact on the notion of a natural rate of interest – the theoretical interest rate level which, if implemented by the central bank, would ensure that price stability is maintained. of course, the practical relevance of… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Understanding inflation dynamics and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2015-09-02 | 0.105 | introduction it is a great pleasure to participate in this policy panel with such distinguished fellow participants. in my remarks today i will discuss the general difficulties in dealing with inflation dynamics, but i will concentrate on the recent developments in euro area inflation and discuss their implications for monetary policy. understanding inflation dynamics has become particularly important in view of the low inflation regime now prevailing and because the traditional relationship between slack in the economy and inflation seems to have weakened significantly in some countries. |
| Philip R Lane: Interview in the Financial Times | Period_2 | 2020-02-03 | 0.099 | yes. i also think we should revisit the issue of energy prices. historically, i think the price of energy has always been very important in the overall dynamic. if the world does adopt more transition-friendly policies that means that the consumer price of energy trends upwards. that could be a force that contributes to inflation dynamics. the narrative of ‘everything inevitably low for longer’ – there is a lot of weight to that –, but i do not put all my probability on it. you should watch out for other forces. 9/9 |
| Vítor Constâncio: Monetary policy and the euro area problem | Period_2 | 2015-11-25 | 0.095 | the current economic situation in the euro area the euro area challenges are part of a predicament shared by other advanced economies: decades of declining economic and productivity growth rates, prolonged periods of low inflation and an untamed financial sector fuelling asset price booms. this constitutes a very challenging situation that cannot be solved by one policy area alone, be it monetary policy or any other. furthermore, issues in the euro area are more acute than in the case of other advanced economies. since 2008, the euro area has experienced a deep recession, a quickly interrupted recovery, another long, mild recession, and finally a slow recovery. euro area gdp per capita at the end of this year is expected to be 1.6 percent below what it was seven years ago, at the end of 2008. notably, growth outcomes in several member states have been much worse than this disappointing average. at the end of 2015, gdp per capita in italy is projected to be 10.1 percent lower than seven years before; 4.2 percent lower in spain; 3.4 percent lower in the netherlands and 8.5 percent lower in finland.1 at the aggregate level, the euro area output is now 20 percent below the level it would have achieved had the trend growth in the previous 15 years continued after 2007. admitting that the economy would grow from now on at that same trend, the accumulated loss of output until 2030, properly discounted, would represent more than three times the whole output of 2008. the crisis lef… |
| Peter Praet: Interview in De Tijd | Period_2 | 2017-09-20 | 0.093 | financed by banks rather than through financial markets. and if the creditors and debtors come from different countries too, you also have a lot of political tensions to deal with as well. in my view people don’t realise how serious the crisis was. i don’t think they realise that the world would have looked totally different – and dramatically worse – if central banks hadn’t stepped in so forcefully. the recent strengthening of the euro is making it even more difficult. our communication about the exchange rate is very careful. the governing council of the ecb has assessed that recent volatility in the exchange rate represents a source of uncertainty which requires monitoring with regard to its possible implications for the medium-term outlook for price stability. in the meantime criticism of the ecb’s policy is growing, because your policy is also doing some damage. i don’t think that the stimulus policy itself is being attacked. i do constantly hear people asking whether it is time to start tapering though. i understand why the question is asked. growth is back. the risk of deflation has gone. but the current economic expansion has yet to translate sufficiently into stronger inflation dynamics. what is your answer to those who think the ecb is interpreting its objective too narrowly and in the meantime causing unnecessary problems elsewhere? that our mandate is to ensure price stability. and the ecb defined ‘price stability’ in 2003 as ’close to two percent inflation in … |
| Philip R Lane: The ECB’s monetary policy in the pandemic - meeting the challenge | Period_2 | 2020-10-07 | 0.083 | [2] the june eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections expected average annual output to decline by 8.7 percent in 2020 but expand by 5.2 percent in 2021 and a further 3.3 percent in 2022. the incoming data have been broadly in line with our expectations: the latest september ecb staff macroeconomic projections see an output decline of 8.0 percent in 2020 and expansions of 5.0 percent in 2021 and 3.2 percent in 2022. [3] see also dossche, m. and zlatanos, s. (2020), “covid-19 and the increase in household savings: precautionary or forced?”, economic bulletin, issue 6, ecb. |
| Frank Elderson: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy - delivering our mandate in all circumstances | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.134 | and we will not ignore all this. to the contrary. we acknowledge that we cannot deliver on our mandate if we assume a status quo in which the world will not transition as the baseline scenario for the future. and by rejecting that status quo as the baseline, we are becoming a force that contributes to the transition. and we will continue to be just that: a force that contributes to the transition. within our mandate. and in the pursuit of our mandate. thank you very much for your attention. 3/3 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economy and the energy transition | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.118 | to counter the sharp rise in energy prices, many governments adopted expensive and broad-based support measures for households and firms. but these measures risk diluting relative price signals that are crucial to incentivise energy saving and foster green investment. instead, government support should be temporary and targeted towards vulnerable households and firms. this would also help to limit risks to fiscal sustainability. fiscal policy and monetary policy need to work hand in hand. in view of the normalisation of monetary policy, it is essential to achieve a good balance between supporting energy security and ensuring price stability, while keeping the green transition on track. 4/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.112 | still, these adjustment processes (the absorption of higher energy costs across all sectors of the economy, the impact of bottlenecks and the post-pandemic re-establishment of those sectors most affected by the pandemic) may still have some distance to run, as is also suggested by indicators of rising costs in the earlier stages of production before goods and services reach consumers. in addition, the process of adjustment in nominal wages adds a further dimension to near-inflation dynamics, both due to the overall recovery in the labour market and the adverse impact of unexpected inflation over recent months on real wages. furthermore, even after the adjustment to these shocks has been completed, it is important to assess whether this phase of high inflation might permanently re-set inflation expectations and thereby also affect longer-term inflation dynamics. chart 8 shows developments in nominal wages, including the information embedded in an experimental forward-looking wage tracker developed by ecb staff. this forward-looking tracker is based on the information for wage trends in 2022 and 2023 embedded in already-finalised wage settlements. the overall tracker indicates only sideways movement in aggregate wage growth at around an annual two percent rate.[4] however, if we focus just on the wage agreements that have been concluded since the start of 2022, these indicate higher wage growth at around 3 per cent in 2022 and 2.5 per cent in 2023. the front-loaded nature of… |
| Philip R Lane: Inflation in the near-term and the medium-term | Period_3 | 2022-02-18 | 0.109 | the carbon transition constitutes an important structural force that will be a primary contributor to macroeconomic dynamics in this decade and in the decades to come. the net impact of the carbon transition on inflation dynamics will depend on the exact transition path that emerges and the time horizon considered. in particular, the mechanical impact of the carbon transition on energy prices (which, in turn, will depend on the evolving mix between fossil fuels and renewables in energy production) must be assessed jointly with the implications of a sustained phase of transition-focused corporate, household and public investment. in particular, the impact on inflation dynamics must take |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy and the money market | Period_3 | 2022-09-15 | 0.103 | this inflation outlook forms the context for the setting of monetary policy. last week’s decision is closely linked to our monetary policy strategy, which stipulates that the appropriate monetary policy response to a deviation of inflation from the symmetric two per cent target is context-specific and depends on the origin, magnitude and persistence of the deviation. in the context of a long projected period with inflation far above target, the net upside risks to inflation and taking into account that the current setting of the key policy rates is still highly accommodative, it was appropriate to take a major step that frontloads the transition from the prevailing highly-accommodative level of policy rates towards levels that will support a timely return of inflation to our target. moreover, all else being equal, in calibrating a multi-step transition path, the appropriate size of an individual increment will be larger, the wider the gap to the terminal rate and the more skewed the risks to the inflation target. at the same time, it is crystal clear that the appropriate monetary policy for the euro area should continue to take into account that the energy shock remains a dominant driving force of inflation dynamics and the general economic outlook, including through the impact of the very significant terms of trade deterioration. in particular, the inflation dynamics associated with the energy shock component, to which the euro area is particularly exposed, are of a diffe… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | purchase | 1 | 0.1687192 | asset purchase | 1 | 0.9996496 |
| 4 | asset | 2 | 0.1074394 | purchase programme | 2 | 0.9996494 |
| 4 | asset purchase | 3 | 0.0837264 | asset purchase programme | 3 | 0.9994742 |
| 4 | programme | 4 | 0.0784569 | purchase | 4 | 0.9992986 |
| 4 | purchase programme | 5 | 0.0487944 | programme | 5 | 0.9988607 |
| 4 | asset purchase programme | 6 | 0.0290760 | app | 6 | 0.9986858 |
| 4 | app | 7 | 0.0279711 | cover bond | 7 | 0.9984225 |
| 4 | security | 8 | 0.0198118 | asset | 8 | 0.9976297 |
| 4 | ease | 9 | 0.0150522 | scale asset | 9 | 0.9975431 |
| 4 | expand | 10 | 0.0123325 | programme app | 10 | 0.9972837 |
| 4 | scale | 11 | 0.0110576 | ab | 11 | 0.9972395 |
| 4 | cover | 12 | 0.0092727 | scale asset purchase | 12 | 0.9971494 |
| 4 | bond | 13 | 0.0091027 | purchase programme app | 13 | 0.9969771 |
| 4 | cover bond | 14 | 0.0082528 | expand asset purchase | 14 | 0.9966638 |
| 4 | launch | 15 | 0.0079978 | quantitative ease | 15 | 0.9966266 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jürgen Stark: Central banking after the financial crisis | Period_1 | 2011-02-23 | 0.078 | adjustments by firms and households, set disincentives to governments for their efforts to consolidate public finances. 7 the ecb (like other central banks) faces a difficult balancing act between doing what is necessary to maintain a properly functioning monetary policy transmission mechanism and doing too much for too long, thus reducing incentives for market participants to make markets work as they should. in japan, the combination of zero interest rates and quantitative easing, while successfully containing liquidity problems of financial institutions, have had some detrimental effect on the intermediary function of the money market and on corporate bond issuance. 8 in our case, we saw that transaction volumes in the short term (eonia) money market increased and eonia rates were only moderately affected [slide 4: eonia rate/trading volume] when the amount of excess liquidity decreased after the expiration of the first (very large, €442 bn) 12 month ltro, indicating that the very generous liquidity provision through the central bank might have had a dampening effect on market activity when confidence between banks re-emerged. some of the very same measures that contributed to stabilizing the economy might unfold negative effects and become destabilizing if policy accommodation is not withdrawn in time. this is particularly true against the background of a recovery gaining momentum, increasing inflation pressures coming from commodity prices and improvement in financial… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Short address in honour of Axel Weber | Period_1 | 2011-05-03 | 0.051 | dimensions, the eurosystem benefited enormously from the bundesbank’s dedication to our common cause, and on both dimensions the bundesbank contribution found in axel its voice. the first task is financial supervision, the importance of which cannot be underestimated. for one thing, the information gathered in supervision has been particularly useful in the preparation of monetary policy decisions during the financial crisis. this has been especially true when and since the governing council of the ecb decided to introduce non-standard monetary policy measures to ensure the proper transmission of the monetary policy stance. the information also helps the governing council of the ecb assess the interconnectedness of national financial systems and vulnerabilities threatening financial stability in the euro area as a whole. in this context the bundesbank has done a crucial job in containing the fallout from the financial crisis. after the collapse of lehman brothers immediate and determined action was crucial to avoid a meltdown of the financial system in germany and the other euro area countries. the bundesbank under the leadership of axel offered the best possible diagnosis to protect the stability of the german banking sector at the height of the crisis. nonetheless, the financial crisis has revealed serious weaknesses in existing supervisory arrangements both at the national and euro area level. in response to these shortcomings, the eu among other initiatives has created… |
| Lucas Papademos: Tackling the financial crisis - policies for stability and recovery | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.041 | additional measures to support the asset side of banks’ balance sheets it may be necessary, however, in order to safeguard banking sector stability and restore an adequate flow of credit to the economy,, that these measures, which were aimed at supporting the liability side of banks’ balance sheets be complemented in certain cases by additional measures designed to support the asset side. various approaches have been considered, ranging notably from (i) asset removal schemes involving the removal of the “problem” assets from the balance sheets, through direct government purchases or by transferring them to “bad banks” or asset management vehicles; to (ii) asset insurance schemes that limit the valuation losses of impaired assets by invoking a government guarantee while keeping them on the balance sheets of institutions concerned, and (iii) including various hybrid schemes that combine features of asset insurance and asset removal. the appropriate design and the effective implementation of asset support measures require addressing a number of complex issues. past experience and the assessment of alternative schemes on the basis of a number of criteria, suggest that there is no single approach that would be uniformly superior independently of the circumstances of the financial institutions concerned. rather, the measures would need to be designed on a case-by-case basis and in a pragmatic manner. in fact, hybrid schemes have often been chosen as the most appropriate. the cho… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2009-10-01 | 0.041 | the assessment of low inflationary pressures over the medium term is also confirmed by our monetary analysis. in this context, we note in particular that money and credit expansion continues to decelerate. the annual growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate m3 declined to 2.5% in august, the lowest reading since the launch of the euro. as regards lending to the private sector, the annual growth rate of loans virtually stalled in august (at 0.1%). to a large extent, this development reflects the fall in production and trade and the ongoing uncertainty regarding the business outlook which has affected demand for financing. given that the pick-up in loans to enterprises typically lags the recovery in economic activity, further weak developments in loans to enterprises in the coming months appear likely. at the same time, lower market interest rates continue to be passed on in lower bank lending rates. this has led to a gradual improvement in financing conditions, which in turn is expected to support the demand for credit in the period ahead. it is against this background that the governing council views the current level of key ecb interest rates as appropriate. in addition, we have implemented five “non-standard” measures to enhance credit support, taking into account the major role played by banks in funding the euro area economy. 1. first, we have fully accommodated banks’ liquidity needs at fixed interest rates. 2. second, we have further expanded the list of assets el… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Real and nominal convergence ¿ policy challenges | Period_1 | 2007-11-21 | 0.037 | 20 ireland is ranked 8th and portugal 37th in the world bank’s ease of doing business index, which ranks economies from 1 to 178. the index is calculated as the ranking on the simple average of country percentile rankings on each of ten topics covered in doing business 2008. see http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/. |
| Mario Draghi: President’s address at the 16th ECB and its Watchers Conference | Period_2 | 2015-03-13 | 0.310 | believe that as our balance sheet grows more substantially under the expanded asset purchase programme, it will support a rebound of these measures. second, our policy announcement was largely anticipated. on 1 january 2015, 60% of surveyed experts attached a 65% or higher probability that we would announce a public sector securities purchase programme at our january meeting. and, according to various surveys, expectations were already quite high in autumn last year. these anticipation effects show up in the financial data. according to estimates, the impact of the asset purchase programme has accounted for most of the fall in euro area long-term sovereign yields since august last year. the same applies for movements in other financial markets metrics, such as the fall in long-term corporate bond yields of non-financial corporations. beyond anticipation effects, the announcement of the expanded programme of asset purchases itself also led to substantial further falls in longer-term sovereign yields. for instance, from just before our announcement on 22 january to the close of business the day after, german 20-year maturity yields fell by almost 25 basis points and italian 20-year maturity yields fell by almost 35 basis points. we also saw a further fall in the sovereign yields of portugal and other formerly distressed countries – in spite of the renewed greek crisis. this suggests that the asset purchase programme may be shielding other euro area countries from contagion, … |
| Mario Draghi: President’s address at the 16th ECB and its Watchers Conference | Period_2 | 2015-03-13 | 0.289 | believe that as our balance sheet grows more substantially under the expanded asset purchase programme, it will support a rebound of these measures. second, our policy announcement was largely anticipated. on 1 january 2015, 60% of surveyed experts attached a 65% or higher probability that we would announce a public sector securities purchase programme at our january meeting. and, according to various surveys, expectations were already quite high in autumn last year. these anticipation effects show up in the financial data. according to estimates, the impact of the asset purchase programme has accounted for most of the fall in euro area long-term sovereign yields since august last year. the same applies for movements in other financial markets metrics, such as the fall in long-term corporate bond yields of non-financial corporations. beyond anticipation effects, the announcement of the expanded programme of asset purchases itself also led to substantial further falls in longer-term sovereign yields. for instance, from just before our announcement on 22 january to the close of business the day after, german 20-year maturity yields fell by almost 25 basis points and italian 20-year maturity yields fell by almost 35 basis points. we also saw a further fall in the sovereign yields of portugal and other formerly distressed countries – in spite of the renewed greek crisis. this suggests that the asset purchase programme may be shielding other euro area countries from contagion, … |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy and climate change | Period_2 | 2018-11-09 | 0.256 | 30 see, for example, matikainen, s., e. campiglio and d. zenghelis (2017), “the climate impact of quantitative easing”, policy paper, grantham research institute on climate change and the environment, london school of economics and political science. 31 for details of the corporate sector purchase programme, see ecb (2017), “the ecb’s corporate sector purchase programme: its implementation and impact”, economic bulletin, issue 4, p. 40–45. 32 see ecb (2018), “purchases of green bonds under the eurosystem’s asset purchase programme”, economic bulletin, issue 7. 9/9 |
| Mario Draghi: President’s address at the 16th ECB and its Watchers Conference | Period_2 | 2015-03-13 | 0.251 | anticipation effects, the overall impact of our programme on bond yields was comparable in size to that observed in other jurisdictions such as the us and the uk. conditions also differ because financial structures differ. in the euro area, corporate debt financing mainly takes place via banks, as opposed to capital markets in the united states. there is, however, no reason, once the transmission channel is not impaired by banks’ poor balance sheets, why this difference should impede the effectiveness of a broad-based asset purchase programme that works through a multitude of channels. the programmes of both the bank of england and the bank of japan were effective and the respective economies are almost as bank-based as the euro area. one criticism is that we should have implemented our asset purchase programme much earlier. but it is not that we have not been acting last year. in a speech in amsterdam in april last year i laid out three contingencies that would warrant a monetary policy reaction. these were, first, an unwarranted tightening of monetary policy stance (e.g. from developments in short-term money markets) that could be tackled through more conventional measures. second, a further impairment in the transmission of our stance, in particular via the bank lending channel, for which a targeted ltro or an abs purchase programme might be the right response. and third, a worsening of the medium-term outlook for inflation, which would warrant a more broad-based asset … |
| Mario Draghi: Introductory remarks at the EP’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee | Period_2 | 2014-09-23 | 0.243 | features and risk management of the new programmes is the market for abs, in particular, sufficiently ample to allow sizeable purchases? our purchases will include a fairly wide range of simple and transparent abs collateralised by loans to the real economy. the total stock of eligible securities which is currently outstanding – held in investors’ portfolios or retained by the originating banks – is already sizeable. we are confident that it will grow as a result of our presence in the market. over time, as our purchases contribute to a normalisation in trading conditions, secondary market and issuance activity will expand in those segments that are currently inactive. as the experience of other central banks that have engaged in outright purchases of structured products can demonstrate, market size and purchasing volumes are to a certain extent co-determined and endogenous. will the new initiatives magnify the eurosystem’s exposure to risk? outright purchases will increase the size of the ecb’s balance sheet, but the additional risk exposure will be limited. under the abs purchase programme we will be purchasing senior and guaranteed mezzanine tranches. regarding senior securities, we would buy only those assets that are eligible for eurosystem operations. so, we have ample experience with managing and understanding the risks associated with this asset class. the assets to be purchased would satisfy high standards of transparency and simplicity and are also characterised … |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.212 | the forward guidance provided by the ecb on asset purchases and interest rates reflects the instrument hierarchy outlined in the strategy review. in relation to net asset purchases under the asset purchase programme (app), the forward guidance is that these will be maintained for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of policy rates and that these are expected to end shortly before the key ecb interest rates are raised. this forward guidance clearly expresses that net asset purchases are designed to supplement the primary role of the set of policy rates (in recognition of the limitations associated with the effective lower bound) but that net asset purchases would cease if the inflation environment no longer required the accommodative impact of policy rates to be reinforced. moreover, this also implies a clear sequencing: the end date for net asset purchases is naturally earlier than the date at which it would be appropriate to raise the key policy rates. introduced in september 2019, the guidance that net asset purchases are expected to end only shortly before the key ecb interest rates are raised provides the reassurance that net asset purchases would not be prematurely terminated. in relation to interest rate forward guidance, three key conditions should be met before interest rates are raised: |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.175 | monetary policy in recent years, the monetary stance of the ecb has been determined by a combination of policy measures: the low level of the key policy rates, rate forward guidance, asset purchases and targeted lending operations. the period of very low interest rates for banks in the targeted lending programme (tltro iii) is scheduled to end next month. moreover, as shown in chart 13, there has been a very substantial decline in the rate of asset purchases in recent months and the governing council expects to end net purchases under the asset purchase programme (app) in the third quarter. |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.169 | various combinations of tools could be used to achieve the desired policy stance. for instance, if we bring net purchases to an end but continue to reinvest the stock of assets purchased, our balance sheet will keep supporting the economy through what is known as the “stock effect”[8], but it will no longer provide additional accommodation. in fact, for technical reasons, the degree of accommodation it provides is likely to decrease over the coming years.[9] so the appropriate stance could in principle involve maintaining a constant stock of assets purchased under our asset purchase programme (app) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp). at the same time, we would be using interest rates to adjust the degree of policy accommodation – so long as this combination of tools remains consistent with inflation stabilising at 2% over the medium term. overall, this way of defining normalisation is consistent with our inflation-targeting framework. it is not about targeting unobservable natural settings for our instruments, or about preferring some tools over others. rather, it is about using an efficient mix of instruments to achieve the policy stance that effectively cements inflation at 2% over the medium term. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Asset purchases – from crisis to recovery | Period_3 | 2021-09-23 | 0.160 | interest rates: channels and implications for policy”, nber working paper, no 17555; andrade, p. et al. (2016), “the ecb’s asset purchase programme: an early assessment”, working paper series, no 1956, ecb; vayanos, d. and vila, j.-l. (2021), “a preferred-habitat model of the term structure of interest rates”, econometrica, vol. 89(1), pp. 77-112; and woodford, m. (2012), “methods of policy accommodation at the interest-rate lower bound”, proceedings - economic policy symposium - jackson hole, federal reserve bank of kansas city, pp. 185-288. 2 see also schnabel, i. (2020), “the ecb’s response to the covid-19 pandemic”, remarks at a 24-hour global webinar co-organised by the safe policy center on “the covid-19 crisis and its aftermath: corporate governance implications and policy challenges”, frankfurt am main. 3 see, for example, blattner, t.s. and joyce, m.a.s. (2020), “the euro area bond free float and the implications for qe”, journal of money, credit and banking, vol. 52, pp. 1361-1395; eser, f. et al. (2019), “tracing the impact of the ecb’s asset purchase programme on the yield curve”, working paper series, no 2293, ecb; and altavilla, c., carboni, g. and motto, r. (2015), “asset purchase programmes and financial markets: lessons from the euro area”, working paper series, no 1864, ecb. 4 see, for example, altavilla, c., canova, f. and ciccarelli, m. (2020), “mending the broken link: heterogeneous bank lending rates and monetary policy pass-through”, journal of monet… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Asset purchases – from crisis to recovery | Period_3 | 2021-09-23 | 0.151 | function and has thereby helped anchor long-term rates at current low levels by reducing the uncertainty around the future course of monetary policy. in the early stages of a recovery, however, forward guidance cannot fully substitute for asset purchases. therefore, forward guidance and asset purchases should be thought of as both substitutes and complements. they are substitutes in the sense that the main instrument to stabilise long-term yields at levels consistent with the inflation outlook gradually shifts from asset purchases to forward guidance, or from a compression of the term premium to managing the expected future path of short-term interest rates. they are complements in the sense that asset purchases can reinforce forward guidance. they can serve as a powerful commitment device to lend additional credibility to a central bank’s forward guidance by signalling that, in all likelihood, the conditions for raising policy rates are not expected to materialise any time soon. one reason is that investors typically do not expect a central bank to raise policy rates abruptly when it is still conducting net asset purchases. doing so would expose the central bank to significant losses on its balance sheets.11 thereby, asset purchases raise the bar for lifting policy rates, helping to raise inflation expectations at the zero lower bound. they reduce harmful uncertainty by making sure that central banks “put their money where their mouth is”. in doing so, they support the ce… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | good | 1 | 0.0747777 | lot | 1 | 0.9993867 |
| 5 | time | 2 | 0.0298943 | qe | 2 | 0.9982473 |
| 5 | question | 3 | 0.0253339 | happen | 3 | 0.9982470 |
| 5 | lot | 4 | 0.0234138 | bite | 4 | 0.9978080 |
| 5 | discussion | 5 | 0.0230538 | eurozone | 5 | 0.9978056 |
| 5 | happen | 6 | 0.0194535 | zone | 6 | 0.9974528 |
| 5 | people | 7 | 0.0182534 | discussion | 7 | 0.9971920 |
| 5 | decision | 8 | 0.0162132 | talk | 8 | 0.9971084 |
| 5 | europe | 9 | 0.0152532 | hope | 9 | 0.9966253 |
| 5 | matter | 10 | 0.0147731 | matter | 10 | 0.9964038 |
| 5 | economy | 11 | 0.0141731 | moment | 11 | 0.9963203 |
| 5 | start | 12 | 0.0124929 | read | 12 | 0.9962719 |
| 5 | understand | 13 | 0.0123729 | euro zone | 13 | 0.9961328 |
| 5 | talk | 14 | 0.0114129 | basically | 14 | 0.9959629 |
| 5 | qe | 15 | 0.0110528 | remember | 15 | 0.9959214 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mr Duisenberg reports at a press conference on the outcome of the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 8 Apr 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-04-13 | 0.143 | mr. duisenberg, i just want to ask if you could elaborate a little bit on the convincing structural reforms that you said you would like to see from euro zone governments and also if you feel that by cutting the rates in such a large step that you actually reduce the pressure on these governments to make these reforms? duisenberg: we hope that the contrary will emerge over time. convincing structural reforms relate to the following: we, and most other observers, are very convinced that the phenomenon of an unacceptably high rate of unemployment across the euro area, but particularly in the larger countries in the euro area, is due to structural factors and to inflexibility in markets for labour and in markets for goods and services and that monetary policy is neither the cause of that structural unemployment nor is it the solution to it. the solution to that problem has to be found in measures of a convincingly reformist nature in the labour and in the goods markets and we do hope that taking the monetary policy stance we have taken today will in the ensuing months increasingly focus the attention of policy-makers and the public on the real causes of the unemployment problem, because it will demonstrably become clear that monetary policy is not the answer to solve those problems. |
| Mr Duisenberg reports at a press conference on the outcome of the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 8 Apr 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-04-13 | 0.111 | question (translation): mr. duisenberg, this interest rate move has turned out to be unexpectedly large. do you believe that you are now at the limit which you can justify in terms of stability policy and how long will this interest rate remain in place if economic activity in the euro zone does indeed pick up in the second half of the year? duisenberg: this is something we have, of course, considered in depth. we wanted the move to be as convincing as possible and we were afraid that a smaller move would only have led to further expectations for the future, that this would only be a first step in a series. we have by all means possible tried to avoid that impression. in very parochial words, i am inclined to say - and i cannot say “do not quote me” here, i realise that - but i am inclined to say that we moved from 3% to 2.5% which is maybe a slightly, unexpectedly large fall, but i would like to add, and now you be sure: this is it. |
| Mr Duisenberg reports at a press conference on the outcome of the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 8 Apr 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-04-13 | 0.076 | europe. in december, although i cannot quote you directly, you stated, much in the same way as today, that following the cut in interest rates the situation with regard to interest rates in europe would be settled. it is now the beginning of april and we see obviously a further cut in interest rates. is there not the danger, mr. duisenberg, that this process is about to begin again and that, after a certain period, owing to a lack of willingness in europe and in germany, in particular, to bring about structural reforms, the whole rigmarole will begin once more and you will be forced, yet again, to cut interest rates? duisenberg: well, we do not see that danger arising from the level which we now have reached. we hope that our call - as i expressed it today - to governments to pursue a reform-oriented policy, to adopt structural reform measures in all markets, that that policy will get a new incentive from the measures we have taken today. if they do not do that - and it will take time, i admit that before you can pursue and effect policies like i have in mind - if they do not do that, then indeed monetary policy is no alternative. |
| Lucas Papademos: The adoption of the euro and economic performance in Monetary Union | Period_1 | 2007-11-28 | 0.075 |
|
| Mr Duisenberg reports at a press conference on the outcome of the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 8 Apr 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-04-13 | 0.073 | transcript of the questions asked and the answers given by dr. willem f. duisenberg, president of the ecb, and christian noyer, vice-president of the ecb i would be very interested if you had anything to say about the exchange rate of the euro, if the central bankers of europe seem comfortable with it. it seems that the strategy of the ecb is now, in light of today’s actions, a double strategy to re-invigorate the european economy. on the one hand, you got the exports boosted by the euro and, on the other hand, you got an interest rate cut to lubricate the economy as well. duisenberg: first of all, as far as the exchange rate of the euro is concerned, i always like to take a slightly longer term perspective than is normally done in articles and considerations about it. i would like to point out that, if you look at the rate of the euro, and look back to what we - in our jargon - call the synthetic euro, the euro that you can calculate before the euro was in existence, then you can observe that the rate of the euro to the dollar has been more or less stable at around a level of usd 1.08 to usd 1.10 from the middle of 1997 until early september 1998. in the middle of september it started to rise to reach a level of 1.16 at the end of the year, and that was the level at which we entered the euro era. after 1 january it gradually declined again in a few weeks to a level of around usd 1.08. so, we have no reason at all to be dissatisfied with that level. it is about the level a… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Bloomberg TV | Period_2 | 2017-06-21 | 0.403 | benoît cœuré: interview with bloomberg tv interview with mr benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the european central bank, and bloomberg tv, conducted by ms francine lacqua on 12 june 2017. * * * benoît cœuré, thank you so much for speaking to bloomberg tv. now, the ecb seems to be in a rush to exit this accommodative stance. how dangerous is lower for longer? thank you for inviting me. basically the thrust of what the governing council decided last week is to acknowledge the improving economic circumstances, to translate it into a revised forward guidance, because we have to adapt to economic reality, but also to give a sense of patience when it comes to rates being low: we are still not seeing inflation where we would like it to be; we’re still not seeing the criteria that we’ve set for inflation to be sustainable all being met. so you need a sense of patience here. how much of a nightmare is stronger gdp on qe? stronger gdp is good news. it’s unqualified good news. this has been acknowledged by the governing council last week, and that’s why we changed our communication to adapt to the changing reality. it also shows that our monetary policy measures are working. all the jobs that have been created in the eurozone over the last three, four years or so, a lot of them have been created thanks to the accommodative monetary policy stance, so it is working very well. now, we have an inflation mandate, so when it comes to the next steps we’ll have to focus on infla… |
| Philip R Lane: Interview with Sky TG24 | Period_2 | 2019-11-27 | 0.381 | riflessione che metta insieme l’esperienza di questi anni e guardi al futuro tenendo conto anche di queste obiezioni sui tassi negativi, sull’eccesso di liquidità. mi domando se c’è in programma di cominciare a pensare a una riflessione strategica. philip lane: i think it’s important to recognise that already the ecb has changed quite a bit, essentially from 2014 onwards. the ecb i think surprised many commentators by being so aggressive to tackle low inflation. the ecb has launched the sovereign bond programme. it has launched targeted lending, many innovations. even this year, in the summertime we clarified that the inflation rate of 1.6 is too low, so the discussion now is much more precise. we do not find it acceptable to have inflation around 1.6. so 1.6 is not close to 2. that is important. we also emphasised in recent months that we view the inflation aim as symmetric. so we care just as much about inflation too low as inflation too high. remember 20 years ago, the challenge was to convince everyone that we would keep inflation low. now the challenge is to convince everyone that we will make sure inflation goes back to where we’d like it. i agree with you; many people agree that essentially the last major review was 2003. it is time to take stock, look at this experience and also recognise what element is unique to the ecb, and what is a global issue. as you know, the fed in the us is in a review right now and many of the challenges are the same. alessandro marenzi:… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with CNBC | Period_2 | 2017-01-24 | 0.288 | no, we haven’t really-, we haven’t discussed the shape, the other modalities of tapering. that discussion will come, it’s not coming yet. but do you worry, given the environment in europe that you’re literally just going to have to keep up with the stimulus, that you’re not going to be able to taper, as you’re talking about? one strategist told me this week that we’re going to see negative rates for two to three years in europe. i mean, that’s a real problem. we’ll be able to taper when we have to taper. we still don’t have to taper. so we’ve got a lot of political risk, as well, in europe this year. the president of the eurogroup said to me yesterday he worries about political paralysis, politicians afraid of voters and afraid of markets. that’s a problem. it is a risk, it is a risk for us. i mean, the ecb is not political animal, we are not a political institution, but we operate in an environment where we need reforms to make what we do more efficient, and we need political bodies, policy makers, to be able to get their act together whenever something bad happens to the eurozone. and yes, the risk today is not that much political risk in individual countries. it’s a risk that the ministers, eurogroup, will not find the strength to unite, to put their heads together and act as one, if anything bad happens to the eurozone. so that’s a concern. the only answer is to-, step by step to make the eurozone stronger, and to create this sense of commonality, a sense of the need f… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Bloomberg TV | Period_2 | 2017-06-21 | 0.271 | stock of the progress that will support an improved path for inflation, and that’s a discussion that we’ll have again and again. so one lesson of what we’ve decided last week, is that the governing council wants to keep our forward guidance aligned with reality, and that’s going to continue. you’re one of the brightest minds when it comes to academic economics. why is inflation so low? is it structural, or is it just that we may be counting things differently? no, i don’t think it’s that much about the statistics. that may play a role, but it’s a lot about the changing structures of the labour market, in particular. this is a recovery which is jobs-rich. a lot of jobs have been created and are being created in the eurozone economy, but it’s a different kind of jobs. a lot of them are on temporary contracts, a lot of them are part-time, and this produces less inflationary pressures. there will be a time where they are consolidated into permanent, full-time contracts, and then nominal wages will start growing, but we’re not yet there. so it has a lot to do with the structure of the job market, and that’s certainly an area where we’re paying a lot of attention, to understand in detail the nature of the jobs being created. do you think the market understands all of these nuances quite well, especially when it comes to when you talk about tapering and exactly what kind of potential roads that may take? i think it’s very well understood. the markets have the example of the fed i… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2018-03-14 | 0.243 | now, going back to your first question, first of all i don’t think mr coeuré said flows don’t matter. or that the stock matters a lot more… draghi: okay, but you see how it makes a big difference whether they matter or they matter slightly less than stocks. the first time that a reference to stock was made was at the end of 2015 in a press conference i had where there was, i remember, a vast disappointment about the measures that the governing council had just decided and i pointed out that even though the measures were probably not fulfilling your expectations, we still had the stocks that were going to go up over the oncoming period of time. at that time, markets paid no attention whatsoever to stocks. now attention is on stocks. now, the reason is not that there is actually more than a trade-off; i would say that the two are complementary. and it’s normal that this should be this way. when the flows were huge and the stocks were small, the flows mattered more. now, gradually this has changed but this doesn’t [mean] – that flows don’t matter. in fact, flows at the present time matter a lot also because of the sequence that we have in our monetary policy decision that it’s cast in stone whereby the interest rate path depends on the dates of the net asset purchases programme. i think the discussion today showed that all four elements, including the reinvestment policy but especially the forward guidance on interest rates, are important. mr draghi, you’ve played down the de… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2021-10-28 | 0.126 | monetary policy decisions, but inflation took a lot of our time, and it takes quite a bit of the space of the monetary policy statement that you have in front of you. i would, by the way, add that our analysis certainly does not support that the conditions of our forward guidance are satisfied at the time of lift-off, as expected by markets, nor any time soon thereafter. so you asked me about this market expectations regarding lift-offs, and we look at all of that, but we really very deeply looked and tested our analysis of the drivers of inflation, and we are confident that our anticipation and our analysis is actually correct. president lagarde, you and many of your colleagues have pushed back against the idea that you need to tighten policy in response to the inflation spike that we’re seeing, but many of your global counterparts have in fact started doing so. so could you explain in what ways the eurozone’s underlying inflation dynamics are fundamentally different to those that we see in other advanced economies, or do you think that other central banks might be overreacting to the rise in prices? secondly, on the pepp pace, you decided in september to slow your pepp purchases to a moderate slower pace in the fourth quarter, but we haven’t actually seen that in any of the weekly data so far this month. so does this have to do with countering the effects of policy-tightening expectations, or how should we read this data? lagarde: well, let me start with the latter part … |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2021-10-28 | 0.119 | currently pushing up inflation. while inflation will take longer to decline than previously expected, we expect these factors to ease in the course of next year. we continue to foresee inflation in the medium term remaining below our two per cent target. our policy measures, including our revised forward guidance on the key ecb interest rates, are crucial to helping the economy shift to a sustained recovery and, ultimately, to bringing inflation over the medium term to our target. we are now ready to take your questions. *** president lagarde, thank you very much for taking my questions. i was wondering, because the markets were – well, everybody was anticipating that this meeting was all about inflation, so what have you been discussing, and what was on top of your agenda? was there at least a slightly different assessment to the nature of inflation, given that inflation is at a 30-year high now for the eurozone. my second question would be on the market expectation about the rate hike. economists were saying that the market has not fully absorbed your new forward guidance. perhaps you can tell us more about it and why the market is wrong to expect a rate hike already by next year. lagarde: thank you very much. actually, we talked about inflation, inflation, inflation. that has been a topic that has occupied a lot of our time and a lot of our debates. we went i think in-depth into analysing the factors that are driving inflation. we looked at, obviously, what is happening… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.113 | that is pretty precise as a commitment, but it is also a factor of how the situation evolves. so, if the medium-term outlook persists as we see it now, or even deteriorates – which of course we don’t wish, but it could happen – then obviously the increment will be higher than 25 [basis points]. and then we go further because we take a third step along that journey to indicate what we will do beyond september, which is also the anticipation that further rate hikes will be necessary on the basis of the data that we collect. just to make that perfectly clear, following up on your last answer: does that mean that if the inflation outlook is not cut back down to 2% that we will see a 50 basis points increase in september? you said that you wanted to increase the rates by september; does that mean all three rates? i don’t want to give a reading exercise because some of you occasionally comment on the fact that i read too much, but this one, i really want to read it a bit because it matters - and every word matters, including plural versus singular – to your point. what we say is: “looking further ahead” – so today we say that – “we expect to raise the key ecb interest rates” – the three of them – “again in september” most likely. “the calibration of this rate increase will depend on the updated medium-term inflation outlook.” and here is the important one: “if the medium-term inflation outlook persists or deteriorates, a larger increment will be appropriate at our september meet… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.113 | money it receives could be interrupted by this political crisis, so also threatening the growth outlook in the whole euro zone? my second question. very often in the last decade at least, the rises of rates on government bonds were caused by political crises. so if i’m not wrong, you mentioned the four criteria, and italy would meet these criteria at this moment. but this is, of course, a crisis which is caused by a political reason, by a political cause, a government crisis, self-inflicted by italy. would you think that this could be considered as an unwarranted rise of rates on the government bonds if it went on? the spread is already rising this morning. let me just remind you that the ecb does not take a stance on political matters. political matters are for the democratic process of each and every member state, and that is certainly the case for the country that you are referring to. differences in local financing [conditions] can legitimately arise. among other [reasons], due to the country-specific macroeconomic landscape, and that has happened in the past. so the governing council will make the assessment of whether a country meets the eligibility criteria or not at the time when it has to make those determinations. and it will do so having a threefold assessment, if you will. first of all, it will determine a comprehensive assessment of market and transmission indicators. there’s a whole range of such indicators. second, it will at that time evaluate the eligibili… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.090 | my second question is on financial stability because you mentioned it; you mentioned that banks will be facing credit risks increased due to tighter financing conditions. how concerned are you about financial stability in a war situation? i have to tell you that i’m concerned about the war, full stop. but your question goes further than that, of course. the financial stability side of the question, i will defer to my esteemed colleague, friend and vice president de guindos. the first one: yes, we are going to pay a lot of attention to data and we are considering data dependency as one of the key four principles according to which we will operate. obviously the quarterly projections that we produce are very rich, inform our decisions best, but we cannot be un-attentive to developments and to data that we continuously collect, both at the ecb and within the national central banks as well. so, we are not going to put ourselves in a straitjacket of only taking decisions when we have projections. de guindos: you know that in our statutory review we included a reference that twice per year, we would include financial stability considerations in our monetary policy making. we did it in december and we have done it now in june. now, here the message is quite clear: the vulnerabilities of the financial system in europe have been defined in our financial stability review. refer to problems in terms of valuations of financial assets, in terms of margins of the banks and in terms as w… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | measure | 1 | 0.2685666 | policy measure | 1 | 0.9995619 |
| 6 | standard | 2 | 0.0860239 | standard measure | 2 | 0.9995617 |
| 6 | policy measure | 3 | 0.0715573 | standard | 3 | 0.9994742 |
| 6 | monetary policy measure | 4 | 0.0514355 | monetary policy measure | 4 | 0.9993867 |
| 6 | impact | 5 | 0.0281573 | standard monetary policy | 5 | 0.9992988 |
| 6 | standard measure | 6 | 0.0280258 | measure | 6 | 0.9992986 |
| 6 | support | 7 | 0.0267107 | standard monetary | 7 | 0.9991236 |
| 6 | standard monetary policy | 8 | 0.0172416 | package | 8 | 0.9974154 |
| 6 | standard monetary | 9 | 0.0164525 | adopt | 9 | 0.9972834 |
| 6 | financial | 10 | 0.0163210 | implement | 10 | 0.9969770 |
| 6 | effective | 11 | 0.0161895 | standard policy | 11 | 0.9969735 |
| 6 | adopt | 12 | 0.0135592 | measure aim | 12 | 0.9965783 |
| 6 | provide | 13 | 0.0126386 | financial condition | 13 | 0.9964079 |
| 6 | ease | 14 | 0.0123756 | effective | 14 | 0.9964045 |
| 6 | implement | 15 | 0.0123756 | counterfactual | 15 | 0.9963612 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jürgen Stark: The global financial crisis and the role of central banking | Period_1 | 2011-04-13 | 0.145 | saw no merit in a central bank’s ex ante intervention to stem asset price developments, arguing that the policy interest rate was too blunt a tool to contain potential bubbles. 2. central bank response to the crisis and “the new normal” the central bank response to the crisis, by any metric, has been unprecedented. when tensions in the interbank market emerged in the euro area and elsewhere in august 2007, the ecb reacted swiftly by providing de facto unlimited overnight liquidity to limit euro area banks’ liquidity risk. as the tensions morphed into a large-scale crisis of confidence in october 2008, the ecb responded with a mix of standard and non-standard monetary policy actions to foster financing conditions and enhance its credit support to the euro area economy, all with a view to maintaining price stability. the standard measures essentially entailed a steep reduction of the main refinancing rate to a historical low of 1% over a seven-month period (october 2008 – may 2009). this was done in reaction to the weak economic environment and the associated change in the inflation outlook. the non-standard measures included granting banks unlimited access to central bank liquidity against an extended range of collateral with the possibility for banks to borrow liquidity at a broader spectrum of maturities, of up to 12 months. the ecb also intervened directly in some market segments that were dysfunctional, namely the covered bonds market. this was deemed important for the … |
| Lucas Papademos: Tackling the financial crisis - policies for stability and recovery | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.143 | financial system, and support the flow of credit necessary for recovery.” 3 in the euro area, as i previously noted, the ecb has already taken non-standard measures in the past by changing aspects of its operational framework to provide unlimited liquidity to financial institutions at a fixed interest rate against an expanded list of collateral. are these measures sufficient? or are additional measures necessary to secure price stability and preserve financial stability under the current circumstances? let me make three pertinent points: • first, the purpose of such measures is to improve the functioning of markets and the transmission of monetary policy when these are impaired by exceptionally high uncertainty and elevated risk perception. 4 clearly, the dysfunctioning of markets because of increased uncertainty and risk cannot be addressed by a change in the stance of monetary policy. • second, any measures that may be deemed appropriate to improve the functioning of markets and help stabilise the financial system may be taken independently of the level of policy rates. this is what the ecb has done in the past when it took “non- standard” measures. put differently, i do not see a dependence, or necessary sequence, between the level or path of policy rates and the possible adoption of “non-standard” measures aimed at improving the functioning of markets and preserving the stability of the banking system. indeed, a possible implementation of such measures can be seen as a… |
| Jürgen Stark: The economic crisis and the response of fiscal and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2009-06-15 | 0.130 | fiscal policy measures let me now turn to the fiscal policy reaction to the economic crisis. fiscal authorities in the euro area have demonstrated their willingness and capacity to act rapidly and in a coordinated manner in exceptional circumstances. it is important to distinguish between measures intended to support the banking sector and fiscal policy measures aimed at stimulating demand. |
| Jürgen Stark: The ECB’s monetary policy - preserving price stability in times of financial distress | Period_1 | 2009-09-08 | 0.121 | the phasing-out of non-standard measures when we consider the phasing-out of the non-standard measures, it is important to keep in mind why they were introduced in the first place. the financial turmoil caused disruption on the money markets, in particular after the collapse of lehman brothers last autumn. because the changes in our key policy rates affect the broader economy initially via money markets, we had to take a number of steps to ensure that our policy changes were transmitted properly to the rest of the economy. overall, we refer to the set of non-standard measures which we employed as our policy of “enhanced credit support”. let me first take stock of the effectiveness of our non-standard measures so far. overall, it is difficult to separate the effects of the ecb’s measures from the effects of other factors. spreads in the money market have come down significantly since last autumn and, together with the policy rate cuts, have brought about a substantial decline in lending rates to households and firms. there has been much focus on the subdued developments in lending in recent months, especially as our measures have been designed to support lending activity. these developments should however be assessed in light of their consistency with stylised facts of the business cycle, which in fact indicate that the recent credit developments appear to be broadly in line with the currently projected path for real gdp growth. furthermore, based on the past regularities, … |
| Jürgen Stark: Economic prospects and the role of monetary policy in the current situation | Period_1 | 2009-03-13 | 0.108 | central bank measures aimed at easing credit conditions have not been met with undivided enthusiasm. commentators have worried about a host of issues. will the expansion of central bank balance sheets ultimately lead to inflation? as central banks are seen as switching attention from implementing monetary policy by steering short-term interest rates to targeting the composition and size of their balance sheets, have they lost their instrument? have they become intransparent and unpredictable? with the measures put in place, how are central banks going to preserve their financial and political independence which has been so hard to earn? under what conditions and when are central banks going to unwind these measures? i can assure you, we have not lost sight of the principles that have successfully guided us in the past. the measures that we have taken and any additional measures we might implement remain strictly consistent with our responsibilities. accordingly they meet a whole range of criteria and they will continue to do so. any additional measures need to be consistent with our mandate and our principles. consequently, they can only be taken with the view to pursue price stability and to contribute to the preservation of financial stability. pursuant to this objective and the treaty requirements the measures must be compliant with the prohibition of monetary financing. in addition, the scope of such measures is limited by the need to contain the eurosystems risk expos… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges to monetary policy in 2012 | Period_2 | 2011-12-15 | 0.170 | of the economy and of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, we must intervene to restore our capacity to ensure price stability over the medium term. the ecb interventions during the crisis have therefore been entirely consistent with the principles of our monetary policy strategy and its medium-term orientation. the provision of liquidity to prevent a collapse of sound financial institutions during a liquidity crisis is also consistent with the broader escb’s responsibility to contribute to financial stability. this is in line with the provisions in the treaty, which gives the escb the competence, without prejudice to the primary objective of price stability and to the ecb independence, to support the general policies of the european union and notably to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the stability of the financial system.4 most central banks have performed such a role as financial lender of last resort to the banking sector in history when severe crises struck.5 nevertheless, the second fundamental issue comes to the fore, raising the question about the possible risk that the non-standard monetary policy measures may produce unintended consequences for the monetary policy stance. this concern has been in the mind of the governing council from the outset of the crisis. it has led to the adoption of a clear guiding principle in the implementation of non-standard measures: the separation principle. the sep… |
| Peter Praet: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy response to disinflationary pressures | Period_2 | 2016-04-08 | 0.143 | impact on financial conditions how do we know that these positive effects of our policy package are indeed occurring and that they are sufficiently powerful to achieve the desired outcomes? in terms of financial conditions, the evidence so far suggests that the impact of our policy has been substantial. since june 2014, we have seen a broad-based easing in money market conditions, long- term government bond yields, corporate and bank bond yields, bank lending rates to firms and households, and the growth of money and credit. using a number of econometric techniques, we find that without our policy measures, financial conditions would be considerably tighter today. events studies conducted by ecb staff give evidence about the central role of our policy package in the broader easing of financial conditions since june 2014. 6 a sizeable impact is estimated for long-term sovereign bonds – around 90% of the total fall in euro area yields. the spillovers to yields of other asset classes are significant, too, in the case of euro area financial and non-financial corporate bonds. while the stock market has overall underperformed in the period since june 2014, we estimate that without our measures stock prices would be notably lower. 6 for more on the methodology behind these estimations see ecb (2015), “the transmission of the ecb’s recent non-standard monetary policy measures”, box 2, economic bulletin, issue 7/2015. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges to monetary policy in 2012 | Period_2 | 2011-12-15 | 0.140 | price stability of the turbulent gyrations in financial markets’ sentiment led central banks – including the ecb – to bring interest rates down to unprecedented levels and to engage in a number of non-standard monetary policy measures. when entering these “uncharted waters” it was and very much remains of paramount importance for the central bank’s measures to be effective that market participants never doubt about their consistency with the overall policy framework. it is precisely because measures were taken in such consistency and in full independence that market participants have never come to doubt the ecb commitment to maintain price stability over the medium-term. ultimately, independence reinforces credibility, maximising the effectiveness of the measures implemented during the crisis. let me therefore dedicate most of the remainder of this speech to our non-standard monetary policy and how it relates to standard interest rate policy. |
| Peter Praet: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy response to disinflationary pressures | Period_2 | 2016-04-08 | 0.137 | transmission channels of the credit easing package our decision to respond to emerging shocks by rescaling our existing measures – rather than adopting new ones – has hinged on our confidence that those measures are effective in lifting inflation back towards our objective. this is based on two assumptions about the monetary transmission process: first, that our policy package has led to improved financial and borrowing conditions; and second, that improved financial and borrowing conditions have led and will lead to higher real activity, reduced economic slack and upward pressure on inflation. how justified are we in making these assumptions? in principle, the mechanisms through which our policy measures should boost the economy are clear. they are designed to work as a package, easing financial conditions through a combination of mutually reinforcing |
| Mario Draghi: Delivering a symmetric mandate with asymmetric tools - monetary policy in a context of low interest rates | Period_2 | 2016-06-08 | 0.133 | monetary policy and the economic recovery in the two years since our policy package was launched, we have seen the effects of these measures in practice. events studies conducted by ecb staff find that our measures have had a major impact on long-term sovereign bonds, and spillovers to yields of other asset classes have been significant, too, especially for euro area financial and non-financial corporate bonds. 5 our analysis also finds that our policy package has had a substantial direct effect on bank lending 5 for more on the methodology behind these estimations see ecb (2015), “the transmission of the ecb’s recent non-standard monetary policy measures”, box 2, economic bulletin, issue 7/2015 |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.094 | lending rate to non-financial corporations and the intermediation wedge ecb (mir statistics) and bloomberg. notes: the intermediation wedge is the distance from the base rate (three-year ois) to the realised lending rate, as measured by the observed lending rate for non-financial corporations. the latest observations are for january 2022. the impact of the pandemic monetary policy measures to assess the contribution of monetary policy to countering the pandemic shock, a natural point of comparison is the calculation of the adverse impact that would have materialised in the absence of the monetary policy response. the alternative path the economy would have taken without responsive monetary policy can be calculated by constructing counterfactual financial conditions and then feeding these into macroeconomic models. a first approach to calculating such counterfactual financial conditions is to employ pre-pandemic impact estimates of past monetary policy recalibrations in order to calculate by how much higher, for example, yields would have been absent monetary policy action. averaging across a range of models, ecb staff analysis based on this approach indicates that, without our monetary policy measures, euro area output would be 1.8 percentage points lower and the annual inflation rate would be 1.2 percentage points lower by 2023 in cumulative terms. |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economy and the energy transition | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.053 | to counter the sharp rise in energy prices, many governments adopted expensive and broad-based support measures for households and firms. but these measures risk diluting relative price signals that are crucial to incentivise energy saving and foster green investment. instead, government support should be temporary and targeted towards vulnerable households and firms. this would also help to limit risks to fiscal sustainability. fiscal policy and monetary policy need to work hand in hand. in view of the normalisation of monetary policy, it is essential to achieve a good balance between supporting energy security and ensuring price stability, while keeping the green transition on track. 4/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.048 | as to the policy instruments that can be deployed, the set of policy interest rates takes primacy and should be sufficient to deliver the two per cent target in scenarios in which the economy is not operating in the shadow of the effective lower bound and in which financial conditions are non- stressed. however, when the economy is close to the lower bound (either as a result of a sequence of adverse shocks or simply due to a sufficiently-low equilibrium real interest rate such that even the steady-state nominal interest rate is close to the lower bound), the strategy review concluded that monetary policy measures should be especially forceful or persistent to avoid negative deviations from the inflation target becoming entrenched. moreover, adopting forceful or persistent measures may also imply a transitory period in which inflation is moderately above target, since a persistently- accommodative stance that successfully lifts inflation towards the target may involve hump-shaped adjustment dynamics for the inflation path. in particular, maintaining some policy measures on a persistent basis acknowledges that a commitment to maintaining monetary policy accommodation into the future can partially substitute for sharper near-term policy easing measures. |
| Luis de Guindos: Policy mix of the future - the role of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.048 | subsequently, to combat steadily rising inflation, in december 2021 we started normalising our monetary policy by announcing the end of our asset purchases, in tandem with targeted fiscal measures aimed at mitigating the hardship of soaring prices for the most vulnerable households and firms. the scope and nature of fiscal measures needs to be different now than it was at the height of the pandemic, following a long period of too low inflation. fiscal policy should not stoke inflation. it needs to be temporary and tailored to the most vulnerable households and businesses, who are being hardest hit by high inflation. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.041 | : response to a standard monetary policy shock: comparison across models (deviation from baseline in percentage points) ecb staff calculations. notes: this chart depicts the impulse responses of real output and inflation to a standard short-term interest rate shock (normalised to 100 basis points) for the ecb-base model, the ecb new area wide model (nawm) and the mmr model. real output refers to the output gap as a percentage of gdp. inflation is in year-on-year percentage change. all responses refer to deviation from the baseline in percentage points. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | cost | 1 | 0.0792889 | competitiveness | 1 | 0.9994743 |
| 7 | wage | 2 | 0.0564848 | labour cost | 2 | 0.9993866 |
| 7 | labour | 3 | 0.0487243 | unit labour | 3 | 0.9992986 |
| 7 | competitiveness | 4 | 0.0472916 | unit labour cost | 4 | 0.9991234 |
| 7 | growth | 5 | 0.0366656 | unit | 5 | 0.9987734 |
| 7 | labour cost | 6 | 0.0341583 | cost | 6 | 0.9985084 |
| 7 | adjustment | 7 | 0.0304572 | ulc | 7 | 0.9976317 |
| 7 | unit | 8 | 0.0277111 | wage | 8 | 0.9974537 |
| 7 | unit labour | 9 | 0.0244875 | relative | 9 | 0.9971953 |
| 7 | unit labour cost | 10 | 0.0242487 | cost competitiveness | 10 | 0.9965767 |
| 7 | relative | 11 | 0.0205475 | labour | 11 | 0.9963974 |
| 7 | economy | 12 | 0.0189954 | ulc growth | 12 | 0.9963574 |
| 7 | development | 13 | 0.0180403 | relative price | 13 | 0.9959698 |
| 7 | productivity | 14 | 0.0163688 | price competitiveness | 14 | 0.9958342 |
| 7 | account | 15 | 0.0129064 | adjustment | 15 | 0.9956965 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Current challenges for the euro area | Period_1 | 2008-10-30 | 0.477 | iii competitiveness and unit labour cost developments in euro area countries having discussed the outlook for inflation and growth – as well as highlighted what are in my view the priority areas in which decisive progress on structural reforms is most urgently needed – i would now like to move on to another key challenge for the euro area countries: improving competitiveness. in this respect, let me elaborate further on developments in unit labour costs, 9 which i briefly mentioned a few minutes ago. a number of euro area countries have witnessed relatively strong increases in unit labour costs since the beginning of 1999. in particular, in cumulative terms, over the nine-year period from 1999 to 2007, a group of countries witnessed increases in unit labour costs of between 25% and 35%, well above the average euro area cumulative increase of around 14%. in spain, unit labour costs grew in total by around 26% over this period, compared with less than 2% in the case of germany and around 4% in the case of austria. differing developments in unit labour costs across the euro area countries from 1999 to 2007 appear to be largely the result of differences in the growth rates of compensation per employee. however, in a few countries, including spain, the cumulated productivity growth rate over the nine-year period of reference appears to have been outstandingly low, also contributing to above average increases in unit labour costs. persistent differences in labour cost developmen… |
| Jean Claude-Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2008-09-11 | 0.377 | intra-euro area competitiveness developments persistent inflation and wage growth differentials may occur in a monetary union, determined by catching-up processes and/or by sustainable trend differentials in potential growth across countries. however, if induced by structural inefficiencies, misaligned national policies including wage-setting policies or overly optimistic expectations, such differentials may be worrisome and may have important adverse implications for cost competitiveness of individual countries in the euro area. as national monetary and exchange rate policies are no longer available options within the euro area, it is important to ensure that the remaining mechanisms of adjustment to shocks function properly and that the build-up of imbalances is avoided. rigidities in price and wage-setting mechanisms or ongoing excessive price and wage developments may delay the necessary adjustments of relative prices to economic shocks and give rise to a prolonged period of relatively high inflation in some countries. this, in turn, could contribute to losses in price and cost competitiveness and an accumulation of internal imbalances within the euro area, which could also dampen output and employment. when looking at unit labour costs, it is also noticeable that a number of euro area countries which experienced significant increases in unit labour costs since their entry into the euro area, also show relatively high current account deficits. national authorities have… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The process of economic, monetary and financial integration in Europe | Period_1 | 2006-12-04 | 0.358 | and of each particular economy and help contain relative unit labour costs through increased labour productivity. they would facilitate price adjustments all over the euro area where we observe a level of price stickiness significantly superior to what characterizes the us economy. they would permit to improve further very significantly the functioning of the labour markets, increasing flexibility and facilitating the attainment of full employment at a high level of participation rate. all these effects would both facilitate adjustments between economies inside the euro area and contribute to an efficient functioning of the euro area as a whole in the context of increased global trade and global financial integration. 14 the relatively modest implementation of the agenda thus far has clearly shown how difficult it is to achieve reforms in practice. governments realise this and recently, the lisbon agenda has been refocused towards reforms targeted at raising growth and employment. d. the fourth element that would support sound economic management is the need to monitor closely unit labour costs and national competitiveness indicators. we know that in the interplay of the market adjustment dynamics the competitiveness channel is of the essence. we also know that the longer and more accute the period of “boom” would be, or, more simply, the longer the period during which relative competitiveness inside the euro area would deteriorate under the pressure of costs, unit labour … |
| Lucas Papademos: Inflation and competitiveness divergences in the euro area countries: causes, consequences and policy responses | Period_1 | 2007-09-13 | 0.310 | across euro area countries. this feature, which is not characteristic of the united states, may suggest that the underlying adjustment mechanisms in the euro area economies are not functioning as smoothly and in a timely manner, with potentially undesirable implications for the dynamics of economic activity and employment. to better understand the causes and consequences of the observed persistence of inflation rates across the euro area, we must look more closely at the inter-temporal and cross-border developments in the underlying determinants of inflation and growth, and in particular ulc and the factors that shape their level and evolution over time. what are the pertinent facts about the evolution and dispersion of ulc in the euro area? on average, unit labour cost in the euro area has increased at a moderate pace in recent years, largely thanks to subdued wage developments in germany. however, unit labour costs have grown at significantly different rates across the euro area countries (see slide 5). the cumulative growth of unit labour cost (for the total economy) in euro area countries relative to the euro area average ranged between +15% in portugal and -10% in germany over the period 1999-2006. nevertheless, the dispersion in ulc growth rates across the euro area countries has declined substantially over the last fifteen years (see slide 6). moreover, the size of dispersion, measured in terms of the non-weighted standard deviation, is in line with that observed in… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: What effects is EMU having on the euro area and its member countries (closing remarks) | Period_1 | 2005-06-21 | 0.310 | determinants of inflation differentials let me turn now to the determinants of inflation dispersion in the euro area. a first insight into the possible causes of inflation differentials in the euro area can be gained by performing an inflation accounting exercise, which breaks down the euro area inflation differentials, measured in terms of the gdp deflator, into their underlying determinants, namely internal factors – such as unit labour costs, profit margins and net indirect taxes – and external factors – such as import prices. this kind of analysis suggests that during the period 1999-2003 internal factors were the most important contributors to inflation differentials relative to the euro area average in the case of 9 member countries, while import costs played a major role in the case of only 3 countries: belgium, france and luxembourg. as regards the internal sources of inflation differentials, the most important component explaining the dynamics of gdp inflation has been the dispersion in unit labour costs. looking at the unit labour cost developments in more detail, the compensation-per-employee component was generally the most important in explaining inflation differentials. at the same time, productivity growth showed a relatively low level of dispersion across the euro area. this points to relatively significant differences across countries in those components of labour compensation that do not reflect productivity growth. in this regard, part of the differences… |
| Peter Praet: The European Central Bank’s fight against low inflation - reasons and consequences | Period_2 | 2016-04-11 | 0.174 | the costs of too-low inflation let me move to the second question about our policy: even if a re-anchoring of expectations around levels in the lower portion of the price stability range were to take place, why is that fundamentally a problem? the answer to this has two parts. first are the costs that come from the level of inflation being too low, both in the steady state and when dealing with the legacies of the crisis. second are the costs that arise from transitioning between different anchors for inflation, and especially when the original objective is not being fulfilled. in terms of the costs of too-low inflation, there are three main issues, each of which we emphasised when we clarified our objective in 2003. first, in the presence of downward rigidities, delivering an inflation rate closer to 2% than to 0% supports product and labour market functioning. on the product market side, it allows relative prices to adjust more easily across goods and services in response to shifts in aggregate supply and demand, which improves price signalling and resource allocation. at an average inflation rate of 2%, relative prices can realign around that level without producers necessarily needing to cut prices in nominal terms, whereas at lower inflation rates nominal downward rigidities are more likely to bite and hamper the adjustment process. on the labour market side, a 2% inflation rate provides an important margin of adjustment in the face of shocks. when demand falls and no… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy in a prolonged period of low inflation | Period_2 | 2014-05-26 | 0.171 | local factors to add to this, aggregate inflation has been dragged down by local factors linked to the sovereign debt crisis and the process of relative price adjustment in stressed countries. several euro area countries are currently undergoing internal devaluation to regain price competitiveness, both internationally and within the currency union. the crucial adjustments vis-à-vis other euro area countries have to take place irrespective of changes in the external value of the euro. this process began hesitantly in the early years of the crisis, largely due to nominal rigidities in wages and prices. the result was that adjustment took place more through quantities – i.e. unemployment – than through prices. stressed countries thus experienced a protracted period of declining disposable incomes and long-drawn-out price adjustment. in this context, several have seen domestic core inflation – that is, excluding the energy and food price effects i just described – fall well below the euro area average. for example, the recent overall fall in services price inflation for the euro area is almost entirely accounted for by price declines in these components in stressed countries. nevertheless, in the last few years relative price adjustment has accelerated in stressed countries. while this may also have initially weighed on disposable incomes, by creating a closer alignment between relative wage and productivity developments, it should increasingly support future incomes through … |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy in the euro area | Period_2 | 2019-03-27 | 0.170 | policy in the euro area has become mildly expansionary, with the aggregate fiscal stance expected to be –0.4% of gdp in 2019 after five years of being broadly neutral.9 and our forward guidance on monetary policy has been effective, as shown by the continuing easing of financial conditions since last december. the outlook for wages and inflation the weakening growth picture has naturally affected the inflation outlook as well. our projections for headline inflation this year have been revised downwards and we now see inflation at 1.6% in 2021. slower growth will also lead to a more muted recovery in underlying inflation than we had previously expected. reflecting the weaker outlook, market-based measures of inflation expectations have edged down recently. the fall in market-based measures has mainly been driven by a decline in inflation risk premia, a volatile component of overall inflation-linked swap rates, not by a drop in “genuine” inflation expectations. while a decrease in inflation risk premia may suggest that market participants assign increased prominence to lower-than-expected outcomes of future inflation, survey-based measures have remained relatively stable. we therefore remain confident that the sustained convergence of inflation to our aim has been delayed rather than derailed – meaning that we expect inflation to reach our objective at a later date than we previously foresaw. this view is based on our assessment of the resilience of the labour market and the… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges for global economic growth | Period_2 | 2014-06-02 | 0.152 | domestic demand has contributed to declining current account surpluses, rebalancing has also been aided by strong export performance. unit labour cost developments during the crisis have helped. in the past five years, the cumulative unit labour cost differential vis-à-vis the euro area fell by more than 20pp in ireland, 16.5pp in greece, 13.5pp in spain, and 9pp in portugal. yet euro area-wide potential growth has also declined. falling capital accumulation and labour utilisation have brought potential growth from a level close to 2% in the years preceding the crisis to less than 1% on average between 2008 and 2012.3 a recent study4 of the centre for european policy studies makes for sobering reading, suggesting that the prospective decline in the working age population (averaging 0.6% per annum until 2030) would translate to an annual growth rate of about only 1% to 1.5% until 2030. the long-term prospects of the euro area hinge, therefore, on generating a sizeable boosting of our productivity performance. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges for global economic growth | Period_2 | 2014-06-02 | 0.150 | spurring productivity growth and competitiveness yet improvements in financial system are not a sufficient condition for improved growth prospects. more needs to be done to spur productivity growth through reforms that foster innovation and competitiveness. a recent, positive aspect has been that stressed euro area countries have taken significant steps in this regard. by reducing unit labour costs relative to euro area partners they have improved competitiveness and adjusted external imbalances. in 2013, all stressed countries – except cyprus – registered a surplus in their current account balances. cyprus is expected to run a surplus in 2014. compared to 2009, the current account (and capital transfers) balance has improved by about 16pp (of gdp) in greece, around 14pp in cyprus and portugal and between 10pp and 12pp in ireland, slovenia and spain. although weak |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.274 | an example of this cost-push view of inflation is the increase in the minimum wage in germany, which takes effect tomorrow.[4] according to a survey, around 60% of affected firms said that they intend to raise prices in response to the increase in the minimum wage.[5] central banks have different ways to analyse and evaluate the relevance and strength of these two channels for the inflation outlook. despite its pitfalls, a prime tool for making such an assessment is the new keynesian phillips curve.[6] under this framework, firms set prices as a mark-up over marginal costs. because firms are forward- looking and change prices only infrequently, profit maximisation implies that consumer price inflation fundamentally depends on current and future expected real marginal costs.[7] real marginal costs, in turn, can empirically be related to average cost measures, such as real unit labour costs, which are defined as the ratio of real wages to labour productivity. using real unit labour costs as an indicator yields two important insights. one is that rising real wages resulting from stronger productivity growth will leave unit labour costs unchanged and will not put pressure on firms’ profits. it should, therefore, not lead to firms raising prices. the cost-push channel thus critically depends on future productivity developments. the second insight is that, from an accounting perspective, real unit labour costs are identical to the labour share of income. that is, for the aggrega… |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.150 | still, these adjustment processes (the absorption of higher energy costs across all sectors of the economy, the impact of bottlenecks and the post-pandemic re-establishment of those sectors most affected by the pandemic) may still have some distance to run, as is also suggested by indicators of rising costs in the earlier stages of production before goods and services reach consumers. in addition, the process of adjustment in nominal wages adds a further dimension to near-inflation dynamics, both due to the overall recovery in the labour market and the adverse impact of unexpected inflation over recent months on real wages. furthermore, even after the adjustment to these shocks has been completed, it is important to assess whether this phase of high inflation might permanently re-set inflation expectations and thereby also affect longer-term inflation dynamics. chart 8 shows developments in nominal wages, including the information embedded in an experimental forward-looking wage tracker developed by ecb staff. this forward-looking tracker is based on the information for wage trends in 2022 and 2023 embedded in already-finalised wage settlements. the overall tracker indicates only sideways movement in aggregate wage growth at around an annual two percent rate.[4] however, if we focus just on the wage agreements that have been concluded since the start of 2022, these indicate higher wage growth at around 3 per cent in 2022 and 2.5 per cent in 2023. the front-loaded nature of… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.146 | the credibility of the euro area’s nominal anchor. if long-term inflation expectations remain anchored, the risks of a wage-price spiral will be limited. this is what we have observed so far in the euro area. the ecb’s forward-looking wage tracker currently points to further increases in wages, but these are expected to remain at levels that are unlikely to set in motion a harmful wage-price dynamic. therefore, while a close monitoring of wage developments remains essential, at present the most likely outcome remains a further decline in real consumer wages and the labour share of income. our consumer expectations survey points in a similar direction. it found that households anticipate their real wages to fall by around 6% over the next twelve months (slide 7, left-hand chart).[17] |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.139 | firms’ efforts to protect profit margins may weaken link between labour costs and inflation the second factor driving a wedge between inflation and the labour share relates to the role of profits. unit labour costs account for a significant share of firms’ total costs and are hence central to the cost- push view of inflation. but the increase in other costs, such as the cost of capital or energy, is currently working in the opposite direction. specifically, the unprecedented scale of pipeline pressures means that firms may choose not to pass lower real unit labour costs on to consumer prices to protect their profit margins from higher energy costs. in some sectors, where producers have not been able to increase prices above the rise in costs, there could even be pressure on firms to actually raise prices, in line with the cost-push view of inflation. this is consistent with recent survey evidence. with pipeline pressures remaining significant, a still historically large share of firms in the manufacturing, retail and services sectors plan to raise prices further over the coming months (slide 8, left-hand chart). of course, such surveys say nothing about the size of future price increases, meaning inflation could still slow. however, the surveys do not signal a fast unwinding of price pressures on the back of the expected decline in aggregate demand. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.123 | for example, digitalisation could trigger a second wave of globalisation based on the virtualisation of services. it might lead to higher trend productivity, which could temper unit labour cost growth even as wage growth becomes stronger. and it could also shift activity more towards digital “superstar” firms that have considerable market power and whose pricing is less sensitive to the business cycle. !241 but over the coming years, there is also a chance that prices will be pushed up. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | central | 1 | 0.1556087 | banker | 1 | 0.9993867 |
| 8 | central bank | 2 | 0.1301372 | central banker | 2 | 0.9990363 |
| 8 | bank | 3 | 0.1089848 | policy objective | 3 | 0.9990353 |
| 8 | objective | 4 | 0.0587063 | inflation objective | 4 | 0.9982475 |
| 8 | banker | 5 | 0.0196131 | monetary authority | 5 | 0.9981595 |
| 8 | credibility | 6 | 0.0193916 | systematic | 6 | 0.9978968 |
| 8 | central banker | 7 | 0.0180626 | central | 7 | 0.9977169 |
| 8 | conduct | 8 | 0.0134113 | credibility | 8 | 0.9976323 |
| 8 | principle | 9 | 0.0128576 | central bank | 9 | 0.9972776 |
| 8 | authority | 10 | 0.0101997 | objective | 10 | 0.9971912 |
| 8 | action | 11 | 0.0086492 | bank credibility | 11 | 0.9971455 |
| 8 | policy objective | 12 | 0.0085385 | monetary policy objective | 12 | 0.9966619 |
| 8 | goal | 13 | 0.0080955 | track record | 13 | 0.9966257 |
| 8 | inflation objective | 14 | 0.0074310 | central bank credibility | 14 | 0.9964876 |
| 8 | control | 15 | 0.0072095 | explicit | 15 | 0.9959699 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The changing role of communication | Period_1 | 2008-12-18 | 0.239 | why did central banks decide to become transparent? prior to the 1990s, central banks were very much working on the assumption that monetary policy effectiveness is greatest when the central bank systematically surprises the markets. the old belief was based on the notion that a central bank would measure the success of its actions by the extent to which economic activity could be raised and maintained above potential. if rational individuals already expect a certain change, they adjust their behaviour to that expectation. and that means that a monetary policy change would have no effect. in the past fifteen years, however, two important developments changed the theory and practice of central banking. first, the assumption that successful monetary policy acts by surprises and is made by a sequence of isolated steps has been the subject of thorough theoretical scrutiny and is now close to oblivion. it became clear that policy-making by surprises and isolated steps will bear no lasting effect on the economy once the public recognises the intentions that motivate the monetary authority. a monetary policy strategy made of isolated actions with the intention of boosting output above potential is bound to lose effectiveness because the short-term inflationary impact of that policy soon becomes embedded in price and wage expectations. output and employment react in the very short-run, but in the medium term the economy suffers from a permanently higher inflation. the drive toward… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Central banks and the public - the importance of communication | Period_1 | 2008-11-21 | 0.237 | the old belief – embodied in the first proposition – that monetary policy is made of a sequence of isolated steps, disconnected from one another and possibly randomised owed a great part of its theoretical appeal to the notion that rational agents do not suffer from money illusion. the logic went that if rational individuals effectively adjust their economic behaviours to insure against money illusion – as indeed they are likely to do over time – then only a central bank acting by unexpected moves can claim some success in steering economic conditions. 3 but how is “success” measured? here is where the case for unanticipated policy actions – and the systematic retention of information that would support this policy – built critically on the second proposition: that a central bank would measure the effectiveness and success of its actions by the extent to which economic activity could be raised and maintained above potential. indeed, the time-inconsistency paradigm articulated by nobel-prize winners finn kydland and edward prescott, and applied to central banking by robert barro and david gordon, offered a positive theory for monetary policy-making by surprises. 4 barro and gordon showed that policy makers – under certain institutional conditions – might have an incentive to exploit the short-run trade-off between inflation and employment. in a world in which money illusion cannot last for long, such a policy is only viable if the central bank releases no hints about its ob… |
| Jürgen Stark: Delivering price stability - benefits and challenges | Period_1 | 2007-12-04 | 0.235 | maintaining credibility for the conduct of monetary policy a second guiding principle for monetary policy conduct is that a central bank cannot ignore the promises – implicit or explicit – made in the past, when designing present policy. in a world of imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality, the track record of a central bank is the only guide for the public to build a view on the true objectives guiding monetary policy, the authentic motives that direct its actions, over and beyond the official purposes that it openly professes. this conference assigns such practical principle of policymaking the theoretical dignity that it deserves. the central question here is how a monetary authority profoundly committed to the objective to which it is mandated, should incorporate in its rule-based behaviour past deviations of inflation from levels that it considers consistent with price stability. a critical aspect to answering this question is the degree to which the economy learns about the economic landscape, including the central bank’s own inclinations. it is clear that a scenario in which central banks’ inclinations and market views are perfectly aligned is unlikely to match reality. in fact, survey evidence about private sector expectations as well as the forecasting practice at central banks suggests that a considerable amount of learning takes place in the economy and that expectations seem to be quite heterogeneous among agents. under learning, the transmission of econom… |
| Mr Erçel discusses the monetary policy of the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 1999-01-08 | 0.199 | from the independence of the central bank governors on the governing council, one can infer a high degree of independence for the system. as i mentioned before, the ecb’s independence in implementing monetary policy towards the price stability objective can be ensured in this way. the second important characteristic of the ecb is its credibility. high credibility will increase the confidence of the public in the ecb’s policies and objectives, which in turn will help it achieve its primary objective. the most important ingredients of credibility are transparency and success in attaining its monetary policy objectives. for years now the central banks of germany, france and the uk have been earning credibility, and the confidence of firms, institutions and individuals in these banks has increased considerably. the ecb, established in an environment of confidence provided by the credibility of national central banks, believes its growing credibility will translate into confidence in its conduct of monetary policy. the third important characteristic of the ecb is transparency, already mentioned as one of the keys to greater credibility. transparency means openness about the ecb’s objectives, its policy implementation, its monetary policy deliberations and the forward-looking orientation of its policies. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Toward the first decade of Economic and Monetary Union - experiences and perspectives | Period_1 | 2008-04-29 | 0.167 | the ecb’s past track record let me now turn to the ecb’s past track record. guiding inflation and interest rate expectations requires not only precise and consistent communication of the central bank’s ultimate objective and the strategy, but also consistency between words and deeds. in the end, only a track record of monetary policy decisions can support the central bank’s credibility. looking back in time, the ecb is also gradually building up its own track record – something which, as a new institution, simply did not exist when we started operations. since its inception, the eurosystem has been tested by a series of events and challenges, some of which we shared with the other major economic areas in the world, and some which were characteristic of our european environment. thanks to a well-defined institutional framework laying down the conditions for a sustainable convergence process, the progressive integration of a number of catching-up economies is an enterprise, a mission, which the euro area – unique among the great economic powers in the world – has set for itself and to which it has successfully worked. euro adoption by greece, slovenia, cyprus and malta was smooth and technically flawless, despite the potential challenges that each enlargement round implicates in both operational and economic terms. some of these events are charged with formidable symbolic implications. for example, slovenia’s accession and rise to the union’s presidency has been only the mos… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy in the crisis - confronting short-run challenges while anchoring long-run expectations | Period_2 | 2013-05-23 | 0.242 | what i refer to as monetary policy objectives are the overarching economic goals of a central bank. for most central banks around the globe, these goals include – as a primary component – the pursuit of price stability. this objective is often complemented by ancillary policy preoccupations, such as minimising deviations from sustainable growth and financial stability. in the modern central banking universe that has emerged since the macroeconomic failures of the 1970s, no one would doubt that while price stability is a desirable medium-term goal for monetary policy. avoiding excessive economic fluctuations around the trend and minimising financial instability, however, often has a different status. these objectives are ancillary because they have more to do with the path to the medium-term objective – a path that should minimise unnecessary fluctuations under way – than with the medium-term objective itself, which remains price stability. that being said, central banks attach different priorities to these ancillary policy goals as they seek to steer the economy to its steady state. in the us, for instance, the federal reserve system has a dual mandate: maximum employment and stable prices. by contrast, the treaty on the functioning of the european union clearly specifies price stability as the primary objective for the eurosystem. i will come back to this distinction between the eurosystem and the federal reserve at a later stage. the conduct of monetary policy refers to … |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy in the crisis - confronting short-run challenges while anchoring long-run expectations | Period_2 | 2013-05-23 | 0.200 | interactions between the conduct of monetary policy and its objectives the success of a monetary policy strategy depends on the interaction between these elements: the more credible a central bank’s commitment to its objective, the more flexibly it can adjust its monetary policy conduct to specific challenges. there are two reasons for this. first, if expectations are firmly anchored by the central bank’s objective, short-term “innovations” in policy conduct will not induce market participants to fundamentally re-assess their anticipations of where the economy will stabilise in the medium term, when all the current shocks have dissipated. this is particularly relevant in crises when the central bank is prompted to expand its toolbox so as to confront exceptional circumstances. by contrast, without a firm commitment to its objective, the adoption of new, temporary instruments may be misinterpreted as a profound shift in the central bank’s overall strategy. and this can change the way society perceives the basic parameters of the monetary policy framework. inflation expectations – one prominent parameter of how the regime is perceived by the public – can become unanchored. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy in the crisis - confronting short-run challenges while anchoring long-run expectations | Period_2 | 2013-05-23 | 0.187 | i wish to thank fédéric holm-hadulla and massimo rostagno for their contributions to this speech. i remain solely responsible for the opinions contained herein. ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, it is a great pleasure to speak to you today. i would like to use this opportunity to reflect on a fundamental tension lying at the heart of monetary policy: a central bank’s success in ensuring macroeconomic stability depends on it having a credible commitment to price stability. and to build and nurture such credibility, it should have a track record of responding in a consistent, transparent and predictable way to shocks hitting the economy. at the same time, financial and macroeconomic disturbances are sometimes of a scale and complexity that they alter the underlying structural relationships between key economic variables. this, in turn, challenges monetary policy-makers to temporarily adapt their established strategies to a new environment without undermining their inflation-fighting credentials. the current crisis provides a salient case study of such a tension: starting with a loss of confidence in the solvency of certain financial institutions, the crisis quickly morphed into a broad-based impairment of private financial intermediation. as a consequence, the link between monetary policy impulses and economic aggregates – which is the structural relationship most relevant for central banks – was severely affected. confronted with this new environment, central banks… |
| Peter Praet: Speech on the occasion of the “Annual Danish Top Executive Summit 2013” | Period_2 | 2013-01-30 | 0.171 | introduction it is a real pleasure for me to share some thoughts today with such a distinguished group of business leaders. 1 it may strike you as somewhat paradoxical for a central banker to address such an audience in a conference where the main theme is innovative thinking. after all, central bankers have traditionally been stereotyped as conservative and, well, rather dull. i firmly believe, though, that in a constantly changing world, decision-makers need to develop and maintain a healthy degree of scepticism around whether their current strategies and practices remain fit-for-purpose. this holds for decision-makers in business as well as in the public policy domain. and it is particularly relevant for central bankers, who have shouldered large part of the responsibility to navigate the economy through a once-in-a-generation financial and economic crisis. in the first part of my remarks today i will contour some salient features of central banks’ response to the crisis. but i am sure that everyone here today is more interested in the future than pondering on what has been done so far. indeed, as the macroeconomic and business environment remains challenging, the calls for a rethinking of business models and strategic orientations become more forceful. this is also the case in the monetary policy-making arena, where new strategic aspects are being promoted and debated around the globe. in the second and main part of my remarks i would, therefore, like to focus on two e… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy in the crisis - confronting short-run challenges while anchoring long-run expectations | Period_2 | 2013-05-23 | 0.169 | second, a credible commitment to the objective allows a central bank to tailor the strength and timing of its monetary policy response more specifically to the shocks that hit the economy from time to time. macroeconomic disturbances can be broadly categorised according to whether they affect mainly the demand side or the supply side of the economy. in the case of a negative demand shock, both economic activity and inflation will tend to fall. typically, a financial crisis is one example of a negative demand shock: credit conditions are restricted, aggregate demand is restrained and firms are encouraged to undercut their competitors, thereby exerting downward pressure on inflation. to the extent warranted by the magnitude of the shock, the central bank thus faces an unambiguous policy prescription, namely to provide additional monetary accommodation. in the case of a negative supply shock, the central bank has a policy dilemma as economic activity and inflation move in opposite directions. a drop in productivity is a case in point: an increase in companies’ cost per unit of output makes production less rewarding, and thus lowers the amount of goods and services supplied relative to demand. here, the central bank either temporarily accepts higher inflation, or – in an attempt to keep inflation right on target – it reinforces the disturbance driving down output. but this trade-off is weakened when the central bank can credibly commit to its price stability objective. knowing… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.089 | the role of monetary policy the transition to the great volatility is not a pre-determined outcome, however. if the nature of the shocks changes – that is, if one of the factors that had contributed to the great moderation subsides – the other factor – better policies – becomes more important in ensuring macroeconomic stability. fiscal policy will play an important role in enhancing the resilience of our economies. governments need to adapt their policies to the risk of a protracted period of lower potential output growth. with debt-to-gdp ratios at or close to historical highs, spending should focus on protecting social cohesion and promoting productive and green investments that will help secure long-term prosperity and rebuild fiscal space needed to cushion future shocks. monetary policy, in turn, needs to protect price stability. what this means in an environment of elevated volatility and structural change is, however, controversial. because monetary policy operates with long lags, price stability is typically defined over the medium term, giving central banks some discretion over the extent and length of inflation overshoots that they are willing to tolerate over the short run. this discretion is particularly relevant in the case of supply-side shocks that tend to push prices and output in opposite directions. stabilising inflation is then no longer equivalent to stabilising output – the divine coincidence of monetary policy disappears.[15] such shocks therefore impl… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.074 | for central banks, these findings highlight the importance of communicating our monetary policy objectives effectively — an important consideration in our strategy review and in our decision to adopt a symmetric inflation target of 2% over the medium term.!““! another conference paper addresses this issue by presenting empirical evidence corroborating the hypothesis that central bank communication focusing on the goals of monetary policy actions is more effective than communication focusing on individual monetary policy instruments.!12! behavioural changes due to the pandemic |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.064 | however, an inflation increase due to a supply-side shock cannot be expected to significantly alleviate the debt burden over the medium term. ecb staff simulations show that the resulting decline in real growth, higher interest payments and deteriorating primary deficits would increase public debt ratios over longer horizons (slide 11, right-hand chart). rising interest rates as a result of tighter monetary policy or higher public debt lift up the interest rate- growth differential for a given rate of potential growth. the negative interest rate-growth differential before the pandemic helped to contain, or even reduce, debt-to-gdp ratios. the differential still stands near historic lows but is about to become less favourable (slide 12, left-hand chart). against this backdrop, current circumstances call for responsible fiscal policy. governments need to be clear that current budget deficits are backed by future primary surpluses, via either future higher tax rates or lower spending. if governments do not credibly signal their commitment to responsible fiscal policies, the private sector may eventually expect that higher inflation is needed to ensure the sustainability of public debt.[16] this would be the case if high unfunded budget deficits ended up eroding the credibility of the central bank to pursue its monetary policy objectives, endangering price stability.[17] if, by contrast, the central bank is fully credible – because it has earned a reputation of safeguarding pr… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.056 | uncertainty about inflation persistence requires a forceful policy response the first observation relates to how central banks should act in the current environment of large uncertainty. william brainard’s well-known attenuation principle suggests that central banks should tread carefully in the face of uncertainty about how their policies are transmitted to the broader economy.[18] there are at least two conceptual cases where the brainard principle breaks down. one is the existence of the effective lower bound. the best way for central banks to avoid the perils of a liquidity trap is to ease policy swiftly when a disinflationary shock hits the economy in the vicinity of the lower bound.[19] this principle has become a cornerstone of the monetary policy strategies of many central banks, including the ecb. the second case is when there is uncertainty about the persistence of inflation. when the degree of inflation persistence is uncertain, optimal policy prescribes a forceful response to a deviation of inflation from the target to reduce the risks of inflation remaining high for too long.[20] in this case, it is largely irrelevant whether inflation is driven by supply or demand. if a central bank underestimates the persistence of inflation – as most of us have done over the past one-and-a-half years – and if it is slow to adapt its policies as a result, the costs may be substantial.[21] in the current environment, these risks remain significant. unprecedented pipeline pres… |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.050 | arise upon a policy announcement (or in anticipation of the announcement) and are influenced by the expected future evolution of central banks’ asset holdings. empirical evidence suggests that stock effects account for the bulk of the impact of asset purchases and are likely to last longer (although assessing their duration is extremely difficult). conversely, within the academic literature, “flow effects” refer to those effects that emerge through the actual implementation of the purchases and generally reflect improvements in liquidity conditions and market functioning during periods of high financial stress. the evidence suggests that flow effects are typically contained and short-lived. it is notable, however, that the term “flow effects” has at times been used in relation to the high pace of asset purchase programmes carried out in response to the covid-19 crisis, for which only the envelope and duration were defined at the time they were announced. from this perspective, flow effects help to signal the central bank’s commitment to providing ample policy accommodation and reassure market participants about the presence of central banks as large and patient investors. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | country | 1 | 0.0744281 | accession | 1 | 0.9995617 |
| 9 | convergence | 2 | 0.0506685 | accession country | 2 | 0.9992988 |
| 9 | member | 3 | 0.0403577 | adoption | 3 | 0.9989487 |
| 9 | eu | 4 | 0.0312798 | erm | 4 | 0.9987727 |
| 9 | process | 5 | 0.0307194 | enlargement | 5 | 0.9986854 |
| 9 | accession | 6 | 0.0255640 | real convergence | 6 | 0.9979827 |
| 9 | adoption | 7 | 0.0187275 | eu member | 7 | 0.9979404 |
| 9 | accession country | 8 | 0.0170464 | convergence | 8 | 0.9977177 |
| 9 | criterion | 9 | 0.0134601 | entry | 9 | 0.9971079 |
| 9 | progress | 10 | 0.0130118 | eastern | 10 | 0.9970197 |
| 9 | challenge | 11 | 0.0125635 | criterion | 11 | 0.9968429 |
| 9 | enlargement | 12 | 0.0112186 | convergence criterion | 12 | 0.9966647 |
| 9 | erm | 13 | 0.0108824 | membership | 13 | 0.9955305 |
| 9 | adopt | 14 | 0.0107703 | eu | 14 | 0.9952512 |
| 9 | real | 15 | 0.0104341 | member | 15 | 0.9952497 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Looking at EU and euro area enlargement from a central banker’s angle - the views of the ECB | Period_1 | 2006-03-03 | 0.487 | euro area enlargement this brings me to the second part of my speech, in which i will discuss the path towards joining the euro area that should be followed upon accession. along this path, every team member can have their own style, as long as the style respects the rules. pre-euro-entry “euroisation” for example is not acceptable. i will now explain in more detail the process of monetary integration and the rules that apply to it. with the exception of denmark and the united kingdom, eu member states do not have an opt-out clause. the path towards euro adoption is embedded in a well-defined multilateral institutional framework and comprises three phases: • the first phase is the period from eu accession up to the country joining erm ii. in this phase, the respective member states continue to be fully responsible for their monetary and exchange rate policies. yet, eu member states are required to treat their exchange rate policies as a matter of common interest and pursue price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy. more generally, during this phase, member states are expected to undertake major policy adjustments – such as to implement a credible fiscal consolidation path and advance with price liberalisation – in order to already prepare for the next steps of monetary integration. • the second phase relates to participation in erm ii. as you know, the mechanism defines a regime characterised by fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates, with a mutually agree… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Presentation of the European Central Bank’s Annual Report for 2003 | Period_1 | 2004-04-30 | 0.440 | eu enlargement to conclude my statement, let me make a few comments on eu enlargement. besides the historic dimension, eu enlargement will also imply substantial benefits in economic terms, both for the new and the current member states. in the ten acceding countries, the prospect of accession has encouraged countries to pursue economic policies that have already led to substantial progress in macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms. this progress is set to continue, as the new member states will be subject to the eu’s overall economic policy coordination and surveillance framework. looking further ahead, full integration into the single market will increase growth prospects and thus foster the catching-up process with the current member states, mainly through trade and investment. at the same time, the new member states will be confronted with a number of challenges. one key challenge for the acceding countries will be to advance real convergence without putting current achievements in terms of macroeconomic and financial stability at risk. at the moment, the gap in per capita income between the current member states and most of the new ones remains large. also, in most cases, the process of catching-up in real incomes has been slower than initially expected. this stresses the need for prudent macroeconomic policies, such as those that lock in inflation at low levels, that preserve the soundness of the financial sector, that renew efforts towards fiscal consoli… |
| Christian Noyer: Challenges ahead - the accession process | Period_1 | 2001-11-20 | 0.430 | ladies and gentlemen, allow me to reflect on this question for a moment and explain why we hold this view. being small open economies, most accession countries cannot disregard exchange rate developments when making their monetary policy decisions. the exchange rate is generally a more potent transmission channel of monetary policy decisions than domestic interest rates, and it also plays a crucial role in explaining the pass-through to price developments in most accession countries. thus, in order to achieve further disinflation and sustainable growth, excessive exchange rate fluctuations need to be avoided. in our view, and this view is supported by our previous experiences with the ems/erm framework, erm ii provides a useful mechanism to anchor exchange rate expectations. at the same time, erm ii, with its adjustable central rate and its current fluctuation band of ±15%, provides accession countries with the same degree of flexibility as the ems/erm following the decision to widen the fluctuation band in 1993. this may be suitable for accession countries. given that accession countries still need to complete the process of restructuring their economies and catching up in terms of real income, the flexibility inherent in erm ii and its wider fluctuation bands provides accession countries with sufficient scope to accommodate these reforms. bearing in mind that erm ii constitutes a multilateral arrangement, and that it is consistent with the regional integration process in… |
| Willem F Duisenberg: The ECB and the accession process | Period_1 | 2001-11-29 | 0.416 | accession countries do not have to pay attention to progress in nominal convergence. on the contrary, a balanced monetary and fiscal policy stance and wage increases supported by productivity gains should favour the disinflation process of accession countries, and allow them to make progress on nominal and real convergence in parallel. as a specific topic that is of great relevance to the ecb in the accession process, i would like to mention the structure and functioning of the accession countries’ financial sector. significant progress has been made in restructuring and consolidating the banking sector over the past few years. this progress has been achieved through the large-scale privatisation of state-owned banks and the extensive opening-up of the banking sector to foreign ownership. this process has contributed to greater financial integration with the eu and significant gains in terms of efficiency and stability. however, the level of financial intermediation remains relatively low and the provision of bank financing represents a much smaller share of gdp in the accession countries than in the euro area countries. furthermore, the financial sector of accession countries remains dominated by the banking industry, as capital markets are not yet fully developed. from an ecb perspective, further deepening of the accession countries’ financial markets is needed to ensure the proper transmission of monetary policy impulses once they join the euro area, and it may also hel… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Looking at EU and euro area enlargement from a central banker’s angle - the views of the ECB | Period_1 | 2006-03-03 | 0.410 | • for the sake of completeness, let me briefly mention that, for those countries complying with the convergence criteria, more practical arrangements will have to be set in motion to prepare for euro adoption. once the ecofin council has decided that an eu member state outside the euro area can adopt the euro, the country needs to prepare for example the cash changeover and the full integration of its central bank into the eurosystem. it is important to bear in mind that the process of monetary integration, which i have just illustrated, is based on some general principles that guide the process. these are defined by the maastricht treaty and other key documents. one basic principle that i would like to draw your attention to is that there is no single trajectory towards the euro that can be identified and recommended to all eu member states at all times. this principle reflects the fact that most member states are far from being a homogeneous group of countries. the current eu member states outside the euro area differ substantially with respect to the size and structure of their economies, the present state of their fundamentals, and the monetary and exchange rate regimes that are currently in place. yet, diversity in economic structures and policies is not an obstacle per se to qualify for the euro. incidentally, this was also not the case for the current euro area countries when they adopted the euro back in 1999. in this context, another important principle evolves, n… |
| Mario Draghi: A central banker’s perspective on European economic convergence | Period_2 | 2012-12-10 | 0.283 | the framework for convergence with two exceptions, all eu members that are not yet in the euro area are expected to adopt the single currency on meeting certain convergence criteria. as you know, the treaty defines these criteria along three dimensions. the first dimension is the degree of nominal convergence with the euro area. this implies achieving price stability; ensuring the sustainability of the government’s financial position; realising sustainable convergence of long-term nominal interest rates; and maintaining a stable exchange rate between the national currency and the euro. the treaty also requires that nominal convergence is sustainable. this is not possible without it being underpinned by a high degree of real convergence. according to this second dimension, adopting the euro makes sense only if the economic structure of a prospective member has converged sufficiently towards the prevailing structures in the euro area. the success of the real convergence process in turn depends on the sustainability of the relevant policies. the challenges that we have faced since 2010 highlight the dangers that large and persistent macroeconomic imbalances pose, not only for the stability of domestic economies, but also for the smooth functioning of the euro area as a whole. we all know the dire implications of prolonged losses of competitiveness, excessive indebtedness and housing market bubbles. recognising this fact, eu members have moved towards stronger surveillance of … |
| Mario Draghi: A central banker’s perspective on European economic convergence | Period_2 | 2012-12-10 | 0.243 | the institutional challenge is the first major challenge with which we are currently confronted. we have already made much progress in addressing the challenge. but a great deal of work remains to be done. the economic challenge the second and complementary challenge is economic. the benefits of adopting the euro are greater the more consistent the economic structures of existing and prospective members are. convergence can be broadly defined as a process in which cross-country differences in economic structures are reduced over time. the success of the convergence process ultimately depends on the sustainability of the underlying policies. shortcomings in the process of convergence across euro area members have been at the root of the challenges we have faced since 2010. but i am pleased to report that progress in addressing those shortcomings is being made. external imbalances and fiscal imbalances are starting to be unwound. efforts to regain price and non-price competitiveness are bearing early fruit. deleveraging is generally proceeding in an orderly way, even though credit flows to the real economy seem to be negatively affected in parts of the euro area. debt is being reduced in some countries, while others are devising strategies to make debt reduction sustainable over time. and financial sector weaknesses are being addressed along with their links to sovereign risk. as i have said, progress is being made but much still needs to be done. the recent experiences of s… |
| Mario Draghi: A central banker’s perspective on European economic convergence | Period_2 | 2012-12-10 | 0.158 | conclusions let me draw to a close. the experiences of the past few years have shown that participation in a monetary union places important demands on national economic policies. euro area governments are hard at work responding to those demands. they are correcting macroeconomic imbalances. they are establishing a stronger framework of governance to keep countries on the path of sustainable convergence. and they are improving the institutional set-up underpinning monetary union. for those eu members that have not yet adopted the euro, the challenge is to achieve a high degree of sustainable convergence with the euro area. this requires credible commitment on the part of their central banks to achieve price stability and treatment of exchange rate policies as a matter of common interest. for the members of the euro area, the challenge is to achieve full compatibility of their economies with participation in monetary union. product and labour markets must possess sufficient adjustment capacity to buffer shocks while maintaining high output and employment. it is in this area that progress is most needed. as i have indicated, much work remains to be done – in both the current and prospective members of the euro area, and both individually in each eu member, and jointly across europe. but i have no doubt that this opportunity to continue progress will be seized and that together we will reap the benefits of sustainable economic convergence and lasting regional integration. th… |
| Mario Draghi: A central banker’s perspective on European economic convergence | Period_2 | 2012-12-10 | 0.139 | ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to be here in budapest and to participate in the annual anchor conference. i understand that this will be the last anchor conference for andrás simor in his position as governor of the magyar nemzeti bank. so this is an excellent opportunity for me to pay him a sincere tribute for his work here and as a valued member of the general council of the european central bank (ecb). in my remarks today, i would like to focus on the process of economic convergence in europe. as the experiences of recent years have made clear, this process does not end with a country’s adoption of the euro. nor does participation in the single monetary policy provide automatic delivery of convergence. i will first talk about the challenges facing the euro area as a result of shortcomings in the process of convergence and integration. i will then discuss the challenges of convergence for those members of the european union (eu) that have not yet adopted the euro. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Economic recovery and the new phase of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2017-11-14 | 0.111 | it is however also true that the present favourable economic environment, should be used to make progress in reinforcing the economic and monetary union resilience. this corresponds to the common interest of countries made closely interdependent by the single currency. reforms at national and eu level will be crucial to improve resilience to shocks, increase growth potential and ultimately restore a path of real economic convergence among member countries. thank you for your attention. |
| Christine Lagarde: Challenges along Europe’s road | Period_3 | 2022-05-16 | 0.064 | christine lagarde: challenges along europe’s road speech by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at the international conference to mark the 30th anniversary of banka slovenije, ljubljana, 11 may 2022 * * * it is a pleasure to be in ljubljana today to discuss “the road already travelled and contemporary challenges”. europe can learn a great deal from the journey of slovenia in recent decades. the country has faced and overcome serious challenges over the years: its independence from yugoslavia; joining the eu; adopting the euro; overcoming the crisis that erupted in 2013; and now the pandemic overlayered with russian war against ukraine. but time and again, slovenia has risen to the challenge and excelled. it has become an integral part of european value chains, with intra-eu trade accounting for over two-thirds of slovenia’s exports. it has shown resilience in the face of difficulty: for instance, its economy bounced back from the 2013 crisis to post robust growth rates before the pandemic. what proved crucial was slovenia’s steadfast commitment to its goal, as well as its flexibility to travel the journey towards the heart of europe. commitment and flexibility are the two yardsticks that i will apply to two challenging episodes that the whole of europe, and particularly the euro area including slovenia, has faced in the last decade. in that period, europe has faced repeated shocks, each one different. in this respect, we can sympathise with the w… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.049 | in particular, under the next generation eu (ngeu) programme a european fiscal instrument was created with the necessary resources to support the recovery.[12] the interventions were based on national recovery and resilience plans detailing reform and investment strategies consistent with shared objectives at european level, such as the green and digital transitions.[13] high debt countries, such as italy and spain, obtained european resources amounting, respectively, to 11% and 6% of gdp. this created the basis for a european social contract for exiting the pandemic: eu member states committed to make their economies more competitive in exchange for european funding.[14] in this way, not only would ngeu enhance medium-term growth prospects but it would also contribute to convergence. through its allocation key, ngeu supports growth in those eu member states hardest hit by the pandemic and with below-average gdp per capita in particular. in so doing, it improves debt sustainability and contributes to fiscal convergence.[15] and by stabilising markets, it has supported a faster-than-expected recovery for all member states. in the process, two paradigm shifts have occurred. first, the new european common fiscal instruments were designed with explicit recognition that the eu is more than the sum of its parts. funded collectively, the ngeu package has created a critical fiscal policy space akin to the federal budget support existing in other economies. this reflected the growi… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.044 | after the treaty of rome, the development of the european project contributed to economic growth in the member states for many years: the progressive abolition of customs tariffs favoured specialisation, made it possible to reap the benefits of economies of scale, and stimulated efficiency and competition, with positive effects on employment and welfare. empirical estimates find that without the single market, our real gdp per capita would be around one-fifth lower today.[2] the european economic community subsequently evolved into the european union, becoming an area where europeans work together on a wide set of policies and enjoy freedom and peace. in 1999 we went one step further with emu. this was a logical step to buttress the single market: the euro eliminates exchange rate risk, facilitates trade and supports confidence in price stability. intra- euro area exports have increased by more than a quarter as a share of gdp since 1999.[3] and firms’ integration in value chains is three times tighter within europe than with the rest of the world. in fact, the regional integration of supply linkages in europe is higher than in any other continent and has continued to increase in recent years.[4] thanks to its size, emu has the economic firepower that gives it policy autonomy and the instruments required to react to external shocks.[5] it also puts the second most important global currency at our disposal. as the experience of recent weeks shows, this is a key ingredient o… |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.041 | furthermore, very good progress has been made as regards the imf’s new resilience and sustainability trust (rst), which has now become operational. for contributions by eu national central banks, it is essential that claims on the rst maintain reserve asset quality. in our assessment, the modalities of the loan and deposit accounts of the rst, as well as the deposit and investment account of the poverty reduction and growth trust, are acceptable in that regard. however, we note that the channelling of special drawing rights by eu national central banks to multilateral development banks or individual countries would not be compatible with the eu’s legal framework. |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.041 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | risk | 1 | 0.0764398 | leverage | 1 | 0.9989479 |
| 10 | bank | 2 | 0.0760306 | financial institution | 2 | 0.9980724 |
| 10 | financial | 3 | 0.0683569 | risk management | 3 | 0.9979809 |
| 10 | credit | 4 | 0.0263053 | exposure | 4 | 0.9976336 |
| 10 | institution | 5 | 0.0220080 | business model | 5 | 0.9974545 |
| 10 | asset | 6 | 0.0204733 | valuation | 6 | 0.9966696 |
| 10 | capital | 7 | 0.0182224 | default | 7 | 0.9965757 |
| 10 | increase | 8 | 0.0173015 | management | 8 | 0.9964936 |
| 10 | fund | 9 | 0.0170969 | financial intermediary | 9 | 0.9961340 |
| 10 | sector | 10 | 0.0169946 | hedge | 10 | 0.9957857 |
| 10 | liquidity | 11 | 0.0161761 | credit risk | 11 | 0.9955317 |
| 10 | leverage | 12 | 0.0138228 | intermediary | 12 | 0.9953518 |
| 10 | management | 13 | 0.0133112 | institution | 13 | 0.9952526 |
| 10 | financial institution | 14 | 0.0130043 | profitability | 14 | 0.9950918 |
| 10 | market | 15 | 0.0123904 | financial instrument | 15 | 0.9946042 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jürgen Stark: Issues paper for the conference “The financial crisis and its consequences for the world economy” | Period_1 | 2008-12-16 | 0.424 | intermediation. rather than holding the credits they originated, credit institutions increasingly sold them off – possibly after repackaging them – to the capital market. the advocators of the new financial instruments praised them as facilitators of an efficient distribution of risk. however, these instruments do not eliminate credit risk. therefore, the high speed of innovation and the instruments’ increasing complexity as well as the exploding trade also pointed to potential weaknesses that required significant vigilance by all parties involved, i.e. originators, investors, rating agencies and supervisors. thus, “creative destruction” turned into “destructive creation”. however, the crisis proves that the institutional framework has not kept pace with the fast speed of innovation. in particular, the lack of adequate checks and balances at all levels of control has led to increased vulnerabilities and risks. • financial institutions: weak risk and liquidity management frameworks; specifically, management and supervisory boards of the financial institutions did not live up to their ultimate responsibilities as regards risk management; risk management models did not keep pace with the increasing complexity of financial instruments and did not properly take into account the potential illiquidity of some market segments. • rating agencies and external auditors: their models and assessments failed to adequately evaluate the financial risks attached to financial innovations. •… |
| Lucas Papademos: Globalisation and central bank policies | Period_1 | 2008-01-25 | 0.399 | market adjustment is still ongoing. nevertheless, i would like to highlight four areas that are also pertinent to the issues of financial integration and development we are discussing. • first, the underlying causes and triggers are to be found in the price dynamics of the us housing market and the excesses and shortcomings (in the practices) in the us sub-prime mortgage market. so, a main determining factor of the financial market turbulence is that same one – property price overvaluation – that characterised previous episodes, as emphasised by kenneth rogoff. • second, weaknesses in the functioning of the market for structured finance products. these included valuation uncertainties due to the complexity of many products, the imperfect information available about the underlying asset characteristics, inadequate appreciation by investors of the embedded risks, and excessive reliance on the ratings of such products by credit rating agencies. • third, weaknesses in the implementation of the “originate-and-distribute” model by banks and in the chain of distribution and acquisition of credit risks. these shortcomings included inappropriate incentive structures for banks, as well as other financial entities and agents in the securitisation process, which fostered moral hazard and contributed to the inadequate assessment and management of credit and funding-liquidity risk. • fourth, the role and features of new financial entities – the off-balance sheet conduits and structured … |
| Lucas Papademos: Globalisation and central bank policies | Period_1 | 2008-01-25 | 0.397 | globalisation on the financial system – its efficiency and stability – it is important to keep in mind the role of the other factors, e.g. financial innovation, new business models, risk management practices, which have simultaneously exerted a significant impact on the functioning of financial markets and institutions. the securitisation of bank loans and the development of credit risk transfer (crt) instruments and complex structured finance products have fundamentally changed the functioning of the financial system and the distribution of risk across sectors and borders. since the mid-1980s, an unprecedented growth in the development and issuance of new financial market instruments has allowed the transfer of risks across market participants also in connection with previously relatively illiquid assets like bank loans and mortgages. while initially the focus was on transferring market risk, credit risk transfer instruments have increasingly gained in importance since the 1990s. 13 with respect to securitisation, this development can best be described by pointing out that the outstanding value of us agency mortgage-backed securities grew from about 100 billion us dollars in 1980 to about 4 trillion dollars in 2006 [chart 9]. annual securitisation is about 3 trillion us dollars a year in the us and about 500 billion euro in europe. in both areas, mortgage-backed securities account for the bulk of the total. with respect to credit risk transfer instruments, the increase in… |
| Jürgen Stark: Issues paper for the conference “The financial crisis and its consequences for the world economy” | Period_1 | 2008-12-16 | 0.357 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: Issues paper for the conference “The financial crisis and its consequences for the world economy” | Period_1 | 2008-12-16 | 0.352 | • not cover all possible states of nature but rather provide automatic stabilisers for the financial system in general term; • strengthen incentives that improve the disciplining forces of competition; • discourage “short-termism” and promote a medium to long-term attitude of financial agents towards success and stability; • not prevent financial innovation as it is important for growth and employment; • but strengthen at the same time the concept of liability and responsibility. it must be clear for those who engage in risky activities that they will be held accountable if these risks materialise. there are already some important initiatives that provide some guidance for consistent regulatory standards on an international basis: • the g20 has approved a set of international standards and codes for a sound regulatory framework. however, implementation is lagging behind. • the financial stability forum has already developed recommendations for the resilience of markets and institutions that have caused the financial turmoil. there are in particular five areas of concern that should be addressed to strengthen the institutional framework for the financial sector: • risk management of banks: both bank management and supervisors will have to play a more active role in scrutinising risk management practices (internal checks and balances, clear lines of responsibilities, etc.), especially with regard to off- balance sheet entities and structured products. this should hold true n… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Monetary policy and the European recovery | Period_2 | 2015-06-02 | 0.270 | in a single currency area, macro-prudential policies are particularly important to deal with sectoral and regional risks that cannot be accounted for by a common monetary policy. measures such as the caps on loan-to-value (ltv) or debt-to-income (dti) ratios are suitable instruments to address these developments. in this context, recent research suggests that exposure-based measures, such as ltv and dti could be more efficient than capital-based measures. on the other hand, they may generate important cross-border spill- overs and leakages, and moreover, are now solely in the remit of national authorities. implementing them will therefore require co-ordination and the ecb will play an active role to facilitate this in the euro area. now, the present tools of macroprudential policy are mostly focused on the banking sector while important risks are emerging from the steadily growing shadow banking sector. the sector is engaged in maturity transformation and, while mostly funded via equity, shadow banks are also subject to the short-term redemption risk. if they experience substantial redemptions, they may, like banks, be forced to promptly sell assets to fulfil their obligations, which may give rise to fire sales. this is particularly worrisome, since 98% of almost 95 thousand non-money market investment funds operating in the euro area in 2014 are open-ended funds, which means that the investors can redeem their shares in the funds at any time. moreover, the funds’ buffer o… |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Low inflation as a challenge for monetary policy and financial stability? | Period_2 | 2014-07-08 | 0.247 | countries. such an instrument could only be considered in a true emergency, for example in the case of imminent deflation. such risks, however, are currently neither discernible nor expected. what is also being discussed is the revitalisation of the market for securitised loans. that is certainly a worthy goal, given that asset-backed securities (abss) have been exceedingly demonised since the outbreak of the financial crisis. they certainly played a role in causing the crisis, but it must be borne in mind that not every case of securitisation is the same. what i am thinking of in this respect are not re-securitisation positions and synthetic securitisation transactions, but rather of very simply and clearly constructed products that are far less risky. the rate of default for european securitisations that are underpinned by sme loans, for instance, stands at around 0.1%. since the onset of the crisis, the average default rate for europe as a whole has been between 0.6% and 1.5%. cause for concern are rather the default rates in the united states, which stood at between 9.3% and 18.4% over the same period. against this background, the governing council has decided, in cooperation with other relevant institutions, to gradually revitalise the market for abss, in particular that for securities backed by loans to smes. for me, that means looking once more at the capital requirements for abs transactions. and in that respect, i am not thinking of endowing this field of business… |
| Yves Mersch: Asset price inflation and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2020-01-28 | 0.198 | greater risk-taking extends beyond the traditional banking system. when non-bank financial institutions (for example pension funds and insurance companies) target a certain nominal rate of return, an environment of lower overall returns means they have to “search for yield” – in other words, acquire riskier assets to maintain nominal returns.[4] we are already seeing some signs of increased risk-taking by non-banks such as pension and mutual funds.[5] |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Monetary policy - end of history? | Period_2 | 2018-07-27 | 0.196 | so the debate about the future does not end here. another thing to discuss is how monetary policy and financial stability interact. and this debate also involves our standard tool, the interest rates. interest rates have been very low for quite some time now. this has coincided with an upsurge in asset prices and a compression of spreads on risky securities. against this backdrop, some economists argue that monetary policy has an effect on both the capacity and the appetite of investors to take on risk.4 this has been termed the risk-taking channel, and it does not play a role in standard monetary policy frameworks. these focus instead on the interest rate, credit or bank lending channels. now, how does this risk-taking channel work? well, it can work in different ways. for a start, low interest rates mean low returns. investors might rebalance their portfolios and take on more risk in order to make up for lost returns. should we be concerned about this? well, if the process is well managed, there is no need for concern. however, some financial institutions set rather inflexible target rates of return, for example because investors expect a certain minimum yield. these inflexible targets may lead them to take on more risk than appropriate. it is clear that this could lead to trouble further down the road. also, the financial system’s behaviour can be procyclical. there is reliable empirical evidence that loose monetary policy lowers both the measured risk in asset prices a… |
| Peter Praet: The low interest rate environment in the euro area | Period_2 | 2015-09-17 | 0.190 | across countries and types of business. small and medium-sized, non-diversified life insurers with high policyholder guarantees are typically highly exposed to low yields and have found their business models more under pressure. for pension funds the impact of low interest rates is strongest on those maintaining defined benefit schemes. the challenges for the insurance sector were underscored by the mixed performance in the stress test undertaken in 2014 by the european insurance and occupational pensions authority (eiopa). 2 while the top 30 european insurers all fulfilled the solvency ii requirements in the baseline scenario, 14% of participants – mainly small firms representing 3% of total assets in the sample – did not do so. the similar exercise currently being conducted by eiopa for pension funds will provide valuable insights into the strengths and vulnerabilities of the sector in the current market environment, an issue for which, at present, data is relatively scarce. the challenges, however, are not limited to the sectoral level. how insurance companies and pension funds adjust to the low interest rate environment could also have wider implications. with total assets of over €9 trillion, the strategies they employ to cope with low investment returns could clearly have spillover effects both to financial markets and the broader economy. one dimension of adjustment that could be relevant here is related to reallocation of portfolios towards higher return assets. “h… |
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.280 | repricing risks and liquidity difficulties render financial markets and non-bank financial institutions vulnerable to disorderly risk adjustments. investment funds’ liquid asset holdings remain low and could thus amplify a market correction in a forced selling scenario. since last year, rising rates reduced by around 4% the value of insurance companies and pension funds’ bond portfolios. this points to risks from further valuation losses, especially for leveraged and liquidity-constrained institutions. |
| Luis de Guindos: Building the financial system of the 21st century | Period_3 | 2022-05-23 | 0.225 | financial stability the macroeconomic forces i have just discussed, amplified by the economic fallout from the russia- ukraine war, also have implications for the financial stability outlook. the improved economic conditions throughout 2021 helped to reduce near-term risks to financial stability. but medium-term vulnerabilities continued to build up in the latter half of last year. the pandemic left a legacy of significantly higher levels of indebtedness across sectors, signs of overvaluation in some financial and property markets, and increased risk-taking by non-bank financial institutions. since the russian invasion, financial stability concerns have centred on the economic and inflationary impacts of the current macro-financial environment through higher commodity and energy prices, trade disruptions and weaker confidence. let me touch upon some components of the euro area financial system in turn. the banking sector is facing new headwinds from the war. higher energy and commodity prices, combined with potential energy supply disruptions, could lead to rising credit risks in the corporate sector, especially in energy intensive sectors. this has already led analysts to cut bank profitability forecasts for 2022, due to increased provisioning expectations. an upward shift in interest rate expectations may affect banks’ financial positions in two different ways. on the one hand, bank earnings are expected to benefit from higher rates in the short-term; on the other, their… |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.219 | the euro area banking sector has sound capital levels and continues to benefit from the falling levels of non-performing loans we have been seeing since 2014. however, while bank profitability has so far been supported by higher interest margins and low impairments, the economic outlook makes future profitability very uncertain. we are seeing early signs of an increase in credit risk, which warrants careful monitoring. russia’s invasion of ukraine has compounded the existing macro-financial vulnerabilities and increased the likelihood of risks materialising in the near term. in this challenging environment, macroprudential authorities in some countries could still increase capital buffers, provided that procyclical effects are avoided. this would preserve the banking sector’s resilience and increase authorities’ room for manoeuvre in the event of adverse developments. at the same time, authorities should take the current headwinds to economic growth into account and avoid an excessive tightening of credit conditions. |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.203 | it is also important to make further progress with global financial reforms. in particular, the resilience of the non-bank financial sector could be improved by enhancing the availability and use of liquidity management tools for open-ended investment funds and by better aligning redemption terms with asset liquidity via more structural liquidity tools. further policy work on margining practices and non-bank leverage would also be important. |
| Luis de Guindos: Euro area current policy challenges | Period_3 | 2022-09-16 | 0.201 | vulnerabilities in euro area residential real estate markets are also rising in light of continued price increases and vigorous mortgage lending growth. in the first quarter of 2022 euro area residential real estate price growth stood at 9.8%, the highest nominal growth rate since the early 1990s. however, since the beginning of the year, household survey responses on the intention to buy a house have declined, and banks have lowered their expectations regarding mortgage loan demand, pointing to a greater potential for house price corrections. turning to financial institutions, vulnerabilities in the non-bank financial sector have also increased this year. the risk that forced selling by investment funds could amplify a market correction remains high, amid low liquidity buffers. duration risk has started to materialise and remains elevated, and further bond portfolio revaluation losses may arise in the context of rising yields. on a better note, systemic vulnerabilities in the banking sector are assessed as moderate. bank profitability has improved owing partly to higher longer-term interest rates. this should, however, not overshadow rising fragilities related to the worsening macroeconomic outlook. higher probabilities of default on corporate exposures and a related increase in provisioning, point to some early signs of higher bank credit risk due to high energy prices. while the situation is stable overall, with little sign of fragmentation in funding markets, bank fund… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 | remain | 1 | 0.0241565 | real disposable | 1 | 0.9927260 |
| 11 | growth | 2 | 0.0214020 | economic growth | 2 | 0.9925095 |
| 11 | continue | 3 | 0.0200568 | disposable | 3 | 0.9922003 |
| 11 | development | 4 | 0.0157008 | domestic inflationary | 4 | 0.9910276 |
| 11 | quarter | 5 | 0.0139071 | commissioner | 5 | 0.9905303 |
| 11 | economic growth | 6 | 0.0133947 | ongoing | 6 | 0.9904264 |
| 11 | risk | 7 | 0.0126260 | real disposable income | 7 | 0.9903173 |
| 11 | oil | 8 | 0.0112807 | disposable income | 8 | 0.9900971 |
| 11 | ongoing | 9 | 0.0112807 | domestic inflationary pressure | 9 | 0.9900111 |
| 11 | oil price | 10 | 0.0111526 | indirect tax | 10 | 0.9898351 |
| 11 | support | 11 | 0.0104480 | interest rate unchanged | 11 | 0.9896117 |
| 11 | confirm | 12 | 0.0096152 | confirm | 12 | 0.9894582 |
| 11 | meet | 13 | 0.0096152 | consumption growth | 13 | 0.9889506 |
| 11 | strong | 14 | 0.0094871 | attend | 14 | 0.9887221 |
| 11 | stability | 15 | 0.0093590 | earnings | 15 | 0.9886924 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| European Central Bank: Press conference ¿ introductory statement | Period_1 | 2006-08-04 | 0.668 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to this press conference to report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council. the meeting was also attended by commissioner almunia. at today’s meeting, we decided to increase the key ecb interest rates by 25 basis points. this decision reflects the upside risks to price stability over the medium term that we have identified through both our economic and monetary analyses. it will contribute to ensuring that medium to longer-term inflation expectations in the euro area remain solidly anchored at levels consistent with price stability. as stressed on previous occasions, such anchoring is a prerequisite for monetary policy to make an ongoing contribution towards supporting economic growth and job creation in the euro area. also after today’s increase, the key ecb interest rates remain low in both real and nominal terms, money and credit growth remain strong, and liquidity in the euro area is ample by all plausible measures. our monetary policy therefore continues to be accommodative. if our assumptions and baseline scenario are confirmed, a progressive withdrawal of monetary accommodation will be warranted. against this background, we will continue to monitor very closely all developments so as to ensure price stability over the medium and longer term. allow me to explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. the main indicators of economic activit… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2007-01-12 | 0.667 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our first press conference in 2007. let me therefore wish you all a very happy new year. i would also like to take this opportunity to welcome slovenia as the thirteenth country to adopt the euro as its currency. accordingly, mr gaspari, the governor of banka slovenije, became a member of the governing council on 1 january 2007. let me now report on the outcome of our meeting, which was also attended by the president of the eurogroup, prime minister juncker, and commissioner almunia. on the basis of our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided at today’s meeting to leave the key ecb interest rates unchanged. the information that has become available since our last meeting has further underpinned the reasoning behind our decision to increase interest rates in december. it has also confirmed that very close monitoring of all developments is of the essence so that risks to price stability over the medium term do not materialise. this will permit medium to longer- term inflation expectations in the euro area to remain solidly anchored at levels consistent with price stability. such anchoring is a prerequisite for monetary policy to make an ongoing contribution towards supporting sustainable economic growth and job creation in the euro area. our monetary policy continues to be accommodative, with the key ecb interest rates remaining at low levels, money and credit growth very strong, and… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference ¿ introductory statement | Period_1 | 2007-07-06 | 0.649 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to today’s press conference. let me report on the outcome of our meeting, which was also attended by commissioner almunia. on the basis of our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided at today’s meeting to leave the key ecb interest rates unchanged. the information that has become available since our previous meeting has further underpinned the reasoning behind our decision to increase interest rates in june. it has also confirmed that the medium-term outlook for price stability remains subject to upside risks. given the positive economic environment in the euro area, our monetary policy is still on the accommodative side, with overall financing conditions favourable, money and credit growth vigorous, and liquidity in the euro area ample. looking ahead, acting in a firm and timely manner to ensure price stability in the medium term remains warranted. the governing council will continue to monitor closely all developments to ensure that risks to price stability over the medium term do not materialise and medium to longer-term inflation expectations in the euro area remain solidly anchored at levels consistent with price stability. such anchoring is a prerequisite for monetary policy to make an ongoing contribution towards supporting sustainable economic growth and job creation in the euro area. allow me to explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. th… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference ¿ introductory statement | Period_1 | 2006-10-06 | 0.631 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to the press conference here in paris. i would particularly like to thank governor noyer for his kind hospitality and express our special gratitude to the staff of the banque de france for the excellent organisation of the meeting of the governing council. let me now report on the outcome of our meeting, which was also attended by the president of the eurogroup, prime minister juncker, and commissioner almunia. at today’s meeting, we decided to increase the key ecb interest rates by 25 basis points. this decision reflects the upside risks to price stability over the medium term that we have identified through both our economic and monetary analyses. today’s decision will contribute to ensuring that medium to longer-term inflation expectations in the euro area remain solidly anchored at levels consistent with price stability. such anchoring is a prerequisite for monetary policy to make an ongoing contribution towards supporting sustainable economic growth and job creation in the euro area. also after today’s increase, the key ecb interest rates remain at low levels, money and credit growth are strong, and liquidity in the euro area is ample by all plausible measures. our monetary policy therefore continues to be accommodative. if our assumptions and baseline scenario are confirmed, it will remain warranted to further withdraw monetary accommodation. the governing council will therefore continue t… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference ¿ introductory statement | Period_1 | 2006-07-12 | 0.622 | ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome you to our press conference and report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the ecb’s governing council. the meeting was also attended by commissioner almunia. on the basis of our regular economic and monetary analyses, at today’s meeting we decided to leave the key ecb interest rates unchanged. the information that has become available since our last meeting has confirmed that a further withdrawal of monetary accommodation was warranted to contain upside risks to price stability. indeed, acting in a timely manner to contain such risks remains essential to ensure that inflation expectations in the euro area are kept solidly anchored at levels consistent with price stability. such anchoring of inflation expectations is a prerequisite for monetary policy to make an ongoing contribution towards supporting sustainable economic growth and job creation in the euro area. with key ecb interest rates at still low levels in both nominal and real terms, money and credit growth dynamic, and liquidity ample by all plausible measures, our monetary policy continues to be accommodative. therefore, if our assumptions and baseline scenario are confirmed, a progressive withdrawal of monetary accommodation remains warranted. against this background, we will exercise strong vigilance so as to ensure that risks to price stability over the medium term do not materialise. turning first to the economic analysis, the latest data and survey releases remain positi… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Securing sustained economic growth in the euro area | Period_2 | 2016-10-12 | 0.062 | prospects for the euro area economy turning to recent euro area developments, the recovery is continuing its moderate but steady pace, supported mainly by the ecb’s expansionary policies, which have significantly improved financial conditions, reduced financial fragmentation and supported economic activity and inflation. in the absence of our measures, both growth and inflation in the euro area would have been significantly worse, as our models calculate that inflation and growth would be lower by 0.8 and 0.7 percentage points, respectively, than the forecast values of 0.2% and 1.7% for this year. for three years now, inflation has been quite low with a level of 0.4% in 2014, 0% last year and 0.2% forecast for this year. however, the recent flash estimate for september at 0.4% may indicate a movement compatible with our baseline scenario that foresees a gradual increase to levels above 1% by next spring, if no major downward movement in commodity prices takes place. additionally, the normalisation of inflation depends on the continued closing of the negative output gap and more dynamic wage behaviour. in the first half of 2016 the euro area grew at an annualised rate of 1.7%, similar to last year’s growth rate. this figure is far from being impressive, especially considering that the euro area is in the early phase of a recovery after the second recession in 2012 and 2013. on the other hand, the unemployment rate, albeit falling, still remains above 10% amid a continuous |
| Vítor Constâncio: Presentation of the ECB Annual Report 2013 to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2014-04-08 | 0.047 | an increase of €500 billion of our monetary base. however, more than €500 billion have already been paid, and excess liquidity came down from a peak of €800 billion to a little over €100 billion. the high levels of inflation that some voices predicted never materialised, and we are now in a regime of low inflation. we closely monitor developments in money markets that may result from the concurrent reduction in abundant liquidity. we continue to stand ready to take measures to ensure stable money market conditions. in order to safeguard price stability in the environment of weak economic activity and downward revisions to the inflation outlook, we lowered key ecb interest rates in may and again in november 2013. in late spring and summer we noted a sustained increase in expected interest rates in money markets, partly as a result of contagion from the united states. this development was unwarranted given the underlying macroeconomic conditions, and was not in line with our policy dispositions. therefore, in july 2013 we started to provide forward guidance, stating that we expected the key ecb interest rates to remain at prevailing or lower levels for an extended period of time. the new policy was successful, leading to a reduction in the short- term forward rates, and we have confirmed this message since then. today these expectations are based on an overall subdued inflation outlook extending into the medium term, given the broad-based weakness of the economy, the high de… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox - evidence from the euro area | Period_2 | 2020-02-23 | 0.044 | there is also evidence that negative rates have increased corporate investment: firms with large holdings of liquid assets that are exposed to negative deposit rates have increased investment compared with firms with small holdings of liquid assets that are less affected by negative deposit rates (see chart 5).[14] this effect is economically significant and estimated to boost corporate investment by as much as 1 percentage point per annum. investment growth of firms exposed to negative deposit rates |
| Philip R Lane: The compass of monetary policy - favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2021-03-02 | 0.042 | while chart 3 shows that the net tightening of credit standards on loans to firms remains moderate compared with the global financial and sovereign debt crises, it signals potential risks to future loan growth. this reflects the well-established leading indicator properties of the bls, according to which changes in credit standards on loans to euro area firms tend to lead actual lending to firms by around four to five quarters. reinforcing these cautionary signals, the bls also shows that the scaling back of |
| Isabel Schnabel: COVID-19 and monetary policy - reinforcing prevailing challenges | Period_2 | 2020-11-24 | 0.038 | [20] duca-radu, i., kenny, g. and reuter, a. (2020), “inflation expectations, consumption and the lower bound: micro evidence from a large multi-country survey”, journal of monetary economics, march. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-12-20 | 0.058 | wage growth is strengthening, supported by robust labour markets and some catch-up in wages to compensate workers for high inflation. as these factors are set to remain in place, the eurosystem staff projections see wages growing at rates well above historical averages and pushing up inflation throughout the projection period. most measures of longer-term inflation expectations currently stand at around two per cent, although further above-target revisions to some indicators warrant continued monitoring. |
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.046 | the currently high inflation is expected to stay above our target for an extended period. our monetary policy must therefore remain focused on reducing support for demand and guarding against the risk of second-round effects. amid the present uncertainty, future decisions on policy rates will continue to be data-dependent and taken on a meeting-by-meeting approach. the policy decisions we will take at our next meeting will be based on various elements, including our december macroeconomic projections. at this meeting, we also expect to lay out the key principles for reducing the bond holdings in our monetary policy portfolios. we will proceed with prudence, continuing to normalise our monetary policy in line with our medium-term price stability objective. 4/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Frank Elderson: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy - delivering our mandate in all circumstances | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.042 | the pandemic and the war have shaken the environment in which the eu must address the vital challenges that it faces, including the ongoing climate and environmental crises. since russia’s unprovoked invasion of ukraine, the global economic outlook has become much less favourable. having said that, the invasion has not shaken the eu’s resolve to address the challenges faced. in actual fact, the war and the ensuing energy crisis have only served to increase eu authorities’ determination to reduce the bloc’s dependence on fossil energy sources. even if in the very near-term the energy crisis may cause an increase in non-gas fossil fuel being used, the likelihood of a timely and orderly transition towards a low-carbon economy consistent with the eu’s commitment to the paris agreement has increased. that being said, another record-breaking summer has confirmed that physical risks of climate change and environmental degradation are materialising ever more frequently, which will add to the risk of increased macroeconomic volatility until the transition has been completed. |
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.040 | second, prolonged imported price shocks make it harder to assess whether inflation is feeding into domestic price pressures. the fact that core inflation is increasing above 2% may initially seem to suggest that domestic inflationary pressures are accumulating. however, rising core inflation is partly due to higher energy prices, which are pushing up costs in almost all sectors (chart 11). |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economy and the energy transition | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.040 | euro area economic outlook and energy price developments growth in the euro area is estimated to have slowed down significantly in the third quarter of this year, with real gdp growing at 0.2%. high inflation continues to dampen spending and production throughout the economy. severe disruptions in the supply of gas have worsened the situation further, and both consumer and business confidence have fallen rapidly. demand for services is decelerating following the strong rebound that came with the reopening of the economy over the summer, especially in tourism. the continued weakening in global demand, also in the context of tighter monetary policy in many major economies, and the worsening terms of trade mean that there is less support for the euro area economy. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | war | 1 | 0.0585938 | war | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 12 | economy | 2 | 0.0529137 | ukraine | 2 | 0.9997371 |
| 12 | impact | 3 | 0.0411985 | russia | 3 | 0.9991239 |
| 12 | ukraine | 4 | 0.0300158 | invasion | 4 | 0.9990359 |
| 12 | time | 5 | 0.0198981 | russian | 5 | 0.9987729 |
| 12 | strong | 6 | 0.0188331 | russian invasion | 6 | 0.9972806 |
| 12 | russia | 7 | 0.0184781 | uncertain | 7 | 0.9968022 |
| 12 | uncertainty | 8 | 0.0172356 | exacerbate | 8 | 0.9961431 |
| 12 | europe | 9 | 0.0168806 | scenario | 9 | 0.9959647 |
| 12 | invasion | 10 | 0.0140405 | sanction | 10 | 0.9958748 |
| 12 | scenario | 11 | 0.0131530 | evolve | 11 | 0.9957061 |
| 12 | russian | 12 | 0.0127980 | shield | 12 | 0.9957005 |
| 12 | slow | 13 | 0.0117330 | dependence | 13 | 0.9955262 |
| 12 | confidence | 14 | 0.0099579 | geopolitical | 14 | 0.9953995 |
| 12 | start | 15 | 0.0099579 | aggression | 15 | 0.9951230 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.089 | 2 “what an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in august, 1914! […] the inhabitant of london could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his door-step; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or information might recommend. […] but, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable.” john maynard keynes, the economic consequences of the peace, new york: harcourt, brace and howe, 1920, pp. 10 –12; quoted by m. wynne (2005), “globalization and monetary policy,” southwest economy , federal reserve bank of dallas, issue 4, pp. 1-8. 3 see berlin declaration of 25 march 2007. 4 papademos, l. (2007), “the effects of globalisation on inflation, liquidity and monetary policy”, speech delivered at the nber conference on “international dimensions of monetary policy,” girona, 11 june 2007. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The role of central banks in a globalised economy | Period_1 | 2007-06-21 | 0.072 | third, the rapid growth that we are seeing at the global level, and highly significant transformations which are both the cause and effect of this growth at the level of each of the economies, rapid changes of the respective economic weightings of the various continents and of the structure of the global economy all combine as a consequence to make predictions based on past regularities less reliable. consequently, uncertainty tends to increase and economic and financial risks with a weak or very weak probability, but a strong destabilising potential, appear as the inevitable, and in fact, “normal” counterpart to an unprecedented period of economic prosperity. now is not a time to be complacent. fourth, more than ever during a period of accelerated globalisation, central bank credibility is essential for anchoring solidly inflation expectations and for forming a solid base for monetary and financial stability in a brilliant, mobile international economy in which uncertainty and risks cannot be ignored. fifth and finally, it is crucial to deepen and strengthen global governance by exploiting to the full all possibilities offered by all formal and informal institutions that exist and by consolidating global financial stability, not only by unifying the principles and concepts of prudential supervision and regulation, but also by achieving real unification, resulting at the global level from the practical implementation of regulation and supervision. ladies and gentlemen, tha… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Short address in honour of Axel Weber | Period_1 | 2011-05-03 | 0.051 | 1 see the article “axel weber – ein porträt: ‘nicht glück – können!’“, authored by marc neller and marietta kurm-engels, published in the handelsblatt of 16–17 july 2010. 17 sovereign countries and 331 million citizens. this is a situation which has no equivalent in the world. more than ever, the unity of the eurosystem and the unity of the governing council is of the essence. lieber jens, herzlich willkommen im eurosystem! 1 see the article “axel weber – ein porträt: ‘nicht glück – können!’“, authored by marc neller and marietta kurm-engels, published in the handelsblatt of 16–17 july 2010. 17 sovereign countries and 331 million citizens. this is a situation which has no equivalent in the world. more than ever, the unity of the eurosystem and the unity of the governing council is of the essence. lieber jens, herzlich willkommen im eurosystem! |
| Jürgen Stark: Economic prospects and the role of monetary policy in the current situation | Period_1 | 2009-03-13 | 0.050 | ladies and gentlemen, since the second half of 2008, we have witnessed the deepest economic downturn since world war ii and the fastest deceleration in inflation since the launch of the euro. we have confronted this situation with unprecedented decisions. unprecedented has been the magnitude and size of interest rate cuts. since october 2008, we have reduced key ecb interest rates by 275 basis points. unprecedented has been the scope of liquidity support we offer to the financial system. but central banks alone are not in a position to resolve the current financial crisis. policy makers need to prevent a further deterioration in economic and financial conditions. to this end, resolute action is needed to restructure, recapitalise and consolidate the banking system. to be realistic, the year 2009 will be a very difficult year. 2009 will be the year of adjustments in the balance sheets of banks, firms and private households. these adjustments should lay the foundations for economic conditions to eventually stabilise and improve. let me now elaborate in greater detail on where we stand in terms of economic and monetary developments in the euro area and how this has affected the conduct of monetary policy. i will subsequently talk about how we have adjusted our refinancing operations in response to the financial crisis. finally, i will briefly discuss challenges in the resolution of the crisis. |
| Lucas Papademos: Five years of the euro - past achievements and future challenges | Period_1 | 2004-05-03 | 0.050 | turmoil in the face of the many adverse shocks that have occurred over recent years, including geopolitical tensions. today we mark “the euro at five”. as i have explained, the accomplishments of those five years are already substantial, and we are ready to face the challenges ahead. let me therefore conclude my speech at this birthday party by saying that we are looking forward to many, many happy returns. thank you very much. |
| Peter Praet: Interview with Bloomberg | Period_2 | 2015-11-27 | 0.111 | how can we estimate the impact of the tragic events in paris? i would like first of all to express our profound sympathy for the victims. it’s something that concerns everybody. now when we talk about the possible impact on the economy, in general, we have to take a holistic view. it’s not so much the economy as the geopolitical environment that is impacted by these events. the impact remains to be seen, beyond the tragic events of last week. the main issue is the economic context of such events, which is a rather difficult one, we cannot deny that. it’s difficult because the euro area is still going through the aftermath of a balance sheet recession which started in 2008. as of today, the gdp of the euro area has still not recovered the level it had in 2008. that’s one thing, and the second thing is the management of immigration in europe which creates some strains at the political level in different countries. |
| Mario Draghi: Interview with Lithuanian business daily Verslo Zinios | Period_2 | 2014-09-26 | 0.099 | be to these concerns? why does lithuania need to be part of the euro area despite those costs? joining the euro area is not a free lunch: it entails significant obligations, but many benefits at the same time. the obligations are stated very clearly in the treaty and in eu regulations. in this respect, compared with those countries that joined in the first wave of entry, lithuania has the advantage of joining a stronger euro area. the euro area has painfully recognised the flaws in its original design and taken major steps to repair them. there are tougher rules for fiscal policies, stronger oversight of macroeconomic imbalances, a lender of last resort for sovereigns in the form of the european stability mechanism, and there will soon be a sounder and more integrated banking sector thanks to the creation of the single supervisory mechanism. the euro area has gone through its difficult initial learning phase, and new members will reap the benefits, which certainly outweigh the costs associated with the existence of these institutions. joining a stronger euro area will increase the long-term prosperity of its members and their resilience to adverse shocks. but there are also other concrete benefits stemming from trade and foreign direct investment, which will be bolstered, especially given lithuania’s strong trade ties with its two baltic neighbours in the euro area, estonia and latvia. moreover, lithuania will be an equal partner at the governing council table and will ful… |
| Isabel Schnabel: The European Central Bank’s policy in the COVID-19 crisis - a medium-term perspective | Period_2 | 2020-06-11 | 0.089 | supply. as a result, headline inflation is not anticipated to be back on its pre-covid-19 path by 2022 in that scenario, and underlying inflation is also expected to remain subdued in the medium term (see right chart on slide 2). given the unprecedented impact of the crisis on income and consumption, such disinflationary effects are not surprising. but uncertainty around these forecasts is exceptionally large: while measuring economic slack is already a challenge in normal times, it is currently exacerbated by the highly uncertain effects of the crisis on potential output, both in the short and in the medium to long run. in the short run, potential output is severely affected by disruptions in global value chains and social distancing measures, which constrain the full use of capital. think of the hairdresser who may only be able to use half of his or her physical capacity. such effects may partly offset the negative effects of weakening demand on inflation even in the short run. in the medium to long run, the impact of the crisis on potential output, and hence on inflation, will crucially depend on the response of firms and policymakers to the challenges we are currently facing. first, some sectors of the economy may never return to their previous size, requiring a large reallocation of capital and labour, also across borders. despite some progress in recent years, however, product and labour markets in the euro area still remain too rigid to accommodate the required shif… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Gazeta Wyborcza | Period_2 | 2014-05-26 | 0.080 | crisis phase into a different environment, with the focus shifting from solving the crisis to ensuring stable economic growth and inflation close to 2%. it requires a different approach and different instruments. the developments beyond our eastern border are the big topic of debate in poland at the moment. could the conflict between russia and the ukraine affect europe and its economy in any way? the impact on trade or the financial system has thus far been limited. but this situation does give rise to uncertainty, so it can be regarded as a potential negative factor that could hinder economic growth in europe, and that is part of our risk assessment. what about the strong euro? aren’t you worried it could cause problems for european exporters and hinder the recovery? the ecb doesn’t target the exchange rate. our primary mandate is price stability, and within this mandate, the exchange rate of the euro is among the factors determining the level of inflation. and indeed, the strong euro is contributing to the current low inflation. consequently, any further strengthening of the euro strengthens the case for more policy action by the ecb aimed at bringing inflation closer to 2%. is there a risk of global currency wars? each country wants to overcome the crisis as quickly as possible and the easiest way is to weaken its currency and thus improve the position of its exporters. these issues have been discussed many times, including among the g20. countries have agreed that the… |
| Fabio Panetta: Monetary autonomy in a globalised world | Period_2 | 2021-04-27 | 0.071 | towards more ambitious goals as i have made clear, europe has the capacity to overcome the pandemic and its economic consequences. so we face an important decision. we can act as a group of small, open economies, as we did after the global financial crisis, with each country competing to capture external demand. or we can behave how a large economy would, with european and national policymakers working together to raise internal demand through adequate policy stimulus. at this point in time, failure to pursue the latter option – reconnecting to the pre-crisis growth path and restoring healthy inflation levels – would increase the danger of the pandemic causing lasting damage to our economy. three risks stand out. the first risk relates to the record high levels of public and private debt reached during the pandemic, which make debt dynamics more sensitive to inflation undershooting. an accounting exercise indicates that if euro area inflation were to undershoot our baseline by 1 percentage point each year for five years, the private debt ratio would increase by around 7 percentage |
| Christine Lagarde: Remarks on the euro area economy | Period_3 | 2022-03-16 | 0.277 | christine lagarde: remarks on the euro area economy remarks by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at the “wirtschaftsgipfel” of welt/axel springer, berlin, 15 march 2022. * * * perhaps more than any other place, berlin embodies europe’s journey from division and war to peace and unity. the city was devastated by fighting in 1945. it was divided by the iron curtain until 1989. but now we see a vibrant city, attracting people from all over europe, living in peace. so it comes as a profound shock to be confronted with a new war in europe, less than 800 kilometres to the east of here. the scenes of dying soldiers and civilians are horrifying. millions of people have been displaced, many of them coming to germany, to berlin. this tragedy is a watershed for europe and it calls on all of us to revise our ambitions. and we, as the central bank of the euro area, will play our part too. on 10 march the ecb’s governing council expressed its full support to the people of ukraine. we will ensure smooth liquidity conditions and implement the sanctions decided by the eu and european governments. we will take whatever action is needed to fulfil our mandate to pursue price stability and to safeguard financial stability. at our meeting on 10 march we made a first assessment of the impact of the russia-ukraine war. we concluded that it would lower growth and raise inflation through higher energy and commodity prices, the disruption of international trade and weaker… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-03-10 | 0.197 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 10 march 2022. * * * good afternoon, the vice-president and i welcome you to our press conference. the russian invasion of ukraine is a watershed for europe. the governing council expresses its full support to the people of ukraine. we will ensure smooth liquidity conditions and implement the sanctions decided by the european union and european governments. we will take whatever action is needed to fulfil the ecb’s mandate to pursue price stability and to safeguard financial stability. the russia-ukraine war will have a material impact on economic activity and inflation through higher energy and commodity prices, the disruption of international commerce and weaker confidence. the extent of these effects will depend on how the conflict evolves, on the impact of current sanctions and on possible further measures. in recognition of the highly uncertain environment, the governing council considered a range of scenarios in today’s meeting. the impact of the russia-ukraine war has to be assessed in the context of solid underlying conditions for the euro area economy, helped by ample policy support. the recovery of the economy is boosted by the fading impact of the omicron coronavirus variant. supply bottlenecks have been showing some signs of… |
| Christine Lagarde: Finding resilience in times of uncertainty | Period_3 | 2022-03-31 | 0.184 | christine lagarde: finding resilience in times of uncertainty speech by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at an event organised by the central bank of cyprus, nicosia, 30 march 2022. * * * constantine p. cavafy’s famous poem “ithaca” starts with the words: “when you set out on your journey to ithaca, pray that the road is long, full of adventure, full of knowledge.” and indeed, these words capture well the story of cyprus in modern times. it is a story full of adventure, with many obstacles along the way. and yet, your people have overcome them all, gaining in knowledge, and emerging stronger and more resilient each time. your nation rebounded after the invasion of 1974 and subsequent partition of the country, using its agility and acumen to become a hub for business in the middle east and north africa region. cyprus transformed itself from an island on europe’s easternmost edge to a member state at its core, joining the eu in 2004 and adopting the euro in 2008. it endured and then recovered from a crippling banking crisis in 2013, with the economy growing by around 6% each year from 2015 until the start of the pandemic. more recently, cyprus has rallied well from the pandemic, despite the importance of tourism to the economy, which was heavily hit by lockdowns and travel bans. but europe is now faced with another crisis in the form of the russian invasion of ukraine. this is first and foremost a human tragedy whose cost is growing by the day. b… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.182 | 3.2 shielding the european economy from global shocks: monetary and fiscal policy the pandemic and the new economic order generated by the war also pose new challenges for monetary policy. the european economy has been hit by an unprecedented sequence of supply shocks which are pushing up inflation and depressing growth.[27] the exit from the pandemic had already produced a sharp rise in energy and commodity prices. in addition, the emergence of supply bottlenecks had raised the prices of durable goods. now the russian invasion of ukraine is exacerbating each of these individual forces.[28] oil and gas prices will stay higher for longer and remain subject to unprecedented uncertainty. not only is russia one of the world’s largest exporters of these products, but the eu is also the largest and most dependent importer of energy from russia. food prices could increase further. russia and ukraine account for about 25% and 17% of total global exports of wheat and maize respectively. and russia is a crucial provider of the raw materials used in fertilizers. other raw materials will also be impacted. for example, russia accounts for over 20% of global exports of vanadium, cobalt and palladium, which are used in the production of 3d printers, drones, robotics, semiconductors and catalytic converters. russia and ukraine are also among the largest exporters of iron ore and nickel, which are used in the iron and steel industries. the economic consequences of these shocks are signific… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in an uncertain world | Period_3 | 2022-03-17 | 0.171 | for example, russia is the world’s top exporter of palladium, which is a key input for producing catalytic converters and is hard to substitute with other suppliers.2! ukraine produces around 70% of the world’s neon gas, which is critical for the laser lithography process used in semiconductor manufacturing. the euro area is highly dependent on russia for cobalt and vanadium, which are key for the 3d printing, drone and robotics industries. the ecb staff’s latest baseline projections — which include a first assessment of the impact of the war — see inflation, on average, at 5.1% this year. in a more severe scenario produced by our staff, inflation might exceed 7% in 2022.11 the balance of forces over the medium term when faced with a supply shock, the key question for monetary policy is whether the effect of the shock on inflation is likely to become persistent. there are several considerations that we need to take |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13 | growth | 1 | 0.0347610 | broad money | 1 | 0.9964079 |
| 13 | support | 2 | 0.0167130 | growth friendly | 2 | 0.9963143 |
| 13 | loan | 3 | 0.0156689 | friendly composition | 3 | 0.9954675 |
| 13 | remain | 4 | 0.0153706 | consistent implementation | 4 | 0.9954319 |
| 13 | continue | 5 | 0.0152960 | growth friendly composition | 5 | 0.9946766 |
| 13 | annual | 6 | 0.0138045 | friendly | 6 | 0.9939965 |
| 13 | analysis | 7 | 0.0120892 | composition | 7 | 0.9928978 |
| 13 | policy measure | 8 | 0.0120892 | decisively | 8 | 0.9923774 |
| 13 | monetary policy measure | 9 | 0.0111942 | reap | 9 | 0.9922460 |
| 13 | increase | 10 | 0.0108213 | narrow monetary | 10 | 0.9920039 |
| 13 | measure | 11 | 0.0108213 | narrow monetary aggregate | 11 | 0.9914305 |
| 13 | implementation | 12 | 0.0104484 | implementation | 12 | 0.9909252 |
| 13 | structural | 13 | 0.0097772 | monetary analysis broad | 13 | 0.9908094 |
| 13 | country | 14 | 0.0091060 | analysis broad money | 14 | 0.9908094 |
| 13 | fiscal | 15 | 0.0082857 | annual growth | 15 | 0.9906707 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy in a changing world ¿ commitment, strategy and credibility | Period_1 | 2006-12-07 | 0.066 | 1 see frey and moëc (2006). in a recent study borio and filardo (2006) find that for many euro area countries the global output gap is statistically significant in explaining domestic inflation, while the contribution of the domestic output gap is reduced, especially since the 1990s. for the euro area as a whole, their findings are more ambiguous: the effect of the global output gap is not statistically significant when import prices and oil prices are included in the equations explaining the dynamics of inflation. 2 see ciccarelli and mojon (2006) and borio and filardo (2006). 3 the average annual growth rates of productivity in the us and the euro area during the period 1980-1995 remained fairly stable. |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2008-08-08 | 0.063 | taking the appropriate medium-term perspective, confirms the underlying strength of money growth. one of the main factors leading to this conclusion is the still high growth of mfi loans to the private sector, which is underpinning the robust nature of monetary growth. the pace, maturity and sectoral composition of bank borrowing suggest that, at the level of the euro area as a whole, the availability of bank credit has, as yet, not been significantly affected by the ongoing financial tensions. higher short-term interest rates and housing market weakness in several parts of the euro area have dampened the growth of household borrowing over the past few years. by contrast, and notwithstanding tighter financing conditions and moderating economic growth, the expansion of bank credit to non-financial corporations thus far remains very robust. to sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis clearly confirms the assessment of increasing upside risks to price stability over the medium term. annual inflation rates are likely to remain well above levels consistent with price stability, and monetary aggregates continue to grow vigorously, with so far no signs of significant constraints on bank loan supply. the latest economic data point to a weakening of real gdp growth in mid-2008, which in part was expected after the exceptionally strong growth in the first quarter. against this background, it remains crucial to avoid broadly bas… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Activism and alertness in monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-16 | 0.053 | wealth of cumulative evidence accruing – from month to month – from the economic and the monetary side. in both cases, the medium-term orientation of its monitoring activity has been preserved. two examples: as regards our economic analysis, when looking at the underlying trend of growth of the european economy, we judged in the second half of last year that we were experiencing a recovery with the trend progressively approaching potential. we judged that the short-term volatility observed in important indicators, including the quarterly growth figure for the fourth quarter of 2005, did not call into question the medium-term growth prospects and therefore the associated gradual increase of risks to price stability. another example can be extracted from our monetary analysis: consistent indications that broad money growth was increasingly due to its most liquid components has contributed in recent months to a gradual tilt of the balance of risks perceived to be signalled by our monetary analysis. it was not the behaviour of aggregate m3 per se which altered the outlook for price stability. it was the realisation that the structural force at work behind persistently abundant liquidity was becoming increasingly connected with final spending and pricing decisions. as i said at the start, the complexity of the analysis required to predict our moves has not materially impeded market participants in responding meaningfully to incoming data. the understanding of our strategy and t… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2004-02-25 | 0.048 | turning to the monetary analysis, annual m3 growth has continued to moderate only slowly over recent months. the shift of portfolios away from monetary assets towards longer-term financial assets outside m3 that started during the summer of 2003 has been rather gradual. the low level of interest rates is contributing to the continued strong growth of very liquid assets and may explain the slow pace of portfolio adjustment. at the same time, the increased growth of loans to the private sector reflects the effects of both low interest rates and an improvement in the economic environment. the strong monetary growth observed over the past few years, means that there is significantly more liquidity available in the euro area than needed to finance non-inflationary growth. whether the accumulated excess liquidity will translate into inflationary pressures over the medium term depends on the extent to which past portfolio shifts are reversed and on the future strength of economic growth. should excess liquidity persist, it could lead to inflationary pressures over the medium and long term. in summary, the economic analysis continues to indicate that the outlook for price developments over the medium term is in line with price stability. cross-checking with the monetary analysis does not alter this picture. against this background, the governing council judged at its last meeting on 5 february that the current stance of monetary policy in the euro area remained appropriate. of cou… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Towards a more integrated Europe - challenges ahead for the euro area and Central and Eastern Europe | Period_1 | 2011-10-24 | 0.046 |
|
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2018-05-03 | 0.710 | euro area annual hicp inflation increased to 1.3% in march 2018, from 1.1% in february. this reflected mainly higher food price inflation. on the basis of current futures prices for oil, annual rates of headline inflation are likely to hover around 1.5% for the remainder of the year. measures of underlying inflation remain subdued overall. looking ahead, they are expected to rise gradually over the medium term, supported by our monetary policy measures, the continuing economic expansion, the corresponding absorption of economic slack and rising wage growth. turning to the monetary analysis, broad money (m3) continues to expand at a robust pace, with an annual growth rate of 4.2% in february 2018, slightly below the narrow range observed since mid-2015. m3 growth continues to reflect the impact of the ecb’s monetary policy measures and the low opportunity cost of holding the most liquid deposits. accordingly, the narrow monetary aggregate m1 remained the main contributor to broad money growth, continuing to expand at a solid annual rate. the recovery in the growth of loans to the private sector observed since the beginning of 2014 is proceeding. the annual growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations stood at 3.1% in february 2018, after 3.4% in january and 3.1% in december 2017, while the annual growth rate of loans to households remained unchanged at 2.9%. the euro area bank lending survey for the first quarter of 2018 indicates that loan growth continues to be supp… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2019-06-06 | 0.684 | bank lending conditions and will continue to support access to financing, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises. to sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed that an ample degree of monetary accommodation is still necessary for the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. in order to reap the full benefits from our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute more decisively to raising the longer-term growth potential and reducing vulnerabilities. the implementation of structural reforms in euro area countries needs to be substantially stepped up to increase resilience, reduce structural unemployment and boost euro area productivity and growth potential. the 2019 country-specific recommendations should serve as the relevant signpost. regarding fiscal policies, the mildly expansionary euro area fiscal stance is providing support to economic activity. at the same time, countries where government debt is high need to continue rebuilding fiscal buffers. all countries should reinforce their efforts to achieve a more growth-friendly composition of public finances. likewise, the transparent and consistent implementation of the european union’s fiscal and economic governance framework over time and across countries remains essential to bolster the resilience of the euro area economy. improving the funct… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2018-10-29 | 0.664 | euro area annual hicp inflation increased to 2.1% in september 2018, from 2.0% in august, reflecting mainly higher energy and food price inflation. on the basis of current futures prices for oil, annual rates of headline inflation are likely to hover around the current level over the coming months. while measures of underlying inflation remain generally muted, they have been increasing from earlier lows. domestic cost pressures are strengthening and broadening amid high levels of capacity utilisation and tightening labour markets. looking ahead, underlying inflation is expected to pick up towards the end of the year and to increase further over the medium term, supported by our monetary policy measures, the ongoing economic expansion and rising wage growth. turning to the monetary analysis, broad money (m3) growth stood at 3.5% in september 2018, after 3.4% in august. apart from some volatility in monthly flows, m3 growth is increasingly supported by bank credit creation. the narrow monetary aggregate m1 remained the main contributor to broad money growth. the growth of loans to the private sector strengthened further, continuing the upward trend observed since the beginning of 2014. the annual growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations rose to 4.3% in september 2018, from 4.1% in august, while the annual growth rate of loans to households stood at 3.1%, unchanged from the previous month. the euro area bank lending survey for the third quarter of 2018 indicates tha… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2018-01-25 | 0.661 | euro area annual hicp inflation was 1.4% in december 2017, down from 1.5% in november. this reflected mainly developments in energy prices. looking ahead, on the basis of current futures prices for oil, annual rates of headline inflation are likely to hover around current levels in the coming months. for their part, measures of underlying inflation remain subdued – in part owing to special factors – and have yet to show convincing signs of a sustained upward trend. yet, looking forward, they are expected to rise gradually over the medium term, supported by our monetary policy measures, the continuing economic expansion, the corresponding absorption of economic slack and rising wage growth. turning to the monetary analysis, broad money (m3) continues to expand at a robust pace, with an annual rate of growth of 4.9% in november 2017, after 5.0% in october, reflecting the impact of the ecb’s monetary policy measures and the low opportunity cost of holding the most liquid deposits. accordingly, the narrow monetary aggregate m1 continued to be the main contributor to broad money growth, expanding at an annual rate of 9.1% in november, after 9.4% in october. the recovery in the growth of loans to the private sector observed since the beginning of 2014 is proceeding. the annual growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations increased to 3.1% in november 2017, after 2.9% in october, while the annual growth rate of loans to households stood at 2.8% in november, compared with 2…. |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2017-04-28 | 0.657 | inflation, but also a decline in services price inflation. looking ahead, on the basis of current futures prices for oil, headline inflation is likely to increase in april and thereafter to hover around current levels until the end of this year. however, as unutilised resources are still weighing on domestic wage and price formation, measures of underlying inflation remain low and are expected to rise only gradually over the medium term, supported by our monetary policy measures, the expected continuing economic recovery and the corresponding gradual absorption of slack. turning to the monetary analysis, broad money (m3) continues to expand at a robust pace, with an annual rate of growth of 4.7% in february 2017, after 4.8% in january. as in previous months, annual growth in m3 was mainly supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate m1 expanding at an annual rate of 8.4% in february 2017, unchanged from the previous month. the recovery in loan growth to the private sector observed since the beginning of 2014 is proceeding. the annual growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations declined to 2.0% in february 2017, from 2.3% in the previous month, while the annual growth rate of loans to households remained broadly stable at 2.3% in february. at the same time, the euro area bank lending survey for the first quarter of 2017 indicates that net loan demand has increased and bank lending conditions have further eased across all loan categories… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.048 | : credit standards, loan demand and bank loan growth to euro area firms (lhs: net percentages, rhs: quarterly growth rates in percentages) ecb (bsi and bls). notes: positive bars indicate a net easing of credit standards (yellow) and a net increase in loan demand (red). the blue line shows the two-quarter moving average of loan growth to euro area non-financial corporations. net percentages for credit standards are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “eased somewhat” and “eased considerably”. net percentages for demand for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “increased considerably” and “increased somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “decreased somewhat” and “decreased considerably”. latest observation: q2 2022. |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.040 | we have also just entered the second year of the investigation phase of our digital euro project. we are examining key questions about the potential design and distribution of a digital euro, which would be a complement to cash, not a replacement for it. for the eurosystem, the motivation behind the digital euro project is mainly domestic in nature. however, we recognise the benefits of discussing various issues at the international level, such as cross-currency payments made in retail central bank digital currency (cbdc) and the potential effects of giving foreign users access to domestic retail cbdc under specific conditions. in this regard, international cooperation on digital currencies will remain essential. 4/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Isabel Schnabel: Looking through higher energy prices? Monetary policy and the green transition | Period_3 | 2022-01-11 | 0.039 | it includes a recommendation to significantly strengthen the ets and widen its scope, which currently covers only around 40% of the eu’s greenhouse gas emissions. the fit for 55 package also proposes a review of the eu energy taxation directive, with the aim of raising the minimum tax rate for inefficient and polluting fuels, and lowering those for efficient and clean fuels. the second development is the ongoing transformation in financial markets. sustainable investment is no longer a “nice to have” policy but has become an essential ingredient in most investor portfolios. many institutional investors have started to materially reduce their exposures to fossil fuel energy producers and have redirected capital to more environmentally acceptable low-carbon alternatives. ecb analysis shows that financial markets are increasingly serving as a corrective device. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-09-26 | 0.034 | the outlook for the euro area economy the euro area economy grew by 0.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2022, mainly owing to strong consumer spending on services as the economy reopened. economies with large tourism sectors benefited especially, as people travelled more over the summer. the still robust labour market also continued to support economic activity. notwithstanding this, we expect activity to slow substantially in the coming quarters. there are four main reasons behind this. first, high inflation is dampening spending and production throughout the economy, and these headwinds are reinforced by gas supply disruptions. second, the strong demand for services that came with the reopening of the economy is losing steam. third, the weakening in global demand, also in the context of tighter monetary policy in many major economies, and the worsening terms of trade will mean less support for the euro area economy. fourth, uncertainty remains high, as reflected in falling household and business confidence. these developments have led to a downward revision of the latest staff projections for economic growth for the remainder of the current year and throughout 2023. staff now expect the economy to grow by 3.1 per cent in 2022, 0.9 per cent in 2023 and 1.9 per cent in 2024. inflation rose further to 9.1 per cent in august. energy and food price inflation remained extremely elevated and were the dominant contributors to overall inflation. price pressures are spreading ac… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.033 | schnabel, i. (2022), “the globalisation of inflation”, speech at a conference organised by the österreichische vereinigung für finanzanalyse und asset management, vienna, 11 may. 15. jordà et al. (2022), “wage growth when inflation is high”, frbsf economic letter 2022-25, 6 september; and carstens, a. (2022), “the return of inflation”, speech at the international center for monetary and banking studies, geneva, 5 april. 16. overall, however, only around 3% of private sector workers in the euro area have their wages and minimum wages automatically indexed to inflation. see koester, g. and grapow, h. (2021), “the prevalence of private sector wage indexation in the euro area and its potential role for the impact of inflation on wages”, published as part of the ecb economic bulletin, issue 7/2021. 17. this is consistent with new survey evidence in the united states. see hajdini et al. (2022), “low passthrough from inflation expectations to income growth expectations: why people dislike inflation”, federal reserve bank of cleveland working paper series no 22-21. 18. deviations of output from the trend are only a good predictor for inflation insofar as they are a good proxy for real marginal costs. see sbordone, a. m. (2002), “prices and unit labor costs: a new test of price stickiness”, journal of monetary economics, vol. 49, issue 2, pp. 265-292. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 14 | stability | 1 | 0.1978775 | maintain price stability | 1 | 0.9996933 |
| 14 | price stability | 2 | 0.1612133 | maintain price | 2 | 0.9996057 |
| 14 | maintain | 3 | 0.0585366 | primary | 3 | 0.9991239 |
| 14 | maintain price | 4 | 0.0427273 | primary objective | 4 | 0.9991236 |
| 14 | maintain price stability | 5 | 0.0427273 | maintain | 5 | 0.9986849 |
| 14 | objective | 6 | 0.0414659 | price stability | 6 | 0.9981574 |
| 14 | primary | 7 | 0.0236383 | stability | 7 | 0.9979809 |
| 14 | mandate | 8 | 0.0196019 | good contribution | 8 | 0.9975871 |
| 14 | primary objective | 9 | 0.0181723 | preserve price stability | 9 | 0.9971505 |
| 14 | achieve | 10 | 0.0164064 | achieve price | 10 | 0.9966647 |
| 14 | contribution | 11 | 0.0118654 | objective | 11 | 0.9964886 |
| 14 | sustainable | 12 | 0.0100995 | safeguard price | 12 | 0.9960931 |
| 14 | contribute | 13 | 0.0098472 | preserve price | 13 | 0.9957931 |
| 14 | employment | 14 | 0.0090063 | achieve price stability | 14 | 0.9957894 |
| 14 | pursue | 15 | 0.0082495 | welfare | 15 | 0.9956631 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mr Noyer: Monetary policymaking in the euro area (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 23 Mar 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-03-01 | 0.305 | price stability as the primary objective of the single monetary policy of the eurosystem the treaty establishing the european community clearly states that the primary objective of the single monetary policy shall be to maintain price stability. furthermore, the treaty requires that, without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the eurosystem shall support the general economic policies in the european community with a view to contributing to the objectives of the community. the latter include, inter alia, sustainable and non-inflationary growth and a high level of employment. the treaty therefore establishes a clear sequence of objectives for the monetary policy of the eurosystem, with price stability unambiguously being the sine qua non. such an assignment of tasks to a central bank is nothing extraordinary. on the contrary, it reflects the consensus which has emerged over the last two decades to the effect that maintaining price stability is the best contribution monetary policy can make to sustainable and non-inflationary output growth and employment perspectives. the belief that monetary policy should be geared towards price stability is firmly rooted in economic theory which clearly demonstrates the costs of inflation, both in terms of allocative inefficiencies and arbitrary redistribution effects. at the same time, these arguments suggest that maintaining price stability in itself contributes to higher growth and employment. several empirical studies have c… |
| Mr Duisenberg reports on the current position and future prospects of the European System of Central Banks (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-12-04 | 0.238 | independence, however, requires a clear mandate. the escb has such a mandate. its primary objective is to maintain price stability. without prejudice to the objective of price stability the escb will support the general economic policies in the community. price stability is not an end in itself: it creates the conditions in which other, higher-order, objectives can be reached. in particular, i share the deep concerns about the unacceptably high level of unemployment in europe. the escb will do what it can to contribute to the solution of this problem. by maintaining price stability inflation expectations and interest rates can be kept at a low level. this creates a stability-oriented environment which fosters sustainable growth, a high level of employment, a fair society and better living standards. moreover, in specific circumstances, if production, inflation and employment all move in the same direction, monetary policy can play some role in stabilising output and employment growth without endangering price stability. however, the contribution from monetary policy can generally be only limited. given the structural nature of the unemployment problems the solution is to be found, above all, in structural reforms aimed at well-functioning labour and product markets. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2006-07-12 | 0.232 | the contribution of monetary policy to economic welfare and stability having explained the more specific and current reasons for the ecb’s recent monetary policy moves, let me now put them in a broader perspective. as you know, the treaty states that, without prejudice to the primary objective of price stability, the eurosystem shall support the general economic policies in the community, aiming at a high level of employment and sustainable and non-inflationary growth. it is sometimes argued that the ecb’s overriding focus on price stability implies that we do not pay sufficient attention to this latter part of our mandate; in other words, that in our policy we do not attach sufficient importance to growth, employment and the welfare of european citizens. i would like to explain to you that these assumptions are misguided: price stability, and economic growth and employment, rather than being substitutes, are complements in a relationship which makes price stability a necessary condition for sustainable growth and job creation. |
| Jean Claude Trichet: The ECB’s monetary policy strategy after the evaluation and clarification of May 2003 | Period_1 | 2003-12-02 | 0.230 | 2.1 the objective of price stability the basis for the strategy is the ecb’s mandate that the primary objective of monetary policy should be to maintain price stability. this mandate, which mirrors the mandates of a very large majority of the eu national central banks before 1998, is enshrined in the maastricht treaty, which was signed by all governments of the european union and ratified by all the parliaments. it is “written in stone”, if you wish. it reflects the well established fact that price stability is a prerequisite for sustainable growth and the creation of employment. price stability preserves and bolsters consumers’ purchasing power, thus supporting consumption. it also enhances the efficacy of the market system in allocating resources. price stability is associated in particular with lower uncertainty and risk premia in financial markets, facilitating financial transactions and ultimately implying lower medium and long-term interest rates. this fosters investment. lasting price stability is also an indispensable nominal anchor for wage developments in line with productivity thereby contributing to preserve the competitiveness of the euro area economy. the evidence provided by experts and academics confirms and even strengthens the conclusion that departures from price stability entail substantial distortions and welfare costs, which manifest themselves thorough various channels. in short, maintaining price stability is the contribution of monetary policy to s… |
| Jürgen Stark: Monetary policy and the euro | Period_1 | 2008-04-16 | 0.210 | the ecb’s mandate the mandate of the ecb is laid down in article 105 of the treaty, which clearly states that the primary objective of the ecb shall be to maintain price stability in the euro area. this specification reflects the fundamental insight that price stability is conducive to sustainable economic growth, job creation, prosperity and social stability. this insight has been established by historical evidence in europe, it has been widely accepted in policy circles and confirmed by a large number of academic studies. why is price stability crucial? • price stability allows people to concentrate on productive activities rather than on strategies to protect their wealth and income against inflation. this is of particular benefit to the weakest groups of society, which have only limited possibilities for hedging against inflation. in this sense, price stability also makes an important contribution to social stability. one should never forget that history is littered with |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges to monetary policy in 2012 | Period_2 | 2011-12-15 | 0.231 |
|
| Mario Draghi: Interview with Neue Zürcher Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-01-23 | 0.177 | and what contribution can the ecb make to more growth? the ecb contribution is to maintain price stability. sustainable growth is possible only with stable prices. we have plenty of instruments to ensure price stability. some of them we have already used, such as forward guidance. and we have shown that we can, if necessary, react quickly. last november, for example, we did not wait. we saw that the inflation path was lower and we acted and, as a result of it, the credibility of our forward guidance became stronger. what we do not see, frankly, is deflation. inflation expectations are firmly anchored in the medium term. |
| Benoît Cœuré: What can monetary policy do about inequality? | Period_2 | 2012-10-18 | 0.171 | price stability and economic stability: the role of ecb measures there is a broader point on the relationship between monetary policy and the fight against poverty, a point that i would like to stress now. social equality is better served by economic stability. a large body of theoretical and applied academic literature and the experience of the past decades indicate that monetary policy’s best contribution to economic stability is to maintain price stability. moreover, credible central banks have a comparative advantage in |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2015-03-24 | 0.171 | price stability and financial stability let me now turn, as suggested by the econ coordinators, to the interaction between price stability and financial stability. price stability is, as you know, the primary objective of the ecb and the eurosystem. and achieving price stability is a necessary condition for financial stability. clearly, unstable inflation developments can distort a wide variety of macroeconomic and financial fluctuations, to the extent that these distortions become harmful for the economy. for example, unstable inflation developments could complicate pricing of assets and blur the signals from relative asset price adjustments with detrimental effects on resource allocation. |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: How innovative should central banks be? | Period_2 | 2014-12-01 | 0.157 | low inflation rates and the catalogue of measures so what does this mean for the current situation? unanimous monetary policy can and must maintain price stability. no more and no less. we are judged on whether we achieve an average rate of inflation for the euro area as a whole which is in line with our target of below, but close to 2%. the commitment to price stability is symmetrical. that means that the ecb must act exactly the same when the target is undershot for a sustained period as when it is overshot. we take a medium-term view when it comes to achieving our target, because our aim is to ensure price stability over the medium term. at the moment, with an inflation rate of 0.4% for the whole euro area, we are a long way off our target. |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economy and the energy transition | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.147 | climate change on the value and the risk profile of these assets to ensure that it does not jeopardise the achievement of our monetary policy objectives. furthermore, without prejudice to our primary goal of safeguarding price stability, a secondary objective of the ecb is to support general economic policies in the eu. these include a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, in line with the eu’s climate neutrality objectives. this means that if faced with a choice between two policy options that have a comparable impact on price stability, we should choose the option that better supports the secondary objective. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.107 | first, there is no stable, long-run trade-off that monetary policy can exploit to permanently lower unemployment at the expense of modestly higher inflation. hence, the best contribution that central banks can make to growth and welfare is to maintain price stability. |
| Luis de Guindos: Policy mix of the future - the role of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.104 | macroprudential policy addresses risks to financial stability. our strategy review acknowledges that financial stability is a necessary condition for price stability. with an impaired transmission mechanism in times of financial turmoil, maintaining price stability is not possible. at the same time, monetary policy itself can have implications for financial stability. accommodative monetary policy can reduce credit risk and prevent debt deflation. but it could also trigger excessive risk taking or encourage higher leverage in the financial system. in times of monetary policy tightening, the converse arguments apply. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.092 | the ecb needs to intensify its efforts to support the green transition while governments need to accelerate their efforts to put the economy on a path towards net zero emissions, the drastic change in the macroeconomic and financial environment over the past year also requires central banks to review the scale and scope of their own contribution to the green transition. without prejudice to the ecb’s primary mandate of price stability, we are obliged to support the eu’s general economic policies in line with our secondary objective. we must therefore ensure that all of the ecb’s policies are aligned with the objectives of the paris agreement to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees celsius. |
| Frank Elderson: Proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank concrete | Period_3 | 2022-03-25 | 0.088 | circumstances and challenges that we face in the pursuit of price stability. making the strategy concrete let me explain how this can be envisaged in practice with an analogy in construction that may speak more to the minds of a general audience than concepts from the world of monetary theorists and lawyers. very much like price stability ensures a solid foundation to support a well- functioning economy, in construction concrete is the bedrock of any structure: homes, office buildings, bridges, wind and solar power stations, and so on. this bedrock is made up of four simple ingredients: cement, gravel, sand and water. every ingredient plays its part. cement is the key bonding agent that holds the concrete together. it is the gravel and sand that give it its strength and structural integrity. the water activates the bonding process and also makes the concrete malleable and allows for flexible application. the optimal concrete mix ratio depends highly on where the concrete will be used. generally, the amount of sand and gravel is important for strength and durability, whereas cement and water add to workability. as one might expect, dry environments call for a relatively higher proportion of water in the concrete mixture, while the opposite holds for moist surroundings. exposure to mechanical or chemical erosion also call for relatively less water to maintain durability. environments subject to freezing and thawing benefit from concrete that contains some air pockets, determ… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | pandemic | 1 | 0.1243129 | pandemic emergency | 1 | 0.9995617 |
| 15 | pepp | 2 | 0.0319853 | pepp | 2 | 0.9993865 |
| 15 | support | 3 | 0.0191720 | pre pandemic | 3 | 0.9989918 |
| 15 | emergency | 4 | 0.0188128 | emergency | 4 | 0.9989484 |
| 15 | purchase | 5 | 0.0156993 | coronavirus | 5 | 0.9988168 |
| 15 | pandemic emergency | 6 | 0.0149808 | pandemic | 6 | 0.9987719 |
| 15 | covid | 7 | 0.0136635 | pandemic emergency purchase | 7 | 0.9985971 |
| 15 | pre | 8 | 0.0129450 | emergency purchase programme | 8 | 0.9982906 |
| 15 | impact | 9 | 0.0127055 | emergency purchase | 9 | 0.9982031 |
| 15 | path | 10 | 0.0124660 | covid | 10 | 0.9977206 |
| 15 | coronavirus | 11 | 0.0122265 | envelope | 11 | 0.9971945 |
| 15 | pre pandemic | 12 | 0.0122265 | pandemic shock | 12 | 0.9971939 |
| 15 | remain | 13 | 0.0121068 | containment | 13 | 0.9970646 |
| 15 | recovery | 14 | 0.0116278 | containment measure | 14 | 0.9967566 |
| 15 | pandemic emergency purchase | 15 | 0.0105500 | pandemic level | 15 | 0.9967122 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The US economy, the euro area economy, and their central banks | Period_1 | 2007-12-10 | 0.030 | months. since 2003, six ecb staff members have spent a total of 40 months at the federal reserve board and district banks as part of the ecb’s external work experience programme. and i do not mention here the many many relationships that are established between the national central banks of the eurosystem and the federal reserve system. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The euro area and its monetary policy | Period_1 | 2007-09-11 | 0.027 | ladies and gentlemen, television dramas tend to be made about medical rescue teams, hospital emergency rooms and heart surgeons, not about the internists who regularly take your blood pressure and check your cholesterol. a central bank has one emergency room which – sporadically – tackles casualties of car accidents and applies angioplasty and bypass surgery. these are, for example, the exceptional decisions on the refinancing on the money market to help it normalize its functioning. but these activities – critical as they are to the functioning of the system – make up a small fraction of their duties. central banks are for the most part made up of legions of internists who stare at your x-rays and engage in sober consultations. at the end, they write diagnostic statements based on regularities and new facts – facts that can change your conditions in the longer run. we call regularities the “deep structure of the economy”. we call the new facts “shocks”. the deep structure is formed by economic institutions, which take considerable time to develop. so central banks, not unlike doctors, take them largely as given. shocks occasionally surprise economic agents, causing them to revise their medium-term outlook. because constant monitoring of regularities and new facts that can change the outlook in a long-lasting fashion is what we practice most often in central banks, central bank watchers should resist the temptation to focus on the drama of emergency medicine. central banki… |
| Jürgen Stark: The ECB’s monetary policy - preserving price stability in times of financial distress | Period_1 | 2009-09-08 | 0.026 | the fiscal factor a discussion of the unwinding of the measures implemented during this crisis would not be complete without a few words on fiscal policy. unsustainable fiscal policies are an upside risk to price stability in a number of countries because we cannot rule out that debt-burdened governments may in the end resort to monetary financing. this is not an option for governments in the euro area, but high inflation in other countries will also make it more difficult to preserve price stability here. the financial crisis has illustrated clearly that capital markets are wary of countries’ fiscal imbalances and that concerns about fiscal sustainability lead to higher risk premia on sovereign debt. spreads have recently narrowed somewhat, but there is no room for complacency. exit strategies from high fiscal deficits need to be developed and consistently implemented in order to contain moral hazard, to forestall a rise in long-term real interest rates and crowding- out effects, and to ensure the sustainability of public finances. bringing sovereign debt ratios onto a sustainable, downward path represents a key priority for fiscal policy-makers. in this respect, the stability and growth pact provides a sound and flexible framework to steer the timing and speed of fiscal consolidation. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Current challenges for the ECB - sustainable non inflationary growth and financial stability | Period_1 | 2004-05-18 | 0.025 | it should also be noted - when talking about the possible conflict - that besides the interest rate “weapon” central banks have some other tools at their disposal to maintain financial stability. these include payment systems tools, such as standards for risk limitation, or communication tools. ultimately, the crisis management measures of emergency liquidity support together with the co-ordination of private sector solutions can be used by a central bank to contribute to financial stability, even if it does not have supervisory responsibilities. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.023 | overall, numerous estimates suggest a small net dampening impact of globalisation on euro area inflation of 0-0.3 percentage point per annum over the last 5-10 years when taking into account the net impact of disinflationary effects of increased trade openness in the manufacturing sector and strong commodity price increases. on the basis of several accounting methodologies, including aggregate and sectoral analysis, ecb research finds a direct dampening effect of import openness on euro area producer price inflation of 0.1-1.0 percentage point per annum for the manufacturing sector over the period 1996 to 2004. 21 likewise, aggregate data shows a dampening impact on euro area consumer price inflation of 0.05-0.2 percentage point per year on average. 22 |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2020-12-11 | 0.289 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 10 december 2020. * * * ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by the commission executive vice-president, mr dombrovskis. while the rebound of economic activity in the third quarter was stronger than expected and the prospects for the roll-out of vaccines are encouraging, the pandemic continues to pose serious risks to public health and to the euro area and global economies. the resurgence in covid-19 cases and the associated containment measures are significantly restricting euro area economic activity, which is expected to have contracted in the fourth quarter of 2020. while activity in the manufacturing sector continues to hold up well, services activity is being severely curbed by the increase in infection rates and the new restrictions on social interaction and mobility. inflation remains very low in the context of weak demand and significant slack in labour and product markets. overall, the incoming data and our staff projections suggest a more pronounced near-term impact of the pandemic on the economy and a more protracted weakness in inflation than previously env… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-04-23 | 0.285 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 22 april 2021. * * * ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of the meeting of the governing council. while the recovery in global demand and the sizeable fiscal stimulus are supporting global and euro area activity, the near-term economic outlook remains clouded by uncertainty about the resurgence of the pandemic and the roll-out of vaccination campaigns. persistently high rates of coronavirus (covid-19) infection and the associated extension and tightening of containment measures continue to constrain economic activity in the short term. looking ahead, progress with vaccination campaigns and the envisaged gradual relaxation of containment measures underpin the expectation of a firm rebound in economic activity in the course of 2021. inflation has picked up over recent months on account of some idiosyncratic and temporary factors and an increase in energy price inflation. at the same time, underlying price pressures remain subdued in the context of significant economic slack and still weak demand. preserving favourable financing conditions over the pandemic period remains essential to reduce uncertainty and bolster confidence, thereby unde… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-01-21 | 0.278 | 21/01/2021 introductory statement to the press conference the purchases under the pepp will be conducted to preserve favourable financing conditions over the pandemic period. we will purchase flexibly according to market conditions and with a view to preventing a tightening of financing conditions that is inconsistent with countering the downward impact of the pandemic on the projected path of inflation. in addition, the flexibility of purchases over time, across asset classes and among jurisdictions will continue to support the smooth transmission of monetary policy. if favourable financing conditions can be maintained with asset purchase flows that do not exhaust the envelope over the net purchase horizon of the pepp, the envelope need not be used in full. equally, the envelope can be recalibrated if required to maintain favourable financing conditions to help counter the negative pandemic shock to the path of inflation. |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_2 | 2020-10-19 | 0.261 | christine lagarde: imfc statement statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at the forty-second meeting of the international monetary and financial committee, virtual imf annual meetings, washington dc, 15 october 2020. * * * the coronavirus (covid-19) pandemic continues to be a truly global challenge. countries all around the world are facing severe human and economic consequences. in the euro area, we have taken decisive action to mitigate the impact of the crisis, both at the national and european levels. however, a global challenge of this nature also requires global solutions and strong international cooperation. at the global level, it will be crucial not to withdraw the policy support prematurely, including on both the monetary and fiscal sides, as reducing support too soon would risk delaying the economic rebound. at the same time, well-tailored structural measures facilitating the re- allocation of resources over time to more viable sectors will be instrumental in minimising permanent damage to our economies and thus key for medium-term growth and the inflation outlook. euro area developments and outlook following the unprecedented fall in output in the first half of the year, economic indicators are pointing to a strong rebound in activity in the third quarter. this rebound is nevertheless uneven across sectors and regions, and a further sustained recovery remains highly dependent on how the pandemic will affect consumption, savin… |
| Philip R. Lane: Macroeconomic policies in the short term and the medium term | Period_2 | 2021-01-27 | 0.258 | pandemic shock. thanks to its scale and flexibility, it both underpins the crucial market stabilisation role of monetary policy (which was urgent in the initial months of the pandemic in the spring and summer of 2020) and is a substantial contributor to the ample monetary accommodation required to counter the negative impact of the pandemic on inflation dynamics. the pepp is a particularly effective and efficient programme for ensuring that the critical middle and long-end segments of the yield curve component of overall financing conditions remain appropriate: the most recent macroeconomic projections suggest that any premature steepening of the yield curve would not be conducive to countering the negative pandemic shock to the projected inflation path. more generally, our commitment to employ the pepp to preserve favourable financing conditions throughout the pandemic period represents a significant easing of the monetary policy stance (and thereby boosts inflation expectations) through the forward guidance it provides. finally, the revisions to the tltro iii programme have also played a central role in easing bank funding conditions in a manner that protects the supply of credit to firms and households. there is considerable uncertainty about pandemic dynamics: the recent intensification of the pandemic in many countries (and the associated containment measures) represents a significant downside risk and also requires the prolongation of various fiscal support measures…. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2021-12-17 | 0.218 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 16 december 2021. * * * good afternoon, the vice-president and i welcome you to our press conference. the euro area economy continues to recover and the labour market is improving, helped by ample policy support. growth is moderating but we expect activity to pick up again strongly in the course of next year. the latest pandemic wave and the omicron variant have prompted some countries to re-introduce tighter restrictions. energy prices have gone up significantly. and in some industries, there are shortages of materials, equipment and labour. these factors are restraining economic activity and are a headwind for the near-term outlook. however, although the public health crisis is still ongoing, many people have been vaccinated and booster campaigns have accelerated. overall, society has become better at coping with the pandemic waves and resulting constraints. this has lessened the pandemic impact on the economy. inflation has risen sharply owing to the surge in energy prices, and also because demand is outpacing constrained supply in some sectors. inflation is expected to remain elevated in the near term, but should ease in the course of next year. the inflation outlook has been revised up, but inflation is still projected to settle be… |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.180 | pmi confidence indicators (diffusion index: 50 = no change) markit. note: the latest observations are for april 2022. turning to the labour market, chart 4 reinforces the message of chart 2: the recovery in the labour market has been asymmetric, with public sector employment above the pre-pandemic level, employment in industry and construction only now reaching the pre-pandemic level and employment in services still below the pre-pandemic level. as indicated in the right panel of chart 4, the distance to the pre-pandemic level is larger for the intensive margin (hours worked per employee) than for the extensive margin (numbers employed). at an aggregate level, the ongoing reduction in the unemployment rate and the recovery in the labour force participation rate underline the overall improvement in the labour market. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.177 | conclusions my overall assessment is that the monetary policy response of the ecb to the pandemic has been a success. our ecb policy package (pepp, revised tltro iii, collateral easing and supervisory measures) preserved favourable financing conditions and enabled the large-scale fiscal response that was crucial to mitigating the economic and financial impact of the pandemic on households and firms. in particular, the pepp has been a proportionate, well-designed and necessary asset purchase programme that fulfilled its dual role of stabilising financial markets and reversing the initial adverse impact of the pandemic on the projected inflation path. as recently emphasised by president lagarde, flexibility is a special principle for conducting monetary policy in a monetary union, as we must continually focus on ensuring that policy is transmitted evenly to all parts of the euro area.[13] with diverging initial conditions, exogenous shocks can affect economies asymmetrically. if this leads to financial fragmentation, the transmission of monetary policy can be disrupted. the pandemic was a particularly extreme exogenous shock and the pepp has shown that, under stressed conditions, flexibility in the design and conduct of asset purchases has helped to counter the impaired transmission of monetary policy and made the governing council’s efforts to achieve its goal more effective. within the governing council’s mandate, under stressed conditions, flexibility will remain an eleme… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2021-09-09 | 0.169 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 9 september 2021. * * * good afternoon, the vice-president and i welcome you to our press conference. the rebound phase in the recovery of the euro area economy is increasingly advanced. output is expected to exceed its pre-pandemic level by the end of the year. with more than 70 per cent of european adults fully vaccinated, the economy has largely reopened, allowing consumers to spend more and companies to increase production. while rising immunity to the coronavirus means that the impact of the pandemic is now less severe, the global spread of the delta variant could yet delay the full reopening of the economy. the current increase in inflation is expected to be largely temporary and underlying price pressures are building up only slowly. the inflation outlook in our new staff projections has been revised slightly upwards, but in the medium term inflation is foreseen to remain well below our two per cent target. financing conditions for firms, households and the public sector have remained favourable since our previous quarterly assessment in june. favourable financing conditions are essential for the economy to continue its recovery and to offset the negative impact of the pandemic on inflation. based on a joint assessment of financi… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.164 | market-based lift-off dates (date of lift-off; date of observation) bloomberg, refinitiv and ecb calculations. notes: the market-based lift-off date is the date during which the €str forward rate exceeds the current €str rate by at least 10 basis points or 25 basis points. the latest observations are for 18 march 2022. as i described in earlier contributions, the pepp was designed with a dual role.[4] first, alongside the ecb’s other monetary policy instruments, asset purchases were the most important mechanism for delivering the additional monetary accommodation required to support the economic recovery and safeguard price stability in the medium term. second, the flexibility embedded in the pepp – across time, asset classes and jurisdictions – was essential in enabling the ecb to stabilise financial markets in an efficient and effective manner. the forward guidance for pepp was connected to the pandemic: net pepp purchases would continue until the governing council judged that the coronavirus crisis phase was over. in december 2020, the initial calendar guidance that the pandemic crisis phase would last until at least june 2021 was extended to march 2022. the march 2022 end date was confirmed in december 2021, while the calendar guidance on the reinvestment horizon was revised until at least the end of 2024. in any case, the future roll-off of the pepp portfolio will be managed to avoid interference with the appropriate monetary policy stance. the calibration of the pepp… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16 | reform | 1 | 0.1164861 | structural reform | 1 | 0.9997372 |
| 16 | structural | 2 | 0.0764551 | reform | 2 | 0.9997371 |
| 16 | structural reform | 3 | 0.0570515 | product market | 3 | 0.9985093 |
| 16 | growth | 4 | 0.0357249 | lisbon | 4 | 0.9985084 |
| 16 | market | 5 | 0.0312964 | structural | 5 | 0.9983332 |
| 16 | labour | 6 | 0.0236632 | product | 6 | 0.9974570 |
| 16 | product | 7 | 0.0174283 | growth potential | 7 | 0.9972834 |
| 16 | flexibility | 8 | 0.0163212 | market reform | 8 | 0.9969288 |
| 16 | enhance | 9 | 0.0157385 | flexibility | 9 | 0.9968423 |
| 16 | potential | 10 | 0.0141653 | agendum | 10 | 0.9965818 |
| 16 | employment | 11 | 0.0131747 | labour market reform | 11 | 0.9960491 |
| 16 | improve | 12 | 0.0128251 | lisbon strategy | 12 | 0.9950760 |
| 16 | labour market | 13 | 0.0123589 | enhance | 13 | 0.9945517 |
| 16 | good | 14 | 0.0115431 | competition | 14 | 0.9943828 |
| 16 | competition | 15 | 0.0111353 | lisbon agendum | 15 | 0.9942410 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Otmar Issing: The euro and the Lisbon agenda | Period_1 | 2004-06-04 | 0.396 | all agree that stepping up structural reforms in these areas is indispensible for improving the euro area’s unsatisfactory growth potential and its ability to create employment, even more so after the eu has been enlarged to countries that have substantially lower labour costs. the euro area’s insufficient flexibility is manifested in the high rate of unemployment, which amounted to 8.8% in 2003. this reveals shortcomings in the implementation of structural refoms that would improve the use of the euro area’s productive forces and increase their flexibility in response to economic shocks. it is thus crucial that the lisbon agenda’s impetus is maintained, which must manifest itself in increased efforts to reach the agenda’s 2010 targets. there is, however, still a long way to go. for example, raising the euro area overall employment rate to 70% by 2010 can be expected to require an additional 15.3 million jobs, although hiding significantly varying challenges for different groups in the labour market. whereas, for example, significant progress has been made to raise female employment, employment growth for older workers aged 55-64 would have to substantially exceed its annual average of 1.7% between 1996 and 2002 to achieve the employment target for older workers of 50% by 2010. making the lisbon agenda a success therefore requires particular efforts in the field of labour market reform to open up additional employment opportunities. at the same time, further structural ref… |
| Lucas Papademos: Presentation of the European Central Bank’s Annual Report for 2004 | Period_1 | 2005-04-28 | 0.374 | and refocus priorities on growth and employment”. member states urgently need to promote innovation and human capital formation, establish a regulatory environment which is friendlier for businesses, accelerate market liberalisation and increase labour utilisation and labour market flexibility. against this background, attention must now shift towards implementing the newly refocused lisbon agenda. closing the implementation gap in all member states is essential in order to reap the full benefits of structural reforms in terms of a higher growth potential and a higher employment rate in the medium term, as well as improved consumer and business confidence in the short term. the new governance framework introduced by the european council should support this process by fostering effective decision-making and priority-setting, and by increasing national ownership. peer support and, where necessary, peer pressure need to be employed to push the lisbon strategy forward. in this context, benchmarking on the basis of sensibly defined quantitative indicators, taking account of national circumstances, would be a useful tool and a welcome driver for public discussion. moreover, this would raise public awareness of the fact that successful implementation of structural reforms is indeed possible in eu member states and would show that structural reforms lead to important benefits. as for the ecb, we will continue to support the lisbon process by maintaining price stability, which fost… |
| Otmar Issing: The euro and the Lisbon agenda | Period_1 | 2004-06-04 | 0.363 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Ten years of the euro - successes and challenges | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.325 | structural reforms structural reforms in the countries of the euro area are very important for two reasons in particular. they are necessary in order to enhance the flexibility and resilience of the euro area economy and to increase its growth potential. such structural reforms relate to the markets for goods and services, and the labour market. reforms of the goods and service markets should strengthen competition and accelerate an effective restructuring. an example of successful reform is the telecommunications sector, where liberalisation has enhanced competition, increased the variety of products and lowered prices, to the benefit of consumers. labour market reforms should have two goals: to promote appropriate wage-setting and to facilitate labour mobility – the mobility between sectors of the economy and between regions. flexible job markets are important particularly in a monetary union. exchange rate adjustments are not possible in response to economic developments and changes in competitiveness. therefore, wage policy in the individual countries bears a special responsibility. it largely determines labour costs and thus a country’s competitiveness. it must take into account productivity, the employment situation and the competitiveness of the respective country. the relative cost competitiveness of the various economies in the euro area has to be monitored very closely. the present situation should be a catalyst, pushing further forward structural reforms in the … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Economic management in a large currency zone like the euro area | Period_1 | 2007-10-08 | 0.324 | evidence suggests that it is still low in the euro area – both across countries and within countries – due to several formal barriers across the euro area. this is in clear contrast to the situation in the united states where labour mobility is considerable and greatly contributes to the adjustment process. hence, more needs to be undertaken to enhance labour mobility in europe including by removing the remaining barriers and by undertaking structural reforms to which i now turn. c) the third principle is the need to monitor closely the implementation of structural reforms. earlier i referred to some factors commonly contributing to inflation and growth differentials, such as the detrimental role played by pervasive price and wage rigidities, excessive labour market regulation and the imperfect competition observed in several important sectors of the euro area economies. this has been well known for quite some time. however, there is a lot at stake here and action is urgently needed. put simply, all euro area countries could benefit from structural reform, although the extent differs from country to country. reforms are essential in order to raise factor productivity and potential output, to create new jobs, to achieve lower prices and higher real incomes, and to increase the resilience and flexibility of the economy. the need for reform is clearly signalled by the fact that the euro area’s potential output growth appears to have moved to the lower bound of its previously … |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-12-05 | 0.273 | particular, consolidation measures should be growth-friendly and have a medium-term perspective, so as both to improve public services and minimise the distortionary effects of taxation. at the same time, there is a need to push ahead with product and labour market reforms, in order to improve competitiveness, raise potential growth, generate employment opportunities and foster the adaptability of our economies. we are now at your disposal for questions. |
| Yves Mersch: Ways towards more dynamic growth | Period_2 | 2015-07-22 | 0.245 | structural reforms are vital yet we cannot conceive of monetary policy as being isolated from other policy areas. in short, the more the structural conditions in the member states vary, the more difficult it is to take care of price stability in the whole of the euro area with a single monetary policy. that’s why we don’t tire of talking about structural reforms. this term occurs in around one- third of all the published speeches of the executive board members. by way of comparison, it occurs in only around 2% of speeches given by the federal reserve bank presidents. 2 with our monetary policy we can support economic growth. but it will only have its full effect if the governments of the euro area countries carry out sensible reforms to improve their competitiveness and thus create conditions for sustainable growth. only when the structural framework conditions permit profitable economic activity will businesses make full use of improved funding conditions. it would therefore be naïve to believe that economic measures alone – including monetary policy – could lead to a lasting return to stability and growth. structural reforms are also necessary in order to counter any possible future shocks more effectively. more flexible labour and product markets increase the resilience of countries in which the adjustments are also made via prices. that means, for instance, that more flexible wages lessen the adjustments needed in the labour market in an economic downturn. the risks of… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2012-01-13 | 0.241 | comprising a fundamental restatement of the fiscal rules together with the fiscal commitments that euro area governments have made, is an important contribution to ensuring the long-run sustainability of public finances in the euro area countries. the wording of the rules needs to be unambiguous and effective. the further development of the european financial stability tools should make the operation of the european financial stability facility and the european stability mechanism more effective. the swift deployment of these tools is now urgently needed. concerning the involvement of the private sector in financial assistance for indebted countries, we welcome the reaffirmation that the decisions taken on 21 july and 26 and 27 october 2011 concerning greek debt are unique and exceptional. to accompany fiscal consolidation, the governing council calls for the urgent implementation of bold and ambitious structural reforms. going hand in hand, fiscal consolidation and structural reforms would strengthen confidence, growth prospects and job creation. key reforms should be rapidly carried out to help the euro area countries to improve competitiveness, increase the flexibility of their economies and enhance their longer-term growth potential. product market reforms should focus on fully opening up markets to increased competition. labour market reforms should focus on removing rigidities and enhancing wage flexibility. we are now at your disposal for questions. |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-09-06 | 0.238 | and efficiency of public services with minimising distortionary effects of taxation. in terms of economic policies, product market reforms to increase competitiveness will facilitate the creation of new businesses, support the tradable goods sector and foster job creation, while high unemployment rates require decisive structural reforms to reduce rigidities in labour markets and to increase labour demand. i am now at your disposal for questions. |
| Peter Praet: Turn cyclical recovery into a structural recovery | Period_2 | 2016-10-13 | 0.232 | it is therefore imperative that decisive action is taken now in order to propel the on-going cyclical recovery into a structural recovery. long-run growth depends on the efficiency with which resources are allocated, the ease of doing business, the incentives for investment and confidence in public institutions. making strides in these areas requires structural reforms aimed at supporting investment, enhancing productivity and increasing flexibility in the markets for labour, goods and services. structural reforms will go a long way, not only in bolstering the trend of long-run growth but also in reducing the fluctuations around that trend. 6 such reforms are the means of addressing the ongoing adjustment difficulties faced by the economy and of preventing secular stagnation – which is not inevitable. however, such reforms are outside of the scope of monetary policy and fall under the remit of other national and european policymakers. just as persistently low potential growth can create a negative circle, structural reforms and the ensuing increase in the economy’s growth potential and in its adjustment capacity – or flexibility to respond to shocks – can create a virtuous circle. higher potential growth feeds into expectations of higher incomes and also of higher tax revenues, increasing the resilience of public finances. at the same time, higher potential growth raises the natural rate of interest. together, this means that fiscal and monetary policies have more space to… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-12-20 | 0.074 | fiscal support measures to shield the economy from the impact of high energy prices should be temporary, targeted and tailored to preserving incentives to consume less energy. fiscal measures falling short of these principles are likely to exacerbate inflationary pressures, which would necessitate a stronger monetary policy response. moreover, in line with the eu’s economic governance framework, fiscal policies should be oriented towards making our economy more productive and gradually bringing down high public debt. policies to enhance the euro area’s supply capacity, especially in the energy sector, can help reduce price pressures in the medium term. to that end, governments should swiftly implement their investment and structural reform plans under the next generation eu programme. the reform of the eu’s economic governance framework should be concluded rapidly. 2/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.063 | bottlenecks are easing. taken together, these factors are significantly clouding the outlook for the second half of 2022 and beyond. at the same time, economic activity continues to benefit from the reopening of the economy, a strong labour market and fiscal policy support. in particular, the full reopening of the economy is supporting spending in the services sector. as people start to travel again, tourism is expected to help the economy in the third quarter of this year. consumption is being supported by the savings that households built up during the pandemic and by a strong labour market. fiscal policy is helping to cushion the impact of the war in ukraine for those bearing the brunt of higher energy prices. temporary and targeted measures should be tailored so as to limit the risk of fuelling inflationary pressures. fiscal policies in all countries should aim at preserving debt sustainability, as well as raising the growth potential in a sustainable manner to enhance the recovery. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-09-08 | 0.061 | restrictions. over the summer, as people travelled more, countries with large tourism sectors benefited especially. at the same time, businesses suffered from high energy costs and continued supply bottlenecks, although the latter have been gradually easing. while buoyant tourism has been supporting economic growth during the third quarter, we expect the economy to slow down substantially over the remainder of this year. there are four main reasons behind this. first, high inflation is dampening spending and production throughout the economy, and these headwinds are reinforced by gas supply disruptions. second, the strong rebound in demand for services that came with the reopening of the economy will lose steam in the coming months. third, the weakening in global demand, also in the context of tighter monetary policy in many major economies, and the worsening terms of trade will mean less support for the euro area economy. fourth, uncertainty remains high and confidence is falling sharply. at the same time, the labour market has remained robust, supporting economic activity. employment increased by more than 600,000 people in the second quarter of 2022 and the unemployment rate stood at a historical low of 6.6 per cent in july. total hours worked increased further, by 0.6 per cent, in the second quarter of 2022 and have surpassed their pre-pandemic levels. looking ahead, the slowing economy is likely to lead to some increase in the unemployment rate. fiscal support measure… |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-11-29 | 0.055 | in the current environment of high inflation, fiscal policy needs to be considerate to not add to inflationary pressures. fiscal support should therefore be targeted, tailored and temporary. it should be targeted, so that the size of the fiscal impulse is limited and benefits those who need it most; tailored, so that it does not weaken incentives to cut energy demand; and temporary, so that the fiscal impulse is not maintained longer than strictly necessary. at the same time, governments should pursue fiscal policies that show they are committed to gradually bringing down high public debt ratios. delivering on the ecb’s mandate will create the conditions for strong and sustainable growth with benefits for everyone. yet, achieving price stability is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. other policy areas will need to act. removing constraints on economic growth through an ambitious economic reform agenda at the eu and national levels will not only rebuild supply that has been impaired by the recent shocks. it will also, over time, strengthen the resilience of our economy in a world that is becoming less predictable. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.052 | monthly smooth local projections (see jarociński, m. (2021), “estimating the fed’s unconventional policy shocks”, working paper series, no 2585, ecb, august (revised june 2022)). 20. obstfeld, m. (2022), op. cit. 21. recent analyses show that the euro area lags notably behind the united states in terms of labour market efficiency (although levels for individual euro area countries vary, see chart 1 in sondermann, d. (2018), “towards more resilient economies: the role of well-functioning economic structures”, journal of policy modeling, vol. 40, no 1, pp. 97-117). productivity growth has also generally been lower in the euro area than in the united states for some time (see chart 7 in masuch, k. et al. (eds.) (2018), “structural policies in the euro area”, occasional paper series, no 210, ecb, june). these factors may limit the euro area’s relative capacity to bounce back from a recession. 22. esrb (2022), “warning of the european systemic risk board”, 22 september. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17 | exchange | 1 | 0.1469371 | exchange | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 17 | exchange rate | 2 | 0.1154757 | exchange rate | 2 | 0.9999124 |
| 17 | development | 3 | 0.0213968 | appreciation | 3 | 0.9980725 |
| 17 | external | 4 | 0.0204805 | euro exchange | 4 | 0.9977196 |
| 17 | account | 5 | 0.0191059 | euro exchange rate | 5 | 0.9977190 |
| 17 | economy | 6 | 0.0181896 | dollar | 6 | 0.9975466 |
| 17 | currency | 7 | 0.0160514 | current account | 7 | 0.9974593 |
| 17 | current | 8 | 0.0154405 | foreign exchange | 8 | 0.9974545 |
| 17 | strong | 9 | 0.0136078 | vis | 9 | 0.9970207 |
| 17 | foreign | 10 | 0.0131497 | foreign | 10 | 0.9968435 |
| 17 | appreciation | 11 | 0.0128442 | external | 11 | 0.9967510 |
| 17 | dollar | 12 | 0.0125388 | surplus | 12 | 0.9965831 |
| 17 | adjustment | 13 | 0.0107060 | exchange rate policy | 13 | 0.9963574 |
| 17 | vis | 14 | 0.0105533 | east | 14 | 0.9963159 |
| 17 | current account | 15 | 0.0100951 | account deficit | 15 | 0.9956094 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: Globalisation, inflation, imbalances and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-07 | 0.332 | globalisation and external imbalances the two forces i mentioned earlier – rapid growth in large emerging market economies that have become integrated in the world economy combined with the substantial increase in energy and commodity prices – have resulted in large excess savings, especially in east asia and in oil-exporting countries. these excess savings (that is, savings greater than the investment opportunities at home have been channelled to industrial countries, notably the united states, financing its increasing current account deficit, which in 2005 reached a historic record, exceeding usd 800 billion, or around 6.4% of gdp. in the us, the main factors driving the widening of its current account deficit in 2005 were household borrowing and fiscal deficits, while the corporate sector remained a net saver. is the whole world contributing to these imbalances? and are we all affected? (see chart 9). not all economic areas are running large net current account positions: the us deficit is mirrored, and is made possible, by growing surpluses in east asia and in oil-exporting countries. in the euro area the current account has remained close to balance. though not all economic areas contribute equally to the external imbalances, all are affected nonetheless. the extent to which we are all affected depends on the sustainability of this constellation of international savings and investment. despite some dissenting voices, the broad consensus view is that this constellation… |
| Jürgen Stark: Does the euro area need an economic government? | Period_1 | 2008-01-23 | 0.266 | therefore, exchange rate policy is also one of the key aspects of the current debate about the pros and cons of an economic government. the governance framework of the euro area as regards exchange rate policy is specified in article 111 of the treaty. the treaty authorises the council to conclude formal agreements on an exchange rate system for the euro and to formulate general orientations for exchange rate policy – after consulting the ecb in order to ensure that any decision is consistent with monetary policy’s overriding objective of price stability. thus far, and with good reason, neither of these procedures has been implemented. during the preparations for emu it was decided that the euro would be a freely floating currency and i do not see any convincing arguments in support of a departure from this principle. however, my scepticism with regard to the implementation of an active exchange rate policy in the euro area does not mean that developments in the exchange rate of the euro are neglected in the ecb’s deliberations on monetary policy. on the contrary, we at the ecb are well aware of the role played by the exchange rate as a source of external shocks in the euro area and as an important link in the monetary transmission mechanism. movements in the euro’s exchange rate are duly taken into account in the ecb’s economic analysis of the short to medium-term risks to price stability. there is therefore no reason to be concerned that the ecb is neglecting the implica… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Real and nominal convergence ¿ policy challenges | Period_1 | 2007-11-21 | 0.241 |
|
| Mr Erçel discusses the monetary policy of the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 1999-01-08 | 0.195 | eleven of the 15 countries in the european monetary system will link their domestic currencies to the euro by january 1, 1999. they will stop issuing their own currencies three years later. there will no longer be independent domestic monetary and exchange rate policies. instead, monetary and exchange rate policies will reflect the needs of the euro region as a whole, as determined by the european central bank. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Adoption of the European Parliament resolution on the ECB’s 2009 Annual Report | Period_1 | 2010-11-29 | 0.180 | of the advanced economies is in the interest of the united states, of europe and of the entire international community. on the other hand, the second topic concerns the currencies of emerging market economies which have current account surpluses and exchange rates that are not sufficiently flexible. on this issue, the international community agrees – and it was restated in korea last week – that moving towards more market-determined exchange rate systems, enhancing exchange rate stability to reflect underlying economic fundamentals, and refraining from competitive devaluation of currencies, are in the interest of the emerging economies concerned and of the international community. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Le Figaro | Period_2 | 2014-04-10 | 0.166 | what should be done to weaken the euro further? another reason why the euro is at this level vis-à-vis the us dollar is that the euro area has recorded large and growing current account surpluses – [editor’s note: forecast at €286 billion for 2014]. this is new. before, the current account of the euro area was generally balanced. it is not the case that germany, for example, exports too much, as is sometimes argued, but that euro area domestic demand is weak. from this perspective, the best solution is therefore to support domestic demand by investing, and that is also a way of preparing europe for the future! but, these exchange rate issues go beyond just the european framework. |
| Peter Praet: Interview in Il Sole 24 Ore | Period_2 | 2015-03-25 | 0.161 | the fall of the euro has been the most visible consequence of qe. there is a disconnect between the state of the economy and monetary policy, especially in respect of the dollar. will the fed be “patient” about a further rise of the dollar? currencies will reflect fundamentals and that is basically what we have seen. i cannot comment further on the exchange rate movements. from the european point of view, the decline of the effective exchange rate has been relatively modest. |
| Benoît Cœuré: The transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy in standard and non-standard times | Period_2 | 2017-09-14 | 0.160 | on the left-hand side of slide 3 you can see initial evidence to support this claim. ecb staff find that less than half of the euro’s exchange rate variations vis-à-vis the us dollar over the past almost 20 years was purely exogenous.8 more often than not, exchange rates move in response to changes in relative demand, supply or monetary policy. and each of these shocks might entail a different response from domestic prices. this you can see on the right-hand side. what this chart shows you is that there are occasions when euro area core inflation rises, rather than falls, following an exchange rate appreciation – which is entirely at odds with our traditional thinking on the pass-through. perhaps unsurprisingly, this is typically the case when the exchange rate appreciates in response to a favourable demand shock. the logic is as follows: as the economy operates above capacity, inflationary pressures emerge that are sufficient to fully offset the disinflationary effects coming from the exchange rate channel. the chart also shows that changes in the relative monetary policy stance have, on average, the expected impact on consumer prices: if euro area policy tightens, the exchange rate appreciates and inflation falls. in other words, there is no empirical evidence that the exchange rate channel of monetary policy is inactive. but its strength will critically depend on the overall state of the economy, and not on the type of policy measure, standard or non-standard. this is m… |
| Benoît Cœuré: The transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy in standard and non-standard times | Period_2 | 2017-09-14 | 0.153 | of course, this also means that should the contributions of the different shocks driving the exchange rate change over time, then also our assessment of the impact on inflation will have to change – expansion or not. exogenous shocks to the exchange rate, if persistent, can lead to an unwarranted tightening of financial conditions with undesirable consequences for the inflation outlook. as shown on slide 6, the emerging disconnect between the euro’s exchange rate vis-à- vis the us dollar and the long term interest rate differential between the us and germany may suggest that we are entering such a situation. against this background, the recent volatility in the exchange rate represents a source of uncertainty which requires monitoring. the new keynesian is curve in the euro area this brings me to the second channel i would like to discuss this morning: the effects of monetary policy on real economic activity. 7 / 14 |
| Benoît Cœuré: The transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy in standard and non-standard times | Period_2 | 2017-09-14 | 0.142 | ball, l., (1998), “policy rules for open economies”, nber working paper no. 6760. bernanke, b. and a. s. blinder (1988), “credit, money, and aggregate demand”, american economic review, vol. 78, no 2, papers and proceedings of the one-hundredth annual meeting of the american economic association, 435–439. bernanke, b. and m. gertler (1995), “inside the black box: the credit channel of monetary policy transmission”, journal of economic perspectives 9 (fall), 27–48. blattner, t.s. and m. joyce (2016), “net debt supply shocks in the euro area and the implications for qe”, ecb working paper no 1957. blattner, t.s. and j. swarbrick (2017), “monetary policy and cross-border interbank market fragmentation: lessons from the crisis”, mimeo. campa, j.m. and l.s goldberg (2008), “pass-through of exchange rates to consumption prices: what has changed and why?”, in ito, t. and rose, a.k. (eds.), international financial issues in the pacific rim: global imbalances, financial liberalization, and exchange rate policy, university of chicago press, chicago, 2008, 139–176. cœuré, b. (2017), “scars or scratches? hysteresis in the euro area”, speech at the international center for monetary and banking studies, geneva, 19 may. comunale, m. and d. kunovac (2017), “exchange rate pass-through in the euro area”, ecb working paper no 2003. corsetti, g. and l. dedola (2005), “a macroeconomic model of international price discrimination”, journal of international economics, vol. 67, issue 1, 129–155. d… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.182 | curve brings about an appreciation of the euro.[19] simple correlations between the exchange rate and interest rate expectations suggest that this relation has held up reasonably well historically and more recently in terms of the euro-us dollar bilateral exchange rate as well as in the cross-section of the effective exchange rates of major currencies. ecb model-based decompositions of financial asset price movements across the united states and the euro area point to a prominent role of us monetary policy tightening in driving the increase in euro area yields, the correction in euro area equity markets, and the recent euro depreciation. in fact, us monetary policy spillovers have had at least as much of an impact on euro area asset prices and the euro-dollar exchange rate over the last 12 months as ecb monetary policy actions.[20] at the same time, while both rate normalisation and balance sheet normalisation in the euro area, all other things being equal, can be expected to exert appreciation pressure on the euro exchange rate, rate policies exert a stronger exchange rate effect than balance sheet policies.[21] |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.103 |
|
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.101 |
|
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.101 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.069 | drivers of the euro-us dollar exchange rate (cumulative changes since january 2022, percentage changes and percentage point contributions) ecb and ecb calculations. notes: a decrease denotes a euro depreciation against the us dollar. the decomposition of exchange rate changes is based on an extended two-country bayesian vector autoregression (bvar) model including ten-year euro area overnight index swap rate, euro area stock price, eur/usd, ten-year euro area overnight index swap-us treasury spread, us stock prices and the relative citi commodities terms-of-trade index in the euro area compared to the united states. an adverse euro area terms-of-trade shock is assumed to depreciate the euro against the dollar, reduce euro area equity prices, and increase euro area yields and yield spreads against the united states. identification via sign and narrative restrictions, using daily data. the latest observation is for 24 october 2022. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18 | debt | 1 | 0.0799342 | ratio | 1 | 0.9990363 |
| 18 | government | 2 | 0.0704619 | public debt | 2 | 0.9990353 |
| 18 | public | 3 | 0.0498597 | debt | 3 | 0.9981568 |
| 18 | fiscal | 4 | 0.0486757 | budget | 4 | 0.9980725 |
| 18 | finance | 5 | 0.0328096 | debt ratio | 5 | 0.9977177 |
| 18 | ratio | 6 | 0.0280735 | revenue | 6 | 0.9973705 |
| 18 | gdp | 7 | 0.0272446 | deficit | 7 | 0.9972823 |
| 18 | country | 8 | 0.0245214 | fiscal stimulus | 8 | 0.9971912 |
| 18 | deficit | 9 | 0.0241661 | automatic | 9 | 0.9971525 |
| 18 | tax | 10 | 0.0223901 | gdp ratio | 10 | 0.9971023 |
| 18 | budget | 11 | 0.0194300 | automatic stabiliser | 11 | 0.9968440 |
| 18 | public debt | 12 | 0.0159963 | stabiliser | 12 | 0.9967574 |
| 18 | sustainability | 13 | 0.0155227 | government debt | 13 | 0.9967550 |
| 18 | public finance | 14 | 0.0130362 | budget deficit | 14 | 0.9966638 |
| 18 | fiscal policy | 15 | 0.0118522 | government | 15 | 0.9966608 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Juergen Stark: Contributions of central bank statistics in a global context | Period_1 | 2010-10-25 | 0.327 | it would, of course, be useful to compare productivity developments in a wider range of sectors in the euro area with those of the united states. but this is not yet possible, as quarterly productivity developments are not produced at the same sectoral breakdown in the us. (the us disaggregates only to the non-farm business sector and the manufacturing sector.) the main comparable indicators used for fiscal policy analysis are the general government deficit, expenditure and debt. harmonised deficit figures show strong deficit deterioration in the euro area and in the us for the last two years. these were driven by sharp declines in tax revenues as well as expansionary fiscal policies. japan 6 displayed a deficit between 6 and 8% of gdp for most of the early 2000s as a consequence of the japanese crises in the 1990s, with some improvement for the period 2006–2008. in 2009, the fiscal outlook deteriorated again with an estimated deficit of around 7% of gdp. 7 again, a direct comparison is not possible without adjustments, 8 due to methodological differences in their compilation. 9 the expenditure-to-gdp ratio 10 indicates the size of the government sector. comparable figures show a convergence of expenditure levels in the us and japan, at around 37% of gdp. the relative importance of the government sector in the euro area is much higher, with a current expenditure ratio just above 50% of gdp. when interpreting these figures, an important caveat concerns the institutional dif… |
| Jürgen Stark: The global financial crisis and the role of monetary policy | Period_1 | 2011-09-26 | 0.314 | lehman brothers. subsequently, financial woes spilled over into the real economy, resulting in recessions in almost all industrialised countries. monetary and fiscal policy countered this with unprecedented vigour. monetary policy responded with very low interest rates and a wide range of non-standard measures. fiscal policy allowed public deficits to widen and set up rescue packages for troubled financial institutions. to a large extent thanks to these measures, economic activity rebounded in 2010. but at the same time, countries that had entered the financial crisis with large public and private debt burdens started to have serious problems accessing sovereign debt markets. in 2011 the tensions in sovereign debt markets intensified further due to increasing concerns about long-term debt sustainability in various parts of the world. these developments have further threatened financial stability as financial institutions hold a significant share of troubled countries’ government bonds. here, the onus is clearly on governments to engage in the necessary fiscal corrections. however, this does not only mean exiting from the fiscal stimulus and support measures taken in response to the crisis. even with these measures reversed, fiscal policy still faces at least three important challenges. first, excluding crisis-related stimulus measures, most advanced economies are still left with historically high deficit-to-gdp ratios, which, in the context of today, are largely structural… |
| Jürgen Stark: The economic crisis and the response of fiscal and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2009-06-15 | 0.311 | for 2009 and 2010, the european commission estimates the overall fiscal impulse to the euro area economy, as measured by the change in the general government deficit, to be about 4.6% of gdp, 60% of which is due to the automatic stabilisers. while the recent coordinated fiscal loosening has been broadly accepted as a legitimate and necessary step in the short run, given the exceptional economic circumstances, it also entails a significant fiscal burden. the latest available economic forecasts (ec spring 2009 economic forecasts) point to dramatic developments in euro area public finances. in addition to a rapidly deteriorating general government deficit, which is expected to be above 6% of euro area gdp in 2010, the euro area debt ratio will increase by about 15 percentage points to above 80% of gdp by 2010. in both 2009 and 2010 13 out of 16 euro area countries are expected to have a budget deficit above the 3% of gdp reference value. these figures are very high, though they compare favourably with other major economic regions that have also provided a substantial fiscal impulse to their economy. the budget deficit in both the united kingdom and the united states is projected to be about 14% of gdp in 2010, whereas in japan it is projected to be about 9% of gdp. against this backdrop, euro area countries must reject calls for additional fiscal loosening. in the current environment, any further fiscal stimulus is likely to be counterproductive as it could hamper the economi… |
| Jürgen Stark: Central banking after the financial crisis | Period_1 | 2011-02-23 | 0.288 | crisis output and correspondingly lower post-crisis tax revenues, pre-crisis spending levels are no longer affordable. secondly, government debt-to-gdp ratios are now much higher than before the crisis and the guarantees provided to the financial sector have added to the potential liabilities [slide 7: government debt – advanced economies]. thirdly, over the next two to three decades, governments face rising costs related to ageing populations. due to the combination of these factors, questions are not surprisingly being asked about the ability of some governments to bring their public finances onto a sustainable path over the medium term. 9 reflecting this problem, the latest round of the financial crisis since early may 2010 was triggered by concerns about the current and future state of the public finances in some euro area countries [slide 8: government debt – ea countries]. what are the implications of these developments for central banking? the state of the public finances clearly matters for central banks. at least from a theoretical point of view, one of the reasons is that monetary policy could in principle be used – or abused – to alleviate the government’s budgetary woes. this can be done via two channels: first, the real value of nominal government debt – in particular of long-term maturity – could be at least partly inflated away via unexpected higher inflation. secondly, expansionary monetary policies could aim at generating substantial seigniorage income in … |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Economic policies on the two sides of the Atlantic (why) are they different? | Period_1 | 2008-11-11 | 0.282 | 3.2 comparing the importance of automatic stabilisers and discretionary policies in the euro area and in the united states if we compare budget policy on the two sides of the atlantic, we see that the automatic 17 stabilisers play a more important role in the euro area. first of all, the greater the percentage of government spending over gdp, the greater the budget position’s response to fluctuations in economic activity. automatic stabilisers are smaller in the united states, where government is smaller in relative terms (government 18 spending is worth 37% of gdp, whereas it tops the 45% mark in the euro area countries). furthermore, the level of government welfare services (including unemployment insurance, social security and welfare services, and senior citizens’ assistance insurance) is systematically lower in the united states than in the euro area countries; at present it stands 19 at 12% of gdp in the united states and at 15% of gdp in the euro area. thirdly, the importance of automatic stabilisers depends also on the taxation system, in terms of its level |
| Fabio Panetta: Monetary autonomy in a globalised world | Period_2 | 2021-04-27 | 0.225 | points. this is equivalent to firms and households taking on €900 billion in extra debt at a time when debt needs to be reduced.[25] that could depress investment and consumption and further reduce inflation. for governments, a similar exercise implies a 5 percentage point increase in the public debt ratio compared with the baseline over five years, and a 10 percentage point increase over ten years.[26] and for countries facing debt-to-gdp ratios of around 150%, ten years of inflation undershooting could increase their debt ratio by approximately 15 percentage points. this is the opposite of what we need at a time when interest rates are near the lower bound and fiscal policy is a transmission channel of monetary policy. the second risk comes from the inequality that will likely result from the outsized impact of the pandemic on less advantaged groups. |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-05-03 | 0.207 | with regard to fiscal policies, the spring 2013 deficit and debt data notifications by euro area countries indicate that the average government deficit declined from 4.2% of gdp in 2011 to 3.7% in 2012. over the same period, the average government debt rose from 87.3% to 90.6% of gdp. in order to bring debt ratios back on a downward path, euro area countries should not unravel their efforts to reduce government budget deficits and continue, where needed, to take legislative action or otherwise promptly implement structural reforms, in such a way as to mutually reinforce fiscal sustainability and economic growth potential. such structural reforms should target improvements in competitiveness and adjustment capacities, as well as aim to increase sustainable growth and employment. we are now at your disposal for questions. |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-11-08 | 0.195 | as regards fiscal policies, the euro area budget deficit is projected to decline further from 3.1% of gdp in 2013 to 2.5% in 2014, according to the european commission’s autumn 2013 economic forecast. at the same time, the euro area government debt ratio is expected to rise from 95.5% of gdp in 2013 to 95.9% in 2014. in order to put high public debt ratios on a downward path, governments should not unravel their efforts to reduce deficits and sustain fiscal adjustment over the medium term. the composition of fiscal consolidation should be geared towards growth-friendly measures which have a medium-term perspective and combine improving the quality and efficiency of public services with minimising distortionary effects of taxation. governments must also decisively strengthen efforts to implement the needed structural reforms in product and labour markets. progress has been made in reducing current account deficits and unit labour cost differentials, but substantial efforts still need to be undertaken with a view to further improving competitiveness, supporting rebalancing within the euro area and creating more flexible and dynamic economies that in turn generate sustainable economic growth and employment. we are now at your disposal for questions. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Le Parisien | Period_2 | 2017-02-09 | 0.182 | the question the french ought to be asking is: would increasing public debt that is close to 100% of gdp create more economic activity? i don’t believe it would. it is difficult to explain that the 3% deficit is a straightjacket when france has not respected the criterion once since 2007. in your view, what would happen if france exited the euro, as the front national is proposing? that’s not a scenario i want to contemplate as it’s not what the french want. when asked if they think the euro is a good thing, the answer is an unambiguous “yes”. according to the eurobarometer, a survey carried out twice a year for the european commission, public support for the euro last december was 70% in the euro area and 68% in france. but if you do pursue that thought, leaving the euro would mean taking risks which have unpredictable consequences. what are they? leaving the euro would threaten savings and jobs in france. it would certainly lead to a rise in interest rates. debts incurred by french businesses and households would increase. inflation, which would no longer be restrained by the ecb, would eat into savings, the fixed incomes of households and small pensions. it would be to choose impoverishment. does the euro have a future? yes, of course, the euro has a future. but the euro area has to undertake reforms. more coordination between governments, more reforms at national level, more solidarity and perhaps a kind of common euro area budget are necessary. in other words, a great… |
| Mario Draghi: Interview with Neue Zürcher Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-01-23 | 0.146 | but you received a lot of criticism shortly afterwards, particularly in germany, when you announced the omt programme, under which the ecb can theoretically purchase unlimited euro area government bonds under certain conditions. it was said that, in doing so, you would be carrying out monetary financing, which is prohibited. omts were not designed to finance government budget deficits, but, in support of our mandate of maintaining price stability, to remove the risk of a break-up of the euro area. we took a lot of precautions when designing omt that demonstrate that the programme has nothing to do with monetary financing. for example, we would only buy on the secondary market; only buy bonds with short maturities and not necessarily keep the bonds until maturity. but the most important thing is that omts are bound by strict conditionality. this conditionality makes sure that countries put their own houses in order as far as budget financing is concerned. a country that is supported by omt would have to have a reform programme, agreed by the eurogroup. if a country no longer stuck to the requirements of the programme, omt purchases would automatically be stopped. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.200 | however, an inflation increase due to a supply-side shock cannot be expected to significantly alleviate the debt burden over the medium term. ecb staff simulations show that the resulting decline in real growth, higher interest payments and deteriorating primary deficits would increase public debt ratios over longer horizons (slide 11, right-hand chart). rising interest rates as a result of tighter monetary policy or higher public debt lift up the interest rate- growth differential for a given rate of potential growth. the negative interest rate-growth differential before the pandemic helped to contain, or even reduce, debt-to-gdp ratios. the differential still stands near historic lows but is about to become less favourable (slide 12, left-hand chart). against this backdrop, current circumstances call for responsible fiscal policy. governments need to be clear that current budget deficits are backed by future primary surpluses, via either future higher tax rates or lower spending. if governments do not credibly signal their commitment to responsible fiscal policies, the private sector may eventually expect that higher inflation is needed to ensure the sustainability of public debt.[16] this would be the case if high unfunded budget deficits ended up eroding the credibility of the central bank to pursue its monetary policy objectives, endangering price stability.[17] if, by contrast, the central bank is fully credible – because it has earned a reputation of safeguarding pr… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.173 | sound fiscal policy helps to anchor inflation expectations sound fiscal policy is also a key factor for stabilising debt dynamics. the fiscal support measures taken during the pandemic resulted in a sharp increase in public debt ratios, which were already elevated before the pandemic started. euro area public debt as a ratio to gdp has increased by around 20 percentage points from 2007 to 2019, and by around another 10 percentage points by 2021. initially, higher inflation had a beneficial effect on debt-to-gdp ratios, due to a temporary windfall from the boost in nominal growth (slide 11, left-hand side).[15] |
| Luis de Guindos: Policy mix of the future - the role of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.106 | academic research points to the need for monetary and fiscal policy to work together in times of crisis. this runs contrary to previous wisdom suggesting fiscal policy should mainly support economic outcomes by playing the role of an “automatic stabiliser.” for example, in recessions, government expenditure would automatically increase and tax revenue would automatically decrease. it has become evident that strong, discretionary countercyclical fiscal policy is needed in a crisis. furthermore, research shows fiscal policy is particularly effective close to the lower bound of interest rates. in this way, fiscal policy not only effectively stabilises the economy, but also contributes to the ecb’s objective of maintaining price stability. structural fiscal policy 1 could also help raise the natural or equilibrium real rate of interest 2. this rate of interest has been falling in recent decades and has made the pursuit of price stability much more challenging for central banks. complementarity between monetary and fiscal policy was greatly effective following a long period of too low inflation. but how is this interaction in an inflationary environment? or more generally, how does the level of inflation affect the fiscal-monetary policy mix? |
| Luis de Guindos: Challenges for monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-07-05 | 0.098 | the even transmission of monetary policy the smooth and even transmission of our monetary policy across the euro area is required to preserve the singleness of monetary policy and achieve our mandate of price stability. changes in financing conditions that go beyond the level merited by fundamental factors undermine the achievement of that objective. sovereign bond yields are an important reference point for assessing the transmission of our policy stance because they act as a benchmark for determining the financing conditions for firms and households. it is natural for sovereign yields to differ somewhat across euro area countries, owing to idiosyncratic factors, such as public debt-to-gdp ratios, budget deficits or long-run growth rates. however, at times yields can, and do, rapidly diverge from economic fundamentals. excessive divergence makes credit conditions inconsistent with the uniform transmission of monetary policy impulses and could cause financial instability. it is instead critical that financing conditions move broadly in sync across the euro area when we change our stance. for two equally sound firms in the euro area, a change in the monetary policy stance should lead to a similar reaction in their financing conditions, no matter in which country they are domiciled. should that not be the case, we will react to prevent fragmentation, with suitable safeguards to prevent moral hazard. preventing fragmentation allows us to adjust our monetary policy stance at t… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Managing policy trade-offs | Period_3 | 2022-04-13 | 0.078 | by showing resolve, monetary policy can break this dynamic and reduce the trade-off central banks face between stabilising output and inflation. a central bank that is perceived as being committed to protecting its mandate can contain inflation at a lower economic cost, since the expectation that adequate policy action will be taken is itself stabilising. such credibility is vital for the conduct of monetary policy. continuing the path of policy normalisation is therefore the appropriate course of action. the speed of normalisation, in turn, will depend on the economic fallout from the war, the severity of the inflation shock and its persistence. we have stressed the importance of optionality and data dependence in our march governing council decision: we expect to conclude net asset purchases under our asset purchase programme in the third quarter, as long as the incoming data support the expectation that the medium-term inflation outlook will not weaken. we will hike interest rates some time after, as appropriate in light of incoming data. the trade-off facing fiscal policy as monetary policy is focused on preserving price stability and anchoring inflation expectations, the headwinds to growth can be buffered by fiscal policy. there is no possibility for the euro area as a whole to escape the costs associated with protecting our freedom, supporting the people of ukraine and reducing our dependence on fossil energy. that said, unless the economic situation deteriorates ma… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19 | guidance | 1 | 0.0798916 | guidance | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 19 | future | 2 | 0.0623857 | policy rate | 2 | 0.9992990 |
| 19 | policy rate | 3 | 0.0577175 | future path | 3 | 0.9989476 |
| 19 | path | 4 | 0.0508448 | future policy | 4 | 0.9982031 |
| 19 | condition | 5 | 0.0325609 | sequence | 5 | 0.9979849 |
| 19 | time | 6 | 0.0259476 | path | 6 | 0.9978069 |
| 19 | expectation | 7 | 0.0199826 | key policy | 7 | 0.9973239 |
| 19 | provide | 8 | 0.0176485 | key policy rate | 8 | 0.9969271 |
| 19 | key | 9 | 0.0157034 | future | 9 | 0.9968371 |
| 19 | outlook | 10 | 0.0153144 | rate path | 10 | 0.9967489 |
| 19 | reaction | 11 | 0.0119429 | intention | 11 | 0.9963640 |
| 19 | reduce | 12 | 0.0109055 | conditional | 12 | 0.9962323 |
| 19 | future path | 13 | 0.0101275 | rate expectation | 13 | 0.9961382 |
| 19 | sequence | 14 | 0.0099978 | reaction | 14 | 0.9947310 |
| 19 | horizon | 15 | 0.0098681 | option | 15 | 0.9940421 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy communication and effectiveness | Period_1 | 2008-01-16 | 0.270 | with those of the central bank. 2 however, at a practical level, there are serious concerns about the feasibility and desirability of announcing a specific likely future path of policy rates. 3 in a world of uncertainty – and the current period of heightened uncertainty and financial market volatility offers a characteristic example – providing markets with a likely future path of policy rates, particularly beyond the short term, may entail a number of risks that may ultimately undermine the initial intention to further reduce financial market and aggregate output volatility. let me highlight some factors and risks that raise doubts about the feasibility and desirability of announcing, as a general rule, the likely future path of policy rates: • the first factor is the uncertainty faced by policy-makers which makes it very difficult, in general and particularly in certain circumstances, to define in a reasonably precise and reliable manner the likely future path of policy rates, or to put it differently, the extent and timing of future adjustments of the monetary policy stance. the uncertainty faced is not limited to that surrounding the future evolution of a large number of exogenous variables that will affect the economic outlook and the risks to the attainment of the policy objectives. this type of uncertainty is considerable and increases with the length of the forecast horizon. more significantly, there is uncertainty about the economy’s structure and functioning whic… |
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy communication and effectiveness | Period_1 | 2008-01-16 | 0.220 | misinterpreted as a quasi-promise or commitment and could lead to a disorderly adjustment of interest-rate expectations. • fourth, another problem is the potential effect on the central bank’s credibility if its communication of future policy rates often deviates from the subsequent actual path of interest rates. in this respect, policy-makers may also be concerned that frequent revisions of a previously announced policy path may weaken the public’s confidence in their forecasting ability or in their commitment to follow through. in particular, policy-makers may hesitate to reverse the direction of such a path, e.g. from an accommodative to a restrictive stance and this could lead to the implementation of a policy path that does not take fully into account new, incoming information and is therefore sub-optimal. there are some factors and risks that call for great caution to be exercised in respect of any pre-announcement of future policy intentions. ultimately, the benefits and drawbacks of communicating the likely future policy rates will depend on the economy’s structure and complexity, the nature and extent of the uncertainty faced by policy-makers and the institutional framework of the central bank. while it might prove to be a useful communication tool for some central banks, others, including the ecb, have concluded that the potential problems outweigh the potential benefits. the ecb has therefore adopted a rather pragmatic and flexible approach when providing forwar… |
| Lucas Papademos: Central banks in the 21st century | Period_1 | 2006-06-13 | 0.219 | let me elaborate on some of the risks. first, the general public may fail to fully understand that a pre- announced path of future policy rates is conditional and that changes in the state of the economy will require changes to this policy path. eventual deviations from the previously projected policy path may therefore be viewed, at least by many who are not experts in monetary economics, as a failure of the central bank to follow its announced intentions. this could damage its credibility, even if it is conducting policy in an optimal manner. second, the central bank is often faced with a high degree of uncertainty, including “knightian” uncertainty, about the functioning of the economy and the response of economic agents to shocks and policy actions. under such circumstances, it is difficult to determine an optimal or appropriate path of policy rates over a long time horizon and to agree about such a policy path in a policy-making committee, and to properly convey to the public all the conditions underlying such a path. finally, i do not think that publishing a path of future policy rates, which is mechanically derived from an empirically estimated reaction function, would be helpful. on the contrary, it would be difficult to explain the difference between this path and the one decided by the decision-making body in the context of a forward-looking strategy with a medium-term orientation. confusion rather than greater clarity may be the outcome of implementing such an a… |
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy communication and effectiveness | Period_1 | 2008-01-16 | 0.139 |
|
| Otmar Issing: The ECB and the euro - the first five years | Period_1 | 2004-05-21 | 0.136 | in addition, the construction and publication of central bank forecasts can raise a whole number of problems which severely limit the relevance of such forecasts for monetary policy. one of the main problems lies in constructing a forecast which is consistent with the underlying interest rate path. exogenous assumptions with regard to the interest rate path - such as assuming constant interest rates - typically lead to instabilities or indeterminacy.16 at the same time, bringing exogenous assumptions on the interest rate policy into line with the expectations of economic agents underlying these forecasts in a credible and convincing way constitutes a considerable challenge in practice. the aforementioned simulation of alternative interest rate paths is thus barely practicable. an alternative to this would be to use market interest rates, as opposed to a fixed interest rate. if the central bank’s reaction function is understood by the public and the markets and if its monetary policy enjoys credibility, the interest rate path expected by the market will mostly be consistent with the envisaged inflation target. however, if new economic shocks arise, it can be extremely difficult to communicate necessary deviations of the monetary policy stance from the interest rate path anticipated in this way. this can place an undue restriction on the ability of monetary policy to react in a timely manner to changes in economic conditions and in risks to price stability. last but not leas… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox - evidence from the euro area | Period_2 | 2020-02-23 | 0.315 | forward guidance initially expressed in qualitative terms, the ecb’s rate guidance has evolved over time, with the current formulation made explicitly conditional on a set of criteria regarding the inflation outlook. the cross-country experience with forward guidance indicates that its effectiveness can differ considerably depending on the type of conditionality attached to the policy rate path. in particular, time-based guidance provided over relatively short horizons appears to be rather ineffective in reducing market uncertainty.[9] conversely, the evidence indicates that rate forward guidance over long horizons, or state-based guidance, is more effective in reducing the sensitivity of asset prices to macroeconomic news. |
| Peter Praet: Forward guidance and the European Central Bank | Period_2 | 2013-08-07 | 0.214 | two examples of forward guidance in one way or another, various forms of indications – more delphic in nature – about the conditional direction of policy have implicitly been part of central bank communication for a while, increasingly so since the mid of the 1990s. around that time, a small number of central banks pioneered the publication of numerical forecasts for the future path of their policy rates. for example, since 1997, the reserve bank of new zealand (rbnz) has provided a numerical projection of future policy rates. in 2005 the norges bank took such explicit forward guidance a step further by communicating not only a forecast of the short-term interest rate path, but also a confidence interval around it. these two – and many other – examples of explicit forward guidance, once more, underscore the importance of 2 there are some intermediate steps missing in this simple view. a description of the (likely) transmission of monetary policy via the real and, importantly, the financial sector is outside the scope of this text. |
| Benoît Cœuré: The usefulness of forward guidance | Period_2 | 2013-09-30 | 0.210 | but the premium on clear communication is particularly large in extraordinary situations, for example when policy rates are at, or close to, their effective lower bound, or when the normal channels of monetary policy transmission are impaired, or when there is exceptional uncertainty on the state of the economy. such situations occur only seldom. this makes it difficult for private agents to infer the future monetary policy path from past regularities. hence, there is a clear added value in such a situation to making central bank communication more explicit. this explains why many central banks that had previously not used forward guidance adopted this tool in recent times. how does forward guidance work? well, first of all, most central banks have linked forward guidance to their main policy interest rates. in implementing their monetary policy, central banks calibrate their main policy tools so as to establish a certain level of short term interest rates in the market. at the same time, expected future short term interest rates are a key ingredient for the determination of long term interest rates. long term interest rates in turn are essential for saving, consumption and investment decisions, and ultimately for the development of prices and inflation in the economy. indeed, some recent papers on central bank communication provide clear evidence that central banks’ communication on their policy decisions and their assessment of the macroeconomic environment can have an i… |
| Benoît Cœuré: The usefulness of forward guidance | Period_2 | 2013-09-30 | 0.208 | this can be especially valuable at times when upward volatility in financial markets risks creating risk premia along the yield curve, thereby inducing a premature withdrawal of monetary accommodation. second, forward guidance can serve to communicate to market participants that the central bank’s policy intentions have changed. most notably, the central bank may try to convince markets that it would keep interest rates low, even if this would imply inflation well above its previous objective, at least temporarily. the promise of higher future inflation, if credible, induces private agents to substitute future for current consumption, hence providing additional stimulus today. this type of forward guidance is closer to the academic concept of forward guidance in the strict sense – as discussed, for example, in woodford (2012). the main challenge of such guidance is its inherent inconsistency over time and thus lack of credibility. when the time comes, the central bank may be tempted to deviate from its prior commitment: once the benefits of higher inflation expectations in terms of front-loaded spending have been reaped, the central bank may not be willing to pay the bill in terms of higher inflation afterwards. if the public foresees this temptation, expectations might remain unaffected in the first instance and the desired inter-temporal substitution of spending might not materialise. this is a possible explanation why, in practice, central banks have refrained from usin… |
| Philip R Lane: The ECB’s monetary policy in the pandemic - meeting the challenge | Period_2 | 2020-10-07 | 0.198 | in line with our forward guidance, market-based expectations of future policy rates and the future path of the app have adjusted in response to changes to the inflation outlook. compared to september 2019, chart 5 shows that the date of the policy rate lift-off implicit in the eonia forward curve – the term structure of expectations for the overnight rate (and associated risk premia) – has shifted from december 2022 to august 2024. similarly, market surveys have shown a similar outward shift for the expected end date of net purchases under the app. through these endogenous market responses, our forward guidance acts as an automatic stabiliser through the adjustment of monetary policy expectations – and hence the entire spectrum of monetary conditions – to changes in the inflation outlook. eonia forward curve and lift-off dates https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201006~e1d38a1ccc.en.html 6/12 |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.317 | the pandemic measures should be viewed as acting to reinforce the impact of the already-low levels of the key policy rates. moreover, the ecb’s forward guidance about the future setting of its policy measures played a central role in determining the overall monetary stance. in relation to the key policy rates, since september 2019 the forward guidance linked future rate setting to the inflation outlook.[2] the governing council framed its forward guidance on the path of policy rates in terms of a commitment to attaining the inflation target by clarifying that policy rates would be lifted only if the evidence was sufficiently robust to foster a high degree of confidence that the inflation rate would reach two per cent on a durable basis.[3] such state-contingent forward guidance represents a strong commitment to keep financing conditions at sufficiently accommodative levels for as long as necessary to stabilise inflation at the medium-term inflation target in a sustainable fashion. in line with the state-contingent forward guidance, market-based expectations of future policy rates adjusted in response to changes to the inflation outlook. chart 2 shows the evolution of the expected timing of the first increase in our key policy rates since the introduction of the state-contingent forward guidance on the path of interest rates. in the initial weeks of the pandemic, the lift off date was pushed from 2022 to 2027, before stabilising around 2025/2026 for most of 2020. over time,… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Asset purchases – from crisis to recovery | Period_3 | 2021-09-23 | 0.148 | function and has thereby helped anchor long-term rates at current low levels by reducing the uncertainty around the future course of monetary policy. in the early stages of a recovery, however, forward guidance cannot fully substitute for asset purchases. therefore, forward guidance and asset purchases should be thought of as both substitutes and complements. they are substitutes in the sense that the main instrument to stabilise long-term yields at levels consistent with the inflation outlook gradually shifts from asset purchases to forward guidance, or from a compression of the term premium to managing the expected future path of short-term interest rates. they are complements in the sense that asset purchases can reinforce forward guidance. they can serve as a powerful commitment device to lend additional credibility to a central bank’s forward guidance by signalling that, in all likelihood, the conditions for raising policy rates are not expected to materialise any time soon. one reason is that investors typically do not expect a central bank to raise policy rates abruptly when it is still conducting net asset purchases. doing so would expose the central bank to significant losses on its balance sheets.11 thereby, asset purchases raise the bar for lifting policy rates, helping to raise inflation expectations at the zero lower bound. they reduce harmful uncertainty by making sure that central banks “put their money where their mouth is”. in doing so, they support the ce… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Asset purchases – from crisis to recovery | Period_3 | 2021-09-23 | 0.121 | progressively reducing the quantity of safe government bonds in the market may no longer be welfare-increasing. another argument arises when considering the consolidated balance sheets of the government and the central bank.8 swapping long-term government bonds for overnight central bank reserves results, over time, in a notable shortening of the maturity structure of public liabilities.9 in other words, it de facto counteracts the efforts by governments to lock in current low interest rates with a view to reducing their exposures to potentially higher interest rates in the future. second, the stock of acquired assets ensures no undue or premature decompression of the term premium, even if the effects of portfolio rebalancing diminish. so far during the pandemic, the eurosystem has bought assets worth more than €1.3 trillion, or nearly 12% of last year’s euro area gdp, under the pepp alone. together with the purchases under the app, we currently hold around €4.4 trillion worth of securities on our balance sheet (slide 6, left-hand chart). ecb simulations show that this stock provides substantial and persistent policy stimulus. even in three to five years’ time, our joint pspp and pepp holdings can be expected to put sizeable downward pressure on interest rates across the maturity spectrum (slide 6, right-hand chart). these effects do not imply, however, that asset purchases no longer play a role once economic conditions and the inflation outlook improve and the need for po… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right sequence | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.109 | our sequencing is subject to three guideposts. the first is our rate forward guidance, which provides the anchor for the normalisation process. it defines three conditions that need to be satisfied in the view of the governing council for our key policy rates to be raised: first, inflation reaching 2% well ahead of the end of our projection horizon; second, inflation remaining around 2% durably for the rest of the projection horizon; and, third, realised progress in underlying inflation being consistent with our inflation target. the second guidepost is that we will stop net asset purchases under the app “shortly before” we increase our main policy rates. “shortly before” is a term that is deliberately vague. it does not indicate a pre-defined distance between the end of our net asset purchases and policy rate lift- off. it does, however, imply that we will end net asset purchases under the app once we judge that it is sufficiently likely that the rate forward guidance criteria are going to be fulfilled over the foreseeable future, while rates are going to be raised only when these conditions are actually met. third, we intend to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the app for an extended period of time past the date when we start raising our key policy rates. again, the notion of an “extended period” is kept open to leave sufficient optionality in order to be able to respond to changes in the inflation outlook. in… |
| Isabel Schnabel: The monetary policy non-puzzle in bond markets | Period_3 | 2021-09-15 | 0.101 | first, we want to see inflation reaching 2% well ahead of the end of our projection horizon and we want it to remain at 2% thereafter. and, second, realised progress in underlying inflation needs to be sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at 2% over the medium term. in other words, given the significant uncertainty surrounding inflation projections many years out, we want to see clearer signs that inflation is reliably moving towards our 2% target. this will imply a more patient reaction function, consistent with the previous scatterplot analysis, and hence may also imply a transitory period in which inflation is moderately above target. two additional developments corroborate the view that investors have started internalising our more patient reaction function. one relates to the distribution of risks around the future interest rate outlook. after the announcement of our new strategy and forward guidance, the risk distribution around the future evolution of the 3-month euribor has been truncated from the top, meaning that investors have effectively priced out contingencies that foreshadow a very steep increase in policy rates (slide 10). such expectations are consistent with our new september ecb staff projections, which show that inflation is expected to remain below our 2% target in the medium term. the second development relates to the distribution of risks around the future inflation outlook. since the beginning of the year, the balance of… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20 | growth | 1 | 0.0386663 | economic expansion | 1 | 0.9976297 |
| 20 | quarter | 2 | 0.0261589 | growth outlook | 2 | 0.9962299 |
| 20 | continue | 3 | 0.0259457 | expansion | 3 | 0.9952540 |
| 20 | support | 4 | 0.0235295 | employment gain | 4 | 0.9950253 |
| 20 | remain | 5 | 0.0230320 | broad base | 5 | 0.9945656 |
| 20 | expansion | 6 | 0.0169205 | solid | 6 | 0.9943903 |
| 20 | increase | 7 | 0.0146464 | mute | 7 | 0.9937701 |
| 20 | outlook | 8 | 0.0130830 | protectionism | 8 | 0.9929841 |
| 20 | rise | 9 | 0.0123724 | private consumption | 9 | 0.9925965 |
| 20 | employment | 10 | 0.0113774 | quarter | 10 | 0.9925886 |
| 20 | underlie | 11 | 0.0111643 | rise wage | 11 | 0.9924740 |
| 20 | policy measure | 12 | 0.0105957 | sentiment | 12 | 0.9915890 |
| 20 | sector | 13 | 0.0104536 | gdp increase | 13 | 0.9914266 |
| 20 | base | 14 | 0.0104536 | underlie inflation | 14 | 0.9913991 |
| 20 | favourable | 15 | 0.0100983 | inflation remain | 15 | 0.9910182 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2006 to the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-07-13 | 0.114 | economic and monetary issues in 2006 the ecb’s monetary policy continued to anchor medium and long-term inflation expectations at levels consistent with price stability. this reflected the credibility of the ecb in conducting its monetary policy, in full compliance with its primary objective of maintaining price stability over the medium term. the solid anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations is a prerequisite for monetary policy to make an ongoing contribution towards supporting sustainable economic growth and job creation in the euro area, in line with article 105 (1) of the ec treaty. in 2006 the euro area economy expanded at the highest growth rate since 2000. notwithstanding the impact of high and volatile oil prices, real gdp rose by 2.9% in 2006, compared with 1.5% in 2005. the economic recovery gradually broadened in the course of 2006, and the nature of the economic expansion became increasingly self sustaining, with domestic demand acting as the main driver. despite some moderation, the ongoing strong momentum in economic growth continued in the first quarter of 2007. the euro area continued to benefit from the robust ongoing expansion of the world economy, while substantial gains in corporate profits and an extended period of very favourable financing conditions supported investment growth and employment. consumption growth observed a gradual recovery, in line with improving conditions in the labour market. the latest data and survey releases have remain… |
| Lucas Papademos: The ECB’s accountability towards the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2010-04-29 | 0.104 | economic developments and monetary policy in 2009 the european central bank performed its functions in an exceptionally challenging environment as the global financial crisis continued to unfold. following the severe intensification of financial market tensions in autumn 2008, euro area real gdp contracted by 4.0% in 2009, largely driven by a sharp decline in exports and in private investment. the decrease in private consumption was relatively contained, although households increased their saving rates substantially. economic activity in the euro area reached a trough in the second quarter of 2009 and has increased at a slow pace since then. the significant macroeconomic stimulus, the measures taken to support the financial system, and the pick-up in global activity have underpinned the recovery of the euro area economy. looking ahead, the governing council expects real gdp to continue to expand at a moderate pace in 2010 and to strengthen further in 2011. this expectation is in line with the latest ecb staff projections and the forecasts of other institutions. the recovery is likely to be uneven over time and across regions. the risks to this growth outlook are assessed to be broadly balanced, but uncertainty remains high. with regard to price developments, average annual hicp inflation fell sharply to 0.3% in 2009, from 3.3% in 2008, largely due to substantially lower oil and other commodity prices as well as a result of the impact of the severe contraction in activity a… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy and economic prospects in the euro area | Period_1 | 2006-02-08 | 0.065 | years. however, a notable feature of the recent recovery is that the euro area economy has shown resilience to exceptionally strong and continued increases in oil and other energy commodity prices. while oil price increases since 2004 have obviously had a visible dampening impact on euro area growth, the recent impact appears to have been more muted compared to previous episodes of significant oil price increases, particularly those in the mid and late 1970s. various developments may have contributed to the increased resilience of the euro area economy to oil price increases. first, there has been a continued decline in oil dependency over the past few decades, due to sectoral shifts and the substitution of oil by other energy sources. the oil intensity of the euro area, as measured by oil consumption in relation to gdp, has roughly halved since the early 1970s. oil consumption (in tonnes) relative to real gdp (in millions of euro, at 1995 prices) has fallen from 160 in 1973 to 80 in 2001. a second factor that may have contributed to resilience to oil price shocks is an improvement in product and labour market flexibility over time, thus facilitating the reallocation of resources and lessening the impact of oil price increases on economic activity. for instance, wage indexation appears to be less widespread at present than in the 1970s. last, but not least, the increased effectiveness of monetary policy in firmly anchoring inflation expectations for the euro area as a whol… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2008-04-11 | 0.058 | looking ahead, both domestic and foreign demand are expected to support ongoing real gdp growth in the euro area in 2008, albeit to a lesser extent than during 2007. while moderating, growth in the world economy is expected to remain resilient, benefiting in particular from strong growth in emerging economies. this should continue to support euro area external demand. meanwhile, investment growth in the euro area should provide ongoing support to economic activity, as capacity utilisation is high, profitability has been sustained and there are no significant signs of supply constraints on bank loans. at the same time, as a result of the improved economic conditions and wage moderation, employment and labour force participation have increased significantly and unemployment rates have fallen to levels not seen for 25 years. while being dampened by the impact of higher energy and food prices on purchasing power, consumption growth should continue to contribute to economic expansion, in line with real disposable income growth. the uncertainty surrounding this outlook for economic growth remains high, and downside risks prevail. the risks relate mainly to the financial market turbulence, which could last longer than initially thought and could have a broader than currently expected impact on the |
| Jürgen Stark: Economic perspectives and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-09-10 | 0.053 | membership in the emu. in particular, denmark is excluded from the decision-making process in the ecb’s governing council, although the decisions taken in the council obviously impact strongly on the danish economy. recent economic and monetary situation let me now turn to the second part of my speech: reviewing the current economic and monetary situation. the global economy we are currently facing a challenging economic environment. the outlook for the world economy continues to be clouded by several developments: 1. there is the sharp rise in commodity prices. recent modest declines in oil and other commodity prices from the peaks seen in mid-july suggest some moderation in external pressures, provided that these declines are sustained. however oil and food prices remain significantly high and above their average 2007 levels, being the main driving forces for inflation in most regions of the world. 2. the persistent financial market turbulences and elevated systemic risk has led to tighter global financing standards as banks are unwinding excessive leverage built up during the credit bubble. while financial market conditions seemed to stabilise somewhat in the second quarter, doubts about the health of some big institutions together with further write-downs by banks and the failure of a mortgage lender led to a renewed rise in global risk aversion. 3. the adjustments in the housing markets of several advanced economies are ongoing and weigh on wealth. there is also the r… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2019-09-12 | 0.394 | today’s decisions were taken in response to the continued shortfall of inflation with respect to our aim. in fact, incoming information since the last governing council meeting indicates a more protracted weakness of the euro area economy, the persistence of prominent downside risks and muted inflationary pressures. this is reflected in the new staff projections, which show a further downgrade of the inflation outlook. at the same time, robust employment growth and increasing wages continue to underpin the resilience of the euro area economy. with today’s comprehensive package of monetary policy decisions, we are providing substantial monetary stimulus to ensure that financial conditions remain very favourable and support the euro area expansion, the ongoing build-up of domestic price pressures and, thus, the sustained convergence of inflation to our medium-term inflation aim. let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. euro area real gdp increased by 0.2%, quarter on quarter, in the second quarter of 2019, following a rise of 0.4% in the previous quarter. incoming economic data and survey information continue to point to moderate but positive growth in the third quarter of this year. this slowdown in growth mainly reflects the prevailing weakness of international trade in an environment of prolonged global uncertainties, which are particularly affecting the euro area manufacturing sector. at the same time, the services and con… |
| Mario Draghi: IMFC Statement | Period_2 | 2019-04-29 | 0.389 | mario draghi: imfc statement statement by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, at the thirty-ninth meeting of the international monetary and financial committee, washington dc, 12 april 2019. * * * the euro area economy expanded at a slower pace in 2018, following robust growth in the previous year. the economy grew by 1.9% in year-on-year terms, marking a sizeable moderation in the pace of economic expansion. while there are signs that some of the idiosyncratic domestic factors dampening growth are fading, global headwinds continue to weigh on euro area growth developments. the persistence of uncertainties, related to geopolitical factors, the threat of protectionism and vulnerabilities in emerging markets, is leaving marks on economic sentiment. at the same time, the economy continues to exhibit a high level of capacity utilisation, and the unemployment rate in the euro area has continued its downward trend, falling to its lowest level since october 2008. the number of people in employment has increased by more than ten million since mid-2013. nevertheless, since the annual meetings in october 2018, incoming data have been weak, in particular in the manufacturing and tradable goods sectors, reflecting a slowdown in external demand. this was compounded by some country and sector- specific factors that are turning out to have somewhat longer-lasting effects than previously expected. our monetary policy measures continue to support domestic demand, which… |
| Mario Draghi: IMFC Statement | Period_2 | 2019-10-18 | 0.374 | mario draghi: imfc statement statement by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, at the fortieth meeting of the international monetary and financial committee, washington dc, 18 october 2019. * * * euro area developments and outlook the euro area economy has expanded at a slower pace since the beginning of last year, marking a sizeable moderation in the pace of economic expansion. according to the latest eurostat release, quarterly gdp growth was 0.2% in the second quarter of 2019. this slowdown in growth mainly reflects the prevailing weakness of international trade in an environment of prolonged global uncertainties, which are particularly affecting the euro area manufacturing sector. these developments are also reflected in economic sentiment indicators that have continued to worsen over recent months. at the same time, the unemployment rate in the euro area has continued its downward trend, falling to its lowest level since may 2008. the number of people in employment has increased by more than 11 million since mid-2013. the services and construction sectors show ongoing resilience and the euro area expansion is also supported by favourable financing conditions, further employment gains and rising wages, the mildly expansionary euro area fiscal stance and the ongoing – albeit somewhat slower – growth in global activity. since the imf spring meetings in april 2019, short-term economic projections have been revised downwards. the latest ecb staff macroe… |
| Peter Praet: Economic developments in the euro area | Period_2 | 2018-05-17 | 0.373 | peter praet: economic developments in the euro area speech by mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the swiss financial analysts association (sfaa), geneva, 7 may 2018. * * * accompanying slides of this speech. i would like to thank john hutchinson for his support in preparing this speech. after several quarters of higher than expected growth, the latest euro area data point towards some moderation, but remain consistent with a solid and broad-based economic expansion. i would like to thank john hutchinson for his support in preparing this speech. monetary policy measures introduced since 2014 have been central in supporting euro area growth and paving the way for a return of euro area inflation to a rate below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. inflation developments, however, remain subdued. overall, an ample degree of monetary stimulus remains necessary for underlying inflation pressures to continue to build up and support headline inflation developments over the medium term. real gdp in the euro area has expanded for 20 consecutive quarters, growing by 0.4% quarter on quarter during the first quarter of 2018, according to preliminary data. while the pace of economic expansion has moderated compared with the previous quarters, the underlying strength of the euro area economy is expected to persist. the moderation in the pace of economic growth indicated by the flow of recent economic data and survey results in part reflects … |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economy and our monetary policy stance | Period_2 | 2019-06-12 | 0.373 | luis de guindos: the euro area economy and our monetary policy stance remarks by mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, during the instituto de empresa (ie) business leadership forum at the ie business school, madrid, 10 june 2019. * * * recent economic developments despite the somewhat better than expected data for the first quarter, in part due to temporary factors, the most recent information indicates that global headwinds continue to weigh on the euro area outlook. in particular, world trade remains subdued due to rising trade tensions and the global growth momentum has slowed somewhat, mainly on account of the weakness in manufacturing. moreover, downside risks have increased on account of the re-escalated trade dispute between the us and china. also, uncertainty surrounding brexit is prolonged and fragilities in emerging market economies remain. while inflation is expected to rise gradually due to tightening labour markets and rising wages, current dynamics of underlying inflation remain muted. it is against this background, that the governing council decided a number of policy measures at its last meeting, including an extension of its forward guidance on policy interest rates, a confirmation of the reinvestment policy and favourable pricing conditions for our new series of targeted longer term refinancing operations (tltro iii). euro area real gdp growth came in at 0.4% quarter-on-quarter in the first quarter of 2019, surprising somewhat … |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-02-04 | 0.147 | inflation inflation increased to 5.1 per cent in january, from 5.0 per cent in december 2021. it is likely to remain high in the near term. energy prices continue to be the main reason for the elevated rate of inflation. their direct impact accounted for over half of headline inflation in january and energy costs are also pushing up prices across many sectors. food prices have also increased, owing to seasonal factors, elevated transportation costs and the higher price of fertilisers. in addition, price rises have become more widespread, with the prices of a large number of goods and services having increased markedly. most measures of underlying inflation have risen over recent months, although the role of temporary pandemic factors means that the persistence of these increases remains uncertain. market-based indicators suggest a moderation in energy price dynamics in the course of 2022 and price pressures stemming from global supply bottlenecks should also subside. labour market conditions are improving further, although wage growth remains muted overall. over time, the return of the economy to full capacity should support faster growth in wages. market-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations have remained broadly stable at rates just below two per cent since our last monetary policy meeting. the latest survey-based measures stand at around two per cent. these factors will also contribute further to underlying inflation and will help headline inflation to se… |
| Luis de Guindos: Challenges for monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-07-05 | 0.140 | the euro area economic outlook over the first half of this year, euro area inflation has continued to rise and has reached undesirably high levels. in june headline inflation rose to 8.6%, another record high, continuing to reflect surging energy and food prices, owing in part to russia’s unjustified invasion of ukraine. but price increases have not been limited to energy and food. in recent months we have seen inflationary pressures broaden and intensify across many goods and services. elevated inflation will remain with us for some time, declining to just above target only at the end of our projection horizon. we expect that moderating energy costs, the easing of supply disruptions related to the pandemic and the normalisation of monetary policy will be conducive to inflation returning to our 2% target over the medium term. but the risks surrounding inflation are on the upside. economic activity is in turn affected by the war and its consequences. rising prices are reducing disposable incomes, while intensified supply disruptions and greater uncertainty are also weighing on growth, particularly in the manufacturing sector. at the same time, developments in the services sector are supporting growth, with the lifting of pandemic-related restrictions and signs of a buoyant summer tourism season boosting activity. these developments are bolstering incomes and consumption, helping an already strong labour market to withstand the economic impact of the war. our projections for… |
| Christine Lagarde: Price stability and policy transmission in the euro area | Period_3 | 2022-06-29 | 0.082 | uncertainty about growth that said, these shocks also have implications for growth and, as such, they can weigh on the medium-term inflation outlook. so what are we seeing in this regard? the external supply shocks hitting the euro area are affecting spending. rising import prices represent a terms of trade “tax” which reduces the total income of the economy. households are seeing their real income being squeezed. real wage growth has been negative for two consecutive quarters. and consumer surveys suggest that households are expecting their real income and consumption to decline further over the next year. firms are trying to protect their margins by raising prices, but this uncertain environment is also leading them to delay investment decisions. and sales growth now appears to be decelerating. the latest purchasing managers’ indices point to no further growth in new business, and business expectations in a year’s time have reached their lowest level since october 2020. at the same time, spending is being supported by the boost to demand from the full reopening of the services sector. and consumption is being buffered by the large stock of household savings built up during the pandemic, fiscal support measures and the continued strength of the labour market, which is helping to sustain labour income overall. but if supply shocks drag on and inflation continues to exceed wage growth by a wide margin, losses in real income could intensify and the excess savings buffer coul… |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.080 | consumption, investment and government spending eurostat, and ecb projections and calculations. note: the latest observations are for the first quarter of 2022. shows a range of purchasing managers’ index (pmi) confidence indicators. the left panel shows the assessment of the current situation in manufacturing and services. the re-opening of the economy is supporting the continuing improvement in the services sector. although the manufacturing indicator edged down in march, it remained broadly stable in april, so that the overall profile has so far been resilient to the outbreak of the war. however, in the middle panel, we see that this resilience did not hold for export orders, which have declined more than total orders, since the war and the covid wave in china are already affecting the external sector. the right panel shows the expectations component, which fell abruptly for manufacturing in particular but has remained in expansionary territory. this can be interpreted as an expectation of a slowdown in growth but not a recession. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.075 | monetary policy and the great volatility speech by isabel schnabel, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the jackson hole economic policy symposium organised by the federal reserve bank of kansas city, jackson hole, wyoming jackson hole, 27 august 2022 the great moderation was a period of prosperity and broad macroeconomic stability.[1] the volatility of both inflation and output declined, the length of economic expansions increased, and people in most economies experienced sustained improvements in their standards of living. there is broad agreement that better monetary policy was an important factor behind the great moderation.[2] as central banks took up the fight against spiralling inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, they brought down and stabilised inflation expectations at levels that provided a solid nominal anchor for firms and households. the subsequent advance of inflation targeting around the world is believed to be a prime reason why the global financial crisis of 2008 merely interrupted the great moderation.[3] afterwards, macroeconomic volatility quickly dropped back to its previous low levels. yet, monetary policy was not the only factor behind the great moderation. good luck, in the sense of a smaller variance of the shocks hitting the global economy, is widely believed to have played an important role as well.[4] compared with the 1970s, for example, real oil prices traded in a much narrower range from the second half of the 1980s until th… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21 | sustain | 1 | 0.0391061 | accommodation | 1 | 0.9992991 |
| 21 | adjustment | 2 | 0.0378814 | sustain adjustment | 2 | 0.9992986 |
| 21 | path | 3 | 0.0375988 | sustain | 3 | 0.9988597 |
| 21 | remain | 4 | 0.0327941 | monetary accommodation | 4 | 0.9976332 |
| 21 | accommodation | 5 | 0.0274242 | policy accommodation | 5 | 0.9975431 |
| 21 | aim | 6 | 0.0264821 | path | 6 | 0.9971023 |
| 21 | level | 7 | 0.0204528 | adjustment | 7 | 0.9969252 |
| 21 | convergence | 8 | 0.0192281 | monetary policy accommodation | 8 | 0.9964403 |
| 21 | sustain adjustment | 9 | 0.0187570 | inflation aim | 9 | 0.9958374 |
| 21 | close | 10 | 0.0186628 | durable | 10 | 0.9954397 |
| 21 | degree | 11 | 0.0177207 | convergence | 11 | 0.9954331 |
| 21 | continue | 12 | 0.0153655 | aim | 12 | 0.9950774 |
| 21 | time | 13 | 0.0150829 | inflation convergence | 13 | 0.9948960 |
| 21 | purchase | 14 | 0.0145176 | monetary stimulus | 14 | 0.9947333 |
| 21 | condition | 15 | 0.0139523 | patient | 15 | 0.9946856 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy and asset prices | Period_1 | 2009-10-19 | 0.073 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Activism and alertness in monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-16 | 0.057 | concluding remarks i am sometimes asked the following “you are in the process of increasing rates. is your judgement that your rates today are significantly lower than they should be? what then is the level of the “neutral rate” that you would judge it appropriate to reach (as rapidly as possible)?” my response to such questions would be the following. first, we are not in a position that we would judge “abnormal”, in the sense that we would have to increase as rapidly as possible our interest rates up to the “normal” level. we are in a process of progressively withdrawing the present degree of monetary accommodation commensurate with the risks to price stability that we perceive, associated in particular with the present development of the economic recovery. to the extent that we never previously pre-committed to unconditional moves and we have always adhered to the posture of steady alertness which is at the heart of our strategy, our monetary policy stance should and does – to the best of our own comprehensive, deep and candid assessment of the situation – at any time makes it possible to cope with the risks we see for price stability in a medium-term perspective. then, in a dynamic perspective, our refusal of unconditional pre-commitments, our position of permanent, steady alertness and our strategy help focus our policy upon being permanently at the “correct level” in terms of attaining our primary goal in a medium-term perspective. second, from a central bank’s persp… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Activism and alertness in monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-16 | 0.053 | monetary policy having reviewed structures and shocks, i now move on to the third aspect of my discussion of the euro area: monetary policy. did considerations pertaining to the nature of the shocks that occurred in the recent past and to the structural peculiarities of the euro area play any role in positioning the stance of monetary policy? can they go some way towards explaining the observationally moderate path that the policy rate has followed in the euro area? did the smoother path of our policy rate impede a smooth adjustment of the euro area to the shocks that have hit the global economy in the recent past? finally, does low inflation persistence provide reason for complacency? when the ecb in early 2001 initiated the easing cycle that we started to reverse in december last year, this was done on the heels of significant adverse supply shocks, relatively strong wage dynamics, and headline inflation rates at levels unseen in europe since the late phases of convergence to the new currency. yet the governing council judged that our commitment to attaining price stability, in line with our official definition, through our monetary policy strategy was sufficiently credible for us to take that easing decision without running the risk of destabilising inflation expectations. that conviction was reinforced by a rapidly deteriorating outlook and by reassuring signs that inflation expectations discounted a scenario in which inflation would settle in the zone of price stabili… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Activism and alertness in monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-16 | 0.050 | ruled out, notably in the face of potent shocks. in particular, we might be confronted with new occurrences of risks which could force us to take bold steps that our observers could not have predicted by extrapolating from our past history of policy conduct. to some extent, this is what occurred over the earlier phase of the international economic downturn: we took sizeable risks in the direction of “activism”. what were those risks? first, in an economy as rigid as the euro area, it might well be true that temporary imbalances between demand and potential supply are slow to show through convincingly to inflation. but if and when they finally do, they would be more costly to correct. 13 so, monetary policy should be sufficiently alert to any threats to the outlook for price stability, so that it does not find itself reacting belatedly – and with less chance of success – to trends that have long been underway. second, it is true that the expectation that inflation will not come loose from its anchor affords some short-term flexibility to respond to economic disturbances – with a view to ensuring more balanced macroeconomic conditions in the longer term. but that flexibility only lasts as long as economic agents and the public are confident that the opportunity will not be misused. and we just do not know enough about the way policy actions influence expectations and how sensitive central banks’ credibility is to short-run departures from low inflation to warrant experimenti… |
| Lucas D Papademos: Challenges for monetary policy in Europe | Period_1 | 2003-11-27 | 0.044 | differently, adequate preparation for future expansions of the euro area will help to make the challenge of heterogeneity more manageable. let me conclude my “movement of the concerto” with a fitting quote from the american writer joshua j. marine: “challenges are what makes life interesting; overcoming them is what makes life meaningful.” in this sense, i see both a very “interesting” and “meaningful” time ahead of us, for the ecb and economic policy makers in the european union. thank you very much for your attention. |
| Peter Praet: Maintaining price stability with unconventional monetary policy | Period_2 | 2018-01-29 | 0.421 | sustained adjustment, if even less supportive monetary policy conditions were to imperil the inflation trajectory. monetary policy will evolve in a data-dependent and time-consistent manner. once the governing council judges that the three criteria for sustained adjustment have been met, net asset purchases will expire, in line with our guidance. from that point in time, the evolution of inflation will remain conditional on reinvestments continuing for an extended period of time and on policy rates remaining at their present levels well past the end of our net asset purchases. the stock of long-duration assets held in our portfolio will continue to put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates well beyond the end of our net purchases. policy rates remaining at their present levels well past the end of our net purchases will contribute to holding the short to intermediate portions of the yield curve in check for as long as necessary, thereby ensuring that financial conditions remain consistent with a sustained adjustment of inflation. 5/5 |
| Peter Praet: Assessment of quantitative easing and challenges of policy normalisation | Period_2 | 2018-03-20 | 0.371 | are becoming more confident that inflation will reach a level of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. nevertheless, from today’s perspective domestic inflation pressures are still subdued and a substantial degree of monetary accommodation remains necessary for price pressures to build up and for inflation to converge sustainably towards our aim. we must be patient, persistent and prudent with our policy. patience is needed because it takes time for underlying inflation dynamics to gain momentum and support a durable convergence of inflation towards our aim. persistence is needed because the recovery in inflation is predicated on a substantial degree of monetary policy accommodation. and prudence is essential because of uncertainties about the transmission of unconventional monetary policy measures on the way to normalisation. this leads me to the question of how monetary policy will evolve once the governing council judges that the criteria for a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation have been met. the answer to this question is essentially already indicated in our forward guidance and in the clear sequencing of policy measures that we have communicated. once the governing council judges that the criteria for a sustained adjustment have been met, our net asset purchases will end. only one of the instruments that are currently contributing to the economic expansion and to inflation convergence will then expire. the monetary support that will still be necess… |
| Yves Mersch: Reflections on monetary policy in the euro area | Period_2 | 2018-05-22 | 0.359 | yves mersch: reflections on monetary policy in the euro area speaking points by mr yves mersch, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the eurofi conference, sofia, 27 april 2018. * * * while the recent flow of data points towards some moderation in the on-going economic expansion, growth is still expected to remain solid and broad based. monetary policy measures introduced since 2014 have been instrumental in supporting euro area growth and employment. underlying inflation continues to be subdued and have yet to show convincing signs of a sustained upward trend. at the same time, wages continue to edge higher and should contribute to price pressures. overall, the underlying strength in the euro area economy continues to support our confidence that inflation will converge towards our aim over the medium term. yet, inflation convergence will likely proceed only gradually, and remains contingent on a highly accommodative monetary policy stance. looking ahead, the evolution of monetary policy will be firmly guided by the outlook for price stability. the transition towards policy normalisation will begin once the governing council assesses there has been sustained adjustment in the path of inflation. this assessment will be based on three criteria: convergence, confidence, and resilience convergence: looking into the medium term, headline inflation should be well on track toward reaching levels below, but close to, 2% confidence: governing council will … |
| Peter Praet: Economic developments in the euro area | Period_2 | 2018-02-05 | 0.350 | gradually, patience and persistence in our monetary policy remain warranted. in the light of this, the governing council in january maintained all elements of its accommodative monetary policy stance. together, our monetary policy measures will preserve the ample degree of accommodation that remains necessary for inflation pressures to continue to build up and support headline inflation developments over the medium term. looking ahead, monetary policy will evolve in a data-dependent and time-consistent manner. once the governing council judges that the three criteria for sustained adjustment – convergence, confidence and resilience – have been met, net asset purchases will expire, in line with our guidance. from that point in time, the evolution of inflation will remain conditional on reinvestments continuing for an extended period of time and on policy rates remaining at their present levels well past the end of our net asset purchases. the stock of long-duration assets held in our portfolio will continue to put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates well beyond the end of our net purchases. policy rates remaining at their present levels well past the end of our net purchases will contribute to holding the short to intermediate portions of the yield curve in check for as long as necessary, thereby ensuring that financial conditions remain consistent with a sustained adjustment of inflation. |
| Peter Praet: Maintaining price stability with unconventional monetary policy | Period_2 | 2018-01-29 | 0.337 | language on the intended horizon of our net asset purchases has reinforced the signalling power of our forward guidance on rates. looking ahead, the question is: how will our monetary policy toolbox evolve in the foreseeable future? monetary policy will evolve in a data-dependent and time-consistent manner. the transition towards a normalisation will begin once we have established that there is a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation. our assessment will be based on three criteria for the inflation outlook: convergence, confidence and resilience. first, convergence: headline inflation will have to be on course to reach levels below, but close to, 2% by the end point of a meaningful medium-term horizon. two things are noteworthy here: the salience of our inflation aim and the forward-looking perspective. there should be no doubt about our steadfast commitment to secure a sustained return of inflation rates towards levels that are below, but close to,, 2%. and the perspective should be forward-looking because our monetary policy framework directs us to shape monetary policy with a firm medium-term orientation. since the start of monetary union, the ecb’s monetary policy has always been formed with a view to stabilising medium-term headline inflation around levels that are most consistent with our price stability definition. since 2003, we have said that those levels should be below, but sufficiently close to, 2%. the second criterion on which our assessment is based … |
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.106 | derived over time. and this reinforces the case that, for as long as inflation expectations remain anchored, monetary policy should adjust but not overreact.[25] ecb staff projections published in september 2022, which foresee inflation close to 2% at the end of their horizon, are consistent with a withdrawal of monetary policy accommodation. but the uncertainty surrounding supply and demand dynamics requires us to remain prudent as regards how far the adjustment needs to go. and we should not ignore the fact that the tightening, which has followed from our decisions since the end of 2021 and from expectations of further adjustments in our stance, is already working its way through the economy – with the usual transmission lags. estimates suggest that this tightening will on average subtract more than one percentage point from annual real gdp growth each year until 2024 compared to a counterfactual where interest rates and balance sheet expectations would have remained unchanged since december 2021.[26] |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.103 | policy implications so what does this imply for the ecb’s normalisation process today? subject to incoming data – we are and should remain data-driven – both the economic outlook and the principles i have outlined justify ending net asset purchases and then gradually exiting negative rates. this would allow us to continue to normalise policy by removing the part of our monetary accommodation that is no longer needed today. in particular, negative rates may imply distortions which were only necessary and proportionate when inflation was threatening to be too low over the medium term, relative to our target.the first adjustment is already under way. the ecb has already made two major announcements on asset purchases, first in december last year, and then again in march, when we signalled our expectation that net asset purchases would be concluded in the third quarter of this year. at the same time, the stock effects associated with our reinvestment policy will ensure that accommodation is withdrawn gradually. this will avoid creating financial stability risks in an already very volatile and uncertain environment. the second adjustment – the adjustment to our deposit facility rate – would allow the recent rise in medium-term inflation expectations to be reflected in our monetary policy. it would be consistent with a progressive removal of accommodation, still allowing us to steer output back towards potential but confirming the direction of normalisation that has already led … |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.103 | various combinations of tools could be used to achieve the desired policy stance. for instance, if we bring net purchases to an end but continue to reinvest the stock of assets purchased, our balance sheet will keep supporting the economy through what is known as the “stock effect”[8], but it will no longer provide additional accommodation. in fact, for technical reasons, the degree of accommodation it provides is likely to decrease over the coming years.[9] so the appropriate stance could in principle involve maintaining a constant stock of assets purchased under our asset purchase programme (app) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp). at the same time, we would be using interest rates to adjust the degree of policy accommodation – so long as this combination of tools remains consistent with inflation stabilising at 2% over the medium term. overall, this way of defining normalisation is consistent with our inflation-targeting framework. it is not about targeting unobservable natural settings for our instruments, or about preferring some tools over others. rather, it is about using an efficient mix of instruments to achieve the policy stance that effectively cements inflation at 2% over the medium term. |
| Philip R Lane: Inflation in the short term and in the medium term | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.097 | two per cent not only “well ahead of the end of our projection horizon” but also “durably for the rest of the projection horizon” ensures that interest rate policy will not react to inflation shocks that are expected to fade away before the end of our projection horizon (which will include 2024 in the december round). moreover, the condition that “realised progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at two per cent over the medium term” serves an important purpose in our analysis of the incoming data: it sharply differentiates between the volatile components of headline inflation and the dynamics of underlying inflation, which is the persistent component that is the best guide to medium-term inflation dynamics. in assessing underlying inflation, it is critically important to filter out the temporary impact of base effects and bottlenecks on goods inflation and services inflation. the persistent component in wage dynamics will be central in the assessment of underlying inflation, especially in view of the high share of services in the overall price level and the high share of labour in services value added. accordingly, tracking wage outcomes – adjusted for productivity – and differentiating between transitory and persistent components in wage settlements will be pivotal in assessing progress in the realised path of underlying inflation. in particular, a one-off shift in the level of wages as part of the adjustment t… |
| Christine Lagarde: Price stability and policy transmission in the euro area | Period_3 | 2022-06-29 | 0.095 | consistent with moving gradually, we announced that we will end net asset purchases under our asset purchase programme on 1 july and intend to raise our three key interest rates by 25 basis points at our next meeting on 21 july. but we also announced that we expect to raise the key interest rates again in september, and “if the medium-term inflation outlook persists or deteriorates, a larger increment will be appropriate at the september meeting.” this reflects the optionality principle. if the inflation outlook does not improve, we will have sufficient information to move faster. this commitment is, however, data dependent. this conditional approach to the pace of interest rate adjustment should not be confused with delaying normalisation. as our policy stance rests on a clear reaction function, interest-rate expectations and risk-free rates can adjust in advance. our policy adjustment is already working its way through the euro area economy. the €str forward rate ten years out is around 240 basis points above its pre-pandemic level, without policy rates having yet moved. one-year forward real rates, one-year ahead and five-year forward real rates, five-years ahead are around 100 and 140 basis points higher, respectively. beyond september, the governing council has agreed that a “gradual but sustained” path of further rate increases will be appropriate. the starting point at each meeting will be an assessment of the evolution of the shocks, their implications for the outl… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | operation | 1 | 0.0861553 | refinance | 1 | 0.9994742 |
| 22 | refinance | 2 | 0.0620449 | main refinance | 2 | 0.9994302 |
| 22 | refinance operation | 3 | 0.0506561 | refinance operation | 3 | 0.9992990 |
| 22 | main | 4 | 0.0301804 | operation | 4 | 0.9990353 |
| 22 | eurosystem | 5 | 0.0254553 | main refinance operation | 5 | 0.9988601 |
| 22 | period | 6 | 0.0224263 | rate tender | 6 | 0.9981140 |
| 22 | decide | 7 | 0.0213359 | allotment | 7 | 0.9980723 |
| 22 | main refinance | 8 | 0.0213359 | tender procedure | 8 | 0.9977190 |
| 22 | term refinance | 9 | 0.0208513 | rate tender procedure | 9 | 0.9972360 |
| 22 | term refinance operation | 10 | 0.0207301 | tender | 10 | 0.9971964 |
| 22 | liquidity | 11 | 0.0204878 | term refinance operation | 11 | 0.9970192 |
| 22 | conduct | 12 | 0.0201243 | term refinance | 12 | 0.9969308 |
| 22 | main refinance operation | 13 | 0.0161261 | maintenance period | 13 | 0.9967983 |
| 22 | procedure | 14 | 0.0128548 | procedure | 14 | 0.9962305 |
| 22 | allotment | 15 | 0.0123702 | bid | 15 | 0.9954837 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: The ECB’s accountability towards the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2010-04-29 | 0.361 | we decided to phase out gradually some of the extraordinary liquidity provision measures and scale back the number, frequency and maturity of longer-term refinancing operations. we conducted the last 12-month operation in december 2009 and the last 6-month operation in march 2010. in early march, the governing council decided to return to variable rate tender procedures for the regular three-month longer-term refinancing operations, starting with the operation to be conducted on 28 april 2010. at the same time, we will continue to provide adequate liquidity to the euro area banking system by conducting the main refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as needed and, at least, until october this year, so as to facilitate the provision of credit to the euro area economy and further support its recovery. needless to say, if upside risks to price stability were to emerge, the governing council would take timely and appropriate action. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-10-06 | 0.355 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference here in berlin. let me take the opportunity to warmly thank president weidmann for his invitation and kind hospitality. i would also like to express our special gratitude to the staff of the deutsche bundesbank for the excellent organisation of our meeting. let me now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by the president of the eurogroup, prime minister juncker, and commissioner rehn. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. inflation has remained elevated and incoming information has confirmed our view that inflation is likely to stay above 2% over the months ahead but to decline thereafter. at the same time, the underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be moderate. ongoing tensions in financial markets and unfavourable effects on financing conditions are likely to dampen the pace of economic growth in the euro area in the second half of this year. the economic outlook remains subject to particularly high uncertainty and intensified downside risks. at the same time, short-term interest rates remain low. it remains essential for monetary policy to maintain price stability over the medium term, thereby ensuring a firm anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates be… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2008-07-01 | 0.332 | recent monetary policy operations of the ecb turning to our liquidity management, since march, the ecb has continued to apply basically four liquidity measures to alleviate ongoing tensions in the euro money market. first, the ecb has continued to “frontload” the supply of liquidity over the reserve maintenance period. this means that we have provided more liquidity at the beginning of the maintenance period, while compensating for this by providing less liquidity towards the end of the period. the average supply of liquidity has thus remained unchanged over the entire maintenance period. second, around the end of the first quarter of 2008, when money market tensions were intensifying, the ecb conducted two liquidity-providing fine-tuning operations to address these tensions. the ecb has recently announced that it stands ready, if needed, to contribute to smoothing the market conditions around the end-of-semester. third, the ecb has continued its policy of providing a higher share of liquidity on a longer- term basis by renewing our supplementary three-month longer-term refinancing operations. moreover, in april 2008 the eurosystem conducted a supplementary longer-term refinancing operation with a six-month maturity and announced another one for july 2008. it is to be noted that the total amount of outstanding refinancing remained unchanged, as we reduced the share provided via the one-week main refinancing operations. fourth, to ensure the availability of funding denomina… |
| Current economic developments and prospects in Europe, as well as other activities of the Eurosystem (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 20 Jun 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-06-26 | 0.300 | contributing to sustained non-inflationary growth in the euro area. the current level of unemployment in the euro area, despite some decline, is still too high. in this respect, both appropriate wage settlements and structural reforms will be important contributions to continued employment growth and to maintaining low inflation. with a view to fiscal policies in the euro area, it is important that the opportunity of the current economic environment is seized to improve the soundness of public finances. member states should take advantage of the current cyclical position in order to achieve and maintain budgetary positions, which meet the requirements of the stability and growth pact. more ambitious fiscal positions than those targeted in member states’ updated stability programmes should be achieved, particularly in countries with high debt ratios and especially if economic growth develops more favourably than expected. in addition, we welcome initiatives to implement tax cuts in a number of countries, provided that these measures are consistent with the progress to be achieved in the area of fiscal consolidation. at the same time, more emphasis should be placed on structural reforms on the expenditure side of budgets leading to stricter expenditure restraint. at the current juncture, a pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policies should be avoided. let me now turn to the decision of the governing council to modify the procedure for the allotment of liquidity in the main refinanc… |
| Jean Claude-Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2008-09-11 | 0.274 | first, the ecb continued to frontload the supply of liquidity over the reserve maintenance periods. this was achieved by increasing the allotment amounts in main refinancing operations (mros) at the beginning of the maintenance period while reducing them towards the end of the maintenance period so that the average supply of liquidity remained unchanged over the entire maintenance period. second, the ecb maintained the increased share of longer-term refinancing operations vis- à-vis the share of main refinancing operations, which it had gradually built up since the start of the turbulences. moreover, on 4 september, the ecb decided to renew the supplementary three and six month longer-term refinancing operations that will mature before the end of the year. this will allow the euro area banks to better plan their liquidity management over the turn of the year. third, the ecb continued to conduct usd term auction facilities (taf) in cooperation with the us fed and other central banks. accordingly, it provided us dollar liquidity to euro area banks, secured with eurosystem eligible collateral. this measure was adjusted in the period under review. indeed, in august 2008, an 84-day taf was introduced to supplement the already existent 28-day taf, however without thereby increasing the total outstanding amount of taf operations. the eurosystem’s collateral framework has proven robust and efficient over the years, and during the recent episode of financial market turbulence. in p… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-05-03 | 0.287 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. i would like to thank governor makúch for his kind hospitality and express our special gratitude to his staff for the excellent organisation of today’s meeting of the governing council. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting, during which we took a number of decisions on key ecb interest rates, liquidity provision and possible ways forward to enhance the provision of credit. the meeting was also attended by the commission vice-president, mr rehn. first, based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to lower the interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the eurosystem by 25 basis points to 0.50% and the rate on the marginal lending facility by 50 basis points to 1.00%. the rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%. these decisions are consistent with low underlying price pressure over the medium term. inflation expectations for the euro area continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. in keeping with this picture, monetary and loan dynamics remain subdued. at the same time, weak economic sentiment has extended into spring of this year. the cut in interest rates should contribute to support prospects for a recovery later in the year. against this overall background, our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long … |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-11-08 | 0.280 | ladies and gentlemen, i am very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. i will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, during which we took a number of decisions on key ecb interest rates, forward guidance and liquidity provision. first, based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to lower the interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the eurosystem by 25 basis points to 0.25% and the rate on the marginal lending facility by 25 basis points to 0.75%. the rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%. these decisions are in line with our forward guidance of july 2013, given the latest indications of further diminishing underlying price pressures in the euro area over the medium term, starting from currently low annual inflation rates of below 1%. in keeping with this picture, monetary and, in particular, credit dynamics remain subdued. at the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. such a constellation suggests that we may experience a prolonged period of low inflation, to be followed by a gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below, but close to, 2% later on. accordingly, our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. it will thereby also continue to assist the gradual economic recovery as reflected in c… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges to monetary policy in 2012 | Period_2 | 2011-12-15 | 0.237 | 6 the balance sheet items related to monetary policy operations include: main refinancing operations, longer- term refinancing operations, fine-tuning reverse operations, structural reverse operations, marginal lending facility, credits related to margin calls and securities held for monetary policy purposes. 7 borio, claudio and p. disyatat 2009) “unconventional monetary policies: an appraisal” bis working paper no. 292. 8 goodhart, charles (1995) “central banks and the financial system” mit press. |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.210 | with respect to the tltros, we eliminated the 10 basis point spread over the key policy rates entailed in the initial pricing of the operations. the interest rate in each operation will now be set at the level of the average rate applied in the main refinancing operations over the life of the respective tltro. for banks whose eligible net lending exceeds a benchmark, the rate applied in the tltro iii operation will be lower, and can be as low as the average interest rate on the deposit facility prevailing over the life of the operation. in addition, the maturity of the operations will be extended from two to three years. |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2012-06-07 | 0.195 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by the commission vice-president, mr rehn. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. while inflation rates are likely to stay above 2% for the remainder of 2012, over the policy-relevant horizon we expect price developments to remain in line with price stability. consistent with this picture, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains subdued. inflation expectations for the euro area economy continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. at the same time, economic growth in the euro area remains weak, with heightened uncertainty weighing on confidence and sentiment, giving rise to increased downside risks to the economic outlook. in previous months we have implemented both standard and non-standard monetary policy measures. this combination of measures has supported the transmission of our monetary policy. today, we have decided to continue conducting our main refinancing operations (mros) as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and at least until the end of the 12th maintenance period of 2012 on 15 january 2013. this procedure will also remain in use for the eurosystem’s specia… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.101 | change in balance sheets of the eurosystem, the federal reserve and the bank of england since 2019 (cumulative changes relative to january 2020 in terms of percentages of gdp in q4 2019) ecb, federal reserve bank of new york, bank of england, haver analytics and ecb calculations. notes: for the eurosystem asset purchases include all pepp and app purchases. credit operations include all tltros, peltros, mros, and ltros. for the federal reserve asset purchases include all treasury bills, notes, and bonds as well as inflation-protected treasuries and floating-rate treasuries. these also include agency bonds and mortgage-backed securities. credit operations include all repurchase agreements, loans, and operations under the commercial paper funding facility ii, the corporate credit facility, the municipal liquidity facility, the main street lending programme, and talf ii. for the bank of england asset purchases include all gilts and corporate assets held within the asset purchase facility. credit operations include all operations within the iltr, ctrf, tfs and tfsme. the latest observations are for december 2021. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy and the money market | Period_3 | 2022-09-15 | 0.079 | the july 2022 rate hike by 50 basis points and rate changes across money market rates segments bloomberg, mmsr, brokertec/mts and ecb calculations. notes: general collateral (gc) and refers to cash-driven repo transactions and non-general (non-gc) refers to collateral-driven repo transactions. the bars show the difference between the average rate of the period 1-26 july (before the hike) and the period 27 july-19 august (after the hike). for 1-month government bills, the bars show the difference in the respective rate between the average rate of the period 10 – 27 june (before the hike) and the period 27 july – 11 august (after the hike). |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economy and the energy transition | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.074 | climate change also has a bearing on the ecb’s own risk management. our monetary policy operations have encompassed asset purchases, which now appear on the eurosystem’s balance sheet. counterparties to our lending operations must pledge assets as collateral against the money they borrow. we need to consider the impact of 2/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-11-29 | 0.069 | in line with its mandate, the ecb is doing its part by ensuring price stability. our third major policy rate increase in october, resulting in a cumulative increase of 200 basis points since july, underscores our commitment to tame inflation. this increase was accompanied by a recalibration for our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltros) to reinforce the transmission of our policy rate increases to bank lending conditions and contribute to the normalisation of the eurosystem balance sheet. 2/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economy and the energy transition | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.055 | in the strategy review we completed last year, we committed to including climate change considerations in our monetary policy operations. more concretely, we have decided to (i) adjust corporate bond holdings in our monetary policy portfolios, (ii) limit the share of assets issued by non-financial companies with a high carbon footprint that can be pledged as collateral by individual counterparties, (iii) introduce climate-related disclosure requirements in our collateral framework, and (iv) enhance our risk assessment and management. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 23 | single | 1 | 0.1060119 | single currency | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 23 | currency | 2 | 0.1001502 | single | 2 | 0.9997371 |
| 23 | single currency | 3 | 0.0379914 | single monetary | 3 | 0.9996495 |
| 23 | single monetary | 4 | 0.0332287 | single monetary policy | 4 | 0.9994743 |
| 23 | single monetary policy | 5 | 0.0324960 | currency | 5 | 0.9992988 |
| 23 | national | 6 | 0.0321296 | single market | 6 | 0.9988609 |
| 23 | success | 7 | 0.0295651 | success | 7 | 0.9986858 |
| 23 | good | 8 | 0.0243140 | national currency | 8 | 0.9974565 |
| 23 | market | 9 | 0.0218716 | achievement | 9 | 0.9971088 |
| 23 | single market | 10 | 0.0169868 | introduction | 10 | 0.9964925 |
| 23 | introduction | 11 | 0.0156435 | national | 11 | 0.9961362 |
| 23 | benefit | 12 | 0.0134454 | emu | 12 | 0.9960552 |
| 23 | european | 13 | 0.0129569 | stable currency | 13 | 0.9958287 |
| 23 | experience | 14 | 0.0119799 | market interest | 14 | 0.9957064 |
| 23 | emu | 15 | 0.0117357 | single european | 15 | 0.9952578 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: What effects is EMU having on the euro area and its member countries (closing remarks) | Period_1 | 2005-06-21 | 0.283 | concluding remarks ladies and gentlemen, let me make three remarks in conclusion. first, there is no doubt in my mind that the full benefits of the european common market could not be realised without the single currency. i propose to you the simple thought experiment: what would be, today, the us market if we would have had different currencies in california and texas, massachusetts and wyoming? would we call it an “achieved single market”? in that perspective, the single currency offers us all the economic benefits associated with an “achieved single market”. in this respect, as regards interest rates and exchange -rate risk for each particular economy, there are no “winners” and “losers”. it is a “win-win” game …. all economies, without exception, are benefiting from the very low market interest rates that reflect the credibility of the currency: it is true that this is a considerable additional advantage given to those countries that had previously very high interest rates. at the same time, all economies, without exception, are benefiting from the elimination of exchange risk within the single currency area, which is a considerable improvement, including for those economies that had already very low interest rates, so that not only each economy is benefiting from a much better functioning of the single market itself, but also from a significant improvement of its own monetary situation. it is equally true for germany, for spain, for italy. it is true for the 12 countr… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Two successes of the euro - the single monetary policy and European financial integration | Period_1 | 2006-05-19 | 0.237 | the single monetary policy the introduction of the euro on 1 january 1999 was an event of the greatest historical, institutional and economic significance. seven and a half years on, we can take stock of the considerable successes achieved by the euro, successes of which the european central bank (ecb) is justifiably proud. more importantly, when seeking to perpetuate these successes and, as the euro area enlarges, to extend them to others, we must identify the key principles on which the successes of the single monetary policy rely. to manage the new currency, the ecb created a strategy for the conduct of a single, stability-oriented monetary policy for the entire euro area. in line with its treaty mandate to maintain price stability, the ecb pursues this strategy so as to keep annual consumer price inflation at rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. this definition of price stability preserves full continuity with the earlier core definitions of the national central banks. furthermore, the process of transition towards the single currency was based upon convergence towards the best performers and not convergence towards an average of the various countries’ performances. as a result, the ecb and the euro inherited the high level of credibility achieved by the most stable national currencies. looking back over the period since the euro was launched, euro area inflation has indeed been very close to 2% on average. moreover, longer-term inflation expectations ha… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The process of economic, monetary and financial integration in Europe | Period_1 | 2006-12-04 | 0.230 | central bank, and is still the only one, to convene a monthly press conference on the decisions of the governing council immediately after they are taken. indeed, we devote a lot of time to explaining and discussing our framework and actions. the monthly press conference is a case in point. we also engage in a continuing dialogue with communities such as academics, european institutions and other policy-makers 1 , ecb-watchers, journalists and the public. the high degree of transparency and credibility that we have achieved has in turn helped us to successfully anchor inflation expectations in the euro area and to make monetary policy more effective. the ecb inherited the high level of credibility of the most stable legacy currencies, itself the achievement of many years of successful monetary policy. from the outset, the ecb has managed to fully consolidate that inheritance. this was clearly demonstrated when the euro was launched, when market interest rates on instruments denominated in euro became aligned with the lowest – and not with the average – rates prevailing prior to the euro. and this happened all along the yield curve. this was an important improvement of their financial environment for the countries which had experienced high risk premia and higher interest rates in the past. the euro also removed the nominal exchange rate volatility and periodical realignments among euro area countries which used to significantly distort their relative competitiveness. the e… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the euro area and its future | Period_1 | 2008-07-15 | 0.228 | must be an integral part of this economic management. the public’s understanding and acceptance of these elements is also crucial. that is why we always strive to explain what actions we are undertaking, and why. *** ladies and gentlemen, let me now conclude. the past ten momentous years have been rich in achievements. the introduction of the euro has been recognised as a remarkable success. since 1999, the single currency has fully inherited the degree of credibility and confidence that was the privilege of the most credible national currencies prior to the euro. inflation expectations are well anchored, and medium and long-term interest rates in the euro area are at the same low level as the levels observed for the most credible of these former national currencies. we also see a remarkable degree of resilience in a complex international environment. these achievements are a solid foundation for our future. but we also know that the challenges lying ahead for the euro area are still demanding. what do we need to do, over the next ten years and beyond, to consolidate the remarkable success of the euro and improve the performance of euro area economies? we, at the ecb and the eurosystem, must preserve the quality of our monetary policy. this will safeguard all the benefits expected of price stability in terms of low current and expected inflation and interest rates. to strengthen the “e” in emu, we need to focus on a sound economic management and we need to secure a broad b… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The euro - five years on | Period_1 | 2004-02-06 | 0.214 | ladies and gentlemen, for five years now, we have had a single currency and a monetary policy conducted by the eurosystem, consisting of the european central bank and the national central banks of the euro area. the introduction of the single european currency has been a historical landmark. the process of preparing for the adoption of the single currency had led to a degree of convergence in the 1990s that many had not thought possible. sceptics were unconvinced as to whether it was possible to establish the euro as a stable currency and to successfully formulate a monetary policy for a diverse currency area. in particular, some observers considered the continuing existence of autonomous national fiscal policies as incompatible with a supranational monetary policy. the “one-size-fits-all” approach implied by the single monetary policy was, on account of the diverse nature of the currency area, criticised to give rise to permanently asynchronous economic developments. critical observers therefore took the view that a stability-oriented monetary policy was doomed to failure. where do we stand five years later? the euro has been firmly and credibly established as a stable currency. the euro area has witnessed a period of low rates of inflation and low levels of long term interest rates. most countries have had their lowest market interest rates for decades. the introduction of the euro, first, in book-entry form, and, second, in the form of banknotes and coins went very smoo… |
| Benoît Cœuré: The future of Europe - building on our strengths | Period_2 | 2013-12-06 | 0.102 | where europe needs to be reinforced yet we know that the central bank does not operate in a vacuum. the ability of the central bank to deliver price stability ultimately depends on other policies being oriented towards stability as well. without this, the benefits of the single market and the single currency are put at risk – we have seen this clearly demonstrated in last few years. the task facing europe today is therefore to secure what we have achieved so far – to ensure that monetary stability is matched by economic and financial stability. this does not require a quantum leap in integration. rather, it requires that we finish what we started in 1999 and put the right framework in place to support emu. let me explain what i mean in more detail. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Le Parisien | Period_2 | 2017-02-09 | 0.087 | benoît cœuré: interview with le parisien interview with mr benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the european central bank, and le parisien, conducted by ms séverine cazes and mr boris cassel and published on 7 february 2017. * * * what is your assessment of the euro, product of the maastricht treaty that was signed 25 years ago today? the euro is clearly a success. it has created a strong bond between european citizens. we can only influence world affairs if we are united. the single currency allows medium-sized countries like france to speak as an equal to the united states or china. the euro does not constitute a loss of sovereignty, it is a lever of sovereignty. how has the single currency affected our daily life? the purchasing power of the french people has been protected by the creation of the euro. inflation has been weaker since 2001. the french tend to think that the changeover to the euro caused prices to soar… in january 2002, when the euro banknotes and coins were introduced, there were admittedly rounding effects that resulted in higher prices, a little bump in inflation. but that was 15 years ago. since then, inflation has averaged 1.9% annually in the euro area, and 1.7% in france, which is much lower than it was before the euro. in the 1980s, inflation was in double figures (editor’s note: 13.6% in 1980 and 13.4% in 1981). how do you explain this gap between the perception in france and the figures? many french people have in their heads the pri… |
| Yves Mersch: Asset price inflation and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2020-01-28 | 0.085 | even more noteworthy is the now quite marked divergence between support for the euro and trust in the ecb. prior to the crisis, net support for the euro and net trust in the ecb generally moved in line with one another, with the currency enjoying a level of support around 20 percentage points higher. support for the single currency weathered the crisis fairly well, and now stands at its highest ever level. but the gap between the two measures now stands at 60 percentage points, and has persisted ever since the introduction of unconventional measures, although other country-specific factors might also have played a role. |
| Mario Draghi: Working together for growth in Europe | Period_2 | 2016-09-29 | 0.085 | the need for decisive action at the national and european level this leads me to my final point: policy-makers across the euro area, need to seize the opportunity to deliver reforms. at the height of the crisis, all member states and citizens showed an enormous commitment to keeping the euro area together when the critics were already talking about the euro’s demise. but we cannot stop here: we need to make sure not only that the euro survives, but that our economic and monetary union thrives. if we want to succeed, we will need to find common solutions for the problems that we all face. if we want to preserve the european social model, we will need to bring labour and product markets in line with the realities of the digital and globalised world of the 21st century. if we want savers to benefit from higher interest rates in the future, we will need to create investment opportunities to put these savings to a productive use. this is about raising productivity and employment. 6 this is about structural reforms that are a necessary complement to our monetary policy. and member states have to do their part. i have highlighted this many times in the past. 7 in fact, i emphasise it every six weeks at the ecb’s press conference. and where we face common supranational challenges, and currently there are several such challenges, there is no alternative to acting jointly as europeans. consider the transformative power of the deepening of the single market at the end of the 1980s. t… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Economic recovery and the new phase of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2017-11-14 | 0.079 | it is however also true that the present favourable economic environment, should be used to make progress in reinforcing the economic and monetary union resilience. this corresponds to the common interest of countries made closely interdependent by the single currency. reforms at national and eu level will be crucial to improve resilience to shocks, increase growth potential and ultimately restore a path of real economic convergence among member countries. thank you for your attention. |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.070 | after the treaty of rome, the development of the european project contributed to economic growth in the member states for many years: the progressive abolition of customs tariffs favoured specialisation, made it possible to reap the benefits of economies of scale, and stimulated efficiency and competition, with positive effects on employment and welfare. empirical estimates find that without the single market, our real gdp per capita would be around one-fifth lower today.[2] the european economic community subsequently evolved into the european union, becoming an area where europeans work together on a wide set of policies and enjoy freedom and peace. in 1999 we went one step further with emu. this was a logical step to buttress the single market: the euro eliminates exchange rate risk, facilitates trade and supports confidence in price stability. intra- euro area exports have increased by more than a quarter as a share of gdp since 1999.[3] and firms’ integration in value chains is three times tighter within europe than with the rest of the world. in fact, the regional integration of supply linkages in europe is higher than in any other continent and has continued to increase in recent years.[4] thanks to its size, emu has the economic firepower that gives it policy autonomy and the instruments required to react to external shocks.[5] it also puts the second most important global currency at our disposal. as the experience of recent weeks shows, this is a key ingredient o… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.056 |
|
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.040 | we have also just entered the second year of the investigation phase of our digital euro project. we are examining key questions about the potential design and distribution of a digital euro, which would be a complement to cash, not a replacement for it. for the eurosystem, the motivation behind the digital euro project is mainly domestic in nature. however, we recognise the benefits of discussing various issues at the international level, such as cross-currency payments made in retail central bank digital currency (cbdc) and the potential effects of giving foreign users access to domestic retail cbdc under specific conditions. in this regard, international cooperation on digital currencies will remain essential. 4/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Isabel Schnabel: New narratives on monetary policy – the spectre of inflation | Period_3 | 2021-10-12 | 0.040 | governments are actively supporting this transition. as the central bank for the euro area we especially welcome the fiscal policy response at eu level. for the first time since the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2008, our monetary policy measures are being adequately supported by fiscal policy at the european level. “next generation eu” is the largest fiscal package that has ever been financed from the eu budget. the countries that were hardest-hit by the pandemic are receiving extensive financial support to accelerate their recovery. financial support is not solely about cushioning the economic and social effects of the crisis. the main aim is to strengthen the growth potential of euro area countries by investing in green and digital technologies – in other words, to counteract the forces that brought about the noticeable decline in interest rates over the past decades. that will not only benefit the countries that are receiving the largest share of transfers and loans, but also countries such as germany that are strongly dependent on exports. germany can only be strong if europe is strong. fiscal and structural policies that are tailored to the euro area strengthen domestic demand, safeguard jobs and prosperity and − by promoting convergence in the euro area − ensure that the single monetary policy can be equally geared to the needs of all euro area countries. remember that the ecb determines monetary policy not only for germany, but for the whole currency a… |
| Luis de Guindos: Policy mix of the future - the role of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.030 | and sectors in the euro area. it fine-tunes the overall policy mix and complements the single monetary policy in support of overall financial stability across the euro area. despite the overall good resilience of the euro area banking sector, certain countries have in recent years seen a build-up of financial vulnerabilities, notably related to residential real estate prices and growing household and firm indebtedness. some further careful and targeted tightening of macroprudential policy would be beneficial in selected countries at present. given the deteriorated outlook for economic growth, some countries might benefit from further increasing the resilience of their financial sectors before credit risks start materialising. this includes for example taking measures to preserve capital in the banking sector which could then be used to absorb losses. lithuania has been active in applying a comprehensive set of macroprudential policies to address current vulnerabilities. this year, authorities have activated a sectoral systemic risk buffer of 2% on residential real estate exposures and have tightened the loan-to-value limit for second and subsequent housing loans to 70%. of course, the benefits of further policy action across countries, would need to be evaluated against the risk of procyclical effects, which is becoming more likely as the economic outlook worsens. let me conclude. policy interaction has been a critical element for navigating the pandemic. complementary act… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 24 | growth | 1 | 0.0393585 | annual growth | 1 | 0.9976323 |
| 24 | remain | 2 | 0.0307132 | monetary expansion | 2 | 0.9976311 |
| 24 | loan | 3 | 0.0184905 | underlie pace | 3 | 0.9974088 |
| 24 | development | 4 | 0.0169254 | annual growth rate | 4 | 0.9972834 |
| 24 | annual | 5 | 0.0168509 | remain broadly | 5 | 0.9945151 |
| 24 | annual growth | 6 | 0.0152113 | term deposit | 6 | 0.9930772 |
| 24 | continue | 7 | 0.0151367 | broadly balance | 7 | 0.9921969 |
| 24 | underlie | 8 | 0.0128263 | growth rate | 8 | 0.9918086 |
| 24 | sector | 9 | 0.0126028 | administer price | 9 | 0.9911417 |
| 24 | growth rate | 10 | 0.0125282 | financial corporation | 10 | 0.9910584 |
| 24 | time | 11 | 0.0120811 | administer | 11 | 0.9909254 |
| 24 | annual growth rate | 12 | 0.0117084 | loan | 12 | 0.9905433 |
| 24 | increase | 13 | 0.0115594 | moderate | 13 | 0.9905432 |
| 24 | pace | 14 | 0.0109631 | remain moderate | 14 | 0.9903433 |
| 24 | pressure | 15 | 0.0108886 | late datum | 15 | 0.9902057 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-04-08 | 0.655 | economic activity in the euro area than currently expected. on the other hand, downside risks relate to the ongoing tensions in some segments of the financial markets that may potentially spill over to the euro area real economy. downside risks also relate to further increases in energy prices, in particular in view of ongoing geopolitical tensions, and to protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. finally, there are potential risks stemming from the economic impact on the euro area and elsewhere of the recent natural and nuclear disaster in japan. with regard to price developments, euro area annual hicp inflation was 2.6% in march 2011, according to eurostat’s flash estimate, after 2.4 % in february. the increase in inflation rates in early 2011 largely reflects higher commodity prices. pressure stemming from the sharp increases in energy and food prices is also discernible in the earlier stages of the production process. it is of paramount importance that the rise in hicp inflation does not lead to second-round effects in price and wage-setting behaviour and thereby give rise to broad-based inflationary pressures over the medium term. inflation expectations must remain firmly anchored in line with the governing council’s aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments remain on the upside. they relate, in particular, to higher than as… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-05-09 | 0.627 | the ongoing tensions in some segments of the financial markets that may potentially spill over to the euro area real economy. downside risks also relate to further increases in energy prices, particularly in view of ongoing geopolitical tensions in north africa and the middle east, and to protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. finally, there are still potential risks stemming from the economic impact on the euro area and elsewhere of the natural and nuclear disasters in japan. with regard to price developments, euro area annual hicp inflation was 2.8% in april according to eurostat’s flash estimate, after 2.7% in march. the increase in inflation rates during the first four months of 2011 largely reflects higher commodity prices. looking ahead, inflation rates are likely to stay clearly above 2% over the coming months. upward pressure on inflation, mainly from energy and commodity prices, is also discernible in the earlier stages of the production process. it is of paramount importance that the rise in hicp inflation does not translate into second-round effects in price and wage-setting behaviour and lead to broad-based inflationary pressures. inflation expectations must remain firmly anchored in line with the governing council’s aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments remain on the upside. they relate, in particular, to high… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-07-11 | 0.615 | rates seen over the past few months largely reflect higher energy and commodity prices. looking ahead, inflation rates are likely to stay clearly above 2% over the coming months. upward pressure on inflation, mainly from energy and commodity prices, is also still discernible in the earlier stages of the production process. it remains of paramount importance that the rise in hicp inflation does not translate into second-round effects in price and wage-setting behaviour and lead to broad-based inflationary pressures. inflation expectations must remain firmly anchored in line with the governing council’s aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments remain on the upside. they relate, in particular, to higher than assumed increases in energy prices. furthermore, there is a risk of increases in indirect taxes and administered prices that may be greater than currently assumed, owing to the need for fiscal consolidation in the coming years. finally, upside risks may stem from stronger than expected domestic price pressures in the context of increasing capacity utilisation in the euro area. turning to the monetary analysis, the annual growth rate of m3 increased to 2.4% in may 2011, from 2.0% in april. looking through the recent volatility in broad money growth owing to special factors, m3 growth has continued to edge up over recent months. the annual growth rate of loans to the private sect… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-01-13 | 0.601 | commodity prices, protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. with regard to price developments, euro area annual hicp inflation was 2.2% in december, according to eurostat’s flash estimate, after 1.9% in november. this was somewhat higher than expected and largely reflects higher energy prices. looking ahead to the next few months, inflation rates could temporarily increase further. they are likely to stay slightly above 2%, largely owing to commodity price developments, before moderating again towards the end of the year. overall, we see evidence of short-term upward pressure on overall inflation, stemming largely from global commodity prices. while this has not so far affected our assessment that price developments will remain in line with price stability over the policy- relevant horizon, very close monitoring of price developments is warranted. inflation expectations over the medium to longer term continue to be firmly anchored in line with the governing council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments are still broadly balanced but could move to the upside. upside risks relate, in particular, to developments in energy and non- energy commodity prices. furthermore, increases in indirect taxes and administered prices may be greater than currently expected, owing to the need for fiscal consolidation in the coming years, and price… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-08-09 | 0.598 | momentum of economic growth in the euro area remains in place and continued moderate expansion is expected in the period ahead. euro area exports should continue to be supported by the ongoing expansion in the world economy. in addition, the present level of consumer and business confidence in the euro area supports private sector domestic demand. however, growth dynamics are currently weakened by a number of factors contributing to uncertainty, and activity is expected to be dampened somewhat by the ongoing process of balance sheet adjustment in various regions and sectors. in the governing council’s assessment, the risks to this economic outlook for the euro area remain broadly balanced in an environment of particularly high uncertainty. on the one hand, consumer and business confidence, together with improvements in labour market conditions, could continue to provide support to domestic economic activity. on the other hand, downside risks may have intensified. they relate to the ongoing tensions in some segments of the euro area financial markets as well as to global developments, and the potential for these pressures to spill over into the euro area real economy. downside risks also relate to further increases in energy prices, protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. with regard to price developments, euro area annual hicp inflation was 2.5% in july 2011, following 2.7% in june. the relatively high inflation rates se… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-01-21 | 0.337 | developments in loans to the private sector were characterised by moderate lending to non-financial corporations and resilient lending to households. the monthly lending flow to non-financial corporations remained very modest in november, continuing the pattern observed since the end of the summer. at the same time, the annual growth rate remained broadly unchanged, at 6.9 per cent, still reflecting the very strong increase in lending in the first half of the year. the annual growth rate of loans to households remained broadly stable at 3.1 per cent in november, amid a sizeable positive monthly flow. |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2012-01-13 | 0.310 | 2011, according to eurostat’s flash estimate, after 3.0% in the preceding three months. this decline was expected and reflects a downward base effect stemming from energy prices. inflation rates have been at elevated levels since the end of 2010, mainly driven by higher energy and other commodity prices. looking ahead, they are likely to stay above 2% for several months to come, before declining to below 2%. this pattern reflects the expectation that, in an environment of weaker growth in the euro area and globally, underlying cost, wage and price pressures in the euro area should remain modest. the governing council continues to view the risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments as broadly balanced. on the upside, the main risks relate to further increases in indirect taxes and administered prices, owing to the need for fiscal consolidation in the coming years, and possible increases in commodity prices. the main downside risks relate to the impact of weaker than expected growth in the euro area and globally. turning to the monetary analysis, taking the appropriate medium-term perspective, the underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be moderate. the annual growth rate of m3 decreased to 2.0% in november 2011, after 2.6% in october. as in the previous three months, monetary developments in november were affected by the heightened uncertainty in financial markets. the annual growth rate of loans to the private sector, adjusted for loan sales and sec… |
| Peter Praet: Economic recovery in the euro area - the role of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2013-12-16 | 0.195 | signals from the monetary pillar let me now turn to the signals we have received from the monetary pillar. in a nutshell, these signals confirm the subdued medium-term inflation outlook deriving from the economic analysis. while monetary dynamics have been weak, essentially since the onset of the crisis, growth in broad money moderated further in recent months. the annual growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate m3 decreased to 1.4% in october 2013 (or 1.7 % adjusting for one-off effects), which is the latest available data point, from 2.0% in september 2013. this marks a continuation in the deceleration from previous months. after m3 still grew at 2.8% in the second quarter of 2013, the third quarter recorded a significant drop in this growth rate to 2.2%. a key driver of these recent developments in m3 is that, in the current environment, monetary assets only yield little remuneration. as a consequence, money holders are incentivised to engage in two types of substitution: either they hold very liquid instruments, such as overnight deposits. this shows up in still robust growth in the narrow monetary aggregate m1, which stood at 6.6% in october 2013, slightly down from 6.7% in september. or they diversify away from short-term deposits and marketable instruments towards better remunerated – but riskier and less liquid – instruments. to the extent these instruments are outside m3, this dampens the growth in the broader monetary aggregate. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges to monetary policy in 2012 | Period_2 | 2011-12-15 | 0.170 | definition of price stability, despite several shocks that euro area economies have been confronted with over this period – most notably the current financial and economic crisis. this is first of all so because the ecb has – from its start – credibly delivered upon its primary mandate, price stability. in fact, by anchoring inflation expectations, a kind of “automatic stabiliser” is implemented. changes in nominal yields induced by monetary policy decisions are reflected into changes in real yields, so as to dampen the destabilising effects of excessive uncertainty, both on financial markets and the real economy. this is true also in normal circumstances, but it is especially important when there are risks of deflation. during the crisis, well anchored inflation expectations helped to avoid deflationary spirals and allowed the ecb to effectively reduce short-term real interest rates by acting on the nominal, policy rate. our robust and medium-term oriented monetary policy strategy has been crucial in credibly anchoring inflation expectations. using the same framework for internal analysis and external communication has helped the ecb to conduct its monetary policy in a credible, consistent and effective manner. this brings me to today’s monetary policy decision. the governing council decided to lower the key ecb interest rates by 25 basis points, following the 25 basis point decrease on 3 november 2011. inflation is likely to stay above 2% for several months to come, but … |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2012-02-10 | 0.157 | euro area annual hicp inflation was 2.7% in january 2012, according to eurostat’s flash estimate, unchanged from december. the average inflation rate for 2011 was 2.7%, mainly driven by higher energy and other commodity prices. looking ahead, inflation is likely to stay above 2% for several months to come, before declining to below 2%. this pattern reflects the expectation that, in an environment of weak growth in the euro area and globally, underlying price pressures in the euro area should remain limited. risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments remain broadly balanced. on the upside, they relate to higher than assumed increases in indirect taxes and administered prices, as well as increases in commodity prices. the main downside risks relate to the impact of weaker than expected growth in the euro area and globally. the monetary analysis indicates that the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains subdued. the annual growth rate of m3 decreased to 1.6% in december 2011, after 2.0% in november, reflecting a further weakening of monetary dynamics towards the end of the year. the annual growth rates of loans to non-financial corporations and loans to households, adjusted for loan sales and securitisation, also decreased further in december, and stood at 1.2% and 1.9% respectively. the volume of mfi loans to both sectors declined in december, and this was particularly pronounced in the case of the non-financial corporate sector. in addition, there are ind… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2021-12-17 | 0.066 | inflation inflation increased further to 4.9 per cent in november. it will remain above two per cent for most of 2022. inflation is expected to remain elevated in the near term, but we expect it to decline in the course of next year. the upswing in inflation primarily reflects a sharp rise in prices for fuel, gas and electricity. in november, energy inflation accounted for more than half of headline inflation. demand also continues to outpace constrained supply in certain sectors. the consequences are especially visible in the prices of durable goods and those consumer services that have recently reopened. base effects related to the end of the vat cut in germany are still contributing to higher inflation, but only until the end of the year. there is uncertainty as to how long it will take for these issues to resolve. but, in the course of 2022, we expect energy prices to stabilise, consumption patterns to normalise, and price pressures stemming from global supply bottlenecks to subside. over time, the gradual return of the economy to full capacity and further improvements in the labour market should support faster growth in wages. market and survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations have remained broadly stable since our last monetary policy meeting in october. but overall, these have moved closer to two per cent in recent months. these factors will help underlying inflation to move up and bring headline inflation up to our target over the medium term. o… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.065 | both credit supply and demand are indicative for future loan growth developments (chart 20). a shift in credit standards tends to lead annual loan growth to firms by about five to six quarters, making loan growth a rather late economic indicator in the transmission of monetary policy compared with survey and market rate indicators. the net tightening of credit standards on loans to firms which we have seen since the fourth quarter of 2021 will likely translate into a dampening impact on the annual growth rate of loans in the coming quarters. while currently still strong, banks expect loan demand by firms to decrease in the coming quarters, related to weakening economic growth and diminishing frontloading effects, in line with the usual delay in loan growth developments compared to real economic activity. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.057 | panetta, f. (2021), “patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery”, speech at sciences po, 24 november. 8. in the euro area, the pick-up of wage growth has been more moderate and gradual than in the united states. the annual growth rate of compensation per employee is still distorted by the impact of the government measures to prevent job losses during the pandemic. negotiated wage growth, which is less affected by these measures, stood at 2.4% (including volatile one-off payments) in the second quarter of 2022. 9. to be consistent with the 2% inflation target under typical conditions, nominal wage growth should be equal to productivity growth plus 2%, which the september ecb staff projections expect to be the case in 2024. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2021-10-28 | 0.048 | to sustain the recovery, targeted and coordinated fiscal support should continue to complement monetary policy. this support will also help the economy adjust to the structural changes that are under way. an effective implementation of the next generation eu programme and the “fit for 55” package will contribute to a stronger, greener and more even recovery across euro area countries. inflation inflation increased to 3.4 per cent in september. we expect it to rise further this year. but while the current phase of higher inflation will last longer than originally expected, we expect inflation to decline in the course of next year. the upswing in inflation largely reflects a combination of three factors. first, energy prices – especially for oil, gas and electricity – have risen sharply. in september, energy inflation accounted for about half of overall inflation. second, prices are also going up because recovering demand related to the reopening of the economy is outpacing supply. these dynamics are especially visible in the prices of consumer services, as well as the prices of goods affected most strongly by supply shortages. and finally, base effects related to the end of the vat cut in germany are still contributing to higher inflation. we expect the influence of all three factors to ease in the course of 2022 or to fall out of the year- on-year inflation calculation. as the recovery continues, the gradual return of the economy to full capacity will underpin a rise in wa… |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.048 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25 | growth | 1 | 0.1776235 | gdp growth | 1 | 0.9996494 |
| 25 | real | 2 | 0.1113469 | gdp | 2 | 0.9995619 |
| 25 | gdp | 3 | 0.1086160 | real gdp | 3 | 0.9995619 |
| 25 | real gdp | 4 | 0.0657620 | real gdp growth | 4 | 0.9994742 |
| 25 | gdp growth | 5 | 0.0593549 | real | 5 | 0.9991234 |
| 25 | real gdp growth | 6 | 0.0467508 | growth rate | 6 | 0.9984229 |
| 25 | quarter | 7 | 0.0340416 | growth | 7 | 0.9983326 |
| 25 | growth rate | 8 | 0.0212274 | quarter | 8 | 0.9976328 |
| 25 | datum | 9 | 0.0133499 | gdp growth rate | 9 | 0.9961802 |
| 25 | positive | 10 | 0.0118794 | major imbalance | 10 | 0.9961351 |
| 25 | period | 11 | 0.0114592 | previous | 11 | 0.9960562 |
| 25 | estimate | 12 | 0.0108290 | employment growth | 12 | 0.9957476 |
| 25 | late | 13 | 0.0107240 | strong growth | 13 | 0.9956603 |
| 25 | economy | 14 | 0.0103039 | positive | 14 | 0.9955234 |
| 25 | average | 15 | 0.0100938 | current assessment | 15 | 0.9952995 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2008-04-11 | 0.212 | according to eurostat’s second estimate, quarter-on-quarter real gdp growth in the fourth quarter of 2007 was 0.4%, following 0.7% in the previous quarter. the latest information on economic activity also underpins previous expectations of moderate but ongoing growth in the first quarter of 2008. overall, the euro area economy has sound fundamentals and does not suffer from major imbalances. |
| Current issues in monetary policy | Period_1 | 2001-02-12 | 0.182 | the current monetary and economic situation in the euro area let me finally turn to the current monetary and economic situation and its implications for monetary policy. as you are no doubt aware, the ecb has kept interest rates unchanged since the beginning of october last year. this policy reflects the fact that risks to price stability in the medium term have become more balanced over the past few months, although some factors which may pose upward risks still remain. starting with the first pillar of the monetary policy strategy of the ecb, monetary data for december 2000 confirmed the moderation of monetary dynamics, which has been observed since the spring of last year. the three-month average of the annual growth rates of m3, covering the period from october to december, stood at 5.0%, slightly lower than the 5.1% for the period from september to november 2000. hence, the risks to price stability from the monetary side have become increasingly more balanced. however, some caution is still warranted, given the previous protracted period of upward deviations of m3 growth from the reference value of 4 1/2%. broadly similar indications are emerging from the second pillar. this year, real gdp growth may be somewhat weaker than last year, and inflationary pressures stemming from previously higher oil prices and a low external value of the euro may gradually disappear. nevertheless, there is also need for some caution. the external environment of the euro area is currently… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy in EMU - views and challenges | Period_1 | 2005-06-29 | 0.161 | inflation and growth differentials among countries in the euro area are moderate … in recent months there has been a renewed interest in the issue of economic differentials between euro area countries. regional differentials in growth and inflation are a standard feature of all large currency areas around the world. in the euro area these differentials are of a similar size to those observed within the united states. let me provide some figures. the degree of inflation dispersion across the euro area countries was characterised by a strong downward trend in the 1980s and 1990s and has broadly stabilised since the inception of the euro. inflation dispersion among the euro area countries (measured as the unweighted standard deviation of annual hicp inflation rates) was around 6 percentage points in late 1990, while it amounted to slightly less than 1 percentage point in spring 2005. the average inflation dispersion across the euro area countries has been 1 percentage point since the launch of the euro. this figure is very close to the dispersion observed across the 14 us metropolitan statistical areas. the dispersion of real gdp growth rates in the euro area has, since 1999, remained very close to its historic average, without any signs of increased divergence having emerged so far. in the period from 1999 to 2004, the average dispersion of annual real gdp growth (measured as the unweighted standard deviation) was around 2 percentage points, and thus very close to the averag… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The entry of Slovakia into the euro area | Period_1 | 2008-09-24 | 0.152 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Asset price bubbles and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-06-14 | 0.146 | summarise information on real estate prices, real investment, real money growth and real credit growth. the data used to construct these synthetic indicator variables correspond to quarterly series for a sample of 17 oecd countries30, covering the period 1970-2003. an asset price boom is defined as a period in which the aggregate real asset price index31 is continuously more than 11% above its trend. each period, the trend32 is recomputed using only the information available up to that period. in this way, the booms are observed as perceive in ‘real time’. overall, 32 asset price boom periods have been identified. asset price booms that were followed by a sharp drop in real gdp growth rates are labelled as high-cost booms while those that were succeeded by a relatively mild slowdown in real growth are labelled as low-cost booms33. 15 booms have been considered high-cost booms and 17 have been considered low-cost booms. for each boom, seven periods are defined according to their relative position to the beginning or to the end of the boom. these periods represent an aggregation of four quarters except for the peak period, which corresponds to a single quarter: • pre2 starts 2 years before the boom, • pre1 starts 1 year before the boom, • b1 is the first year of the boom, • peak is the quarter where the difference between the aggregate asset price index and its trend is at its maximum, • last is the last year of the boom, i.e., the last quarter of the boom plus the three pre… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Effectiveness of Monetary Union and the Capital Markets Union | Period_2 | 2017-04-10 | 0.155 | note: the chart summarizes the five-year cumulative contributions of capital markets, credit markets, fiscal tools, and relative prices to the smoothing, in terms of consumption growth, of a 1-standard-deviation shock to gdp growth. each bar thus measures the parts of the shock to country-specific gdp that are absorbed by the respective channels. the remainder is interpreted as the unsmoothed portion of a gdp shock, i.e., the part of a shock to country-specific gdp growth that is reflected into country-specific consumption growth. contributions sum up to 100 percent, and a negative contribution corresponds to dis-smoothing of consumption growth. the respective contributions are estimated over rolling ten-year backward-looking windows, based on annual data and applying the asdrubali and kim (2004) approach enhanced for relative price adjustments in the spirit of corsetti, dedola, and viani (2011). 8 / 10 |
| Peter Praet: Price stability - a sinking will-o’-the-wisp? | Period_2 | 2015-04-17 | 0.150 |
|
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.129 | the effect on both financial conditions and the real economy was significant. considering all the measures taken since mid-2014, the overall impact on euro area real gdp growth is estimated to have been between 2.5 and 3 percentage points cumulatively until 2019, and the impact on inflation is estimated to have been between 1.7 and 2 percentage points cumulatively over the same period. |
| Vítor Constâncio: The outlook for the global economy | Period_2 | 2016-05-11 | 0.125 | prospects for the global economy: cyclical developments in the euro area, the overall data points towards a continued moderate recovery, which is nonetheless still subject to fragilities. according to the latest eu commission projections, euro area real gdp is expected to expand by 1.6% this year and 1.8% next year (figures stood at 1.4% for 2016 and 1.7% for 2017, according to the march 2016 ecb staff macroeconomic projections). that said, the euro area’s emergence from the financial crisis has been protracted, particularly when seen from an historical perspective. it was only in the first quarter of this year that it surpassed its pre-crisis peak level of output. in this quarter, the euro area had a higher growth rate than the u.s. or the u.k., which creates a positive dynamics for this year’s overall growth, exceeding recent forecasts. this recovery needs to be seen in a context where legacies from the crisis continue to dampen growth, and the contribution of external demand to the recovery is less assured. the latter reflects a 5-year string of weakening growth in emerging market economies (emes) as well as less favourable than expected out-turns at the turn of this year, at a global level. while domestic demand in the euro area is rising, it still shows a weakness that relates in part to the fact that the euro area is coming out of a balance sheet recession, where economic activity is constrained by the need for governments, firms and households to deleverage. for ins… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox - evidence from the euro area | Period_2 | 2020-02-23 | 0.124 | ameco database (european commission spring forecast). note: the fiscal stance is approximated by a change in the ratio to gdp of the cyclically adjusted government balance. contributions to euro area real gdp growth (annual gdp growth in percentages; contributions in percentage points) ecb staff calculations based on eurostat data. notes: real gdp growth and demand components in 2019 are from december 2019 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections. government balances december 2019 broad macroeconomic projections for the euro area, imf world economic outlook october 2019 for other countries, and ecb staff calculations. notes: the projection for japan is adjusted to include the recently announced fiscal stimulus. it assumes an overall stimulus of jpy 13 trillion, distributed evenly over calendar years 2020 and 2021 with a positive effect on gdp growth of 0.3 percentage points in both years. for china, the estimated “augmented” fiscal numbers, which include estimated off- budget spending and debt, point to larger deficits and debt than reported in these charts. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.200 | historical lows.[13] and financial and credit indicators also point to significant downside risks to gdp growth (chart 4).[14] downside risks to euro area real gdp growth lower tail of the distribution of real gdp growth forecasts for q1 and q3 2023 based on “gdp-at-risk” models (quarter-on-quarter change in percentage points) |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.185 | impact of financial tightening on real gdp growth under different quantiles of the distributions ecb calculations. notes: the chart shows the impact of a one standard deviation increase in the euro area composite indicator of systemic stress (ciss) on the one-year ahead annual growth rate of euro area gdp, by gdp decile. the estimates are based on quantile regressions of the one-year ahead gdp growth rate on the ciss index. the estimation is carried out for the period january 1999 to december 2021, based on monthly observations. the shaded area is the 64% confidence interval for the estimates of the coefficients, while the linear model refers to the ordinary least squares estimate. |
| Christine Lagarde: Challenges along Europe’s road | Period_3 | 2022-05-16 | 0.143 | 1 1. considering all the measures taken since mid-2014, the overall impact on euro area real gdp growth is estimated to have been between 2.5 and 3 percentage points cumulatively until 2019, and the impact on inflation is estimated to have been between 1.7 and 2 percentage points cumulatively over the same period. 2 2. lagarde, c. (2022), “a new global map: european resilience in a changing world”, keynote speech at the peterson institute for international economics, 22 april. 3 3. lagarde, c. (2022), “monetary policy in an uncertain world”, speech at “the ecb and its watchers xxii” conference, 17 march. 4/4 |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.127 | both credit supply and demand are indicative for future loan growth developments (chart 20). a shift in credit standards tends to lead annual loan growth to firms by about five to six quarters, making loan growth a rather late economic indicator in the transmission of monetary policy compared with survey and market rate indicators. the net tightening of credit standards on loans to firms which we have seen since the fourth quarter of 2021 will likely translate into a dampening impact on the annual growth rate of loans in the coming quarters. while currently still strong, banks expect loan demand by firms to decrease in the coming quarters, related to weakening economic growth and diminishing frontloading effects, in line with the usual delay in loan growth developments compared to real economic activity. |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.102 | economic activity euro area real gdp growth was robust in the first half of 2022, supported by the reopening of economies in the second quarter as pandemic-related restrictions were lifted. however, the outlook has since darkened due to high inflation, waning reopening effects, weakening global demand and falling confidence. these factors are likely to cause a significant slowdown in euro area gdp growth in the second half of the year 1/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26 | framework | 1 | 0.0932095 | maker | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 26 | macroeconomic | 2 | 0.0668090 | policy maker | 2 | 0.9996495 |
| 26 | maker | 3 | 0.0443037 | policy framework | 3 | 0.9994743 |
| 26 | policy maker | 4 | 0.0419955 | monetary policy framework | 4 | 0.9991238 |
| 26 | policy framework | 5 | 0.0316084 | framework | 5 | 0.9987719 |
| 26 | good | 6 | 0.0304543 | governance | 6 | 0.9984230 |
| 26 | imbalance | 7 | 0.0225197 | macroeconomic policy | 7 | 0.9984225 |
| 26 | monetary policy framework | 8 | 0.0179033 | macroeconomic | 8 | 0.9979815 |
| 26 | exist | 9 | 0.0171819 | surveillance | 9 | 0.9978084 |
| 26 | governance | 10 | 0.0168934 | economic governance | 10 | 0.9975454 |
| 26 | provide | 11 | 0.0142966 | monetary policy maker | 11 | 0.9974119 |
| 26 | require | 12 | 0.0132868 | exist | 12 | 0.9971945 |
| 26 | key | 13 | 0.0128540 | imbalance | 13 | 0.9971933 |
| 26 | macroeconomic policy | 14 | 0.0125655 | macroeconomic environment | 14 | 0.9965809 |
| 26 | element | 15 | 0.0122769 | macroeconomic stability | 15 | 0.9963192 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Reflections on the European Economic and Monetary Union | Period_1 | 2010-11-17 | 0.309 | but complacency would be inappropriate. the european leaders recognise that our economic model is in need of a considerable strengthening. at their meeting in october, the heads of state or government agreed on the reform of the system of economic governance. the proposals put forward by president van rompuy represent a strengthening of the existing framework for fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance. but as i have said before, the governing council of the ecb considers that they do not represent the quantum leap in the economic governance that is needed to be fully commensurate with the monetary union we have created. one key area is surveillance of fiscal policies to prevent excessive deficits and unsustainable public debt. in our view we need shorter deadlines under excessive deficit procedures so that corrective policy action is taken in good time. we need quasi-automaticity in the application of sanctions, based on clearly defined criteria and with less discretion over outcomes. and we need ambitious targets for the reduction of public debt towards the 60% of gdp ceiling. the second key area is broader surveillance of macroeconomic policies in the euro area. we need a new system of mutual surveillance in the euro area, concentrating firmly on euro area countries experiencing sustained losses of competitiveness and large current account deficits as these countries face the greatest sustainability challenges. it should be determined by transparent and effective trigger … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2010-03-24 | 0.220 | policy responses to imbalances one of the main drivers of the financial crisis were the large global external imbalances. these imbalances implied massive capital inflows into deficit countries. those inflows had partly been financed by the issuance of financial instruments, whose value was shattered in the turmoil. the imbalances reflected a lack of medium-term orientation towards stability and sustainability of macroeconomic policies in key deficit and surplus economies. the euro area did not contribute to the build-up in global imbalances. its current account has remained close to balance over the years. the crisis has induced a partial reduction in global imbalances, but this correction appears to be largely cyclical. some important structural factors that led to unsustainable imbalances remain largely in place. a risk that unsustainable global imbalances might re-emerge in the period ahead can therefore not be ruled out. ruling it out would require rigorous policy adjustments in key deficit and surplus economies. the g20’s decision to create a process of mutual assessment of its members’ macroeconomic and structural policies is fundamental in this respect. to be successful, this process requires that peer surveillance is executed fairly and without complacency, and that the countries and economies concerned have the will and the operational capacity to change their domestic policies accordingly. these are necessary conditions to pave the way for a better functioning o… |
| Lucas Papademos: Tackling the financial crisis - policies for stability and recovery | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.182 |
|
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2010-11-08 | 0.180 | economies. increasing product market competition, particularly in the services sectors, would also facilitate the restructuring of the economy and encourage innovation and the adoption of new technologies. at their meeting on 28–29 october 2010 the eu heads of state and government agreed on the reform of the european union’s economic governance. the proposals put forward by president van rompuy represent a strengthening of the existing framework for fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance in the european union. however, the governing council considers that they do not go as far as the quantum leap in the economic governance of monetary union that it has been calling for. in particular, the governing council is concerned that there would be insufficient automaticity in the implementation of fiscal surveillance, that there is no specification of the rule to reduce the government debt ratio, and that financial sanctions have not been explicitly retained under the macroeconomic surveillance procedure. with regard to the macroeconomic surveillance procedure in particular, the new system of mutual surveillance would need to concentrate firmly on euro area countries experiencing sustained losses of competitiveness and large current account deficits. it should be determined by transparent and effective trigger mechanisms. it would be essential that the assessments of macroeconomic imbalances and recommendations for corrective action be given broad publicity at all stages of the surv… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Reflections on the European Economic and Monetary Union | Period_1 | 2010-11-17 | 0.143 | both areas, fiscal and macroeconomic policies, are monitored by the peers, supported mainly by the commission. the eurogroup and ecofin meetings of finance ministers are the fora for such peer monitoring. of course, effective monitoring requires adherence by members to the policy framework, it requires peer pressure and consequences to deal with deviant behaviour and it requires reliable statistics. it is in these areas that the biggest deficiencies have been revealed. fiscal policy conduct has quite often not been in line with the pact, macroeconomic policies have been too loose and peer pressure has been too weak. these problems were visible well before the financial crisis, but the crisis has of course aggravated them, and massively so. i will come back to how we deal with these problems in a moment. but first let me turn directly to the crisis and say a few words about its origins and developments, and how the ecb has responded to it. |
| Jürgen Stark: Globalisation and monetary policy - from virtue to vice? | Period_2 | 2011-11-30 | 0.118 | shock transmission and policy degrees of freedom in a globalised era second, i would argue that globalisation (and in particular financial globalisation) has changed the risk and reward matrix associated with policy failures and successes, respectively. globalisation may be initially more forgiving with policy mistakes on account of higher thresholds of tolerance, for example as regards current account or public debt positions. however – as the crisis has forcefully taught us – by enabling these imbalances to remain unaddressed for longer, the eventual cost of adjustment of unsustainable policies would be higher than would otherwise be the case – and the adjustment may occur in a very swift manner. it is the sudden operation of these centripetal (as opposed to centrifugal) forces of globalisation enabling the rapid propagation of shocks across borders which has led observers such as rogoff to deem the euro area “the ultimate contagion machine”31. the key policy elements to restore normalcy in the euro area thus require (i) redressing the macroeconomic imbalances and unsustainable fiscal policies that lie at the heart of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area; (ii) much greater economic policy co-ordination among 30 see saving capitalism from the capitalists: unleashing the power of financial markets to create wealth and spread opportunity, book by r. rajan and l. zingales, (2003). 31 see the interview of k. rogoff in the frankfurter allgemeiner zeitung, september 2011. |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2014-07-18 | 0.097 | challenges ahead let me now turn to the challenges that the euro area will face in the years to come. in the last legislative period, a great deal has been done to restore stability as a key prerequisite for economic dynamism. this has resulted in a return of confidence to the euro area. but high public and private debt, low growth and unacceptably high levels of unemployment are reminding us that the most pressing matter now is to bring the euro area back onto a path of shared prosperity. to achieve this, the focus in the next five years should lie on thoroughly implementing the reinforced policy framework that was agreed in the last term, and on further increasing the resilience of euro area countries’ economies. for us at the ecb, this means assuming a new role in the banking union by supervising the euro area banks as from november. with the comprehensive assessment exercise that we are currently conducting, we will contribute to putting euro area banks on a healthy footing, so as to enable them to provide financing to the real economy. for euro area member states, this means undertaking the necessary structural reforms to foster growth, and to avoid any new build-up of macroeconomic imbalances. it also means continuing fiscal consolidation to rebalance public finances in line with the rules underpinning the stability and growth pact. the euro area policy framework was strengthened considerably by the agreement between this house and the council on the six-pack and the… |
| Mario Draghi: Plenary debate of the European Parliament on the ECB’s Annual Report 2013 | Period_2 | 2015-03-02 | 0.097 | medium to longer term, we need to move from a system of rules and guidelines for national economic policy making to a system of further sovereignty sharing within common institutions so as to strengthen our economic policy governance. a common rule is only as strong as the common institution that can enforce it. the discussions on the new four presidents’ report will certainly provide a good opportunity to think further on these matters, and i am looking forward to your views in the upcoming berès report on the economic governance framework. thank you for your attention. |
| Peter Praet: Speech on the occasion of the “Annual Danish Top Executive Summit 2013” | Period_2 | 2013-01-30 | 0.091 | conclusion let me conclude with a cautionary tale. innovation is the quintessence of entrepreneurship and a cornerstone for economic growth and prosperity in market-based economies. but there can be innovations that create more problems than the ones they were originally conceived to address. i am reminded of the two mortal sins of economic policy-making that clearly transpire when reading carmen reinhart and kenneth rogoff’s excellent book on financial crises: arrogance and ignorance. 8 transposing this insight to the discussion on monetary policy frameworks, i would say that it is dangerously arrogant to believe that one’s current approach to monetary policy is perfect and no improvements or changes will ever be needed. certainly, before the crisis, a certain degree of academic group thinking and central bank professional hubris bred a sense of accomplishment that proved exceedingly complacent and ultimately self-defeating. looking forward, we should temper a tendency to self-complacency – if not arrogance – with the strength of thought and the courage of vision. but courage and vision should not entice us into hazardous experimentations. we should not be ignorant of the lessons that history has taught. and history has shown that inflation was permanently brought under control when the public’s inflation expectations became safely anchored. this in turn occurred when central banks gained credibility regarding their determination to stabilise inflation. this credibility w… |
| Jürgen Stark: Globalisation and monetary policy - from virtue to vice? | Period_2 | 2011-11-30 | 0.090 | monetary union members; and (iii) ensuring that there is an effective governance framework in place which can guard against similar instances from occurring in the future, inter alia through macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance and early correction mechanisms. emerging challenges to monetary policy frameworks third, as regards the challenges for monetary policy looking forward, central banks are likely to be subject to greater peer and public scrutiny in a world of higher interconnectedness. at the same time, however, monetary authorities are also more liable to be burdened with the spillovers resulting from the actions of other parties. crucial challenges in this regard include the risk that monetary policy is overburdened by fiscally dominant regimes caused by government’s irresponsible fiscal behaviour and unsustainable public finances. there is also the risk that monetary policy is dominated by financial stability concerns, implying that price stability would be subjugated by financial stability. monetary policy frameworks have to be made robust against the challenges ahead and i believe a number of principles for robust monetary policy frameworks should be strongly reaffirmed as a result. first, we should recognise the centrality of price stability for monetary policy. this is the best contribution that monetary authorities can make to overall economic welfare. price stability should thus remain the primary task and the key “deliverable” for central banks in the peri… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-12-20 | 0.096 | fiscal support measures to shield the economy from the impact of high energy prices should be temporary, targeted and tailored to preserving incentives to consume less energy. fiscal measures falling short of these principles are likely to exacerbate inflationary pressures, which would necessitate a stronger monetary policy response. moreover, in line with the eu’s economic governance framework, fiscal policies should be oriented towards making our economy more productive and gradually bringing down high public debt. policies to enhance the euro area’s supply capacity, especially in the energy sector, can help reduce price pressures in the medium term. to that end, governments should swiftly implement their investment and structural reform plans under the next generation eu programme. the reform of the eu’s economic governance framework should be concluded rapidly. 2/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.054 | at the same time, investors are increasingly challenging the view that the euro area economy will fall back into the vicious circle of low growth and low inflation that characterised the pre-pandemic macroeconomic environment. current forward inflation swap rates indicate that inflation is expected to stabilise at, or close to, our two per cent target over the medium to long term, well above the level that was expected before the pandemic. |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.051 | and enhance risk management practices. this is all part of our action plan to incorporate climate change considerations into our monetary policy framework. just this month, the eurosystem started taking each issuer’s climate score into account for all purchases of corporate bonds in the context of the ongoing reinvestment purchases. tackling climate-related and environmental risks is also one of the ecb’s key supervisory priorities for 2022-24. we have set a strategic objective for banks to proactively incorporate climate-related and environmental risks into their business strategies and their governance and risk management frameworks. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.044 | in terms of supporting demand, our monetary policy will continue to provide the conditions necessary to fuel the recovery. indeed, our forward guidance has already led to a better alignment of rate expectations with our new inflation target, while helping to strengthen inflation expectations, which lowers real interest rates. we expect to see further progress toward an even tighter alignment between |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.043 | a shifting macroeconomic environment yet, these large-scale policy interventions coincided with fundamental structural changes in the global economy. as the recovery of supply was held back by persistent disruptions to global supply chains, labour shortages and social distancing measures, demand started to outpace supply, putting upward pressure on prices. inflationary pressures were then reinforced by russia’s invasion of ukraine, which led to a surge in energy and food prices. over time, inflation broadened substantially, creeping into most goods and services, and pushing up underlying inflation to historically high levels, with no clear signs of reversal so far (slide 3). ecb staff analysis suggests that both demand and supply have made a significant and broadly even contribution to the recent rise in underlying inflation in the euro area (slide 4). these price pressures are unlikely to dissipate quickly. even if the deterioration in the euro area’s terms of trade and the significant loss in purchasing power will dampen private consumption and investment, the current macroeconomic environment differs from that before the pandemic in at least four key aspects. first, excess savings accumulated since the start of the pandemic remain significant in both nominal and real terms (slide 5, left-hand side). second, due to supply constraints, firms in the manufacturing sector continue to have full order books with a backlog of more than five months (slide 5, right-hand side). th… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 27 | economy | 1 | 0.0541469 | cycle | 1 | 0.9997372 |
| 27 | cycle | 2 | 0.0491320 | recession | 2 | 0.9992115 |
| 27 | business | 3 | 0.0433795 | slowdown | 3 | 0.9989486 |
| 27 | lead | 4 | 0.0348245 | business cycle | 4 | 0.9989484 |
| 27 | time | 5 | 0.0333496 | business | 5 | 0.9987727 |
| 27 | recession | 6 | 0.0293671 | tighten | 6 | 0.9986858 |
| 27 | tighten | 7 | 0.0237621 | delay | 7 | 0.9985543 |
| 27 | slowdown | 8 | 0.0227296 | slow | 8 | 0.9976336 |
| 27 | slow | 9 | 0.0224346 | reverse | 9 | 0.9969332 |
| 27 | business cycle | 10 | 0.0171247 | cyclical | 10 | 0.9969330 |
| 27 | start | 11 | 0.0168297 | typically | 11 | 0.9967583 |
| 27 | delay | 12 | 0.0168297 | economic cycle | 12 | 0.9967049 |
| 27 | phase | 13 | 0.0159447 | downturn | 13 | 0.9966264 |
| 27 | cyclical | 14 | 0.0149122 | produce | 14 | 0.9964077 |
| 27 | fact | 15 | 0.0141747 | loosen | 15 | 0.9964023 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Three questions on monetary policy easing | Period_1 | 2009-03-10 | 0.176 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Three questions on monetary policy easing | Period_1 | 2009-03-10 | 0.173 | cukierman and gerlach find support for their theory using data from 22 oecd countries. 13 this hypothesis nevertheless does not seem to be fully convincing for independent central banks. surico (2007), for instance, produced evidence suggesting that the federal reserve exhibited asymmetric preferences only until 1979, with a stronger reaction of the interest rate to output contractions than to output expansions. in discussing his experience as vice-chairman of the fed, alan blinder seems to suggest the opposite: “…in most situations the central bank will take far more political heat when it tightens pre-emptively to avoid higher inflation than when it eases pre-emptively to avoid higher unemployment”. 14 this is also consistent with my own experience. there were many more pressures on the ecb – not only from political authorities but also from academics – at the start of the tightening cycle, at the end of 2005, than during the loosening cycle of the last few months. needless to say, such pressures have obviously no impact on the conduct of monetary policy. independent central banks are used to hearing but not listening, as wim duisenberg once said. the alternative hypothesis is that the business cycle itself is asymmetric. wesley mitchell, a pioneer of business-cycle analysis, wrote in 1927: “…business contractions appear to be briefer and more violent than business expansions”. 15 modern economic analysis, based on data from the united states, confirms that contractions … |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Economic policies on the two sides of the Atlantic (why) are they different? | Period_1 | 2008-11-11 | 0.134 | years the euro area has been worse hit by “supply shocks” than the united states. a supply shock tends to have an effect on growth with the opposite sign to that of inflation. one example is the decline in total factor productivity (tfp) in the early part of this decade which brought upward pressure to bear on inflation at a time when economic activity was slowing down, as occurred following the bursting of the dot.com bubble. indeed, available evidence seems to suggest that the exacerbation of negative supply shocks is a recurring feature of economic slowdown phases in the euro area. as a result of that phenomenon, inflation in the euro area tends to react to an economic slowdown less rapidly than it does in the united states. this difference may explain why, especially in cyclical slowdown phases, monetary policy action in the euro area tends to be less aggressive than it is in the united states. in the united states, on the other hand, analysis seems to show that demand shocks tend to prevail, which puts pressure on inflation and on economic activity simultaneously. supply shocks like those related to productivity tend to have a considerable impact on demand if agents expect them to have an impact on permanent income, affecting consumption. for example, the increase in productivity in the second half of the 1990s led to strong growth in consumption in the united states, financed by debt. in this context, the monetary policy reaction can be more decisive, and transmitted… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Three questions on monetary policy easing | Period_1 | 2009-03-10 | 0.133 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Three questions on monetary policy easing | Period_1 | 2009-03-10 | 0.123 | let us consider the most recent example of the start of the easing cycle in the fall of 2008. the euro area economy was projected to slow down in the second half of 2008 already for some time. for instance, in the ecb 2008 spring forecast, the euro area gdp growth was projected to fall from 2.7% in 2007 to 1.8% in 2008 and 1.5% in 2009. however, in spite of the projected slowdown, inflationary pressures continued to rise until the summer of 2008. headline inflation rose to 4%, on account of strong commodity price pressures. long-term inflation expectations derived from inflation-linked bonds increased in the course of the spring, from levels slightly above 2% to levels above 2.5% in june 2008. shorter term forecasts from consensus, the ecb’s survey of professional forecasters (spf) and other private sector forecasts, as well as forecasts from international organisations, pointed to an inflation rate above 2% in 2009. growth in compensation per employee also continued to increase in the second and third quarter of 2008 at a rate above 3%, in spite of the expected economic slowdown. under these circumstances, a premature interest rate cut would have signalled a passive acceptance of such behaviour, which would have translated into a further misalignment of price and wage expectations with respect to the underlying fundamentals. this would have made the current slowdown ultimately more severe. in conclusion, with the benefit of hindsight, the easing cycle often seems to start… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a pandemic emergency | Period_2 | 2020-11-13 | 0.132 | christine lagarde: monetary policy in a pandemic emergency keynote speech by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank at the ecb forum on central banking (virtual event), frankfurt am main, 11 november 2020. * * * let me begin by welcoming all of you to this year’s ecb forum on central banking. regrettably, we cannot be together in sintra this time, but i trust that this virtual environment will be no less conducive to challenging ideas and productive debate. the purpose of this year’s conference is to examine the challenges facing central banking in a shifting world. we will be discussing many of the long-term trends monetary policy has to contend with, including shifting patterns of globalisation, climate change and a lower natural interest rate. actually, the largest shift central banks are facing today may well turn out to be the pandemic itself. as john kenneth galbraith said, “the enemy of the conventional wisdom is not ideas, but the march of events”. and the events we are seeing today are momentous. the coronavirus (covid-19) has produced a highly unusual recession and is likely to give rise to a similarly unsteady recovery. today i would like to talk about how the ecb’s monetary policy has responded to this unique environment, and how we can best contribute to supporting the economy going forward. a highly unusual recession the deliberate shutdown of the economy triggered by the covid-19 pandemic has produced a highly unusual recession. most im… |
| Peter Praet: Lifting potential growth in the euro area | Period_2 | 2015-04-27 | 0.101 | potential growth and monetary policy the euro area economy seems now to be turning the corner. both the hard and soft data suggest that the activity is gathering momentum and looks set to strengthen over the course of this year. consistent with this, all the major forecasting institutions have revised up their expectations for gdp growth in 2015 and the years ahead. we are therefore seeing the beginnings of a cyclical recovery. but it is not yet a structural one. what i mean by this is that, though the business cycle is improving, the notable decline in euro area’s potential growth rate has not been addressed, which can be imagined as the “speed limit” of the economy – the rate at which it can grow while maintaining stable inflation. international institutions currently estimate the potential growth rate to be below 1% in the euro area, compared with above 2% in the united states. 1 this fall in potential growth is not a new phenomenon. potential growth in the euro area has been declining since the late 1990s, driven mostly by a prolonged slowdown in total factor productivity growth, a trend decline in hours worked and the labour participation rate growing more hesitantly. before the crisis, however, it seems that this deceleration went largely unnoticed. and this has in fact contributed both to the type of crisis we have experienced and the situation of weak potential growth that we face now. in several countries expectations of future income became detached from these un… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy in a pandemic - ensuring favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2020-12-01 | 0.092 | [8] a recent federal reserve study makes further progress towards the construction of counterfactuals that are more realistic when the starting conditions are extremely fragile: see kiley, m. t. (2020), “pandemic recession dynamics: the role of monetary policy in shifting a u-shaped recession to a v-shaped rebound”, finance and economics discussion series 2020- 083, board of governors of the federal reserve system. kiley illustrates how effective us monetary policy has been in responding to the pandemic and, in doing so, preventing a v-shaped rebound from morphing into a deep u-shaped recession. the paper shows how the sharp increase in financing conditions at the outset of the pandemic were assuaged by a qe programme that eased balance sheet constraints on financial intermediaries, which in turn improved overall financial conditions. the study also shows that these crisis policy interventions may have longer lasting effects on the economy. in the model set-up, these are shown to prevent a fall in the stock of productive capital. [9] this approach follows adrian, t., boyarchenko, n., and giannone, d. (2019), “vulnerable growth”, american economic review, vol 109 (4), pp. 1263-89. |
| Benoît Cœuré: What can monetary policy do about inequality? | Period_2 | 2012-10-18 | 0.088 | inequality/poverty is a cause for concern also in the euro area it is well known that the relationship between inequality and growth is complex and not necessarily monotonic.2 on average, inequality in developed economies has increased in recent years. the gini coefficient, a standard measure of income inequality that ranges from 0 (when everybody has identical incomes) to 1 (when all income goes to only one person), stood at an average of 0.29 in oecd countries in the mid-1980s. by the end of the last decade, it had increased by almost 10% to 0.32. it rose in 17 of the 22 oecd countries for which long-term data series are available. of the eight euro area countries for which we have data, inequality increased in five, changed little in two and declined in one. thus, although incomes remain more unequally distributed in the united states, the data suggest that inequality is also on the rise in the euro area. the increase in inequality since the 1980s largely reflects a faster increase in household incomes at the top of the income distribution.3 more precisely, greater inequality in labour income, which represents about three-quarters of total income across the working age population, emerges as the most important driver of household income inequality. in particular, most of the microeconomic studies find a continuous and sharp increase in wage dispersion in anglo-saxon countries over the last 30 years. microeconomic evidence is, however, mixed across countries. in countrie… |
| Philip R Lane: The pandemic emergency - the three challenges for the ECB | Period_2 | 2020-08-27 | 0.084 | euro area loans to firms (indices, with t=100 for period of peak in economic activity) ecb and ecb calculations. notes: non-financial corporation (nfc) loan data deflated by the hicp. derivation of interquartile range and median for recessions and severe downturns based on quarterly data from q1 1980 to q2 2020 for france, germany, italy and spain. recessions defined by business cycle chronologies. severe downturns defined as periods of one or more quarters of real gdp declining by 1 percent or more quarter-on-quarter (whether part of a recession or not). the latest observations are for q2 2020. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy in the euro area - the next phase | Period_3 | 2022-08-31 | 0.126 | much higher than the current policy rate, such that the extent of monetary tightening that has already occurred is far greater than the july first step in raising the policy rate. in assessing the terminal rate, both structural and cyclical factors are relevant. in the long-term steady state (with no shocks hitting the economy), the equilibrium nominal risk-free interest rate will be the sum of the two per cent inflation target and the long-term equilibrium risk-free real interest rate. however, within the medium-term horizon of monetary policy, time-varying cyclical factors may require interest rates to move above or below that long-term equilibrium level in order for inflation to stabilise at two per cent. it follows that, meeting-by-meeting, an important element of the monetary policy debate will be the discussion of our latest assessment of the appropriate terminal rate that takes into account the evolution of cyclical factors, in addition to assessing a potential role of structural forces in shifting the underlying long-term equilibrium real interest rate. in terms of understanding the interplay of cyclical factors, there are no shortcuts in following a data- dependent approach. it is essential to maintain an integrated analytical framework that jointly analyses the inflation cycle, the economic cycle and the financial cycle, in recognition of the interactions and inter-dependencies across economic, monetary and financial developments in determining the dynamics of no… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.107 | then, the pandemic hit, which led to a highly unusual recession followed by a highly atypical recovery. in conventional business cycles, the depth of the slump normally determines the pace of the recovery. after exceptionally deep recessions, both demand and supply are often impaired for many years. from the onset of the great financial crisis, for example, it took seven years for euro area gdp to get back to its pre-crisis level. growth never reconnected with the trend we thought possible before 2008. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.093 | financial conditions indices in advanced economies and emerging market economies refinitiv, bloomberg and ecb staff calculations. notes: national financial conditions indices are aggregated using gdp purchasing power parity shares. the latest observations are for 6 october 2022. it is sometimes argued that domestic inflation having a large global component should mean that domestic monetary policy needs to be tightened more forcefully to compensate for this weakened grip on prices. but if central banks across advanced economies are simultaneously tightening monetary policy – as is the case today – the opposite is true.[20] if central banks do not fully factor in the effects of other central banks’ policies, the current phase of global adjustment may give way to a more severe slowdown than anticipated. in recent decades, episodes of highly synchronised global monetary policy tightening have been associated with subsequent global recessions (chart 10). |
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.087 | similarly, industrial goods inflation may remain elevated in the near term due to higher input costs, but beyond that its dynamics are hard to predict. inventory levels are starting to return to normal, which suggests that demand might have peaked. the memory of supply shortages might prompt firms to build precautionary stocks that initially prolong tensions but ultimately lead to excess inventories once bottlenecks ease. this would amplify the manufacturing cycle and the volatility of goods inflation. the russian invasion of ukraine is now intensifying this uncertainty. we face greater financial volatility in the short term. there is a risk of renewed market dislocations as investors anticipate the potential impact of sanctions and possible retaliatory actions. and these dislocations might be felt unevenly, threatening the smooth transmission of our monetary policy across the euro area. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a high inflation environment - commitment and clarity | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.085 | the risk of second-round effects monetary policy cannot prevent the first-round effects of many of these shocks. but especially when the shocks are persistent, we must ensure they do not produce second-round effects that cause too-high inflation to become entrenched. since the euro area is a net importer of energy, we are facing a large and unavoidable shock to real income owing to the deterioration in our terms of trade. this terms-of-trade “tax” amounted to around 2 percentage points of gdp in the second quarter of this year.[12] the question that workers, firms and governments confront today is how this burden should be distributed within the economy and over time. fair burden-sharing between wage income and profit margins is certainly justified. fiscal policy can help spread the burden across different income groups. at the ecb, given our mandate of price stability, we need to ensure that this process does not lead to an inflationary dynamic. if inflation expectations become de-anchored and engrained in wage negotiations and price setting, that could lead to a wage-price spiral which in turn sustains the de-anchoring. and the result would ultimately be both lower real incomes and higher inflation over time. so how acute is the risk of second-round effects today? there are factors on the horizon which are likely to reduce demand and therefore, all else being equal, make it harder for firms to pass on cost increases into prices. as wholesale energy prices are passed thro… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 28 | bank | 1 | 0.0904915 | bank union | 1 | 0.9997371 |
| 28 | union | 2 | 0.0358871 | capital market union | 2 | 0.9979836 |
| 28 | capital | 3 | 0.0322403 | market union | 3 | 0.9978084 |
| 28 | bank union | 4 | 0.0209054 | capital market | 4 | 0.9972813 |
| 28 | european | 5 | 0.0207083 | single supervisory | 5 | 0.9967940 |
| 28 | single | 6 | 0.0192298 | single resolution | 6 | 0.9966167 |
| 28 | capital market | 7 | 0.0166672 | resolution | 7 | 0.9965809 |
| 28 | mechanism | 8 | 0.0164700 | single supervisory mechanism | 8 | 0.9964426 |
| 28 | risk | 9 | 0.0159772 | complete | 9 | 0.9962279 |
| 28 | complete | 10 | 0.0143016 | supervisory mechanism | 10 | 0.9960469 |
| 28 | strengthen | 11 | 0.0142031 | capital | 11 | 0.9959563 |
| 28 | resolution | 12 | 0.0141045 | risk share | 12 | 0.9950936 |
| 28 | share | 13 | 0.0117390 | union | 13 | 0.9948943 |
| 28 | market | 14 | 0.0116404 | perform loan | 14 | 0.9946932 |
| 28 | progress | 15 | 0.0111476 | european bank | 15 | 0.9943928 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Christian Noyer: The ECB and the accession process | Period_1 | 2001-10-15 | 0.099 | the strengthening of the financial and banking sectors although the restructuring process in accession countries has made substantial progress, the financial sectors of accession countries still need to be further developed in terms of size, depth and functioning. this applies, in particular, to the banking sector that largely dominates the financial sector of these economies. the challenges ahead are numerous: inter alia, the weakness of banking intermediation, reflected in the low level of credit to the private sector, the relatively large proportion of bad loans in banks’ balance sheets in some countries or the exceptionally high spreads between lending and deposit rates that will progressively vanish in the next years. fortunately, the privatisation process and the increasing participation of foreign investors in the banking system have supported the rehabilitation and transformation of formerly state banks into efficient and profitable banking institutions. efforts to strengthen the financial and banking systems need to be made in the next years, also for the fulfilment of the so-called “economic” copenhagen criterion, which requires the existence of functioning market economies and the ability to cope with competitive pressures. compliance with this criterion for eu accession will require the adoption of eu legislation in the area of financial services, including those related to banking, insurance and investment firms, as i have mentioned before. all in all, in orde… |
| Lucas Papademos: Price stability, financial stability and efficiency, and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-07-14 | 0.063 | 14 the recent studies by guiso, sapienza and zingales (2005) and bertrand, schoar and thesmar (forthcoming) provide some evidence in this direction. 15 see federal deposit insurance corporation (1997) and curry and shibut (2000). the number of federally insured thrift institutions declined by about 50% from 3,234 to 1,645 over the period 1986-1995. by the end of 1995, the crisis had cost the us taxpayers usd 124 billion. 16 see carletti and hartmann (2003). 17 see allen and gale (2004). 18 this is because each bank reacts strategically as its own individual actions affect the price of liquidity. a bank can avoid its own bankruptcy and contagion by providing adequate liquidity to the market. 19 see northcott (2004). another recent paper by boyd and de nicolo (2005) models both deposit and loan markets as a contracting problem as opposed to just modelling one side of the banks balance sheet. the finding from this model suggests that banks may rather become more risky as markets become more concentrated. 20 beck et al. (2005). 21 schaeck et al. (2006). 22 de nicolo and kwast (2002). |
| Lucas Papademos: The ECB’s accountability towards the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2010-04-29 | 0.057 | towards a more resilient financial system let me now conclude by addressing issues concerning financial regulation and supervision. as regards the regulatory reform agenda defined by the g20 leaders, significant and wide- ranging work has already been carried out or is under way, but we should not be complacent. it is crucial that the momentum for regulatory reform does not wane. there is still much to do: first, it is essential that the planned reforms effectively lead to a harmonised global regulatory framework. second, it is an urgent priority that the basel committee proposals on capital requirements and liquidity standards are properly calibrated and finalised by the end of 2010. third, we need to ensure that the regulatory framework effectively captures all systemically important financial institutions, and that moral hazard problems related to them are fully addressed. in the european union, the enhancements to the capital requirements directive should be swiftly adopted and an agreement on the directive on alternative investment fund managers be promptly reached. as regards the establishment of the new eu financial supervisory framework, it is important that the legislative process concerning the proposals made by the commission in september 2009, which are currently being discussed by your committee, is completed as expeditiously as possible and that all relevant parties reach an agreement on the legal texts so that the european systemic risk board (esrb) and the … |
| Mr Duisenberg reports on the current position and future prospects of the European System of Central Banks (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-12-04 | 0.053 | the institutional implication is that the escb should develop into a strong unity, with a strong centre and strong national central banks. it should become a truly european institution, with a truly european outlook. of course, it may take some time to arrive where we ultimately want to be. we have to get used to thinking in euro area-wide terms. in the ecb governing council we are already “practising” that approaches and are making progress. i am confident that the escb will indeed act as a unity. |
| Lucas Papademos: Tackling the financial crisis - policies for stability and recovery | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.049 | additional measures to support the asset side of banks’ balance sheets it may be necessary, however, in order to safeguard banking sector stability and restore an adequate flow of credit to the economy,, that these measures, which were aimed at supporting the liability side of banks’ balance sheets be complemented in certain cases by additional measures designed to support the asset side. various approaches have been considered, ranging notably from (i) asset removal schemes involving the removal of the “problem” assets from the balance sheets, through direct government purchases or by transferring them to “bad banks” or asset management vehicles; to (ii) asset insurance schemes that limit the valuation losses of impaired assets by invoking a government guarantee while keeping them on the balance sheets of institutions concerned, and (iii) including various hybrid schemes that combine features of asset insurance and asset removal. the appropriate design and the effective implementation of asset support measures require addressing a number of complex issues. past experience and the assessment of alternative schemes on the basis of a number of criteria, suggest that there is no single approach that would be uniformly superior independently of the circumstances of the financial institutions concerned. rather, the measures would need to be designed on a case-by-case basis and in a pragmatic manner. in fact, hybrid schemes have often been chosen as the most appropriate. the cho… |
| Peter Praet: Beyond monetary policy - on the importance of a proper alignment of economic policies in EMU | Period_2 | 2016-10-13 | 0.391 | the need for decisive action at european level however, beyond the three-pronged approach, it will be necessary to fortify the institutional foundations of emu. for the resilience of the euro area depends not only on structural reforms at the national level but also on effective risk-sharing mechanisms preventing the resurgence of financial fragmentation that plagued the euro area in the 2011-12 period. the priority should be on strengthening the potential for private-sector risk sharing. two key initiatives in this respect are the banking union and the capital markets union. the banking union holds the promise to break the sovereign-bank nexus. the creation of the single supervisory mechanism and the single resolution mechanism are important steps in this direction. further steps are under discussion, such as the creation of a fiscal backstop for the single resolution fund and a european deposit insurance scheme. these additional arrangements are inspired by similar institutions in the united states. the 5 presidents’ report of june 2015 also calls for further integration in the fields of economic union and fiscal union, with a view to increasing the resilience and shock-absorbing capacity of the euro and its member states. the rationale for economic union is to foster real convergence among euro area member states, while the rationale for fiscal union is to provide insurance against shocks that may overwhelm national budgets or overburden monetary policy. going into this… |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area - current status and challenges ahead | Period_2 | 2018-09-03 | 0.388 | third, we expect the key ecb interest rates to remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure that the evolution of inflation remains aligned with our current expectations of a sustained adjustment path. together, these measures will continue to provide the necessary degree of monetary policy accommodation to bring inflation back towards a level that is below, but close to, 2%. looking ahead, monetary policy will continue to be firmly guided by the outlook for price stability and our stance will evolve in a data-dependent and time-consistent manner. having reflected on the current economic situation in the euro area and the corresponding monetary policy stance, let me now turn to the future, notably to governance of emu. emu governance the ecb’s monetary policy measures introduced since 2014 have been essential in supporting the robust recovery and paving the way for inflation to return towards our objective. similarly, the removal of some of the institutional and structural factors that contributed to the crisis helped maintain that recovery. nonetheless, the architecture of emu is still incomplete in many ways. further reforms are needed to make the financial sector more stable. as the euro area’s financial system is predominantly bank-based, completing the banking union remains a key priority. we gladly welcome the agreement on the european stability mechanism, or esm, as the backstop for the single… |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area - current status and the monetary policy stance | Period_2 | 2019-02-12 | 0.388 | objective. this year, we are celebrating the 20th anniversary of the euro. in the two decades of its existence, the euro, underpinned by economic and monetary union (emu), has been a powerful tool of integration. but it has also faced a crisis so severe that its very existence was at times questioned. this sparked a thorough revision of our institutional framework, in the broader context of the international response to the global financial crisis. the architecture of emu is still incomplete in many ways. ensuring its longer-term resilience requires joint efforts at both the national and european levels. at the national level, we need to pursue reforms that promote sustainable economic convergence, and increase the growth potential and resilience of local economies. at the european level, i welcome the agreement reached by the euro summit in december last year on a euro area budgetary instrument aimed at fostering competitiveness and convergence. this could help the implementation of structural reforms and strengthen resilience in the euro area. however, the euro area would also benefit from a common stabilisation function – which is not foreseen under the december agreement. such an instrument could provide macroeconomic support in the event of euro area-wide recessions, thereby maintaining convergence and reducing the burden on monetary policy. with a predominantly bank-based financial system, completing the banking union also remains a key priority. agreeing on a backst… |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2018-07-19 | 0.361 | we should not be held back by the distinction between risk reduction and risk sharing, for two reasons in particular. first, substantial risk reduction has already taken place. common equity tier 1 ratios of significant banks – a key indicator of bank health – are now 67% higher than they were ten years ago. further risk reduction is under way with the reduction of non-performing loans and toxic assets in the portfolios of some large banks. second, risk-sharing greatly helps risk reduction. consider the united states federal deposit insurance corporation. it successfully resolved 500 banks without causing financial instability, also because it was backstopped by the us government. the corresponding number for the euro area was ten times lower, which is another reason why the euro area banking sector still faces structural challenges. in other words, if risk-sharing were to lead to an orderly management of the financial stability consequences derived from risk reduction, risk reduction would proceed at a much faster pace. moreover, a european deposit insurance scheme would avoid the risk of destabilising self-fulfilling prophecies in the form of bank runs. it would also reduce the risk of financial fragmentation and thus support the effectiveness of monetary policy throughout emu, contributing to economic stability. with the right policy framework, risk-sharing and risk reduction are thus mutually reinforcing1. a more resilient emu would also benefit from a bolstered crisis… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Exchange of views with members of the High Council of Public Finance | Period_2 | 2019-07-18 | 0.360 | space. but while not all countries have the space to spend more, all have the opportunity to spend better. the euro’s benefits, however, will not fully materialise for as long as the architecture of emu remains incomplete. material progress has been achieved in recent years. the european stability mechanism provides an important safeguard and reforms currently under discussion will strengthen its precautionary and crisis resolution toolkit. the creation of banking union, meanwhile, has considerably strengthened the resilience of the euro area financial sector and, together with the bank recovery and resolution directive, has created instruments to combat banking crises in a swifter and fairer way. banks directly supervised by the ecb have built up strong capital positions in recent years, with a common equity tier 1 (cet1) ratio of 14.3% in the first quarter of 2019 compared with 11.3% at the end of 2014. they have also substantially reduced their non-performing loan ratio, which stood at 3.7% in the first quarter of 2019 compared to 7.5% in the second quarter of 2015. these are important steps forward as euro area firms rely heavily on bank credit to finance growth and investment. so what more should be done at the european level? first, the ability of the financial sector to contribute to economic stabilisation should be strengthened. during the crisis, financial integration in the euro area reversed and it has only gradually recovered over the past few years. the credit… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.165 | finally, governments should reinforce their efforts to deepen capital markets and create a green capital markets union. ecb research has long shown that stock markets are more effective than banks in supporting the decarbonisation of the economy.[16] yet, eu equity markets remain fragmented and often illiquid. reliance on bank lending at a time of rising constraints on banks’ balance sheets considerably reduces the set of options for firms to push ahead with their green agenda. the european commission’s recent package of legislative measures, including the proposed harmonisation of key aspects of corporate insolvency law and the removal of red tape for companies to list and raise capital on public exchanges, is an important step in the right direction.[17] but further decisive steps are needed to fast-track the establishment of a european green capital markets union.[18] |
| Luis de Guindos: Presentation of the European Central Bank annual report 2021 | Period_3 | 2022-05-04 | 0.148 | assets. commodity markets have been the main transmission channel for stress up to now. elevated commodity prices increase financial stability concerns associated with high inflation and low growth. furthermore, the extreme volatility of prices has led to some stress in commodity derivatives markets, although there has been no major incident so far. financial institutions have limited net exposures on commodity derivatives and banks acting as clearing members are generally safeguarded by robust credit-risk management frameworks. bigger net exposures are held by energy producers and suppliers, commodity traders, as well as energy-dependent firms who use commodity derivatives to hedge their core business risk. the significant drop in outstanding contracts suggests that these entities might be scaling down this hedging activity. therefore, further episodes of high volatility in commodity prices could adversely affect their operational capacity and thereby exacerbate tensions in the supply of commodities. the importance of a strong, resilient and well-integrated financial sector in the eu sound financial regulation and integration have allowed europe to manage the turbulence caused by the russian invasion. underpinned by regulatory and supervisory reforms, financial integration in the eu has not only enhanced the resilience of our economy and financial sector, but also improved our ability to act together. close collaboration in various aspects of eu decision-making allowed eu… |
| Christine Lagarde: New challenges in a changing world | Period_3 | 2023-01-24 | 0.122 | challenges for europe in 2023 as this new global map takes shape, we enter 2023 facing three big challenges. the first challenge is to reconsider how we can best protect europe’s critical interests in a fast-changing world. as an economy that is very open to trade and deeply integrated into global supply chains, we are vulnerable to geopolitical headwinds. for example, 35% of europe’s manufacturing output is absorbed outside the eu, much more than for the united states or china. so, as the next chapter in the globalisation story is being written, we need to ensure that europe is a leader, not just a follower. and as the french president and german chancellor have recently argued, we have the capacity to do so.[8] already now, europe is the top trading partner for 80 countries, compared to just over 20 countries for the united states.[9] that gives us unique bargaining power to shape openness in a european direction and strengthen ties with key partners, such as those on whom we rely for critical resources. and where we see our interests being threatened, we can use our economic weight more strategically – something we have already started to see with the unprecedented sanctions placed upon russia. but we must also be prepared for a future in which the global economy could fragment. and the best insurance against a more uncertain world is building more resilience at home. so, the second challenge for europe is to develop more our own sources of growth. here, the new global … |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.119 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.109 | even these institutional innovations were initially insufficient to change the course of european policies. the financial assistance given to countries hit by the financial and sovereign debt crises was tied to strict policy conditionality. financial assistance programmes were conceived in partial equilibrium at the level of single countries, with insufficient efforts made to understand their implications for the euro area as a whole. the start of banking union was also not immune to policy errors. as a member of the ecb’s supervisory board at the time, i argued against the decision to accelerate the necessary increase in banks’ capital ratios in the midst of a crisis, especially in view of the incomplete nature of banking union.[8] the procyclical policies that characterised those years generated a political backlash. europe was unnecessarily divided into creditor and debtor countries, a core and a periphery, resulting in a deep economic, social and political divide. during those difficult years, the ecb showed, however, that another way was possible. with three words, ecb president mario draghi demonstrated that with the determination to act, the euro area could provide a strong crisis response.[9] and with his institutional counterparts, he initiated the reform of emu.[10] |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 29 | european | 1 | 0.0327864 | supervisory | 1 | 0.9989485 |
| 29 | eu | 2 | 0.0283958 | regulatory | 2 | 0.9985982 |
| 29 | commission | 3 | 0.0221673 | cooperation | 3 | 0.9983344 |
| 29 | level | 4 | 0.0212484 | supervisor | 4 | 0.9982886 |
| 29 | supervisory | 5 | 0.0172662 | commission | 5 | 0.9972784 |
| 29 | framework | 6 | 0.0169599 | supervision | 6 | 0.9968452 |
| 29 | institution | 7 | 0.0161430 | regulation | 7 | 0.9961443 |
| 29 | national | 8 | 0.0156325 | european commission | 8 | 0.9961406 |
| 29 | issue | 9 | 0.0154283 | legislative | 9 | 0.9958693 |
| 29 | regulatory | 10 | 0.0139988 | eu | 10 | 0.9958666 |
| 29 | european commission | 11 | 0.0133862 | field | 11 | 0.9954441 |
| 29 | effective | 12 | 0.0126714 | proposal | 12 | 0.9952233 |
| 29 | authority | 13 | 0.0117525 | legislation | 13 | 0.9947297 |
| 29 | supervision | 14 | 0.0115482 | recommendation | 14 | 0.9946529 |
| 29 | regard | 15 | 0.0113440 | bank supervision | 15 | 0.9946427 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean Claude-Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-12-28 | 0.348 | given the uncertainties, the adjustment process in the financial system in the coming period may be challenging, and we have to be prepared to the materialisation of risks at any time. that being said, there are mitigating factors including a broadly favourable economic outlook, the largely sound balance sheets of households and firms, and the generally sound capital positions of core financial firms. this should not, however, provide any grounds for complacency given the heightened uncertainties. in a fluid environment where financial system conditions may unexpectedly change, prudence is of the essence both for policymakers and financial institutions. concerning the role of financial institutions and supervisory authorities in coping with the financial turmoil, i would submit three observations. first, given the underlying factors of the financial stress, and in order to re-establish confidence within the financial system, it is crucial to promote a widespread consistent valuation of complex structured products as well as an adequate disclosure by banks of their exposures, in particular related to the us sub- prime mortgage sector. second, i would welcome the efforts of the supervisory community, namely through the basel committee on banking supervision and the committee of european banking supervisors, in keeping each other abreast of developments and in considering jointly possible measures to contain the potential effects of the turmoil. third, i would underline the i… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: European financial integration and the management of inflation expectations by the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 2005-04-21 | 0.341 | regard, the ecb supports initiatives from both the private sector and the european commission to encourage further integration. so what we need to do is to remove the remaining obstacles to effective cross-border banking in order to foster cross-border competition and further banking integration. let me mention a few examples. in the area of financial regulation and supervision, a key objective is to achieve a high degree of regulatory and supervisory convergence across countries. this will help to reduce the compliance burden on financial institutions, thus addressing one of the largest remaining obstacles to enhanced cross-border activities. the extension of the lamfalussy approach to the banking sector and the establishment of the committee of european banking supervisors (cebs) are milestones in this respect. the work of the cebs is crucial to develop common benchmarks and best practices for the consistent implementation of eu banking directives as well as principles for cooperation between home and host supervisors. in addition, the forthcoming revision of the codified banking directive will enhance cross-border co-ordination between supervisors and, in particular, it will provide an enhanced role for the authority responsible for consolidated supervision. such an enhanced role will encompass co-ordination in the information exchange and a decision-making process for approving advanced approaches at group level under the basel ii framework. more generally, the ecb wel… |
| Willem F Duisenberg: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2002-12-04 | 0.329 | issues related to the eu arrangements for financial regulation, supervision and stability today, the ecofin council is considering adapting the eu structures for financial regulation, supervision and stability. the ecb keenly supports the basic thrust of such proposals, namely to reduce barriers to further financial integration and to maintain systemic stability in financial markets, which have become increasingly interconnected in a single currency area. against this background, the respect of the subsidiarity principle in supervisory matters necessitates enhanced co-operation between national authorities. the ecb has repeatedly stressed that in the banking sector close and effective co-operation between central banks and supervisory authorities is crucial for the promotion of financial stability, a point that i am glad to see strongly backed also in recent resolutions of the european parliament. the ecb has also emphasised that technical authorities need to be represented in regulatory committees and that any new arrangements for financial stability should draw on the technical expertise at central banks and supervisory agencies. all these points are reflected in the proposals endorsed by the ecofin council in october. now the crucial phase is beginning when the ability of the new arrangements to meet the high expectations they are raising will be tested in practice. the measure of success will be whether the overall rulebook, with which financial institutions operating … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The role of central banks in a globalised economy | Period_1 | 2007-06-21 | 0.328 | • the second way is that it calls for enhanced cross-border cooperation and exchange of information among central banks (and between them and other authorities contributing to financial stability). this should produce a comprehensive picture of risks and vulnerabilities and identify appropriate and effective mitigating policy actions. in the european union this goal is pursued mainly through the activity of the economic and financial committee in its financial stability table set-up, comprising representatives from ministries of finance, central banks and the supervisory committees in banking, securities and insurance, as well as the escb/eurosystem. at the level of the g-10, this goal is pursued by the financial stability forum and other sectoral committees. the globalisation of financial systems also affects the role of central banks in the design of financial regulation and supervision. this role is played by central banks because they either have a direct supervisory responsibility or act in an advisory capacity to governments. in general, financial globalisation calls for an intensification of efforts among regulators on a cross-border basis to produce consistent regulatory and supervisory standards. the aim is to promote a level playing-field and reduce regulatory arbitrage. this is clearly illustrated by the experience of the european union where the establishment of a single financial market is a main strategic objective and presupposes the removal of potential reg… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2005-09-23 | 0.310 | financial services policy i would now like to say a few words about the european commission’s green paper on financial services policy for the period 2005-2010. as already expressed in its contribution to the commission’s public consultation, the eurosystem supports the key policy orientation of the green paper, which highlights the need to focus on the consolidation and consistent implementation of the legislative framework for financial services. to this end, the potential of the lamfalussy framework should be exploited to the extent possible. as regards the area of financial regulation, the eurosystem concurs with the emphasis placed by the commission on the objective of rationalising the existing framework. the proposal for “better regulation” based on open, transparent and evidence-based policy-making is fully supported. the eurosystem also supports the suggestion by the commission to launch a feasibility study on the development of one body of consistent law. we regard such a “financial services rulebook” as a tool to rationalise the existing set of eu rules for financial institutions and, in particular, to reduce complexity and legal uncertainties and to eliminate possible inconsistencies. still in the context of financial regulation, the completion of the current fsap legislative work is also important. in that connection, i would like to mention in particular the capital requirements directive, on which, i am informed, work is proceeding smoothly. also, i would li… |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2018-03-02 | 0.287 | impair normal monetary policy transmission channels. these are just two examples of the links between the operation of ccps and the transmission of monetary policy. while these links are not new, they now warrant closer attention for two reasons. first, the financial system has come to rely more on central counterparties. the introduction of mandatory central clearing requirements in response to the crisis has made financial markets safer and more transparent. this is in large part thanks to the european parliament’s push for stronger financial regulation, such as the european market infrastructure regulation (emir). while this strengthening is of course welcome, it also means that ccps have become more systemic. second, the united kingdom’s decision to leave the eu means that, under the current legislative regime, several ccps clearing significant volumes of euro-denominated business will be operating outside the framework of eu regulation and the safeguards this provides. in this context, the commission’s emir ii proposal, currently being discussed by this committee, is a welcome and necessary initiative. the existing regime was never intended to cope with large-scale euro-denominated clearing activities being carried out in a country outside the eu. the emir ii proposal would enable eu authorities to directly supervise systemically important third-country ccps on the basis of eu regulatory requirements using eu supervisory instruments. the proposal provides for an enhan… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Presentation of the ECB Annual Report 2013 to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2014-04-08 | 0.283 | looking ahead therefore, it is of the utmost importance to maintain this momentum and to continue with the rapid adoption of a number of pending legislative proposals. first, the proposed regulation on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts needs urgently to be adopted and implemented, as regulatory uncertainty has been one of the factors leading to banks leaving the euribor panel. second, regulatory reforms of shadow banking, in particular the commission’s proposal on money market funds, will ensure that money market funds are safer and better managed. third, the legislative work will have to proceed on the european commission’s proposal on the structural reform of the eu banking sector, as it would contribute to reducing the potential fragmentation caused by different national regulations. beyond these pending legislative proposals, the coming months will also provide the opportunity to review a number of legislative packages adopted during the crisis. first, the review of the six-pack and of the two-pack will allow stock to be taken of what has been achieved and to identify gaps in the emu architecture that still need to be filled. i trust that with its european perspective, the european parliament will ensure that this review will consolidate those achievements that have proven successful, while at the same time strengthening the governance framework in those areas where there is room for improvement. second, the review of the europ… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Presentation of the European Central Bank Annual Report 2015 to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2016-04-07 | 0.270 | the ecb’s contributions to regulatory initiatives at international level let me now turn to the international regulatory agenda, also in response to the call by econ to receive more information on these issues. as i argued before, initiatives at european level are not taking place in isolation. last november, the financial stability board finalised the total loss-absorbing capacity (tlac) standard for large, complex, global systemically important banks. tlac is an important milestone in overcoming the “too big to fail” problem. it now needs to be implemented in the european framework. to further reduce risk-taking and strengthen the resilience of the banking system, the finalisation and implementation of the leverage ratio and the strategic review of the capital framework should be matters of priority. the basel committee concluded its work on the definition of the leverage ratio, the trading book requirements and is working to conclude the revision of risk-weighted assets framework both for the standardised approach and for the use of banks’ internal risk models before the end of the year. swift legislative action on the key unfinished parts of the basel iii agenda will provide clarity to the financial system and support the latter in financing the recovery. as confirmed by g20 finance ministers and governors at their meeting in shanghai, the aim is now to focus on making basel iii effective without further increasing regulatory capital requirements. in addition, in 2015 … |
| Mario Draghi: Interview with Neue Zürcher Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-01-23 | 0.203 | is the ecb really the institution that should deal with banking supervision? aren’t you afraid of reputational risks? not really. we will keep supervision strictly separate from monetary policy. the supervisors will have to take care of their reputation with respect to banking supervision, while the monetary policy-makers will take care of their credibility with respect to price stability. i actually believe that our monetary policy will become more effective if supervision is carried out well, because healthy banks will ensure that our monetary policy is better transmitted to the real economy. and what do you expect of davos? praise, because you have rescued the euro area, or criticism because you are not doing enough? both. is the ecb really the institution that should deal with banking supervision? aren’t you afraid of reputational risks? not really. we will keep supervision strictly separate from monetary policy. the supervisors will have to take care of their reputation with respect to banking supervision, while the monetary policy-makers will take care of their credibility with respect to price stability. i actually believe that our monetary policy will become more effective if supervision is carried out well, because healthy banks will ensure that our monetary policy is better transmitted to the real economy. and what do you expect of davos? praise, because you have rescued the euro area, or criticism because you are not doing enough? both. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with CNBC | Period_2 | 2017-01-24 | 0.191 | uk will not stay in the single market. single market is not only about tariffs, it’s not only about free access to a market. it’s a set of rules. it’s a set of rules to protect investors, it’s a set of rules to protect consumers, it’s a set of rules to ensure a level playing field, among institutions, and it’s a set of rules to provide-, to deliver financial stability. when this is gone, we’ll have to know which set of other rules will protect investors, provide a level playing field and provide financial stability, and that’s very much the background against which any specific issue has to be assessed. so when it comes to clearing, it’s very simple. we have an mou with the bank of england, we have ways to know what’s going on in terms of euro clearing in london. it works very well. thanks to our good cooperation with the bank of england, it works very well. but it has foundations, the foundations are the emir regulation, the foundation is european law, and it’s european law being implemented under the authority of the european court of justice. so when this is gone, we’ll have to know what are the new foundations, and whether this is good enough to ensure financial stability in the eurozone. so really, our core concern will be financial stability and investor protection, and having a level playing field for eurozone consumers, citizens and companies. so there are situations where the uk could leave the single market, and you would be comfortable leaving euro clearing deri… |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2021-11-16 | 0.238 | policy framework. the resulting climate action plan we announced in july presents a comprehensive roadmap to step up our involvement in climate change-related matters, in line with our obligations under the eu treaties. the ecb has already taken concrete steps to strengthen the role of climate risk in both financial stability monitoring and banking supervision. the ecb recently published the methodology and results of our economy-wide climate stress test, showing that there are clear benefits for both banks and companies if they act early and ensure an orderly transition. the exercise will also be used to inform the 2022 supervisory climate stress test that will be conducted to test banks’ preparedness to assess climate risks. ecb banking supervision has also asked banks to conduct self-assessments in the light of the ecb guide on climate-related and environmental risks and to draw up action plans. the preliminary results were published in august and show that banks have made some progress in adapting their practices, but they are still moving too slowly. next year, ecb banking supervision will conduct a full supervisory review of banks’ risk management and disclosure practices. as regards the digital economy, the ecb will continue to contribute to the g20 initiative to enhance cross-border payments to make them faster, cheaper and more inclusive, and to address the opportunities and challenges of the digitalisation of finance. at the ecb, we have launched the investigatio… |
| Frank Elderson: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy - delivering our mandate in all circumstances | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.190 | while i understand it is not a specific topic covered in today’s conference, a similar commitment to fully incorporate climate-related and environmental risks applies to our banking supervision tasks and responsibilities. in addition to the climate stress test that was concluded by ecb banking supervision earlier this year, we will soon publish the results of our thematic review. as part of this exercise, our core banking supervision teams – joint supervisory teams – thoroughly assessed to what extent banks’ risk management practices for climate-related and environmental risks live up to the supervisory expectations we published in 2020. we conducted this exercise to assess where banks stand with regard to our expectations and to highlight any gaps they urgently need to close. we will also take the opportunity to identify and share best practices to help banks close any gaps identified. and we will insist that banks’ risk 2/3 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.139 |
|
| Christine Lagarde: International Monetary and Financial Committee statement | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.103 | wider economy under all possible scenarios. international crisis response financial support for ukraine was quickly mobilised from various sources. yet the war is also affecting other countries through rising commodity prices, disruptions to trade and remittances, an influx of refugees, and shortages of food imports from both ukraine and russia. we welcome the fact that the imf is monitoring developments and stands ready to act to support affected countries. depending on how the situation evolves, all layers of the global financial safety net may need to be activated to deal with the fallout. in view of the russian invasion of ukraine, there cannot be a “business-as-usual” approach to international cooperation. still, the international community needs to work together on other issues of global importance, including the ongoing international initiatives to support the most vulnerable countries. we note the good progress being made towards establishing and operationalising the resilience and sustainability trust (rst) at the imf to support countries undertaking macro-critical reforms to reduce risks to prospective balance of payments stability. for eu national central banks to contribute to the rst, it is essential that claims on the rst have reserve asset status. according to the preliminary stance of the ecb, as agreed by the governing council, the arrangements to ensure that claims on the rst have reserve asset status are acceptable overall – subject to a number of condit… |
| Frank Elderson: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy - delivering our mandate in all circumstances | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.094 | management practices are fully aligned with all our expectations by the end of 2024 at the latest. it is clear that central banks and supervisors are not primarily responsible for addressing the ongoing climate and environmental crises. they are climate and environment policy-takers, whereas governments and legislators – including the european parliament – are climate and environment policymakers. the european union and its co-legislators are clearly committed to the paris agreement. the eu is taking concrete steps to implement legislation that puts this commitment into practice. central banks and supervisors cannot ignore this in the pursuit of their mandate. similarly, on the path to meeting the paris agreement goals, we cannot ignore scenarios which include a greater manifestation of physical risks from climate change and environmental degradation. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30 | medium | 1 | 0.2018320 | medium term inflation | 1 | 0.9996494 |
| 30 | medium term | 2 | 0.1781773 | inflation outlook | 2 | 0.9993866 |
| 30 | outlook | 3 | 0.0714798 | medium term | 3 | 0.9992988 |
| 30 | term inflation | 4 | 0.0510965 | medium | 4 | 0.9992986 |
| 30 | medium term inflation | 5 | 0.0436730 | term inflation | 5 | 0.9992114 |
| 30 | inflation outlook | 6 | 0.0322232 | term inflation outlook | 6 | 0.9992111 |
| 30 | current | 7 | 0.0281968 | outlook | 7 | 0.9988604 |
| 30 | base | 8 | 0.0168728 | term outlook | 8 | 0.9986856 |
| 30 | term inflation outlook | 9 | 0.0136014 | medium term outlook | 9 | 0.9985100 |
| 30 | assessment | 10 | 0.0134756 | incoming | 10 | 0.9980725 |
| 30 | term outlook | 11 | 0.0088202 | anticipate | 11 | 0.9970212 |
| 30 | expect | 12 | 0.0086943 | term inflation aim | 12 | 0.9965748 |
| 30 | incoming | 13 | 0.0081910 | current inflation | 13 | 0.9963159 |
| 30 | medium term outlook | 14 | 0.0080652 | current | 14 | 0.9963134 |
| 30 | assess | 15 | 0.0078136 | weaken | 15 | 0.9962764 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mr. Duisenberg elucidates the European System of Central Banks’ stability-oriented monetary policy strategy (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 10 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-11-20 | 0.076 | the governing council also announced that “price stability is to be maintained over the medium term”. in doing so, it realistically acknowledged that disturbances to the price level can occur in the short run - for example, those caused by changes in indirect taxes or commodity prices - that cannot be controlled by monetary policy of the escb. such factors may lead to occasional falls in the hicp, or occasional increases above 2%. these are quite normal and consistent with a meaningful definition of price stability. by focusing on the medium term, the escb’s monetary policy will ensure that these transitory deviations from the definition do not become sustained over the medium term. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2006 to the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-07-13 | 0.072 | economic and monetary issues in 2006 the ecb’s monetary policy continued to anchor medium and long-term inflation expectations at levels consistent with price stability. this reflected the credibility of the ecb in conducting its monetary policy, in full compliance with its primary objective of maintaining price stability over the medium term. the solid anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations is a prerequisite for monetary policy to make an ongoing contribution towards supporting sustainable economic growth and job creation in the euro area, in line with article 105 (1) of the ec treaty. in 2006 the euro area economy expanded at the highest growth rate since 2000. notwithstanding the impact of high and volatile oil prices, real gdp rose by 2.9% in 2006, compared with 1.5% in 2005. the economic recovery gradually broadened in the course of 2006, and the nature of the economic expansion became increasingly self sustaining, with domestic demand acting as the main driver. despite some moderation, the ongoing strong momentum in economic growth continued in the first quarter of 2007. the euro area continued to benefit from the robust ongoing expansion of the world economy, while substantial gains in corporate profits and an extended period of very favourable financing conditions supported investment growth and employment. consumption growth observed a gradual recovery, in line with improving conditions in the labour market. the latest data and survey releases have remain… |
| Lucas D Papademos: Challenges for monetary policy in Europe | Period_1 | 2003-11-27 | 0.062 | last thursday, the governing council decided to leave the ecb’s key interest rates unchanged. our judgement on the appropriateness of the current monetary policy stance is based on, among other things, the expectation of a gradual economic recovery in the euro area during the second half of the year, in an environment of improving activity in the world economy as a whole. this expectation is supported by new data releases, several forward-looking indicators including confidence surveys, recently published forecasts from official and private sources, as well as developments in financial markets. even though inflation may not fall over the coming months as quickly and by as much as had been previously anticipated, the medium-term outlook for price stability remains favourable. the past appreciation of the euro should continue to dampen import prices and it is presumed that wage increases will be moderate. finally, the strong monetary expansion, which we have been observing for quite a while, is not considered a factor adversely affecting this outlook, for the time being. the mild recovery underway in the second half of 2003 is expected to gain momentum over the next two years. the pace of economic activity, however, is likely to increase only gradually. consequently, average annual real gdp growth is projected to approach its potential level in 2005, while unemployment is not expected to fall next year. in the short run, the risks to growth appear to be limited and balanced…. |
| Lucas Papademos: Tackling the financial crisis - policies for stability and recovery | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.057 | the inflation outlook for the euro area the preservation of price stability over the medium term is the overriding policy objective for the ecb. by achieving this objective, we contribute to financial stability and support sustainable growth. since mid-2008, annual (hicp) inflation in the euro area declined steadily from 4% in july 2008 to 1.1% in january 2009 (according to eurostat’s flash estimate). this decline in headline inflation reflects largely the substantial fall in global commodity prices and associated “pipeline” price pressures over this period. annual inflation rates are projected to decline further in the coming months, mainly due to expected lower commodity prices and base effects stemming from past energy prices, but also owing to diminishing domestic inflationary pressures in an environment of subdued economic activity. around the middle of this year, annual inflation may reach very low levels, but then it is expected to increase again and be in line with our definition of price stability, that is, inflation rates of below, but close to, 2%. several available indicators of medium-term inflation expectations support this assessment. this likely time profile of inflation should be seen against the background of an extended period of significant economic downturn in the euro area and all other advanced economies. |
| Lucas Papademos: The effects of globalisation on inflation, liquidity and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2007-06-13 | 0.056 | households or non-financial corporations. moreover, the process of securitisation of loans itself positively affects the capacity of banks (of mfis, to be precise), to issue new loans and thus it could have an indirect expansionary effect on m3 growth. how can we deal with the influence of these factors on money creation and their potential effects on the medium and long-term inflation outlook? in general, the same answer applies as with respect to changes in net external assets. given that the ofis’ money holdings and investment activities could have indirect effects on consumer price developments via asset prices, it would be premature to automatically exclude, without further analysis, the money balances held by ofis from the monetary aggregates when assessing the risks to price stability. 22 the general conclusion that emerges from these considerations is that monetary analysis has become more challenging in the global economy as it has to explicitly take account of changes in domestic money and credit markets induced by, or accompanying, financial globalisation. to address this challenge, the eurosystem is currently stepping up its analytical efforts to deepen its understanding of several aspects of these processes and their implications for the assessment of medium to longer- term risks to price stability. |
| Philip R Lane: The ECB’s monetary policy in the pandemic - meeting the challenge | Period_2 | 2020-10-07 | 0.112 | in terms of policy making, the ecb governing council will carefully assess the incoming information with regard to its implications for the medium-term inflation outlook. the governing council continues to stand ready to adjust all of its instruments, as appropriate, to ensure that inflation moves towards its aim in a sustained manner, in line with its commitment to symmetry. furthermore, the current monetary policy strategy review exercise provides an excellent opportunity to revisit the strategic underpinnings of our monetary policy, in order to ensure we are maximising our effectiveness and efficiency in delivering our mandate.[10] [1] i am grateful to demosthenes ioannou and nick ligthart for their contributions to this speech. |
| Fabio Panetta: Asymmetric risks, asymmetric reaction - monetary policy in the pandemic | Period_2 | 2020-09-22 | 0.101 | the appreciation of the euro is one factor that we need to watch closely with regard to its implications for the medium-term inflation outlook, particularly at a time when current and expected inflation rates are both very low. the sustained appreciation in the external value of the euro has brought about an undesirable tightening of financial conditions and has offset some of the monetary accommodation provided by our measures. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy in a pandemic - ensuring favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2020-12-01 | 0.100 | under these conditions, the first challenge in delivering the medium-term inflation aim is to reconnect inflation to its pre-pandemic projected path. this means boosting inflation momentum towards the upper part of the “bcde” area (the grey shaded area), so that the adjustment approaches the “bcd” path. by setting the monetary stance at the appropriate level to deliver the financial conditions required to offset the pandemic shock to inflation, the underlying inflation trajectory will be restored. in turn, this also serves to underpin the formation of inflation expectations in a manner that is consistent with meeting the medium-term inflation aim. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Inflation expectations and the conduct of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-07-15 | 0.091 | actual expectations have fallen to a much smaller extent. in other words, while expectations of a surge in euro area demand and inflation, as typically captured by a rising inflation risk premium, have been significantly cut, expectations about the baseline have remained more stable. yet, while shifts in risk premia can explain the bulk of recent developments in long-term inflation expectations, they can explain much less of the recent fall in short and medium-term expectations, which you can see on the right-hand side of this slide. three-quarters or more of the decline in short and medium-term maturity inflation swap rates since the autumn of last year reflect a genuine fall in inflation expectations. such a drop in short and medium-term inflation expectations is particularly remarkable in an environment where highly volatile inflation components, such as energy prices, have remained relatively stable, and have even been rising since the start of the year. recent market developments therefore suggest expectations that the current weakness in euro area and global demand will persist. households are not professional forecasters this brings me to the second question as to whether similar shifts in the expected inflation outlook can be observed outside financial markets.3 one drawback of much of the empirical work on the role of inflation expectations is that it has largely assumed that all measures of expectations are interchangeable – that households and 2 / 13 |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.090 | reflections on monetary policy page 12 of 18 monetary policy at our meeting last week, the governing council was hence confronted with a more extended slowdown of the euro area economy than previously anticipated, persistent and salient downside risks to the growth outlook, and a further delay in the convergence of inflation towards our medium-term inflation aim (chart 15). the case for a monetary policy response was clear, and a comprehensive package of measures was judged to be the most effective way to support the convergence of inflation to our aim.[6] actual and projected hicp inflation |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.185 | looking further ahead, we expect to raise the key ecb interest rates again in september. the calibration of this rate increase will depend on the updated medium-term inflation outlook. if the medium-term inflation outlook persists or deteriorates, a larger increment will be appropriate at our september meeting. third, beyond september, based on our current assessment, we anticipate that a gradual but sustained path of further increases in interest rates will be appropriate. in line with our commitment to our two per cent medium-term target, the pace at which we adjust our monetary policy will depend on the incoming data and how we assess inflation to develop in the medium term. within the governing council’s mandate, under stressed conditions, flexibility will remain an element of monetary policy whenever threats to monetary policy transmission jeopardise the attainment of price stability. the decisions taken today are set out in full in a press release available on our website. i will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing, and will then explain our assessment of financial and monetary conditions. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in an uncertain world | Period_3 | 2022-03-17 | 0.171 | all this suggests that inflation is increasingly likely to stabilise at our 2% target over the medium term. this was the outlook which led us, in december last year, to start with a step-by-step reduction in the pace of our asset purchases. we also adjusted our communication in february as the incoming data suggested that inflation was converging even faster towards our medium-term goal. the inflation outlook and the war the outbreak of the war has introduced new uncertainty into the outlook. in particular, the short-term factors pushing up inflation are likely to be amplified. |
| Luis de Guindos: Challenges for monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-07-05 | 0.147 | the ecb’s recent monetary policy decisions the governing council has a steadfast and unwavering commitment to its medium-term inflation target of 2%. on the basis of our updated assessment, we decided at our meeting on 9 june to take further steps towards normalising our monetary policy. first, we decided to end net asset purchases under our asset purchase programme as of last friday, 1 july. second, we announced our intention to raise the key ecb interest rates by 25 basis points at our july monetary policy meeting and to raise them again in september. the size of the interest rate increase in september will depend on the updated medium-term inflation outlook − if the medium-term inflation outlook persists or deteriorates, an increment of more than 25 basis points will be appropriate. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.143 | conclusion let me conclude. we find ourselves in an exceptionally volatile environment, with multiple and complex risks for the inflation outlook and the appropriate monetary policy response. we are normalising our monetary policy to keep inflation expectations anchored and bring inflation back to 2% over the medium term. but we cannot ignore the sizeable challenges that we are facing. so we must calibrate our monetary policy carefully to ensure that inflation durably returns to our target, while also guiding market expectations and limiting excess volatility. our policy stance must remain evidence-based and adapt to changes in the medium-term inflation outlook, avoiding an excessive focus on short-run developments and fully taking into account the risks emanating from the domestic and global economic and financial environment. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.139 | this new formulation clearly enhances the governing council’s flexibility and optionality as it helps to manage in a more agile manner the specific steps regarding the implementation of the sequence of normalisation decisions, allowing us to attune such steps to incoming data. moreover, the governing council reconfirmed that the path for our policy rates will continue to be determined by our forward guidance and by our strategic commitment to stabilise inflation at two per cent over the medium term, and we also signalled that any adjustments to our interest rates will be gradual, which is especially important in times of uncertainty. more than ever, it is important to maintain optionality in the conduct of monetary policy. in current conditions, it is especially important to remain data-dependent and for optionality to be two-sided. on the one side, we should ensure that our policy settings are adjusted if de-anchored inflation expectations, an intensification in catch-up wage dynamics or a persistent deterioration in supply capacity threaten to keep inflation above target in the medium term. on the other side, we should also be fully prepared to appropriately revise our monetary policy settings if the energy price shock and the russia-ukraine war were to result in a significant deterioration in macroeconomic prospects and thereby weaken the medium-term inflation outlook. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 | recovery | 1 | 0.1625883 | recovery | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 31 | support | 2 | 0.0424763 | economic recovery | 2 | 0.9998247 |
| 31 | economic recovery | 3 | 0.0415396 | momentum | 3 | 0.9979847 |
| 31 | continue | 4 | 0.0335252 | improve | 4 | 0.9972806 |
| 31 | remain | 5 | 0.0331089 | cyclical recovery | 5 | 0.9971014 |
| 31 | improve | 6 | 0.0255108 | strengthen | 6 | 0.9967561 |
| 31 | level | 7 | 0.0250945 | pick | 7 | 0.9965822 |
| 31 | positive | 8 | 0.0203066 | positive | 8 | 0.9965783 |
| 31 | investment | 9 | 0.0202025 | improvement | 9 | 0.9964513 |
| 31 | return | 10 | 0.0199944 | return | 10 | 0.9962279 |
| 31 | strengthen | 11 | 0.0193699 | cyclical | 11 | 0.9960573 |
| 31 | condition | 12 | 0.0178086 | profitability | 12 | 0.9957496 |
| 31 | strong | 13 | 0.0167678 | resilient | 13 | 0.9956189 |
| 31 | confidence | 14 | 0.0161433 | gain momentum | 14 | 0.9956045 |
| 31 | momentum | 15 | 0.0145821 | economic prospect | 15 | 0.9952982 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: European economy - current state and prospects | Period_1 | 2004-09-29 | 0.124 | current economic situation and future prospects let me start by describing the current economic and financial situation. the latest data releases confirm that the economic recovery in the euro area is continuing. real gdp grew by 0.5% quarter on quarter in the second quarter of this year, having recorded a 0.6% increase in the first quarter. moreover, the latest indicators of output and demand remain consistent with ongoing growth in real activity. looking ahead, the conditions for a continuation and broadening of the recovery remain in place. economic growth outside the euro area continues to be robust, and should continue to support euro area export growth. on the domestic side, investment should benefit from the positive global environment and the very favourable financing conditions. improvements in corporate efficiency and higher profits are also supporting business investment. moreover, private consumption should continue its gradual recovery, broadly in line with growth in real disposable income which, with the usual lag, should be further underpinned by an increase in employment growth later on. against this background, the economic recovery in the euro area is expected to continue and to become more broadly based over the coming quarters, leading to a somewhat stronger upswing in the course of 2005. i should note that this scenario of an ongoing and further progressing economic recovery is, as always, subject to some risks - in both directions. on the upside, the … |
| Lucas Papademos: The economic outlook and the ECB’s monetary policy - some key issues | Period_1 | 2004-11-12 | 0.110 | the economic outlook and monetary policy in the euro area i will start by discussing the current state of the euro area economy and the medium-term economic outlook. the performance of the euro area economy this year is characterised by the ongoing recovery of economic activity at a pace somewhat faster than previously envisaged. inflation, however, has remained above (though relatively close to) 2%. this outcome is not in line with our notion of price stability and is higher than the average inflation expected a year ago for 2004. the sharp rise in oil prices since the beginning of this year, by about 60% (in us dollar terms), has been the main reason for the higher than earlier expected inflation. let me elaborate a bit on the pace of the economic recovery, the factors that have contributed so far to the pick-up in growth, and the conditions and basic factors that are expected to influence the medium- term economic prospects. since the start of the economic recovery in the second half of 2003, we have seen robust growth rates in the first half of 2004, with real gdp increasing by 0.7% and 0.5% in the first and second quarters, respectively. the recovery in growth has so far been driven partly by buoyant external demand and partly by domestic demand. private consumption increased moderately but investment was subdued. although short-term indicators have become more mixed over the past couple of months, the underlying determinants of economic activity remain favourable, an… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2004-02-25 | 0.096 | in my testimony today i will first comment on recent economic and monetary developments. i will then make a few remarks about the benefits that have been brought to us by the euro in its first five years of existence. economic and monetary developments when we last met in december, economic indicators and financial market developments were already supporting our view that a gradual economic recovery had started in the euro area in the second half of 2003. the evidence that has since become available has made us more confident that the recovery did indeed begin in the second half of 2003 and has strengthened our expectation of an upswing in economic activity. an upturn in economic activity is well under way at the global level. this view was shared by all participants at the recent g7 meeting in florida. the robust real gdp growth in the economies of the euro area’s major trading partners over the past few months can be expected to support foreign demand for euro area goods and services. looking ahead, the external environment of the euro area should continue to develop favourably, and the broadly-based global economic recovery should gain further momentum. external developments should thus support the continued recovery in the euro area. we expect this economic recovery in the euro area to proceed gradually. after real gdp growth picked up in the third quarter of 2003, survey evidence on business confidence and the eurostat flash estimate for real gdp growth in the fourth … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the European economy and the ECB’s monetary policy concept | Period_1 | 2004-07-20 | 0.088 | the current state of the euro area economy overall, the latest data releases confirm that the economic recovery in the euro area is continuing. quarterly real gdp growth in the first quarter of this year was 0.6%, slightly higher than what had been expected earlier this year. for the second quarter of this year, the latest indicators of output and expenditure, as well as the most recent survey data, remain consistent with ongoing growth in real activity, with the working assumption of a gradual recovery. looking ahead, we remain confident that the recovery of economic activity will continue. indeed, the conditions for a broadening and strengthening of the recovery are in place. starting with external developments, economic growth outside the euro area remains strong and this should promote euro area exports. as regards domestic developments, investment should benefit from the positive external environment and the favourable financing conditions within the euro area. as corporate restructuring gathers pace and business efficiency advances, improved profitability should underpin business investment. as regards private consumption, its recovery should proceed in parallel with increases in real disposable income and the gradual strengthening of employment growth. this picture of the euro area economy is broadly in line with all available forecasts from international and private organisations. in addition, it is worth stressing that financing conditions in the euro area are ver… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2004-09-28 | 0.086 | economic and monetary developments at the time of my last appearance before this committee in april, i foresaw that annual inflation rates would edge up temporarily to above 2%, mainly on account of oil price developments and increases in indirect taxes. at the same time, i stated that we expected the economic recovery which had started in the second half of 2003 to continue, albeit at a gradual pace. in this light, i assessed that the outlook for price developments over the medium term remained consistent with price stability. against this background, the governing council had left the key ecb interest rates unchanged at their historically low level of 2.0% since june 2003. the data that have become available over the past few months in fact confirm the outlook i gave in april. they indicate that the economic recovery in the euro area has maintained its momentum. in the second quarter of 2004, real gdp grew at a rate of 0.5% relative to the previous quarter, after 0.6% in the first quarter. the conditions for a continuation of the economic recovery remain in place. on the external side, global demand remains robust, notwithstanding temporary fluctuations, contributing to euro area export growth. on the domestic side, higher corporate profitability and favourable financing conditions should support business investment. in particular, the level of interest rates is very low by historical standards, in both nominal and real terms. private consumption should also be sustained… |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2015-03-24 | 0.165 | economic outlook and monetary policy the most recent data and survey evidence show that growth is gaining momentum. the basis for the economic recovery in the euro area has clearly strengthened. this is due to in particular the fall in oil prices, the gradual firming of external demand, easy financing conditions driven by our accomodative monetary policy, and the depreciation of the euro. these more positive developments are also reflected in the recent ecb staff projections. compared with the projections from december, the outlook for 2015 and 2016 has been visibly revised upwards by 0.5 and 0.4 pp., respectively. we expect inflation in the euro area to remain very low or negative in the months ahead, because the recent fall in oil prices will continue to influence the figures until later in the year. however, inflation rates are expected to start increasing gradually towards the end of the year. they will be supported by aggregate demand, by the impact of the lower euro exchange rate and by the recovery of oil prices from their current troughs in the years ahead. the latest ecb staff projections foresee average inflation at 0.0% in 2015, rising to 1.5% in 2016 and 1.8% in 2017. a key factor for a full recovery of the euro area economy and ensuring that inflation does not remain too low for too long will be the extra stimulus that the governing council decided to introduce in january under the ecb’s expanded asset purchase program. this decision was premised on two consid… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Effectiveness of Monetary Union and the Capital Markets Union | Period_2 | 2017-04-10 | 0.160 | euro area activity has been improving against this backdrop of easing financing conditions. higher employment has boosted labour incomes and consumption, and investment has begun a cyclical recovery. global growth prospects are showing signs of strengthening and may well further support the recovery. indeed, despite the waning support from oil prices, growth has continued to broaden and gain momentum. while risks to the outlook remain on the downside, they are less pronounced than before. our latest staff macroeconomic projections were revised slightly upwards, with annual real gdp is expected to increase by 1.8% in 2017, 1.7% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019. the impact of monetary policy measures on euro area gdp growth is sizeable, adding a cumulative 1.7% over the period 2016–2019 (chart 4). 5 / 10 |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy and the outlook for the economy | Period_2 | 2017-11-21 | 0.153 | mario draghi: monetary policy and the outlook for the economy speech by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, at the frankfurt european banking congress “europe into a new era – how to seize the opportunities”, frankfurt am main, 17 november 2017. * * * today i would like to describe how the euro area economy is developing and explain our latest monetary policy decisions. the economic recovery is continuing but inflation developments remain subdued. so, while we are confident in the recovery, we still need a patient and persistent approach to our monetary policy to ensure that medium-term price stability is achieved. the euro area economic recovery the euro area is in the midst of a solid economic expansion. gdp has risen for 18 straight quarters, with the latest data and surveys pointing to unabated growth momentum in the period ahead. from the ecb’s perspective, we have increasing confidence that the recovery is robust and that this momentum will continue going forward. there are three factors in particular that suggest this. first, the major headwinds that were weighing on the recovery in recent years have now largely dissipated, although downside risks still remain related to external factors. for some years global growth and world trade have been a drag on the recovery. now, we are seeing signs of a sustained expansion. global pmis remain strong. the share of countries in which growth has been improving relative to the previous three years has risen… |
| Peter Praet: Lifting potential growth in the euro area | Period_2 | 2015-04-27 | 0.153 | since we announced our purchase programme in january, real interest rates have fallen along the yield curve, driven by both a flattening of the term structure of interest rates and, crucially, by a reversal in the decline of inflation expectations. market-based measures of inflation expectations have increased at all horizons, and as they rise back to levels consistent with medium-term price stability real interest rates should further decrease. bank lending data have also been steadily improving. the cost of borrowing for euro area firms has fallen by around 45 basis points since the summer of last year, with rates converging across euro area countries. our most recent bank lending survey shows that euro area banks are continuing to ease credit conditions. 6 importantly, this is mainly being driven by an improved pass through from banks’ cost of funding to their lending rates in a context of higher competition for customers – which was exactly the reaction that our credit measures aimed to provoke. at the same time, confidence in the recovery is improving considerably. the latest european commission economic sentiment indicator improved notably in march and was driven by a pick-up in both consumer and business confidence. this improvement was also echoed in the latest data in germany, with consumer confidence rebounding strongly in march and business confidence indicators continuing to expand. all in all, this is creating a propitious environment for firms to undertake ne… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Consolidating the euro area’s economic recovery | Period_2 | 2015-05-19 | 0.149 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.090 | what are the monetary policy implications of the medium-term picture? most importantly, we still need to complete the recovery. a major achievement of the european crisis response was to provide a common answer to a common shock. now, we need common policies to support a common recovery, underpinning the sustained return of inflation to our target. next generation eu provides the fiscal support for the recovery, but continued monetary stimulus is necessary to cement progress. if we lose patience now, we will put at risk everything we have achieved so far. |
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.055 | the corporate sector, which benefited from the fiscal support and a strong recovery in the second half of last year, has seen profitability above pre-pandemic levels in the first half of 2022. but soaring prices for energy and commodities are likely to hurt activity, especially in energy-intensive sectors. corporate insolvencies have remained well below pre-pandemic levels. but some sectors have already seen an increase in expected default rates and might be at greater risk of insolvencies in the event of adverse economic surprises or a further tightening of financial conditions. in 2021, households benefited from the economic recovery, low unemployment and favourable financing conditions. but they are now feeling the effects of higher inflation and recession fears, as reflected in declining consumer confidence and projections of households’ future financial situation. low-income households have been 3/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2021-11-16 | 0.049 | measures. in support of this inflation target and in line with our monetary policy strategy, the governing council revised its forward guidance on the key ecb interest rates. we expect them to remain at their present or lower levels until we see inflation reaching 2% well ahead of the end of our projection horizon and durably for the rest of the projection horizon, and we judge that realised progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at 2% over the medium term. preserving favourable financing conditions over the pandemic period is essential to reduce uncertainty and bolster confidence, thereby underpinning economic activity and safeguarding medium-term price stability. the governing council regularly recalibrates the net purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp) based on a joint assessment of financing conditions and the inflation outlook. at its meeting in september, the governing council assessed that the prevailing level of financing conditions, in conjunction with the slight improvement in the medium-term inflation outlook, allow favourable financing conditions to be maintained with a moderately lower pace of net asset purchases under the pepp than in the second and third quarters of this year. the governing council also confirmed in september its other measures, namely the level of the key ecb interest rates, the forward guidance on their likely future evolution, the purchases under the … |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.048 | financial and monetary conditions market interest rates have increased in response to the changing outlook for inflation and monetary policy. with benchmark interest rates rising, bank funding costs have increased, and this has fed into higher bank lending rates in particular for households. nevertheless, lending to firms picked up in march. this was because of the continued need to finance investment and working capital, against the backdrop of increasing production costs, persisting supply bottlenecks and lower reliance on market funding. lending to households also increased, reflecting continued robust demand for mortgages. in line with our monetary policy strategy, the governing council has undertaken its biannual in-depth assessment of the interrelation between monetary policy and financial stability. the environment for financial stability has worsened since our last review in december 2021, especially over the short term. in particular, lower growth and increasing cost pressures, as well as rising risk-free rates and sovereign bond yields, could lead to a further deterioration in the financing conditions faced by borrowers. at the same time, tighter financing conditions could reduce some existing financial stability vulnerabilities over the medium term. banks, which started the year with solid capital positions and improving asset quality, are now facing greater credit risk. we will watch these factors closely. in any case, macroprudential policy remains the first l… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2021-09-09 | 0.048 | bank lending rates for firms and households are at historically low levels. lending to households is holding up, especially for house purchases. the somewhat slower growth of lending to firms is mainly due to the fact that firms are still well funded, because they borrowed heavily in the first wave of the pandemic. they have high cash holdings and are increasingly retaining earnings, which reduces the need for external funding. for larger firms, issuing bonds is an attractive alternative to bank loans. solid bank balance sheets continue to ensure that sufficient credit is available. however, many firms and households have taken on more debt during the pandemic. a deterioration in the economic outlook could threaten their financial health. this, in turn, would worsen the quality of banks’ balance sheets. policy support remains essential to prevent balance sheet strains and tightening financing conditions from reinforcing each other. conclusion summing up, the euro area economy is clearly rebounding. however, the speed of the recovery continues to depend on the course of the pandemic and progress with vaccinations. the current rise in inflation is expected to be largely temporary and underlying price pressures will build up only gradually. the slight improvement in the medium-term inflation outlook and the current level of financing conditions allow favourable financing conditions to be maintained with a moderately lower pace of net asset purchases under the pepp. our policy… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 32 | financial | 1 | 0.1910004 | prudential | 1 | 0.9996494 |
| 32 | stability | 2 | 0.0844771 | financial stability | 2 | 0.9995619 |
| 32 | financial stability | 3 | 0.0829360 | macroprudential | 3 | 0.9992990 |
| 32 | risk | 4 | 0.0423878 | macro prudential | 4 | 0.9991234 |
| 32 | prudential | 5 | 0.0214877 | systemic | 5 | 0.9987734 |
| 32 | macro | 6 | 0.0188872 | macro | 6 | 0.9985102 |
| 32 | macroprudential | 7 | 0.0159978 | macroprudential policy | 7 | 0.9984661 |
| 32 | authority | 8 | 0.0146494 | systemic risk | 8 | 0.9983786 |
| 32 | systemic | 9 | 0.0143604 | prudential supervision | 9 | 0.9973257 |
| 32 | macro prudential | 10 | 0.0133973 | financial instability | 10 | 0.9964517 |
| 32 | supervision | 11 | 0.0125305 | supervision | 11 | 0.9963166 |
| 32 | address | 12 | 0.0095447 | instability | 12 | 0.9962299 |
| 32 | instability | 13 | 0.0088705 | macro prudential policy | 13 | 0.9959638 |
| 32 | systemic risk | 14 | 0.0085816 | prudential policy | 14 | 0.9958795 |
| 32 | macroprudential policy | 15 | 0.0085816 | financial stability risk | 15 | 0.9956163 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2009-04-01 | 0.397 | what role for the ecb in the area of financial market supervision? i will now turn to the final topic, the review of the framework for financial supervision in the european union. already last autumn the european parliament asked the ecb and the escb to play an active role in macro-prudential supervision and financial stability. such a role is envisaged in the report by the high-level group chaired by jacques de larosière. i welcome its proposals on macro-prudential supervision, which relate in particular to a european systemic risk council under the auspices of the ecb. let me provide you with a few observations on this matter. first, the output of the systemic risk council will make a major contribution to financial stability in the eu. in accordance with the de larosière report, it will identify and assess risks and vulnerabilities in the eu financial system, issue risk warnings and adopt related policy recommendations. this will substantially improve the present arrangements for risk assessment at eu level. second, the proposed composition of the systemic risk council reflects a recognition of the role played by central banks in macro-prudential supervision. third, the fact that the systemic risk council would be set up under the auspices of the ecb and the escb would allow it to benefit from the analytical capabilities and technical infrastructures developed by central banks in its analysis of monetary and financial stability. in this context, the systemic risk counci… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2009-10-01 | 0.383 | measures are being phased out naturally, as the operations stop at maturity, unless we decide to extend them. macro-prudential supervision in europe and the role of the ecb let me now turn to the second main issue, the role of macro-prudential supervision and the envisaged european systemic risk board (esrb). the financial crisis has shown that the present, highly sophisticated globalised financial markets and interconnected financial institutions are prone to systemic risk. systemic risk concerns the possibility that the functioning of the financial system can be threatened or materially impaired as a result of the collective behaviour of market participants, investors and financial institutions; it derives, in particular, from their interactions in financial markets and from the close links between the supply of credit and the macro-economy. systemic risks can emerge even when financial institutions manage their risks in a way that looks appropriate from their individual perspective. given the interconnectedness in highly developed financial systems, the behaviour of financial institutions – especially systemically important ones – can have an impact on other financial institutions and the financial system as a whole. macro-prudential supervision has to take account of these externalities and focus on the interconnectedness of financial institutions, markets and infrastructures. therefore it contributes to an important public good – namely systemic financial stability. c… |
| Lucas Papademos: Price stability, financial stability and efficiency, and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-07-14 | 0.325 | opportunities. understood this way, the safeguarding of financial stability requires identifying the main sources of risk and vulnerability; assessing whether the financial system is facilitating a smooth and efficient reallocation of financial resources from savers to investors; and evaluating whether financial risks are being appropriately priced and efficiently managed. this is because financial stability has a forward looking dimension: inefficiencies in the allocation of capital or shortcomings in the pricing and management of risk can, if they lay the foundations for vulnerabilities, compromise future financial system stability and therefore economic stability. consequently, monitoring financial stability with a systemic perspective and in a comprehensive manner is of major importance. for this reason many central banks around the world, including the ecb, are addressing their financial stability mandates in part through the periodic issuing of a public report. financial efficiency can be defined as a condition in which the resources available in a financial system are allocated to the most valuable investment opportunities, at the lowest possible cost. in an efficient financial system, markets are competitive, information is accessible and widely disseminated, and the conflicts between borrowers and lenders that arise from agency problems are effectively dealt with through market contracts. 1] in this way, financial efficiency contributes to minimising the wedge bet… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy and asset prices | Period_1 | 2009-10-19 | 0.302 | however, most policy decisions are confronted with similar informational problems and require a difficult evaluation of the statistical evidence. while monetary and financial conditions are explicitly part of the analysis of the risks to price stability at the ecb, such policy is not a panacea, nor a certain means to ensure that financial crises never arise. there are limitations to what monetary policy alone can achieve. excessive risk and pro-cyclicality in the financial system can also result from factors other than sustained credit growth and high leverage. hence, they require policy actions that can address the underlying causes of these factors. supervisory and regulatory instruments are particularly well suited to preventing excessive risk-taking and the accumulation of financial imbalances. in this respect, the creation of the european systemic risk board (esrb) should contribute to foster financial stability. the esrb was proposed following the setting up of the de larosière group in february 2009, and its establishment was agreed by the ecofin council in june 2009. the main tasks of the esrb will be to monitor the stability of eu financial system, to issue warnings when the assessment of risks are deemed to be significant, and to suggest, when appropriate, policy recommendations. close cooperation with national eu supervisory authorities and with global institutions (such as the imf and the financial stability board) should help this new institution and the centr… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Lessons for monetary policy from the recent crisis | Period_1 | 2011-01-20 | 0.285 | over and above the floor interest rate set by the central bank do not become an additional pro-cyclical source of volatility for the financial system and the economy as a whole. how about the other dimension of supervision: micro-prudential policies? note, first, the difference between macro and micro. macro-prudential supervision aims at limiting the likelihood of failure of significant portions of the financial system, or systemic risk. it follows that the macro-prudential supervision stresses the possibility that actions that may seem desirable or reasonable from the perspective of individual institutions may result in unwelcome system outcomes. micro-prudential supervision, instead, aims at limiting the likelihood of failure of individual institutions. while the two policies have clearly a different scope, ultimately the micro-prudential sphere provides the instruments that can be activated in response to macro-prudential risks. an issue which has attracted attention in the past is whether central banks should be entrusted with supervisory powers – the instruments – or whether those powers should remain within a separate body. my take on this dispute is the following. the experience of the crisis tends to suggest that having the micro and macro-prudential instruments well integrated among other functions within the central bank might be desirable. why? because it always makes good sense to coordinate objectives with instruments. and it looks to me natural that such coo… |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2015-03-24 | 0.387 | however, price stability is not a sufficient condition of financial stability. the last crisis proved that financial stability can be at risk even at times when price stability is achieved. and monetary policy decisions also affect expectations and a wide range of asset prices. our monetary policy measures are necessary to achieve our primary objective of maintaining price stability. but we are nevertheless aware that they may have unintended side effects on the financial system. for example, asset prices may increase to levels that are not justified by fundamentals, while periods of low yields and volatility may invite excessive risk taking by financial investors. in turn, such developments can act as an amplifying mechanism for any eventual financial instability. at the same time, financial stability is a precondition for the efficient conduct of monetary policy. to be successful in delivering price stability, monetary policy relies on the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism. in this context, a stable and non- fragmented financial system is important for the smooth transmission of monetary policy signals. we are monitoring closely any potential risks to euro area financial stability, including those from excessive risk taking. currently these risks are contained. and should they emerge, macro-prudential policy would be best suited to address them. recently, indeed some national authorities in the euro area have decided to implement such measures that go … |
| Yves Mersch: Swedbank Economic Outlook Seminar | Period_2 | 2015-05-19 | 0.302 | because the longer such measures persist, the greater the risks that can come with it. and in the euro area context there are two main risks that can in principle arise: first, greater financial instability (and let me stress here i am talking only about the situation in the euro area and not in other jurisdictions); and second, the delay of much needed structural reforms. to provide a framework for how to think about these risks i find it useful to invoke the well- known “tinbergen rule”, which states that a macroeconomic authority must have at least as many instruments as it has objectives. in terms of the first risk – financial stability – one has to distinguish between conflicting and complementary objectives. in normal times, it might be appropriate for monetary policy to take financial stability into account in its assessment of the appropriate level of interest rates. the reason is that, especially if one extends the concept of the medium-term, raising rates to choke off excessive credit developments will actually contribute to our price stability objective. it helps to prevent deflationary episodes emanating from large financial crises. and the symmetrical argument is also true: lowering rates in a downturn to support the financial sector will safeguard the transmission of monetary policy and hence support the achievement of our mandate. in this sense, i am supportive of the “leaning against the wind” argument in both directions, provided instruments and objectives… |
| Mario Draghi: The path to recovery and the ECB’s role | Period_2 | 2014-02-28 | 0.256 | something one would observe in a deflationary environment. but any setbacks in the absorption of economic slack may give rise to further negative developments. against this background, we will remain alert as to whether any indications on further downside risks to price stability emerge and we stand ready to act. a second challenge we will be facing in the coming months is to make the single supervisory mechanism really work. as i initially explained, the institutional reforms that have been adopted or are being adopted to establish a banking union constitute important progress. but to meet the ultimate objective of strengthening financial stability, implementation is key. and implementation is well under way: the supervisory board has held its first three meetings; a framework regulation has been prepared and is now the subject of a public consultation; and work is progressing on the supervisory model of the ssm with the supervisory manual. one of the first major implementation tests is the comprehensive assessment, the health check of the euro area banking system, which is currently being conducted as a prelude to the ssm becoming operational. here, the ecb is making good progress in establishing the new structures and ensuring that the exercise will be fair, transparent and stringent. but many more steps still lie ahead of us. a final challenge relates to the macro-prudential arm of the ssm. as you know, the ssm regulation gives the ecb the power to apply stricter macro… |
| Peter Praet: The interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy | Period_2 | 2018-10-04 | 0.251 | peter praet: the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy speech by mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the money, macro and finance research group conference on the resilience of the global financial architecture, london, 27 september 2018. * * * i would like to thank john hutchinson for his support in the preparation of this speech. introduction a decade on from the start of the global financial crisis, which led to the biggest drop in economic activity in euro area economies since the second world war, the euro area is currently experiencing a broad-based expansion. looking ahead, significant monetary policy stimulus is still needed to support the gradual build-up of price pressures for the sustainable return of inflation to levels below, but close to, 2%. at this stage of the recovery, the main risk to price stability would be a significant slowdown in growth that could originate from rising protectionism, vulnerabilities in emerging markets and a global repricing of risk. the crisis has brought about a major overhaul of the regulatory, supervisory and macroprudential frameworks in europe. while this is expected to reduce the likelihood of systemic financial vulnerabilities taking root and morphing into a crisis, we should acknowledge that we are still in a transition phase. some major elements of the new frameworks still have to be implemented or finalised, and legacies from the previous crisis are still… |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Low inflation as a challenge for monetary policy and financial stability? | Period_2 | 2014-07-08 | 0.229 | the more the key interest rates are lowered and the longer the low interest rate phase lasts, the bigger the risk that one of these undesired side effects materialises. how should we respond to such developments? should monetary policymakers make compromises on their objective of price stability? i don’t think so. and not only because i feel committed to our treaty basis. a basis that we are not authorised to change. even if, in choosing its instruments, the ecb’s governing council cannot ignore the side effects but must precisely analyse the costs and benefits, the monetary policy objective of preserving price stability is always at the forefront; it is always the primary aim. but that does not mean that we should simply accept these undesired side effects. effective macro-prudential oversight, committed to preserving financial sector stability, is a central building block for a stable monetary and economic union. europe has comprehensively responded to this lesson from the financial crisis and has created the appropriate legal and institutional preconditions, which must now be made a reality by all eu member states. as our experience shows, it is not enough to gear regulation and supervision exclusively to the stability of individual financial institutions. it is rather the close interaction between macro-prudential oversight and micro-prudential supervision that is one of the essential prerequisites for consistent crisis prevention. at european and national level, there… |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.221 |
|
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.186 | improved economic conditions in reducing risks to financial stability. since then, the outlook for financial stability has been downgraded twice: in our financial stability review of may 2022, and the one to be published this week, which sets out how deteriorating economic and financial conditions have further increased risks to the stability of the euro area financial system. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-12-20 | 0.178 | in line with our monetary policy strategy, twice a year the governing council assesses in depth the interrelation between monetary policy and financial stability. the financial stability environment has deteriorated since our last review in june 2022 owing to a weaker economy and rising credit risk. in addition, sovereign vulnerabilities have risen amid the weaker economic outlook and weaker fiscal positions. tighter financing conditions would mitigate the build-up of financial vulnerabilities and lower tail risks to inflation over the medium term, at the cost of a higher risk of systemic stress and greater downside risks to growth in the short term. in addition, the liquidity needs of non- bank financial institutions may amplify market volatility. at the same time, euro area banks have comfortable levels of capital, which helps to reduce the side effects of tighter monetary policy on financial stability. macroprudential policy remains the first line of defence in preserving financial stability and addressing medium-term vulnerabilities. |
| Luis de Guindos: Policy mix of the future - the role of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.176 | and sectors in the euro area. it fine-tunes the overall policy mix and complements the single monetary policy in support of overall financial stability across the euro area. despite the overall good resilience of the euro area banking sector, certain countries have in recent years seen a build-up of financial vulnerabilities, notably related to residential real estate prices and growing household and firm indebtedness. some further careful and targeted tightening of macroprudential policy would be beneficial in selected countries at present. given the deteriorated outlook for economic growth, some countries might benefit from further increasing the resilience of their financial sectors before credit risks start materialising. this includes for example taking measures to preserve capital in the banking sector which could then be used to absorb losses. lithuania has been active in applying a comprehensive set of macroprudential policies to address current vulnerabilities. this year, authorities have activated a sectoral systemic risk buffer of 2% on residential real estate exposures and have tightened the loan-to-value limit for second and subsequent housing loans to 70%. of course, the benefits of further policy action across countries, would need to be evaluated against the risk of procyclical effects, which is becoming more likely as the economic outlook worsens. let me conclude. policy interaction has been a critical element for navigating the pandemic. complementary act… |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-09-27 | 0.164 | these favourable financing conditions, which are necessary for a robust recovery that will restore inflation to its pre-pandemic level. financial stability considerations in our new monetary policy strategy i will now turn to the second topic which you have selected for this hearing, namely the risk of financial dominance. financial dominance occurs when central banks delay the removal of monetary policy accommodation for longer than appropriate, in order to avoid market turmoil. let me be clear on this. the ecb has a very clear primary mandate which is stipulated in the treaty: price stability. as stipulated by the treaty, any other consideration should be subordinate and without prejudice to delivering on our primary mandate. regarding the stability of the financial sector, our new strategy explicitly considers the interactions of price stability and financial stability, reflecting our belief that each is a precondition for the other. to start with, the strategy recognises that macroprudential policy, along with microprudential supervision, is the first line of defence against the build-up of financial imbalances. indeed, effective macroprudential policy can address such risks more directly in a targeted fashion, and thereby reduce the burden that would be placed on monetary policy. nonetheless, given that the macroprudential framework in the euro area is incomplete, and given the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policy, the governing council monitors and… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | output | 1 | 0.1153457 | gap | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 33 | potential | 2 | 0.0928503 | output | 2 | 0.9996494 |
| 33 | gap | 3 | 0.0664270 | output gap | 3 | 0.9994742 |
| 33 | estimate | 4 | 0.0482164 | potential growth | 4 | 0.9992114 |
| 33 | growth | 5 | 0.0435745 | potential output | 5 | 0.9992113 |
| 33 | output gap | 6 | 0.0400038 | potential | 6 | 0.9986845 |
| 33 | potential growth | 7 | 0.0303629 | estimate | 7 | 0.9981584 |
| 33 | potential output | 8 | 0.0245307 | potential output growth | 8 | 0.9978958 |
| 33 | trend | 9 | 0.0225073 | output growth | 9 | 0.9977220 |
| 33 | structural | 10 | 0.0181035 | structural unemployment | 10 | 0.9970207 |
| 33 | close | 11 | 0.0157230 | hysteresis | 11 | 0.9970204 |
| 33 | output growth | 12 | 0.0133425 | trend | 12 | 0.9966670 |
| 33 | measure | 13 | 0.0116762 | european commission | 13 | 0.9962318 |
| 33 | unemployment | 14 | 0.0116762 | real time | 14 | 0.9957505 |
| 33 | forecast | 15 | 0.0100099 | potential growth rate | 15 | 0.9957454 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy and asset prices | Period_1 | 2009-10-19 | 0.283 | provides a vivid example of this problem. it displays alternative vintages of output- gap estimates for the united states as calculated by the imf. consider, for instance, spring 2005, when the federal funds target rate was at the relatively low level of 2.75%. the initial estimate of the output gap was negative at -1.3%. two years later it was revised upwards to 0.1%, and four years later, in 2009, it was revised upwards again to positive territory 1.4%. interestingly, the latest estimate suggests that the us output gap was never in negative territory over the last decade, not even between 2001 and 2005. large subsequent revisions of the output gap are not confined to specific years, but are a pervasive feature. chart 2 shows the actual size of these revisions as estimated by the oecd and the imf in spring 2009. the size of revisions and the disparity between the different sources is striking. |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: The challenges facing monetary policy | Period_1 | 2011-01-27 | 0.220 | for example, if it is considered that the crisis has had a limited effect on both the level and potential growth rate of the economy, the output gap will be estimated to be very large and the risks of deflation may be considerable. this hypothesis justifies a very expansive monetary policy and fiscal policy, in order to fill the output gap as quickly as possible, with few risks that could have inflationary effects. in other words, the wider the estimated gap, the more reason for keeping the interest rate at very low levels, even close to zero, for an extended period of time, until the economic system returns to levels close to full employment. if the crisis had the effect of reducing economic potential in terms of level and growth, the accumulated gap is less than when compared with the previous case and will tend to fill up more quickly. in this case, if monetary policy remains accommodative for too long and does not adjust in advance, it risks being late and not countering inflationary pressures in time. if this delay materialises, the central bank then has to raise interest rates to a greater extent, with potentially recessionary effects. an overestimation of the potential growth rate of the economy also affects the ability of the central bank to properly calibrate the setting of its policy. in principle, as the economy gradually starts to grow above potential, and closes the output gap, the monetary stance should be gradually adjusted through a progressive increase in … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Jackson Hole Conference - monetary policy and ‘credible alertness’ | Period_1 | 2005-09-01 | 0.219 | hand, for example, the revised output-gap measure available to us today is positive in almost all estimates for 1999, 2000 and 2001, but it was estimated to be negative in real time [as shown in chart 1.] 2 uncertainty is even higher for output gap projections, which are the only measures of output gap existing at the beginning of each year. for example, the real-time estimates of the output gap for 2005, published in spring by the european commission, the imf and the oecd, differ on average more than 25% from the output-gap projections that these institutions made at the end of 2004. and, if we add to the real-time measures of the output gap for 2005 the average size of revisions observed in the past, we can conclude that it may ex post turn out to be anything between -3.6% and +0.8%. clearly, output-gap measurement issues are not a fact of the past. central banks also need to cope with this problem at present. i take this as a warning that the central bank should not rely on any simple indicator of economic slack in taking its policy decisions. to conclude this point i would say that there are, undoubtedly, great differences in terms of monetary policy strategy between us at the ecb and, to use alan blinder terms, the greenspan’s fed. we consider the public display of our arithmetic definition of price stability essential to the success of our strategy. we equally deem that the communication to the markets of our two-pillar monetary policy concept is important and has be… |
| Jürgen Stark: The global financial crisis and the role of monetary policy | Period_1 | 2011-09-26 | 0.217 | typically, policies of short-term demand management rely heavily on inflation forecasts and output gap measures. experience, especially prior to the crisis, has revealed the risks of constructing policy on indicators and variables which are not sufficiently robust. let me take the output gap as an example. as the literature has clearly shown, the empirical proxies used to capture the output gap are subject to constant revisions.6 policy-makers who base their decisions mainly on such assessments of the cyclical position can be led very much astray. for instance, the great inflation of the 1970s occurred, to a large extent, due to measurement errors in the real-time estimates of the output gap combined with an overreaction to output gap measures when assessing the state of the economy.7 arguably, the same can be said of the low interest rates implemented for a prolonged period in the middle of the previous decade.8 monetary policies aimed at fine-tuning short-term objectives also run a serious risk of inducing too much policy forbearance for too long. exiting an extraordinary accommodative mode too late can sow the seeds of future imbalances. as the economy recovers from an exceptionally deep recession, real time output gap estimates and estimates of structural unemployment or the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (nairu) are particularly uncertain. potential output is likely to have fallen for a variety of reasons. this could be due to a mismatch between the s… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Could monetary policy have helped prevent the financial crisis? | Period_1 | 2010-04-13 | 0.216 | 20 see: a. orphanides and s. van norden (2002), “the unreliability of output gap estimates in real time”, review of economics and statistics 84(4), pp. 569–583; and a. orphanides and s. van norden (2005), “the reliability of inflation forecasts based on output gap estimates in real time”, journal of money, credit and banking 37(3), pp. 583–601. 21 l. bini smaghi (2009), “monetary policy and asset prices”, freiburg university, 14 october 2009. 22 such as seasonal movements in food prices. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Scars that never were? Potential output and slack after the crisis | Period_2 | 2018-04-26 | 0.292 | hysteresis versus measurement my first slide shows the mysterious situation that has been the subject of much debate in recent months. output gaps across many advanced economies, including the euro area, are widely thought to have closed, or to close in the very near future. but on the right-hand side you can see that while global inflation – here proxied by the oecd average – has recovered from its mainly oil-driven lows in 2015 and 2016, it is stabilising just above 2% and has shown no convincing signs of accelerating. inflation excluding food and energy has hardly moved for the last four years. broadly speaking, this could mean one of two things.4 either the relationship between output and inflation – the phillips curve – has broken down. that is, firms are unwilling to increase prices even when capacity constraints are kicking in. or there is something wrong with the way we measure the supply capacity of our economies. i would dismiss the first assertion, by and large. there is a plethora of empirical studies that prove that the phillips curve is alive and well, in particular if one accounts for changes in the way firms and households incorporate past inflation developments in their price and wage setting behaviour.5 many of these studies, however, highlight that the output-inflation relationship is non-linear, with a much more muted inflation response at high levels of slack – after all, no one speaks of a “phillips line” – and that it crucially depends on the measure… |
| Peter Praet: Lifting potential growth in the euro area | Period_2 | 2015-04-27 | 0.269 | both the level and growth rate of potential fell steeply after 2008 and have barely recovered since. this is due to, first, a deep and protracted decline in investment – nearly 20% from peak to trough – which has caused the capital stock to grow more slowly and increased its average age. seen in historical perspective, this deceleration since 2008 has been substantially stronger than in previous recessions. of particular concern is the growth rate of the machinery and equipment stock, the most productive component, which has slowed the most. second, long spells of crisis-related unemployment have resulted in so-called “hysteresis effects” in the labour market – that is, where workers are unemployed for so long that they lose their skills and become unemployable. as result, structural unemployment (unemployment caused by a mismatch between jobs and skills) has risen in the euro area as whole, increasing from just under 9% in 2008 to almost 10% in 2014 2, and much more in some stressed countries. low potential growth matters for several reasons. it creates a vicious circle where firms and households hold back consumption and investment due to diminished expectations, which in turn lowers potential growth further. it makes it harder for the economy as a whole to grow out of debt. and, if sustained, it implies a permanent loss in productive capacity – and hence in jobs – which has social consequences. indeed, if potential growth in the euro area had carried on rising at the sa… |
| Isabel Schnabel: How long is the medium term? Monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2020-03-02 | 0.266 | a uncertainty over the remaining degree of economic slack… euro area output gap (in percent of potential output) european commission, imf, oecd last observations: 2022 (imf); 2021 (ec, oecd). alternative measures of the output gap paint a different picture, however. b uncertainty over the remaining degree of economic slack… euro area output gap (in percent of potential output) |
| Benoît Cœuré: Scars or scratches? Hysteresis in the euro area | Period_2 | 2017-05-24 | 0.228 | benoît cœuré: scars or scratches? hysteresis in the euro area speech by mr benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the international center for monetary and banking studies, geneva, 19 may 2017. * * * accompanying slides. one of the most interesting questions for policymakers to have emerged from the crisis is the strength of links between the demand and supply sides of the economy. 1the classical view – that only cyclical policies influence the former, and structural policies the latter – has been challenged in two ways: first, by the observation that long periods of weak demand can lead to rising structural unemployment and a permanently lower capital stock – the so-called hysteresis effects. and second, by corollary suggestion that stronger demand might be able to reverse such effects. these insights are not entirely new, of course. in 1986, blanchard and summers’ seminal “insider-outsider” model laid bare how recessions might lead to higher underlying “structural” unemployment rates even after shocks have fully dissipated. the question of hysteresis, however, received renewed interest as we have gone through the steepest collapse in demand since the second world war, which has exposed our economies to significantly higher risks of hysteresis than in the past. and, as a consequence, policymakers are asking themselves if this should change the way they implement monetary policy. should they, as usual, raise rates when there are signs … |
| Peter Praet: Lifting potential growth in the euro area | Period_2 | 2015-04-27 | 0.227 | lifting potential growth taking these improvements into account, the ecb is currently projecting the output gap to close and inflation to return close to 2% around 2017. this is expected to be driven by a rise in actual growth towards potential, rather than the other way around. yet this does not make the challenge of raising potential growth any less important – even on this improved trajectory the output gap will still close with high levels of structural unemployment, which would not be socially acceptable. monetary policy can play a role in supporting potential growth through the investment channel i have already described. moreover, if it is true that weak demand has reduced potential growth through hysteresis effects in the labour market, it could also be true that an acceleration in demand will support potential through the same mechanism working 6 ecb bank lending survey, april 2015. 7 “competitiveness and external imbalances within the euro area”, gvar handbook structure and applications of a macro model of the global economy for policy analysis, 2013. |
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.429 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.317 | euro area real gdp ecb staff macroeconomic projections and calculations. distinguishing between these two possible explanations in real time is no easy task. just as for the origins of the shocks, it requires a close look at the evidence. one way of doing this is by looking at output gap estimates. estimates from major forecasting institutions show some dispersion, but point in a similar direction: they all foresee a negative output gap in 2023 that does not fully close in 2024 (chart 8).[13] with regard to the current situation, estimating revisions of potential output in real time is tricky[14] but the latest european commission estimates foresee potential growth at 1.2% in 2023 and 1.3 % in 2024, with the level of potential output in 2024 being 5.6% higher than in 2019. |
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.273 | euro area output gap measures of the euro area output gap across a suite of models (percentage of potential output) european commission’s autumn 2022 european economic forecast, oecd’s june 2022 economic outlook and imf’s november 2022 world economic outlook. quarterly estimates are interpolated from annual data. an alternative way of analysing whether supply capacity has fallen is to examine the possible effects of individual adverse supply shocks. ecb staff recently conducted a series of studies which suggest that shocks analogous to those seen in recent months are likely to have limited effects on potential. the studies found that even significant hypothetical negative shocks such as deglobalisation[15] – and the associated global supply chain disruptions – or a permanent and large increase in oil prices[16] would induce only a moderate downward revision in the level of potential output in the euro area after four years, ranging from -0.3% in the first case to -0.8% in the second compared to the baseline scenario without these shocks.[17] these effects need to be set against a projected cumulative increase in potential output of around 5% over the same period, as estimated by the european commission. similarly, analyses focusing on the euro area labour market suggest that the shocks we have seen in recent years – in particular, the pandemic – do not seem to have left lingering scars on labour supply and potential output, for instance, by triggering early retirement.[18]… |
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.191 | this argument does not deny historical examples of central banks over-estimating potential and setting policy inappropriately. there is strong evidence to suggest that part of the reason the federal reserve lost control of inflation in the 1970s is that it missed a slowdown in productivity growth and did not realise that the economy was overheating. however, the lessons learned from that period indicate that when uncertainty is high, it is safest not to base policy around large, real-time revisions in potential output or any other unobservable variable. indeed, those central banks that best navigated the 1970s energy shock – such as the deutsche bundesbank – reacted to changes in the output gap rather than estimates of levels. this was a more robust strategy because changes are less subject to mismeasurement and are therefore revised less ex post. current output gap estimates by major institutions point to the output gap in the euro area becoming more negative in 2023 and only partly recovering in 2024 (see chart 8). in other words, historical experience supports the case for waiting for stronger evidence on potential output and proceeding prudently. 8). see orphanides, a. (2003), “the quest for prosperity without inflation”, journal of monetary economics, vol. 50, no 3, pp. 633-663, orphanides, a. and williams, j.c. (2002), “robust monetary policy rules with unknown natural rates”, brookings papers on economic activity, vol. 2002, no 2, and beyer, a., gaspar, v., gerberdi… |
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.156 | the complexity of monetary policy keynote speech by fabio panetta, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the cepr-eabcn conference on “finding the gap: output gap measurement in the euro area” held at the european university institute florence, 14 november 2022 the output gap – the difference between actual and potential output[1] – plays an important conceptual role in central banking. in normal conditions, the output gap represents a gauge of inflationary pressure by signalling the amount of slack in the economy.[2] in turn, this provides a yardstick against which central banks calibrate monetary policy. by steering demand so that actual output matches potential central banks can stabilise inflation around their targets. from the global financial crisis until the start of the pandemic, variations in the output gap reflected prominently the role played by demand factors. the implication for monetary policy was relatively straightforward. the shocks to demand pushed output, employment and inflation in the same direction, leading to a positive correlation between output gaps and inflation. monetary policy could aim to close the inflation gap without facing major trade-offs in terms of the output gap. central banks ultimately faced the difficulty, not so much of diagnosing, but of delivering: once inflation fell too low, their conventional instruments were constrained as interest rates approached their lower bound.[3] central banks had to deploy non-standard policy to… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 34 | crisis | 1 | 0.2608186 | financial crisis | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 34 | financial | 2 | 0.1188962 | pre crisis | 2 | 0.9995619 |
| 34 | financial crisis | 3 | 0.0713693 | crisis | 3 | 0.9994741 |
| 34 | pre | 4 | 0.0352963 | global financial crisis | 4 | 0.9992113 |
| 34 | pre crisis | 5 | 0.0251590 | pre | 5 | 0.9987729 |
| 34 | global | 6 | 0.0185763 | crisis level | 6 | 0.9985974 |
| 34 | global financial | 7 | 0.0163382 | pre crisis level | 7 | 0.9984222 |
| 34 | global financial crisis | 8 | 0.0146267 | global financial | 8 | 0.9981595 |
| 34 | cause | 9 | 0.0125202 | current crisis | 9 | 0.9978080 |
| 34 | post | 10 | 0.0105454 | post | 10 | 0.9975461 |
| 34 | main | 11 | 0.0102821 | post crisis | 11 | 0.9969758 |
| 34 | major | 12 | 0.0090973 | onset | 12 | 0.9968010 |
| 34 | return | 13 | 0.0076491 | paradigm | 13 | 0.9964512 |
| 34 | crisis level | 14 | 0.0073858 | downturn | 14 | 0.9962323 |
| 34 | pre crisis level | 15 | 0.0069908 | severe | 15 | 0.9962318 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy and asset prices | Period_1 | 2009-10-19 | 0.270 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy and asset prices | Period_1 | 2009-10-19 | 0.176 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: Central banking after the financial crisis | Period_1 | 2011-02-23 | 0.174 | ladies and gentlemen, the global financial crisis has been the most severe financial and economic debacle since the great depression of the 1930s. central banks, and governments played a key role in containing the impact of the crisis by preventing a global economic and financial meltdown. at the same time, the crisis – which, by the way, is not over yet – may have important implications for central banking. this is what i will reflect upon in today’s lecture. |
| Jürgen Stark: The global financial crisis and the role of central banking | Period_1 | 2011-04-13 | 0.173 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: The global financial crisis and the role of monetary policy | Period_1 | 2011-09-26 | 0.150 | the challenges ahead and the role for monetary policy the global financial crisis is far from over. by now the global financial crisis has gone through a number of different phases. initially the crisis started in the sub-prime mortgage market during the summer of 2007, and became very intense in september 2008 with the default of |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Monetary policy in uncertain times - the European Central Bank and the crisis | Period_2 | 2016-09-15 | 0.157 | uncertain times looking back over the recent past, we see a decade of crisis and uncertainty; we see a whole series of “black swans” – events that could not be foreseen. we see how the insolvency of an american investment bank triggered a global financial crisis. we see a global economic crisis, a european sovereign debt crisis and we see how the people of the united kingdom voted to leave the european union. brexit was an event that few people had reckoned with, surely; an event that has heightened economic uncertainty and that may damage the economy. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Heterogeneity and the European Central Bank’s monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-04-02 | 0.127 | dispersion in real per capita private consumption across euro area countries was twice its historical levels for a period of more than three years after the outbreak of the global financial crisis. by the same standard, the effects of recession and financial crisis are hardly visible for the united states. monetary policy cannot eliminate such persistent differences, but it can accommodate them. we have proven that a carefully calibrated package of non-standard policy measures, including our targeted long-term refinancing operations, asset purchases, forward guidance and negative rates, can successfully overcome even significant causes of heterogeneity, such as the impairment of the bank lending channel across large parts of the single currency area in the wake of the euro area’s sovereign debt crisis. you can see this on my next slide. 5 / 14 |
| Mario Draghi: The state and prospects of the euro area recovery | Period_2 | 2016-11-28 | 0.119 | mario draghi: the state and prospects of the euro area recovery speech by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, at the european banking congress, frankfurt am main, 18 november 2016. * * * since the onset of the global financial crisis, 2016 has been the first full year where gdp in the euro area has been above its pre-crisis level. it has taken around 7.5 years to get there. the economy is now recovering at a moderate, but steady, pace. employment has grown by more than four million since its trough in 2013. and the recovery has become more broad-based, with less difference in economic performance across countries. what we have now to ask is what are the factors that have allowed the recovery to gather steam, and whether we have reason to believe that they are sufficient to deliver a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation. we have witnessed many encouraging developments, not least the healing of the euro area banking sector, which has allowed credit growth to turn positive again and monetary policy transmission to strengthen. this is a necessary condition for a full return to macro-economic and price stability. but despite the uplift to prices provided by the gradual closing of the output gap, a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation still relies on the continuation of the current, unprecedented financing conditions. it is for this reason that we remain committed to preserving the very substantial degree of monetary accommodation, which is… |
| Fabio Panetta: Monetary autonomy in a globalised world | Period_2 | 2021-04-27 | 0.117 | second, even with the ongoing monetary and fiscal policy support, our recovery is expected to be slow and incomplete in terms of both growth and inflation. in fact, the euro area economy is projected to return to its pre-crisis gdp level only in the middle of 2022 and to remain below its pre-crisis trend (chart 9, left panel).[24] gdp in the united states, in contrast, is projected to recover both its pre-crisis level this year and its trend thereafter (chart 9, right panel). the euro area and japan are the only major advanced economies where inflation is projected to remain subdued over the medium term. |
| Mario Draghi: The European Central Bank - rebuilding trust, restoring prosperity and re-establishing price stability | Period_2 | 2015-11-11 | 0.116 | the adult lives of the students gathered here today have been marked by crisis: a global financial crisis of a magnitude that many, more fortunate, generations have never had to experience; a european economic crisis that has lasted too long, and from which we are only gradually emerging; and a series of critical situations that has significantly tested the solidity of european monetary union. everyone has paid a very high price, but particularly younger generations. the crisis has laid bare the imbalances that built up in the preceding years, which were certainly due to serious errors in the economic policies of member states, but also to shortcomings in europe’s institutional architecture. those shortcomings in turn contributed to making the policy response to the crisis slow and cumbersome. the price paid has been the unacceptable number of unemployed, of whom many, too many, are young people. today i will try to explain what the ecb, the central bank of the euro area, in fulfilling its mandate, has done and is doing to rebuild trust, restore prosperity and re-establish price stability. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in an uncertain world | Period_3 | 2022-03-17 | 0.161 | we have reacted to this new environment by increasing our optionality and emphasising that we will act gradually and flexibly in order to deliver our mandate of price stability. we have also outlined a conditional path towards policy normalisation if the necessary conditions are satisfied. and, at the same time, we are mindful of the risks ahead, and we are ready to revisit our plan if the incoming data require us to do so. our outlook today can be neatly summed up in the words of maya angelou: we are “hoping for the best, prepared for the worst, and unsurprised by anything in between.” 1. for example, from the onset of the great financial crisis, it took seven years for euro area gdp to return to its pre-crisis level. today, gdp has already surpassed its pre-pandemic level. 2. after the great financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, employment fell by around 5 million and it did not reach its pre-crisis level until late 2016. but during the pandemic, employment fell by around the same number and it has already risen by almost 5.5 million. 3. inflation averaged 0.3% in 2020 but 2.6% in 2021. 4. according to ecb analysis, since the trough in april 2020, around 30% of the increase in the oil price is explained by oil demand, while around 45% is explained by oil supply. 5. hamilton, j.d. (2013), “historical oil shocks”, in parker, r. and whaples, r. (eds.), routledge handbook of major events in economic history. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.118 | then, the pandemic hit, which led to a highly unusual recession followed by a highly atypical recovery. in conventional business cycles, the depth of the slump normally determines the pace of the recovery. after exceptionally deep recessions, both demand and supply are often impaired for many years. from the onset of the great financial crisis, for example, it took seven years for euro area gdp to get back to its pre-crisis level. growth never reconnected with the trend we thought possible before 2008. |
| Philip R Lane: Inflation in the near-term and the medium-term | Period_3 | 2022-02-18 | 0.108 | first, the scale of the fiscal and monetary response to the pandemic demonstrated the strength of the commitment to delivering macro-financial stability, rather than seeing a return of the pre-pandemic dynamics that acted as a powerful anti-inflationary force after the global financial crisis and the euro area sovereign debt crisis (the twin crises between 2008 and 2013). importantly, this included substantial policy action at both eu and national level; with the former including the sure programme, extra funding for the european investment bank and, most significantly, the ngeu initiative. in particular, the medium-term nature of the ngeu programme has provided an important anchor for medium-term economic prospects, especially for the main beneficiaries. |
| Christine Lagarde: Finding resilience in times of uncertainty | Period_3 | 2022-03-31 | 0.106 | christine lagarde: finding resilience in times of uncertainty speech by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at an event organised by the central bank of cyprus, nicosia, 30 march 2022. * * * constantine p. cavafy’s famous poem “ithaca” starts with the words: “when you set out on your journey to ithaca, pray that the road is long, full of adventure, full of knowledge.” and indeed, these words capture well the story of cyprus in modern times. it is a story full of adventure, with many obstacles along the way. and yet, your people have overcome them all, gaining in knowledge, and emerging stronger and more resilient each time. your nation rebounded after the invasion of 1974 and subsequent partition of the country, using its agility and acumen to become a hub for business in the middle east and north africa region. cyprus transformed itself from an island on europe’s easternmost edge to a member state at its core, joining the eu in 2004 and adopting the euro in 2008. it endured and then recovered from a crippling banking crisis in 2013, with the economy growing by around 6% each year from 2015 until the start of the pandemic. more recently, cyprus has rallied well from the pandemic, despite the importance of tourism to the economy, which was heavily hit by lockdowns and travel bans. but europe is now faced with another crisis in the form of the russian invasion of ukraine. this is first and foremost a human tragedy whose cost is growing by the day. b… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.095 | 2.3 lessons learned the experience of the recent crisis has left us with two main lessons. first, situations requiring a joint monetary policy and fiscal policy response may arise more frequently than previously thought.[18] during the pandemic, fiscal policies and our independent monetary policy have reinforced each other.[19] this prevented a repetition of the euro area’s experience in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, when procyclical amplification of financial stress and inadequate support for demand resulted in a persistent output gap, high unemployment, financial instability and too low inflation. second, for emu to be viable, european policies must be conducted for the benefit of all member countries. the new model embraced by european authorities during the pandemic avoided the political divisions we saw in the past. as a result, we have emerged from the pandemic with a stronger economy and greater social cohesion. no country felt that it could be better off outside of emu. this was, and will remain, the necessary condition for continuing on the path towards european integration. but we now face new challenges: from economic shocks to security risks, climate change and the need to speed up the energy transition. in many ways, this brings us back to the inception of the european project, when schuman saw supply management and economic unification as critical to europe’s security and prosperity. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 35 | expectation | 1 | 0.1178150 | market base | 1 | 0.9992114 |
| 35 | inflation expectation | 2 | 0.0617309 | forecaster | 2 | 0.9988604 |
| 35 | survey | 3 | 0.0578895 | base measure | 3 | 0.9987723 |
| 35 | base | 4 | 0.0523836 | professional | 4 | 0.9985102 |
| 35 | measure | 5 | 0.0289512 | professional forecaster | 5 | 0.9984644 |
| 35 | market | 6 | 0.0237013 | survey | 6 | 0.9977184 |
| 35 | market base | 7 | 0.0229330 | survey base | 7 | 0.9976336 |
| 35 | term inflation | 8 | 0.0179392 | respondent | 8 | 0.9971054 |
| 35 | indicator | 9 | 0.0174270 | market base measure | 9 | 0.9971040 |
| 35 | consumer | 10 | 0.0165307 | inflation link | 10 | 0.9965809 |
| 35 | term inflation expectation | 11 | 0.0162746 | expectation | 11 | 0.9963067 |
| 35 | forecaster | 12 | 0.0137137 | inflation expectation | 12 | 0.9961315 |
| 35 | professional | 13 | 0.0125613 | base inflation | 13 | 0.9960980 |
| 35 | base measure | 14 | 0.0116650 | survey base measure | 14 | 0.9958739 |
| 35 | forecast | 15 | 0.0111528 | actual | 15 | 0.9957921 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation and deflation risks - how to recognise them? How to avoid them? | Period_1 | 2009-07-01 | 0.311 | indicates (slide 12). all survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations stood at 1.9% in april. financial instruments are the third way of obtaining information about market participants’ inflation expectations. they also contain information about inflation risks, since investors not only demand compensation for the level of expected inflation but also for bearing the risk associated with the inflation outlook. in practice, yields on inflation-linked bonds are used as a basis to derive indicators of inflation expectations. 7 however, since the beginning of the crisis, bond markets have been exposed to significant disturbances that have made the measurement of inflation expectations and the associated risks more difficult than usual. thus, it is useful to complement this measure with expectations extracted from inflation derivatives. in particular, inflation-linked swap rates provide a measure of the expected inflation rates at short horizons (one and two years ahead, for example). 8 one-year inflation swap rates fell sharply in the second half of 2008 (slide 13), following the decline in oil prices and the worsened macroeconomic outlook, and remained between 0.0% and 0.5% until recently. however, they have returned to levels above 1% since early april 2009. the chart also displays market uncertainty about the future inflation outcomes in the euro area, represented by the coloured areas. unsurprisingly, uncertainty has increased since october 2008. furthermore… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy and private expectations | Period_1 | 2005-02-28 | 0.258 | direct measures of inflation expectations in the euro area are provided by a number of surveys. these are regularly analysed in the ecb’s monthly bulletin. one comes from the ecb survey of professional forecasters. this is a quarterly survey conducted by the ecb. it asks experts affiliated with financial or non-financial institutions based within the european union to forecast euro area inflation up to five years ahead. importantly, survey respondents also provide a quantitative assessment of the uncertainty surrounding their forecasts in the form of ranges. the dispersion and asymmetry around the mean provide useful information about shifts in inflation expectations that might be in the pipeline. another measure of inflation expectations is provided by the survey conducted by consensus economics, a private firm. it asks private sector economists to give their short-term and long-term inflation expectations. a further source of information is the european commission’s monthly business and consumer survey. it asks a large number of manufacturing firms about their selling price expectations and consumers about their inflation expectations. this survey has some limitations however. it provides qualitative information only.9 in addition, it is available only for a very short time period ahead (12 months). despite these limitations, detected changes in the direction towards which firms’ and consumers’ expectations are heading may provide useful information. the information that… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation and deflation risks - how to recognise them? How to avoid them? | Period_1 | 2009-07-01 | 0.237 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: European financial integration and the management of inflation expectations by the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 2005-04-21 | 0.231 | 3.2 monitoring a wide range of expectation indicators the ecb does not rely on a single indicator when monitoring expectations but rather takes a comprehensive and pragmatic approach that balances off the information provided by various sources. by their very nature, inflation expectations are not directly observable or measurable. furthermore, the way private agents form and update their view on the likely developments of an economic variable, including inflation, is likely to be different in important dimensions across different types of agents. from this perspective, relying on a single measure of expected inflation in the context of its assessment of the monetary policy stance may mislead the central bank, even if that measure is constructed on the basis of the central bank’s own internal analysis. it is for those reasons that the ecb makes constant use of several measures of inflation expectations that are either based on surveys, thus providing a direct measure of agents’ expectations, or are based on the analysis of information contained in asset prices, which provide an indirect gauge of the inflation path expected by market participants. to be sure, both measures only represent an imperfect gauge of inflation expectations thus requiring careful analysis and full awareness of the limitations inherent in the information they convey. the survey measures that are typically analysed by the ecb, like the ecb survey of professional forecasters, the consensus economics fo… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Commentary on “Fifty years of monetary policy - what have we learned?” by Adam Cagliarini, Christopher Kent and Glenn Stevens | Period_1 | 2010-02-11 | 0.230 | : measures of longer-term inflation expectations in the euro area percent per annum, 5-day averages of daily data note: data in percent; beir denotes the break-even inflation rate; spf denotes the ecb survey of professional forecasters. source: consensus economics, reuters, ecb calculations. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Understanding inflation dynamics and monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2015-11-10 | 0.514 | recent evolution of inflation expectations in the euro area since 2005, there has been a broad degree of co-movement between survey-based (ecb survey of professional forecasters, (ecb spf)) and market-based measures of inflation expectations, although the latter have tended to fluctuate more widely. both survey-based and market-based longer-term inflation expectations moved down, in 2009 and 2010, before they both increased again in 2011 and 2012, only to subsequently decline more substantially in 2013 and 2014, with a partial rebound so far in 2015. the scale of movements in market- based measures however, has been significantly larger than those from surveys – the ratio of the two scalings is four-to-one [4:1]. focusing on the recent period, although both survey-based and market-based measures of inflation expectations declined over the period early-2013 to early-2015, and both have since rebounded somewhat, there have been significant differences in the magnitude of movements and in the changes in the slope of the inflation expectations curve. the market- based curve has tended to move by more both at the short- and long-end, whereas the survey-based curve has moved by less, particularly at the longer-end of the curve. considering first the shorter-end of the curve, the one-year forward in one year (i.e., two years ahead) market-based measure declined by 1.1 p.p. between january 2013 and january 2015 and rebounded by 0.6 p.p. by july 2015. in contrast, the same measure … |
| Vítor Constâncio: Assessing the new phase of unconventional monetary policy at the European Central Bank | Period_2 | 2015-08-28 | 0.340 | expectations of inflation five years ahead, as expressed in the ecb survey of professional forecasters, fell from 1.98% in the first quarter of 2013 to 1.77% in the first quarter of 2015. the five-year inflation-linked swap rate five years ahead fell from 2.4% to 1.5% over the same period. since january 2015 this declining trend has been reversed. both market-based and survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations have recovered from their lows. while broadly similar dynamics in market-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations have been observed in other countries, the decline in the euro area somewhat preceded them and was more prolonged. i will now turn briefly to macro developments, both in terms of inflation and economic growth. |
| Peter Praet: Current issues of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2014-07-04 | 0.280 | how acute is the risk of supply shocks morphing into demand shocks? what is our assessment of the risk of inflation expectations becoming unanchored in the euro area? let me emphasise three elements. first, long-term inflation expectations based on surveys remain in line with our focal point for price stability, but market expectations for inflation have fallen. market participants seem to factor in a longer period of low inflation. since summer 2012, following movements in hicp inflation, market-based measures of inflation expectations have been on a declining trend. in particular, declines have been observed in shorter-term inflation expectations. at this juncture, market-based inflation expectations suggest a rather slow increase in inflation over the next years. second, the decline in inflation is broad-based across sectors. hicp inflation has oscillated between 1.0% and 0.5% since last october. but the same holds when excluding the volatile |
| Benoît Cœuré: Inflation expectations and the conduct of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-07-15 | 0.253 | benoît cœuré: inflation expectations and the conduct of monetary policy speech by mr benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at an event organised by the safe policy center, frankfurt am main, 11 july 2019. * * * stable inflation expectations at levels consistent with price stability provide an important nominal anchor for the economy. they reduce inflation persistence and curb harmful macroeconomic volatility. there is compelling empirical evidence suggesting that increased clarity about central banks’ mandates, their reaction functions and inflation aims has helped anchor inflation expectations and reduce their variability around the communicated inflation aim despite significant shocks to inflation in both directions.1 however, persistently low inflation since the great financial crisis has led some central bank observers, and financial market participants in particular, to question the ability of central banks to deliver on their mandate. in the euro area, where the coordinating role of a nominal anchor is particularly important in view of cross-country differences in wage and price-setting, market- based long-term inflation expectations have fallen since the crisis, and this fall has accelerated since the start of the year. these developments have sparked a discussion on two related questions. the first question, which i have discussed on previous occasions, is whether the fall in market- based inflation expectations reflects a growin… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Understanding inflation dynamics and monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2015-11-10 | 0.235 | 2013, appear to be in line with the factors cited by spf respondents. most recently, the analysis suggests that the decline in longer-term spf expectations may reflect developments in actual hicp inflation, market-based measures of inflation expectations and wage growth. a model-based analysis of the determinants of long-term market-based inflation expectations shows that the main determinants of the five-year implied forward inflation linked swap rate five years ahead (5y5y ilsr) are real gdp and monetary policy. real gdp is estimated to provide an overall positive contribution of about +20bps. monetary policy is proxied by the eonia 1y1y rate (that gauges the market sentiment about future ecb policy interest rates) and the size of the eurosystem balance sheet’s assets. the latter reflects not only the asset purchase programme (app) but also all the other non-conventional monetary policy measures undertaken by the eurosystem since the inception of the global financial crisis in august 2007. in conclusion, recent evolutions of both survey-based and market-based measures tend to raise some concerns of a de-anchoring of long-term inflation expectations in euro area. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.344 | employ various proxy measures. one method is to use market-based measures of inflation compensation. immediately prior to the pandemic, estimates derived from market prices pointed to medium-term inflation expectations of only 1.1%, substantially below our medium-term inflation target (chart 6, left panel). with the onset of the pandemic and the severe disruption to economic activity, these expectations declined to nearly 0.5% in march 2020. in that regard, the recent increase in market-based inflation expectations along the entire maturity distribution to levels closer to our target is a welcome development. it signals that investors have become more sanguine about the euro area inflation outlook without pointing — so far at least — to fears of more persistent inflation overshoots that could spiral back into actual price and wage dynamics. and since inflation expectations help to determine the real interest rate, higher inflation expectations reinforce the degree of policy accommodation in an environment of low nominal yields, and thus contribute to lifting inflation towards our new symmetric medium-term target of 2%. chart 6 survey and market-based inflation indicators for the euro area survey- and market-based measures of inflation probability of average inflation over the next five years _expectations (percentage) cs (ercentage) oe fi'e-year ahead spf point forecast mbelow 0% e between 0% and 1.0% ebetween 1.0% and 1.5% eo spf mean mebetween 1.5% and2.0% wsbetween2.0%… |
| Philip R Lane: Inflation in the near-term and the medium-term | Period_3 | 2022-02-18 | 0.332 | longer-term inflation expectations from professional forecaster surveys (annual percentage changes) == survey of professional forecasters (4-5 years ahead) == consensus economics (5 years ahead) == eurozone barometer (4 years ahead) m= survey of monetary analysts (long-term) == weighted average of surveys l2 2.0 ————————————_ ee —_er— eee eee eaeeer—_e—er—ee——e——e—_er—eaerer—er—e—e——e_eer ere oer = - lz ff a etl et ~ — ——— 16 ts 1.4 jan-20 jul-20 jan-21 jul-21 jan-22 sources: survey of professional forecasters, ecb survey of monetary analysis, consensus economics, eurozone barometer and ecb staff calculations. notes: the weighted average is calculated using the average number of respondents from each survey as weights. the latest observations is for the first quarter of 2022 for the spf, january 2022 for consensus economics and the eurozone barometer and february 2022 for the survey of monetary analysts. chart 3 survey of professional forecasters: cross-sectional distribution of longer-term inflation point forecasts (percentages of respondents; inflation point forecasts) wm c1 2071 ™ q1 2022 ro 30 29 20 15 10 5 0 $1.2 ed 1.4 ’lg 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2:1 22 22 2.4 =e sources: survey of professional forecasters and ecb staff calculations. note: the latest observations are for the first quarter of 2022. |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.302 | realised and expected level of hicp and hicp excluding energy and food survey of monetary analysts. note: expectation is based on the median from the april 2022 survey of monetary analysts. in terms of the evolution of longer-term inflation expectations, charts 10-12 present a range of indicators. in relation to the survey of professional forecasters, chart 10 conveys two messages. first, over the course of 2021, there was a significant re-anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations at our two per cent target: the distribution in the q1 2021 survey was similar to the prevailing pattern for an extended period before the pandemic with the modal expectation at around 1.6 per cent, whereas the distributions in the q1 2022 and q2 2022 surveys show the modal expectation at 2.0 per cent and a significant rightward shift in the mass of the distribution. second, there is also a visible difference between the q1 2022 and q2 2022 survey: the right tail of the distribution has expanded, with more forecasters expecting long-term inflation above 2.5 per cent, significantly higher than the target level. |
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.291 | consumer inflation expectations rise but fall back consumer expectations one year ahead consumer expectations three years ahead (annual percentage changes) (annual percentage changes) = consumer expectations, 1 year ahead - jan 2021 w consumer expectations, 3 years ahead - jan 2021 18 = consumer expectations, 1 year ahead - jan 2022 ; = consumer expectations, 3 years ahead - jan 2022 . 3 0.2 0.2 | 0.0 = =- call | wil - i . ot 00 ® #– veal at = _ ” ot — v“~ sue £- © 2 & fa o2 © on ® fs ® sf b& 8g note: these data are derived from responses to the quantitative question on inflation expectations in the ecb’s consumer expectations survey. chart 14 inflation expectations are re-anchoring at 2% long-term inflation point forecasts long-term inflation expectations (percentages) (percentages of respondents) me 2099 1 7071 ——below 2% ——2% -——above 2% 35 100 100 80 | 80 25 70 | 70 60 | + 60 15 50 | strategy;review 50 announcement 10 40 40 7 30 | 30 20 | | 20 0 10 | | 10 -5 0 | ae if — a 7 7 __ j 0 sources: left panel: ecb survey of professional forecasters; right panel: ecb survey of monetary analysts. note: values were rounded to one decimal place prior to aggregation. accompanying the recovery with a light touch more than 40 years ago, william brainard proposed the “conservatism principle”, which calls for cautious action when policymakers are faced with uncertainty. |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.275 | shows the three-year-ahead inflation expectations from the consumer expectations survey. the left panel shows that there has been a marked shift in the march results – having been quite stable at around 2 per cent, the median expectation moved up to 2.9 per cent. in particular, there was a shift in the proportion of participants reporting expected inflation rates above 4 per cent. in line with the literature on household inflation expectations, the most important signal is conveyed by the shift in the distribution of beliefs about future inflation more than the precise level of expected inflation. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 36 | strategy | 1 | 0.1907337 | policy strategy | 1 | 0.9998248 |
| 36 | policy strategy | 2 | 0.0869743 | monetary policy strategy | 2 | 0.9998247 |
| 36 | monetary policy strategy | 3 | 0.0848568 | strategy | 3 | 0.9996494 |
| 36 | ecb monetary | 4 | 0.0542231 | ecb monetary | 4 | 0.9994743 |
| 36 | ecb monetary policy | 5 | 0.0523879 | ecb monetary policy | 5 | 0.9994743 |
| 36 | review | 6 | 0.0346006 | strategy review | 6 | 0.9986856 |
| 36 | element | 7 | 0.0211895 | review | 7 | 0.9985979 |
| 36 | conduct | 8 | 0.0194955 | guide | 8 | 0.9979849 |
| 36 | framework | 9 | 0.0137075 | evaluation | 9 | 0.9979843 |
| 36 | reflect | 10 | 0.0135664 | element | 10 | 0.9978962 |
| 36 | strategy review | 11 | 0.0130017 | ecb strategy | 11 | 0.9970187 |
| 36 | guide | 12 | 0.0121547 | conduct | 12 | 0.9966663 |
| 36 | implication | 13 | 0.0101783 | policy strategy review | 13 | 0.9966655 |
| 36 | provide | 14 | 0.0083431 | announce | 14 | 0.9962310 |
| 36 | announce | 15 | 0.0082019 | clarification | 15 | 0.9961399 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean Claude Trichet: The ECB’s monetary policy strategy after the evaluation and clarification of May 2003 | Period_1 | 2003-12-02 | 0.273 | the 2003 review of the strategy: confirmation and clarification in december 2002 the ecb announced its decision to conduct a comprehensive review of its strategy. this decision was sometimes wrongly interpreted by observers as an implicit indication of dissatisfaction with the experience thus far. in fact, the opposite was true. it was natural that, after more than four years of experience, the governing council of the ecb wanted to look back and reflect in a systematic way on the experience gained and the comments of external observers. indeed, we conduct monetary policy in a complex and changing environment. undertaking such an exercise in stock taking and reflection is essential to ensure a satisfactory evaluation of the strategy. as i will explain, the result of this evaluation demonstrates that our monetary policy is based on a sound, robust fundament. [the document entitled “overview of the background studies for the reflections on the ecb’s monetary policy strategy” (8 may 2003) provides a detailed discussion of the issues considered in the governing council’s review of the strategy. it is available on the ecb’s website in the section publications.] 2. the elements of the ecb’s strategy |
| Making monetary policy in a broad monetary union (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 12 Oct 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-10-18 | 0.258 | the ecb’s monetary policy strategy the institutional setup provided by the treaty, therefore, ensures a very solid foundation for building and maintaining a high level of credibility for the ecb and for the successful conduct of monetary policy in the euro area. in the end, however, it will be the central bank’s own performance that will determine its credibility. this naturally leads to the following how should price stability be maintained? this question is addressed by the ecb’s monetary policy strategy, which was adopted by the governing council of the ecb and announced in october 1998. the strategy provides the framework for conducting monetary policy in the euro area. first and foremost, the ecb’s monetary policy strategy provides a quantitative definition of the primary objective of monetary policy in the euro area, namely the maintenance of price stability. price |
| Otmar Issing: The ECB and the euro - the first five years | Period_1 | 2004-05-21 | 0.241 | bruggemann, a., p. donati and a. warne (2003), is the demand for euro area m3 stable?, in: o. issing (ed.), background studies for the ecb’s evaluation of its monetary policy strategy, ecb, pp. 245-300. calza, a. and j. sousa (2003), why has money demand been more stable in the euro area than in other economies? a literature review, in: o. issing (ed.), background studies for the ecb’s evaluation of its monetary policy strategy, ecb, pp. 229-244. calza, a., d. gerdesmeier and j. levy (2001), euro area money demand: measuring the opportunity costs appropriately, imf working paper, no. 01/179. camba-méndez, g. (2003), the definition of price stability: choosing a price measure, in: o. issing (ed.), background studies for the ecb’s evaluation of its monetary policy strategy, ecb, pp. 31-42. card, d. and d. hyslop (1997), does inflation ‘grease the wheels’ of the labor market?, nber working paper no 5538. castelnuovo, e., s. nicoletti altimari and d. rodríguez-palenzuela (2003), definition of price stability, range and point inflation targets: the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations, in: o. issing (ed.), background studies for the ecb’s evaluation of its monetary policy strategy, ecb, pp. 43-90. coenen, g. and j.-l. vega (2001), the demand for m3 in the euro area, journal of applied econometrics, 16, pp. 727-748. coenen, g. (2003a), zero lower bound: is it a problem in the euro area?, in: o. issing (ed.), background studies for the ecb’s evaluation of its monetary po… |
| Lucas Papademos: Policy-making in EMU - strategies, rules and discretion | Period_1 | 2004-04-23 | 0.204 |
|
| Otmar Issing: Evaluation of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy | Period_1 | 2003-07-27 | 0.181 | why an evaluation of the strategy? many people were surprised by the announcement, last december, that the ecb would undertake an evaluation of its monetary policy strategy. some took it as an implicit indication that we were dissatisfied by the strategy and prepared to change it. the opposite is true. when our strategy was announced, on october 1998, the ecb had not yet assumed its responsibility of conducting monetary policy for the euro area. the strategy we designed was a novel one, suited for the special characteristics of the euro area and its central bank, and different in a number of respects from other current and past strategies. it incorporated the best judgement and experience of central banks and the key lessons of economic research, but it lacked one fundamental element: the test of practical experience. hence it was only natural that, after a period of time, the council would want to go back and reflect on the accumulated experience in a systematic way. this did not mean that changes were necessarily needed - any more than a new car necessarily needs repair when it is taken to the garage for its 5,000 miles checkup! it is true, however, that we undertook our evaluation with an open mind, ready to introduce changes in case our evaluation had suggested the need to do so. there are in my view three areas where a monetary policy strategy plays a crucial role in a central bank, and this is where our attention focused: |
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.261 | 30/09/2020 the monetary policy strategy review: some preliminary considerations the monetary policy strategy review: some preliminary considerations speech by christine lagarde, president of the ecb, at the “ecb and its watchers xxi” conference frankfurt am main, 30 september 2020 thank you for inviting me to address this conference. this morning, i would like to speak to you about the ecb’s strategy review, the reasons we are conducting it, and our expectations as a result of it. since 2003, when we last conducted a strategy review, the euro area and the world economy have undergone profound changes. the consensus that has governed monetary policy worldwide has been challenged on a number of fronts. |
| Isabel Schnabel: COVID-19 and monetary policy - reinforcing prevailing challenges | Period_2 | 2020-11-24 | 0.167 | in the euro area, the coincidence of a protracted period of low inflation, sluggish potential growth and highly accommodative financial conditions raises important questions as to how the governing council should interpret its mandate and how it should conduct and communicate its operations in a way that credibly conveys its strong commitment to achieving price stability while minimising any adverse consequences of its policies for society. these questions form important elements of our monetary policy strategy review. the outcome will be a framework that reflects our understanding of how the economy has changed since we conducted our last strategy review and ensures that monetary policy will continue to faithfully serve the people of europe. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201124~bcaebee7c0.en.html 11/13 |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economic outlook and the current monetary policy stance | Period_2 | 2020-02-20 | 0.156 | overall, the present monetary policy stimulus lends substantial support to growth and inflation developments, buffering to a large degree the negative impulse from global factors. indeed, the unfolding of our monetary policy measures will ensure that financial conditions will remain very favourable, shielding the economy against the external headwinds and laying out the conditions for the build-up of domestic price pressures. at the same time, we are attentive to the possible side effects of the present monetary policy measures. these need to be carefully and continuously monitored. the ecb strategy review in january, the governing council decided to launch a review of the ecb’s monetary policy strategy. after more than 16 years, it was time to conduct a thorough review taking stocks of the profound structural changes that have intervened since the 2003 strategy exercise, and reflecting on what these changes and new trends mean for our framework. this process is expected to last one year and it will be conducted by the eurosystem and the ecb staff. we will also reach out to academics, members of parliament – including the european parliament – representatives from the civil society and business, and seek the opinion of financial market participants on selected issues. the scope of the strategic review will be comprehensive. that means that we will look at the quantitative formulation of price stability, together with the approaches and instruments by which price stability … |
| Mario Draghi: Delivering a symmetric mandate with asymmetric tools - monetary policy in a context of low interest rates | Period_2 | 2016-06-08 | 0.143 | 1 see evaluation of the ecb’s monetary policy strategy. 2 coenen, g. (2003), “zero lower bound: is it a problem in the euro area?”, ecb working paper series no 269, september 2003. 3 see evaluation of the ecb’s monetary policy strategy. 4 see draghi, m. (2016), “addressing the causes of low interest rates”, introductory speech held at a panel on “the future of financial markets: a changing view of asia” at the annual meeting of the asian development bank, frankfurt am main, 2 may 2016 |
| Philip R Lane: The ECB’s monetary policy in the pandemic - meeting the challenge | Period_2 | 2020-10-07 | 0.139 | 07/10/2020 the ecb’s monetary policy in the pandemic: meeting the challenge [9] see lane, p.r. (2020), “the pandemic emergency: the three challenges for the ecb”, speech at the jackson hole economic policy symposium “navigating the decade ahead: implications for monetary policy”, hosted by the federal reserve bank of kansas city. [10] for more details on the strategy review, see the speech by christine lagarde, president of the ecb, “the monetary policy strategy review: some preliminary considerations” at the “ecb and its watchers” conference on 30 september 2020. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201006~e1d38a1ccc.en.html 12/12 |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.149 | econometric estimates of the euro area nominal natural rate of interest r° (percentage per annum) range of all natural rate estimates mmm range of smoother estimates 6 ex ©|s 1-year forward rate 9 years ahead wgem report “the natural rate of interest: estimates, drivers, and challenges to monetary policy”, occasional paper, no 217; ajevskis (2020); brand, goy, lemke (2020); brand, mazelis (2019); fiorentini, galesi, pérez-quirds, sentana (2018); geiger and schupp (2018); holston, laubach, williams (2017); jarocinski (2017); johannsen and mertens (2021), refinitiv. notes: the natural nominal rate estimates are constructed by adding the inflation target of 2% to all real values. ranges span point estimates across models to reflect model uncertainty and no other source of r* uncertainty. the dark shaded area highlights smoother r* estimates that are statistically less affected by cyclical movements in the real rate of interest than the other estimates depicted in the chart. last observation: 28 february 2022 for the ois 1-year forward rate 9 years ahead (reporting average values over the quarter). a monetary policy strategy serves two main purposes: first, it provides policymakers with a coherent analytical framework that maps actual or expected economic developments into policy decisions; and, second, it serves as a tool for communicating with the public. a strategic approach to monetary policy is especially valuable when confronted with possible shifts in the underlying for… |
| Isabel Schnabel: New narratives on monetary policy – the spectre of inflation | Period_3 | 2021-10-12 | 0.137 | 1 schnabel, i. (2020), “narratives about the ecb’s monetary policy – reality or fiction?“, speech at the juristische studiengesellschaft, karlsruhe, 11 february. 2 the ecb website provides detailed information on the new monetary policy strategy. for a description of the key elements of the new strategy, see schnabel, i. (2021), “a new strategy for a changing world“, speech at the virtual financial statements series hosted by the peterson institute for international economics, frankfurt am main, 14 july. 3 see also schnabel, i. (2020), “covid-19 and monetary policy: reinforcing prevailing challenges”, speech at the bank of finland monetary policy webinar “new challenges to monetary policy strategies”, frankfurt am main, 24 8/9 |
| Frank Elderson: Proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank concrete | Period_3 | 2022-03-25 | 0.094 | frank elderson: proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the european central bank concrete keynote speech by mr frank elderson, member of the executive board of the european central bank and vice-chair of the supervisory board of the ecb, at the institute of international & european affairs webinar, frankfurt am main, 24 march 2022. * * * as no doubt all of you joining me here today, we at the european central bank look with horror at the distressing reports from ukraine. the human suffering and destruction we see in our part of the world remains difficult to fathom. our hearts and minds are with the people of ukraine. with those who are still in harm’s way, and with those who have been forced to seek refuge elsewhere, mainly in the european union. these events are a stark reminder about what the european union stands for: peace in europe, being united in diversity, shared principles and the rule of law. the rule of law that also governs the institutions – including the ecb – that within their mandate serve european citizens. today, i want to outline to you how the ecb will continue to contribute to this greater purpose by delivering on the mandate bestowed upon us by the european treaties. the mandate to deliver price stability in the euro area. you may be aware that last summer the ecb announced a new monetary policy strategy after concluding a comprehensive review. a review in which we engaged with a wide range of stakeholder… |
| Christine Lagarde: Commitment and persistence - monetary policy in the economic recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.074 | finally, although the main driver of higher inflation, the price of energy, is likely to stay elevated over the coming months, it should stabilise in the course of 2022 — as it normally has done historically after a sharp rise. futures prices for oil, gas and electricity point to a decline in the coming period, and gas prices have already fallen by about 21% since their record highs in october. however, prices remain volatile and there is some uncertainty over the longer-run outlook: for example, a global shift away from emission-intensive energy could lead to a sustained demand for gas as a transition fuel, resulting in further periods of price volatility.!12! the outlook for monetary policy over the medium term so, how should monetary policy respond? as | have already indicated, in our strategy review we considered carefully how to respond in circumstances where we face pronounced but passing inflation shocks. three key elements of our strategy are relevant to the current situation. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.072 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 37 | market | 1 | 0.1010686 | participant | 1 | 0.9997372 |
| 37 | expectation | 2 | 0.0557253 | market participant | 2 | 0.9997371 |
| 37 | participant | 3 | 0.0526840 | agent | 3 | 0.9994743 |
| 37 | market participant | 4 | 0.0443895 | economic agent | 4 | 0.9989484 |
| 37 | agent | 5 | 0.0432835 | behaviour | 5 | 0.9985106 |
| 37 | future | 6 | 0.0337448 | market expectation | 6 | 0.9981595 |
| 37 | change | 7 | 0.0266945 | understand | 7 | 0.9978088 |
| 37 | understand | 8 | 0.0213031 | financial market participant | 8 | 0.9974559 |
| 37 | behaviour | 9 | 0.0210266 | formation | 9 | 0.9970636 |
| 37 | economic agent | 10 | 0.0195059 | surprise | 10 | 0.9969335 |
| 37 | good | 11 | 0.0170176 | private agent | 11 | 0.9959599 |
| 37 | view | 12 | 0.0139763 | circumstance | 12 | 0.9958368 |
| 37 | general | 13 | 0.0136998 | general | 13 | 0.9956142 |
| 37 | information | 14 | 0.0132850 | rational | 14 | 0.9955653 |
| 37 | uncertainty | 15 | 0.0125938 | future | 15 | 0.9952540 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy and private expectations | Period_1 | 2005-02-28 | 0.250 | central banks’ long quest for macroeconomic stability 30 years ago the formation of expectations moved from a peripheral area of theoretical enquiry into the very core of macroeconomic thinking. today, the economics of expectations and macroeconomics itself are largely coextensive. the trigger of this transformation was, as is well known, the rational expectations revolution, which started with the pioneering work by robert lucas (1972, 1973) and thomas sargent and neil wallace (1975).1 the upshot of the rational expectations hypothesis is that – at least in a world in which information is largely publicly available and speedily disseminated – individuals should not make predictable errors when formulating conjectures about their future. this does not imply that individuals will invariably forecast accurately if random movements are inevitable. but guesses about the future must be correct on average if individuals are to remain satisfied with the mechanism by which their anticipations are formulated. when agents diagnose systematic errors, they have an incentive to amend the basis of their forecasts. expectations are thus the outcome of a decision process and this process responds and adapts to changing circumstances, in particular to possible changes in the behaviour of monetary authorities. understanding expectations formation as a process underscores the strategic interdependence that exists between expectations formation and economic institutions. recognition of this i… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Jackson Hole Conference - monetary policy and ‘credible alertness’ | Period_1 | 2005-09-01 | 0.217 | scenario that is considered most plausible, given the conditioning assumptions, for purposes of the central bank’s own internal assessment of the macroeconomic outlook. as agents’ expectations shape the market reaction to new economic data and to the central bank’s own policy actions, they embed information that the central bank cannot neglect or grossly underrate in its own analysis. the difficulty lies in devising a prudent way to factor such situations into policy. and here is where the fundamental tension inherent in our profession comes in. on the one hand we want to keep our eyes on the fundamentals and avoid being misled or intoxicated by what could well be noise and unfounded overreactions. on the other hand, excess endogenous volatility in private expectations could indeed provide advance warning of pending risks that the central bank should take into account. misled market expectations can prolong the dynamic response of inflation and real activity to an inflationary or deflationary shock of sufficiently great potency. this might entail serious risks of instability. recent work done at the federal reserve board by athanasios orphanides and john williams3 shows that, in these circumstances, a rise (or fall) of private inflation expectations beyond (or short of) those implied by perfect knowledge should elicit a more aggressive response than could be expected in normal conditions. the optimality of such a response is corroborated in a study by vitor gaspar, frank s… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation, expectations and current challenges to monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-10-14 | 0.203 | this requires intense communication with market participants, of at least two sorts. first, the central bank has the duty to warn market participants when their own behaviour is not consistent with price stability and may lead to a tightening of monetary policy which would lead to a worse outcome for all. this has to involve communication with the public at large: unions, employers, budgetary authorities. this type of communication is in the interest of all, since any inconsistency would lead in the end to a worse result in terms of economic growth. it is also in the interest of the central bank as price stability can be more easily maintained if agents act consistently. warning economic agents openly about their behaviour is not easy and does not make central banks popular. these warnings are not nice to hear either and often irritating for the addressees who feel like being lectured on their own behaviour. it is nevertheless the statutory responsibility of the central bank to make all agents, private and public, aware of the consequences of their behaviour on monetary policy. making this clear at the outset, in public, is the best way to coordinate expectations around the best possible outcome. it is also a way to ensure accountability by the central bank. for instance, if unions request higher wages to compensate for oil and gasoline price increases, the central bank cannot abstain from warning that this would lead to a vicious scenario and ultimately to higher interest… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Jackson Hole Conference - monetary policy and ‘credible alertness’ | Period_1 | 2005-09-01 | 0.175 | the advantages of a rule-like behaviour at first thought, a “discretionary” response to shocks might seem exactly what one would expect of a professional central banker. after all, each economic contingency is a unique combination of circumstances that, in its own way, is unprecedented, and will probably never repeat itself again in that precise form. so, each new contingency would seem to command a different, tailor-made response on the part of monetary authorities. there is some grain of truth to this. but decades of reflections on the role of expectations in macroeconomics have taught us that monetary policy is not a sequence of isolated policy actions. when forming their expectations, agents seek to capture the general pattern of monetary policies, and it is that pattern that matters in shaping their economic behaviour. therefore, the relevant problem to solve for central banks is not so much about the size and timing of a given interest rate move in response to a particular contingency. it is more about the strategy for repeatedly adjusting the policy instrument in response to the state of the economy, whatever this might be. if the central bank is able to convince economic agents and markets participants of its analysis and assessment of the outlook, and about the policy measures that it is going to take in response to it, this mechanism of anticipation will act in self-equilibrating manner. as soon as the macroeconomic news is |
| Lucas Papademos: The science of monetary policy ¿ past advances and future challenges | Period_1 | 2007-09-24 | 0.168 | market expectations of future inflation. more analysis is needed to understand this discrepancy – and some promising work has already been done at the ecb in this respect. more generally, research aiming at incorporating empirically plausible theories of expectations formation into our models is of particular relevance. this will require the introduction and testing of hypotheses of how economic agents learn about the evolving structure and functioning of the economy it and may lead to a relaxation of the assumption of the representative agent which is characteristic of most of our models, including the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (dsge) models, and thus to allow for the heterogeneity of agents and expectations. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Interview in Börsen-Zeitung | Period_2 | 2016-01-13 | 0.136 | only rise when growth and inflation pick up again. that is precisely what we are trying to achieve. at the beginning of december, the ecb’s governing council decided on further monetary easing. the financial markets were disappointed; they had expected more. the volatility was bigger than it has been for years. what lessons does the ecb draw from this? that was undoubtedly the largest gulf so far between what we intended to do and what the markets expected. both sides need to learn lessons. the markets need to understand our decision-making processes better, and must not allow themselves to get carried away by wishful thinking. but we also have to communicate better. we made the decision that we wanted to make. however, we did not want to give the markets such a surprise. what does “communicate better” mean? why did the ecb’s governing council not try to dampen expectations in advance? it is difficult enough to calibrate monetary policy correctly. but it is even more difficult to fine- tune market expectations. sometimes our statements are over-interpreted. will the ecb’s governing council, and in particular the ecb’s president, mario draghi, find it more difficult to guide the markets after this incident? we should also not exaggerate the importance of this one episode. with regard to the future, there are very different expectations in the market. some say the ecb has now “finished” or, at least, that the barrier to further loosening is very high. others say that further… |
| Luis de Guindos: Communication, expectations and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-08-27 | 0.132 | become known as the “echo chamber effect”. as hyun shin from the bis has put it, “the louder the central bank talks, the more likely it is to hear its own echo.”4 this is particularly prominent in times when the central bank gives strong forward guidance. ecb research has shown that in such circumstances, market expectations become “cemented”, i.e. they do no longer respond to news about the macro economy.5 this is something we need to keep in mind when designing our communication strategy and when reading the signals from financial markets – the more forward guidance we give, the less informative are market signals for gauging the state and the expected evolution of the economy. a second point is that even if central bank transparency and communication has helped anchoring market-based inflation expectations, they do remain rather volatile. the volatility itself is a signal that is useful for us to understand. however, even if markets are volatile, central bank policy cannot be volatile. hence, we need to look through some of this volatility to get a feeling for the underlying pricing that would result in the absence of short-term market moves that are likely to revert quickly. the echo chamber effect and the inherent noisiness of market signals are reasons why we need to take the expectations that are priced in financial markets with a pinch of salt. this means that we need to also rely on other sources of information to ensure that we conduct a robust monetary policy. t… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Developing models for policy analysis in central banks | Period_2 | 2017-09-28 | 0.128 | consumption.10 in typical representative-agent models, consumption behaviour is captured by an euler equation, an inter-temporal optimality condition that links today’s level of consumption to expected consumption in the next period and further into the future. in its linearised form, it does neither envisage that consumers face idiosyncratic (household-specific) and uninsurable income uncertainty, nor that uncertainty interacts with credit or liquidity constraints. this is in stark contrast to recent research that emphasises the importance of precautionary saving, liquidity constraints, leverage and of heterogeneity, including heterogeneity in marginal propensities to consume.11 compared to simple representative-agent models, the ecb-mc clearly marks an improvement. the consumption function is explicitly affected by agents’ wealth holdings.12 agents have shorter average horizons than presumed under the text-book permanent income hypothesis and the model further allows for the presence of agents that do not optimize but rather exhibit ‘hand-to-mouth’ behaviour. last, but not least, risk aversion and income uncertainty also play a role for consumption behaviour. this setup, for example, allows quantifying how larger income uncertainty reduces the power of forward guidance. all in all, i think that we are moving in the right direction. nevertheless, the modelling of aggregate consumption is an area in which research is currently developing fast and we should be ready to lear… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Inflation expectations and the conduct of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-07-15 | 0.119 | the first is that financial market participants are not particularly good at predicting future inflation. i’m not claiming that central banks are particularly better. you can see this on my next slide. but as you can see on the following one, financial market participants repeatedly failed to correctly project even the very near-term outlook for inflation in the euro area. 6 / 13 |
| Yves Mersch: Interview with Reuters | Period_2 | 2018-03-22 | 0.116 | well, other things being equal, it would be shallower. another explanation for low wage growth is that there is some backward looking behaviour in the wage-setting mechanism and in inflation expectations. for the time being i take an open view. monetary policy also plays a role. our asset purchases programme has a minimum horizon of end september, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until we see a sustained adjustment in inflation. it is true that when we communicate about what happens beyond september, we want to have confirmation of data. things are going in the right direction but there are a number of uncertainties. so the message is patience, persistence and prudence. when do you need to communicate what happens beyond september? it can’t be on the very last day, but i argue that it shouldn’t be too early, either. there are not too many governing council meetings between now and then. can you see a scenario that you use the june projections to set up the decision and then take the actual decision in july? the projection exercise is always important. there are four per year and there will be one in june. it’s true that projections in general are useful to guide and structure the discussion. but i would caution against concluding that there is a pattern. we should not put too much weight on the projections. you mentioned earlier that market expects the first rate hike between the first and second quarters of next year. how comfortable with those expectations? the e… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.065 | at our last governing council meeting, we concluded that, in spite of significant uncertainty, there is still good reason to believe that euro area inflation will decline visibly over the course of next year and gradually fall back below our target of two per cent in the medium term, meaning that the conditions for raising interest rates, as set out in our forward guidance, are very unlikely to be met next year. financial market participants, too, expect a considerable and lasting decline in inflation in 2022 (slide 11). there is no evidence that markets, or professional forecasters, expect runaway inflation, or inflation dynamics even remotely similar to what we observed in the 1970s. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy in the euro area - the next phase | Period_3 | 2022-08-31 | 0.057 | (and prospects at the individual level) suggest a high degree of concern about a potential economic slowdown, a general recognition that supply shocks will generate both near-term inflation surges and a decline in the economic outlook, which in turn will constrain the persistence of inflation. this profile is consistent with a profile in which market participants, experts and households broadly understand (albeit to varying degrees) that supply shocks and temporary factors have pushed inflation up to the current high levels but that these factors are expected to fade over time, reinforced by the understanding that monetary policy actions (as captured by the expectations of substantial rate hikes in the coming months) will ensure the return of inflation to target. in terms of the feedback loop from inflation expectations to nominal and real dynamics, it is important to appreciate that, for any given nominal yield curve, if high near-time inflation expectations are accompanied by expectations of a deteriorated macroeconomic outlook and significant uncertainty then the inflation cycle is less likely to be amplified through an endogenous increase in consumption, investment and credit compared to an alternative scenario in which high near-term inflation expectations are accompanied by macroeconomic optimism. put differently, cost-push inflation shocks are less likely to give rise to a pro-cyclical real interest rate channel compared to demand-driven inflation shocks. at the sam… |
| Isabel Schnabel: New narratives on monetary policy – the spectre of inflation | Period_3 | 2021-10-12 | 0.052 | the recovery and be most harmful to those who are already suffering from the current spike in inflation. finally, i will explain why the higher inflation we are seeing now may actually be positive news. there are good reasons to assume that the current constellation of fiscal and monetary policy in the euro area may finally chart the path out of the low interest rate environment. new monetary policy strategy as yardstick and compass the assessment of current and future inflation lies at the heart of our monetary policy decisions that we take to maintain price stability in the euro area as a whole. about every six weeks – and most recently last week – we look at a broad range of economic indicators to assess the future path of inflation. so how do we assess the current situation? will the much-invoked “flood of money” really cause the “great inflation”? yardstick and compass of our assessment of the risks to price stability is our new monetary policy strategy, which was adopted unanimously by the governing council in july.2 the key element of this strategy is a new, symmetric inflation target of 2% over the medium term, which replaced our previous target of below, but close to, 2%. to many, this adjustment may seem insignificant. however, it is anything but, and the reason is simple – our new target makes it abundantly clear that we consider sustained negative and positive deviations of inflation from our target as equally undesirable. this clarification matters because the… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.041 | euro area headline and core hicp inflation (annual percentage changes) om hicp om hicpx 3 | | covid-19 outbreak | 4 : 1999-2012 3 avg: 2.07 2020-2021 | | / 2013-2019 aes = wv f __ a avg: 0.95 (vn oo rama wee 7 y p 1 | —— ma = _ tm awit -3 1999-2012 ; avg: 1.53 mw 0 ) ) + 2013-2019 2020-2021 al avg: 0.98 avg: 0.89 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019 source: eurostat and ecb calculations. latest observation: september 2021 (flash estimate). moreover, inflation repeatedly surprised on the downside relative to our in-house staff projections before the pandemic (chart 2). other international institutions and financial market participants also continuously overpredicted future inflation developments. chart 2 eurosystem headline annual inflation projections over time (annual percentage changes) wees = septernber 2021 ecb staff projections ees pastvintages of ecb staff projections cs) start projection honzon 3 ? 4 wa ns gpellrn sm eee oe bs 7. “mae s— 15 noes = ey 5 5 eo ee eee of et ta eepeeetes et ae j a ia sete ok i reas a ae eo ee saa pe ae eae nee a fit 0.6 - hinae. fi bea q s222 - -0.5 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 source: ecb. note: the chart is based on annual inflation data. latest observation: august 2021, september 2021 macroeconomic projections. subdued inflation dynamics were driven by both cyclical and structural factors, which, in combination, created sustained headwinds for underlying price pressures. a high level of slack after … |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.040 | monthly flow of net purchases under app and pepp ecb. notes: the chart shows aggregated net purchases for all public and private app and pepp programmes at month-end. the latest observation is for 30 april 2022. the values for may and june 2022 were inferred from the ecb’s most recent monetary policy announcement (14 april 2022). furthermore, as shown in chart 14, there has been a remarkable shift in the yield curve during the initial months of 2022. in part, this reflects the re-pricing of risk premia in the current highly-uncertain environment. in part, it reflects the anticipation of market participants that the rate forward guidance criteria of the ecb are closer to being fulfilled and that the medium-term inflation outlook will call for a normalisation of policy rates over time. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 38 | unite | 1 | 0.1202194 | unite | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 38 | federal | 2 | 0.0470150 | federal | 2 | 0.9994742 |
| 38 | reserve | 3 | 0.0468403 | feed | 3 | 0.9990363 |
| 38 | difference | 4 | 0.0356588 | federal reserve | 4 | 0.9989485 |
| 38 | federal reserve | 5 | 0.0339116 | unite kingdom | 5 | 0.9989476 |
| 38 | feed | 6 | 0.0230795 | japan | 6 | 0.9989047 |
| 38 | include | 7 | 0.0223806 | reserve | 7 | 0.9987727 |
| 38 | figure | 8 | 0.0209829 | kingdom | 8 | 0.9987723 |
| 38 | good | 9 | 0.0202841 | cpi | 9 | 0.9978069 |
| 38 | japan | 10 | 0.0202841 | atlantic | 10 | 0.9976332 |
| 38 | explain | 11 | 0.0195852 | figure | 11 | 0.9973697 |
| 38 | compare | 12 | 0.0185370 | difference | 12 | 0.9971912 |
| 38 | unite kingdom | 13 | 0.0143439 | activism | 13 | 0.9970197 |
| 38 | kingdom | 14 | 0.0139944 | statistic | 14 | 0.9965831 |
| 38 | economy | 15 | 0.0136450 | table | 15 | 0.9965809 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The euro area and its monetary policy | Period_1 | 2007-09-11 | 0.297 | table 2: estimates of intrinsic inflation persistence by monetary regime full sample european monetary union new monetary regime inflation targeting after the great inflation japan 0.660 0.634 sources: benati (2007). figures report the mode of the estimated structural persistence parameter in conventional hybrid phillips curves, featuring a forward-looking and a backward-looking term for inflation. monetary regimes are defined as follows. for the euro area, the full sample is 1970q1-2006q4, and the european monetary union period includes 1999q1-2006q4. for switzerland, the full sample is 1970q1-2006q4, and the new monetary regime includes 2000:1-2006:4. for the united kingdom the full sample is 1963q1- 2006q4, and the inflation targeting period includes 1992q4-2006q4. for canada the inflation targeting sample includes 1991q1-2006q4. for australia, the full sample includes 1969q3-2006q3, and the inflation targeting sample includes 1994q3-2006q3. for sweden, the inflation targeting sample includes 1993q1-2006q3. for new zealand, the inflation targeting sample includes 1990q1-2006q4. for the us, the full sample is 1954q3-2007q1, and after the great inflation includes 1983q1-2007q1. for japan, the full sample includes 1957q1-2006q4, and after the great inflation includes 1983q1-2006q4. however, when the same test is conducted on a restricted sample, including the most recent years only, a dramatic difference emerges between the economies where there is a clearly defined object… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The US economy, the euro area economy, and their central banks | Period_1 | 2007-12-10 | 0.234 | contacts with the federal reserve these international organisations provide an excellent opportunity for the federal reserve chairman and myself, for the members of the boards as well as for the staff of both the fed and the ecb/eurosystem, to meet very regularly. to give you some idea of the level of contact we have, i can say that ben and i meet, through the g7, the g10, the g20, the imf and bis meetings, probably a little more than once a month on average. in addition, mr bernanke and i jointly participate in a number of international conferences. indeed, through our regular meetings, ben and i have built up a very close working relationship, a climate of mutual trust, and a platform for direct and quick contact in special circumstances that would require urgent communication. why is this important? the purpose of our contact is not the coordination of our monetary policies. this would be incompatible with the orientation of our policies towards our respective domestic objectives. rather, the benefit of our close contact lies in the in-depth exchange of information and views on recent economic developments, on the monetary, financial and economic outlook in our respective economies, and on the policy challenges ahead. this includes, as i discussed before, trade and financial linkages between our two economies, directly or via other economies. sharing first-hand knowledge on the world outlook and on how we see our respective domestic economies influencing and being influ… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The US economy, the euro area economy, and their central banks | Period_1 | 2007-12-10 | 0.206 | conclusion ladies and gentlemen, allow me to conclude. the euro area and the united states are large economic blocs which are, at the same time, largely open to world markets. the last decades, in particular, have witnessed a tightening of the trade and financial linkages and the bilateral relationships between the united states and the euro area have been reinforced. as a result, central banks worldwide, and in particular the federal reserve and the eurosystem, always keep an eye on partners’ economic, monetary and financial developments. the ecb and the federal reserve system have many opportunities to share their experience and technical expertise, whether through discussions within international meetings or in informal ways through conferences, staff visits, personal contacts of all nature, including confident personal relationships at the level of chairmen. i would also like to point to one example of cooperation that might look unusual. last year, we had one case of cooperation in the domain of culture and arts, as the federal reserve exhibited a remarkable set of the art works of its collection at the premises of the ecb in frankfurt. this art exhibition was another symbolic illustration of our close cross- atlantic ties, in which tonight’s journalist prize ceremony also plays a part. i have always been convinced that a very strong relationship between both sides of the atlantic is essential for the stability and continued prosperity of our respective continents but… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Jackson Hole Conference - monetary policy and ‘credible alertness’ | Period_1 | 2005-09-01 | 0.195 | dear alan, dear ladies and gentlemen, i had the privilege of participating with alan in all meetings of the g7 ministers and governors over the last 18 years. but there is one big difference between us! he participated in all these meetings as president of the federal reserve, whereas my responsibilities changed three times during this period. i was successively undersecretary of the treasury of my country, governor of banque de france and then president of the european central bank. i could therefore look at the legendary exposition of alan in the g7 from three different angles, now not only with the benefit of a multiocular perspective but also of hindsight. and i can say that in 3-d alan’s expositions in this intimate, restricted format are incredibly sharp, profound and visionary. i personally share fully, in particular, the judgement of alan blinder and ricardo reis on the lucidity of alan as regards the early diagnosis of the productivity jump in the us economy. not only in the united states, also in europe as in the rest of the world, alan has a very high reputation. in some european quarters, he is even sometimes made the principal witness of monetary policy activism, but i am not sure whether he himself would agree with such a role. still, the issue of the fed’s movements in interest rates and those of the ecb is frequently debated. let me elaborate on this debate somewhat further. since 1 january 1999, when the european central bank (ecb) officially became the mo… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Issues in monetary policy - views from the ECB | Period_1 | 2004-04-30 | 0.187 | two central banks in comparison in conclusion, let me wrap up my remarks in a comparative mode. let me explain how i see our european monetary policy concept in comparison with the us federal reserve monetary policy concept. i will not dwell on what is from time to time presented as the major difference, namely the legal objective assigned to the central bank. i already said that in my analysis this difference is one of presentation more than of substance, and should not be overdone. instead, i would stress that i see two major similarities and two significant differences between the ecb and the federal reserve concept. two similarities: |
| Fabio Panetta: Monetary-fiscal interactions on the way out of the crisis | Period_2 | 2021-07-02 | 0.107 | domestic and external demand ameco. inflation dynamics failed to keep up with a 2% trend – although economies where unconventional monetary policy was used earlier and more aggressively did perform better (chart 3). and crucially, inflation expectations began to adapt to prolonged below-target inflation. long-term market-based expectations fell by more than 150 basis points in both the united states and the euro area.[6] headline inflation eurostat, federal reserve and bank of japan. notes: numbers denote average annualised inflation over sub-periods. red line denotes constant 2% growth. |
| Mario Draghi: Twenty years of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-06-18 | 0.086 | 1 rostagno et al. (2019), forthcoming. 2 the difference in growth in energy prices between the euro area and the united states can in large part be attributed to differences in tax rates, which are typically higher in the euro area. as such, the share of the final price paid by consumers accounted for by oil is much smaller in the euro area, and cpi energy prices are less affected in aggregate by movements in oil prices. that being said, the energy component has a higher weight in euro area hicp, so a 1 percentage point increase in cpi energy prices has a greater impact on headline inflation in the euro area than in the united states. 3 the equivalent figure for core pce inflation was 1.9%. 4 rostagno et al. (2019), op.cit. 5 measured as the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. 6 7/8 |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Between low interest rates and bond purchases - has European monetary policy reached a dead end? | Period_2 | 2017-10-10 | 0.086 | monetary policy were very opaque. in the 1980s, alan greenspan claimed that he had to learn “fedspeak” when he became chairman of the federal reserve board. he “learned to mumble with great incoherence”. back then central banks were secretive about monetary policy and vague, at best, when speaking to the markets. so markets had to find ways to second-guess what the central bank was up to. some of these ways were a bit odd. alan greenspan’s briefcase was one of the more inventive indicators. whenever the federal reserve had a meeting to discuss monetary policy, the markets apparently observed alan greenspan’s briefcase. if it was bulging, markets concluded that interest rates would change; if it was thin, they concluded that no change was likely. in the end, such ways of gauging what the central bank is up to are quite unreliable. markets might easily draw the wrong conclusions and this might lead to unwanted volatility and turbulence. that is one of the reasons why today, almost everyone agrees that central banks need to be transparent. it helps them to steer the expectations of markets and make their policies more effective. at the same time, it helps them be more accountable. both of these things have become even more important against the backdrop of our unconventional measures. so we need to communicate very carefully on our next steps. we must help markets get an idea of what the exit will look like. and we mustn’t confuse them with vague or ambiguous ideas. we have t… |
| Mario Draghi: How central banks meet the challenge of low inflation | Period_2 | 2016-02-05 | 0.081 | needs to be complemented by programs designed to enhance competition and to correct structural problems”. 4 it was only when paul volcker arrived as chairman in 1979 and shortened the policy horizon that the fed took ownership for controlling inflation. inflation, which peaked at around 15% in march 1980, fell below 3% by 1983. some argue that today the situation is different; that whereas volcker could raise rates to 20% to tame inflation, central banks fighting disinflation are inhibited by the lower bound on interest rates. the japanese experience after the bursting of the housing bubble in early 1990s is often presented as evidence. but the japanese case in fact only reinforces the importance of full commitment from policymakers. as long as the commitment of the bank of japan to a low positive inflation number was not clear, actual inflation and inflation expectations stayed in deflationary zone. since the bank of japan has signaled its commitment to reach 2% inflation, however, core inflation has risen from less than –0.5% in 2012 to close to 1% today. this is still short of the 2% objective, to be sure, but downward price shocks are also hitting japan like all other advanced economies. we now have plenty of evidence that, if we have the will to meet our objective, we have the instruments. as the ecb and others have demonstrated, the lower bound for policy rates, wherever it might be, is not at zero. and we have also shown how non-standard tools can be used to deliver… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview in the Leading European Newspaper Alliance - LENA | Period_2 | 2015-11-17 | 0.079 | in december the us federal reserve system (fed) will take a decision on whether to maintain its key rates at zero or increase them. will their decision influence yours? it will have no direct impact on our decision. whatever the fed decides, our monetary policy framework (zero rates, liquidity, “forward guidance” and asset purchases) allows us to keep interest rates low, no matter what happens in the rest of the world. our policy protects the interest rate curve for the euro area from external shocks. what interests us above all is what the fed’s decision tells us about the us economy. if the fed were to raise its rates, it would be a sign that growth and employment indicators are robust in the united states. this, essentially, would be good news for europe. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.140 | change in balance sheets of the eurosystem, the federal reserve and the bank of england since 2019 (cumulative changes relative to january 2020 in terms of percentages of gdp in q4 2019) ecb, federal reserve bank of new york, bank of england, haver analytics and ecb calculations. notes: for the eurosystem asset purchases include all pepp and app purchases. credit operations include all tltros, peltros, mros, and ltros. for the federal reserve asset purchases include all treasury bills, notes, and bonds as well as inflation-protected treasuries and floating-rate treasuries. these also include agency bonds and mortgage-backed securities. credit operations include all repurchase agreements, loans, and operations under the commercial paper funding facility ii, the corporate credit facility, the municipal liquidity facility, the main street lending programme, and talf ii. for the bank of england asset purchases include all gilts and corporate assets held within the asset purchase facility. credit operations include all operations within the iltr, ctrf, tfs and tfsme. the latest observations are for december 2021. |
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.140 | income and savings in the united states and euro area household nominal income savings rate (index: q1 2015 = 100) (percentage point differences compared with q4 2019) ome fro area wwe united states ome fto area eee united states 150 20 18 | 140 16 + 130 te py leet 12 + 120 weet 10 + 110 ow 6 + 100 « 4 | 90 0 es es ee es sn sn. ~ cee mar-15 mar-16 mar-17 mar-18 mar-19 mar-20 mar-21 q4 20191 202002 202003 202004 202001 202102 202103 202104 2021 sources: left panel: eurostat and federal reserve system; right panel: eurostat, bureau of economic analysis and ecb calculations. notes: us quarterly data are computed as averages of monthly data. the latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2021 for the united states and the third quarter of 2021 for the euro area. chart 3 domestic demand in the united states and euro area real private consumption real private investment (index: q1 2015=100) (index: q1 2015=100) me united states we united states es euro area ee euro area 120 140 - ey at 110 a awa 4 aed | ae . = 120 > 105 le —_ ” 100 110 — le / 95 - 100 weer” 90 90 85 80 80 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2015 2016 201? 2018 2019 2020 2021 sources: ecb and federal reserve system. notes: the latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2021 for the united states and the third quarter of 2021 for the euro area. for the right panel, ireland is excluded from the euro area aggregate due to the volatility it would impose on the data series, as large multinational firms us… |
| Isabel Schnabel: The globalisation of inflation | Period_3 | 2022-05-16 | 0.101 | because the euro area is a net importer of energy, this surge in inflation is often referred to as “imported inflation” – in other words, inflation over which monetary policy has no, or very little, control. in this context, comparisons are often made with the united states, where energy is making a smaller contribution to headline inflation, suggesting that price pressures are predominately a result of domestic forces. and indeed, there is currently a large gap between the euro area and the united states when looking at measures of inflation that exclude energy and food (slide 3, left-hand side). for at least three reasons, however, such comparisons should be treated with caution. first, even if we exclude the impact of energy and food, inflation in the euro area is currently at levels never seen before in the history of the single currency. the prices of goods and services other than energy and food are currently increasing at an annual rate of 3.5%, more than twice as much as the pre-pandemic historical average. so, most people in the euro area are seeing a marked increase in their cost of living across the board. it gives them little comfort that inflation in other countries may be even higher. second, differences between the euro area and the united states have already existed previously. over the ten years preceding the pandemic, inflation excluding food and energy was, on average, about 50% higher in the united states than in the euro area. so, inflation in the unit… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.092 | inflation excluding food and energy: euro area (left) vs. united states (right) eurostat, haver and ecb staff calculations. notes: for the euro area, the panel shows the hicp excluding food and energy, as well as the contributions to it. for the united states the panel shows the cpi excluding food and energy, as well as the contributions to it. items affected by bottlenecks include new motor cars, second-hand motor cars, spare parts and accessories for personal transport equipment, and furnishings and household equipment. items affected by reopening include clothing and footwear, recreation and culture, recreation services, hotels and motels, and domestic and international flights. rents include actual rents paid by tenants, and for the united states also imputed rents for owner-occupied housing. the latest observations are for february 2022 for core cpi and the contributions in the united states and hicp excluding food and energy in the euro area, otherwise january 2022. real consumption expenditure: euro area (left) vs. united states (right) |
| Isabel Schnabel: The monetary policy non-puzzle in bond markets | Period_3 | 2021-09-15 | 0.088 | 1 i would like to thank johannes gräb for his contributions to this speech. 2 bank of america global research (2021), european fund manager survey, 14 september. 3 these simulations assume future purchases corresponding to the median response from our survey of monetary analysts (sma). 4 options are based on consumer price index (cpi) inflation, but the federal reserve system states its goal for inflation in terms of the personal consumption expenditure (pce) price index. 5/5 |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 39 | bank | 1 | 0.3096721 | central | 1 | 0.9998248 |
| 39 | central | 2 | 0.2808661 | central bank | 2 | 0.9998247 |
| 39 | central bank | 3 | 0.2685090 | bank | 3 | 0.9995617 |
| 39 | major central | 4 | 0.0031998 | major central | 4 | 0.9993867 |
| 39 | dimension | 5 | 0.0027087 | bank policy | 5 | 0.9992990 |
| 39 | major central bank | 6 | 0.0024632 | central bank policy | 6 | 0.9991238 |
| 39 | bank policy | 7 | 0.0021359 | major central bank | 7 | 0.9990363 |
| 39 | central bank policy | 8 | 0.0018086 | dimension | 8 | 0.9986854 |
| 39 | form | 9 | 0.0016449 | precisely | 9 | 0.9971949 |
| 39 | precisely | 10 | 0.0013175 | belong | 10 | 0.9971505 |
| 39 | understand | 11 | 0.0012357 | blur | 11 | 0.9970632 |
| 39 | decade | 12 | 0.0012357 | comprise | 12 | 0.9968460 |
| 39 | future | 13 | 0.0011539 | central bank include | 13 | 0.9967543 |
| 39 | task | 14 | 0.0010720 | chance | 14 | 0.9958809 |
| 39 | fact | 15 | 0.0009902 | permanently | 15 | 0.9957504 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation, expectations and current challenges to monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-10-14 | 0.184 | this requires intense communication with market participants, of at least two sorts. first, the central bank has the duty to warn market participants when their own behaviour is not consistent with price stability and may lead to a tightening of monetary policy which would lead to a worse outcome for all. this has to involve communication with the public at large: unions, employers, budgetary authorities. this type of communication is in the interest of all, since any inconsistency would lead in the end to a worse result in terms of economic growth. it is also in the interest of the central bank as price stability can be more easily maintained if agents act consistently. warning economic agents openly about their behaviour is not easy and does not make central banks popular. these warnings are not nice to hear either and often irritating for the addressees who feel like being lectured on their own behaviour. it is nevertheless the statutory responsibility of the central bank to make all agents, private and public, aware of the consequences of their behaviour on monetary policy. making this clear at the outset, in public, is the best way to coordinate expectations around the best possible outcome. it is also a way to ensure accountability by the central bank. for instance, if unions request higher wages to compensate for oil and gasoline price increases, the central bank cannot abstain from warning that this would lead to a vicious scenario and ultimately to higher interest… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Lessons for monetary policy from the recent crisis | Period_1 | 2011-01-20 | 0.164 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation, expectations and current challenges to monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-10-14 | 0.138 | institutional constraints for monetary policy the main objective of communication policy is to make monetary policy predictable. there are not many analyses looking at the predictability of central banks. those that i have seen suggest that central banks of major countries have achieved a high degree of predictability in recent years, and are performing quite similarly in this respect.7 analyses tend to focus more on the means and instruments to achieve predictability, than the result itself. these analyses often fail to take into account the institutional and political context in which different central banks operate. they also at times entail the risk of suggesting superficial and naïve prescriptions that are simply not realistic, not because the central bank does not want to implement them prescriptions, but because they are not available within the prevailing institutional or political set up. i would like to touch briefly upon this issue because i am repeatedly confronted with it, since my confirmation hearing in the european parliament, and have not seen signs of a full understanding of the arguments. the point that i would like to submit for a serious analysis of central bank transparency is that the latter is inextricably linked to accountability. the means and instruments for implementing transparency in any country depend on its institutional and political framework for accountability. just to point to one relevant aspect, a system in which accountability is coll… |
| Jürgen Stark: Central banking after the financial crisis | Period_1 | 2011-02-23 | 0.136 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Ten years of the euro - successes and challenges | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.136 | granted that the euro would be able to establish itself so quickly as a stable and internationally recognised currency. this was only possible because the ecb and the national central banks of the eurosystem have solid institutional foundations. these foundations are the treaty negotiated in maastricht in 1991 and the statute of the escb. the treaty and the statute of the escb are clear: the primary objective of the eurosystem is to ensure price stability. the ecb and the national central banks of the eurosystem are independent so that they can pursue this goal. neither the ecb, nor the national central banks, nor the members of their decision-making bodies may seek or receive any instructions from anybody. this applies to european as well as national institutions. they, for their part, are obliged to respect the principle of central bank independence. the priority given to price stability and the independence of the central bank are the results of a long, historical learning process in monetary policy. it is theoretically well founded and empirically proven that independent central banks are better able to ensure low inflation rates than those which are subject to political influence. independence guarantees above all that central banks can focus on securing price stability over the medium and long term and are not exposed to short-term political influences, or to vested interests’ pressures. in germany the primary mandate of price stability and the independence of the ce… |
| Peter Praet: Have unconventional policies overstretched central bank independence? Challenges for accountability and transparency in the wake of the crisis | Period_2 | 2017-03-30 | 0.166 | 5 milton friedman (1963), inflation: causes and consequences, asian publishing house. 6 willem buiter (2016), “dysfunctional central banking; the end of independent central banks or a return to ‘narrow central banking’ – or both?”, global economics view, citi research, 21 december; otmar issing (2016), “central banks – from overburdening to decline?”, safe white paper series, no 42. 7 jakob de haan and sylvester c.w. eijffinger (2017), “central bank independence under threat?”, cepr policy insight, no 87. 8 transparency international eu (2017), two sides of the same coin – independence and accountability of the european central bank, transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ti-eu_ecb_report_digital.pdf. 6/6 |
| Peter Praet: The role of the European Central Bank - pudence and responsibility in times of crisis | Period_2 | 2017-05-12 | 0.156 | 1 see willem buiter (2016), “dysfunctional central banking; the end of independent central banks or a return to ‘narrow central banking’ – or both?”, global economics view, citi research, 21 december; otmar issing (2016), central banks – from overburdening to decline?, safe white paper series, no 42; jakob de haan and sylvester c.w. eijffinger (2017), central bank independence under threat?, cepr policy insight, no 87. 2 max weber was professor of economics at heidelberg university from 1896–1903. his lecture was given in 1918 at the university of munich and published in 1919. see max weber (1919), “der beruf zur politik”, in johannes winckelmann (ed.), max weber – soziologie – universalgeschichtliche analysen – politik, , alfred kröner verlag, 1973, pp. 167–185. 3 7/8 |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy communication in turbulent times | Period_2 | 2014-04-24 | 0.138 | thank you very much for inviting me to speak at this conference marking the bicentenary of de nederlandsche bank (dnb). congratulations to you, klaas, and to all the staff of the dnb! we are tasked today with reflecting on central banking in the next two decades, and the theme i would like to talk about is central bank transparency and communication. this is not only because transparency and communication has grown ever more important for central banks over the past twenty years, and look set to become even more important over the two decades to come. it is also because the netherlands seems a fitting setting for such a discussion. as you know well, this country has a long history of transparency – households in the netherlands are renowned for keeping open their curtains. the classic explanation is that people do this for the benefit of others: with nothing to hide, they are happy to grant passers- by a look inside. another explanation i have heard is that people do it for themselves: in dark northern european climates, they simply want to let more light into their houses. but whatever the motivation, what matters is that an open curtain benefits both those on the outside and those on the inside. the same is true for us as central banks. a transparent central bank serves the general public, by improving understanding of its actions and accountability for its decisions. and a transparent central bank contributes to its own mission, by steering expectations and making its m… |
| Benoît Cœuré: The usefulness of forward guidance | Period_2 | 2013-09-30 | 0.135 | but the premium on clear communication is particularly large in extraordinary situations, for example when policy rates are at, or close to, their effective lower bound, or when the normal channels of monetary policy transmission are impaired, or when there is exceptional uncertainty on the state of the economy. such situations occur only seldom. this makes it difficult for private agents to infer the future monetary policy path from past regularities. hence, there is a clear added value in such a situation to making central bank communication more explicit. this explains why many central banks that had previously not used forward guidance adopted this tool in recent times. how does forward guidance work? well, first of all, most central banks have linked forward guidance to their main policy interest rates. in implementing their monetary policy, central banks calibrate their main policy tools so as to establish a certain level of short term interest rates in the market. at the same time, expected future short term interest rates are a key ingredient for the determination of long term interest rates. long term interest rates in turn are essential for saving, consumption and investment decisions, and ultimately for the development of prices and inflation in the economy. indeed, some recent papers on central bank communication provide clear evidence that central banks’ communication on their policy decisions and their assessment of the macroeconomic environment can have an i… |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Stormy times - how is the ECB handling them? | Period_2 | 2015-11-30 | 0.134 | to achieve this, the ecb needs to be independent; also independent from political influence. the independence of central banks is a relatively new, but now undisputed, achievement. the deutsche bundesbank was the trailblazer in this regard: since 1957 it has been the very model of an independent central bank. since the 1990s most industrialised countries have adopted this model in one form or another. indeed, the ecb itself was also modelled on the bundesbank. why does a central bank need to be independent? on a matter as important as money, people justifiably want to see tight controls. history has shown independent central banks to be the most successful in keeping the value of money stable. the underlying principle is that responsibility for maintaining price stability should be in the hands of independent experts, rather than politicians, who are forced to think in terms of legislative periods and who may be tempted to solve problems with the printing press or, at least, to make life slightly easier for themselves through excessively low interest rates. comparative surveys have indeed shown significant positive effects of a country’s central bank being accorded independence, such as macroeconomic stability and, in particular, lower rates of inflation. to enable a central bank to fulfil its mandate of ensuring price stability, it uses monetary policy instruments in a way that is designed to have the best possible impact on price developments. this cannot happen without … |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.117 | second, central bank independence is important for safeguarding stable prices. today, central banks in almost all advanced economies and many emerging market economies are politically independent. the “great moderation” that took off in the 1980s built on these two pillars — a narrow, well-defined mandate and central bank independence. over time, a clear commitment to price stability has anchored inflation expectations at very low levels. maintaining this level of trust is what will guide the response of central banks to the challenges we are facing today. |
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.106 | “hitting the elusive inflation target”, nber working paper, no 26279, september. 33. see also panetta, f. (2021), “monetary-fiscal interactions on the way out of the crisis”, keynote speech at the conference of the governors of mediterranean central banks on “central banks at the frontline of the covid-19 crisis: weathering the storm, spurring the recovery”, 28 june. contact european central bank directorate general communications > sonnemannstrasse 20 > 60314 frankfurt am main, germany > +49 69 1344 7455 > media@ecb.europa.eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. media contacts copyright 2021, european central bank |
| Luis de Guindos: Policy mix of the future - the role of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.078 | luis de guindos: policy mix of the future - the role of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies remarks by mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, at the international conference “future of central banking” organised by the bank of lithuania and the bank for international settlements on the occasion of the centenary of the bank of lithuania, vilnius, 29 september 2022. i am very pleased to participate in this conference to mark the centenary of lietuvos bankas. building on the ecb’s recent strategy review and our reflections on the policy mix, i will outline my views on the interplay between monetary, macroprudential and fiscal policy. |
| Frank Elderson: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy - delivering our mandate in all circumstances | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.075 | while i understand it is not a specific topic covered in today’s conference, a similar commitment to fully incorporate climate-related and environmental risks applies to our banking supervision tasks and responsibilities. in addition to the climate stress test that was concluded by ecb banking supervision earlier this year, we will soon publish the results of our thematic review. as part of this exercise, our core banking supervision teams – joint supervisory teams – thoroughly assessed to what extent banks’ risk management practices for climate-related and environmental risks live up to the supervisory expectations we published in 2020. we conducted this exercise to assess where banks stand with regard to our expectations and to highlight any gaps they urgently need to close. we will also take the opportunity to identify and share best practices to help banks close any gaps identified. and we will insist that banks’ risk 2/3 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.073 | european central bank directorate general communications > 60314 frankfurt am main, germany > media@ecb.europa.eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. media contacts copyright 2021, european central bank |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 40 | stability | 1 | 0.0479897 | citizen | 1 | 0.9991238 |
| 40 | price stability | 2 | 0.0354212 | deliver price stability | 2 | 0.9987719 |
| 40 | deliver | 3 | 0.0343336 | social | 3 | 0.9986858 |
| 40 | citizen | 4 | 0.0303455 | job creation | 4 | 0.9983792 |
| 40 | good | 5 | 0.0294996 | deliver price | 5 | 0.9983336 |
| 40 | creation | 6 | 0.0280494 | deliver | 6 | 0.9980701 |
| 40 | social | 7 | 0.0244238 | creation | 7 | 0.9978958 |
| 40 | job | 8 | 0.0234570 | trust | 8 | 0.9976781 |
| 40 | europe | 9 | 0.0174145 | ensure price | 9 | 0.9974580 |
| 40 | job creation | 10 | 0.0174145 | fellow | 10 | 0.9974096 |
| 40 | growth | 11 | 0.0169311 | ensure price stability | 11 | 0.9965825 |
| 40 | trust | 12 | 0.0169311 | job | 12 | 0.9965783 |
| 40 | confidence | 13 | 0.0163269 | fellow citizen | 13 | 0.9964866 |
| 40 | ensure | 14 | 0.0154809 | social partner | 14 | 0.9963623 |
| 40 | deliver price stability | 15 | 0.0122180 | partner | 15 | 0.9962764 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: European economy - current state and prospects | Period_1 | 2004-09-29 | 0.349 | conclusion ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude with two remarks which could be summed up in two words : confidence and conviction. confidence first. we all know that the euro area has a considerable potential, which will progressively materialize in the period to come. the present gradual recovery is underway and conditions are there for it to be progressively more broadly based. in the present juncture confidence is of the essence. the degree of confidence in all economic constituencies, households, savers, entrepreneurs and investors is a key factor to foster growth and job creation. a central bank is an anchor of confidence. we, in the ecb and in the eurosystem, are doing all what is necessary to preserve and consolidate confidence: confidence in our currency, confidence in our capacity to deliver price stability, confidence in the stability of our monetary and financial environment. and then conviction. we, in the ecb and the eurosystem, are convinced that fully enhancing and expressing the growth potential of the euro area calls for reforms to be implemented. we support governments and parliaments that have embarked on such structural reforms. i know that these reforms are neither easy to decide nor easy to put in place once decided. they need a great deal of courage and determination, particularly when the general public is not yet fully convinced that they are necessary. the sentiment of the public at large is decisive in any democracy. this is why i think that ap… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with Le Figaro magazine | Period_1 | 2009-01-30 | 0.276 | was too simplistic a view. the ecb’s governing council does what the treaty on european union asks it to do, on behalf of 329 million european citizens in the euro area. while i was governor of the banque de france, there was also a public debate on the decisions of the monetary policy council, which some 70% of french citizens approved, across all public sensibilities. i have noticed that public support for the ecb’s policy of price stability is also very strong and is an element of trust which is important for the economy as a whole. le figaro magazine: was the euro not responsible, in part, for inflation? jean-claude trichet: on the contrary. over the last ten years, we have managed to maintain a stable rise in prices of 2.2% per annum on average in the euro area. this is a good result given the spectacular rise in the prices of raw materials and energy which has been recorded over this period. nevertheless, it is true that, when the euro was introduced, a few sectors in some european economies tried to take advantage of the changeover to increase certain prices abnormally. this led to an average rise of around 0.2% at the time of the changeover. in the case of france, christian noyer explained this phenomenon, which is insignificant in the life of the euro thus far, outstandingly well. it has become clear that we have done what has been necessary to guarantee price stability in the euro area. we will have very low inflation for some months in the course of 2009, and i … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with Folha | Period_1 | 2008-11-11 | 0.270 | folha – it is a (paradigm) dogma that central banks should only pay attention to inflation and not to other points of the economy like jobs or consumer spending. you have indicated that you are, now, more concerned about growth than about inflation. in times of a severe crisis like these in which we are, isn’t that dogma correct anymore? jean-claude trichet – i didn’t say that. we are not changing the way we look at our monetary policy strategy. we consider that our primary mandate has been – it is today and will be tomorrow – to deliver price stability in the medium term. this is the mandate that we were asked to fulfil by the treaty of maastricht. in this perspective, we decided to decrease interest rates by 100 basis points in less than one month because we have observed a significant alleviation of inflationary pressures. we also took into account that we had regained control of medium term inflation expectations. that being said, i profoundly trust that by delivering price stability, we are contributing to sustainable growth, job creation and fostering financial stability. by being credible in delivering price stability over time, and by solidly anchoring inflation expectations, we are fostering, in very difficult times, the confidence of households. our fellow citizens have to be reassured on the fact that their purchasing power will be preserved in the period to come. it is also very important for sustainable growth that all economic agents take appropriate decision… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with Paris Match | Period_1 | 2005-12-21 | 0.265 | p.m. what criteria served to justify this rate rise? there has of course been a rise in prices due to the leap in oil prices. did you also take account of the boom in property prices and the surge in consumer credit? j.-c. t. we increased rates as a preventative measure, thereby strengthening saver confidence, because we identified these inflation risks. this allows us to continue to profit today from the lowest medium and long-term market interest rates for fifty years. it’s a remarkable contribution to growth and job creation, thanks to our credibility in delivering price stability. p.m. by anticipating a resurgence of inflation in the medium term, don’t you, as jean-claude juncker fears, run the risk of triggering a round of wage rises that would work counter to your desire to fight inflation? j.-c. t. no, not at all. by being credible in our task of safeguarding price stability, we protect the purchasing power of europe’s citizens and therefore move in the direction that everyone desires. p.m. so, you would say that everything is “under control”? j.-c. t. we will do at all times what is necessary. p.m. if you are so certain that the ecb is safeguarding purchasing power, growth and employment, why are these three areas doing so poorly throughout most of the euro area? j.-c. t. the ecb does well to satisfy one of the necessary conditions for growth and employment. but this does not suffice in itself. monetary policy cannot do all on its own! there are many other factors … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with Hospodarske noviny | Period_1 | 2008-09-25 | 0.262 | price stability in the medium term, which means less then two, close to two percent. that being said, in order to deliver price stability in the medium term, in line with our definition, we must avoid any second round effects of both price setting as well as wage negotiations. to the contrary, we will do all what is necessary for inflation to go down, back to our definition of price stability. as our mandate is requiring, and as our fellow citizens are asking us, and they are very keen on asking us to deliver price stability. this is necessary for sustainable growth and sustainable job creation. and that is the reason why we recommend not only towards the social partners but also price setters to strictly avoid those second round effects. |
| Mario Draghi: A route for Europe | Period_2 | 2012-05-25 | 0.127 | processes. in addition to undermining society’s sense of fairness, it is a waste that we cannot afford. i think it’s essential to ask how economic policy conducted in various member states has done its duty in the way desired by caffè. social progress is one of the key objectives of the european integration process: “the union shall work for the sustainable development of europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress … it shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child”. (article i–3 of the draft european constitution). welfare is not only a remedy for the failure of insurance markets, but also a tool to promote inclusion, solidarity and a sense of fairness. in the three post-war decades (the so-called “golden age”), which especially in europe were marked by high growth rates, use of advanced technologies, high growth employment, stable lifetime employment, welfare started to emerge, at different times and on different scales depending on the country, as an integrated system that protects its citizens from significant risks. the european model redistributes many more resources for social purposes than the us and japanese systems: on the eve of the crisis, the total expenditure on pensions, unemployment benefit, for … |
| Benoît Cœuré: The future of Europe - building on our strengths | Period_2 | 2013-12-06 | 0.123 | our common future cannot be found in the past. the world has changed too much in recent decades to go back. none of our countries are strong enough to survive alone. europe faces considerable challenges, yes, but the answers are not so complicated. the europe we aspire to is the one that has worked well so far; that is based on economic integration and price stability; and that is embedded in the eu treaty. the future of europe is to continue on the course we set ourselves in 1999 – but follow through with it fully and to complete the original vision where it proves necessary. we at the ecb will continue to deliver price stability. governments, companies and social partners need to do their part. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Price stability as the basis of a sustained recovery | Period_2 | 2014-07-04 | 0.121 | summary only sustainable growth via enhancing the productive potential in the euro area will lead to an environment that secures fair prices for credit and fair compensation for savers, said benoît cœuré, member of the ecb’s executive board. cœuré explained in his speech at the wirtschaftstag in berlin the ecb’s monetary policy in the current environment of a stagnating economy. “in a stagnating economy savers complain about low returns while borrowers complain about too restrictive credit conditions”. only an economy with sustainable growth and price stability can solve this dilemma. “the only way to move on from the current low interest rate environment is to reinvigorate the productive potential of the euro are economy”, cœuré said. like ludwig erhard did by establishing the social market economy after the war, euro area countries today need to go on with fiscal, structural and institutional reforms to revive the area’s productivity potential. monetary policy can only facilitate that process but not change the long-term path. “governments should not view the current period of low interest rates and favourable market sentiment as an invitation to abandon the path of fiscal prudence.” cœuré said that the measures the ecb’s governing council had agreed in june have been warranted because of the low inflation in the euro area as a whole and also in germany. the fall in german inflation was adding the risk of a race to the bottom for the euro area as a whole, with potentiall… |
| Mario Draghi: Interview in De Telegraaf | Period_2 | 2014-06-23 | 0.116 | do you understand that people see the euro as the cause of the crisis, and of unemployment? “the crisis and the unemployment are the result of a very severe financial crisis and partly also of wrong economic policies. the euro may have masked it but it has not caused it. we must end the crisis in monetary union and enable it to create prosperity and jobs again.” that sounds terrific, but the many eu summits on growth and job creation have all led to nothing. what needs to be done? “that is a complicated issue. we cannot accept the present because we currently have low growth and insufficient job creation. on the other hand, we should not dream of a past that cannot be brought back and that cannot by any means be clearly taken to be better. we must work for the future in order to achieve not only stability, but also growth and employment.” |
| Yves Mersch: Economic and monetary policy at a turning point - where is the economy heading in Europe, the United States and China? | Period_2 | 2019-07-15 | 0.104 | transmission of our monetary policy. this being said, the governing council remains ready to act in case of adverse contingencies and to use its instruments – as appropriate – to ensure price stability. a reliable strategy is an anchor for credible monetary policy. erratic policy debates for the purpose of creating short-term stimulus risk undermining that credibility in the long run. 3/3 |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.098 | determination against the risk of people starting to doubt the long-term stability of our fiat currencies. regaining and preserving trust requires us to bring inflation back to target quickly. the longer inflation stays high, the greater the risk that the public will lose confidence in our determination and ability to preserve purchasing power. trust in our institutions is even more important at a time of major and disruptive structural change that brings about larger, more persistent and more frequent shocks. a reliable nominal anchor eases the transition towards the new equilibrium, and improves the trade-off facing central banks in the future. all in all, therefore, an important lesson from the great moderation is that it is also up to central banks whether the challenges we are facing today will lead to the great volatility, or whether the pandemic and the war in ukraine will ultimately be remembered as painful but temporary interruptions of the great moderation. thank you. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.090 | moreover, numerous questions remain unanswered. how high and how persistent does inflation need to be for the frequency of price changes to increase significantly? how would this affect the strength of the selection effect? and could real rigidities become weaker, for example because real wages adjust faster or price-setters pay more attention to inflation? improving our grasp of these issues is essential to foster our understanding of the effects of monetary policy. research is the backbone of good policymaking – and we count on you helping us to advance our knowledge of these fundamental issues, which helps us to deliver on our mandate of price stability. thank you very much for your attention, and i wish you an interesting and productive conference. |
| Frank Elderson: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy - delivering our mandate in all circumstances | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.084 | it therefore follows that our actions in pursuit of price stability do not undermine our commitment to incorporate climate change considerations, within our mandate. similarly, this same commitment does not undermine our commitment to price stability. nor does it in any way restrict our ability to deliver price stability, even in the challenging circumstances we are currently facing. not only have we started policy rate normalisation with an unprecedented 125 basis point increase in our rates over the last two governing council meetings, we have also released details of how we aim to decarbonise our corporate bond holdings on a path aligned with the goals of the paris agreement. as of next monday, we will start tilting our corporate bond purchases towards issuers with a better climate performance. this is a milestone in the implementation of our climate action plan which will reduce our exposure to climate- related financial risks and support the green transition of the european economy in line with the eu’s climate neutrality objectives. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.065 | monetary policy can best contribute to macroeconomic stability and social welfare by ensuring a timely return of inflation to target, thereby preserving people’s purchasing power, and supporting investment by reducing uncertainty. thank you. 1. schnabel, i. (2021), “unconventional fiscal and monetary policy at the zero lower bound”, speech at the third annual conference organised by the european fiscal board, 26 february. reichlin, l., ricco, g. and tarbé, m. (2021), “monetary-fiscal crosswinds in the european monetary union”, cepr discussion paper series, no 16138, centre for economic policy research, may. 2. lagarde, c. (2022), “monetary policy in a high inflation environment: commitment and clarity”, lecture organised by eesti pank, 4 november. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.061 | before turning to the topic of today’s lecture, | wish to comment on the russian invasion of ukraine. at stated by president lagarde last friday, at this dark moment for europe, the thoughts of the ecb’s governing council are with the people of ukraine. the ecb is closely monitoring the evolving situation. with regard to policy measures, the ecb will implement the sanctions decided by the eu and the european governments. the ecb will also ensure smooth liquidity conditions and the access of citizens to cash. the ecb stands ready to take whatever action is needed to fulfil its responsibilities to ensure price stability and financial stability in the euro area. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 41 | economy | 1 | 0.2265204 | emerge | 1 | 0.9996495 |
| 41 | emerge | 2 | 0.0807920 | advance economy | 2 | 0.9993866 |
| 41 | global | 3 | 0.0757433 | emerge market | 3 | 0.9993865 |
| 41 | market | 4 | 0.0589600 | emerge market economy | 4 | 0.9992109 |
| 41 | advance | 5 | 0.0529562 | advance | 5 | 0.9991239 |
| 41 | advance economy | 6 | 0.0338532 | market economy | 6 | 0.9989486 |
| 41 | emerge market | 7 | 0.0311242 | global economy | 7 | 0.9985982 |
| 41 | market economy | 8 | 0.0204811 | emerge economy | 8 | 0.9985100 |
| 41 | global economy | 9 | 0.0192531 | economy | 9 | 0.9981568 |
| 41 | emerge market economy | 10 | 0.0143409 | global | 10 | 0.9978942 |
| 41 | numb | 11 | 0.0118848 | china | 11 | 0.9977220 |
| 41 | china | 12 | 0.0099745 | usd | 12 | 0.9973270 |
| 41 | major | 13 | 0.0092922 | emerge country | 13 | 0.9972818 |
| 41 | emerge economy | 14 | 0.0083371 | industrialise | 14 | 0.9971079 |
| 41 | account | 15 | 0.0082006 | india | 15 | 0.9966237 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Charting a new global landscape ¿ the growing impact of emerging markets on the world economy | Period_1 | 2007-06-04 | 0.344 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Charting a new global landscape ¿ the growing impact of emerging markets on the world economy | Period_1 | 2007-06-04 | 0.331 | dimension which is, for sure, interlinked with the economic one. take film-making as an example. in 2005, the largest world producer of films was india, with over 900 films, ahead of the european union, with about 800, and the united states, with about 700. 11 other emerging markets, such as china and russia, ranked among the top ten film producers. turkey was within the top 20, with 27 films. consider the internet as a second example. the internet plays a crucial role in making the world more global, and here too the weight of emerging markets is already impressive. there are already around 16 million internet users in turkey, corresponding to about one fifth of the population. excluding japan, asia has the highest number of internet users, with over 310 million users, ahead of north america, with 230 million users. 12 there are almost as many internet users in china and india (close to 180 million) as in the united states (some 200 million). take finally the number of nobel prizes awarded, which reward the highest achievements in science, literature and peace. here again, emerging markets seem to be growing in importance. back in the 1980s, 24 nationals from emerging market countries were awarded a nobel prize. within only six years of the new millennium, this figure is already almost as high (22). all in all, the growth in the economic weight of emerging economies and nations and the rise in their cultural importance are very much synchronised. |
| Jürgen Stark: Issues paper for the conference “The financial crisis and its consequences for the world economy” | Period_1 | 2008-12-16 | 0.230 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Charting a new global landscape ¿ the growing impact of emerging markets on the world economy | Period_1 | 2007-06-04 | 0.229 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Charting a new global landscape ¿ the growing impact of emerging markets on the world economy | Period_1 | 2007-06-04 | 0.209 | all in all, it is difficult to measure accurately the total impact of emerging markets on inflation. for instance, the imf’s staff has estimated that globalisation, through its direct effects on non-oil import prices, has reduced inflation by a quarter of a percentage point per year, on average, in mature economies. 17 however, the overall impact is more difficult to estimate and disentangle from other factors that reduce inflation, for instance the increases in productivity growth and the stronger credibility of monetary policy. take now international capital flows, the other dimension for which the growing role of emerging markets has a clear global effect. certain emerging markets, notably in asia and among oil exporters, have become the “financiers of the world”. they are indeed large net savers, with hefty current account surpluses, in the order of usd 800 billion last year. interestingly, the net capital outflows from these emerging markets finance the deficits of a number of mature economies, the united states, in particular. of course, many emerging economies remain external borrowers, turkey being one of them. but for the first time in modern history, the “southern hemisphere” is overall financing the “northern hemisphere”: capital is flowing from the “poorer” economies to the “richer” economies. this looks abnormal both from an economic standpoint and from a moral standpoint: according to standard economic theory, capital should flow in the opposite direction, i…. |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.217 | reflections on monetary policy page 2 of 18 markit and ecb staff calculations.notes: the long-run averages are 53.0 for the euro area, 54.2 for advanced economies excluding the euro area and 53.1 for emerging market economies. long-run average refers to the period from 1999 onwards for euro area and advanced economies and 2005 onwards for emerging market economies. latest observation: july 2019. global merchandise import growth |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges for global economic growth | Period_2 | 2014-06-02 | 0.196 | the structural slowdown in emerging markets a second global theme has been the remarkable moderation of growth in emerging markets. to take just one statistic, aggregate emerging market growth has slowed sharply in recent years, from just under 8% in 2010 to around 4.5% last year. one component of this slowdown has been a structural moderation. in retrospect, the early part of this century stands out as an exceptional period for emerging economies. between 2000 and 2010, aggregate growth in emerging markets averaged 6% on an annual basis. that compared to around 4% in the preceding two decades. the future looks less rosy. estimates from the imf2 point to a significant moderation in potential growth in large emerging markets. the factors behind the slowdown are varied. but a common theme is that several countries are reaching the limits to their current growth models. china has become overly reliant on credit and investment; in india structural reforms slowed; russia and brazil have failed to diversify growth models and domestic investment has languished. the answers to such problems are structural reforms and ambitious efforts which became now necessary. in view of emerging economies’ growing importance, the success of this process of reform and adjustment will have a profound impact on the global outlook in the coming years. |
| Philip R Lane: International inflation co-movements | Period_2 | 2020-05-25 | 0.183 | international inflation patterns as illustrated in chart 1, average rates of inflation have generally declined and exhibited lower volatility in recent decades, most notably in advanced economies.[1] a common component accounts for a large share of the remaining variability of national inflation rates: this finding has been confirmed for advanced economies in a range of studies.[2] range of inflation in advanced and emerging economies over time haver analytics. note: the interquartile range covers 50% of the sample of 25 advanced and 93 emerging market economies. |
| Mario Draghi: The international dimension of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2016-06-29 | 0.170 | inflation, but also into lower underlying inflation through its effect on costs and imported prices. indeed, if one decomposes inflation for the average advanced economy, one finds that since mid-2014 there has been a notable rise in the global component, linked largely to oil and commodity price falls. 4 these various factors may originate only in parts of the global economy – some originate more in advanced economies, other more in emerging markets – but in an integrated world they have global effects. cyclical weakness has spilled over through various channels into a similar challenge for all. the second type of factors is more structural in nature. they concern the global forces that have led to very low real equilibrium interest rates across advanced economies, and hence made it more complicated for monetary policy everywhere to provide the appropriate boost to global demand given an effective lower bound on nominal interest rates. in particular, this has led many central banks in the advanced economies to engage in large-scale unconventional policies. that low interest rate environment is a consequence of a global excess of desired saving over planned investment, which results from rising net savings as populations plan for retirement; from increased demand for and lower supply of safe assets; from relatively less public capital expenditure in a context of slowing population growth in advanced economies; from the secular shift from industries intensive in physical ca… |
| Philip R Lane: International inflation co-movements | Period_2 | 2020-05-25 | 0.158 | [29] parker, m. (2018), op. cit., studies a wide range of economies – 223 countries over the period 1980 to 2012 – and finds that global inflation can explain around 70 percent of national inflation variability in a group of around 20 advanced economies, but only 20 percent for middle-income countries and 13 percent for low-income countries. the model of an independent central bank commited to a clear inflation aim had spread much more widely among advanced economies than among emerging and developing countries. however, more recently, as this model has become more widespread, both average inflation and inflation volatility have declined in a wider range of economies. in a similar vein, ha, j., kose, a. and ohnsorge, f. (2019), “ global inflation synchronization”, policy research working paper series, no 8768, world bank, argue that global inflation is becoming more pervasive. [30] see choi, s., furceri, d., loungani, p., mishrah, s. and poplawski-ribeiro, m. (2018), “oil prices and inflation dynamics: evidence from advanced and developing economies”, journal of international money and finance, vol. 82, pp. 71-96. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.089 | second, central bank independence is important for safeguarding stable prices. today, central banks in almost all advanced economies and many emerging market economies are politically independent. the “great moderation” that took off in the 1980s built on these two pillars — a narrow, well-defined mandate and central bank independence. over time, a clear commitment to price stability has anchored inflation expectations at very low levels. maintaining this level of trust is what will guide the response of central banks to the challenges we are facing today. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.085 | financial conditions indices in advanced economies and emerging market economies refinitiv, bloomberg and ecb staff calculations. notes: national financial conditions indices are aggregated using gdp purchasing power parity shares. the latest observations are for 6 october 2022. it is sometimes argued that domestic inflation having a large global component should mean that domestic monetary policy needs to be tightened more forcefully to compensate for this weakened grip on prices. but if central banks across advanced economies are simultaneously tightening monetary policy – as is the case today – the opposite is true.[20] if central banks do not fully factor in the effects of other central banks’ policies, the current phase of global adjustment may give way to a more severe slowdown than anticipated. in recent decades, episodes of highly synchronised global monetary policy tightening have been associated with subsequent global recessions (chart 10). |
| Christine Lagarde: New challenges in a changing world | Period_3 | 2023-01-24 | 0.080 | russia’s unjustifiable invasion of ukraine has brought supply security back to the top of the agenda for all major economies, most saliently for energy. and over the longer term, it is likely to accelerate the global transition to clean energy production as a way to increase climate and energy security. but such technologies are highly resource-intensive in their installation phase. getting the global economy on a path to meet the paris agreement goals could see total mineral demand from clean energy technologies quadrupling by 2040.[7] this threatens a new era of competition for resources. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in an uncertain world | Period_3 | 2022-03-17 | 0.075 | energy and food account for, on average, around two-thirds of inflation since june last year, with supply failing to catch up with demand as the world economy reopened.4] durable goods inflation is 16 times higher today than it was in february 2020. consumers in advanced economies have spent more on goods relative to services, while producers have been constrained by “zero covid” policies in parts of asia, a major provider of consumer goods worldwide. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-21 | 0.065 | but now we are facing a new environment. new supply constraints have arisen in the global economy owing to supply chain disruptions, zero-covid policies, energy production cuts, and russia’s invasion of ukraine. and in this context, swings in demand caused by the closing and reopening of the economy have “hit a wall”. rather than quantities increasing to match demand, prices have surged instead. that is a key reason why – alongside rising energy prices – inflation has returned so fiercely. some of these constraints will fade over time. we are already seeing, for example, shipping costs declining and delivery times shortening. but other changes may well be more persistent. the shocks triggered by the pandemic and the war are creating what i have called a “new global map” of economic relationships.[3] and in this environment, it is uncertain whether a seamless expansion of supply will continue and how global demand will be affected. indeed, the new global map is characterised by two key shifts. the first is from efficiency to security in global supply chains. this is reflected in new industrial policies that in recent years have prioritised geopolitical goals over efficiency concerns. many advanced economies are coming to see their past de-industrialisation as a vulnerability, leading to a push to “re-shore” or “friend-shore” industries seen as strategic. that is likely to increase costs and affect production while supply chains are adjusting. at the same time, this shift co… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 42 | trade | 1 | 0.0941974 | trade | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 42 | service | 2 | 0.0611053 | manufacture | 2 | 0.9988610 |
| 42 | good | 3 | 0.0444986 | import | 3 | 0.9987732 |
| 42 | increase | 4 | 0.0438925 | service | 4 | 0.9986845 |
| 42 | import | 5 | 0.0297102 | export | 5 | 0.9980718 |
| 42 | gdp | 6 | 0.0291041 | intra | 6 | 0.9978948 |
| 42 | export | 7 | 0.0263161 | extra | 7 | 0.9976332 |
| 42 | country | 8 | 0.0223160 | china | 8 | 0.9975468 |
| 42 | manufacture | 9 | 0.0212250 | fdi | 9 | 0.9971885 |
| 42 | grow | 10 | 0.0177097 | extra euro | 10 | 0.9968371 |
| 42 | cost | 11 | 0.0171037 | service sector | 11 | 0.9967584 |
| 42 | percentage | 12 | 0.0145581 | import price | 12 | 0.9962325 |
| 42 | account | 13 | 0.0141945 | total | 13 | 0.9962310 |
| 42 | china | 14 | 0.0140732 | cost country | 14 | 0.9955201 |
| 42 | total | 15 | 0.0134672 | direct investment | 15 | 0.9952526 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.471 | import prices as i argued before, intra-euro area imports have been growing strongly, but euro area imports from low-cost countries such as china and the new eu member states (henceforth nms) have been growing even more rapidly. based on highly detailed data disaggregated both by sectors and countries over the period 1995-2004, chart 4a shows that the level of import prices (proxied by absolute unit value indices) from china and the nms are estimated to be approximately one-quarter the import price of total euro area import prices, and about one-fifth the price of imports from high-cost countries. 14 since the start of the 2000s, the share of low-cost countries in extra-euro area manufacturing imports has increased from just over one-third to almost a half (chart 4b). 15 rising imports from low-cost countries are putting downward pressure on extra-euro area manufacturing import prices. overall, it is estimated that the increase in import penetration from low-cost countries over this period may have dampened euro area import price inflation by an average of 2.1 percentage points each year, an effect almost equally accounted for by china and the nms. 16 the overall impact could be decomposed into two components (table 1): the first is the “share effect”, which captures the downward impact on import prices of the rising import share of low-cost countries combined with the relatively lower price level of low- cost import suppliers (1.6 percentage points per year); and the seco… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The US economy, the euro area economy, and their central banks | Period_1 | 2007-12-10 | 0.415 | globalisation and the surge in world trade, financial flows and innovative ideas that has been getting stronger during the last few decades. trade openness the euro area is the largest exporter in the world. its extra-area exports amounted to €1.9 trillion last year, while us exports reached €1.1 trillion. together, these two economies account for almost a third of world trade. the euro area is a significantly open economy for its size. its exports and imports of goods reached 33% of its own gdp in 2006, a figure to add to the rising importance of trade in services – around 10% of gdp. in 1998, euro area exports and imports only accounted for 24% of gdp, and trade in services for 8%. trade openness of the euro area has therefore been reinforced since the advent of the euro. the united states is slightly less open, with trade in goods representing 22% of gdp and trade in services 6% of gdp. however, among euro area trade partners, the united states plays a central role. indeed, around 15% of euro exports in goods goes to the united states. looking at the other side of the atlantic, american exports represent around 10% of our imports of goods. on balance, over the last few years, we have recorded a large trade surplus with the united states. our goods exports exceeded our imports from the united states by more than usd 80 billion. in the services sector, where trade has been growing and continues to grow, our connection with the united states is even more important. 22% of … |
| Lucas Papademos: China and the European Union - global economic challenges and policy responses | Period_1 | 2008-09-17 | 0.396 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.389 | the united states was fourth. 5 when one looks at measures focusing more narrowly on economic globalisation, however, the striking and not widely known fact is that europe, and the euro area in particular, turn out to be more closely integrated with the global economy than the us. globalisation, if narrowly defined as growing trade openness in response to declining trade and transport barriers, has been ongoing for decades and in this sense is not a novel phenomenon. over the last decade, however, this process appears to have accelerated, and the increasing trade integration has been accompanied by signs of a rapidly growing interdependence of economies also via production and financial market linkages, with two broad factors underlying such a development. first, falling costs of moving not only goods, but also services and information across borders, have led to changes in the production processes, most notably related to the international fragmentation of production (chart 1). second, there has been a large expansion in global productive capacity on account of the opening up of emerging economies to international trade and production. against this backdrop, euro area external trade as well as flows and stocks of foreign assets and liabilities have been growing strongly. this has been partly as a result of the increasing role of new eu member states as trade partners, as well as rapidly increasing imports from asia (especially china). thus the trade openness of the euro a… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The role of central banks in a globalised economy | Period_1 | 2007-06-21 | 0.356 |
|
| Benoît Cœuré: The rise of services and the transmission of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-07-19 | 0.237 | two waves of service-sector growth,” oxford economic papers, vol. 65, no 1, pp. 96–123; and berlingieri, g. (2013), “outsourcing and the rise in services,” cep discussion papers, no 1199. 29 this can also be seen on slide 4. the relative price of services in the euro area increased by 33% from 1970 to 1989 and by 21% from 1990 to 2009. 30 see, for example, baldwin, r., forslid, r. and ito, t. (2015), “unveiling the evolving sources of value added in exports”, ide-jetro joint research program series, no 161. see also imf (2018), op. cit. for a more general discussion, see acemoglu et al. (2012), “the network origins of aggregate fluctuations”, econometrica, vol. 80, no 5, pp. 1977–2016. 31 see also pastén, e., schoenle, r. and weber, m (2018), op. cit, and anderton et al. (2017), “ sectoral wage rigidities and labour and product market institutions in the euro area” , open economies review, vol.28(5), pp.923–965. changes in the input-output structure have also been found to have affected sectoral reallocation of labour, in particular though outsourcing. see berlingieri, g. (2014), “outsourcing and the rise in services”, cep discussion paper, no 1199. 32 the world input-output database suggests that, for the largest five euro area countries, the gross input share of services in the production of final services has increased by 5 percentage points, to 81%, from 1995 to 2011. for goods, it has increased by 2 percentage points, to 38%. 33 see also masuch et al. (2018), “structu… |
| Benoît Cœuré: The rise of services and the transmission of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-07-19 | 0.232 | the second structural change relates to the input-output structure of our economies. services not only account for a much larger share of consumption and employment, they also make up a growing share of intermediate inputs used in the production of both services and manufacturing – a development that some have coined “servicification”.30 you can see this on my next slide for the case of the united states, where reliable long time series data are available. for the manufacturing sector, the proportion of total inputs accounted for by services increased from around 28% in 1970 to 32% in 2010. for the services sector, the increase is even more striking. intermediate services increased their share of total inputs by 14 percentage points, to 87%, over the same period. 11 / 16 |
| Benoît Cœuré: The rise of services and the transmission of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-07-19 | 0.215 | 20 percentage points in the euro area and by about 14 and 16 percentage points in the united states and japan respectively. you can see this on my first slide. second, and unsurprisingly given that many services are labour intensive, there has been an even greater increase in the percentage of the workforce employed in the services sector. you can see this on my next slide. in 2010, the services sector accounted for three-quarters of the jobs in the euro area, while in 1970 this figure was about 45%. the situation in the united states is even more stark. in 2010, the services sector accounted for nearly 85% of jobs. 2 / 16 |
| Benoît Cœuré: The rise of services and the transmission of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-07-19 | 0.190 | activity across sectors, which may further delay the pass-through of policy changes. but i would argue that part of the puzzle may also relate to structural changes within the services sector, which is itself subject to transformation. i would like to highlight two of these changes. first, all services are not made equal. recent research shows that some services industries, mostly those that can be delivered at distance, such as telecommunications and finance, are among the most productive and thriving industries in the economy. 27 as a result, a portion of services have been found to feature a falling relative price as income rises, much like manufacturing industries.28 indeed, on my next slide you can see that the difference between price inflation for services and non-energy goods has been steadily trending downwards over time, reducing overall inflationary pressures in the economy. in other words, the pace with which the relative price of services is increasing over time – baumol’s cost disease channel – has gradually started to decelerate, at least in the euro area.29 |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges for global economic growth | Period_2 | 2014-06-02 | 0.180 | waning global trade integration the third global theme i would like to touch on is the future for global trade. in recent years, world trade has been puzzlingly weak. before the financial crisis, global imports typically rose considerably faster than activity. in the three decades before the great recession, trade rose almost twice as fast as output (an elasticity of trade to gdp growth averaging 1.8). but since 2011, world trade has plateaued relative to world gdp around the level reached in 2008. some of this weakness is likely to be cyclical. global business investment, which typically has high trade content, has surprised on the downside in recent years and that has probably restrained the pace of global trade. as investment recovers, it should also spur a pick-up in global trade in the medium term. however, there are a number of structural factors that could underlie the slow global trade growth. a first factor may be slower progress in trade liberalisation. while stalled talks at the 2 see box 1.2 in october 2013 imf’s weo. |
| Christine Lagarde: New challenges in a changing world | Period_3 | 2023-01-24 | 0.150 | a changing world this map is defined by three interrelated factors: shocks, supply, and security. first, with support for an open global trading order on the wane, we are facing new types of shocks to the global economy. for the past few decades, open trade has supported global growth by allowing countries to “rotate” demand during slumps.[2] but now it could become a source of volatility. that is because the rise of international free trade – and the stability that comes with it – has historically depended on the backing of a global hegemon. this was evident during the british empire in the 19th century, as it was with american support in the wake of the cold war.[3] however, major economies – led by the united states and china – are now increasingly using trade to limit the ambitions of geopolitical rivals. that could fragment world trade with potentially huge costs. the imf estimates that severe trade fragmentation may cost global output roughly 7% in the long term – an amount similar to the annual output of japan and germany combined.[4] these geopolitical winds are reshaping the second feature of this new map: supply. we are seeing strategic considerations becoming increasingly important in where suppliers are located. the us inflation reduction act, for example, is deliberately aimed at “reshoring” production and reducing the country’s reliance on strategic imports like batteries.[5] china is also seeking to reduce its own dependence on the rest of the world. and som… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.136 | supply mismatches – should fade as extra supply becomes available and sectoral demand surges normalise.[11] in analysing the current high inflation rate, the surge in energy prices constitutes an adverse terms of trade shock for the euro area, which imports more than 90 per cent of its energy inputs. in addition, the bottlenecks in global supply chains are primarily external in nature rather than reflecting an overheating of domestic demand in the euro area. chart 17 illustrates this for the trade balance. whereas the euro area goods trade balance generally registered a surplus of around two per cent before the pandemic, the goods trade balance has gradually deteriorated over 2021. this deterioration reflects the steady worsening of the energy and food trade balance, which was largely driven by the rising bill for energy imports. by the same token, the euro area terms of trade have declined during 2021 (chart 18).[12] higher import prices for energy reduce the disposable incomes of households and the cash flows of energy-intensive firms. the impact of this terms of trade shock on euro area macroeconomic dynamics will warrant close monitoring in the coming quarters. |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.098 | 3.2 shielding the european economy from global shocks: monetary and fiscal policy the pandemic and the new economic order generated by the war also pose new challenges for monetary policy. the european economy has been hit by an unprecedented sequence of supply shocks which are pushing up inflation and depressing growth.[27] the exit from the pandemic had already produced a sharp rise in energy and commodity prices. in addition, the emergence of supply bottlenecks had raised the prices of durable goods. now the russian invasion of ukraine is exacerbating each of these individual forces.[28] oil and gas prices will stay higher for longer and remain subject to unprecedented uncertainty. not only is russia one of the world’s largest exporters of these products, but the eu is also the largest and most dependent importer of energy from russia. food prices could increase further. russia and ukraine account for about 25% and 17% of total global exports of wheat and maize respectively. and russia is a crucial provider of the raw materials used in fertilizers. other raw materials will also be impacted. for example, russia accounts for over 20% of global exports of vanadium, cobalt and palladium, which are used in the production of 3d printers, drones, robotics, semiconductors and catalytic converters. russia and ukraine are also among the largest exporters of iron ore and nickel, which are used in the iron and steel industries. the economic consequences of these shocks are signific… |
| Christine Lagarde: Finding resilience in times of uncertainty | Period_3 | 2022-03-31 | 0.095 | income (i.e. their income adjusted for inflation) squeezed. households are likely to save less, which should absorb part of this shock, but they have also revised down their spending plans. second, business investment is likely to be affected. the latest survey data suggest that business activity held up relatively well in march, but firms’ expectations in a year’s time fell sharply. suppliers’ delivery times, capturing manufacturing supply disruptions, also deteriorated again. how much inflation rises and growth slows will ultimately hinge on how the conflict and sanctions evolve. reflecting this uncertainty, at the last governing council meeting ecb staff prepared different scenarios to capture some of the possible outcomes. clearly, the longer the war lasts, the higher the economic costs will be and the greater the likelihood we end up in more adverse scenarios. this is why we are continually monitoring the incoming data and updating our analysis accordingly. this is a challenging situation for cyprus, too. the country will be affected by the inflationary pressures from higher energy costs owing to its dependence on oil imports for power generation.3the tourism sector will also see dwindling numbers of visitors from russia and ukraine, which represented 27% and 5% of total arrivals in 2021 respectively. in addition, given the importance of cyprus as a hub for foreign direct investment to and from russia, professional services such as accounting, consulting and legal ser… |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.087 | consumption, investment and government spending eurostat, and ecb projections and calculations. note: the latest observations are for the first quarter of 2022. shows a range of purchasing managers’ index (pmi) confidence indicators. the left panel shows the assessment of the current situation in manufacturing and services. the re-opening of the economy is supporting the continuing improvement in the services sector. although the manufacturing indicator edged down in march, it remained broadly stable in april, so that the overall profile has so far been resilient to the outbreak of the war. however, in the middle panel, we see that this resilience did not hold for export orders, which have declined more than total orders, since the war and the covid wave in china are already affecting the external sector. the right panel shows the expectations component, which fell abruptly for manufacturing in particular but has remained in expansionary territory. this can be interpreted as an expectation of a slowdown in growth but not a recession. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 43 | percentage | 1 | 0.0525884 | observation | 1 | 0.9994743 |
| 43 | note | 2 | 0.0521645 | calculation | 2 | 0.9994742 |
| 43 | chart | 3 | 0.0483486 | late observation | 3 | 0.9992986 |
| 43 | observation | 4 | 0.0367596 | calculation note | 4 | 0.9986849 |
| 43 | late | 5 | 0.0352050 | panel | 5 | 0.9985104 |
| 43 | calculation | 6 | 0.0323784 | note | 6 | 0.9981574 |
| 43 | panel | 7 | 0.0285625 | ecb calculation | 7 | 0.9980710 |
| 43 | change | 8 | 0.0240400 | staff calculation | 8 | 0.9974565 |
| 43 | late observation | 9 | 0.0224854 | percentage | 9 | 0.9974528 |
| 43 | estimate | 10 | 0.0212134 | ecb calculation note | 10 | 0.9972813 |
| 43 | average | 11 | 0.0190935 | ecb staff calculation | 11 | 0.9971060 |
| 43 | leave | 12 | 0.0171149 | chart | 12 | 0.9971023 |
| 43 | ecb staff | 13 | 0.0169736 | percentage change | 13 | 0.9969308 |
| 43 | calculation note | 14 | 0.0164083 | leave panel | 14 | 0.9964925 |
| 43 | staff | 15 | 0.0159843 | staff calculation note | 15 | 0.9964918 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.246 | 1.0 0.0 0.5 -2.5 0.0 -5.0 -0.5 -7.5 p ho to graphic and cinematic equipment - 1.0 - 1.5 -10.0 telepho ne and telefax equipment consumer goods capital goods energy -12.5 excluding food info rmatio n pro cessing equipment and tobacco -15.0 ecb calculations based on eurostat data. source: ecb calculations based on eurostat data. note: data for 92 hicp subcomponents. recent developments in extra-ea manuf. import prices by import supplier (monthly data, unit value indices, 3mma, euro) 70 jan- nov- sep- jul- may- mar- jan- nov- 01 01 02 03 04 05 06 0 6 ecb, hwwa and eurostat. note: last observation relates to dates ranging from nov. 2006 to march 2007. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.199 | : inward capital flows in the oecd countries % of w orld gdp 16 cross-border lending 14 12 foreign equity investment foreign direct investment 10 euro area foreign assets euro area foreign liabilities (as percentage of gdp) (as percentage of gdp) 1999 2006 1999 2006 45 45 40 40 35 35 30 30 25 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 fdi equity fixed income loans/deposits fdi equity fixed income loans/deposits a: chart 4b: china and nms have lower rising share of low-cost import price level countries in euro area imports (euros per kg of ea manufacturing imports) (values in euro; % of extra-ea imports) 70 share share of low-cost of low-cost (%, lhs)(%, lhs) countries countries high cost 50 60 48 50 total 30 43 rest of world 20 40 nms eurostat, ecb staff calculations source: eurostat comext data and ecb staff calculations. note: latest observation refers to q4 2006. low-cost countries note: latest observation refers to 2005. consists of 15 countries and regions (including asean, nms, cis, china, india, etc). |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.190 | table 1 impact of low-cost countries on extra-ea manuf. import prices decomposition of low-cost effect (annual average 1996-2004, percentage points unless otherwise indicated) low-cost effect (aggregate -2.1 direct effect) share effect -1.6 of which: china -0.8 nms -0.7 rest of low-cost 0.0 price effect -0.5 of which: china -0.2 nms -0.2 rest of low-cost -0.1 sources: ecb staff calculations. note: “share effect” captures the impact of rising import share and relatively low price level of low cost import suppliers (1.6 pp per annum); “price effect” captures impact of relatively lower import price inflation of low cost countries (0.5 pp per annum). extra-euro area import and commodity prices (indices: 2003m1=100, 3-month moving avg.) 210 non-energy total imports 130 commodities of goods 70 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 sources: ecb, hwwa and eurostat. note: last observation relates to dates from july 2007 to september 2007. all prices are in euro. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.172 | 35% imports (extra) exports (extra) 30% 130 percentage of g d p 25% 120 20% 110 15% 100 10% 90 5% 80 0% euro area euro area united united jap an jap an 70 (1997- (2001- states states (1997- (2001- 2000) 2006) (1997- (2001- 2000) 2006) 60 2000) 2006) 50 source: ecb calculations. 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 note: the degree of openness is measured as exports plus imports as a percentage of gdp, average 1997-2006. euro area based on extra euro area trade. source: ecb calculations. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Asset price bubbles and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-06-14 | 0.125 | proceeding like this, 15 pre2 periods, 15 pre1 periods, 15 b1 periods and so on are obtained for the high-cost booms. the low-cost booms have 17 pre2 periods, 17 pre1 periods, 17 b1 periods and so on. subsequently, the median values of the synthetic indicator variable have been determined for each period (pre2, pre1, b1, etc.) across all high-cost booms on the one hand and across all low-cost booms on the other hand. specifically, we have computed the median values for four synthetic variables characterising the evolution of the rates of growth in real estate prices, real investment, real money growth and real credit over low and high-cost asset-price booms. the patterns of the computed median values are depicted on the graphs. a bar indicates that the distribution of growth rates in high-cost booms is significantly different34 from the distribution of growth rates in low-cost booms for the considered period at the 20% (low bar), 10% (medium bar) or 5% (tall bar) significance level. in the graphs, the vertical axis represents annualised percentage points, while the horizontal axis displays the seven periods considered. 34 the differences between high- and low-cost booms in each period of the boom have been tested using the wilcoxon/mann- whitney test. |
| Isabel Schnabel: How long is the medium term? Monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2020-03-02 | 0.301 | ecb calculations. notes: the model is a four variable bvar containing the 10-year real ois rate, the 10-year ils rate, equity prices, and the nominal effective exchange rate. it is identified using sign restrictions at impact and is estimated using daily data over the period 2005-2019. the chart shows the cumulative changes in the 10-year ils since july 2005, and the contributions of the four underlying factors. latest observation: 18 february 2020. the exercise shown here imposes sign restrictions on cross-asset price correlations of bonds, equities, exchange rates and inflation swaps to extract signals about the potential drivers of the cumulative changes in ten-year inflation-linked swaps since 2005. |
| Fabio Panetta: Monetary autonomy in a globalised world | Period_2 | 2021-04-27 | 0.274 | refinitiv, bloomberg finance l.p. and ecb staff calculations. notes: left panel: original data at daily frequency collapsed to monthly averages. x-axis displays end date of five-year rolling window. right panel: the cut-off date for the march governing council meeting was 9 march 2021.the latest observation is for 23 april 2021. |
| Fabio Panetta: A commitment to the recovery | Period_2 | 2020-12-16 | 0.252 | 12/16/2020 a commitment to the recovery (period averages of annual percentage changes and percentage point contributions) the european commission’s ameco database and ecb staff calculations. notes: productivity is measured in terms of output per person employed. percentage point contributions are computed using a cobb-douglas production function, with capital deepening contributions estimated using two-period average factor shares. the total factor productivity (tfp) contribution is taken as the residual. |
| Fabio Panetta: Monetary autonomy in a globalised world | Period_2 | 2021-04-27 | 0.239 | policy support from job retention schemes and loan guarantees (left panel: percentage of labour force; right panel: eur billions) eurostat, march 2021 ecb staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, and ecb staff calculations (left panel); kreditanstalt für wiederaufbau for germany, instituto de crédito oficial for spain, ministère de l’économie et des finances for france, ministero dell’economia e delle finanze and banca d’italia for italy and ecb calculations (right panel). notes: in the left panel, the unemployment rate in q1 2021 is the average in january and february 2021 (latest observation). the quarterly labour force in q1 2021 is based on the march 2021 mpe. the number of job retention schemes is up to march 2021 as collected by ecb staff from national employment and social security agencies for the four largest euro area countries. discouraged workers are approximated with those leaving the labour force in q1 2021. in the right panel, the data on the take-up of guaranteed loans are for the period between april 2020 and march 2021. in the absence of a breakdown by firm size for italy, it is assumed that guaranteed loans to smes are those granted via the fondo di garanzia, while guaranteed loans to large firms are those granted via sace (the italian export credit agency). the latest observation is for q1 2021. this policy dependence masks the true underlying state of the economy – particularly in terms of labour market scarring and corporate vulnerabilities … |
| Fabio Panetta: Monetary autonomy in a globalised world | Period_2 | 2021-04-27 | 0.233 | these forces, especially commodity price shocks, can have sizeable effects on price developments. but the evidence suggests that globalisation has only marginal effects on trend inflation.[7] while inflation has fallen across advanced economies over recent decades, its correlation with the pace of globalisation is weak. the sharpest reductions took place in the early 1980s, before globalisation took off (chart 1). since the 1990s, inflation has fallen fastest in two periods when trade integration was less intense.[8] median inflation rates in advanced economies and kof globalisation index[9] (left-hand scale: index; right-hand scale: annual percentage changes) ecb staff calculations, kof swiss economic institute and national sources. notes: headline median inflation of 22 oecd countries and kof overall globalisation index. the latest observation is for 2018. |
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.567 | contributions of temporary factors to monthly hicp inflation and components changes in headline inflation (annual percentage changes and percentage point (percentage point contributions and annual contributions) percentage changes) meee other wus enel gy gums changes to hicp weights — so mma ale alld mame non-energy industrial goods mums energy base effect —— hicp gues sales period-related neig base effects 5.0 oe change in headline hicp inflation 40 ome headline hicp (rhs) 48 40 4.0 1.5 39 3.0 1.0 2.4 . ae 2.0 } . 0.8 1.0 | | | | | ; 5 bhalla tt nen - wv. . wv y qn 0.5 45 -1.0 24 -1.0 ® a a a qa qa aaa a gg 8b be 5 5b ar “2.0 o>uzttse7 * € ho 2014 2016 2018 2020 oct-21 left-hand panel. source: eurostat, deutsche bundesbank, september nipe and ecb staff calculations. note: the latest observations are for october 2021. right-hand panel. source: eurostat and ecb staff calculations. chart 3 contribution to hicp inflation by import content hicp inflation and domestic component (annual percentage changes and percentage (annual percentage changes) points) meee items with high import content es | cp =—=}icp domestic gas items with low import content 5 —=hicp 9 4 4 3 3 y) 2 l 1 0 a 0 -1 2 -1 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 left-hand panel. sources: wiod, eurostat and ecb staff calculations. note: the latest observations are for october 2021. right-hand panel. sources: wiod, eurostat and ecb staff calculations. note: the latest observations are… |
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.425 | strength of imported inflation contribution to hicp by import content energy dependence (annual percentage changes and percentage points) (left-hand scale: net energy imports as a percentage of gross available energy: right-hand scale: tonnes of oil equivalent/chained 2015 eur thousands) a teeta energy intensity (hs) overall dependence ——hicp «= dependence on oil == dependence on gas 90 0.14 . 3 80 0.12 ° | 70 any - 0.10 1 0 ivatnal yh mai nal | 60 - 0.08 2 50 0.06 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 1999 2006 2013 2020 sources: left panel: world input-output database, eurostat and ecb staff calculations; right panel: eurostat and ecb calculations. notes: energy intensity is measured as the ratio between gross available energy and real gdp. the latest observations are for december 2021 for the left panel, and 2020 for the right panel. chart 5 energy supply shocks in the euro area european oil and gas prices in oil equivalent oil drivers decomposition terms (daily cumulated percentage changes since january 2020) (usd/barrel) —_——erent oil spot price = =§ == oil equivalent gas price @emm risk gm supply @beconomic activity ——oil price 400 50 | 350 25 } 300 250 0 200 150 29 | 100 -50 - 50 0 -75 l 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 jan-20 may-20 sep-20 jan-21 may-21 sep-21 jan-22 sources: refinitiv and ecb staff calculations. notes: an energy equivalent price compares the price of two energy sources for the same energy content. structural shocks are estimated using the… |
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.387 | shift in soending between goods and services euro area united states (individual expenditures as percentages of private consumption, (individual expenditures as percentages of private consumption, percentage point differences compared with january 2019) percentage point differences compared with january 2019) = goods = goods = services = services 6 6 4 4 2 2 0 0 zy, -2 -4 -4 -b -6 a1 a2 03 4 a @ oo a4 a1 @ a 4 01/2019 = o7/2019) 01202072020 = ot/2021 = 072021 2019 2020 2021 sources: bureau of economic analysis, eurostat and ecb staff calculations. notes: aggregation of all euro area countries except slovenia, greece, lithuania, slovakia, portugal and belgium, and using estimated values for spain. the latest observations are for december 2021 for the united states and the third quarter of 2021 for the euro area. chart 7 uncertain domestic inflation euro area hicp: deviation from the 2015-19 decomposition of services inflation trend and contributions (annual percentage changes at constant 2021 weights; percentage point (percentage points) contributions) wae food and energy gum services mums goods mame contact-intensive services mame miscellaneous ——hicp ae ves rl 3.0 | 25 2.9 ff } 2.0 | 1.5 | f 1.0 | o tn, i, i/l hell ht ths 0.5 | | 0.0 , ae ae 9 -0.5 | jan-20 may-20 sep-20 jan-21 may-21 sep-21 jan-22 jan-20 jul-20 jan-21 jul-21 jan-22 sources: left panel: ecb and ecb staff calculations; right panel: eurostat and ecb staff calculations. note: the latest observations are f… |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.368 | contributions of energy-sensitive components to goods and services inflation in the euro area (annual percentage changes and percentage point contributions) eurostat and ecb staff calculations. notes: the term “energy-sensitive component” reflects items with a share of energy in direct costs above the average share of energy across services items (left-hand panel) and non-energy industrial goods (neig) items (right-hand panel). the latest observations are for september 2022. |
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.354 | beveridge curve negotiated wages (y-axis: job vacancy rate, percentages of jobs; x- (annual percentage changes) axis: u7 rate, percentages of the labour force) @ beveridge curve — u7 versus jvr me fo are =n any 278 20213 -<=-euro area (excluding = - ; bonuses) : —=netherlands 2.50 201904 a 5 5 “ne 2.25 4 4b 2.00 202002 ~ ~ | 1.75 — 150 201103 ° “ty a -y it | | eta 1.25 1.00 0 “talelelclalelelclale 0 = = “tole tr ai) 5 10 15 °20 95 big|gb|gig|g|g|gia|a]a} is cs als 5|a ’alle: slale g| 2019 2020 2021 | 2019 9020 2021 left-hand panel. sources: ecb calculations based on data from eurostat, federal employment agency germany, ifo institute munich, ministere du travail, de l’emploi et de i’insertion, instituto nazionale previdenza sociale (inps), and ministerio de inclusion, seguridad social y migraciones. notes: the highlighted area marks the coronavirus (covid-19) crisis period from the first quarter of 2020 to the second quarter of 2021. the latest observations are for the third quarter of 2021 for germany, spain and france and the second quarter of 2021 for italy for the number of workers in job retention schemes (jrs); and the third quarter of 2021 for the unemployment rate and job vacancy rate. right-hand panel. notes: the latest observations are for the third quarter of 2021 based on july and august data for the euro area and germany, the third quarter of 2021 based on full quarter data for italy and the fourth quarter of 2021 based on october data for spain, france and th… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 44 | financial | 1 | 0.2021475 | turmoil | 1 | 0.9995617 |
| 44 | market | 2 | 0.1868745 | financial market | 2 | 0.9993866 |
| 44 | financial market | 3 | 0.1159476 | financial turmoil | 3 | 0.9986852 |
| 44 | impact | 4 | 0.0277807 | market volatility | 4 | 0.9986849 |
| 44 | volatility | 5 | 0.0247724 | turbulence | 5 | 0.9984230 |
| 44 | turmoil | 6 | 0.0238467 | market turmoil | 6 | 0.9984210 |
| 44 | tension | 7 | 0.0137804 | tension | 7 | 0.9980718 |
| 44 | development | 8 | 0.0136647 | volatility | 8 | 0.9978953 |
| 44 | turbulence | 9 | 0.0113506 | financial market development | 9 | 0.9978084 |
| 44 | affect | 10 | 0.0104250 | financial | 10 | 0.9977169 |
| 44 | real economy | 11 | 0.0101936 | market turbulence | 11 | 0.9976317 |
| 44 | correction | 12 | 0.0085737 | correction | 12 | 0.9974589 |
| 44 | financial turmoil | 13 | 0.0084580 | market development | 13 | 0.9971963 |
| 44 | market volatility | 14 | 0.0083423 | financial market turmoil | 14 | 0.9971939 |
| 44 | associate | 15 | 0.0082266 | market | 15 | 0.9971895 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Ten years of the euro - successes and challenges | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.269 | global financial market turbulence and the economic downturn we are currently in an extraordinary situation. it is marked by an intensification and broadening of the global financial market turbulence – in particular since september last year – and a sharp downturn in the world economy. the tensions have increasingly spilled over from the financial sector to the real economy. their negative effects can be felt worldwide. since the end of 2008 virtually all economies – both of the industrialised countries and the emerging markets – have been moving in the same direction. this considerably contributes to the scale of the present downturn. this economic downturn has also affected the euro area. foreign demand for exports from the euro area has fallen. very low confidence and tight financing conditions have adversely affected domestic demand. on the basis of our current analysis, we see persistent weakness in economic activity in the euro area over the coming quarters. the financial market tensions have a further impact on the global and domestic economy. the economic prospects are still marked by an exceptionally high degree of uncertainty. |
| Lucas Papademos: Globalisation and central bank policies | Period_1 | 2008-01-25 | 0.256 | absorb shocks – and can tolerate a higher level of volatility – without this volatility having an adverse effect on growth. 16 globalisation and the volatility and liquidity of financial markets an important issue for financial system stability is whether financial globalisation has been – or can be– a key factor in reducing volatility and increasing liquidity in financial markets. over a number of years, before the current financial market turmoil, global financial markets were characterised by abundant liquidity which had indeed reached unprecedented levels. financial market liquidity, a concept distinct from monetary liquidity, is a measure of the ability of market participants to undertake transactions without triggering large changes in asset prices. the abundant financial market liquidity over the period 2003 until the summer of 2007 was associated with very low market volatility, especially in equity and bond markets [chart 11], low risk aversion [chart 12], low corporate bond yield spreads [chart 13] and credit spreads, high leverage and high market turnover. it also reflected the “search for yield” and confidence in the smooth functioning of the market. a composite indicator of financial market liquidity in the euro area equity, bond, credit and foreign exchange markets, 17 constructed at the ecb [chart 14] shows that financial market liquidity had increased significantly since 2001, rose sharply in 2003 and 2004 and remained at high level until the summer of 2007… |
| Lucas Papademos: Globalisation and central bank policies | Period_1 | 2008-01-25 | 0.191 | causes of the financial market turmoil what have been the underlying main causes of the financial market turmoil? what have been the key weaknesses in the functioning of the financial system that have been revealed? and what are the appropriate further responses of market participants and policy-makers? a full diagnosis of the causes and weaknesses is not yet complete and, indeed, not possible as the 19 see ecb (2007b), box 7, on the propagation of the sub-prime shock to other markets. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Ten years of the euro - successes and challenges | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.186 | lessons of the financial market turmoil an economic recovery must not however be a reason for returning to “business as usual”. lessons must be learnt from the financial market turbulence. this work is still under way. many national, european and international institutions and bodies are discussing the conclusions to be drawn for the financial system. the global financial system must become |
| Lucas Papademos: The adoption of the euro and economic performance in Monetary Union | Period_1 | 2007-11-28 | 0.178 |
|
| Luis de Guindos: Most recent ECB monetary policy decisions | Period_2 | 2018-07-19 | 0.106 | of japan. looking at central bank communication, what is of particular importance to market participants as central banks wind down their net asset purchases? what were the main lessons from the us federal reserve’s experience? are there certain structural developments that could hinder a smooth end to net purchases? how do you foresee the reaction in fixed income segments that have benefited from inflows through the portfolio rebalancing channel? last but not least, your third item, the discussion on the hidden risks to bond markets, is probably the most challenging topic. it is widely known that market participants often tend to focus on the same risks at the same time. but today’s discussion should be an exercise in thinking outside of the box to try to identify potential pressure points and gauge the likelihood of these risks materialising over the short to medium term. do you see a concentration of risk in certain asset classes? does the continued popularity of exchange-traded funds harbour risks for financial market functioning, in particular in times of stress? to what extent is algorithmic and high frequency trading in the fixed income space a cause for concern? are you observing certain financial market practices that seem unsound or unsustainable to you? let me conclude by saying that we greatly value the structured interactions we have with you to inform our understanding of ongoing financial market developments. the topics discussed at today’s bond market conta… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2018-03-14 | 0.091 | inflation – which was falling by the way – and a number about nominal wage growth. in a sense they reacted with a sharp market correction, which was in a sense amplified by the conditions of financial markets, especially the stocks, especially the equity market. it was mostly limited to the equity market and it was pretty short in terms of reaction. in europe the situation is different. in europe we don’t see wage growth of that amount, we don’t see inflation rates of that amount. it’s just that the risk is different. first one was on the sensitivity of… draghi: if we make exception for what’s happening in the united states between market correction, statements, various statements on trade and other issues, you would agree you don’t see much volatility in our financial markets in the eurozone. if anything, the volatility is mostly caused by our own statements. this angst that everything should be clear in advance isn’t reflected in the markets. let me add that the reason why we have these discussions is that there are different states of mind regarding the new information. there is uncertainty about potential output growth. there is uncertainty about the size of slack and this uncertainty is more present in some members than in others. in some members there is a little less confidence and more desire to wait for more data and to see. and in others, there is more confidence in the fact that they would like to say things sooner rather than later. i think that’s the main diff… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Bloomberg | Period_2 | 2014-01-17 | 0.088 | on financial-market fragmentation: “fragmentation in european markets will subside only very gradually. that’s because economic convergence itself is slow. it’s taking place but it takes time for reforms to feed into the economic fabric of each country. and then it takes time for structural changes in the economy to be acknowledged by financial market participants, particularly in terms of credit supply. there’s not much that we can do about that time dimension.” |
| Isabel Schnabel: COVID-19 and monetary policy - reinforcing prevailing challenges | Period_2 | 2020-11-24 | 0.087 | 24/11/2020 covid-19 and monetary policy: reinforcing prevailing challenges acted as an important circuit breaker that stopped the pandemic from turning into a full-blown financial crisis (see slide 4). slide 4 pepp highly effective in stabilising financial markets in doing so, it saved millions of jobs and businesses. its strong impact on the economy was in line with a rich literature that suggests that monetary policy is most effective during periods of market turmoil or when the economy is in a severe recession.[5] in these circumstances, a tightening of financial conditions damages the economy more severely due to a negative multiplier effect (see left chart slide 5). monetary policy that acts to offset a tightening in financial conditions is then highly effective. slide 5 monetary policy most effective in stressed conditions, deposit rates often floored at 0% https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201124~bcaebee7c0.en.html 4/13 |
| Luis de Guindos: Communication, expectations and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-08-27 | 0.083 | luis de guindos: communication, expectations and monetary policy intervention by mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, at the ecb policy panel of the annual congress of the european economic association, manchester, 27 august 2019. * * * introduction ladies and gentlemen, every year, the ecb organises a policy panel at the annual congress of the european economic association.1 the intention of these panels is to combine the results of research and the views of policy makers to advance our thinking on a topic of great policy relevance. this year, it has been straightforward to decide on such a topic. communication and expectations are central to the conduct of monetary policy, and there is a substantial body of research that allows us to have an informed discussion on the topic. it is therefore a great pleasure for me to speak at this year’s policy panel. central banks communicate with many different groups of economic actors. let me focus my remarks on two such groups, both of which are essential to the conduct of monetary policy, namely participants in financial markets on the one hand, and the general public on the other hand. the central role of financial market expectations in the conduct of monetary policy there is a tight two-way relationship between central banks and financial markets. extensive research has dealt with the flow of information from central banks to financial markets, and has shown that central bank communication exerts stro… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.139 | equity and housing markets equity markets in the euro area have largely moved sideways after the sharp correction experienced at the onset of russia’s invasion of ukraine (chart 15). that correction was mostly driven by downward revisions in longer-term earnings expectations amid mounting recession fears. since then, equity markets have been driven by two largely offsetting factors: while rising risk-free discount rates in the context of monetary policy normalisation have put downward pressure on equity valuations, lower equity risk premia have worked in the opposite direction. if equity risk premia were to increase in the context of a slowing economy, tighter financial conditions and elevated uncertainty, the correction in equity markets would be sharper than experienced so far. |
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.098 | in the non-bank financial sector, it is imperative to reduce vulnerabilities arising from liquidity mismatch by better aligning redemption terms with asset liquidity. international efforts should prioritise developing a globally consistent approach for addressing risk from leverage – including synthetic leverage. high financial market volatility and associated liquidity challenges have once more highlighted the need to improve margining practices and the ability of non-banks to meet margin calls in derivatives transactions. |
| Luis de Guindos: Building the financial system of the 21st century | Period_3 | 2022-05-23 | 0.090 | firms with higher credit risk, or firms in energy-intensive industries that are more vulnerable to risks from rising commodity prices. turning to financial markets, corrections we saw after the russian invasion of ukraine have remained largely orderly. but high volatility in some commodity prices has triggered liquidity stress in related derivatives markets. an increase in initial margin requirements has greatly increased firms’ liquidity needs, making it more difficult for some firms to hedge. this recent episode raises the question of whether margining practices, including those between the clearing member and their clients, may be too procyclical. financial markets remain vulnerable to further corrections that could potentially be triggered by an escalation of the war, or a faster-than-expected pace of monetary policy normalisation. |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.072 | euro area banking sector and financial stability the financial stability outlook has deteriorated as weaker economic growth, higher inflation and tighter financing conditions put pressure on the debt servicing capacity of companies and households. despite recent adjustments, financial markets still appear to be pricing in outcomes that could turn out to be too optimistic. this makes valuations vulnerable to a range of possible negative surprises, whether from growth, inflation, monetary policy or corporate profitability. and although open-ended investment funds have slightly reduced their credit risk exposures, their low liquidity buffers imply that there is still a significant risk of these funds amplifying a market correction via forced selling. vulnerabilities also remain elevated in property markets, where the potential for a price correction has increased. 2/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.068 | however, these calculations are based on elasticities of financial conditions to policy impulses that are estimated based on data observed in non-stressed market conditions. this implies, in turn, that the impact estimates are typically moderate in size. it follows that this first approach to quantifying the effects of our policies is likely to underestimate by a wide margin their true effect under the macro- financial conditions generated by the extraordinary pandemic shock. this approach likely also understates the overall impact of monetary policy during the pandemic, since it does not take into account that fiscal policy would likely have been less countercyclical in the absence of favourable financing conditions. more generally, in the macroeconomic models that central banks typically use for simulation and policy analysis, it is challenging to reflect the role of monetary policy measures in providing a credible backstop against adverse tail risks, such as an arrest in the flow of credit to the economy and acute financial instability. a more realistic assumption for constructing counterfactual financial conditions is to recognise that, in the event of policy inaction, financial markets – which were already highly destabilised – would have gone into a tailspin, sending the economy into a meltdown. building on recent advances in the macro-econometrics of estimating the impact of financial tail risks, preliminary results produced by ecb staff indicate that the ecb’s remo… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45 | stance | 1 | 0.1531240 | policy stance | 1 | 0.9998248 |
| 45 | policy stance | 2 | 0.1059818 | monetary policy stance | 2 | 0.9998247 |
| 45 | monetary policy stance | 3 | 0.0884563 | stance | 3 | 0.9998247 |
| 45 | accommodative | 4 | 0.0646813 | accommodative | 4 | 0.9992991 |
| 45 | level | 5 | 0.0361515 | accommodative monetary | 5 | 0.9990362 |
| 45 | risk | 6 | 0.0335702 | accommodative monetary policy | 6 | 0.9990361 |
| 45 | period | 7 | 0.0334343 | current monetary policy | 7 | 0.9981595 |
| 45 | accommodative monetary | 8 | 0.0327550 | current monetary | 8 | 0.9978088 |
| 45 | accommodative monetary policy | 9 | 0.0311248 | accommodative stance | 9 | 0.9972384 |
| 45 | time | 10 | 0.0288152 | monetary stance | 10 | 0.9969314 |
| 45 | current | 11 | 0.0182184 | prolong period | 11 | 0.9967580 |
| 45 | contribute | 12 | 0.0160447 | level close | 12 | 0.9966696 |
| 45 | determine | 13 | 0.0107463 | determine | 13 | 0.9965814 |
| 45 | remain | 14 | 0.0097953 | accommodative policy | 14 | 0.9965804 |
| 45 | signal | 15 | 0.0092518 | period | 15 | 0.9964895 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2008-03-27 | 0.110 | the separation of the tasks of determining the monetary policy stance on the one hand and the preservation of the proper functioning of the money markets on the other hand let me now address the issue of the separation between the determination of the monetary policy stance on the one hand and its actual implementation on the other hand, meant as keeping short-term rates close to the level chosen by the governing council. in accordance with the treaty provisions, the primary objective of the ecb is to maintain price stability in the euro area. to that end, the governing council determines, on the basis of its economic and monetary analyses, the appropriate monetary policy stance by setting the key ecb interest rates at the level that ensures the maintenance of price stability over the medium term. in view of safeguarding its credibility and firmly anchoring long-term inflation expectations, it is crucial that the governing council sets the appropriate monetary policy stance on the basis of no other considerations than the delivery of price stability in the medium term. once the appropriate level of the key ecb interest rates has been set, the executive board of the ecb implements monetary policy so that the level of the key interest rates decided by the governing council actually prevails in the money market. for this purpose, the ecb steers, primarily by means of open market operations, the liquidity which is lent to euro area credit institutions against adequate and soun… |
| Jürgen Stark: Adjusting monetary policy in a challenging environment | Period_1 | 2011-06-17 | 0.097 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: Adjusting monetary policy in a challenging environment | Period_1 | 2011-06-17 | 0.095 |
|
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy communication and effectiveness | Period_1 | 2008-01-16 | 0.092 |
|
| Lucas Papademos: Five years of the euro - past achievements and future challenges | Period_1 | 2004-05-03 | 0.086 | it should be clear from what i have said that, over the long term, the key to addressing the problem of europe’s less-than-satisfactory growth performance lies with national governments, trade unions and employers, and not with the ecb. monetary policy cannot be expected to increase economic growth sustainably by tolerating higher inflation. what it can do is to promote long-term growth by maintaining an environment of price stability - and this is precisely what the ecb is committed to doing. at the present juncture, with the euro area economy operating below capacity, the pace of economic recovery hinges critically on strengthening the confidence of both consumers and producers. the ecb’s current monetary policy stance - with interest rates at their lowest level in over 50 years - has been, and continues to be, conducive to the expected pick-up in economic activity. |
| Yves Mersch: Asset price inflation and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2020-01-28 | 0.138 | indeed, the prolonged period of substantial accommodation and the unconventional nature of our measures call for vigilance on the efficacy of the policy measures and might affect the strategic calibration and the appropriateness of the monetary policy stance. this vigilance is particularly warranted in the light of some signs that monetary policy is encouraging increased risk-taking and contributing to elevated asset price inflation and income inequality. to my mind, this raises two concerns for the long-run efficacy of our measures, which i wish to discuss today. |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.119 | to ensure the continued smooth transmission of our monetary policy stance, we decided to adjust the parameters of the new series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltro iii) and announce a two-tier system for reserve remuneration. both measures serve to mitigate the risk of possible side effects of the ecb’s accommodative monetary policy stance on bank-based intermediation undermining the sustained convergence of inflation. |
| Peter Praet: Economic developments in the euro area | Period_2 | 2015-02-12 | 0.118 | the context for our recent decisions a stylised way of thinking about why we introduced our recent measures is to use the concept of the “inflation gap”. this gap is the difference between our aim of an inflation rate below but close to 2% over the medium-term and our projection for inflation over that same horizon, based on our current monetary policy stance and the information on the state and evolution of the economy that we have access to today. if the inflation gap widens, and the monetary policy stance remains unchanged, it follows that there is a “missing stimulus” to which we may need to respond. at its meeting on 22 january, the governing council assessed that two factors had come together which had led to a widening of this “inflation gap” and had hence rendered our stimulus insufficient. the first was the fact that the credit easing package we decided in june-october 2014 had delivered less stimulus and thus less support to inflation than initially expected. and the second was the fact that, in parallel and independent of the monetary policy stance, the inflation outlook for the euro area had further deteriorated towards the end of the year. this contributed to a further widening the inflation gap that our measures needed to close. let me explain each point in some more detail. the initial impact of credit easing for some time inflation dynamics in the euro area have been surprising on the downside, and by june last year our inflation projections were suggesting… |
| Isabel Schnabel: The European Central Bank’s policy in the COVID-19 crisis - a medium-term perspective | Period_2 | 2020-06-11 | 0.109 | under the pepp until at least the end of 2022. calibrating pepp this brings me to the second question – the calibration of the pepp. by removing duration risk from the market, pepp reduces the bond free-float ratio –the share of bonds that need to be held by private price-sensitive investors relative to total bond supply (see left chart on slide 8). in the absence of our new measures, this ratio would have gradually increased on the back of the large coronavirus-induced increase in debt issuance, thereby putting upward pressure on bond yields. the pepp envelope has been calibrated with a view to restoring and preserving financial conditions that are consistent with bringing inflation back to the pre-covid-19 inflation path. the evidence speaks for itself. upon the announcement of the pepp, and again in response to our actions last week, the euro area gdp-weighted yield curve has shifted downward measurably, and today it is not far from the level we observed before the outbreak of the crisis (see right chart on slide 8). in view of the historically weak inflation outlook and the already accommodative stance, the question arises whether our actions are sufficient and proportionate. in answering this question, the governing council assesses whether the benefits of achieving a faster return of inflation to levels closer to 2% outweigh the potentially adverse side effects. in other words, it assesses how long the “medium term” should be, given current circumstances. in earlier … |
| Philip R Lane: Low inflation - macroeconomic risks and the monetary policy stance | Period_2 | 2020-02-12 | 0.106 | the monetary policy stance and the banking system the evidence shows that the accommodative monetary stance has been effective in encouraging banks to provide more credit and firms to boost investment.[12] ,[13] in terms of the effectiveness of the monetary stance, a countervailing factor is that the negative policy rate can mechanically weigh on the net interest income of the banking system, since banks typically do not pass on negative rates to most retail depositors.[14] |
| Luis de Guindos: Euro area current policy challenges | Period_3 | 2022-09-16 | 0.091 | the ecb’s recent monetary policy decisions this outlook for growth and inflation leaves monetary policymakers with no easy choices. some might ask why the ecb is normalising its interest rates in the face of an economic slowdown and high inflation that are largely driven by a cost-push shock. it is true that we are not in a classic demand-driven overheating episode, and that energy remains the dominant driver of rising inflation and slowing growth. but at the current low level of interest rates, monetary policy is still accommodative, thus supporting demand and ultimately also contributing to price pressures. with inflation at record-high levels, such an accommodative monetary policy stance is no longer appropriate. moreover, we need to ensure that inflation expectations remain well anchored until the current shocks have passed so as to facilitate the return of inflation to our medium-term target. against this background, we decided to raise interest rates by 0.75 percentage points at our governing council meeting last week. this major step frontloaded the transition from a highly accommodative level of policy rates towards levels that will ensure the return of inflation to our 2% medium-term target. we will regularly re-evaluate our policy path in light of incoming information and the evolving inflation outlook. our future policy rate decisions will continue to be data-dependent and follow a meeting-by- meeting approach. importantly, we need to guard against second-round … |
| Luis de Guindos: Challenges for monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-07-05 | 0.086 | the even transmission of monetary policy the smooth and even transmission of our monetary policy across the euro area is required to preserve the singleness of monetary policy and achieve our mandate of price stability. changes in financing conditions that go beyond the level merited by fundamental factors undermine the achievement of that objective. sovereign bond yields are an important reference point for assessing the transmission of our policy stance because they act as a benchmark for determining the financing conditions for firms and households. it is natural for sovereign yields to differ somewhat across euro area countries, owing to idiosyncratic factors, such as public debt-to-gdp ratios, budget deficits or long-run growth rates. however, at times yields can, and do, rapidly diverge from economic fundamentals. excessive divergence makes credit conditions inconsistent with the uniform transmission of monetary policy impulses and could cause financial instability. it is instead critical that financing conditions move broadly in sync across the euro area when we change our stance. for two equally sound firms in the euro area, a change in the monetary policy stance should lead to a similar reaction in their financing conditions, no matter in which country they are domiciled. should that not be the case, we will react to prevent fragmentation, with suitable safeguards to prevent moral hazard. preventing fragmentation allows us to adjust our monetary policy stance at t… |
| Christine Lagarde: Price stability and policy transmission in the euro area | Period_3 | 2022-06-29 | 0.079 | governing council. the new instrument will have to be effective, while being proportionate and containing sufficient safeguards to preserve the impetus of member states towards a sound fiscal policy. this decision lies squarely within the ecb’s tradition. in the past, the ecb has made use of separate instruments to target inflation and to preserve the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. measures to preserve transmission could be used at any level of interest rates – so long as they were designed not to interfere with the monetary policy stance. at times when inflation fell too low, it made sense to shift from “separation” to “combination” so that all tools reinforced the required policy easing. that is why, for example, we linked asset purchases tightly to forward guidance on rates. but with high inflation now being the main challenge, there are merits in separating policy tools again. preserving policy transmission throughout the euro area will allow rates to rise as far as necessary. in this sense, there is no trade-off between launching this new tool and adopting the necessary policy stance to stabilise inflation at our target. in fact, one enables the other. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.078 | in the rest of the world); and the strength of self-reinforcing persistence dynamics (including pipeline pressures, second round effects, shifts in inflation expectations). in addition, as reviewed in this speech, there is also a feedback loop between our monetary policy decisions and monetary policy transmission mechanism. in particular, in calibrating our future monetary policy decisions, it will be essential to closely monitor the impact of our monetary policy decisions on the different stages of the transmission mechanism. in one direction, if we observe that transmission is weaker or slower than expected, this would require a further tightening of the monetary policy stance. in the other direction, if we observe that transmission is stronger or faster than expected, this would require a less-tight monetary policy stance. |
| Christine Lagarde: Price stability and policy transmission in the euro area | Period_3 | 2022-06-29 | 0.078 | the path ahead for rate normalisation based on the overall outlook, the process of normalising our monetary policy will continue in a determined and sustained manner. but given the uncertainty we still face, the pace of interest rate normalisation cannot be defined ex ante. as i laid out in a recent blog post[10], the appropriate monetary policy stance has to incorporate our principles of gradualism and optionality. gradualism allows policymakers to assess the impact of their moves on the inflation outlook as they go, which can be a prudent strategy in times of uncertainty. optionality ensures that policy can react nimbly to the incoming data on the economy and inflation expectations and, if uncertainty decreases, re-optimise the policy path as necessary. indeed, there are clearly conditions in which gradualism would not be appropriate. if, for example, we were to see higher inflation threatening to de-anchor inflation expectations, or signs of a more permanent loss of economic potential that limits resource availability, we would need to withdraw accommodation more promptly to stamp out the risk of a self- fulfilling spiral. these two elements of the monetary policy stance underlie the governing council’s decisions at our meeting on 9 june. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 46 | bank | 1 | 0.0959694 | lend rate | 1 | 0.9995617 |
| 46 | lend | 2 | 0.0741405 | bank lend | 2 | 0.9992991 |
| 46 | credit | 3 | 0.0591154 | lend | 3 | 0.9992111 |
| 46 | loan | 4 | 0.0560678 | bank lend rate | 4 | 0.9985089 |
| 46 | bank lend | 5 | 0.0314039 | lend survey | 5 | 0.9979822 |
| 46 | lend rate | 6 | 0.0261593 | enterprise | 6 | 0.9975468 |
| 46 | firm | 7 | 0.0217652 | bank lend survey | 7 | 0.9975449 |
| 46 | fund | 8 | 0.0214817 | credit standard | 8 | 0.9975444 |
| 46 | household | 9 | 0.0199225 | loan | 9 | 0.9971912 |
| 46 | condition | 10 | 0.0192846 | smes | 10 | 0.9971032 |
| 46 | cost | 11 | 0.0173710 | medium size | 11 | 0.9961414 |
| 46 | finance | 12 | 0.0164497 | credit ease | 12 | 0.9958758 |
| 46 | survey | 13 | 0.0158118 | fund condition | 13 | 0.9956163 |
| 46 | ease | 14 | 0.0155992 | medium size enterprise | 14 | 0.9953501 |
| 46 | borrow | 15 | 0.0122682 | credit | 15 | 0.9953381 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2009-04-01 | 0.214 | structural issues report on housing finance in the euro area let me now turn to the second topic, namely housing finance, which is covered in this year’s ecb structural issues report. as in previous years, i will present to you the general thrust of our report, which will be published later today. the report analyses trends and differences in the characteristics of housing loans, in the funding of bank loans, and in the spread between mortgage interest rates and the funding costs of banks. it also compares housing finance in the euro area, the united kingdom and the united states. generally, euro area banks are significantly stricter in terms of non-interest conditions on loans, partly explaining the significantly smaller sub-prime market here. on the funding side, relatively stable bank deposits continue to be the main source of funding for bank loans in the euro area, with much less emphasis on the “originate-to-distribute” function. these observations support the conclusion that housing finance in the euro area should be more resilient to shocks. housing finance has an impact on the transmission of monetary policy to the economy. two observations deserve particular attention. on the one hand, a higher degree of competition among mortgage suppliers leads to a strengthening of that transmission. on the other hand, the introduction of greater flexibility in mortgage contracts via the temporary suspension of payment or maturity extensions would result in interest rate chang… |
| Jürgen Stark: Economic prospects and the role of monetary policy in the current situation | Period_1 | 2009-03-13 | 0.177 |
|
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2008-04-11 | 0.162 | the growth of household borrowing has moderated over recent months, reflecting the impact of higher key ecb interest rates since december 2005 and cooling housing markets in several parts of the euro area. however, the growth of loans to non-financial corporations has remained very robust. bank borrowing by euro area non-financial corporations grew at an annual rate of 14.8% in the year to february 2008. overall, bank loans to the domestic private sector have grown at around 11% on an annual basis for the past two years. for the time being, there is little evidence that the financial market turbulence seen since early august 2007 has strongly influenced the overall dynamics of broad money and credit aggregates. notwithstanding the tightening of credit standards reported in the bank lending |
| Lucas Papademos: Tackling the financial crisis - policies for stability and recovery | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.120 | the prospects for economic growth the latest data and survey indicators point to a substantial decline of real gdp in the fourth quarter of 2008 and to a continued weakness in economic activity in the euro area in the first half of this year. confidence is at historically low levels, world trade has sharply declined and financing conditions remain tight. all these factors are adversely affecting aggregate demand. recently, some survey indicators showed signs of stabilisation. it is too early to declare that we may be reaching the bottom of the downturn on the basis of these signals. other indicators point to a less encouraging, if not gloomier, outlook. in other words, what we see flashing amid the clouds that cover the economic landscape right now could either be a silver lining and a first ray of light, or the harbinger of stormier weather conditions. the risks to economic growth remain on the downside. among the factors that may adversely affect economic activity is the prospect of growing protectionism. economic nationalism is an emerging threat to global economic recovery and should be avoided. another risk is the possibility that the financial crisis may have a greater negative impact on the real economy than currently expected. this could be the outcome of the mutually reinforcing effects of weak economic activity, deteriorating bank asset quality and constraints on the supply of bank credit. the intensification and broadening of the financial market turmoil since s… |
| Juergen Stark: Contributions of central bank statistics in a global context | Period_1 | 2010-10-25 | 0.113 | these caveats notwithstanding, there is a remarkable difference in household debt levels. the greater home ownership in the us and the uk compared with the euro area due to a more developed mortgage market has certainly contributed significantly to the higher levels of household debt in these countries. this chart illustrates a comparison of total household wealth. in this context, it is my pleasure to announce that the ecb will publish for the first time quarterly data on household wealth in the next statistical press release “euro area financial and non-financial developments” to be issued on 28 october 2010. the proportion of financial wealth to total wealth is much higher in the us, mainly because of the higher weight of private pension schemes, and it is also more volatile, owing to the higher weight of equity assets in total wealth. the large drop in equity prices and house prices in some countries and in residential investment is reflected in a pronounced decline in the ratio of wealth to disposable income, particularly so in the u.s. moreover, in the us, the gap between total wealth and financial wealth has narrowed substantially. i will turn now from a typical lender, the household sector, to the typical borrower, the non- financial corporations’ sector. the main difference between the euro area and the us is the weight of bank financing. in the us, the recourse to equity, debt securities and loans channelled outside the banking sector is much more widespread than… |
| Peter Praet: The transmission of recent non-standard measures | Period_2 | 2015-12-14 | 0.371 | conditions, staff analysis finds that the app has had an indirect effect on bank lending conditions through its marked effect on long-term government bond yields. 1 this indirect effect has been further reinforced by the beneficial impact of lower long-term yields on the macroeconomic outlook and hence on the credit component embedded in lending rates. with bank lending rates lower, the volume of loans to nfcs is now recovering in the euro area as a whole as well. in may last year, before the announcement of the credit easing measures, loans to nfcs contracted at an annual rate of 2.9% in the euro area as a whole. since july 2015, however, the year-on-year contraction has stopped and loans have started to grow at a very modest rate just above zero. as a result, fewer small and medium-sized companies (smes) report that credit has been a limiting factor for their businesses. in fact, the last results of the survey on the access to finance of enterprises (safe), conducted in april this year, show that “access to finance“, which was considered the dominant concern of smes in 2012, is now considered the least important problem. “finding customers” is instead still a primary source of concern for smes. these results mask some heterogeneity: in the major vulnerable member states loans are still contracting compared to a year ago. but the pace of contraction has slowed considerably in these economies. this reflects both improved funding conditions for banks thanks to the tltros an… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy - past, present and future | Period_2 | 2015-11-25 | 0.313 | for asset purchases to boost activity and inflation, however, these improvements in financial markets need to be passed through into credit conditions for the real economy. here there was another concern about the effectiveness of our policy – that with banks deleveraging, trying to enlist them as vehicles of monetary policy might be futile, as banks would retain the stimulus and try to deleverage rather than create more loans. in fact, the power of transmission through the banking system has been rising through the life of our programme. between june 2014 and today, composite lending rates for non-financial companies have declined by more than 70 basis points for the euro area as a whole, and by between 110 and 120 basis points in stressed economies in the euro area periphery. that is a formidable pass-through. to give you a comparison, we estimate that in normal times our policy rate has to be instantaneously reduced by 100 basis points to see a similar impact on lending rates after such a short time period. banks’ rate-setting process is typically slow, but not this time. and we are not only seeing this pass-through for larger firms, but also for small- and medium-sized enterprises (smes). remember that at the height of the crisis in 2012, the rates on very small business loans, which are typically given to smes, were about 2.5 percentage points higher than those on large loans. other terms and conditions, such as collateral, were also more demanding. as documented by o… |
| Peter Praet: Monetary policy transmission in the euro area | Period_2 | 2016-10-12 | 0.311 | impact of easing measures on financing conditions and macroeconomic developments what is already clear, however, is that our package of unconventional measures has had a substantial impact on euro area financial conditions – an impact which was indeed observable soon after their launch in june 2014. bank lending rates that had remained stubbornly high in the preceding years started trending downwards already in the third quarter of 2014. borrowing costs faced by households and companies have since dropped to unprecedented lows. and this improvement is also evident if we look at the dispersion of bank-individual lending rates (for loans to non-financial corporations). the country distribution of interest rates charged by banks has returned to levels comparable with pre-crisis norms. the generalised decline in bank lending rates has a twofold expansive effect. the first is that it frees up purchasing power that was previously locked up in high loan servicing costs. whether it is because loan rates are floating and are reset according to a particular money market benchmark, or because borrowers are able to refinance outstanding credit at a much more attractive fixed interest rate – and possibly also to extract housing equity in the re- negotiation process – the end result is that borrowers receive a boost in disposable income that they can use to fund current consumption or expand investment. the second effect that is associated with a decline in lending rates of the magnitud… |
| Peter Praet: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy - past and present | Period_2 | 2017-03-17 | 0.310 | our measures have helped induce this broad easing of borrowing conditions very much through the channels we expected. on the liability side, bank funding conditions have eased considerably, with the average cost of funding in the euro area reaching historical lows of around 40 basis points. very low short-term rates have encouraged banks to rebalance their liability structures away from more expensive debt securities and towards deposits, providing funding cost relief. but there are of course limits to such substitution – namely the incoming requirement to hold a minimum amount of eligible liabilities and own funds (tlac/mrel) – so it is important that wholesale funding costs have also come down substantially. our outright purchases under the app have tightened spreads on covered bonds and abs, while rates on senior unsecured bank bonds have fallen due to the portfolio rebalancing effects of the app. this positive effect of monetary policy on wholesale funding conditions is confirmed by the bank lending survey (bls). close to two-fifths of banks surveyed in the october 2016 bls reported a net improvement in their market financing conditions owing to the app – up from one-fifth in the april survey – in particular for financing via covered bonds and unsecured bank bonds, but also via abs issuance. the tltros, too, have directly lowered term funding costs, especially for banks in vulnerable countries, since those that draw on these operations have been able to substitute more… |
| Peter Praet: The transmission of recent non-standard measures | Period_2 | 2015-12-14 | 0.308 | i would like to thank carlo altavilla for his contribution to this speech. since june 2014 the ecb has adopted a series of new monetary policy measures, with the aim to both enhance the transmission of policy and to reinforce the accommodative policy stance to counter growing risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation. those measures have included reducing key policy rates to levels below zero, introducing a credit easing package – specifically our targeted long-term refinancing operations (tltros) – and expanding our asset purchase programme (app). they were decided against the backdrop of credit dynamics that were at the weaker end of what can typically be observed in the aftermath of banking crises, and, from summer of 2014 onwards, heightened downside risks to the inflation outlook and a concrete threat to the stability of inflation expectations. this complex package of policy measures has led to a significant easing in borrowing rates for the broad economy and should thereby continue to contribute to the recovery of the euro area economy and the return of inflation rates in the medium term to levels closer to 2%. early evidence confirms that the current policy measures are delivering tangible results, in particular by improving financing conditions faced by firms – including small and medium- sized ones – and households, thereby stimulating credit demand and spending. starting with the cost of bank credit, this has fallen sharply across euro area member states a… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.349 | : credit standards, loan demand and bank loan growth to euro area firms (lhs: net percentages, rhs: quarterly growth rates in percentages) ecb (bsi and bls). notes: positive bars indicate a net easing of credit standards (yellow) and a net increase in loan demand (red). the blue line shows the two-quarter moving average of loan growth to euro area non-financial corporations. net percentages for credit standards are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “eased somewhat” and “eased considerably”. net percentages for demand for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “increased considerably” and “increased somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “decreased somewhat” and “decreased considerably”. latest observation: q2 2022. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.324 | : share of fixed-rate loans for households and firms in the euro area (percentages, based on amounts outstanding) ecb (bsi). latest observation: august 2022. bank lending channel in the euro area’s bank-centred economy, the bank lending channel plays an important role. it covers the transmission through banks to a larger share of firms, also including smaller firms which do not issue bonds, as well as to households.[14] bank funding costs are the first important element in the bank lending transmission channel. for about half of banking-sector liabilities, corresponding to debt securities and wholesale deposits, the remuneration is closely linked to market rates and therefore passed through quickly to the marginal funding costs of banks.[15] by contrast, retail deposit rates adjust more sluggishly, keeping the rise in bank funding costs contained in a period of interest rate increases. in addition, tltros allowed for a compression in the intermediation wedge - the difference between the cost of loans and the risk-free interest rate. tltro therefore operated primarily via the bank lending channel - by providing funding certainty at attractive rates, which lowered the cost of loans for households and firms - rather than via risk free rates.[16] at the same time, in the absence of new operations, tltros no longer have a direct accommodative contribution to the marginal funding costs of banks. the increase in market rates is transmitted via bank funding costs to bank lending r… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.304 | bank lending rates, in particular for households. while the volume of bank lending to households remains strong, it is expected to decline in view of lower demand. lending to firms has also been robust as high production costs, inventory building and lower reliance on market funding have created a continued need for credit from banks. at the same time, demand for loans to finance investment has declined. money growth has continued to moderate owing to lower liquid savings and lower eurosystem asset purchases. our most recent bank lending survey reports that credit standards tightened for all loan categories in the second quarter of the year, as banks are becoming more concerned about the risks faced by their customers in the current uncertain environment. banks expect to continue tightening their credit standards in the third quarter. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.303 | : developments in lending rates for new loans of euro area firms and households for house purchase ecb (mir). notes: the indicator for the total cost of borrowing for firms and for households for house purchase is calculated by aggregating short-term and long-term rates using a 24-month moving average of new business volumes. latest observation: august 2022. since the fourth quarter of 2021, banks have also started to tighten their credit standards for loans to euro area firms. the current tightening follows an extended period during which credit standards were eased reflecting the monetary policy accommodation that prevailed at the time. since the end of last year, monetary policy normalisation in the context of high inflation and the dampened economic outlook due to the rise in energy costs have significantly changed the perception and tolerance of risks when granting loans. by contrast, the moderate increase in funding costs has so far only contributed little to the tightening of lending conditions for firms, which is a positive sign for the robustness of capitalisation in the banking sector. despite the tightening of the financing conditions facing firms, loan demand has so far remained strong in nominal terms, with the annual growth rate of loans to firms standing at 8.7% in august. this can be explained by the need of firms to finance working capital and inventories in the current environment of high input costs and significant uncertainty, lower corporate issuance d… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.273 | compared with lending to firms, we may see the growth in loans to households for house purchases react more strongly to monetary policy normalisation and high inflation in the coming quarters, following strong mortgage loan growth during past years, especially in some euro area countries. both credit supply and demand developments point to a weakening of housing loan growth in the coming weeks and months. credit standards on housing loans have tightened since the start of monetary policy normalisation and especially in the second quarter of 2022. the higher cost of living due to the sharp increases in energy bills and food prices, together with increases in construction costs, limit the capacity of households to take up a new mortgage and finance it at higher lending rates. this is reflected in the net decline in the demand for new housing loans reported by banks in the second quarter of 2022, which tends to lead a slowdown of actual loan growth in the coming quarters. while the annual growth of euro area housing loans has remained robust so far, standing at 5.2% in august, lending flows have clearly started to moderate. households that can afford it frontload their housing loan demand to benefit from the currently still comparatively favourable financing costs. but this may not be an option for all and potential borrowers may change their plans in the current situation of high energy costs and lending rate increases. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 47 | underlie | 1 | 0.0513065 | headline | 1 | 0.9996495 |
| 47 | headline | 2 | 0.0458185 | core | 2 | 0.9993867 |
| 47 | headline inflation | 3 | 0.0367467 | headline inflation | 3 | 0.9993866 |
| 47 | core | 4 | 0.0349547 | core inflation | 4 | 0.9993863 |
| 47 | measure | 5 | 0.0324907 | underlie inflation | 5 | 0.9987733 |
| 47 | underlie inflation | 6 | 0.0286828 | exclude | 6 | 0.9979849 |
| 47 | pressure | 7 | 0.0276748 | inflation exclude | 7 | 0.9979815 |
| 47 | core inflation | 8 | 0.0237549 | underlie | 8 | 0.9974528 |
| 47 | energy | 9 | 0.0235309 | exclude food | 9 | 0.9971464 |
| 47 | dynamic | 10 | 0.0202829 | underlie price | 10 | 0.9965375 |
| 47 | exclude | 11 | 0.0191629 | price pressure | 11 | 0.9963178 |
| 47 | food | 12 | 0.0187149 | exclude energy | 12 | 0.9960931 |
| 47 | price pressure | 13 | 0.0164750 | item | 13 | 0.9957048 |
| 47 | domestic | 14 | 0.0163630 | food | 14 | 0.9957014 |
| 47 | slack | 15 | 0.0163630 | upward trend | 15 | 0.9956157 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: Central banks in the 21st century | Period_1 | 2006-06-13 | 0.294 | core versus headline inflation despite the convergence of many aspects of the monetary policy strategies, there are still important differences. one such difference is whether the operational target for inflation should be the headline or a core measure of inflation. alan has declared that he is firmly in the “core” camp for several reasons. he argues that a central bank should aim at core inflation because (i) it cannot effectively control headline inflation given its inability to offset supply shocks; (ii) it can better forecast future headline inflation on the basis of past core-inflation dynamics, and (iii) targeting core inflation is likely to result in more sensible monetary policy in the presence of supply (energy price) shocks. in this debate, i am firmly in the “headline inflation” camp. let me explain. to begin with, our responsibility as central bankers is to preserve the stability of the overall, general price level which determines the public’s purchasing power and social welfare. the inability to offset immediately supply-side shocks does not change this responsibility, while the medium-term orientation of our monetary policy clearly indicates that we do not aim to offset such unanticipated shocks over the short run. i believe it is important to differentiate the role of a core inflation measure in the definition of the central bank’s objective from its relevance and potential usefulness in the assessment of the outlook for price stability and the formulation… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation and deflation risks - how to recognise them? How to avoid them? | Period_1 | 2009-07-01 | 0.160 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.149 | some implications for the ecb’s definition of price stability the medium-term orientation of the ecb monetary policy strategy ensures that the governing council duly discounts short-term price volatility in its deliberations. our medium-term orientation is supported by recent research in monetary economics. on the one hand, there is a substantial theoretical literature on the optimal response of monetary policy to inflation. on efficiency grounds the best way to absorb relative price shocks is to let more flexible prices – like those of commodities and oil – bear the brunt of the downward or upward adjustment, while stabilizing more inflexible prices and wages, and preventing inflationary pressures to materialize owing to possible second round effects. 30 on the other hand, the transmission lags of monetary policy decisions to prices (as indicated also by recent research on monetary transmission that the ecb has conducted with the national central banks) are long and variable, thus strongly advocating against any attempt to fine tune short-run price developments. in light of this, some observers have argued that, since terms of trade shocks often contaminate standard price measures, central banks should put more emphasis on measures of so-called “core” or “underlying” inflation, or even specify their objective in terms of a measure of core inflation. 31 these measures, it was argued, could help avoid the risk of monetary policy-makers focusing excessively on temporary pric… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation and deflation risks - how to recognise them? How to avoid them? | Period_1 | 2009-07-01 | 0.108 | inflation rates are those such as clothes or electronic devices, which undergo constant quality improvements. a few items, mainly related to oil, recorded very strong price cuts. to check whether price cuts are generalised beyond food and energy, we could look at measures that exclude such items. these – the so-called measures of exclusion-based underlying inflation – can be constructed in several ways. i won’t go into the technical details here. let’s just take the lowest and the highest at any point in time and construct a range. this range is shown as the shaded area of chart 6, together with the headline inflation rate. the range has come down from the peak and is at or below 1.8%. although this level is below the ecb definition of price stability, it is not exceptionally low and is actually higher than in 1998/1999, when underlying measures fell around 1%. international organisations, private forecasters and indeed the ecb expect this spell of negative inflation to be reversed, as suggested by inflation forecasts for 2009 and 2010. this can be seen, for example, from slide 7. it plots the latest hicp inflation forecasts from the euro zone barometer – a publication that produces macroeconomic and financial forecasts every month from a number of major economic forecasters in europe. in this month’s edition, forecasters expect the spell of negative inflation in 2009 to last on average for a few months. looking at the range of individual responses (which is shown as a sha… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: The challenges facing monetary policy | Period_1 | 2011-01-27 | 0.087 | basket of goods and services purchased by households. for example, food and energy account for about 30% of the average shopping basket in the euro area. assuming an average increase of these products by 4% a year, more or less in line with the rate of growth of the world economy (or long-term interest rates, according to the hotelling rule), average prices in the euro area will increase by 1.2% only because of the effect of these products. it is therefore not a component that can be ignored, as it would be if core inflation were used as a reference. this concept is obviously losing its relevance in a global world. the second effect concerns the implications for prices of other products, making up 70% of the basket, and which include manufactured goods and services, some of which are imported and others are produced domestically. assume, for simplicity’s sake, that these goods are only produced domestically. if the prices of these products grow at a rate of 2% per year, overall average inflation is 2.6%, exceeding the 2% objective of most central banks in advanced countries, including the ecb, which aims for inflation of below but close to 2% over the medium term. the central bank is therefore faced with two alternatives. the first is to revise the inflation rate objective upwards, taking account of imported inflation, or only to look at non-imported inflation and to ignore the rest. this strategy is complex because first and foremost it is not clear how much the imported … |
| Peter Praet: The economic situation in the euro area and the implications for monetary policy | Period_2 | 2017-03-28 | 0.288 | market conditions, with unemployment steadily falling despite a rise in participation. these developments increase households’ real disposable income, which in turn boosts their spending. business investment is also expected to continue recovering amid support from better corporate profitability and the very favourable financing conditions. as for price developments, after hovering at levels well below 1% for three years, with occasional dips into negative territory, euro area headline inflation edged higher towards the end of last year and reached 2% in february. this upward movement of inflation mainly reflects increases in energy and food prices. underlying inflation – which relates more to domestic price pressures – continues to remain very subdued and has yet to show clear signs of trend inversion as unutilised resources still weigh on wage and price growth. for example, the annual rate of hicp inflation excluding food and energy has mostly remained below 1% since late 2013. concerning the outlook for price developments, our latest staff macroeconomic projections suggest that the strong upward pressures on headline inflation from recent increases in energy and food price inflation are not expected to fundamentally change the medium-term outlook for price stability. in fact, while the staff projections indicate that the recent price pressures will cause a hump in the inflation path in 2017 and 2018 relative to the trajectory expected in december last year, the projecti… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy and the economic recovery in the euro area | Period_2 | 2017-04-10 | 0.242 | this was also the assessment of the governing council at its last monetary policy meeting in march, where the staff projections for growth in the coming years were revised slightly upwards. and in light of the improving risk outlook, the council affirmed that it is no longer concerned about deflation risks, nor do we perceive a sense of urgency to take further measures to combat adverse tail risks. inflation dynamics depend on continued policy support yet despite these signs of progress, it is clearly too soon to declare success. in important ways the outlook for price stability remains unchanged. in particular, while growth and employment rates have been converging upwards across the euro area, significant gaps still remain in terms of levels. in large parts of the euro area there are still substantial under-utilised resources, reflected in a negative output gap and high unemployment rates. and this is of course crucial for our assessment of the path of inflation – namely, whether we see a sustained adjustment that would warrant a scaling back of our exceptional degree of monetary policy accommodation. let me remind you that we have established four criteria to confirm a sustained adjustment: first, that headline inflation is on a path to levels below but close to 2% over a meaningful medium- term horizon; second, that inflation will be durable and stabilise around those levels with sufficient confidence; third that inflation will be self-sustained, meaning it will mainta… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Effectiveness of Monetary Union and the Capital Markets Union | Period_2 | 2017-04-10 | 0.228 | but while significant progress has been made, it is too soon to declare complete success. headline inflation has increased, but has yet to sustainably converge towards our objective. the increase mostly reflects rising energy and food price inflation, with underlying inflation pressures still subdued (chart 5). the flash estimate for march shows that headline inflation has dropped to 1.5% from 2% in february and that underlying inflation decreased from 0.9% to 0.7%. we had previously warned that headline inflation could decline after march-april as a result of the reduced statistical base effect of comparing this year’s price levels of oil and other commodities with their value a year ago. the decrease in underlying inflation, however, is disappointing. the domestic drivers of inflation, namely wages, are not yet responding to the recovery and the narrowing output gap. according to our latest projections, inflation is expected to move towards 1.7% in 2019 (chart 5), predicated on underlying inflation and wage growth of 1.8% and 2.4%, respectively. without the foreseen increase in wages, the baseline scenario of our staff projections for growth and inflation will not materialise in 2019. at early stages of its recovery, the us also faced the same subdued behaviour of underlying inflation and wages that accelerated only later. to achieve our goals concerning self-sustained inflation, we have to be sure that domestic drivers of inflation are behaving accordingly. in this pers… |
| Peter Praet: Ensuring price stability | Period_2 | 2017-05-05 | 0.224 | m1 and m3 growth. judging from their leading indicator properties on economic activity, this might also bring some confidence on the strength of the underlying economic recovery. underlying inflation dynamics remain subdued is macroeconomic repair complete? i would not conclude in this direction. first, while the drag on domestic activity from abroad – which was considerable in certain stages of the crisis – has largely faded, and while global data and indicators point to sustained momentum in activity and trade early in 2017, the ongoing synchronised recovery is still depending on a high degree of policy support. and even if on the upside there is a possibility that stronger sentiment in financial markets and confidence indicators translate into a faster pick-up in activity than currently foreseen, risks to the global economy over the medium term are stacked to the downside and weigh on euro area prospects. these relate to re-escalating geopolitical tensions, the possibility of a less favourable resolution of some remaining fragilities in key emes, particularly china, as well as questions related to brexit and the future policy choices of the us administration. second, most importantly, the strengthening of economic activity has yet to find correspondence in inflation developments: underlying inflation and domestic price pressures remain subdued. headline inflation has been exceptionally volatile over recent months. after a sharp rebound between november and february, in … |
| Peter Praet: Monetary policy and the euro area economic expansion | Period_2 | 2017-10-13 | 0.211 | two-thirds of total private sector employment in the euro area. heterogeneity of lending rates across countries has also fallen sharply. for example, the difference between the average lending rate for firms in countries that were severely affected by the crisis versus other countries has narrowed by around 100 basis points over this period. the pass-through of monetary policy has become more even. these positive developments have been further supported by the second series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations, as a result of which banks are passing on the favourable funding conditions to their customers.2 the sharp reduction in bank lending rates has been accompanied by easier access to funding, as recent surveys have shown.3 moreover, bank lending volumes have been gradually recovering since early 2014. according to the latest survey on the access to finance of enterprises, covering the period from october 2016 to march 2017, euro area smes have continued to signal improvements in the availability of bank loans. market-based funding conditions, too, have improved significantly in response to the corporate sector purchase programme launched in june 2016. against the backdrop of this substantial easing of financing conditions, domestic demand has become the mainstay of growth in the euro area, making the recovery more resilient to developments overseas. the latest ecb staff macroeconomic projections point to robust private consumption and a continued recovery in … |
| Isabel Schnabel: The globalisation of inflation | Period_3 | 2022-05-16 | 0.315 | because the euro area is a net importer of energy, this surge in inflation is often referred to as “imported inflation” – in other words, inflation over which monetary policy has no, or very little, control. in this context, comparisons are often made with the united states, where energy is making a smaller contribution to headline inflation, suggesting that price pressures are predominately a result of domestic forces. and indeed, there is currently a large gap between the euro area and the united states when looking at measures of inflation that exclude energy and food (slide 3, left-hand side). for at least three reasons, however, such comparisons should be treated with caution. first, even if we exclude the impact of energy and food, inflation in the euro area is currently at levels never seen before in the history of the single currency. the prices of goods and services other than energy and food are currently increasing at an annual rate of 3.5%, more than twice as much as the pre-pandemic historical average. so, most people in the euro area are seeing a marked increase in their cost of living across the board. it gives them little comfort that inflation in other countries may be even higher. second, differences between the euro area and the united states have already existed previously. over the ten years preceding the pandemic, inflation excluding food and energy was, on average, about 50% higher in the united states than in the euro area. so, inflation in the unit… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.162 | policy tightening in the face of cost-push shocks that might elevate headline inflation temporarily but fade within the projection horizon. it is important to recognise that underlying inflation is a broad concept and refers to the persistent component of inflation that filters out short-lived movements in the inflation rate and that provides the best guide to medium-term inflation developments. in the current context, two factors make it especially difficult to interpret standard indicators of underlying inflation. first, the scale of the energy shock means that the producers of many goods and services that are included in the core inflation measure face higher energy input costs and are passing these cost increases on to consumer prices. to the extent that the increase in energy prices is a level effect, it follows that the knock-on impact on core prices is also primarily a level effect, rather than necessarily representing a shift in the persistent component of inflation. second, the bottlenecks generated by the sectoral shifts in demand and supply associated with the pandemic are currently generating temporary inflation pressures, which also do not necessarily constitute a source of persistent inflation pressure. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.144 | inflation excluding food and energy: euro area (left) vs. united states (right) eurostat, haver and ecb staff calculations. notes: for the euro area, the panel shows the hicp excluding food and energy, as well as the contributions to it. for the united states the panel shows the cpi excluding food and energy, as well as the contributions to it. items affected by bottlenecks include new motor cars, second-hand motor cars, spare parts and accessories for personal transport equipment, and furnishings and household equipment. items affected by reopening include clothing and footwear, recreation and culture, recreation services, hotels and motels, and domestic and international flights. rents include actual rents paid by tenants, and for the united states also imputed rents for owner-occupied housing. the latest observations are for february 2022 for core cpi and the contributions in the united states and hicp excluding food and energy in the euro area, otherwise january 2022. real consumption expenditure: euro area (left) vs. united states (right) |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox and the effective lower bound | Period_3 | 2021-11-16 | 0.137 | “durably for the rest of the projection horizon.” the third condition is that the governing council “judges that realised progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at two per cent over the medium term.” let me highlight today two key features of this rate forward guidance. first, requiring that we see inflation reaching two per cent not only “well ahead of the end of our projection horizon” but also “durably for the rest of the projection horizon” ensures that interest rate policy will not react to inflation shocks that are expected to fade away before the end of our projection horizon. second, the condition that “realised progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at two per cent over the medium term” serves an important purpose in our analysis of the incoming data: it sharply differentiates between the volatile components of headline inflation and the dynamics of underlying inflation, which is the persistent component that is the best guide to medium-term inflation dynamics. the inclusion of a condition that is based on realisations of underlying inflation takes into account the intrinsic uncertainty of economic forecasts, especially during periods of structural change that generate “disparate confounding dynamics”.1 since the services sector constitutes a large share of the overall price level and since wages (adjusting for productivity) are the princip… |
| Christine Lagarde: Price stability and policy transmission in the euro area | Period_3 | 2022-06-29 | 0.135 | the persistence of inflation but the size and complexity of these shocks are also creating uncertainty about how persistent this inflation is likely to be. we are not facing a straightforward situation of generalised excess demand or economic overheating, in which case the trajectory of medium-term inflation would have been clearer. despite the bounceback in services, private consumption in the euro area is still more than 2% below its pre- pandemic level. and investment remains subdued. although there have been some signs of above-target revisions in recent months, longer-term inflation expectations currently stand at around 2% across a range of measures. this supports our baseline projection for inflation to converge back towards our medium-term inflation target. at the same time, inflation pressures are intensifying and broadening through the domestic economy. almost four-fifths of items in the consumption basket had annual price increases above 2% in april, and this is not only a reflection of high import prices. a new ecb indicator of domestic inflation – which removes items with a high import content – currently stands above 3%.[4] in this environment, it is important to understand how persistent domestic price pressures are likely to become. there are several factors worth considering here. first, inflation is starting to take root in the services sector, which is the “stickiest” component of inflation and has a higher weight than goods.[5] second, unemployment in t… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 48 | conference | 1 | 0.0375503 | pleasure | 1 | 0.9989479 |
| 48 | challenge | 2 | 0.0332193 | gentleman | 2 | 0.9988610 |
| 48 | issue | 3 | 0.0297544 | lady | 3 | 0.9986858 |
| 48 | address | 4 | 0.0271558 | invite | 4 | 0.9984644 |
| 48 | discuss | 5 | 0.0261452 | conference | 5 | 0.9980688 |
| 48 | gentleman | 6 | 0.0258565 | speak | 6 | 0.9978972 |
| 48 | lady | 7 | 0.0255677 | topic | 7 | 0.9976345 |
| 48 | introduction | 8 | 0.0235466 | distinguish | 8 | 0.9972831 |
| 48 | remark | 9 | 0.0200817 | audience | 9 | 0.9972367 |
| 48 | opportunity | 10 | 0.0183493 | discuss | 10 | 0.9971040 |
| 48 | speak | 11 | 0.0177718 | introduction | 11 | 0.9969302 |
| 48 | pleasure | 12 | 0.0173387 | honour | 12 | 0.9969302 |
| 48 | focus | 13 | 0.0169056 | theme | 13 | 0.9966629 |
| 48 | event | 14 | 0.0163281 | opportunity | 14 | 0.9959638 |
| 48 | topic | 15 | 0.0140182 | remark | 15 | 0.9956986 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo: Globalisation, macroeconomic stability and monetary policy at a time of financial turmoil | Period_1 | 2008-09-09 | 0.183 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: South Eastern European challenges and prospects | Period_1 | 2004-12-02 | 0.179 | ladies and gentlemen, i am delighted to talk here in vienna to this distinguished audience at the conference on south eastern europe, the first of its kind organised by the österreichische nationalbank. let me also warmly congratulate the oenb and governor liebscher for the initiative. when i think of the recent enlargement of the eu in central banking terms i cannot do so without thinking of the contribution of the oenb, which has been involved in enlargement issues from the very beginning. this was thanks to its long-standing expertise on central and eastern europe. with this event, the oenb clearly demonstrates once more that it is, inside the eurosystem, at the forefront of the analysis of european integration. the topic that we have for today - south eastern european challenges and prospects - is indeed a broad one.1 challenges refer mainly to those that arise in the process of transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. in this respect, they are similar to the ones that those eight countries faced that joined the eu earlier in the year. but, as our friend and coparticipant in this conference governor nicholl of the central bank of bosnia and herzegovina puts it, for countries in the former yugoslavia there are also two other transitions with their own particular challenges: the transition from being part of a larger state to being independent democratic countries and the transition from war to peace. i do not intend to dwell on these issues but they are … |
| Christian Noyer: Monetary policy formulation in the euro area | Period_1 | 2001-05-25 | 0.171 | introduction ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure, and a very great honour, to have been invited to address this special meeting of the national association for business economics and to present the monetary policy of the ecb before this distinguished audience of business economists and policy-makers. the theme of the conference, “monetary policy and the markets” is of the greatest interest – i believe – both to market participants endeavouring to discern and assess central banks’ policy directions, and to the ecb, which, since its creation almost three years ago, has been assigning a prominent role to transparency and openness in its policy-making. in my brief remarks today, i will first elaborate on the institutional set-up of the ecb and its objectives. against this background, i will then attempt to explain the ecb’s decision-making process as it is structured by our monetary policy strategy. |
| Willem F Duisenberg: The first lustrum of the ECB | Period_1 | 2003-06-27 | 0.170 | introduction it gives me great pleasure to address such a distinguished audience today; even more so as it is not the first time i am speaking at the international frankfurt banking evening. on 1 june of this year, the ecb celebrated its fifth anniversary. hence, in my speech today, i will focus on two topics. first, i will discuss some lessons from our experience of monetary policy in the euro area during the first five years of the ecb. second, i will look ahead and elaborate on ongoing developments in the context to the convention on the future of europe, which aims to lay the foundations for a constitutional treaty for the european union. |
| Mr Duisenberg reports on the current position and future prospects of the European System of Central Banks (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-12-04 | 0.168 | mr duisenberg reports on the current position and future prospects of the european system of central banks keynote address to the president of the european central bank, dr w.f. duisenberg, at a conference organised by the royal institute of international affairs on european economic and monetary union markets and politics under the euro in london on 27/11/98. ladies and gentlemen, i should like to express my appreciation at being invited to deliver a speech at this conference organised by the royal institute of international affairs. it is a great pleasure for me to be here, in london, today. |
| Peter Praet: Monetary policy and balance sheet adjustment | Period_2 | 2014-05-28 | 0.134 | i would like to thank jan felix hammermann and arthur saint-guilhem for their significant contribution in the preparation of this speech. ladies and gentlemen it is a great pleasure to be here on the second day of the ecb forum on central banking. i am pleased to welcome on this panel three outstanding central bankers who have shaped our thinking on monetary policy. we have tasked our panellists with reflecting on monetary policy and balance sheet adjustment. i very much look forward to hearing their views on this important and complex topic. but before giving them the floor let me share with you a few thoughts on how the process of balance sheet correction that is taking place in the euro area could influence the shaping of monetary policy in the current conditions. |
| Mario Draghi: The path to recovery and the ECB’s role | Period_2 | 2014-02-28 | 0.133 | *** ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to speak to you tonight. when i last spoke at an event organised by the bundesbank, in march 2012, the euro area stood at a crossroads. one direction pointed to continued malaise, with various vulnerabilities threatening to undo the benefits of economic, financial and even monetary integration. the other direction pointed to gradual repair, with ambitious reform efforts removing the key obstacles to economic stability and growth. the euro area has chosen the latter path. and today, we are seeing first signs that this decision is paying off. at the same time, challenges remain and continued reform efforts are needed to ensure that the recovery proves sustainable. against this background, let me first elaborate on what i think are the key milestones achieved so far and then address what are the key challenges for the ecb in the coming months. |
| Peter Praet: Current issues in monetary policy | Period_2 | 2014-12-10 | 0.132 | ladies and gentlemen, let me thank the organisers for inviting me here today. konrad adenauer – germany’s first post-war chancellor – once famously said, (and freely translated): “why should i care about remarks i made in the past?” he said so knowing that the speed at which events unfold may – at times –outpace our comprehension of them at any given moment. and when i went back to the remarks i gave here in the spring of last year, my impression was that the pace of events over the past year or so was indeed dramatic. in may last year i discussed two things. i discussed the challenges monetary policy faces when banks engage in rapid leveraging and deleveraging. i noted that “the central bank may have to be vigilant that the pace of asset reduction by banks is commensurate with an evolution of income, activity, and employment that does not create downside risks to price stability”. and i discussed the long-term strategy of the ecb. here i highlighted two main attributes of this strategy, namely that “it must be sufficiently flexible to adjust its policy conduct to the specific challenges at hand. and it must be sufficiently binding to anchor expectations and build central bank credibility with market participants and the general public”. when reading through my notes, i asked myself: did we indeed have a steady eye on the state of the banking sector? and have we applied the two principles of our strategy – that it is flexible and binding – in what turned out to be a very c… |
| Vítor Constâncio: The outlook for the global economy | Period_2 | 2016-05-11 | 0.125 | this is the full text of a speech delivered in abridged form at city week on 9 may. ladies and gentlemen, i would like to thank the organisers for inviting me to participate in this event. in my remarks today, i intend to outline my assessment for the euro area outlook against the backdrop of developments in the rest of the global economy. in doing so, i will discuss the prospects of the euro area’s recovery as well as some of the policy initiatives which are required to make it more lasting and vigorous. the main point that i want to make is that the shock absorption capacity of the euro area has increased. this notwithstanding, the continuation of our accommodative monetary policy needs to be supported by a determined implementation of structural reforms as well as growth friendly fiscal policies in order to strengthen and secure the recovery and with this, accelerate the return of inflation to levels below, but close to, 2%. |
| Mario Draghi: A central banker’s perspective on European economic convergence | Period_2 | 2012-12-10 | 0.121 | ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to be here in budapest and to participate in the annual anchor conference. i understand that this will be the last anchor conference for andrás simor in his position as governor of the magyar nemzeti bank. so this is an excellent opportunity for me to pay him a sincere tribute for his work here and as a valued member of the general council of the european central bank (ecb). in my remarks today, i would like to focus on the process of economic convergence in europe. as the experiences of recent years have made clear, this process does not end with a country’s adoption of the euro. nor does participation in the single monetary policy provide automatic delivery of convergence. i will first talk about the challenges facing the euro area as a result of shortcomings in the process of convergence and integration. i will then discuss the challenges of convergence for those members of the european union (eu) that have not yet adopted the euro. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.132 | prospects for inflation: sneezes and breezes welcome address by isabel schnabel, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the ecb and federal reserve bank of cleveland’s “inflation: drivers and dynamics conference 2021” frankfurt am main, 7 october 2021 introduction euro area headline inflation is expected to have reached 3.4% in september according to the most recent flash estimate, its highest annual rate in more than a decade and notably above the ecb’s new symmetric target of 2% to be attained over the medium term.!” the recent rise in inflation, which was at least partly expected, has intensified the debate about the most likely future evolution of price pressures — in the euro area and elsewhere. it stands in sharp contrast to the developments observed over the past decade when structural headwinds prevented inflation from converging towards our target. the timing of this conference on inflation drivers and dynamics could therefore hardly be more fitting. | will begin my remarks by briefly discussing how the current spike in inflation can in large part be attributed to temporary pandemic-related factors that are likely to dissipate in the medium term. then | will turn to a more thorough discussion of the headwinds and tailwinds that may contribute to the evolution of inflation over the medium term, linking them to research that will be presented at this conference. my main focus will be on two important topics: inflation expectations and behavioural changes, for … |
| Christine Lagarde: New challenges in a changing world | Period_3 | 2023-01-24 | 0.090 | new challenges in a changing world speech by christine lagarde, president of the ecb, at the deutsche börse annual reception in eschborn eschborn, 23 january 2023 introduction it is a pleasure to speak with you here in eschborn, marking the start of the new year. a new beginning often brings with it new challenges, but it also presents us with plenty of opportunities. and today i would like to touch on both. looking at today’s global economy, i am reminded of the playwright and poet bertolt brecht, who once observed: “because things are the way they are, things will not stay the way they are.” the global economy finds itself at a crucial turning point. last year, we began to see the emergence of a “new global map” of economic relationships – one in which geopolitics is increasingly influencing the global economy.[1] and that in turn has important implications for europe, which will define the year ahead. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-21 | 0.087 | monetary policy in a new environment speech by christine lagarde, president of the ecb, at the european banking congress frankfurt, 18 november 2022 it is a pleasure to speak to you this morning. when the former british prime minister harold macmillan was asked what the greatest challenge was for a statesman, he is said to have replied: “events, dear boy, events”. and indeed, as policymakers, we are constantly faced by unpredictable events and shocks. but what makes the situation we face today especially challenging is that we are not only facing a sequence of ill-fated events – the pandemic, the energy crisis, russia’s unjustifiable invasion of ukraine and high inflation – but that as a result, the environment around us is also changing. some of the major trends that characterised the past few decades are shifting or even reversing. in particular, we can no longer assume, at least in the near future, that global supply will gradually expand or that global demand will act as a shock absorber. and this has implications for the focus of macroeconomic policy in the years to come. today i will argue that three themes will matter: ensuring price stability as the different shocks play out; lifting constraints on growth in the areas where they have emerged; and safeguarding a resilient financial sector which can support the transitions we will face. for the ecb, displaying our commitment to our mandate is vital to ensure that inflation expectations remain anchored while inflation… |
| Luis de Guindos: Challenges for monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-07-05 | 0.075 | challenges for monetary policy remarks by luis de guindos, vice-president of the ecb, at the frankfurt euro finance summit frankfurt am main, 4 july 2022 having participated in the previous two summits, it is a great pleasure to speak with you again this year. in my remarks today, i will first discuss the economic outlook for the euro area. i will then turn to the ecb’s recent monetary policy decisions and look at why an even transmission of our monetary policy is vital to the achievement of our price stability mandate. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.073 | reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy welcome address by isabel schnabel, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the seventh ecb annual research conference frankfurt, 12 september 2022 introduction i would like to welcome you all very warmly to the seventh ecb annual research conference. after two years of holding this conference virtually, we are very happy to see many of you in person – thank you so much for coming to frankfurt. an equally warm welcome to those of you who can only join us online. thanks to luc and his team, we have an exciting programme with high-quality research papers on important topics. one set of presentations will help us to better understand business cycle dynamics and the effects of monetary policy. the focus will be on price rigidities in microeconomic data, the role of temporary layoffs for unemployment dynamics, the effect of macroeconomic uncertainty on household spending decisions and the potential crowding out of bank lending by quantitative easing policies. we will also hear about a new econometric methodology for constructing monetary policy counterfactuals. another group of presentations will cover structural changes in the economy, in particular the data economy and automation, and what they imply for the functioning of our economy and monetary policy. the two highlights of the conference will be the jean monnet lecture by jean tirole and the debate about the outlook for inflation in the euro a… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 49 | medium | 1 | 0.0994478 | orient | 1 | 0.9992991 |
| 49 | medium term | 2 | 0.0877563 | term orientation | 2 | 0.9991234 |
| 49 | stability | 3 | 0.0762962 | medium term orientation | 3 | 0.9990792 |
| 49 | price stability | 4 | 0.0531446 | orientation | 4 | 0.9990363 |
| 49 | short | 5 | 0.0341602 | stability orient | 5 | 0.9987727 |
| 49 | orient | 6 | 0.0290669 | orient monetary | 6 | 0.9982467 |
| 49 | orientation | 7 | 0.0266360 | orient monetary policy | 7 | 0.9978962 |
| 49 | horizon | 8 | 0.0195747 | term price | 8 | 0.9978091 |
| 49 | time | 9 | 0.0188802 | stability orient monetary | 9 | 0.9976332 |
| 49 | term orientation | 10 | 0.0184171 | medium term | 10 | 0.9974537 |
| 49 | risk | 11 | 0.0180698 | medium | 11 | 0.9971004 |
| 49 | medium term orientation | 12 | 0.0180698 | medium term price | 12 | 0.9969327 |
| 49 | stability orient | 13 | 0.0178383 | tune | 13 | 0.9969314 |
| 49 | imply | 14 | 0.0127450 | term price stability | 14 | 0.9966261 |
| 49 | focus | 15 | 0.0117031 | fine | 15 | 0.9960565 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the European economy and the ECB’s monetary policy concept | Period_1 | 2004-07-20 | 0.336 | the medium-term orientation of monetary policy ever since the announcement of its strategy in 1998 the ecb has made it clear that price stability is to be maintained over the medium term. i emphasised before that it is crucial in monetary policy to look through” short-term volatility in prices, which is typically outside the control of central banks. the medium-term orientation of the ecb’s monetary policy strategy clarifies that the time horizon over which price stability has to be re-established needs to be tailored to the prevailing circumstances in the economy. this horizon would depend on factors such as whether the shocks are temporary or permanent, on whether they emerged on the supply or the demand side, on whether the origin of the shocks is domestic or external or on whether they have a bearing on the performance or even the fragility of the financial system. by adapting the appropriate monetary policy horizon to the nature of the shock, the ecb makes an important contribution to avoiding unnecessary volatility in output growth. the focus on the medium term in the ecb’s monetary policy strategy embodies a commitment to avoid overly activist and ambitious attempts to fine-tune inflation outcomes. it also helps to reinforce the credible anchoring of our definition of price stability in the medium and long-term expectations of economic agents and markets. |
| Jean Claude Trichet: The ECB’s monetary policy strategy after the evaluation and clarification of May 2003 | Period_1 | 2003-12-02 | 0.330 | the medium-term orientation of monetary policy another very important aspect of our monetary policy, which was also emphasised at the start of stage three of emu, is that it aims to maintain price stability over the medium term. the medium- term orientation clarifies that there is no fixed time horizon over which price stability has to be re-established. the medium-term orientation embodies several important general principles of the strategy. first, the explicit acknowledgement that, given the long and uncertain lags in the transmission of monetary impulses, central banks cannot steer short-term price developments with high precision. second, it also reflects the idea that monetary policy should react differently to different forms of economic shocks. notably, supply-side shocks, for example those to oil prices, often require a much more gradual monetary policy response than shocks on the demand side of the economy or shocks coming from labour cost developments. by adapting the appropriate monetary policy horizon to the nature of the shock, the ecb helps to avoid unnecessary volatility in output growth. in sum, the focus on the medium term in the ecb’s monetary policy strategy embodies a commitment to avoid overly activist and ambitious attempts to fine-tune inflation outcomes, while reinforcing the credible anchoring of our definition of price stability in the medium and long-term expectations of economic agents and markets. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Current challenges for the ECB - sustainable non inflationary growth and financial stability | Period_1 | 2004-05-18 | 0.249 | the medium-term orientation of the ecb’s monetary policy the ecb’s monetary policy strategy also makes clear that price stability is to be maintained over the medium term. this is a crucial element of our policy. first and foremost, it means that the central bank eschews over-ambitious attempts to steer price developments over short horizons and with a high degree of precision. second, the medium-term orientation gives the ecb the possibility to respond in the most appropriate manner to different economic shocks, according to their origin, size and nature. in particular, the time horizon over which price stability has to be re-established would depend on whether the shocks are temporary or permanent, whether they emerged on the supply or the demand side, on their domestic or external origin, their potential for becoming entrenched in pricing decisions and on their implications for the fragility of the financial system. in all events, the central bank has to preserve its credibility, ensuring that expectations remain consistent with its declared policy objective. |
| Jürgen Stark: Monetary policy and the euro | Period_1 | 2008-04-16 | 0.230 | definition of price stability the ecb defines its price stability objective as a year-on-year increase in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) for the euro area of below, but close to 2% over the medium term. by referring to an increase in the hicp of below but close to 2%, the ecb has made it clear that hicp inflation of 2% or above, but also very low or negative rates of inflation are not consistent with its price stability objective. therefore, we aim at a low positive inflation rate in order to mitigate the detrimental effects of inflation on the euro area economies while at the same time maintaining a sufficient safety margin against potential risks of deflation. another fundamental aspect of our definition of price stability is its medium-term horizon, which means that we do not attempt to fine-tune the inflation rate at short horizons, but aim at keeping inflation below but close to 2% over the medium term. the medium-term orientation of our strategy acknowledges that – in view of long, variable and uncertain transmission lags – monetary policy is not equipped to control price developments at short horizons. monetary policy can only act in a forward looking manner and maintain price stability over longer periods of time when monetary policy measures come into effect. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Key issues for monetary policy - an ECB view | Period_1 | 2004-10-13 | 0.223 | medium-term orientation second, the ecb has adopted a medium-term orientation, thereby preserving monetary policy from short-termism. constantly faced with economic news, a central bank risks being swamped by the latest indicator and by its conjectures concerning markets’ likely reaction to the latest indicator. this can gradually steer monetary policy away from its foremost role of providing a firm medium-term anchor for the economy. instrumental in this steady-hand framework is our notion that the appropriate horizon for monetary policy is the “medium term”. in this respect, the time horizon over which price stability has to be re-established needs to be tailored to the circumstances prevailing in the economy. sometimes, notably if there is a suspicion that asset prices are moving up or down substantially, it pays to look very far ahead, beyond the average lag of monetary transmission. in other cases, the economy may need to return to price stability within a shorter horizon. in general, the horizon should depend on whether the shocks are temporary or permanent, whether they emerged on the supply or demand side, whether they are domestic or external, on their potential for becoming entrenched in pricing decisions and on their implications for the fragility of the financial system. in all events, the central bank has to preserve its credibility, thus ensuring that expectations remain consistent with the declared policy objective. |
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.179 | the second issue is the horizon over which price stability should be achieved, which is captured by the ecb’s “medium term” orientation. this forward-looking orientation reflects traditional and well- established principles of prudent monetary policy, which is consistent with the notion that monetary policy works with a lag and can influence inflation over the medium term rather than the near term. |
| Vítor Constâncio: “We are certainly not almighty”- interview with Börsen-Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-09-16 | 0.172 | but the feeling is that the ecb is more and more deviating from the stability-oriented monetary policy of the bundesbank in its former days. this feeling even increases if bundesbank president jens weidmann is opposing ecb decisions. i find it difficult to say that the ecb is deviating from a stability-oriented policy when inflation rates are at 0.3%. you could say so if inflation was at 3% or 4%. our primary mandate is price stability and we will not embark in policies that may create dangers to the upside in this regard. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges to monetary policy in 2012 | Period_2 | 2011-12-15 | 0.155 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: Globalisation and monetary policy - from virtue to vice? | Period_2 | 2011-11-30 | 0.136 | complacency and insufficient medium-term orientation of monetary policy the first was complacency. with inflation seemingly under control following “the great moderation” of the 1990s amid intensified globalisation, many observers thought that monetary policy had greater degrees of freedom to devote to short-term demand management. proponents of this view referred to this as “fine-tuning”19, whose theoretical counterpart was a form of “flexible inflation targeting” with an added emphasis on output stabilisation beyond inflation stabilisation. the pre-crisis focus on the output gap was in many ways paradoxical insofar as consensus macroeconomics had run full circle back to the intellectual climate of the 1970s, where policymakers’ exaggerated real time measures of economic slack was at the root of many policy failures. this was the same environment that had favoured the great inflation. too much emphasis on short run economic developments, or – in my view – an insufficient medium-term orientation of monetary policies has certainly contributed in part to the build-up of monetary and financial imbalances. although monetary policy frameworks oriented towards the medium-term could probably not have completely prevented the current crisis, i am convinced that they would have helped to make it less disruptive. as you know, the ecb has never subscribed to the view that monetary policy has a primary role to play in the management of aggregate demand and we think that this element o… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy in the crisis - confronting short-run challenges while anchoring long-run expectations | Period_2 | 2013-05-23 | 0.133 | important pre-condition. indeed, the governing council’s specification of the ecb’s primary objective has two characteristic features, which complement its monetary pillar. first, it is a range of values, not a point target. second, it is based on a medium-term orientation. this has two implications. first, there is some flexibility as to where inflation could be within the range at any point in time. in 2003 the governing council announced that within the range of inflation rates consistent with price stability, a rate “close to 2%” should be the aim of policy in the medium term. but there is scope for inflation to vary within the range along the way to convergence with the medium-term policy aim, and many path configurations are possible. second, the medium term itself is not a pre-set time span, but it is dependent on the underlying shocks that may explain inflation dynamics from time to time. the former type of discretion – related to the path of convergence of inflation to its medium- term level – is critical when supply shocks are positive, that is, expansionary and disinflationary. this dimension of the ecb’s monetary policy strategy is not always appreciated, but is important. when inflation pressures are absent or negative and positive shocks to aggregate supply feed financial buoyancy – the conditions which prevailed in the late 1990s and for a good part of the 2000s – having a range definition of price stability, rather than, say, a point target, is essential. t… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.154 | the 2021 strategy review lays the foundations for monetary policy decisions in the coming years. there is a clear anchor for monetary policy: we will set monetary policy to ensure that inflation stabilises at two per cent over the medium term. the medium-term orientation allows for inevitable short-term deviations of inflation from the target, as well as lags and uncertainty in the transmission of monetary policy to the economy and to inflation. the flexibility of the medium-term orientation takes into account that the appropriate monetary policy response to a deviation of inflation from the target is context-specific and depends on the origin, magnitude and persistence of the deviation. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.117 | an important element in the strategy review was to re-confirm the medium-term orientation of the ecb’s monetary policy. in line with the treaty mandate and without prejudice to price stability, the medium-term orientation allows for inevitable short-term deviations of inflation from the target, as well as lags and uncertainty in the transmission of monetary policy to the economy and to inflation. it also provides room for monetary policy to take into account considerations such as balanced economic growth, full employment and financial stability. under many scenarios, these are mutually consistent objectives. in particular, so long as longer-term inflation expectations are anchored at the target level, inflation will be at the target level if economic activity and employment are at their potential levels. however, in the event of an adverse supply shock, the horizon over which inflation returns to the target level could be lengthened in order to avoid pronounced falls in economic activity and employment, which, if persistent, could jeopardise medium-term price stability. this consideration is relevant in developing the appropriate monetary policy response to the current energy shock and pandemic shock. in particular, it should be recognised that the prevalence of downward nominal rigidities in wages and prices means that surprises in relative price movements should mainly be accommodated by tolerating a temporary increase in the inflation rate, rather than by seeking to ma… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.107 | expected to largely fade out over the course of next year. overreacting to such short-term volatility would be harmful and risk jeopardising the ongoing economic recovery, which is why the ecb’s monetary policy remains focused on fulfilling its medium-term price stability mandate. nonetheless, significant uncertainty remains as to how persistent some of the current price pressures will prove to be. the ecb therefore continues to carefully monitor inflationary developments in the euro area, with a particular focus on second-round effects, to determine whether the headwinds that have exerted downward pressure on inflation for much of the past decade are still present, or whether they may reverse in the aftermath of the pandemic. the cyclical and specific pandemic factors will increasingly be overlaid by structural changes, which can go in different directions.!2”! structural factors such as globalisation, the fight against climate change, demographic trends and digitalisation are likely to continue to affect prices and price-setting, and hence the transmission of our policy, but the direction is still unclear.!22! high-quality academic research into the underlying drivers of inflation dynamics hence remains a vital input for our monetary policy deliberations. | therefore look forward to hearing more about the insightful papers and novel research findings that will be presented at this conference. thank you. |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.090 | conclusion let me conclude. the ecb is currently dealing with the economic effects of an unprecedented sequence of shocks generated abroad. like other major central banks, we are faced with the task of normalising monetary policy at a point in time that is anything but normal. in this difficult situation we will guarantee medium-term price stability, just like we protected the euro area economy from deflation during the pandemic. normalisation does not mean removing stimulus outright. rather, it is a process of gradually reducing that stimulus in a way that firmly anchors the inflation path at 2% over the medium term. this process has already got under way in the euro area. getting normalisation right is no easy task, as the euro area economy must contend with an outlook that is marked by exceptional uncertainty. this means we should normalise our monetary policy gradually and choose a mix of instruments that is robust to the wide range of plausible scenarios we could face. these tried-and-tested principles have proved instrumental for central banks in the past. we should remain true to them today. 1. lagarde c. (2022), “monetary policy normalisation in the euro area”, the ecb blog, 23 may. 2. in the ecb’s case, the price stability objective corresponds to 2% inflation over the medium term. |
| Christine Lagarde: Introductory statement - European Parliament plenary debate on the ECB Annual Report | Period_3 | 2022-02-17 | 0.087 | consider influential factors relevant for our medium-term horizon. third, we must be clear about our actions. our audience should be able to understand what we are trying to achieve with our measures, as well as why they are effective, efficient and remain proportionate to our aim. clearly communicating these three a’s to different audiences often means being more simple and straightforward. but being more simple does not mean being simplistic. it means being more inclusive when we talk. following on from our strategy review, we are using clearer, more narrative-driven language, together with visuals people can relate to. finally, in all our communication, we need to be open about what we can and cannot do as a central bank. for example, our monetary policy cannot fill pipelines with gas, clear backlogs at ports or train more lorry drivers. conclusion let me conclude. we are very aware that many people across the euro area are concerned about the rising cost of living at the moment – as you also highlight in the report. and the burden is primarily borne by those with lower incomes, who must face the day-to-day hardship of having to cope with higher prices. we remain committed to delivering on our price stability mandate – as we have done over the past 20 years. our target is an inflation rate of 2 per cent over the medium term. to achieve this, we will take action at the right time. but it is also our task to openly engage with people’s concerns with regards to monetary po… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 50 | response | 1 | 0.1120261 | policy response | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 50 | action | 2 | 0.0839447 | response | 2 | 0.9997371 |
| 50 | policy response | 3 | 0.0440311 | policy action | 3 | 0.9995619 |
| 50 | policy action | 4 | 0.0292016 | action | 4 | 0.9991234 |
| 50 | reaction | 5 | 0.0280972 | monetary policy response | 5 | 0.9989479 |
| 50 | shock | 6 | 0.0268352 | reaction | 6 | 0.9987732 |
| 50 | economy | 7 | 0.0255731 | reaction function | 7 | 0.9981595 |
| 50 | require | 8 | 0.0254153 | monetary policy action | 8 | 0.9979832 |
| 50 | aim | 9 | 0.0216290 | respond | 9 | 0.9978095 |
| 50 | function | 10 | 0.0202092 | react | 10 | 0.9974592 |
| 50 | respond | 11 | 0.0191049 | policy reaction | 11 | 0.9972806 |
| 50 | monetary policy response | 12 | 0.0176850 | contingency | 12 | 0.9971939 |
| 50 | commitment | 13 | 0.0167384 | restore | 13 | 0.9971086 |
| 50 | react | 14 | 0.0146876 | require | 14 | 0.9970181 |
| 50 | effective | 15 | 0.0138987 | warrant | 15 | 0.9967584 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Central banks and the public - the importance of communication | Period_1 | 2008-11-21 | 0.123 | communication about actions and prospects the adoption of a clear and deliberate monetary policy strategy has added two further dimensions to communication: the announcement and explanation of monetary policy decisions when these are made, and the regular exposition of the central bank’s assessment of the current economic situation and its most likely evolution. in the absence of frequent disclosures about policy and the economic situation, market participants may not be in a position to attribute fluctuations in inflation either to exogenous disturbances outside the control of the central bank or to changes in policy intentions. adverse adjustments in expectations could lead to an increase in inflation today and to a slower and more painful reversal later in the process. 9 a central bank has two instruments in these situations, which are not substitutes, but rather complement each other. it can react to misconceptions once they manifest themselves, by enacting a particularly strong response to the threats that they pose. as inflation tends to persist once it is set in motion, the policy response might need to be sizeable and disruptive. in the “old world” in which central banks minimised their pronouncements and made no efforts to disclose their views on an ongoing basis, this reactive and demonstrative pattern of monetary policy response was indeed the only option open. it is difficult not to associate the systematic disconnect between the views entertained by the policy… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Jackson Hole Conference - monetary policy and ‘credible alertness’ | Period_1 | 2005-09-01 | 0.115 | the advantages of a rule-like behaviour at first thought, a “discretionary” response to shocks might seem exactly what one would expect of a professional central banker. after all, each economic contingency is a unique combination of circumstances that, in its own way, is unprecedented, and will probably never repeat itself again in that precise form. so, each new contingency would seem to command a different, tailor-made response on the part of monetary authorities. there is some grain of truth to this. but decades of reflections on the role of expectations in macroeconomics have taught us that monetary policy is not a sequence of isolated policy actions. when forming their expectations, agents seek to capture the general pattern of monetary policies, and it is that pattern that matters in shaping their economic behaviour. therefore, the relevant problem to solve for central banks is not so much about the size and timing of a given interest rate move in response to a particular contingency. it is more about the strategy for repeatedly adjusting the policy instrument in response to the state of the economy, whatever this might be. if the central bank is able to convince economic agents and markets participants of its analysis and assessment of the outlook, and about the policy measures that it is going to take in response to it, this mechanism of anticipation will act in self-equilibrating manner. as soon as the macroeconomic news is |
| Lucas Papademos: Policy-making in EMU - strategies, rules and discretion | Period_1 | 2004-04-23 | 0.101 | inflation forecasts or projections, while useful and indeed indispensable ingredients of a monetary policy framework, cannot be the only input in decision-making. the same inflation forecast figures can be associated with quite different states of the economy, reflecting the effects of different factors and shocks, and thus potentially requiring different policy responses on the part of the central bank. for this reason too, monetary authorities carefully take into account the specific determinants of the economic situation and outlook as well as the nature and size of the threats to price stability. such an analysis may require adapting, to a certain extent, the appropriate monetary policy horizon for restoring price stability in response to the nature and magnitude of shocks. in this respect, it is notable that quite a few “inflation-targeting central banks” have recently relaxed their emphasis on a fixed horizon, in favour of the more flexible medium-term notion, thereby moving closer to the approach adopted by the ecb. all in all, the uncertainty and our imperfect knowledge of the state, structure and dynamics of the economy severely limit the usefulness of relying on a single model and on simple and fully defined policy reaction functions for determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. if monetary policy bases its decisions on just one single equation or set of equations, it effectively assumes to have perfect knowledge of the key structural aspects of an ever… |
| Mr. Duisenberg elucidates the European System of Central Banks’ stability-oriented monetary policy strategy (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 10 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-11-20 | 0.087 | relying on a single forecast that attempts to summarise all the information available from a wide range of indicators would be misguided. the governing council will not wish to be presented with a single number to which it will have to react mechanistically, if at all. in contrast, the governing council will want to know the economic reasons behind the projected risks to price stability. the appropriate monetary policy response to a threat to price stability will depend on the nature of the threat. the governing council can only understand the nature of the risk if it is presented with a full set of data. from these data, it can attempt - with the help of various staff analyses - to identify the nature of the disturbance to price stability. having identified the threat, an appropriate policy response can be selected and implemented. |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Economic policies on the two sides of the Atlantic (why) are they different? | Period_1 | 2008-11-11 | 0.087 | years the euro area has been worse hit by “supply shocks” than the united states. a supply shock tends to have an effect on growth with the opposite sign to that of inflation. one example is the decline in total factor productivity (tfp) in the early part of this decade which brought upward pressure to bear on inflation at a time when economic activity was slowing down, as occurred following the bursting of the dot.com bubble. indeed, available evidence seems to suggest that the exacerbation of negative supply shocks is a recurring feature of economic slowdown phases in the euro area. as a result of that phenomenon, inflation in the euro area tends to react to an economic slowdown less rapidly than it does in the united states. this difference may explain why, especially in cyclical slowdown phases, monetary policy action in the euro area tends to be less aggressive than it is in the united states. in the united states, on the other hand, analysis seems to show that demand shocks tend to prevail, which puts pressure on inflation and on economic activity simultaneously. supply shocks like those related to productivity tend to have a considerable impact on demand if agents expect them to have an impact on permanent income, affecting consumption. for example, the increase in productivity in the second half of the 1990s led to strong growth in consumption in the united states, financed by debt. in this context, the monetary policy reaction can be more decisive, and transmitted… |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.133 | (year-on-year percentage change) ecb and eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections. the policy response to the continued shortfall of inflation from our aim also reflects our commitment to symmetry in the inflation aim, which we emphasised in the statement following the governing council’s july meeting. this was essentially a clarification of our reaction function: our determination to act when inflation falls short of our medium-term inflation aim is just as strong as our determination to act when inflation exceeds that aim. stating clearly our commitment to symmetry is important, since the formulation of our aim – “below, but close to, 2 percent” – risks being misunderstood, particularly in an environment of falling inflation expectations. we also stressed in july that both realised and projected inflation have been persistently below levels that are in line with our aim. this was also an important facet of our communication because the “close to” formulation of our inflation aim does not provide a precise numeric anchor for inflation expectations. |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy communication in turbulent times | Period_2 | 2014-04-24 | 0.107 | while such “management by expectations” worked relatively well in normal times, the crisis inevitably made our decision-making process more complicated and our policies more difficult to understand. for example, the use of unconventional measures implied a wider range of possible monetary policy responses to a given shock. to continue to steer expectations in this environment, the ecb had to be more explicit in its communication. this involved reaffirming our mandate and explaining its medium-turn orientation and euro area perspective. furthermore, the governing council will be equally active in guarding against inflation and deflation. and, faced with the effective lower bound and different contingencies, we had to explain our future policy intentions and clarify our more complex reaction function. |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy in the euro area | Period_2 | 2018-03-19 | 0.106 | we have proven in the past that our forward guidance is credible. this has been the case both for our guidance on rates and on our reaction function, notably when we laid out the contingencies that would justify launching an asset purchase programme in response to a too- prolonged period of low inflation.9 conclusion to conclude, we currently see inflation converging towards our aim over the medium term, and we are more confident than in the past this convergence will come to pass. but we still need to see further evidence that inflation dynamics are moving in the right direction. so monetary policy will remain patient, persistent and prudent. |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy in a prolonged period of low inflation | Period_2 | 2014-05-26 | 0.104 | the physiology of disinflation so to sum up: falling energy and food prices, coupled with the effects of relative price adjustment in stressed countries, explain almost fully the disinflation we have seen in the euro area. we also see that disinflation produces counterveiling forces, which may in time cause it to self-correct. to what extent should monetary policy therefore react to these developments? the answer relates to the physiology of inflation: whether or not these factors are likely to persist into the medium-term and therefore enter the horizon of monetary policy. temporary movements in the exchange rate or relative price adjustments would not normally warrant a monetary policy response. given the lag in monetary policy transmission, a monetary impulse would hit the economy just when the effect on inflation has faded out and the impulse is no longer necessary. that said, shocks can change: in certain circumstances temporary shocks can morph into persistent shocks via second-round effects. in particular, a prolonged period of low or even negative inflation rates might destabilise inflation expectations. and we know from international experience this change can happen quite quickly, especially if the objective of monetary policy is not clear. thus, we have to judge carefully how an apparently temporary shock is spreading through the economy and affecting expectations. moreover, the situation is more complex if there are impairments in monetary policy transmission t… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy communication in turbulent times | Period_2 | 2014-04-24 | 0.102 | with our forward guidance, we aim to give guidance on the expected level of future interest rates, and to remove uncertainty about that level by strengthening communication on our reaction function. we have also further simplified our reaction function by laying out some contingencies that would warrant a monetary policy reaction. these are, first, an unwarranted tightening of monetary policy stance (from developments in short-term money markets, global bond markets or foreign exchange markets) that could be tackled through more conventional measures. second, a further impairment in the transmission of our stance, in particular via the bank lending channel, for which a targeted ltro or an abs purchase programme might be the right response. third, a worsening of the medium-term outlook for inflation, which would warrant a more broad- based asset purchase programme. the governing council is committed – unanimously – to using both unconventional and conventional instruments to deal effectively with the risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.102 | stronger anchor for inflation expectations, a strategic commitment to simplifying the communication of monetary policy also makes it easier for the ecb to be held accountable and for it to build trust among the general public. regarding the symmetry of the inflation target, the recognition that deviations from the target in either direction are equally undesirable implies that a risk-management approach to the calibration of monetary policy should balance equally the risks of inflation being too high and too low. at the same time, the symmetry of the target does not necessarily imply symmetry in policy responses to these risks, in view of the constraints imposed by the effective lower bound in reacting to below-target inflation. |
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.099 | patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery speech by fabio panetta, member of the executive board of the ecb, at sciences po the long and rocky road out of the pandemic is creating challenges for monetary policy. following years of too-low inflation and policy oriented at addressing deflationary risks, we are now in an environment of two-way inflation risks and heightened short-term volatility (chart 1). markets are indicating increasing uncertainty about the inflation outlook, and investors’ expectations of lift-off dates have become more dispersed. in this environment, central banks must clarify their reaction function, so that market expectations remain aligned with their policy intentions. this, in turn, requires a clear framework for thinking about inflation developments and what conditions would warrant a monetary policy response. |
| Christine Lagarde: Commitment and persistence - monetary policy in the economic recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.094 | first, we focus on the medium term, not on current inflation numbers. this is because, for one, monetary policy affects the economy with a lag. so, when inflation pressure is expected to fade — as is the case today — it does not make sense to react by tightening policy. the tightening would not affect the economy until after the shock has already passed. second, our strategy tailors our monetary policy response to the type of shock we are facing. |
| Frank Elderson: Proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank concrete | Period_3 | 2022-03-25 | 0.088 | circumstances and challenges that we face in the pursuit of price stability. making the strategy concrete let me explain how this can be envisaged in practice with an analogy in construction that may speak more to the minds of a general audience than concepts from the world of monetary theorists and lawyers. very much like price stability ensures a solid foundation to support a well- functioning economy, in construction concrete is the bedrock of any structure: homes, office buildings, bridges, wind and solar power stations, and so on. this bedrock is made up of four simple ingredients: cement, gravel, sand and water. every ingredient plays its part. cement is the key bonding agent that holds the concrete together. it is the gravel and sand that give it its strength and structural integrity. the water activates the bonding process and also makes the concrete malleable and allows for flexible application. the optimal concrete mix ratio depends highly on where the concrete will be used. generally, the amount of sand and gravel is important for strength and durability, whereas cement and water add to workability. as one might expect, dry environments call for a relatively higher proportion of water in the concrete mixture, while the opposite holds for moist surroundings. exposure to mechanical or chemical erosion also call for relatively less water to maintain durability. environments subject to freezing and thawing benefit from concrete that contains some air pockets, determ… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.081 | lending rate to non-financial corporations and the intermediation wedge ecb (mir statistics) and bloomberg. notes: the intermediation wedge is the distance from the base rate (three-year ois) to the realised lending rate, as measured by the observed lending rate for non-financial corporations. the latest observations are for january 2022. the impact of the pandemic monetary policy measures to assess the contribution of monetary policy to countering the pandemic shock, a natural point of comparison is the calculation of the adverse impact that would have materialised in the absence of the monetary policy response. the alternative path the economy would have taken without responsive monetary policy can be calculated by constructing counterfactual financial conditions and then feeding these into macroeconomic models. a first approach to calculating such counterfactual financial conditions is to employ pre-pandemic impact estimates of past monetary policy recalibrations in order to calculate by how much higher, for example, yields would have been absent monetary policy action. averaging across a range of models, ecb staff analysis based on this approach indicates that, without our monetary policy measures, euro area output would be 1.8 percentage points lower and the annual inflation rate would be 1.2 percentage points lower by 2023 in cumulative terms. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 51 | bond | 1 | 0.1330125 | bond | 1 | 0.9996494 |
| 51 | market | 2 | 0.0669151 | government bond | 2 | 0.9995617 |
| 51 | yield | 3 | 0.0525695 | bond yield | 3 | 0.9992988 |
| 51 | government | 4 | 0.0372853 | bond market | 4 | 0.9991236 |
| 51 | sovereign | 5 | 0.0321906 | corporate bond | 5 | 0.9989484 |
| 51 | government bond | 6 | 0.0283025 | sovereign bond | 6 | 0.9983786 |
| 51 | corporate | 7 | 0.0214649 | yield | 7 | 0.9979822 |
| 51 | bond yield | 8 | 0.0210627 | holding | 8 | 0.9976783 |
| 51 | bond market | 9 | 0.0191856 | sovereign | 9 | 0.9976317 |
| 51 | corporate bond | 10 | 0.0155657 | corporate | 10 | 0.9975449 |
| 51 | basis | 11 | 0.0148954 | sovereign yield | 11 | 0.9973692 |
| 51 | issue | 12 | 0.0146272 | bond issue | 12 | 0.9965343 |
| 51 | spread | 13 | 0.0139569 | spread | 13 | 0.9964936 |
| 51 | holding | 14 | 0.0135546 | bond purchase | 14 | 0.9961001 |
| 51 | sovereign bond | 15 | 0.0135546 | government bond yield | 15 | 0.9960070 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The euro in 2000 - principal features of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 29 Jun 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-07-14 | 0.174 | the euro and the financial markets the creation of the euro has accelerated the development and integration of the capital markets in europe, which, in recent years, have also been fostered by financial liberalisation and technological innovation. this also contributes to high growth, as more efficient financial markets help in allocating funds to their best use. in effect, the single currency has removed the exchange risk between the countries of the euro area. it is facilitating the standardisation of debt instruments and their management on a larger scale. this integrative effect of the euro has been most evident in the money market, by virtue of, in particular, the establishment of target, the large-value payment system. this integration has shown itself in, for example, the rapid adoption by the market of reference rates for the euro area, such as the eonia overnight rate or the euribor for maturities of less than one year. above all, we have seen a total convergence in short-term interest rates within the euro area. in bond markets, the integration of markets remains incomplete, owing, for instance, to national differences in respect of taxation, accounting and supervisory regulations and payment and settlement systems. nevertheless, the integration of bond markets is progressing. we have seen european bond indices become standardised. the differences in rates between sovereign issues within the euro area fell substantially in 1998. furthermore, 1999 was characterise… |
| Jürgen Stark: The economic crisis and the response of fiscal and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2009-06-15 | 0.131 | support for the banking sector government support for the banking sector was necessary; it has safeguarded the stability of the financial system. the price of this success, however, is that governments have incurred substantial fiscal costs and credit risks that are ultimately borne by taxpayers. following the adoption of a concerted european action plan on 12 october 2008, euro area governments announced national measures to support the banking sector. these measures consist of government guarantees for interbank lending, recapitalisation of financial institutions in difficulty, increase the coverage of retail deposit insurance and asset relief schemes. overall, euro area governments committed about 23% of euro area gdp to financial sector support measures. for the euro area, the various support measures adopted so far are expected to have only a small direct impact on government deficits, whereas the impact on debt is expected to be about 3% of gdp. finally, contingent liabilities related to the financial rescue measures are expected to be about 8% of gdp, excluding government guarantees on retail deposits. these figures, however, do not reflect the very different developments taking place across euro area countries. between end-september and end-october 2008, concurrent to the announcement of the broad-based bank rescue packages, an adverse shift in market sentiment towards sovereign borrowers occurred. it became more expensive to insure against the default of euro area… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Further integrating euro area economies ¿ some reflections | Period_1 | 2006-07-14 | 0.114 | 5 a more sophisticated analysis based on an international portfolio choice model reaches the same conclusion (see de santis and gérard, 2006, “financial integration, international portfolio choice and the european monetary union”, ecb working paper series, n. 626.). emu has enhanced regional financial integration in the euro area in both the equity and bond markets. there is evidence of active trading among euro area member states, with euro area investors assigning a higher weight to portfolio investment in euro area countries. over the period 1997-2001, the average increase in weights – on top of the world average portfolio weight increase in euro area assets – amounts to 12.7 percentage points for equity holdings and 22.4 percentage points for bond and note holdings. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: European financial integration and the management of inflation expectations by the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 2005-04-21 | 0.090 | action by providing central banking services that foster european financial integration. we are currently building target2, which is due to go live in 2007 and which will replace the current decentralised system with a single technical platform. with the functionalities that will be introduced in target2, we also expect it to be one of the most sophisticated payment systems in the world. target2 will also further improve financial integration. it will increase cost effectiveness. it will allow for the provision of a harmonised level of services across europe, supported by the implementation of a single price structure for domestic and cross-border payments. and finally, it will offer new functionalities enabling banks to better integrate their euro liquidity management. moreover, to also mention a retail aspect, the ecb, and the eurosystem as a whole, fully support the establishment of a single euro payments area (sepa) from 1 january 2008. this means that citizens and enterprises will be able to make payments throughout the euro area from a single bank account using a single set of payment instruments, as easily and safely as today in the national systems. in addition, national infrastructures should progressively migrate towards a pan-european payments infrastructure with a view to achieving it by the end of 2010. consequently, decisions related to the next generation of national systems should be made from a pan-european perspective to ensure compliance with the sepa. t… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Two successes of the euro - the single monetary policy and European financial integration | Period_1 | 2006-05-19 | 0.089 | many factors have contributed in the recent past to enhancing financial integration in europe. first, public action at the community level aims to remove residual legislative and regulatory obstacles as well as to allow competitive forces to deploy their effects in full. second, the introduction of the euro has removed a major hindrance to financial integration, notably foreign exchange risk. third, market participants have to a certain extent exploited the new environment by increasing their cross-border activities. the ensuing question is how can the euro’s contribution and performance in this respect be measured? i suggest two measures of performance. the first and most obvious way of measuring performance is to look at the “hard facts”. as discussions on this topic are often of a qualitative nature, stating the general need to enhance european financial integration in view of the related benefits, the ecb has sought to devise a way to capture, in quantitative terms, the state of financial integration in the euro area. such quantitative measures, mainly based on the law of one price – which states that assets with identical risks and return characteristics should be priced identically regardless of where they are transacted – offer the advantage of being able to illustrate both the current level of financial integration and its evolution over time, i.e. whether integration is progressing, stable or even regressing. the ecb therefore published last year a first set of qu… |
| Philip R Lane: The compass of monetary policy - favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2021-03-02 | 0.301 | 02/03/2021 the compass of monetary policy: favourable financing conditions bank loans to firms and households (chart 4 and chart 5). as such, sovereign yields are a key element in determining general financing conditions in all sectors and jurisdictions across the euro area. bank and sovereign bond yields (daily; percentages per annum; x-axis: sovereign yields; y-axis: bank bond yields) markit iboxx, ecb and ecb calculations. notes: the chart reports the correlation between the (level of) bank bond yields and sovereign yields. each dot corresponds to a daily recording of the average yield for senior unsecured bonds (ig) issued by banks with a given maturity in a given country and the sovereign yields with the same maturity for the same day in the same country. the latest observation is for 11 february 2021. corporate and sovereign bond yields (daily; percentages per annum; x-axis: sovereign yields; y-axis: corporate bond yields) https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2021/html/ecb.sp210225~7e2955b6e5.en.html 11/20 |
| Mario Draghi: President’s address at the 16th ECB and its Watchers Conference | Period_2 | 2015-03-13 | 0.281 | believe that as our balance sheet grows more substantially under the expanded asset purchase programme, it will support a rebound of these measures. second, our policy announcement was largely anticipated. on 1 january 2015, 60% of surveyed experts attached a 65% or higher probability that we would announce a public sector securities purchase programme at our january meeting. and, according to various surveys, expectations were already quite high in autumn last year. these anticipation effects show up in the financial data. according to estimates, the impact of the asset purchase programme has accounted for most of the fall in euro area long-term sovereign yields since august last year. the same applies for movements in other financial markets metrics, such as the fall in long-term corporate bond yields of non-financial corporations. beyond anticipation effects, the announcement of the expanded programme of asset purchases itself also led to substantial further falls in longer-term sovereign yields. for instance, from just before our announcement on 22 january to the close of business the day after, german 20-year maturity yields fell by almost 25 basis points and italian 20-year maturity yields fell by almost 35 basis points. we also saw a further fall in the sovereign yields of portugal and other formerly distressed countries – in spite of the renewed greek crisis. this suggests that the asset purchase programme may be shielding other euro area countries from contagion, … |
| Mario Draghi: President’s address at the 16th ECB and its Watchers Conference | Period_2 | 2015-03-13 | 0.248 | believe that as our balance sheet grows more substantially under the expanded asset purchase programme, it will support a rebound of these measures. second, our policy announcement was largely anticipated. on 1 january 2015, 60% of surveyed experts attached a 65% or higher probability that we would announce a public sector securities purchase programme at our january meeting. and, according to various surveys, expectations were already quite high in autumn last year. these anticipation effects show up in the financial data. according to estimates, the impact of the asset purchase programme has accounted for most of the fall in euro area long-term sovereign yields since august last year. the same applies for movements in other financial markets metrics, such as the fall in long-term corporate bond yields of non-financial corporations. beyond anticipation effects, the announcement of the expanded programme of asset purchases itself also led to substantial further falls in longer-term sovereign yields. for instance, from just before our announcement on 22 january to the close of business the day after, german 20-year maturity yields fell by almost 25 basis points and italian 20-year maturity yields fell by almost 35 basis points. we also saw a further fall in the sovereign yields of portugal and other formerly distressed countries – in spite of the renewed greek crisis. this suggests that the asset purchase programme may be shielding other euro area countries from contagion, … |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: How innovative should central banks be? | Period_2 | 2014-12-01 | 0.212 | conditions for borrowers in the real economy. the same logic can also be applied to the selective purchase programmes for covered bonds and asset-backed securities. the eurosystem is currently faced with 18, soon to be 19, issuers of government securities. should we not take into account during a broad purchase programme of securities the fact that government securities in the euro area are not without credit risk? there are very few shared competencies in fiscal policy. as long as this is the case, the ecb’s purchase of government securities is inevitably linked to a serious incentive problem. after all, the required cost-benefit considerations should also take into account the fact that other central banks bought government securities in a different economic environment with considerably higher long-term interest rates. in the euro area, the long-term interest rates on spanish and italian government bonds, for example, are already lower than those from the united states or the united kingdom. it is therefore questionable whether we should “depress” interest rates for the securities class even further. moreover, the interest on national government bonds in the euro area doesn’t operate as a benchmark for all further refinancing operations, as is the case in the united kingdom or the united states for example. besides, the effect of intervening in capital markets in a bank- based financial system is weaker than in a market-based system, as illustrated by wealth effects, fo… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy - past, present and future | Period_2 | 2015-11-25 | 0.192 | effectiveness of asset purchases there are many reasons why asset purchases should have a strong impact on activity and inflation. purchases compress yields and reduce the cost of financing in the economy through direct pass-through and portfolio rebalancing effects. for banks they make lending to the real economy more attractive than purchasing government bonds. higher financial and real estate asset prices can also increase demand via wealth effects and lower the cost of equity for firms. when we launched the app, however, it was in an environment where the strength of these conventional transmission channels was questionable – at least in the eyes of some observers. one concern was that the impact of interventions might be meagre given that yields were already very low at the start of the purchase programme. as such, savers selling securities to the ecb might not feel substantially richer and spend more, while borrowers might not perceive a material easing in their financing costs and borrow more. indeed, at the launch of the app nominal borrowing conditions for virtually all sovereign issuers were the most favourable in post-war history. but the low yields we saw in january were not a limiting factor on our programme; they were proof that it was already working. following our communication on our reaction function in the first half of last year1, interest rates had in fact been falling consistently over the months preceding the launch of app, as markets began to price … |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.361 | corporate bonds the corporate bond market plays an important role in the financing of larger non-financial firms in the euro area. similar to sovereign bonds, increases in risk-free rates have been well transmitted to the corporate bond market. aggregate investment-grade corporate bond spreads over risk-free rates increased throughout the year from 50 to 100 basis points, with high-yield corporate bond spreads having increased from 310 to 460 basis points (chart 14). |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.280 | our main steering tool in this process is the tilting parameter – that is, the weight we put on the climate score in our benchmark allocation for new purchases. however, the tilting parameter lost part of its punch when we decided to stop net asset purchases (slide 5). the forthcoming reduction in reinvestments will further significantly constrain the ability of a flow-based approach to decarbonise our corporate bond portfolio at a pace that is consistent with our climate ambitions.[21] the decarbonisation of our corporate bond portfolio depends not only on our tilting parameter but also considerably on the rate at which the firms in our portfolio decarbonise their businesses.[22] for example, assuming full reinvestment, we would achieve only half of the total decarbonisation of our corporate bond holdings by 2030 if firms were to stop taking steps to decarbonise their activities (slide 6, left-hand side). this effect depends to a significant extent on the actions of a few high-emitting companies (slide 6, right-hand side). together, this implies that by ending our reinvestments, the speed of decarbonisation of our portfolio would slow down substantially and be largely out of our control. a flow-based tilting approach is thus insufficient to achieve our goal. the paris agreement requires a stable decarbonisation trajectory in our portfolio irrespective of our monetary policy stance or companies’ individual actions. we therefore need to move from a flow-based to a stock-bas… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.280 | greening our public sector bond holdings the second question is how to put our public sector bond holdings, which currently account for around half of our balance sheet, on a paris-aligned path. aligning our large public sector bond holdings with the objectives of the paris agreement is proving challenging for a variety of reasons. first, purchases of sovereign bonds are guided by the capital key, which limits the scope for tilting strategies based on countries’ carbon intensities. second, there is not yet a reliable framework in place to assess the extent to which sovereign bond portfolios are aligned with the paris agreement. and, finally, the amount of green sovereign bonds is still limited, in particular when compared with the size of our current bond portfolio. finding options for overcoming these constraints within our mandate is critical: any attempt to green the stock of our bond holdings needs to include a solution for our sovereign bond portfolio, in particular in the light of the review of the ecb’s future operational framework, which is likely to imply a larger steady-state balance sheet, potentially including a structural bond portfolio. at present, there are two options to make our sovereign bond portfolio greener in a timely manner. one is to increase the share of bonds issued by supranational institutions and agencies. a considerably larger fraction of their outstanding bonds is already green (slide 7). tilting our purchases towards green bonds issued by su… |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economy and the energy transition | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.255 | the aim is to gradually decarbonise our corporate bond holdings, on a path aligned with the goals of the paris agreement. in practice, this involves measuring the climate performance of each eligible issuer based on its greenhouse gas emissions, carbon reduction targets and climate-related disclosures. ultimately, this will result in the purchase of more bonds issued by companies with a good climate performance and fewer bonds from those with a poor climate performance. this tilting changes the composition of the monetary policy portfolio, but the overall purchase volume is still determined solely by monetary policy considerations – in line with our primary mandate. this process is already under way: as of 1 october we have started to tilt our reinvestment purchases towards issuers with a better climate performance. and from the first quarter of 2023, we will start to publish climate-related information on our corporate bond holdings. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.211 | greening the stock of corporate bond holdings first, the ongoing decline in our balance sheet will visibly diminish the effect of some of our actions going forward. for example, for our corporate bond portfolio we are following a flow-based tilting approach where we adjust our reinvestments of corporate bonds based on a climate score that reflects issuers’ carbon intensity, their decarbonisation plans and the quality of their climate-related disclosures. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 52 | raise | 1 | 0.0422458 | normalisation | 1 | 0.9991236 |
| 52 | meet | 2 | 0.0303552 | hike | 2 | 0.9987723 |
| 52 | normalisation | 3 | 0.0295352 | policy normalisation | 3 | 0.9985962 |
| 52 | basis | 4 | 0.0206514 | raise interest rate | 4 | 0.9980710 |
| 52 | interest | 5 | 0.0195580 | raise | 5 | 0.9975408 |
| 52 | step | 6 | 0.0191480 | rate hike | 6 | 0.9972344 |
| 52 | datum | 7 | 0.0165512 | raise interest | 7 | 0.9969758 |
| 52 | adjust | 8 | 0.0153211 | term target | 8 | 0.9967069 |
| 52 | interest rate | 9 | 0.0153211 | medium term target | 9 | 0.9964005 |
| 52 | condition | 10 | 0.0135444 | tpi | 10 | 0.9961812 |
| 52 | return | 11 | 0.0131343 | step | 11 | 0.9959599 |
| 52 | target | 12 | 0.0129977 | meet | 12 | 0.9954249 |
| 52 | decision | 13 | 0.0127243 | datum dependent | 13 | 0.9952638 |
| 52 | hike | 14 | 0.0119043 | monetary policy normalisation | 14 | 0.9950801 |
| 52 | september | 15 | 0.0112209 | raise rate | 15 | 0.9945629 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Activism and alertness in monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-16 | 0.064 | ladies and gentlemen, since 1 january 1999, the day on which it officially became the monetary authority of the euro area, the ecb has changed its policy rate, the rate on its main refinancing operations, 18 times. over the same period, the federal reserve system has made 35 changes. the easing cycle that started on both sides of the atlantic – and of the channel – in 2001 saw a cumulative reduction in the policy rate of 275 basis points in the euro area, accomplished in a sequence of seven moves. the ecb started to reverse that cycle in december last year and has since changed its policy in a sequence of three steps. in the united states, the same easing phase saw 13 reductions, with a total loosening of 550 basis points, and was first reversed in june 2004. since then, the federal reserve has hiked its target rate 16 times in continuous steps. i thought i would take advantage of the opportunity afforded by this impressive programme to revisit a theme on which i have reflected in the past: “activism” in monetary policy. is there a univocal definition of this notion? can “activism” be quantified by simple statistics such as the frequency and size of policy moves? can a central bank be “active” while moving its policy rate in a measured and observationally cautious way? was the ecb active enough in responding to the evolving state of the euro area economy? the few facts that i have recounted seem to suggest otherwise. i will try to convince you that the contrary is true. i … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The ECB’s response to the crisis | Period_1 | 2011-05-30 | 0.056 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Activism and alertness in monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-16 | 0.052 | concluding remarks i am sometimes asked the following “you are in the process of increasing rates. is your judgement that your rates today are significantly lower than they should be? what then is the level of the “neutral rate” that you would judge it appropriate to reach (as rapidly as possible)?” my response to such questions would be the following. first, we are not in a position that we would judge “abnormal”, in the sense that we would have to increase as rapidly as possible our interest rates up to the “normal” level. we are in a process of progressively withdrawing the present degree of monetary accommodation commensurate with the risks to price stability that we perceive, associated in particular with the present development of the economic recovery. to the extent that we never previously pre-committed to unconditional moves and we have always adhered to the posture of steady alertness which is at the heart of our strategy, our monetary policy stance should and does – to the best of our own comprehensive, deep and candid assessment of the situation – at any time makes it possible to cope with the risks we see for price stability in a medium-term perspective. then, in a dynamic perspective, our refusal of unconditional pre-commitments, our position of permanent, steady alertness and our strategy help focus our policy upon being permanently at the “correct level” in terms of attaining our primary goal in a medium-term perspective. second, from a central bank’s persp… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The monetary policy of the ECB during the financial crisis | Period_1 | 2011-06-08 | 0.050 | into the long-term inflation expectations, which could trigger second-round effects on wages and prices. it is against this background that the governing council decided in april to raise interest rates. i stressed in reporting this decision it had been taken unanimously. the action of the governing council is motivated by a common goal. that decision in april confirmed that the separation principle is strictly applied and that our non-conventional measures do not restrict in any way our ability to toughen the monetary policy stance when facing inflationary pressures. thus, when the governing council decided in march and april that it was time to raise interest rates, in parallel, at the same time, it decided to keep, in the second quarter, the provision of unlimited fixed-rate liquidity for a period of three months. let me remind you of what i said earlier: nothing of what i have just said can or should be interpreted in terms of future decisions of the governing council next thursday. |
| Mr. Duisenberg elucidates the European System of Central Banks’ stability-oriented monetary policy strategy (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 10 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-11-20 | 0.050 | clearly, the governing council could have decided to announce some form of inflation forecast and justify policy decisions by reference to it. interest rate increases or decreases could then be explained on the basis that the inflation forecast pointed to threats to price stability. however, this presentation of monetary strategy to the public is likely to involve a circular argument. for example, interest rate increases would be justified on the basis that the inflation forecast pointed to an inflation rate higher than that consistent with price stability. however, critical observers might soon argue that the inflation forecast was above the target precisely because there was a perceived need to raise interest rates. simply publishing a forecast does not explain why interest rates need to be changed. moreover, as i have said, simply presenting a forecast to the public does not explain how the conclusion that a rate rise is required has been reached. on both grounds, publishing the forecast does not enhance the transparency and clarity of the strategy. |
| Luis de Guindos: Interview with Börsen-Zeitung | Period_2 | 2019-11-12 | 0.100 | when president draghi said the famous words “whatever it takes” in 2012… …when he promised in the summer of 2012 to do whatever it takes, within the limits of the ecb’s mandate, to preserve the euro… …the message was clear: the ecb stands ready to safeguard the integrity of the euro. monetary policy is not an isolated tool and it does not operate in a political vacuum, separate from the rest of the world. it interacts with fiscal policy and also with structural policies. we don’t live in an ivory tower. but at the same time monetary policy is not almighty. take the trade dispute or brexit, which have economic consequences. the ecb can make liquidity available, which helps, but it doesn’t solve the problems. in his eight years as ecb president mario draghi made monetary policy ever more accommodative and he never raised interest rates. you have a bit more than seven years to go. do you think interest rates will be raised again at some point in that period? when president draghi arrived at the ecb, i’m sure that he also expected to be raising rates at some point. but the economic situation meant it wasn’t possible. he did at least stop asset purchases for a while, even if he didn’t manage to raise rates. i don’t know how things will stand two or three years from now. there are models that make predictions for the next 50 years, but life is much more complicated than that. there’s also the question of whether there will ever be a normalisation of monetary policy, with an end … |
| Yves Mersch: Monetary policy in the euro area - scope, principles and limits | Period_2 | 2016-06-24 | 0.080 | impact. in other words, the app, coupled with our other credit easing measures, has reduced distortions caused by market fragmentation in the euro area. still, we know that the longer unconventional policy lasts, the greater the risk of distortions appearing and diminishing its effectiveness over time. the principle of proportionality also implies that we should only use such measures for as short a time as is necessary to fulfil our mandate. that is why, when the economy improves and inflation returns to our objective, we will have to reassess, adjust and ultimately phase out our purchase programmes and other non-standard measures. but the surest way to reach that point is to stay true to the course we are on now. if we were to change speed or direction too soon, it would only set back the recovery of inflation and delay the day that interest rate normalisation can happen. we will decide upon this in full independence, in the interests of price stability, impervious to the wishes of any interest group with any partial agenda. |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2014-03-04 | 0.071 | five years of monetary policy – the ecb has delivered in the last five years, the ecb has continued to take the necessary measures with a view to maintaining price stability in the euro area. let me turn back to the first hearing of this parliament’s term which took place with my predecessor in september 2009. at the time, the economy was just bottoming out in the aftermath of the great contraction which had ensued after lehman’s failure. we were witnessing negative inflation rates. in this environment, the outlook was seen to be broadly in line with price stability. inflation was projected to increase toward levels close to 2%. the key ecb interest rates were kept on hold at the very low level to which they had been brought in several stages since the autumn of the preceding year. some phasing-out of non-standard measures was announced. however, in may 2010, sovereign debt markets froze in various euro area member states. financial fragmentation took a new and unfamiliar form, with financial conditions and the transmission of our monetary policy varying to a great extent across member states. we responded by introducing the securities markets programme, focused on purchases of government bonds. initially, while the economic impact of the sovereign debt crisis was limited and largely confined to vulnerable economies, the rapid global recovery put upside pressure on energy prices. this drove up inflation also in the euro area. we decided to raise interest rates in |
| Philip R Lane: Q&A with Bloomberg | Period_2 | 2019-10-01 | 0.068 | concerned, in the most recent statements and what you’ve just said, has the ecb gone as far as it can go on the spectrum between encouraging expansionary fiscal policy and explicitly underwriting it, if you like – which people would be very nervous about, potentially? legally, do you think you could go any further in terms of specificity? lane: i’m not so sure that’s the way i would think about it. i don’t think i’ve been in and had such kind of a conversation in the ecb. it’s basically a reminder of the situation, which is: we have a weak economic outlook; we are responding to that. but the mapping of our measures to the overall economy and to inflation does depend on what’s going to happen and the decisions made in terms of setting fiscal policy now. i don’t think it’s anything like a deep philosophical issue. of course, there’s lots of debates going on in the world about monetary-fiscal interactions. it’s much more confined than that. i’m dying to ask more but i know there’s lots of frustrated people wanting to ask questions! i’ll take a few. question 1) you’ve done ten basis points of rate cuts. you’ve done €20 billion of qe. that’s in the context of 350 to 500 basis points of rate cuts and €2.6 trillion of qe. some people might argue that’s tinkering at the edges. if this didn’t work and it didn’t prove to be the panacea, what new tool might you add to your monetary toolbox? question 2) you have made a big point now and also in the helsinki speech about the negative r… |
| Peter Praet: Interview in Expansión | Period_2 | 2017-04-04 | 0.063 | after what happened in italy in november last year, is the concept of the “bail-in” still alive and well? the european rules allow flexibility for financial stability reasons under well-defined conditions. without any specific reference to the case of italy, it has to be clear that when the authorities are forced to intervene in this way, they must ensure that the bank undergoes a decisive restructuring process to ensure its viability on a lasting basis. this is crucial for generating the necessary confidence so that we can together move forward with the process of banking union. what is the situation of the spanish banks? i think they have made a tremendous effort and improved their situation significantly. the level of non-performing loans to the private sector has fallen below 7%, which, while still high, is certainly manageable. nevertheless, there is still room for greater consolidation because their cost ratios, while not the highest in the euro area, are still too high. profitability remains weak, although there are substantial differences between banks. while there is a need for more consolidation, preserving a diverse banking system, with both large and local banks, remains important. the banks are blaming low rates for their reduced profitability. yes, they are, but at the same time they are also recognising the favourable effects of low rates on improved economic conditions and the need to change business models and reduce costs. over time, the economic recovery… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.419 | the flexible reinvestment under pepp, and, more importantly, the unanimous support of the governing council for the transmission protection instrument - led us to decide a larger-than-what-had-been- signalled rate hike on the occasion of this meeting. that is really what, if you want to go behind the curtain of the governing council debates, this is what took place. i would add that in relation to the rate hikes we had the debate, weighted the pros and cons, and at the end of the discussion all members of the governing council rallied to the consensus of 50 basis points. so it’s a strong indication on both accounts in relation to the higher step that we are taking to exit from negative interest rates, and on the other front, which is making sure that our monetary policy stance is transmitted smoothly throughout the entire euro area. now, the tpi is, obviously, an instrument that will help us deliver on our mandate of price stability, bringing inflation in the medium term back to 2%, and under that tpi all members of the euro area can be eligible; all of them. you will find in the press release later, after this press conference, the detail of the eligibility conditions, but all members of the euro area are eligible. the governing council, in its discretion, in its assessment will determine on the basis of the eligibility criteria, on the basis of the indicators that will signal or not unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics, whether or not a country is eligible and whether… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.401 | the governing council, on the occasion of this meeting organised outside of frankfurt, in beautiful amsterdam – thanks to the national central bank of the netherlands – focussed primarily on the challenge of high inflation facing the euro area, and on taking further steps in our normalisation path that we started back in december. so it’s not a question of catching up; it’s a question of using all the tools that we have in order to deliver on our mandate of price stability and in order to bring inflation down to target over the medium term. our analysis was obviously that inflation was undesirably high and that we had to take the steps that i have identified in the monetary policy statement. i would like to add that it’s not just a step; it’s a journey. we started back in december. we gradually over the course of time put ourselves in a position to move away from unconventional monetary policy, which will actually be taking place as of 1 july, in order to use more conventional tools which are the interest rates. on the issue of the interest rates: we also identified a path, which is not only limited to a particular move, but a series of moves over the course of the next few months depending on the medium-term outlook of inflation. on the second issue: we have to have the right monetary policy stance; that is critically important and that is what we are doing with that identification of the journey that i just mentioned. but we also have to make sure that our monetary polic… |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-09-26 | 0.332 | the ecb’s monetary policy based on the medium-term inflation outlook, the governing council decided to raise the three key ecb interest rates by 75 basis points, on top of the 50 basis point increase announced in july. as things currently stand, we expect to raise interest rates further over the next several meetings to dampen demand and guard against the risk of a persistent upward shift in inflation expectations. we will regularly re-evaluate our policy path in light of incoming information and the evolving inflation outlook. our future policy rate decisions will continue to be data-dependent and follow a meeting-by- meeting approach. as requested by the committee, i will now turn briefly to the issue of fragmentation. since we embarked on our normalisation path in december 2021, we have made clear that we will act should fragmentation risks threaten the even transmission of monetary policy across the euro area. since 1 july 2022, we have been applying flexibility in reinvesting redemptions coming due in the pandemic emergency purchase programme portfolio, with a view to countering risks to the transmission mechanism related to the pandemic. later in july, we also announced a new monetary policy tool, the transmission protection instrument (tpi), complementing our existing tools. this tool has been designed to counter unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics, with sufficient flexibility to respond to the severity of the risks facing policy transmission. it will safeguard … |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.328 | macroeconomic] projection exercise in september. so on the basis of the data that we receive at the time of those projections, we will determine what step we take on the normalisation path that we are taking in order to deliver on our medium-term 2%. now, that doesn’t mean to say that we are changing the ultimate point of arrival. we are accelerating the exit, and we are following the path of normalisation that we have flagged. how will the ecb decision on the interest rates affect the retail investors in the medium- and long-term? more specifically, i am wondering what kind of effect it will have on a normal private person that is in the market and now wondering what this will do with his or her money? well, we are moving all three interest rates by 50 basis points. so, obviously, the cost of funding for banks and the cost of credit for those who borrow from banks is, assuming good transmission, which i do, given that we have a transmission protection instrument and that we are very attentive to that, will go up. that’s pretty obvious. why is that actually beneficial, at the end of the day, for those in the retail sector, for those consumers, for all economic agents? the most precious good that we can deliver, and that we have to deliver, is price stability. so we have to bring inflation down to 2% in the medium- term. that is the imperative under the treaty, that is the strategy review objective that we have set for ourselves, and it’s time to deliver. my first question … |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-06-22 | 0.311 | the ecb’s monetary policy the current inflation environment – with figures well above our target – clearly poses a challenge. that’s why at its 8-9 june meeting the governing council expressed its unwavering commitment to bring inflation back to its medium-term target of 2%. with this in mind, and on the basis of the updated assessment i have just outlined, we decided at that meeting to take further steps in normalising our monetary policy. first, we decided to end net asset purchases under our asset purchase programme (app) as of 1 july 2022. second, as the governing council concluded that the conditions underlying our forward guidance have been satisfied, we intend to raise the key ecb interest rates by 25 basis points at our july monetary policy meeting. third, looking further ahead, we expect to raise the key ecb interest rates again in september. the calibration of this rate increase will depend on the updated medium-term inflation outlook. if the medium-term inflation outlook persists or deteriorates, a larger increment will be appropriate at our september meeting. and fourth, beyond september, based on our current assessment, we anticipate that a gradual but sustained path of further increases in interest rates will be appropriate. in line with our commitment to our 2% medium-term target, the pace at which we adjust our monetary policy will depend on the incoming data and how we assess inflation to develop in the medium term. since the gradual process of policy norm… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 53 | germany | 1 | 0.0426164 | german | 1 | 0.9997372 |
| 53 | people | 2 | 0.0365138 | saver | 2 | 0.9996494 |
| 53 | german | 3 | 0.0272469 | germany | 3 | 0.9992986 |
| 53 | draghi | 4 | 0.0235176 | draghi | 4 | 0.9989484 |
| 53 | saver | 5 | 0.0209183 | bundesbank | 5 | 0.9985100 |
| 53 | country | 6 | 0.0197882 | people | 6 | 0.9981574 |
| 53 | good | 7 | 0.0183191 | deutsche | 7 | 0.9975883 |
| 53 | time | 8 | 0.0174150 | pay | 8 | 0.9971949 |
| 53 | return | 9 | 0.0144767 | feel | 9 | 0.9963641 |
| 53 | pay | 10 | 0.0131206 | expansionary monetary policy | 10 | 0.9960016 |
| 53 | mandate | 11 | 0.0118775 | bild | 11 | 0.9958680 |
| 53 | benefit | 12 | 0.0116514 | save | 12 | 0.9951791 |
| 53 | president | 13 | 0.0113124 | worry | 13 | 0.9950926 |
| 53 | bundesbank | 14 | 0.0110864 | saving | 14 | 0.9949996 |
| 53 | saving | 15 | 0.0105213 | expansionary monetary | 15 | 0.9946813 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung | Period_1 | 2011-10-19 | 0.155 | but inflation is not the only thing that the germans fear. they are also scared that they will end up being responsible for the debts of other countries. can you understand that? first of all, i don’t like this talk of “the germans”, “the italians” or “the french”. we live in democracies. our mandate is to ensure price stability. we have delivered price stability, and the markets clearly trust us to continue doing so for the next ten years. the question of debts and who should be responsible for them needs to be put to national governments. first, to the governments who behaved improperly in the past and accumulated excessive levels of debt. and second, to the governments who simply accepted that behaviour on the part of their neighbours. we, the executive board and governing council of the ecb, have spent years arguing publicly against infringements of the stability and growth pact and warning of the dangers that this poses. do you think germany has changed over the years? i have, of course, had the opportunity to discover much of germany for myself and have gained a lasting impression of this country. this is due, among other things, to the fact that i have many, many friends here – friends such as jürgen stark, horst köhler, theo waigel and hans tietmeyer and many more. so, i have close ties with germany. i have observed changes in germany which are highly significant from an economic perspective. a simple example is the fact that, when i moved to frankfurt eight years … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview in Bild | Period_1 | 2011-01-17 | 0.145 | mr trichet, in one word, how would you describe the state of the euro today? if you allow me two words: credible and stable. will the euro crisis get worse this year? let me be very clear: this is not a crisis of the euro. rather, what we have is a crisis related to the public finances of a number of euro area countries. all governments have to put their finances in order, and above all those governments and countries which have lived well beyond their means in the past. how are the euro area countries ever to reduce the debt, now totalling €7 trillion? this year, the budget deficit in the euro area will be half as high as that in the united states or japan. virtually all advanced economies face acute fiscal problems. this is something that is often forgotten. that being said, this is no time for any complacency. let me repeat: the ecb expects the governments in the euro area to make enormous efforts to bring down their debt. some countries have to get their debt under control again. can you understand that many germans are afraid of inflation? the germans are right to be fiercely against inflation. inflation hurts in particular the poorest. price stability is a precondition for growth. but the germans and the european citizens do not need to be afraid: we have delivered and we will deliver price stability. inflation in europe rose to 2.2% in december, the highest rate for two years. we are always concerned if inflation rises and are following developments very closely. bu… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview in Der Spiegel | Period_1 | 2010-05-19 | 0.137 | in refusing to decrease rates, in 2005 in increasing rates against their wishes, and throughout this period in fiercely defending the stability and growth pact including defending it against the german chancellor of the time. just who has been weak over the past few months? it was not the ecb. the governments with their high debts were weak. was i weak myself when i explained to all floor leaders in the german bundestag just why it was important to decide rapidly? was i weak when i informed the heads of state and government in full independence that the situation was grave and that they had to live up to their responsibilities? we took our decision on sunday in full independence. spiegel: thus far, the ecb has been strong and independent because it had repeatedly rejected demands from the political domain for lower interest rates or too expansionary a monetary policy. you have now consented for the first time. trichet: we have consented nothing to the heads of state and government. we always take our decisions taking into account only our own assessment of the situation and not the “recommendations” of governments, markets or social partners. we decided on 9 of august 2007 to supply €95 billion of liquidity in a few hours because our money market was being disrupted. and i could give many such examples. as i have already said, if there has been any direction of influence, it has been more in the opposite direction, from the ecb to governments, when making recommendations t… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with L’Espresso | Period_1 | 2006-09-21 | 0.125 | that of pensions is a european problem, due to the ageing population and the resulting pressure on public funds. without further reforms to pension systems, the contribution rates would need to be doubled in some countries, up to as much as 40% of salaries in some cases, in order to keep a balance in the system’s accounts. but what should be done in these cases? in order to tackle the consequences of ageing populations, we need comprehensive reforms. even if there are no unequivocal solutions, some measures are valid for several countries: raising the retirement age, eliminating early retirement incentives, reduction in replacement rates, integrating public pensions within a system which allows future payments to be financed so that the ageing of the population does not create imbalances between generations. should men and women retire at the same age? this is a sensitive and important issue triggering a whole host of reactions and different points of view. apparently, in accordance with current jurisprudence, i would say they should retire at the same age, as the european court of justice maintains that there should be no discrimination or distinction between men and women in any area. how urgent is pension reform? extremely urgent, in all euro area countries. when we look at demographic trends, we tend to put it off as we are talking about long-term developments. it seems that the movement is slow and long, and that there is time. however, it is a complete illusion becau… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with El País | Period_1 | 2011-05-17 | 0.123 |
|
| Mario Draghi: Interview in Bild | Period_2 | 2016-05-10 | 0.379 | bild: mr draghi, when you became president of the european central bank (ecb) just over four years ago, the germans were scared that, as an italian, you would create too much inflation. now, even an italian is unable to generate sufficient inflation. what is going wrong? mario draghi (laughs): nothing. people in germany can rest assured that their ecb president is doing everything to restore inflation to the right level. our mandate is price stability, which means inflation of just below 2%. bild: in order to achieve that, you have cut interest rates to zero. german savings are melting away like butter in the sun. don’t you care about that? draghi: we are well aware of the situation for savers. and it’s not only in germany that people have to face low interest rates. but interest rates are low because growth is low and inflation is too low. think about the alternative: if we raised rates now, it would be bad for the economy and it would unleash deflation, unemployment and recession. the interest on savings comes from growth, so it is in the interests of savers that inflation stabilises and growth becomes more robust. besides, many people benefit from low interest rates as they are also homebuyers, taxpayers, entrepreneurs and workers whose companies are benefiting. bild: in germany the adverse effects are predominant. making provision for retirement is becoming increasingly difficult… draghi: remember, what counts is what you earn on savings in real terms, i.e. interest mi… |
| Mario Draghi: Interview in Handelsblatt | Period_2 | 2015-01-12 | 0.337 | draghi: history shows that falling prices can be as damaging to the prosperity and stability of our countries as high inflation. that is why our mandate is symmetric. and that is why we are now ensuring that the risk of deflation you just asked me about does not materialise. you, as a journalist, also have a duty to explain. public opinion in germany is very important for us. your intentions are good, the effects of your policies are simply not acceptable for many citizens. people are worried about their savings and pensions. they did not invest money, like goldman sachs, in shares, options and highly controversial bonds, but focused with your majority – rather conservatively – on savings books, german government bonds and life insurance policies. because of the ecb’s low interest rate policy, they are currently experiencing a clear drop in wealth. savings accounts and insurance policy pay-outs are melting. draghi: interest rates have been very, very low for a long time – and they will presumably stay like that for a while longer. people see that the returns on their savings and the profits from their life insurance policies are shrinking. we understand the concerns of savers. but now let me ask a is that the only factor? my answer is no. after the crisis, germany became a safe haven. a lot of money therefore flowed into the country, with the result of falling interest rates on medium and long term bonds – the interest rates of which are not set by the ecb. this has hurt s… |
| Mario Draghi: Interview with Bild Zeitung | Period_2 | 2012-03-23 | 0.312 | part i bild: president draghi, when it was clear that you were to become head of the european central bank, bild made a photomontage of you wearing a prussian spiked helmet and called you a “true german”. what did you think of that? mario draghi: i really liked it. the prussian element is a good symbol of the ecb’s key task: to maintain price stability and to protect european savers. bild: for germans, a central bank chief must take a strict line on inflation, be politically independent and favour a strong euro. in that light, how german are you? draghi: these are indeed german virtues. but every central banker in the euro area should have them. bild: the french president said that europe should learn from the german model… draghi: …he’s right. long before him i said that germany is a model. the old european welfare state model is in fact dead, because it had to make debts far too often. the germans have re-invented it – with no excessive debts. bild: do you have a message for the people of germany? draghi: keep it up! bild: the ever-present fear of devaluation, of inflation, is typically german. can you understand that? draghi: in the twentieth century the people of this country suffered terribly because of inflation. it destroys wealth and makes planning impossible. what’s more, it can really destroy the fabric of a society. bild: why then, as ecb president, are you allowing euro area inflation to currently stand at 2.7%, significantly more than the ecb’s objective? drag… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Die Zeit | Period_2 | 2013-12-12 | 0.297 | mr cœuré, do you know what the interest rate on savings accounts in germany is? very low, probably close to 0%. that’s correct. some banks pay 0.25% or even less. can you relate to savers in germany being annoyed that the european central bank (ecb) is making them foot the bill for the crisis? rates are very low because the euro area economy is weak. take the example of low long-term interest rates on german government bonds, which are important for life insurance contracts and pensions. why exactly is the weak economy responsible for low rates? if growth is weak, there are few profitable investment opportunities. as savings need to be invested in order to achieve returns, this means that returns are low. low market rates also, however, create the conditions for new growth and this will also boost future returns on savings. so you are saying that german savers benefit from the ecb’s low rates? my message is: it is important to differentiate between long-term rates for savers and the policy rate of the ecb. long-term rates are low because the economy is weak. in such circumstances, the ecb has to set its policy rate in such a way as to ensure price stability. thereby we support the economy and create the conditions for profitable investment opportunities – and this is also of benefit to german savers. so what would you say to germans who are worried about their retirement provision? i would tell them that the best way to improve the return on their savings is for the crisis… |
| Mario Draghi: Interview in Bild | Period_2 | 2016-05-10 | 0.280 | bild: does such criticism from the finance minister or from the german vice chancellor threaten the independence of the ecb? draghi: no. but any perception that the ecb’s independence is under attack can unsettle businesses and consumers. they might then postpone investment and spending decisions that would be good for jobs and growth. that might force the central bank to do more to achieve price stability. bild: has the strength of the criticism from germany also got something to do with the fact that you are an italian, and what do you think of demands that the next president of the ecb must be a german? draghi: there is really nobody in the world who is interested in the fact that i am an italian apart from the german media. and what difference would it make if a non-italian were now in office? none at all. he or she would pursue the same course as we do now. all other large central banks in the world are pursuing similar policies. bild: but it is precisely this policy of cheap money that is not working… draghi: wrong – our policy is working, but we must be patient; investor confidence has not yet been fully restored. for two years, the economy in the euro area has been growing month by month, banks are lending and unemployment is steadily falling. meanwhile, euro area countries are now able to buy more german exports again, which, for german companies, is partly making up for the decline in trade with china. but it is a slow process because the crisis was more severe t… |
| Christine Lagarde: Welcome address marking the change in office of the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank | Period_3 | 2022-01-11 | 0.180 | christine lagarde: welcome address marking the change in office of the president of the deutsche bundesbank welcome address by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at a virtual ceremony marking the change of office of the president of the bundesbank,11 january 2022. * * * it is a pleasure to be here today to speak with you. this ceremony marks an important moment of transition for the deutsche bundesbank. we say goodbye to a good friend, jens, after more than ten successful years at the helm of this proud institution. and we welcome joachim as the bundesbank’s new president. the bundesbank is no stranger to moments of transition. it has presided over some remarkable changes in germany’s economy since its establishment back in august 1957. that includes implementing the monetary union as part of german reunification in 1990. overnight, the purchasing power of the deutsche mark could be something enjoyed by all germans. and it also includes introducing germany to the euro. indeed, this month we celebrate the 20th anniversary of euro banknotes and coins becoming part of our daily lives.1 but amid all these transitions, one element has remained constant throughout. the bundesbank has remained faithful to its mandate of maintaining price stability. this has been the key to the bundesbank’s success – and we have inherited that rich tradition at the ecb. price stability is the north star that has helped us navigate through some extremely turbulent times. … |
| Isabel Schnabel: New narratives on monetary policy – the spectre of inflation | Period_3 | 2021-10-12 | 0.098 | governments are actively supporting this transition. as the central bank for the euro area we especially welcome the fiscal policy response at eu level. for the first time since the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2008, our monetary policy measures are being adequately supported by fiscal policy at the european level. “next generation eu” is the largest fiscal package that has ever been financed from the eu budget. the countries that were hardest-hit by the pandemic are receiving extensive financial support to accelerate their recovery. financial support is not solely about cushioning the economic and social effects of the crisis. the main aim is to strengthen the growth potential of euro area countries by investing in green and digital technologies – in other words, to counteract the forces that brought about the noticeable decline in interest rates over the past decades. that will not only benefit the countries that are receiving the largest share of transfers and loans, but also countries such as germany that are strongly dependent on exports. germany can only be strong if europe is strong. fiscal and structural policies that are tailored to the euro area strengthen domestic demand, safeguard jobs and prosperity and − by promoting convergence in the euro area − ensure that the single monetary policy can be equally geared to the needs of all euro area countries. remember that the ecb determines monetary policy not only for germany, but for the whole currency a… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.094 | even these institutional innovations were initially insufficient to change the course of european policies. the financial assistance given to countries hit by the financial and sovereign debt crises was tied to strict policy conditionality. financial assistance programmes were conceived in partial equilibrium at the level of single countries, with insufficient efforts made to understand their implications for the euro area as a whole. the start of banking union was also not immune to policy errors. as a member of the ecb’s supervisory board at the time, i argued against the decision to accelerate the necessary increase in banks’ capital ratios in the midst of a crisis, especially in view of the incomplete nature of banking union.[8] the procyclical policies that characterised those years generated a political backlash. europe was unnecessarily divided into creditor and debtor countries, a core and a periphery, resulting in a deep economic, social and political divide. during those difficult years, the ecb showed, however, that another way was possible. with three words, ecb president mario draghi demonstrated that with the determination to act, the euro area could provide a strong crisis response.[9] and with his institutional counterparts, he initiated the reform of emu.[10] |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.085 | conclusion i’d like to conclude by reminding the young students that are in this room today that not far from here, in monte cassino, 78 years ago there was war. thousands of italians, many of them civilians, as well as germans, french, poles, brits, americans and many others, lost their lives in the valleys near here, in what was the tragedy of the second world war. today monte cassino has returned to the vocation that the monks chose for it: a place of meditation and study. and we should thank the european project for this. the war on our doorstep reminds us of what we owe european integration: three-quarters of a century of peace, during which we have built our wealth. ukrainians know that well. they are fighting for their country, and for the very freedoms that we hold dear. and they want to join the european union because this will give them peace, freedom and prosperity. our forebears built the european project patiently: for us, and for generations to come. their hope was that future generations would continue to overcome the divisions of the past. so we should not just ask what europe is doing for us. we should also ask ourselves what we can do for europe. i have sought to address this question with you today, a question which i often ask myself in my day- to-day work. the answer is that we need to take an active part in the european debate, contributing to a european union that is designed for the benefit of all its members. the versailles declaration renews our e… |
| Christine Lagarde: Commitment and persistence - monetary policy in the economic recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.078 | but if we are patient and persistent now, | am confident that these conditions will eventually be met. gdp should reach its pre-pandemic level before the end of this year. inflation expectations are rising towards our target. measures of underlying inflation are moving in the right direction. and wage growth, which is a key element of underlying inflation, should start to gradually strengthen. the ecb’s recent contacts with large european companies suggest that wage growth will pick up somewhat next year, [15] let me conclude. we do not take this phase of higher inflation lightly. but in our strategy review we have agreed on how to approach the type of situation we face today. we are committed to ensuring that inflation stabilises at our 2% target in the medium term. today, inflation is largely being pushed up by the exceptional circumstances created by the pandemic. and the nature of the inflation is likely to slow the pace of the recovery in the near term. monetary policy today must therefore remain patient and persistent, while being alert to any possible destabilising dynamics emerging. this is the best way to ensure that we return to our 2% inflation target on a sustained basis. now, we need to follow abraham lincoln’s maxim and turn this promise into reality. and if we do, we will escape the low inflation environment of the last decade — and monetary policy will be able to adjust. 1. deutsche bundesbank (2020), monthly report, vol. 72, no 11, november. 2. in the euro… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 54 | activity | 1 | 0.1508584 | activity | 1 | 1.0000000 |
| 54 | economic activity | 2 | 0.0963794 | economic activity | 2 | 0.9998248 |
| 54 | quarter | 3 | 0.0433125 | quarter | 3 | 0.9985093 |
| 54 | expect | 4 | 0.0309577 | consumer confidence | 4 | 0.9974984 |
| 54 | remain | 5 | 0.0258981 | weigh | 5 | 0.9973714 |
| 54 | decline | 6 | 0.0242508 | confidence | 6 | 0.9971939 |
| 54 | economy | 7 | 0.0234271 | economic outlook | 7 | 0.9969336 |
| 54 | confidence | 8 | 0.0233094 | contraction | 8 | 0.9965775 |
| 54 | impact | 9 | 0.0217798 | weak economic | 9 | 0.9965307 |
| 54 | continue | 10 | 0.0167202 | weak | 10 | 0.9960541 |
| 54 | affect | 11 | 0.0160142 | slow | 11 | 0.9958800 |
| 54 | indicator | 12 | 0.0153082 | decline | 12 | 0.9958717 |
| 54 | weak | 13 | 0.0146022 | weakness | 13 | 0.9956625 |
| 54 | follow | 14 | 0.0124843 | indicator | 14 | 0.9956134 |
| 54 | reflect | 15 | 0.0120136 | subdue | 15 | 0.9954877 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jürgen Stark: The economic crisis and the response of fiscal and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2009-06-15 | 0.246 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: Economic prospects and the role of monetary policy in the current situation | Period_1 | 2009-03-13 | 0.149 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: The economic crisis and the response of fiscal and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2009-06-15 | 0.132 | economic outlook a. global economic situation let me begin with the assessment of the global economic situation. the turmoil in financial markets, which was triggered by a systematic under-pricing of risk, particularly in the us sub- prime mortgage market, has now developed into a fully-fledged financial and economic crisis at global level. while the world economy continues to face a severe and synchronised downturn, recent international business confidence indicators suggest that the pace of the decline in economic activity is slowing down somewhat. most forecasters expect that the global economy is likely to recover in 2010, albeit at a gradual pace. the june 2009 eurosystem staff |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2009-10-01 | 0.131 | economic and monetary developments the economic situation and outlook have improved since the previous hearing before parliament on 30 march 2009. inflation and inflationary pressures have remained low over recent months. as expected, inflation turned into negative territory over the summer period, due to the large decline in oil prices since last year. in august, annual inflation was still slightly negative, at -0.2%, after a reading of -0.7% in july. looking ahead, inflation is expected to turn positive again within the coming months and to remain subdued, within positive territory, over the policy-relevant horizon. this also reflects the fact that economic activity is expected to recover at a very gradual pace. the risks to the inflation outlook are broadly balanced. indicators of inflation expectations over the medium to longer term remain firmly anchored in line with the governing council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. following the “free fall” in economic activity that we witnessed around the turn of the year, the euro area economy shows signs of stabilisation. after the strongly negative readings recorded earlier, economic activity in the second quarter of 2009 is estimated to have declined by 0.1%, compared with the previous quarter. in the period ahead, we expect to see a very gradual recovery. this expectation remains surrounded by high uncertainty, while risks to the outlook remain broadly balanced. on the upside, … |
| Lucas Papademos: Tackling the financial crisis - policies for stability and recovery | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.120 | the prospects for economic growth the latest data and survey indicators point to a substantial decline of real gdp in the fourth quarter of 2008 and to a continued weakness in economic activity in the euro area in the first half of this year. confidence is at historically low levels, world trade has sharply declined and financing conditions remain tight. all these factors are adversely affecting aggregate demand. recently, some survey indicators showed signs of stabilisation. it is too early to declare that we may be reaching the bottom of the downturn on the basis of these signals. other indicators point to a less encouraging, if not gloomier, outlook. in other words, what we see flashing amid the clouds that cover the economic landscape right now could either be a silver lining and a first ray of light, or the harbinger of stormier weather conditions. the risks to economic growth remain on the downside. among the factors that may adversely affect economic activity is the prospect of growing protectionism. economic nationalism is an emerging threat to global economic recovery and should be avoided. another risk is the possibility that the financial crisis may have a greater negative impact on the real economy than currently expected. this could be the outcome of the mutually reinforcing effects of weak economic activity, deteriorating bank asset quality and constraints on the supply of bank credit. the intensification and broadening of the financial market turmoil since s… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-02-08 | 0.164 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. hicp inflation rates have declined further, as anticipated, and are expected to fall below 2% in the coming months. over the policy-relevant horizon, inflationary pressures should remain contained. the underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be subdued. medium to longer-term inflation expectations for the euro area remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. overall, this allows our monetary policy stance to remain accommodative. the economic weakness in the euro area is expected to prevail in the early part of 2013. in particular, necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and private sectors will continue to weigh on economic activity. later in 2013 economic activity should gradually recover, supported by our accommodative monetary policy stance, the improvement in financial market confidence and reduced fragmentation, as well as a strengthening of global demand. in order to sustain confidence, it is essential for governments to reduce further both fiscal and structural imbalances and to proceed with financial sector restructuring. with regard to the liquidity situation of banks, counterparties have so far repa… |
| Yves Mersch: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy amid the pandemic | Period_2 | 2020-10-19 | 0.140 | yves mersch: the european central bank’s monetary policy amid the pandemic introductory remarks by mr yves mersch, member of the executive board of the european central bank and vice-chair of the supervisory board of the european central bank, at the mni connect roundtable, 19 october 2020. * * * i will provide a brief overview of our monetary policy amid the coronavirus (covid-19) pandemic shock and against the background of our current assessment of the macroeconomic outlook.1 the economic outlook while euro area economic activity has rebounded strongly from the unprecedented collapse earlier this year, the recovery remains incomplete and prone to setbacks. we have seen a clear improvement across economic indicators, especially at the beginning of the summer. as strict lockdown measures were relaxed and economies reopened, the recovery turned out to be slightly stronger than we expected. however, these gains in activity have not yet fully made up for the earlier decline. more recently, incoming data have suggested that the recovery is losing some of its momentum, as the resurgence in virus infection rates is causing renewed challenges for businesses – especially for those more affected by containment measures. according to the september pmi indicator, for instance, overall euro area services business activity contracted when compared with august, while manufacturing output continued to expand, and at a better pace than in august. this asymmetry means that the impact of t… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-01-21 | 0.135 | let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. following a sharp contraction in the first half of 2020, euro area real gdp rebounded strongly and rose by 12.4 per cent, quarter on quarter, in the third quarter, although remaining well below pre-pandemic levels. incoming economic data, surveys and high-frequency indicators suggest that the resurgence of the pandemic and the associated intensification of containment measures have likely led to a decline in activity in the fourth quarter of 2020 and are also expected to weigh on activity in the first quarter of this year. in sum, this is broadly in line with the latest baseline of the december 2020 macroeconomic projections. |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-10-03 | 0.104 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. i would like to thank governor noyer for his kind hospitality and express our special gratitude to his staff for the excellent organisation of today’s meeting of the governing council. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting, which was also attended by the commission vice-president, mr rehn. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. incoming information and analysis have further underpinned our previous assessment. underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued over the medium term. in keeping with this picture, monetary and, in particular, credit dynamics remain subdued. inflation expectations for the euro area continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. at the same time, real gdp growth in the second quarter was positive, after six quarters of negative output growth, and confidence indicators up to september confirm the expected gradual improvement in economic activity from low levels. our monetary policy stance continues to be geared towards maintaining the degree of monetary accommodation warranted by the outlook for price stability and promoting stable money market conditions. it thereby provides support to a gradual recovery in economic activity. looking ahead, our monetary … |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.103 | let me elaborate on the contrast between developments in the manufacturing and services sectors, which is evident in activity, confidence, employment and price data. the manufacturing sector has been underperforming the more domestically oriented services sector since 2018 (chart 6). the pmi manufacturing output index has been in contractionary territory for seven consecutive months, decreasing to 47.4 in the first two months of the third quarter, compared with an average of 48.5 in the second quarter. by contrast, the services pmi remains in expansionary territory and has edged higher, on average, in the third quarter to date, when compared with the previous quarter. so the gap between weak manufacturing and resilient services activity has further widened. euro area pmi indices (diffusion index; 50 = no change) https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp190916~ca7… 16.09.2019 |
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.190 | in fact, the euro area economy grew by 0.2% in the third quarter of this year, significantly slower than in the second quarter. by reducing people’s real incomes and pushing up costs for firms, high inflation continues to dampen consumption and investment. severe disruptions to the gas supply have exacerbated the situation, and both consumer and business confidence have plummeted. after a strong performance in previous quarters demand for services is slowing, and survey-based indicators for new orders in the manufacturing sector are falling. moreover, global economic activity is growing more slowly, reflecting the impact of continued high inflation, tightening financial conditions and elevated geopolitical uncertainty. as the prices paid for imports rise faster than those received for exports, worsening terms of trade are weighing on incomes in the euro area. |
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.146 | euro area economic outlook one year ago i said that growth prospects appeared quite positive following the rebound in economic activity in the first three quarters of 2021, as lockdown measures were lifted and vaccination rates rose. but as we know, the euro area growth outlook has deteriorated significantly since then. one year on, the russian invasion of ukraine and the ensuing global energy crisis have added to already high inflationary pressures, which continued to rise throughout 2022. as a result, economic activity has slowed down to the point that we cannot rule out a technical recession at the turn of the year. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.127 | the reduction in real wages and purchasing power is weakening domestic demand, with several leading indicators already pointing to a likely contraction in economic activity, starting from the last quarter of this year. the euro area pmi composite output index fell in october to its lowest level since november 2020, [11] with forward-looking indicators of activity particularly weak.[12] consumer confidence plummeted to |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.101 | economic activity in the near term, we expect activity to be dampened by high energy costs, the deterioration in the terms of trade, greater uncertainty and the adverse impact of high inflation on disposable income. the war in ukraine and renewed pandemic restrictions in china have made supply bottlenecks worse again. as a result, firms face higher costs and disruptions in their supply chains, and their outlook for future output has deteriorated. however, there are also factors supporting economic activity and these are expected to strengthen over the months to come. the reopening of those sectors most affected by the pandemic and a strong labour market, with more people in jobs, will continue to support incomes and consumption. in addition, savings accumulated during the pandemic are a buffer. fiscal policy is helping to cushion the impact of the war. targeted and temporary budgetary measures protect those people bearing the brunt of higher energy prices while limiting the risk of adding to inflationary pressures. the swift implementation of the investment and structural reform plans under the next generation eu programme, the “fit for 55” package and the repowereu plan would also help the euro area economy to grow faster in a sustainable manner and become more resilient to global shocks. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-09-26 | 0.095 | the outlook for the euro area economy the euro area economy grew by 0.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2022, mainly owing to strong consumer spending on services as the economy reopened. economies with large tourism sectors benefited especially, as people travelled more over the summer. the still robust labour market also continued to support economic activity. notwithstanding this, we expect activity to slow substantially in the coming quarters. there are four main reasons behind this. first, high inflation is dampening spending and production throughout the economy, and these headwinds are reinforced by gas supply disruptions. second, the strong demand for services that came with the reopening of the economy is losing steam. third, the weakening in global demand, also in the context of tighter monetary policy in many major economies, and the worsening terms of trade will mean less support for the euro area economy. fourth, uncertainty remains high, as reflected in falling household and business confidence. these developments have led to a downward revision of the latest staff projections for economic growth for the remainder of the current year and throughout 2023. staff now expect the economy to grow by 3.1 per cent in 2022, 0.9 per cent in 2023 and 1.9 per cent in 2024. inflation rose further to 9.1 per cent in august. energy and food price inflation remained extremely elevated and were the dominant contributors to overall inflation. price pressures are spreading ac… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 55 | time | 1 | 0.0458438 | history | 1 | 0.9994743 |
| 55 | experience | 2 | 0.0345796 | learn | 2 | 0.9987734 |
| 55 | lead | 3 | 0.0253213 | lesson | 3 | 0.9987732 |
| 55 | history | 4 | 0.0225439 | century | 4 | 0.9986416 |
| 55 | lesson | 5 | 0.0180690 | idea | 5 | 0.9974146 |
| 55 | follow | 6 | 0.0179147 | experience | 6 | 0.9964844 |
| 55 | learn | 7 | 0.0162174 | gold | 7 | 0.9963962 |
| 55 | view | 8 | 0.0156002 | episode | 8 | 0.9962314 |
| 55 | introduce | 9 | 0.0120512 | friedman | 9 | 0.9961399 |
| 55 | late | 10 | 0.0115883 | famous | 10 | 0.9960480 |
| 55 | idea | 11 | 0.0115883 | precede | 11 | 0.9959240 |
| 55 | direction | 12 | 0.0109710 | accept | 12 | 0.9948303 |
| 55 | century | 13 | 0.0109710 | send | 13 | 0.9946913 |
| 55 | good | 14 | 0.0108167 | economist | 14 | 0.9946523 |
| 55 | control | 15 | 0.0108167 | tradition | 15 | 0.9946439 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jürgen Stark: Lessons for central bankers from the history of the Phillips Curve | Period_1 | 2008-06-16 | 0.287 | theories cannot even be tested before application. to be sure, history has offered a few “natural experiments”: for example, the hyperinflations that swept europe after the first world war were a prominent collective test, whose lessons have been absorbed, and are today deeply entrenched into the collective psyche of many european peoples. but the fundamental irreproducibility of controlled experiments in social sciences remains. true, in recent years, a very limited number of theories in the field of social science have been subjected to experiments. and, a recent strand of macroeconomic literature 18 has even argued that in the presence of uncertainty about the structure of the economy monetary authorities should “experiment”, by running monetary policy in such a way as to create sufficient variation in the data. by standard econometric arguments, this will indeed allow better identification of the relevant, unknown deep parameters for future policy conduct. when presented with this line of arguments, however, a policymaker’s instinctive reaction is that they cannot possibly be right. • first and foremost, any experimenting with the economy would inevitably and fatally run the risk of destabilising expectations. indeed, the result that it is optimal to experiment with the economy was originally obtained within models in which the public played a purely passive role and the behaviour of the policymaker could not alter the public’s beliefs and expectations. • second, when … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Swiss monetary policy as viewed by the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 2007-06-26 | 0.254 | a historical and international perspective: a low-inflation country it has been noted that, notwithstanding the great inflation episode, and the temporary inflationary outbursts corresponding to the two world wars, the united states should correctly be characterised, when seen from a very long-run perspective, as a low-inflation country. this is a claim made, in particular, by bradford delong in his analysis of the us inflationary experience since the time of the civil war. 1 historical experience suggests that switzerland deserves such a characterisation to a significantly greater extent. first, since 1880 swiss annual inflation has been, on average, just 2.2%, to be compared to 2.6% in the us. second, in an international comparison with 13 other oecd countries since 1880, and excluding from the computation the years corresponding to the first and second world wars and their immediate aftermath (in order to avoid a distortion of the results through the extraordinary turbulence associated with the two world wars), switzerland comes out on top once again, with an annual average inflation rate of just 1.5%. finally, focusing on the period following the creation of the swiss national bank, and excluding, once again, the years of the two world wars and their immediate aftermath, switzerland, with an average annual inflation rate of 2.1% is, together with germany, again the best performer. switzerland’s consistent “credible currency, low-inflation” strategy clearly emerged duri… |
| Jürgen Stark: Lessons for central bankers from the history of the Phillips Curve | Period_1 | 2008-06-16 | 0.232 | it is a great pleasure for me to be here today at this conference. i will try to look at the historical evolution of the phillips curve and its interaction with macroeconomic outcomes from a slightly eccentric angle. forty years ago it suddenly became very difficult even for navigated policymakers who had been raised in the revered intellectual tradition of monetary orthodoxy to resist the revolutionary notion of a stable trade- off between inflation and unemployment. some rejected this notion – out of common sense and practical experience – and did it before scholars in universities could prove that it was theoretically fragile and empirically elusive. i view this episode – in which honest civil servants were ahead of their times in rejecting faulty propositions – as highly symbolic. the episode is representative of the key but swinging and ambivalent relationship between cutting-edge economic research and long established central banking principles. at the end, i will submit few reflections on how that relationship ought to be governed in modern policy-making institutions and how the ecb – for its part – has insured against major policy failures that revolutionary ideas can inflict if applied untested. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Swiss monetary policy as viewed by the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 2007-06-26 | 0.189 | madame la présidente de la confédération suisse, monsieur le président du gouvernement du liechtenstein, ministers, excellencies, dear president of the bank council of the swiss national bank, dear jean-pierre roth, dear chairman of the governing board of the swiss national bank, dear fellow governors, ladies and gentlemen, it is an immense pleasure for me to be here today with such a distinguished audience to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the swiss national bank (snb). the snb is to be especially congratulated because, in spite of the turbulences which have characterised the period since 1907 – two world wars, the great depression, and the great inflation – it has succeeded in delivering, on average, a remarkably low inflation rate. i regard a historical and international perspective on swiss price stability as being especially appropriate. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Swiss monetary policy as viewed by the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 2007-06-26 | 0.183 | monetary policy and monetary aggregates as stressed by lucas, recalling the swiss national bank’s – and the bundesbank’s, as well as a number of european central banks’, including banque de france’s –acceptance, back in the 1970s, of the ultimately monetary nature of inflation, and their use of monetary means to bring it under control, is especially important today, when the relevance of monetary analysis for monetary policy is sometimes questioned. as charles goodhart sarcastically put it 5 “[m]onetarism, in any of its guises, has become somewhat unfashionable; and the new keynesian three-equation synthesis […] rides high. […] deviate from this, and you are not a member of the in crowd.” the reasons why the role of monetary aggregates in monetary policy analysis is today questioned are well known. on the conceptual front, the ascendancy of neo-wicksellian theory 6 which assigns to monetary aggregates a purely residual role. at the practical level, the breakdown, in several countries, of the empirical relationship between money growth and inflation, which led the former governor of the bank of canada, gerald bouey, to famously quip that “ we didn’t abandon monetary aggregates, they abandoned us”. i have three comments on this. first, empirical evidence 7 shows that – since the first half of the nineteenth century, and in a number of countries – fluctuations in trend money growth have almost always led to fluctuations in trend inflation, with upswings or downswings in trend… |
| Mario Draghi: Interview in Die Zeit | Period_2 | 2015-01-15 | 0.291 | same time, we were angry that our institutions, our universities and our country were unable to function better, to address inequalities, to satisfy our desire for change. did you sympathise with any political grouping? no. my convictions were along what you would call today ideas of liberal socialism, not really suited for extremist groups. no open rebellion, no long hair? my hair was quite long, but not very long. and, that aside, i did not have parents whom i might have rebelled against. people close to you say that the period that really shaped mario draghi was that as from 1971, the five years he spent in the united states. is that so? that is correct. you asked me earlier whether there was a specific moment when i realised what work meant. well, in the united states, i learnt what hard work is and how much there is to do. namely? initially i was admitted at mit as a special student, that is on a temporary basis. to become a regular student, i had to convince my professors i was worth keeping. there i learned that incentives can work wonders. my scholarship covered the rental costs and tuition fees for only the first two years. i had to work to pay for everything else. fortunately mit helped by giving its students teaching assignments and paying for them. later, when my daughter was born, i got a job with a computer company some 40 miles from boston. the typical day was made up of attending classes, studying for exams and later writing the dissertation, fulfilling tea… |
| Mario Draghi: Interview in Die Zeit | Period_2 | 2015-01-15 | 0.273 | did you ever feel homesick? i certainly did miss italy a little, but the 1970s were not really pleasant in my country. there was terrorism, an inflation rate that reached 20% … didn’t that inflation erode what your father left as inheritance? what we inherited was not very large, but enough for his three children to study. the first time i returned to italy in 1976 i found that the equivalent of a few hundred euros was all that remained of our inheritance. this was because the family court judge had instructed the guardian of my two younger siblings to invest the money in fixed-interest treasury bills. and that made all the money disappear into thin air. so you should actually understand why people in germany are so afraid of inflation. that is precisely the point: in germany, some people say of me – ah, that italian, he is sure to fuel inflation in the german economy! and i explain to them that their experience of inflation dates back to the 1920s, while mine is far more recent. those were difficult years. when we returned to italy we went to trento because it was there that i found my first university teaching post. trento was a political hotspot at the time, a stronghold of the extreme left. it certainly was a very left wing university, to the extent that a small number of students from there later became violent terrorists. i was supposed to teach students how a capitalist economy works, which was what i learned at mit. how did you do that? certainly it was not easy … |
| Mario Draghi: A route for Europe | Period_2 | 2012-05-25 | 0.166 | a teacher, says eco, “teaches that everyone must become individual and different”.1 professor federico caffè, albeit with a coherent vision and deeply held convictions, was a teacher. he taught his students to think for themselves and did not pass on a binding creed. he helped his students – economists, thinkers, servants of the state and of the institutions, alert citizens – to discover themselves. i’ll start with the subject which, without a doubt, was the most precious to caffè, namely welfare. probably nothing in his intellectual heritage is more topical than this painful protest of his: one cannot, he would say, “accept the idea that an entire generation of young people should consider themselves as having being born at the wrong time and having to suffer job insecurity as an inevitable fact”.2 |
| Jürgen Stark: Globalisation and monetary policy - from virtue to vice? | Period_2 | 2011-11-30 | 0.136 | confusing “known knowns” with “known unknowns” a third element of vice in the relationship between monetary policy and globalisation in recent years has been the failure of policymakers to think through the possible ways in which they might be called to act as a result of situations which they have helped to bring about. in their well-cited book, reinhart and rogoff (2009) make a compelling case to show that financial bubbles throughout history have shared a number of common elements, such as rising home prices and financial innovation. yet as these authors point out, in spite of these common traits, policymakers have at times fallen prey of the “this time is different”23 illness. |
| Peter Praet: Price stability - a sinking will-o’-the-wisp? | Period_2 | 2015-04-17 | 0.112 | i would like to thank john hutchinson and elena bobeica for their contributions to this speech. ladies and gentlemen, i would like to thank the imf for inviting me to this excellent workshop and to be part of such a distinguished panel. i. introduction almost 50 years ago milton friedman famously described the phillips curve as a “will-o-the- wisp”. when he first used this metaphor, he was isolated in the macroeconomist community. but in a matter of few years – and after a few bad inflation surprises that were hard to square with the solid and steady phillips curve formalism that was embedded in many models of the time – his vision became less alien. many of his colleagues started to admit that the phillips curve was an extraordinarily frail platform for central banks to base monetary reflation experiments on. indeed, at that point, friedman had been joined by the so-called neo-classicals to demonstrate that what might appear as a steady association between price pressures and economic slack could in fact represent a collection of disequilibrium points which could only be maintained by monetary policy perpetuating the disequilibrium through ever-more aggressive expansion. arthur okun, one of the founding fathers of post-war stabilisation theories, was more cutting in his assessment. on observing a scatterplot of phillips curve observations over the stagflation decade of 1970–1980 – which defied theory as it showed a positive (not a negative) correlation between inflation a… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a high inflation environment - commitment and clarity | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.113 | as samuel johnson wrote, “great works are performed not by strength, but by perseverance”. and we will persevere until we have ensured price stability in the euro area. 1. league of nations (1946), “the course and control of inflation: a review of monetary experience in europe after world war i”, series of league of nations publications. economic and financial. 3. since the start of the pandemic, the volatility of durable goods consumption has been almost ten times higher than during the preceding two decades, and almost 30 times higher for services. 4. gonçalves, e. and koester, g. (2022), “the role of demand and supply in underlying inflation – decomposing hicpx inflation into components”, economic bulletin, issue 7, ecb. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.082 | the experience of this episode dramatically changed the conduct of monetary policy in the following decades. it forged a consensus among policymakers and academia on two fundamental pillars of modern central banking. |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.079 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.067 | this is why european countries have increasingly adopted common objectives and embedded them in european law. and this is why we built economic and monetary union (emu). not because a common law and a single economic area are an end in themselves, but because they are a means to an end offering peace, freedom and prosperity. but we should not take the success of the european project for granted. europe emerged from the lessons of history repeated time and again across the centuries. but any progress made has not been free from uncertainty or errors, including in the recent past. so we should always measure the european project against our common objectives, asking ourselves whether it properly addresses our shared aspirations and our collective needs. today, i would like to assess the progress of european economic governance in this respect. and i shall discuss the challenges faced by the euro area economy and monetary policy in the new geopolitical landscape. |
| Christine Lagarde: Challenges along Europe’s road | Period_3 | 2022-05-16 | 0.051 | ensure the smooth transmission of monetary policy as needed. the governing council’s decisions in april reflect these characteristics, while also providing a clearly defined sequence of events for the normalisation process. first, we will end net purchases under the asset purchase programme. judging by the incoming data, my expectation is that they should be concluded early in the third quarter. the first rate hike, informed by the ecb’s forward guidance on the interest rates, will take place some time after the end of net asset purchases. we have not yet precisely defined the notion of “some time”, but i have been very clear that this could mean a period of only a few weeks. after the first rate hike, the normalisation process will be gradual. conclusion let me conclude. in prešeren’s poem that i mentioned earlier, the protagonist “finds no peace from worries on his road, though to the farthest place his search may lead”. this is a feeling we can all relate to at times. but europe can take courage from the decisive direction taken by slovenia following its independence and the results it has achieved along the way. the road travelled has been a difficult one, and the challenges we still face are many. but i have every confidence that we will overcome them. the ecb’s actions over the last decade should leave no doubt about our commitment to the euro and to our mandate in all circumstances. and just as the ecb has shown commitment and flexibility, so too have europe’s leade… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 56 | increase | 1 | 0.0965273 | average | 1 | 0.9995619 |
| 56 | average | 2 | 0.0818685 | volatility | 2 | 0.9983352 |
| 56 | period | 3 | 0.0650045 | period | 3 | 0.9982458 |
| 56 | level | 4 | 0.0648748 | peak | 4 | 0.9979822 |
| 56 | decline | 5 | 0.0325736 | mid | 5 | 0.9978972 |
| 56 | result | 6 | 0.0298494 | record | 6 | 0.9974592 |
| 56 | time | 7 | 0.0277738 | average inflation | 7 | 0.9974528 |
| 56 | volatility | 8 | 0.0250496 | decline | 8 | 0.9972800 |
| 56 | fall | 9 | 0.0210282 | increase | 9 | 0.9971004 |
| 56 | start | 10 | 0.0193418 | inflation volatility | 10 | 0.9966608 |
| 56 | reach | 11 | 0.0190823 | substantial | 11 | 0.9964954 |
| 56 | inflation rate | 12 | 0.0181743 | reach | 12 | 0.9964045 |
| 56 | rise | 13 | 0.0173959 | historical | 13 | 0.9960571 |
| 56 | follow | 14 | 0.0149312 | observe | 14 | 0.9960557 |
| 56 | mid | 15 | 0.0146717 | result | 15 | 0.9959599 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: EMU after seven years - successes and challenges | Period_1 | 2006-05-09 | 0.159 | price stability contributes to low macroeconomic volatility in the euro area in our short history, we have had to face substantial challenges and economic shocks. just think of the economic consequences of the terrorist attacks in september 2001, the sharp decline of equity prices at the beginning of this decade and the substantial increases in oil prices. against this background, our track record since 1999 in terms of price developments and inflation expectations bears testimony to the ecb’s ability to deliver a monetary policy that is in continuity with the best practices inherited from the national central banks of the euro area. as you know, the ecb aims to maintain price stability by keeping inflation rates below, but close to 2% over the medium term. since the launch of the euro back in 1999, the inflation rate in the euro area has been on average slightly above 2%. we are of course not satisfied with inflation above 2%. in this context it is important that, since 1999, average long-term inflation expectations – as measured, for example, by consensus economics forecasts or the survey of professional forecasters – have been at a level consistent with price stability, i.e. below, but close to, 2%. the steadiness of inflation expectations over such a long period of time, during which, as mentioned, many unforeseen events impacted on the euro area inflation rate, demonstrates that markets and private agents perceive the ecb as being fully committed to maintaining price … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy in EMU - views and challenges | Period_1 | 2005-06-29 | 0.151 | strongly. the volatility of quarterly hicp inflation in the euro area (measured as the standard deviation over the previous six years) fell from around 0.6 percentage point during the late 1980s to less than 0.3 percentage point in the mid-1990s. since then, inflation volatility has stabilised at this very low level, in spite of major inflationary shocks. and the average volatility of long-term consensus inflation expectations has also declined substantially, by four-fifths, from almost 0.5 percentage point in the 1990s to around 0.1 percentage point in recent years. lower volatility of actual and expected inflation reduces consumer and investor uncertainty and thereby enhances welfare. stable inflation expectations and a high degree of confidence on the part of financial market participants in monetary policy should, over time, also lead to a reduction in the volatility of longer-term interest rates, and thus also to lower risk premia. indeed, over the past six years, there has been a substantial decline in the volatility of long-term interest rates as compared with that recorded in the past decade. in the 1990s, for example, the standard deviation of long-term interest rates (monthly data) was around 2 percentage points; in the past six years, this measure has fallen to a little more than ½ a percentage point. it is striking that, while the volatility of long-term interest rates in the euro area was still around twice as high as that in the united states in the 1990s, th… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy in EMU - views and challenges | Period_1 | 2005-06-29 | 0.144 | the first years of the euro - price stability and well-anchored inflation expectations … when taking a closer look at those developments that can be influenced by monetary policy, there can be little doubt that the emu project has been a great success, which is particularly remarkable against the background of the many and sizeable economic shocks that have hit the euro area since the introduction of the euro. when looking at the euro area as a whole, a regime shift towards greater monetary stability took place during the second half of the 1990s. this was associated with the emu project enshrined in the maastricht treaty, and in particular with the convergence process and the introduction of the euro. since the ecb became responsible for monetary policy in the euro area in 1999, hicp inflation has averaged 2%. this is very near to the “below and close to 2%” at which the ecb aims over the medium term. let me remind you that during the 1980s and 1990s, the average inflation rate was 4%. inflation expectations have also been remarkably stable in recent years. average long-term consensus inflation expectations have fallen from 2.8% in the 1990s (1990 to 1998) to 1.8% over the past six years. this is fully in line with our definition of price stability. the very low levels of short-term and long-term interest rates which we are currently observing are providing substantial support to favourable financial conditions. these low levels would be unthinkable without the successful… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: EMU after seven years - successes and challenges | Period_1 | 2006-05-09 | 0.121 | response to macroeconomic shocks. under current circumstances, this implies that higher inflation due to oil price shocks and higher indirect taxes should not be included in wage contracts. otherwise unemployment and inflationary pressures would increase. it is sometimes argued that a policy aimed at price stability could lead to higher unemployment and increased macroeconomic volatility. it will not surprise you that i do not agree with this view. to the contrary, not only reforms that enhance the flexibility of markets, but also credible monetary policy and well-anchored inflation expectations, over time, contribute to job creation and to dampening macroeconomic fluctuations. and indeed, the achievements in the area of monetary stability have not come at the cost of higher unemployment. despite remaining at still unacceptably high levels, especially in some euro area countries, the unemployment rate in the whole euro area has averaged around 8½% over the past seven years, which is more than one percentage point lower, on average, than in the 1990s. furthermore, annual employment growth (in terms of persons employed) has doubled from an average of around 0.5% in the 1980s and 1990s to around 1.2% since the start of the single monetary policy. moreover, in recent years the volatility of some real variables has also declined relative to the averages observed during the 1980s and 1990s. for example, the volatility (in terms of standard deviation) of quarter-on-quarter percen… |
| Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Challenges for the Euro at ten | Period_1 | 2008-12-12 | 0.117 |
|
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.138 | prior to the financial crisis, the performance of inflation targeting was in practice widely considered as a success.2 to recall that in the 70s and 80s, a period that now seems in the distant past, the key challenge for central banks was very high inflation, not too low. empirical evidence suggests that countries that adopted inflation targeting, beginning with new zealand in 1989, have experienced lower average inflation rates than they did before its adoption. for instance, in a prominent study, carl walsh identifies ten inflation‐targeting oecd countries and reports that the average inflation rate across countries declined from 9.2% prior to the adoption of inflation targeting to 3.2% after the adoption. importantly, the decline in the level of inflation was accompanied by a decline in the volatility of inflation and an improved anchoring of inflation expectations.3 |
| Benoît Cœuré: The monetary policy of the European Central Bank | Period_2 | 2012-03-27 | 0.136 | measures of performance how well has the ecb managed the transmission mechanism and the macroeconomy? since the inception of the single currency the ecb has fulfilled its price stability mandate. taking the long-term average as a performance indicator, inflation rates in the euro area have been on average a few basis points above 2%. you can see their exact evolution over time on this slide [4]. the slight overshoot relative to our aim – close to, but below, 2% – is due to the recent renewed pressures on volatile components of the price basket. it certainly remains within the strictest tolerance bands. simultaneously, the ecb has managed to compress the volatility of inflation in the euro area. slide 5 shows a breakdown of the volatility of headline inflation into the volatility of core inflation which central banks can influence over the medium term – the solid yellow bars – and the volatility of food and energy prices – in blue and grey respectively. the left-hand chart indicates the results for the euro area. you see that since the launch of the euro, overall inflation volatility has decreased despite a substantial increase in energy and food price volatility. during the same period of time, inflation volatility in the us has actually increased, as the drop in core inflation volatility was not offset by the surge in the variance introduced by energy inflation. did systematic compression of inflation volatility come at the price of more erratic real activity? let me move… |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.100 | let me now turn to the second argument against inflation targeting: its apparent inability to engineer a quicker recovery in economic activity and inflation. to provide you with some additional figures, it took the euro area almost eight years before real gdp reached the 2008 q1 level again, which marked the previous peak. likewise, hicp inflation has been considerably below 2% since the second half of 2013, and only more recently started to move closer to its objective. this increase in headline inflation was however mainly driven by rising energy and food prices and not accompanied by the evolution of underlying inflation.8 price and nominal gdp level targeting 6 see, for instance, de grauwe (2007) and eichengreen et al. (2011). 7 see svensson (2016). 8 a fair assessment of the performance of inflation targeting, however, also has to acknowledge that the euro area like all other major inflation‐targeting jurisdictions has avoided the risk of falling into a deflationary spiral from materialising. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Assessing the new phase of unconventional monetary policy at the European Central Bank | Period_2 | 2015-08-28 | 0.089 | the ongoing deterioration of long-term inflation expectations was a major factor in the extension of our purchase programme in january this year. figure 6 shows the evolution of these expectations over the past decade and since 2012. euro area longer-term inflation expectations (both market-based and, to a lesser extent, survey-based) had been falling since early 2013, reaching an all-time low by early 2015. |
| Peter Praet: The APP impact on the economy and bond markets | Period_2 | 2015-07-14 | 0.089 | that outlook is of course contingent on the full implementation of our app. as of 26 june 2015 the ecb had purchased eur 297.1 bn under the entire app, including eur 193.9 bn under the public sector purchase programme (pspp), eur 94.6 bn under the covered bond purchase programme (cbpp3) and eur 8.6 bn under the asset-backed securities purchase programme (abspp). accordingly, the ecb’s balance sheet has expanded by eur 527 bn to eur 2,539.5 bn since end-september 2014, mainly due to the asset purchases and the four tltros. for the pspp we have been able to achieve all operational targets (i.e. announced quantities and parameters of the asset allocation) and purchases have by and large not been disruptive to market functioning. since mid-april, however, volatility has risen markedly, reversing the initial downward impact of the pspp on sovereign bond yields. gdp-weighted euro area sovereign yields are now roughly half a percentage point higher than the level reached on the day of the pspp announcement. but we need to be patient in assessing the significance of these developments. such a reversal of the downward trend in sovereign yields following a qe announcement is common to other jurisdictions which undertook similar policies in the past. our purchases of private assets have also proceeded relatively well. the cbpp3 has had a strong downward impact on covered bonds spreads, which reached the tightest levels in the last five years at the start of june this year. and though… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.147 |
|
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.132 | compared with the rise in market rates, the adjustment in the rates on deposits – which are a stable funding source for banks, amounting to a third of their liabilities – has been more sluggish and this has contributed to containing the increase in bank funding costs so far. in some euro area countries, deposit rates were negative during recent years – providing evidence that monetary policy transmission also works in a negative rate environment – and are now coming back into positive territory.[37] in addition, the outstanding funds in the ecb’s targeted lending programme (tltros) are still dampening the increase in bank funding costs.[38],[39] the recent monetary policy rate hikes, combined with the expectation of future rate increases, have been substantially passed through to lending rates applied to new borrowing (and variable-rate loans). lending rates on new mortgages started to increase early on at the beginning of this year, leading to a substantial increase of about 100 basis points from december 2021 up to august 2022, closely tracking long-term market rate developments (chart 18). this represents the largest increase over a corresponding eight-month period on record (since the start of the series on cost of borrowing for housing loans in 2003.) lending rates to firms have started to increase somewhat later and less rapidly, since march this year, as these are linked more closely to short-term market rates given their shorter maturities. the increase in the cost… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.125 | a new era of volatility the pandemic and the war in ukraine have led to an unprecedented increase in macroeconomic volatility. output growth volatility in the euro area over the past two years was about five times as high as it was at the peak of the great recession in 2009.[5] inflation volatility has surged beyond the levels seen during the 1970s. once the exceptional effects of the pandemic and the war wash out from the data, output and inflation volatility are bound to decline. yet, there are valid grounds to believe that policymakers will find themselves in a less favourable environment over the medium term – one in which shocks are potentially larger, more persistent and more frequent. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.095 | services inflation has also been rising — to 1.1% in august!“4! — and it would have reached 2% using the consumption weights of last year, slightly above its historical average. this is also largely the result of demand returning to the sectors hardest hit by the lockdowns. inflation in high-contact services accounts for virtually all of the rise we are seeing in services. once these pandemic-driven effects pass, we expect inflation to decline. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.073 | digging deeper into the micro evidence since the golosov-lucas paper was published, economists have been studying numerous micro price datasets from different countries. researchers have been busy constructing models that can match various features of the micro data, including the average frequency and size of price changes. in 2018 the european system of central banks established prisma – the price-setting microdata analysis network – to collect and study various kinds of micro data, aiming to deepen our understanding of price-setting behaviour and inflation dynamics. today, peter karadi will present the findings from a research project undertaken as part of the prisma network. in the paper, peter and his co-authors raphael schoenle and jesse wursten set out to measure the selection effect in micro data. to give you a preview of their findings in a nutshell, the selection effect is absent. the probability that a given price will change increases, to a certain extent, when that price is further from the optimum. however, the probability of price adjustment conditional on an aggregate shock does not seem to depend on the distance from the optimum.[6] the authors also discuss which models can match such price-setting behaviour. the promising candidates are state-dependent models with random menu costs and models of information- constrained price-setting.[7] in both classes of models, the selection effect can be weak: some prices fail to adjust even though the distance from t… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 57 | loan | 1 | 0.0240167 | sale | 1 | 0.9986854 |
| 57 | growth | 2 | 0.0215937 | loan sale | 2 | 0.9980248 |
| 57 | annual | 3 | 0.0196113 | securitisation | 3 | 0.9973277 |
| 57 | financial | 4 | 0.0193910 | annual growth | 4 | 0.9954353 |
| 57 | risk | 5 | 0.0168212 | financial corporation | 5 | 0.9952222 |
| 57 | continue | 6 | 0.0163073 | sector balance sheet | 6 | 0.9949828 |
| 57 | credit | 7 | 0.0154996 | corporation | 7 | 0.9947372 |
| 57 | analysis | 8 | 0.0121221 | sector balance | 8 | 0.9946323 |
| 57 | remain | 9 | 0.0112411 | annual rate | 9 | 0.9942176 |
| 57 | annual growth | 10 | 0.0107271 | loan | 10 | 0.9940954 |
| 57 | adjust | 11 | 0.0104334 | ongoing adjustment | 11 | 0.9940657 |
| 57 | sale | 12 | 0.0101397 | financial sector balance | 12 | 0.9936562 |
| 57 | reflect | 13 | 0.0094789 | analysis confirm | 13 | 0.9918905 |
| 57 | balance | 14 | 0.0092586 | annual growth rate | 14 | 0.9918473 |
| 57 | increase | 15 | 0.0088181 | household adjust | 15 | 0.9914431 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-11-07 | 0.150 | of the still high energy prices, protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. with regard to price developments, euro area annual hicp inflation was 3.0% in october according to eurostat’s flash estimate, unchanged from september. inflation rates have been at elevated levels since the end of last year, mainly driven by higher energy and other commodity prices. looking ahead, they are likely to stay above 2% for some months to come, before falling below 2% in the course of 2012. inflation rates are expected to remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. this pattern reflects the expectation that, in an environment of weaker euro area and global growth, price, cost and wage pressures in the euro area should also moderate. the governing council continues to view the risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments as broadly balanced, taking also into account today’s decision. on the upside, the main risks relate to the possibility of increases in indirect taxes and administered prices, owing to the need for fiscal consolidation in the coming years. in the current environment, however, inflationary pressure should abate. the main downside risks relate to the impact of weaker than expected growth in the euro area and globally. in fact, if sustained, sluggish economic growth has the potential to reduce medium-term inflationary pressure in the euro area. turning to the monetary analysis, the annual … |
| Lucas Papademos: The effects of globalisation on inflation, liquidity and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2007-06-13 | 0.116 | households or non-financial corporations. moreover, the process of securitisation of loans itself positively affects the capacity of banks (of mfis, to be precise), to issue new loans and thus it could have an indirect expansionary effect on m3 growth. how can we deal with the influence of these factors on money creation and their potential effects on the medium and long-term inflation outlook? in general, the same answer applies as with respect to changes in net external assets. given that the ofis’ money holdings and investment activities could have indirect effects on consumer price developments via asset prices, it would be premature to automatically exclude, without further analysis, the money balances held by ofis from the monetary aggregates when assessing the risks to price stability. 22 the general conclusion that emerges from these considerations is that monetary analysis has become more challenging in the global economy as it has to explicitly take account of changes in domestic money and credit markets induced by, or accompanying, financial globalisation. to address this challenge, the eurosystem is currently stepping up its analytical efforts to deepen its understanding of several aspects of these processes and their implications for the assessment of medium to longer- term risks to price stability. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-09-09 | 0.070 | mainly relate to the ongoing tensions in some segments of the financial markets in the euro area and at the global level, as well as to the potential for these pressures to spill over into the euro area real economy. they also relate to further increases in energy prices, protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. with regard to price developments, euro area annual hicp inflation was 2.5% in august 2011, according to eurostat’s flash estimate, unchanged from july. we have now seen inflation rates at relatively high levels since the end of last year, with higher energy and other commodity prices as the main drivers. looking ahead, inflation rates are likely to stay clearly above 2% over the coming months. thereafter, on the basis of the path implied by futures markets for oil prices, inflation rates should fall below 2% in 2012. this pattern reflects the expectation of relatively stable wage growth developments in the context of moderate economic growth. the september 2011 ecb staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area embody these considerations and foresee annual hicp inflation in a range between 2.5% and 2.7% for 2011 and between 1.2% and 2.2% for 2012. in comparison with the june 2011 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the range for hicp inflation in 2011 remains unchanged, while the range for 2012 is slightly narrower. it is necessary to recall that the staff projections are conditional on a number of pu… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation, expectations and current challenges to monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-10-14 | 0.061 | vigilance can thus be communicated to the public even if policy rates remain unchanged, in particular if risks emerge or increase but have not materialised and if underlying developments justify the no-change option. this explains why communication intensity can at times increase, as measured by what some call “hawkish-ness” indicators, while policy rates remain unchanged, as happened in the first half of 2004.6 if the communication strategy is successful, expectations converge over time back to the level of unchanged policy rates. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2008-03-27 | 0.056 | unemployment rates have fallen to levels not seen for 25 years. accordingly, consumption growth should continue to contribute to economic expansion. this assessment is reflected in the latest ecb staff projections, which foresee annual real gdp growth in the range of 1.3% to 2.1% in 2008 and of 1.3% and 2.3% in 2009. these ranges have been revised downwards, reflecting weaker global demand, stronger pressure from commodity prices and less favourable financing conditions than foreseen in december. in the view of the governing council, uncertainty about the prospects for economic growth remains unusually high. downside risks relate to a potentially broader than currently expected impact of financial market developments. further downside risks stem from the scope for additional increases in commodity prices, protectionist pressures and the possibility of disorderly developments owing to global imbalances. the monetary analysis confirms the prevailing upside risks to price stability at medium to longer-term horizons. on the basis of data available up to january, the underlying money and credit expansion remains strong, even taking temporary factors into account, such as the relatively flat yield curve. there is little evidence that the financial market turbulence since august 2007 strongly influenced the overall dynamics of broad money and credit aggregates. bank loans to the domestic private sector have grown at annual rates around 11% for the past two years. while the growth… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2014-01-10 | 0.613 | according to eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual hicp inflation was 0.8% in december 2013, compared with 0.9% in november. this outcome was broadly as expected and reflected lower services price inflation. on the basis of prevailing futures prices for energy, annual inflation rates are expected to remain at around current levels in the coming months. over the medium term, underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued. at the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. the risks to the outlook for price developments continue to be seen as broadly balanced over the medium term, with upside risks relating to higher commodity prices and stronger than expected increases in administered prices and indirect taxes, and downside risks stemming from weaker than expected economic activity. turning to the monetary analysis, data for november support the assessment of continued subdued underlying growth in broad money (m3) and credit. annual growth in m3 was broadly unchanged at 1.5% in november, after 1.4% in october, following two consecutive declines in september and august. annual growth in m1 remained strong at 6.5%, reflecting a preference for liquidity, although it was below the peak of 8.7% observed in april 2013. as in previous months, the main factor supporting annual m3 growth was an increase in … |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2014-02-12 | 0.606 | the medium term, underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued. inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. both upside and downside risks to the outlook for price developments remain limited, and they continue to be broadly balanced over the medium term. turning to the monetary analysis, data for december 2013 confirm the assessment of subdued underlying growth in broad money (m3) and credit. annual growth in m3 moderated to 1.0% in december, from 1.5% in november. deposit outflows in december mirrored the strong sales of government and private sector securities by euro area mfis, which, in part, could be related to adjustments by banks in anticipation of the ecb’s comprehensive assessment of banks’ balance sheets. these developments also affected annual growth in m1, which moderated to 5.8% in december but remained strong. as in previous months, the main factor supporting annual m3 growth was an increase in the mfi net external asset position, which continued to reflect the increased interest of international investors in euro area assets. the annual rate of change of loans to the private sector continued to contract. the annual growth rate of loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) stood at 0.3% in december, broadly unchanged since the beginning of 2013. the annual rate of change of lo… |
| Mario Draghi: Introductory statement to the press conference | Period_2 | 2014-08-08 | 0.602 | the risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area remain on the downside. in particular, heightened geopolitical risks, as well as developments in emerging market economies and global financial markets, may have the potential to affect economic conditions negatively, including through effects on energy prices and global demand for euro area products. a further downside risk relates to insufficient structural reforms in euro area countries, as well as weaker than expected domestic demand. according to eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual hicp inflation was 0.4% in july 2014, after 0.5% in june. this reflects primarily lower energy price inflation, while the other main components of the hicp remained broadly unchanged. on the basis of current information, annual hicp inflation is expected to remain at low levels over the coming months, before increasing gradually during 2015 and 2016. meanwhile, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. the governing council sees both upside and downside risks to the outlook for price developments as limited and broadly balanced over the medium term. in this context, we will closely monitor the possible repercussions of heightened geopolitical risks and exchange rate developments. turning to the monetary analysis, data for june 2014 continue to point to subdued underlying growth in broad mo… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2014-10-03 | 0.574 | loan growth to the private sector, and the necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and private sectors. the risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area remain on the downside. in particular, the recent weakening in the euro area’s growth momentum, alongside heightened geopolitical risks, could dampen confidence and, in particular, private investment. in addition, insufficient progress in structural reforms in euro area countries constitutes a key downward risk to the economic outlook. according to eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual hicp inflation was 0.3% in september 2014, after 0.4% in august. compared with the previous month, this reflects a stronger decline in energy prices and somewhat lower price increases in most other components of the hicp. on the basis of current information, annual hicp inflation is expected to remain at low levels over the coming months, before increasing gradually during 2015 and 2016. the governing council will continue to closely monitor the risks to the outlook for price developments over the medium term. in this context, we will focus in particular on the possible repercussions of dampened growth dynamics, geopolitical developments, exchange rate developments and the pass-through of our monetary policy measures. turning to the monetary analysis, data for august 2014 continue to point to subdued underlying growth in broad money (m3), with the annual growth rate increasing moderately to 2.0% in august, after 1… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-10-03 | 0.560 | downside risks include higher commodity prices in the context of renewed geopolitical tensions, weaker than expected global demand and slow or insufficient implementation of structural reforms in euro area countries. according to eurostat’s flash estimate, and broadly in line with expectations, euro area annual hicp inflation decreased in september 2013 to 1.1%, from 1.3% in august. on the basis of current futures prices for energy, annual inflation rates are expected to remain at such low levels in the coming months. taking the appropriate medium-term perspective, underlying price pressures are expected to remain subdued, reflecting the broad-based weakness in aggregate demand and the modest pace of the recovery. medium to long-term inflation expectations continue to be firmly anchored in line with price stability. the risks to the outlook for price developments are expected to be still broadly balanced over the medium term, with upside risks relating in particular to higher commodity prices as well as stronger than expected increases in administered prices and indirect taxes, and downside risks stemming from weaker than expected economic activity. turning to the monetary analysis, data for august indicate that the underlying growth of broad money (m3) and, in particular, credit remained subdued. annual growth in m3 continued to be broadly stable at 2.3% in august, compared with 2.2% in july. annual growth in m1 remained strong but decreased to 6.8% in august, from 7.1% i… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.060 | with the recovery now in a more advanced stage, and with growth momentum moderating, some observers see current developments as raising the spectre of stagflation, reminiscent of the 1970s when a surge in oil prices stifled growth and pushed inflation levels up into double digits across most oil-importing economies. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.050 | notably, the current estimates are well below the unconditional estimate which reflects average tail risks over a long horizon. an analysis of the underlying drivers suggests that the intensification of the downside risks to real gdp growth can be traced back predominantly to heightened financial and geopolitical risk, a bleaker macroeconomic outlook, and some deterioration in credit and financial conditions. |
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.043 | inflation seen in recent months. 7. the previous high was 1.67 percentage points in july 2008. 8. more domestically-generated inflation refers to the items in the hicp that are characterised by a direct and indirect import content in consumption expenditure of less than 15%. see frohling, a., o’brien, d. and schaefer, s. (2021), “a new measure for domestic inflation in the euro area”, mimeo. 9. see bokan, n., dossche, m. and rossi, l. (2018), “oil prices, the terms of trade and private consumption”, economic bulletin, |lssue 6, ecb. 10. the mechanism described in the text applies mainly to non-energy industrial goods but also to services. in addition, base effects related to the negative inflation in some sectors during the pandemic are also affecting services price inflation. 11. see also moéc, g. (2021), “second-guessing the second-round effects”, axa im research and strategy insights, no 108, 11 october. |
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.037 | the persistence of the shocks when inflation is driven mainly by supply shocks, monetary policy should respond when the shocks are persistent to keep inflation expectations anchored and avoid that inflation becomes entrenched. understanding the reasons for the persistence of current shocks and whether they may permanently lower potential is also crucial for designing the adequate policy response. there are two alternative explanations for the persistence of the supply shocks we have experienced. the first is that the economy has been hit by a sequence of temporary supply shocks, which have jointly created a persistent effect on inflation. in this case, potential output should remain broadly unchanged. and the lingering effect of the supply shocks on economic activity through real incomes and confidence could result in a negative output gap. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.035 | first, there is no stable, long-run trade-off that monetary policy can exploit to permanently lower unemployment at the expense of modestly higher inflation. hence, the best contribution that central banks can make to growth and welfare is to maintain price stability. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 58 | target | 1 | 0.2450466 | target | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 58 | inflation target | 2 | 0.0711977 | inflation target | 2 | 0.9999124 |
| 58 | level | 3 | 0.0490897 | cent target | 3 | 0.9984222 |
| 58 | cent | 4 | 0.0253069 | cent | 4 | 0.9979827 |
| 58 | reach | 5 | 0.0234646 | target inflation | 5 | 0.9977649 |
| 58 | stabilise | 6 | 0.0177701 | level target | 6 | 0.9977623 |
| 58 | horizon | 7 | 0.0172677 | symmetric | 7 | 0.9973716 |
| 58 | consistent | 8 | 0.0171002 | stabilise | 8 | 0.9973686 |
| 58 | nominal | 9 | 0.0139180 | price level | 9 | 0.9971516 |
| 58 | set | 10 | 0.0129131 | reach | 10 | 0.9970160 |
| 58 | deviation | 11 | 0.0117407 | cent inflation | 11 | 0.9970152 |
| 58 | price level | 12 | 0.0117407 | deviation | 12 | 0.9969760 |
| 58 | effective | 13 | 0.0109032 | durably | 13 | 0.9968888 |
| 58 | bind | 14 | 0.0102333 | flexible inflation | 14 | 0.9966647 |
| 58 | cent target | 15 | 0.0085585 | flexible inflation target | 15 | 0.9963574 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Could monetary policy have helped prevent the financial crisis? | Period_1 | 2010-04-13 | 0.140 |
|
| Juergen Stark: In search of a robust monetary policy framework | Period_1 | 2010-11-25 | 0.135 | international convergence on these principles has, however, been a slow process. after the collapse of the bretton woods system there was a long period of confusion created by the loss of a nominal anchor, which, during the system’s good times, had been provided by the us commitment to peg its currency to the price of gold. in the 1970s even some central bankers were sceptical that monetary policy alone could control inflation. 3 failed attempts to fine-tune the economy and the associated stop-and-go policies resulted in stagflation in a vast portion of the industrialised world. drawing lessons from this experience, and inspired by monetarist views that had successfully influenced monetary policy in germany and switzerland, central banks in the 1980s gained confidence in their ability to bring inflation down to levels consistent with price stability at a modest cost to the economy at large. the 1990s were characterised by the development of monetary policy frameworks capable of perpetuating the achieved degree of price stability. in my view, two major initiatives stand out: first, the development of inflation targeting. inflation targeting developed in many countries when other strategies failed to bring about the desired level of price and macroeconomic stability. some countries turned to inflation targeting because the instability of money demand in the face of ongoing financial innovation appeared to render the application of textbook-type versions of monetary targeting… |
| Jean Claude Trichet: The ECB’s monetary policy strategy after the evaluation and clarification of May 2003 | Period_1 | 2003-12-02 | 0.133 | 2.4 the ecb’s strategy and inflation-targeting strategies the two-pillar framework, in conjunction with the medium-term orientation of the ecb’s monetary policy conduct, has over time become the hallmark of the ecb’s strategy. these features, among others, distinguish the ecb’s strategy somewhat from the approaches implemented by some other central banks, in particular from inflation-targeting strategies. the notion of inflation targeting has changed over time and it is not a clearly defined concept. it is nevertheless true that the ecb’s monetary policy concept and the “inflation targeting” concept are relatively close in some respects: in particular the quantitative setting of the inflation target in the latter is close, without being identical, to the quantitative definition of price stability in the ecb’s concept. in both cases there is a level of |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Could monetary policy have helped prevent the financial crisis? | Period_1 | 2010-04-13 | 0.122 | 9 see m.a. king (1997), “changes in uk monetary policy: rules and discretion in practice”. journal of monetary economics 39, pp. 81–97. 10 see l.e.o. svennson (1998), “inflation targeting in an open economy: strict or flexible inflation targeting?” victoria economic commentaries 15(1). 11 at least when the output gap is defined in a “model-consistent” manner, i.e. as deviations of output from the level it would achieve in the absence of nominal rigidities. 12 see: o. blanchard and j. galí (2007). “real wage rigidities and the new keynesian model”, journal of money, credit and banking 39(s1), pp. 35–65. |
| Mr Erçel discusses the monetary policy of the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 1999-01-08 | 0.113 | there are lingering suspicions in some quarters about the credibility and reliability of this system, and since there is a good chance that a loss of credibility will follow a failure to meet an inflation target, the ecb will not announce such a target. i should also mention that some member countries’ central banks have reservations about conducting monetary policy with inflation targeting. people who accept monetary aggregates as good intermediate targets say that in accordance with the principles of continuity and flexibility, which are the basis for central bank credibility, it is more realistic to target monetary indicators and use these targets to attain price stability. |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.269 | against this background, some commentators argue that inflation targets should be replaced with some sort of level target. the two most prominent examples are price level targeting and nominal gdp level targeting, where central bank aim to stabilise the price level and nominal gdp respectively along some target path. proponents of level targeting strategies argue that they allow for a more powerful management of private sector expectations, leading to better stabilisation outcomes than under inflation targeting.9 |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.268 | another proposed alternative strategy is nominal gdp growth targeting or, as economists sometimes call it, “speed limit” policy.14 nominal gdp growth targeting is different from nominal gdp level targeting – as with inflation targeting, past outcomes are not taken into account. bygones are bygones. loosely speaking, the nominal gdp target is the sum of an inflation target and an estimate of potential gdp growth. the central bank tightens policy whenever nominal gdp growth is above this target and loosens when it is below. while theoretical analyses suggest that speed limit |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.218 | flexible inflation targeting implies that the central bank attempts to reach the target gradually in the medium‐term and not in the immediate period. svensson (1997)4 has shown that this gradualism is equivalent to an objective function that includes both the inflation rate deviation from its target and the output gap. this is close to inflation targeting regimes of central banks with a dual mandate but with primordial importance given to inflation as the variable in relation to which monetary policy is more efficient. on the other hand, bean (2009, 2013)5 has shown that no great differences exist between a flexible inflation targeting framework and one with a nominal gdp target. these |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.196 | 9 see, for example, svensson (1999), vestin (2006), gaspar, smets and vestin (2007) and schmidt (2011). 10 see eggertsson and woodford (2003), and nakov (2008). 11 see evans (2010). 12 note also that in the case of nominal gdp level targeting, an additional challenge arises due to the unobservability of potential gdp and measurement errors in real gdp. 13 see, for instance, kryvtsov, shukayev and ueberfeldt (2008). it is therefore perhaps not surprising that one has to go far back in history to find an example of a level‐targeting central bank. in the 1930s, the swedish riksbank pursued a price level targeting strategy. see berg and jonung (1999). 14 see, for instance, walsh (2003). |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.190 | similarities should be taken into consideration when understanding the popularity of the flexible inflation targeting framework since the early 90s. this positive verdict on inflation targeting has been more recently called into question. typically, opponents of inflation targeting rely on one of the following two arguments. first, some criticise inflation targeting for having failed to prevent the occurrence of the crisis. inflation‐targeting central banks, it is argued, focused too narrowly on inflation stabilisation and payed too little attention to financial developments, such as the rapid increase in house prices or the rise in financial institutions’ leverage ratios prior to the financial crisis.6 second, inflation targeting is attacked for its apparent inability to speed up the recovery in economic activity and inflation. incorporating financial stability considerations into monetary policy decisions |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.256 | inflation episodes would not be tolerated by policymakers. the policy commitment to resist below-target inflation was also reinforced by publication of the ecb’s new monetary policy strategy statement in july 2021, which articulated our determination to deliver our symmetric two per cent inflation target, including through forceful or persistent policy measures in the neighbourhood of the effective lower bound. more recently, the surge in inflation since autumn 2021 also has potentially acted as a circuit breaker in terms of the setting of inflation expectations by overturning the pre-pandemic narrative that an array of structural forces would permanently keep inflation at a low level. while a re-anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations around the two per cent target rate acts as a stabilising force and reinforces the credibility of the inflation target, complacency should be avoided. in particular, the current prolonged phase of spot inflation rates far above the target might lead some types of economic actors to make further upward revisions to their near-term and medium-term inflation expectations. accordingly, it is essential for the ecb to monitor closely a wide array of indicators of inflation expectations and to ensure that its commitment to delivering two per cent inflation over the medium term is understood by the full spectrum of economic actors. |
| Philip R Lane: Inflation in the near-term and the medium-term | Period_3 | 2022-02-18 | 0.159 | second, the re-anchoring of medium-term inflation expectations towards two percent has also been supported by the clarity of the ecb’s new monetary policy strategy, which was finalised in july 2021 and backed up by its revised interest rate forward guidance. the revised strategy makes it clear that the monetary policy of the ecb is dedicated to delivering the two per cent target over the medium term, with a symmetric aversion to below-target and above-target deviations. the simplicity and transparency of the two per cent target increases accountability and improves clarity compared to the previous target of “below, but close to, two per cent.” |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.138 | the second condition – that we expect inflation to reach two per cent not only well ahead of the end of the projection horizon but also “durably for the rest of the projection horizon” – telegraphs that inflation reaching the target should be lasting and not just be the result of short-lived forces that lead to one- time increases in prices that are unlikely to lead to persistently higher year-over-year inflation. the third condition, which requires “progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at two per cent over the medium term’, signals that policy rates should not be lifted unless underlying inflation is also judged to have made satisfactory progress |
| Philip R Lane: Inflation in the near-term and the medium-term | Period_3 | 2022-02-18 | 0.131 | inflation persistently below the two per cent target over the medium term. moreover, it should also be recognised that medium-term inflation expectations have been increasing from a low base towards the two per cent inflation target over the last year, even before the energy shock. in the specific context of the euro area, there are several factors indicating that the excessively- low inflation environment that prevailed from 2014 to2019 (a period over which inflation averaged just 0.9 per cent) might not re-emerge even after the pandemic cycle is over. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.128 | the first condition “until we see inflation reaching two per cent well ahead of the end of our projection horizon’ provides reassurance that the convergence of inflation towards the new target should be sufficiently advanced and mature at the time of policy rate lift off. moreover, requiring the inflation target to be reached “well ahead of the end of the projection horizon’ helps to hedge monetary policy against the risk of relying excessively on inflation projections at the long-end of the projection horizon, where forecast errors tend to be larger under typical conditions.!) |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 59 | market | 1 | 0.1422984 | money market | 1 | 0.9997371 |
| 59 | liquidity | 2 | 0.0797171 | market rate | 2 | 0.9992111 |
| 59 | money | 3 | 0.0685117 | money market rate | 3 | 0.9987727 |
| 59 | money market | 4 | 0.0550863 | collateral | 4 | 0.9980710 |
| 59 | collateral | 5 | 0.0171358 | liquidity | 5 | 0.9978936 |
| 59 | bank | 6 | 0.0167130 | repo | 6 | 0.9974565 |
| 59 | security | 7 | 0.0149159 | interbank | 7 | 0.9973701 |
| 59 | fund | 8 | 0.0144931 | term money | 8 | 0.9971920 |
| 59 | market rate | 9 | 0.0139645 | term money market | 9 | 0.9971472 |
| 59 | provide | 10 | 0.0115331 | overnight | 10 | 0.9966696 |
| 59 | function | 11 | 0.0111103 | security market | 11 | 0.9964948 |
| 59 | segment | 12 | 0.0104760 | segment | 12 | 0.9961414 |
| 59 | money market rate | 13 | 0.0083618 | unlimited | 13 | 0.9959647 |
| 59 | overnight | 14 | 0.0075161 | operational framework | 14 | 0.9959222 |
| 59 | instrument | 15 | 0.0074104 | market fund | 15 | 0.9956556 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: China and the European Union - global economic challenges and policy responses | Period_1 | 2008-09-17 | 0.276 | at the same time, the ecb will continue to manage liquidity in the interbank money market in order to ensure that the very short-term money market rate remains close to the ecb’s main policy rate, as required for the efficient implementation of monetary policy, and to alleviate the persisting pressures in the term money markets, so as to mitigate the impact of the financial turmoil on the banking system and the broader economy. over the past year, the ecb money market operations have effectively contributed to containing risks to the euro area’s financial stability without changing the stance of monetary policy – as defined by the key ecb interest rates – which remained firmly geared towards the price stability objective. moreover, although the ecb supplied large amounts of liquidity to the banking system to offset or contain the impact of disturbances to the money market, the injection of additional liquidity was temporary. as a result, the overall amount of bank reserves – central bank money– in the economy has not been augmented, but only the intertemporal allocation and the maturity structure of the central bank funds provided has been affected. last week, we announced certain changes in the operational risk framework (collateral framework) of the eurosystem’s money market operations. these changes did not alter the key elements of this framework – as they did not affect the range of eligible counterparties or the range of eligible collateral – but they did refine some… |
| Jürgen Stark: Economic perspectives and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-09-10 | 0.275 | liquidity management while the ecb has maintained a steady hand in its monetary policy decisions, we have not been passive in the face of the financial tensions. rather – and contrary to the expectations of some observers – we have proved able to act rapidly and, when necessary, significantly, to support the functioning of the money market that is central to the implementation and transmission of monetary policy. during this period of heightened stress and uncertainty, the ecb has used its liquidity operations in a pragmatic manner, consistent with both the monetary policy stance decided by the governing council and the market-oriented approach that has always characterised our liquidity management. although the frequency of liquidity operations has increased when necessary and the timing and maturity of liquidity provision has evolved over time, such actions aimed at reassuring market participants about the continuation of transactions in the money market and have neither involved substantial changes to the operational framework nor impinged on the monetary policy decisions and the primary objective of price stability. this means that we adhered from the very outset of the turmoil to the clear separation between the determination of the monetary policy stance, on the one hand, and the steering of short-term market interest rates via the operational framework, on the other. this has ensured the “neutrality” of liquidity operations: allotment decisions and other operational… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2008-07-01 | 0.235 | recent monetary policy operations of the ecb turning to our liquidity management, since march, the ecb has continued to apply basically four liquidity measures to alleviate ongoing tensions in the euro money market. first, the ecb has continued to “frontload” the supply of liquidity over the reserve maintenance period. this means that we have provided more liquidity at the beginning of the maintenance period, while compensating for this by providing less liquidity towards the end of the period. the average supply of liquidity has thus remained unchanged over the entire maintenance period. second, around the end of the first quarter of 2008, when money market tensions were intensifying, the ecb conducted two liquidity-providing fine-tuning operations to address these tensions. the ecb has recently announced that it stands ready, if needed, to contribute to smoothing the market conditions around the end-of-semester. third, the ecb has continued its policy of providing a higher share of liquidity on a longer- term basis by renewing our supplementary three-month longer-term refinancing operations. moreover, in april 2008 the eurosystem conducted a supplementary longer-term refinancing operation with a six-month maturity and announced another one for july 2008. it is to be noted that the total amount of outstanding refinancing remained unchanged, as we reduced the share provided via the one-week main refinancing operations. fourth, to ensure the availability of funding denomina… |
| Lucas Papademos: Globalisation and central bank policies | Period_1 | 2008-01-25 | 0.221 | asset valuation is difficult and highly uncertain, and incentives are distorted, the risks to financial stability could increase. the current financial turmoil provides a clear example of how a shock to a relatively small segment of a national financial market can spread globally across borders and across other markets. as early as 2005, us sub-prime loan delinquencies started to rise. consequently the value of credit products based on sub-prime mortgages rated lower than aa started falling. but it was not until two hedge funds from bear stearns with active exposure in the sub-prime market had almost lost all their capital by june 2007 and when some rating agencies in early july announced that they would downgrade many asset-backed securities (abss) and collateralised debt obligations (cdos) that a significant reassessment of the expected returns of structured finance products took place and aa and aaa-rated asset- backed securities (or abs) also started falling in value. the following general re-pricing of risk [see chart 15] and tensions in credit markets (e.g. also the corporate bond market) now affected several countries other than the us (e.g. the corporate bond markets in the us and europe). financial market liquidity for most structured credit products started evaporating [chart 16]. equity markets have also been affected by the increase in risk aversion and a general flight to quality. 19 as a consequence of inadequate risk management, and in particular liquidity r… |
| Lucas Papademos: Economic outlook in the euro area | Period_1 | 2008-06-17 | 0.216 | financial markets let me now turn to financial market developments and the financial stability outlook in the euro area. the financial system of the euro area is still undergoing further adjustment as the processes of risk repricing and de-leveraging continue. the stresses on the financial system have persisted longer and they have become broader and deeper than anticipated six months ago. although there have been some signs of easing tensions in certain markets since mid-march, elevated pressures remain in others, notably in the term money markets of major currencies. moreover, high uncertainty surrounds the future dynamics of property prices, the magnitude of possible further asset valuation write-downs by financial institutions and the effects of the market turmoil on the broader economy. over the past two months, money, credit and other financial markets appear to be sending mixed signals. the term money market spreads between euro deposit and eonia swap rates have remained high and close to record levels, for maturities from three to twelve months. tensions in the term money market continue to be a global phenomenon. currently, the spreads between three-month deposit and overnight-indexed swap rates are virtually the same in the euro, us dollar and pound sterling money markets. in the credit markets, greater risk awareness by banks and increased bank funding costs have been reflected in the significant and general further tightening of lending standards in the euro ar… |
| Peter Praet: Opening remarks - “Money markets, monetary policy implementation and central bank balance sheets” | Period_2 | 2017-11-06 | 0.335 | favour of a much reduced level of fragmentation and a more homogenous degree of access to liquidity across the euro area. this is also supported by the fact that the interest rates observed across countries are more correlated with aggregate excess liquidity levels rather than country- specific levels. unsecured vs. secured segments second, we have observed a sustained shift of money market activity from the unsecured to the secured segment. activity in the unsecured segment has declined significantly over time, in the first place due to the heightened counterparty risk in the wake of the crisis. activity in the unsecured market has stabilised but remains subdued. this is linked to the high level of excess liquidity and reduced short-term funding needs for banks, as well as, to some extent, regulatory changes affecting banks’ liquidity management. the ecb has never singled out one specific short-term interest rate as its operational target, but it is clear that the eonia, an unsecured money market rate, has provided an important point of reference to practitioners. the observed shift of activity from the unsecured to the secured market raises a number of important questions. for instance: do unsecured rates still have the same information content as before the crisis? is the arbitrage between secured and unsecured rates working efficiently? and, should the central bank focus more on steering secured rather than unsecured rates? in this regard it is also relevant that we ha… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Bloomberg | Period_2 | 2014-01-17 | 0.263 | on money-market conditions: “it’s not new that we’ve been worried by possible upward shifts in our money-market curve, in particular caused by external shocks. u.s. tapering is one of them, but there could be others that could make the money-market curve both higher and steeper. it’s all a matter of judgment and measure, not black and white. but at some point such developments could interfere with our monetary-policy stance, generally, and with our forward guidance, more specifically. so we want to make sure that monetary conditions, including money-market rates in the euro area, remain appropriate to the situation. our recovery is lagging the recovery in the u.s. that’s a fact and that warrants different monetary conditions.” “what we’ve seen around the end of 2013 was positive. the market was able to absorb a significant drain of liquidity due to year-end factors which we knew would be temporary. it has been managed and addressed by market participants in a very smooth way. we are now close to money-market conditions that were prevailing before the year end. it shows that the money market can be resilient to temporary factors.” “at the end of december, we had very tight liquidity and elevated eonia and euribor rates; that’s something we wouldn’t like to see as a permanent situation. but the issue was addressed by banks drawing more on our main refinancing operation, the mro. this can serve as an illustration of the usefulness of fixed-rate, full-allotment as a way to pro… |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.255 | this development is not neutral for market rates in the euro area. secured money market rates, backed by high quality collateral, have for a while been trading well below the ecb deposit facility rate, which normally sets a floor for short‐term money market rates. in part, this discount is explained by the activity of non‐banks who do not have access to central bank facilities and are accepting interest rates below the deposit facility rate. the discount is, of course, also attributed to the app which has reduced the availability of high quality collateral at the same time as market demand for that collateral has increased. understanding the root causes of these observed outcomes better is crucial for the central bank when making decisions about future counterparty eligibility and the choice of money market rates used to assess monetary policy transmission. negative interest rates |
| Peter Praet: Steering the economy in a challenging environment | Period_2 | 2013-11-19 | 0.239 | enumerated before could pose further threats to our price stability objective, and may thus call for more action. second, within the fixed rate full allotment operational framework that we have prolonged in time, the rate on the main refinancing operations can act as a backstop for money market borrowing and lending activity over an extended horizon. this effectively can cap upward volatility in the money market rates. if banks expect to be able to draw central bank credit on demand over an extended horizon, the cost of interbank credit in the money market, even for longer tenors, will be unlikely to increase much beyond the rate at which the ecb is expected to lend under the main refinancing operations in the future. this, again, helps flatten the yield curve in the money market and keep the cost of credit in the broader economy constrained. this latter feature of our current system of liquidity provision is important, particularly in conditions – like at present – in which excess liquidity in the money market is shrinking. indeed, since the peak of the sovereign debt crisis in the summer of 2012, we have witnessed a significant reduction in the amount of excess liquidity. excess liquidity is the amount of cash over and above the level that banks collectively need to fulfil reserve requirements, to meet the demand for currency by their customers and to cope with other exogenous factors that drain liquidity from circulation occasionally. banks participate less in new refin… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges for future monetary policy frameworks - a European perspective | Period_2 | 2016-11-09 | 0.239 | reasons behind this growth provide useful lessons for the post-crisis world. 12 beyond the justifications provided by the crisis for the use of the size and composition of central banks’ balance sheets as policy instrument, there are good arguments to preserve the instrument in the policy toolkit. they stem from some structural changes that have occurred in financial markets. in particular: the increased role of secured money market transactions; the importance of a broad set of market rates beyond the overnight rate, in view of imperfections in arbitrage; the growing relevance of non-bank institutions in market-based finance; and finally, the scarcity of safe assets that affects the functioning of markets and the management of collateral. these developments are behind proposals recently presented in jackson hole by duffie and krishnamurthy (2016) and by greenwood, hanson and stein (2016) which stress the importance of the fed’s reverse repo programme (rrp).13 in the first paper, the programme would be used to involve more counterparties and affect several interest rates, thereby contributing to a better transmission of monetary policy, in view of the limits to arbitrage hampering the pass-through from short- to long-term interest rates. recent internal work at the ecb also detects similar pass-through imperfections in european markets. in the paper by greenwood et al. (2016), rrp is considered a way to create very short-term safe assets. it would foster financial stabilit… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy and the money market | Period_3 | 2022-09-15 | 0.314 |
|
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.313 | financial markets the money market starting with the money market, the transmission of the increase in the key ecb interest rates to the unsecured money market rates has been smooth and complete for both the july and september rate hikes (chart 8).[31] this is especially important, since the €str is the basis for the overnight interest rate swap curve, along which the market prices expectations of future policy. in the secured segment, the general pattern has been that of near-complete adjustment of repo rates for transactions based on a broad collateral pool, which are predominantly driven by a motivation to borrow or lend cash. by contrast, repo rates for transactions using specific collateral – which are driven by the need to source a specific security – have seen some delayed and partial adjustments, which has reflected increased demand for short-term secure investments. to prevent an abrupt outflow of deposits into the market at a time when euro area repo markets were experiencing collateral scarcity, the ecb’s governing council on 8 september 2022 decided to temporarily remove the 0% interest rate ceiling for remuneration of government deposits.[32] this measure has helped reduce tensions in secured money markets. looking forward, we remain attentive to the spread between different money market rates as well as collateral scarcity concerns. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy and the money market | Period_3 | 2022-09-15 | 0.236 | the transmission of interest rate changes in the money market the money market is key for the implementation and transmission of monetary policy: it acts as a seismograph for liquidity conditions and market expectations of future policy, while money market rates are central to the transmission of monetary policy through their impact on economy-wide financing conditions. it follows that it is important that money market rates adjust in line with changes in key ecb interest rates. this applies in particular to changes in the deposit facility rate (dfr), which represents the relevant policy rate in conditions of excess liquidity. the available evidence suggests that our july rate hike of 50 basis points, which increased the dfr from -0.5 per cent to zero, has been well transmitted to money market rates overall. in particular, the euro short-term rate (€str) moved up by the full size of the change in policy rates (chart 1). this is especially important, since the €str is the basis for the overnight interest rate swap curve, along which the market prices expectations of future policy. the reaction was similar across deposits by banks and by the different types of non-bank financial institutions that are active in the money market. the near-complete adjustment of repo rates for transactions based on a broad collateral pool – which are predominantly driven by a motivation to borrow or lend cash – was immediate. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy and the money market | Period_3 | 2022-09-15 | 0.185 | moreover, there has been a widening of the spread between short-term government bill rates and swaps with the same maturity (chart 1). this can be mainly attributed to demand/supply imbalances in the market for short-term government bills, which is partially driven by the level of excess liquidity and increased demand for short-term high-quality assets. this increased demand is also motivated by the current interest rate uncertainty and high level of volatility. these demand/supply imbalances of high- quality collateral with short-term maturities can also be observed in other jurisdictions of major central banks for similar reasons.[4] the increase of the dfr by 75 basis points to 0.75 per cent that we decided last week will only become effective with the start of the new maintenance period today. to preserve the effective transmission of last week’s rate hike by 75 basis points and safeguard the orderly functioning of money markets, the governing council also decided last week to temporarily remove the zero per cent interest rate ceiling for remunerating government deposits held with the eurosystem. until 30 april 2023, the remuneration ceiling government deposits will remain at the €str or the dfr, whichever is lower. this temporary adjustment was in recognition that the faster than initially expected pace of monetary policy normalisation gave only little time for government deposit holders to adjust and plan for alternative arrangements. the temporary adjustment allows … |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy and the money market | Period_3 | 2022-09-15 | 0.170 | monetary policy and the money market opening remarks by philip r. lane, member of the executive board of the ecb, meeting of the money market contact group 14 september 2022 it is a pleasure to open this meeting of the ecb’s money market contact group (mmcg).[1] while the money market is always central to the transmission of monetary policy, its role is especially prominent when the set of policy interest rates is the main active monetary policy instrument. after an extended period in which policy rates were stable near the lower bound and asset purchasing was the marginal monetary policy instrument, the money market is now back to centre stage in the transmission of monetary policy and the mmcg is an excellent forum to collect feedback from you, the money market practitioners. in these opening remarks, i will first explain the monetary policy decisions we took last week, before turning to the transmission of our recent interest rate moves in the money market. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 60 | expectation | 1 | 0.2158248 | anchor | 1 | 0.9995619 |
| 60 | inflation expectation | 2 | 0.1617564 | inflation expectation | 2 | 0.9994742 |
| 60 | anchor | 3 | 0.1109092 | anchor inflation | 3 | 0.9993865 |
| 60 | term inflation expectation | 4 | 0.0339480 | anchor inflation expectation | 4 | 0.9993863 |
| 60 | term inflation | 5 | 0.0255502 | good anchor | 5 | 0.9991236 |
| 60 | remain | 6 | 0.0214088 | term inflation expectation | 6 | 0.9989484 |
| 60 | anchor inflation | 7 | 0.0168072 | expectation | 7 | 0.9987719 |
| 60 | anchor inflation expectation | 8 | 0.0164621 | expectation remain | 8 | 0.9977221 |
| 60 | good anchor | 9 | 0.0137012 | inflation expectation remain | 9 | 0.9977221 |
| 60 | commitment | 10 | 0.0102500 | level consistent | 10 | 0.9973716 |
| 60 | firmly | 11 | 0.0094447 | term inflation | 11 | 0.9972800 |
| 60 | level | 12 | 0.0081793 | firmly | 12 | 0.9971075 |
| 60 | stable | 13 | 0.0077191 | remain anchor | 13 | 0.9970600 |
| 60 | expectation remain | 14 | 0.0076041 | firm anchor | 14 | 0.9964075 |
| 60 | inflation expectation remain | 15 | 0.0072590 | firmly anchor | 15 | 0.9963198 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean Claude Trichet: The ECB’s monetary policy strategy after the evaluation and clarification of May 2003 | Period_1 | 2003-12-02 | 0.199 | the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations second, with its quantitative definition the ecb has made a very significant contribution to the firm anchoring of inflation expectations. the definition of price stability permits all economic agents and the public at large to build expectations of future inflation outcomes. by providing a benchmark for inflation expectations, the quantitative definition of price stability has considerably facilitated the conduct of monetary policy by the ecb. indeed, if the public can trust the ecb, we can assume that the setting of wages and prices will be compatible with the ecb’s definition. this significantly reduces the likelihood of temporary bouts of inflation triggering harmful wage and price spirals, as was the case in previous decades. in our evaluation of the strategy we analysed particularly closely the experience with euro area inflation expectations. we were very pleased to see that the volatility of long-term inflation expectations in the euro area is as low as in the best performing industrialised countries in this respect. since january 1999, medium and long-term inflation expectations, as measured by survey data, have remained stable most of the time within the range of 1.7 to 1.9%, thus at a level compatible with the definition of price stability. this is all the more remarkable given that the ecb started without a track record of its own and was faced with a number of sizeable, mainly upward, price shocks hitting the e… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the European economy and the ECB’s monetary policy concept | Period_1 | 2004-07-20 | 0.196 | the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations in the light of past experience, it is clear that the announcement of the quantitative definition of price stability, in combination with the medium-term orientation of policy, has been an extremely valuable element of the ecb’s strategy. with its quantitative definition, the ecb has made a very significant contribution to the firm anchoring of inflation expectations. notably, it has provided a benchmark for inflation expectations, which in turn has considerably facilitated the conduct of monetary policy. indeed, as long as longer-term inflation expectations are firmly anchored, chances are high that the setting of wages and prices will be guided primarily by the ecb’s objective rather than by past developments. this significantly reduces the likelihood of temporary increases in inflation triggering harmful second-round increases in wages and prices, events which were fairly frequent in previous decades. for these reasons, the ecb has from the start carefully monitored and continuously communicated the developments in euro area inflation expectations. experience indicates that the volatility of indicators of long-term inflation expectations, especially those based on survey data, has always remained relatively limited, at levels comparable to those in the best performing industrialised countries in this respect. notably, survey-based indicators of inflation expectations have always remained fairly close to 1.8% and, most of… |
| Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Challenges for the Euro at ten | Period_1 | 2008-12-12 | 0.179 | disappearance of an impact of actual inflation outcomes on agents’ expectations, which is a clear indication of the credibility of our price stability objective. i briefly elaborate on both issues. recent ecb research 3 has shown that, after january 1999, inflation persistence has disappeared both at the aggregate, euro area-wide level, and within its three largest countries (germany, france, and italy). further, similar changes have affected inflation dynamics in several inflation-targeting countries and in switzerland under the “new monetary policy concept”, whereas they have been largely absent in the united states and japan, two countries characterised by a committment to price stability but lacking a clearly-defined nominal anchor. as a result, in the euro area, switzerland, and inflation-targeting countries, inflation dynamics is – as of today – essentially purely forward-looking, whereas in countries such as the united states and japan it still retains a significant backward-looking component. what explains these findings? the simplest and most logical explanation is that credible and clearly defined nominal anchors, by providing a “focal point” for agents’ inflation expectations, have rescinded the link between such expectations and past inflation outcomes, which was instead inevitable during historical periods in which such anchors either were absent or were not regarded as credible. this conjecture is indeed compatible with the stylised fact previously mentioned:… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Lessons for monetary policy from the recent crisis | Period_1 | 2011-01-20 | 0.176 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: Economic prospects and the role of monetary policy in the current situation | Period_1 | 2009-03-13 | 0.157 | indicates that medium-term inflation expectations in the euro area are solidly anchored at levels consistent with the aim of the governing council of keeping inflation at rate of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. such a firm anchoring represents the strongest and most reassuring safeguard against any risk of a downward spiral of inflation and inflation expectations. the fact that we have a clear mandate and a clear definition of price stability is helpful in anchoring inflation expectations. as in the case of growth, a considerable degree of uncertainty surrounds the inflation projections of the ecb staff. risks to these projections are broadly balanced. they relate in particular to the risks to the outlook for economic activity as well as to risks to commodity prices. |
| Vítor Constâncio: “We are certainly not almighty”- interview with Börsen-Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-09-16 | 0.184 | what really matters are medium- to longer-term inflation expectations. are they still “anchored”? they are starting to get de-anchored for horizons up to 4 years. these figures declined significantly during the past two months. now it is also starting to attain the inflation expectations in five years for the following five years. furthermore, the influence of short- term expectations on longer-term expectation is increasing. this is a bad signal and a big concern for us. the risk that the longer-term expectations get de-anchored has definitely increased enormously. |
| Peter Praet: Interview with Bloomberg | Period_2 | 2015-11-27 | 0.169 | inflation has repeatedly undershot your forecasts… it is key for a central bank to keep inflation expectations anchored, especially in a period of slack in the economy. and we have some signals that these inflation expectations are still fragile. is that still the case? i think it’s still the case. long-term inflation expectations remain fragile. i never said they are de-anchored, i don’t think they are, but there are risks and this is why we are considering further action. a possible de-anchoring of inflation expectations together with a lot of slack is a dangerous cocktail. a lot of the latest wave of commodity price declines is demand related. at some point in the recent past you had a supply side issue, which is a windfall for consumers, but now a significant part is also coming from weak global conditions. global growth this year will be the weakest since 2009. |
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.144 | for the actual process of setting wages and prices, it is the expectations of the public that matter most. since our last strategy review there has been more research on how consumers and firms form their inflation expectations. while data are still scarce and noisy, the general picture is that consumers hold very diverse expectations about inflation that appear far less well anchored to our aim than other measures of inflation expectations. in 2015 average perceived inflation among euro area households was just under 5%, while actual inflation was 0.3%. |
| Peter Praet: Monetary policy under uncertainty | Period_2 | 2015-11-26 | 0.133 | uncertainty over the way economic agents form expectations about future economic developments and economic policy actions in terms of inflation expectations, a series of both demand and supply shocks in the euro area have led, at times, to a possible loosening in the anchoring of agents expectations of inflation. today, inflation expectations have only partially regained the values that would indicate a rapid and sustained adjustment in the path of inflation to levels closer to 2%. in particular, we have seen, on occasions, longer-term inflation expectations responding to short-term movements in oil prices. that is unacceptable for a central bank, insofar as it implies that people’s expectations of its reaction function have become less certain. at the same time, the crisis has also left a mark on agents’ expectations of economic activity. many countries are confronting a situation of disappointed growth expectations. for the euro area as a whole, 5 years ahead growth expectations among forecasters have been falling continuously since 2001, and during the crisis the distribution of those expectations has also widened, reflecting greater uncertainty about the lasting impact of the crisis on potential output. this matters for our policy insofar as lower expectations of future income feed back into the present and add to the forces weighing on against inflation. monetary policy cannot affect expectations about long-term growth: that is the task of governments introducing stru… |
| Fabio Panetta: Monetary-fiscal interactions on the way out of the crisis | Period_2 | 2021-07-02 | 0.111 | we must be clear that, in order to re-anchor inflation expectations, our policy horizon cannot extend far into the future. if we are seen as determined to achieve 2% without undue delay and have a clear plan to do so by enabling monetary-fiscal interactions, rising inflation expectations will make our task easier. but if we are seen to be lacking determination, expectations will be less responsive and the “bang for our buck” will be considerably lower: we will end up spending more, not less, and we may not exit the liquidity trap. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in the euro area | Period_3 | 2022-09-21 | 0.169 | the pace of rate increases the second consideration in responding to current inflation is the pace of rate increases. when inflation is high for a long period of time, an important role for monetary policy is to ensure that inflation expectations remain anchored as the shocks work their way through the economy. if expectations become de-anchored and trigger a wage-price spiral, it can lead to inflation becoming persistent even after the shocks disappear. raising interest rates has a mechanical effect on demand and inflation, and thereby on inflation expectations. but when interest rates are starting from unusually low levels, rate hikes are more powerful if they also create signalling effects that influence expectations directly. in this context, especially compared with the traditional focus on 25 basis-point increments, adjusting the pace of rate hikes is a key tool to signal our determination to fulfil our mandate and keep inflation expectations contained. and moving faster at the start of the hiking cycle clearly conveys our commitment to bring down inflation to our medium-term target. at present, inflation expectations remain relatively well anchored across a range of measures. but there are two reasons why it would be unwise to take this for granted. first, the shock is severely affecting the prices of those consumption items, such as groceries and petrol, that have the greatest influence on households’ inflation expectations.[15] the ecb’s consumer expectations surv… |
| Isabel Schnabel: The globalisation of inflation | Period_3 | 2022-05-16 | 0.151 | conditions in domestic product and labour markets, which monetary policy can influence directly, are still the key drivers of a significant share of overall inflation. it rather means that the importance of keeping inflation expectations firmly anchored at our target has increased. large and persistent global shocks can destabilise inflation expectations even if the main source of expansion or contraction stems from abroad. in the 2010s, global shocks were largely disinflationary, contributing to the secular decline in long- term inflation expectations. today, global conditions give rise to the risk of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations to the upside. by responding swiftly and decisively to these risks, monetary policy can secure price stability over the medium term, thereby avoiding the much higher economic cost of acting too late. thank you. |
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.136 | modest wage demands also suggest that inflation expectations remain well anchored. that picture is corroborated by market-based and survey-based measures — at both medium- and longer-term horizons — which show no signs of de-anchoring. what we see is rather inflation expectations re- anchoring towards our 2% target from below, especially when filtering out risk premia (chart 8). an increase in risk premia in inflation compensation is common in response to a supply shock. |22 |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.130 | the credibility of the euro area’s nominal anchor. if long-term inflation expectations remain anchored, the risks of a wage-price spiral will be limited. this is what we have observed so far in the euro area. the ecb’s forward-looking wage tracker currently points to further increases in wages, but these are expected to remain at levels that are unlikely to set in motion a harmful wage-price dynamic. therefore, while a close monitoring of wage developments remains essential, at present the most likely outcome remains a further decline in real consumer wages and the labour share of income. our consumer expectations survey points in a similar direction. it found that households anticipate their real wages to fall by around 6% over the next twelve months (slide 7, left-hand chart).[17] |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.127 | monetary policy should normally “look through” temporary supply-driven inflation, so long as inflation expectations remain anchored. indeed, we are monitoring developments carefully but, for now, we see no signs that this increase in inflation is becoming broad-based across the economy. a “trimmed mean’”!“4] of inflation — which removes the items with the highest and lowest inflation rates — stood at 2.1% in august. furthermore, wage developments so far show no signs of significant second-round effects. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 61 | hand | 1 | 0.0634136 | slide | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 61 | slide | 2 | 0.0631500 | hand | 2 | 0.9989476 |
| 61 | firm | 3 | 0.0452239 | profit | 3 | 0.9988610 |
| 61 | chart | 4 | 0.0377107 | hand chart | 4 | 0.9985967 |
| 61 | leave | 5 | 0.0324383 | margin | 5 | 0.9981601 |
| 61 | rise | 6 | 0.0241343 | leave hand | 6 | 0.9981598 |
| 61 | share | 7 | 0.0204437 | chart slide | 7 | 0.9981579 |
| 61 | profit | 8 | 0.0196528 | leave | 8 | 0.9980710 |
| 61 | increase | 9 | 0.0189938 | chart | 9 | 0.9978069 |
| 61 | cost | 10 | 0.0180711 | profit margin | 10 | 0.9972806 |
| 61 | margin | 11 | 0.0167530 | firm | 11 | 0.9967500 |
| 61 | pass | 12 | 0.0160940 | leave hand chart | 12 | 0.9967069 |
| 61 | demand | 13 | 0.0159621 | pass | 13 | 0.9963172 |
| 61 | level | 14 | 0.0151713 | leave chart | 14 | 0.9960910 |
| 61 | leave hand | 15 | 0.0126669 | cost push | 15 | 0.9951278 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: The effects of globalisation on inflation, liquidity and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2007-06-13 | 0.060 | such estimated effects is not straightforward. the domestic economy’s response to the emergence of new international low-cost competitors is not captured by these estimates. furthermore, it is not clear to what extent and for how long these effects should be expected to persist. the empirical evidence on the direct impact of globalisation on labour markets is also mixed. indeed, it seems that the findings are getting less rather than more robust and it may be difficult to disentangle the effects of globalisation from those resulting from technological advances. in theory, it could be expected that the increased openness of the economies may affect the demand for labour by firms in advanced economies directly, as a result of increased international competition and, indirectly, by increasing the real wage elasticity of labour demand. there is some evidence confirming these theoretical propositions. 17 the quadrupling of the effective global labour force over the last twenty years has led to a fall in the labour share of unskilled workers’ sectors in advanced economies and to a – more moderate – rise in the labour share of skilled workers’ sectors. in the euro area, shifts in labour demand are predominantly resulting in changes in employment rather than in wages. the imf concludes, however, that technological advances had an even bigger impact on the labour share of unskilled workers’ sectors than globalisation as such. |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy and asset prices | Period_1 | 2009-10-19 | 0.057 | euro area output gap estimates are also characterised by a large degree of revision, and there is an equally large disagreement between different sources, as documented in charts 3 and 4. however, the latest estimates do suggest that the euro area had a negative output gap in the period 2002-2005. overall, the unreliability of measures of the output gap affects the appropriateness of monetary policy prescriptions that are predicated on such a construct. and, in all likelihood, output-gap estimates are going to become more unreliable than ever due to the increased uncertainty and possible time-variation in potential output brought about by the recent financial crisis. the unreliability of output-gap measures is not the only reason why a central bank may fail to take timely action, irrespective of its willingness to act pre-emptively. a too-narrow focus on inflation forecasts may be equally hazardous. on one hand, inflationary pressures might remain latent for years owing to compensation by other forces, especially if the central bank gives strong weight to measures of core inflation. for instance, globalisation may exert a disinflationary impact on consumer price inflation through a rising share of imports from low-cost countries. a focus on core inflation may fail to detect the inflationary pressure associated with an increase in the prices of oil-related items and non-energy commodities owing to rising demand from the fast growing non-oecd economies. 9 on the other hand, … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: A stability-oriented monetary policy as a necessary condition for long term growth | Period_1 | 2004-12-23 | 0.048 | labour costs, which fosters firms’ competitiveness, growth and job creation. in a credible regime of low inflation workers do not ask for extra-wage increases to compensate for inflation risk and firms and trade unions know ex-ante that firms will not be able to pass higher wages on to consumer prices. this helps to avoid excessive nominal increases, thus enhancing the ability of firms to efficiently manage their production costs and create new jobs. at the current juncture, it is important that there are no second round effects on wage and price settings arising from the recent increase in oil prices. such effects have not been observed till now. all economic agents know without any doubt that we are very vigilant in this respect; and we trust that it is this vigilance and our credibility that are decisively contributing to prevent second round effects. |
| Jürgen Stark: Main challenges for monetary policy in a globalised world | Period_1 | 2008-03-31 | 0.047 |
|
| Lucas Papademos: Globalisation, inflation, imbalances and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-07 | 0.044 | relative to the rate of growth in domestic trade”. these are quantities and processes we can measure. let us look at some charts. the value of all world exports of goods and services relative to world gdp has increased by ten percentage points (from 19% to 29%) over the past 10-15 years (see chart 3) and it is expected to continue to grow steadily until the end of the decade. even more impressive is the acceleration in total foreign direct investment (fdi) relative to world gdp (see chart 4). since the late 1990s, the pace of integration in the world economy, as illustrated by the stock of inward fdi as a percent of gdp, has accelerated substantially, particularly in non-japan asia and in the new member states of the european union (see chart 5). the charts for fdi implicitly incorporate the associated exchanges of technology, information and know-how and other factors that have strengthened the interdependence of our economies. statistics and charts on the movement of people and the exchange of ideas, information and technology are more difficult to come by, but i believe that they would give the same sense of the velocity of the process. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Escaping low inflation? | Period_2 | 2021-07-05 | 0.352 | option prices in financial markets, for example, suggest that investors currently price in almost a one-in-four chance that inflation over the next five years will average more than 2% – the highest level since 2014 (left chart slide 9). estimates of the inflation risk premium, which had turned negative a few years ago on the back of growing risks of deflation, now signal a renewed interest of investors to hedge against the risks of inflation (right chart slide 9). flows into inflation-protected bond funds have accelerated measurably since around last summer in both the euro area and the united states. survey-based evidence points in a similar direction. the results of our most recent survey of monetary analysts suggests that more than 40% of respondents see upside risks to inflation this year, while almost a third sees upside risks for 2022 (left chart slide 10). similarly, the share of consumers that expect inflation over the next 12 months to increase more rapidly than it did over the past 12 months is at the highest level in nearly 20 years, abstracting from the short-lived blip in expectations immediately after the outbreak of the pandemic last year (right chart slide 10). there are three broad reasons that likely motivate these shifting expectations.3 price level normalisation and pass-through of higher input prices the first is that the impact on inflation of the re-opening of the euro area economy could be larger than expected. that is, even if supply and demand im… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Escaping low inflation? | Period_2 | 2021-07-05 | 0.337 | in the past, there have often been substantial lags in the pass-through of pipeline pressure. ecb staff analysis finds, for example, that it usually takes one year or more for cost-push shocks in intermediate goods prices to pass through to hicp inflation (right chart slide 13).4 surveys, however, signal that a historically large share of companies is raising output prices today (left chart slide 14). many firms also expect prices to continue to rise in the near term. two factors might cause firms to frontload and strengthen the pass-through to consumer prices at present. one relates to firms’ state-contingent pricing behaviour. empirical evidence suggests that firms are more likely to pass through cost-push shocks in an environment of rising demand.5 consumers being willing to accept higher prices in light of substantial excess savings might reinforce this channel. ecb staff estimates that the stock of accumulated excess savings amounted to €540 billion in the first quarter of this year, or 7.4% of annual disposable income in 2019.6 the other factor relates to non-linearity. research by goldman sachs finds that, when cost pressures are within the historical norm, the pass-through of input costs to output prices is typically low and short-lived in the manufacturing sector (right chart slide 14). but at times of significant cost pressure, like today, pass-through is almost complete as firms seek to protect their margins. the persistence of supply and demand imbalances the s… |
| Isabel Schnabel: How long is the medium term? Monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2020-03-02 | 0.316 | the share of euro area firms with very high profitability – here measured as firms displaying a ratio of profits over revenues of greater than 5% – has increased by around 10 percentage points, to 42%, since 1995. at the same time, the share of firms with very low profitability has declined. two broad competing hypotheses have been proposed in the literature to explain the rise in profits, mainly for the case of the united states. one is that growing profits are the result of the rise of highly productive “superstar firms”. the other hypothesis, which is less favourable, is that a gradual decline in competition and increased regulation has protected rent-seeking firms.[11] a more detailed discussion of these hypotheses is beyond the scope of my remarks today. i will rather focus on what the rise in profits may imply for the pass-through of monetary policy to inflation. i see two broad repercussions. the first is rather mechanical but quantitatively important. rising profits imply a lower labour share, so changes in labour costs have less direct impact on inflation than they did two or three decades ago. the second, and related, implication is that higher profit margins provide a larger cushion for firms to absorb cost-push shocks, such as wage increases. a staff analysis using the ecb’s workhorse structural model, the new area-wide model, supports the view that profit margins were, and are, being used to cushion emerging price pressures.[12] profit margins buffer upside sh… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Escaping low inflation? | Period_2 | 2021-07-05 | 0.254 | 80% over the past 12 months (left chart slide 3). surging commodity prices reflect, to a large extent, base effects, meaning that price increases are statistically amplified by the exceptionally low prices observed a year ago. this can easily be seen when comparing prices today with prices two years ago, before the pandemic hit. over this period, energy price inflation in the euro area was, by and large, flat (right chart slide 3). that is, households saw no increase in energy costs over the past two years. the second factor that has contributed to the observed rise in global headline inflation is the marked increase in the inflation rate of the broader consumption basket. this increase has been much more dispersed across economies (left chart slide 4). in the euro area, for example, there has so far been limited upward pressure on core inflation, which excludes more volatile prices, such as those for food and energy. core inflation typically shows few signs of acceleration in the early stages of a recovery, as it takes time for economic slack to be reabsorbed and for underlying price pressures to build. indeed, in the oecd as a whole, there is still abundant slack: the output gap is estimated to be around –3% this year, and is expected to remain negative in 2022 (right chart slide 4). the unprecedented rise in global core inflation in recent months can be tied to two pandemic- related developments. one is the unparalleled downturn in service sector activity last year, whi… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Escaping low inflation? | Period_2 | 2021-07-05 | 0.211 | the potential for second-round effects the third upside potential relates to second-round effects. an example best illustrates this: today, the price of hairdressing is visibly above its pre-pandemic trend, and unlikely to reverse in the future, given sticky prices in this sector (left chart slide 17). so, even if current price dynamics will ultimately be limited to a one-time level effect, if it extends to a broad category of goods and services and if it is not matched by higher wages, it may depress real incomes. perceptions of an erosion of purchasing power may be reinforced by price increases being concentrated in frequently purchased consumer goods and services (right chart slide 17). second-round effects refer to the possibility that a transitory rise in inflation may lead to stronger wage growth if unions attempt to re-establish workers’ pre-pandemic purchasing power, which may subsequently lead to firms passing on higher wages to final consumer prices. typically, central banks watch second-round effects with great caution, as they have the potential to alter the persistent underlying direction of inflation. today, however, with trend inflation having moderated visibly in recent years, and with real compensation per employee having expanded at a pace considerably slower than productivity per employee over the past two decades, a virtuous price-wage spiral may support demand, sustain underlying inflation and thereby help inflation to converge to our aim. the chances … |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.348 | (slide 5, left-hand chart). the aggregate demand channel therefore points to an easing in inflationary pressures. the cost-push channel, too, currently suggests that wages are unlikely to add to inflation going forward, as real producer wages, deflated using sectoral value added deflators, have also fallen across most industries since the start of the pandemic (slide 5, right-hand chart). in fact, profits across a broad range of industries have risen markedly, even in some contact-intensive sectors (slide 6, left-hand chart). this means that many firms have so far been able to increase their prices beyond the increase in nominal wages, and in many cases even beyond the increase in energy costs. in the hospitality and transport sectors, for example, profits have expanded by nearly 20% since the outbreak of the pandemic, more than twice as fast as the growth rate of nominal wages. the rise in profits is strikingly different from previous crises that have all seen profits fall. this suggests that strong pent-up demand created an environment for many firms to boost profit margins.[14] |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.332 | firms’ efforts to protect profit margins may weaken link between labour costs and inflation the second factor driving a wedge between inflation and the labour share relates to the role of profits. unit labour costs account for a significant share of firms’ total costs and are hence central to the cost- push view of inflation. but the increase in other costs, such as the cost of capital or energy, is currently working in the opposite direction. specifically, the unprecedented scale of pipeline pressures means that firms may choose not to pass lower real unit labour costs on to consumer prices to protect their profit margins from higher energy costs. in some sectors, where producers have not been able to increase prices above the rise in costs, there could even be pressure on firms to actually raise prices, in line with the cost-push view of inflation. this is consistent with recent survey evidence. with pipeline pressures remaining significant, a still historically large share of firms in the manufacturing, retail and services sectors plan to raise prices further over the coming months (slide 8, left-hand chart). of course, such surveys say nothing about the size of future price increases, meaning inflation could still slow. however, the surveys do not signal a fast unwinding of price pressures on the back of the expected decline in aggregate demand. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.287 | a declining labour share will weigh on aggregate demand the link between the labour share and inflation is not just a conceptual idea. new research by economists at the federal reserve board suggests that the sharp decline in inflation in the united states and the united kingdom in the 1980s may have been driven to a significant extent by the marked decline in the labour share.[8] the study suggests that the secular erosion of workers’ bargaining power is an important factor explaining the joint dynamics of inflation and the labour share.[9] the same mechanism has likely been at work in the euro area. from the early 1980s until the eve of the global financial crisis, the labour share of income fell significantly and persistently, coinciding with a measurable decline in inflation and trade union density (slide 3, left-hand chart).[10] the flip side of the decline in the labour share was the marked rise in the profit share (slide 3, right-hand chart). the loss in workers’ bargaining power might also explain what we are seeing today. despite a historically tight labour market, a substantial decline in real consumer wages is weighing on the labour share of income. although nominal wage growth is gradually picking up, the current pace of increase has been insufficient to preserve people’s purchasing power. compared to the third quarter of last year, real wages declined by nearly 5% (slide 4, left-hand chart).[11] these developments are fundamentally different from the experienc… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right sequence | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.279 | when the labour market in the euro area is already showing first signs of strain. this brings me to the second point – the recovery in the labour market. strong recovery in the labour market although the pandemic is still raging through the economy, slack in the labour market has continued to decline at a notably faster pace than projected (slide 5, left-hand chart). a year ago, our central forecast was that the euro area unemployment rate would decline, on average, to 8.1% in 2022. in december 2021, the unemployment rate stood already at 7%. we are currently witnessing the strongest labour market in the history of the single currency. the unemployment rate is at a record low and below estimates of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (nairu), while the participation rate is at a record high (slide 5, right-hand chart). broader labour market slack, too, for which data are lagging, was already reabsorbed, by and large, by the end of the summer of last year, as strong demand is bringing more and more people – also those at the fringes of the labour market – back into work.1 while total hours worked still remained below pre-pandemic levels in the third quarter of last year, there are good reasons to believe that the widespread easing of contact restrictions will help accelerate progress on that front too. survey evidence confirms the picture of a tightening labour market. a rapidly rising share of firms across all economic sectors report shortages of labour as … |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right sequence | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.242 | to increase both in december 2021 and in january 2022, when it reached a new historical high of 5.1% (slide 2). in january, euro area inflation surprised to the upside for the seventh consecutive month. today, inflation is not only higher than expected, but price pressures are also visibly broadening. measures of underlying inflation are following an unprecedented upward trend (slide 3, left-hand chart). the prices of around two-thirds of the goods and services included in the hicp are currently increasing at an annual rate above 2% (slide 3, right-hand chart). less than a year ago, this share was close to 20%. current measured inflation would be even higher if the costs of owner-occupied housing were included. residential real estate prices continued to increase at an alarming pace. in the third quarter of 2021, prices for houses and flats in the euro area increased by 9% year-on-year, an unprecedented rate of increase (slide 4, left-hand chart). if owner-occupied housing were included in the hicp, headline inflation in the third quarter of 2021 would have been 0.3 percentage points higher. for core inflation, the difference would have been twice as much – that is, core inflation would have been 2% rather than 1.4%, which is the largest difference observed since the start of the sample in 2012 (slide 4, right-hand chart). looking forward, the broad-based nature of recent upward surprises, extending well beyond the energy component, implies that significant uncertainty rem… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 62 | country | 1 | 0.2199594 | individual | 1 | 0.9992990 |
| 62 | national | 2 | 0.0393214 | divergence | 2 | 0.9985105 |
| 62 | individual | 3 | 0.0380284 | individual country | 3 | 0.9985084 |
| 62 | development | 4 | 0.0291064 | country | 4 | 0.9981568 |
| 62 | shock | 5 | 0.0275547 | economic performance | 5 | 0.9978496 |
| 62 | difference | 6 | 0.0222533 | region | 6 | 0.9977213 |
| 62 | specific | 7 | 0.0210895 | performance | 7 | 0.9976332 |
| 62 | performance | 8 | 0.0185034 | specific | 8 | 0.9972813 |
| 62 | region | 9 | 0.0174690 | country specific | 9 | 0.9971047 |
| 62 | member | 10 | 0.0165639 | national | 10 | 0.9970133 |
| 62 | divergence | 11 | 0.0119089 | heterogeneity | 11 | 0.9969748 |
| 62 | common | 12 | 0.0107452 | difference | 12 | 0.9964886 |
| 62 | structure | 13 | 0.0103573 | member country | 13 | 0.9963178 |
| 62 | level | 14 | 0.0100987 | common shock | 14 | 0.9955589 |
| 62 | degree | 15 | 0.0100987 | cross country | 15 | 0.9954405 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Are different price developments in the euro area a cause for concern? (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 6 Sep 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-09-11 | 0.398 |
|
| Mr Noyer gives a review of the economic situation in the euro area (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 8 Mar 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-02-13 | 0.309 | differences in economic performance across member states … the single currency reflects a large number of factors, both at the area-wide and at the national level, and is therefore a joint responsibility of all member states and of all policy areas. in this respect, differences in growth and inflation between member states will continue to occur also with a single monetary policy, just as they have been normal between regions in the individual countries. monetary union is no universal shield against shocks and does not prevent these shocks from affecting countries differently, depending on their economic structures and policy responses. at the same time, monetary policy can no longer be geared towards the divergent developments in individual countries and it is clear that, if this divergence is considered to reflect unwarranted cyclical or structural conditions, this is primarily a question of the country in question and of national economic policies. but we should not forget that some divergence is quite normal. for instance, with countries still in a process of catching-up in terms of productivity and living standards, there will be some natural and even warranted divergence in growth and inflation in the course of this process. |
| Mr Duisenberg discusses the challenges posed by economic divergences in the euro area: the consequences for economic policies (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 5 Nov 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-11-09 | 0.270 | short-term divergences among euro area countries considering the short-term factors, with regard to price developments, there are various “country-specific” factors of a very temporary nature. among these, government policies are perhaps the most obvious. these may lead to different price developments across countries within the monetary union in the short run via indirect tax changes, liberalisation measures and administrative price changes. these are generally not of the same magnitude and timing across countries. differences in growth and inflation may also occur over relatively short periods due to the occurrence of “asymmetric shocks” or differences in the responses to common shocks. a very clear example of such an asymmetric shock was german reunification. other shocks affect countries in a more or less similar fashion - for example, recent increases in oil prices have tended to lead to higher consumer prices in all euro area countries in the past few months. shocks may affect countries in a diverse way due to different structures of the economy, patterns of trade and/or production for example. evidence tends to suggest, however, that the industrial specialisation of the euro area countries is not one-sided, so that there is no risk of significant asymmetric effects. moreover, the high degree of trade between euro area countries means that country- or region-specific developments tend to have significant spillover effects within the euro area. nevertheless, a common … |
| Christian Noyer: The ECB and the accession process | Period_1 | 2001-10-15 | 0.192 | looking at the broader picture, however, there are other types of challenges that one should also consider. these challenges are closely related to what are the fundamental differences between the accession countries and the current euro area members. i have already mentioned what is, perhaps, the most striking difference: the divergence of per capita income levels and, related to this, the difference in price levels. other important factors, however, may also be worth investigating, such as the different potential vulnerabilities to external shocks. some of these ‘features’ of the new member states will probably not have fully disappeared, when these countries will join the euro area. the successful implementation of structural reforms and the acceleration of the catching-up process of the accession countries would definitely facilitate the task of integrating these countries into the euro area. indeed, the deepening of the integration process between current and new member states is likely to reduce the risks associated with the effects of asymmetric shocks. against this background, it needs to be stressed that monetary policy in an enlarged euro area would not – and could not - include, as an own objective, the promotion of the catching up process of any participating country. notwithstanding that catching up is desirable, it is our conviction that the best contribution the ecb can make to enhancing the growth prospects of current and new participants in the single curr… |
| Christian Noyer: France, Europe, the euro and the ECB | Period_1 | 2002-03-22 | 0.185 | can one size fit all? the ecb’s definition of price stability should be seen as a quantification of the ecb’s primary objective, which applies to the euro area as a whole. this implies that for the single monetary policy to be considered successful in fulfilling its primary objective only aggregate developments matter. the euro area countries need not and will not always exhibit similar price developments. in the same way as the maintenance of price stability within a single country is consistent with divergences in the rate of price change among different regions and cities, price stability in the euro area is generally in line with inflation differentials among individual member countries. indeed, studies of price differentials between major us cities show that these differentials are at least as large and sometimes even larger than between countries of the euro area. whether such differentials are a cause for concern depends on their source. inflation differentials which result from what in public debates is often quoted as “a catching-up process”, as illustrated by the balassa-samuelson theory, should be seen as part of a normal process of adjustment consistent with a well-functioning economy. thus they are not a cause for concern. a catching-up process may start when the level of productivity – and thus of per capita income – of a country in the monetary union is (much) lower than the other participating economies. when some of its productive sectors, notably the trad… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Heterogeneity and the European Central Bank’s monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-04-02 | 0.187 | on the left-hand side you can see ecb research on the extent to which output in each country responds to a common area-wide shock. clearly, there are significant differences, even among countries of broadly comparable size. on the right-hand side you can see eurosystem estimates of the slope of the phillips curve.8 it shows a high degree of heterogeneity across euro area countries for the sensitivity of core inflation to economic slack. in other words, country-specific factors of inflation remain considerable, for example the degree of wage negotiation centralisation. these factors are also related to national institutions. the upshot is that, in this environment, monetary policy is more difficult to calibrate. different transmission mechanisms propagate the same shock to different degrees and with lags that may vary across countries. minimising these differences in transmission does not require all countries to adopt the same economic structures.9 what matters is for countries to have institutions that deliver the right outcomes, both individually and jointly. our system of economic coordination, the european semester, still falls short of achieving this objective. 10 and as a consequence, it still falls short of supporting adequately the single monetary policy. strengthening domestic institutions is not only about improving shock absorption capabilities. it is also about cohesion and sowing the seeds for renewed convergence. you can see this on my next slide. 7 / 14 |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy in a prolonged period of low inflation | Period_2 | 2014-05-26 | 0.149 | local factors to add to this, aggregate inflation has been dragged down by local factors linked to the sovereign debt crisis and the process of relative price adjustment in stressed countries. several euro area countries are currently undergoing internal devaluation to regain price competitiveness, both internationally and within the currency union. the crucial adjustments vis-à-vis other euro area countries have to take place irrespective of changes in the external value of the euro. this process began hesitantly in the early years of the crisis, largely due to nominal rigidities in wages and prices. the result was that adjustment took place more through quantities – i.e. unemployment – than through prices. stressed countries thus experienced a protracted period of declining disposable incomes and long-drawn-out price adjustment. in this context, several have seen domestic core inflation – that is, excluding the energy and food price effects i just described – fall well below the euro area average. for example, the recent overall fall in services price inflation for the euro area is almost entirely accounted for by price declines in these components in stressed countries. nevertheless, in the last few years relative price adjustment has accelerated in stressed countries. while this may also have initially weighed on disposable incomes, by creating a closer alignment between relative wage and productivity developments, it should increasingly support future incomes through … |
| Vítor Constâncio: Effectiveness of Monetary Union and the Capital Markets Union | Period_2 | 2017-04-10 | 0.140 | note: the chart summarizes the five-year cumulative contributions of capital markets, credit markets, fiscal tools, and relative prices to the smoothing, in terms of consumption growth, of a 1-standard-deviation shock to gdp growth. each bar thus measures the parts of the shock to country-specific gdp that are absorbed by the respective channels. the remainder is interpreted as the unsmoothed portion of a gdp shock, i.e., the part of a shock to country-specific gdp growth that is reflected into country-specific consumption growth. contributions sum up to 100 percent, and a negative contribution corresponds to dis-smoothing of consumption growth. the respective contributions are estimated over rolling ten-year backward-looking windows, based on annual data and applying the asdrubali and kim (2004) approach enhanced for relative price adjustments in the spirit of corsetti, dedola, and viani (2011). 8 / 10 |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy in a prolonged period of low inflation | Period_2 | 2014-05-26 | 0.123 | propagation through the euro area so do we see any signs that low inflation might propagate through the euro area in this way? on aggregate, euro area firms and households do not seem to be particularly exposed to debt deflation dynamics. the interest payment burden of euro area firms – the ratio of their gross interest payments to gross operating surplus – has actually fallen from 22% in 2008 to less than 12% at the end of 2013, which suggests that firms are in a stronger position today to withstand a period of low inflation. for euro area households debt service-to-income ratios are similar – around 14% – while the median household holds the equivalent of around two months’ income in liquid assets to cushion nominal income shocks. but importantly, this picture masks the heterogeneity mentioned previously. for firms in some countries the interest payment burden has in fact risen since 2008, in particular for firms based in stressed countries. debt service-to-income ratios also tend to be higher in stressed countries, implying greater vulnerabilities in these jurisdictions if low inflation persists. bank lending also presents a mixed picture. surveys of bank behaviour show a gradually improving aggregate situation. according to the latest bank lending survey credit conditions generally stabilised at the start of this year, and even improved in some stressed countries. the incremental tightening process that banks reported throughout the crisis seems to have come to a halt. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Heterogeneity and the European Central Bank’s monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-04-02 | 0.111 | benoît cœuré: heterogeneity and the european central bank’s monetary policy speech by mr benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the bank of france symposium & 34th suerf colloquium on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the euro on “the euro area: staying the course through uncertainties”, paris, 29 march 2019. * * * from the beginning of the euro area’s existence, it was well known that it did not meet all of the classic requirements of an optimal currency area. some critics have seen heterogeneity across member states as the factor that would ultimately cause the collapse of the single currency. but the euro is still here, despite years of crisis. while managing heterogeneity between regions and countries has been a challenge – at times tremendously so – this challenge is not insurmountable. no single currency area in the world is free of heterogeneity, including the ones widely regarded as most homogeneous. in my remarks this morning, i will argue that the ecb has always found ways to accommodate heterogeneity, particularly at times when it threatened to impair the uniform transmission of monetary policy. but i will also argue that if we want to minimise episodes of demoralising output and employment losses, as we experienced after the financial and euro area crises, and if we want to avoid overburdening monetary policy, then policymakers need to act more forcefully to reduce the major sources of euro area heterogeneity – that i… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.149 | risk-sharing a distinct feature of monetary policy in a monetary union is that it might entail differences in transmission across countries or regions, reflecting differences in the financial structure or other country-specific factors. for example, as noted above, the speed at which interest rate changes are passed through to households and firms might differ across euro area countries due to differences in the share of variable-rate loans. in addition, recent analysis by ecb staff suggests that the extent of international risk sharing plays a key role in shaping the real effects of monetary policy shocks in euro area regions. in particular, a monetary policy tightening is associated with a stronger output contraction, the lower is the degree of risk sharing in a region. moreover, regions with a higher degree of risk sharing are less prone to persistent economic effects of interest rate changes (chart 3): while output in regions with minimum risk sharing remains around 1.5 percentage points below its initial level five years after a monetary policy tightening shock, it fully recovers over this period in regions with maximum risk sharing. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-11-29 | 0.092 | having lower financial buffers to cover the rising cost of living. currently, the gap between the effective inflation rate experienced by the lowest and highest income groups is by far at its highest level on record in the euro area.3 the divergence in inflation rates across euro area member countries is also at a record high, mainly due to different degrees of exposure to the energy shock and to the pandemic. we are monitoring these divergences carefully and expect them to normalise as the impact of these shocks fades over time. the different shocks over the past year have also had an impact on real economic activity. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.076 | monthly smooth local projections (see jarociński, m. (2021), “estimating the fed’s unconventional policy shocks”, working paper series, no 2585, ecb, august (revised june 2022)). 20. obstfeld, m. (2022), op. cit. 21. recent analyses show that the euro area lags notably behind the united states in terms of labour market efficiency (although levels for individual euro area countries vary, see chart 1 in sondermann, d. (2018), “towards more resilient economies: the role of well-functioning economic structures”, journal of policy modeling, vol. 40, no 1, pp. 97-117). productivity growth has also generally been lower in the euro area than in the united states for some time (see chart 7 in masuch, k. et al. (eds.) (2018), “structural policies in the euro area”, occasional paper series, no 210, ecb, june). these factors may limit the euro area’s relative capacity to bounce back from a recession. 22. esrb (2022), “warning of the european systemic risk board”, 22 september. |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.053 | a balance will need to be found between remaining open, in order to support economic efficiency, while avoiding dependencies on suppliers that may become unreliable. this is the objective of the eu’s drive towards an “open strategic autonomy”. 3.1 the versailles declaration: implications for europe’s economic governance the versailles declaration of 11 march recognised that this conflict will have far-reaching effects on the structure and governance of the european economy.[20] in this declaration, eu leaders defined russia’s aggression against ukraine as a “tectonic shift in european history”. the declaration identifies security as a key common public good. and it identifies three conditions to achieve it: reducing energy dependence, bolstering defence capabilities and building a more robust economic base. the adjustment to the new state of international political and trade relations will be costly and will require conspicuous investment. the financing needs associated with the green transition are massive if one considers all relevant components of investment, including clean energy and energy efficiency, as well as both the private and the public sectors. even before the invasion of ukraine, the attainment of the eu’s 2030 climate targets[21] required energy-related investments of €402 billion (2.9% of 2019 gdp) per year on average in the decade 2021-2030, according to the european commission’s estimates.[22] compared with the previous decade, it implies additional annu… |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.051 | overall, the global inflation outlook and the global economic outlook are both fraught with uncertainty. monetary policy needs to ensure that inflation does not become entrenched and that it returns to target in the medium term. and fiscal policy needs to be carefully calibrated to country-specific circumstances to protect the most vulnerable groups from the cost-of-living crisis while preserving debt sustainability and without adding to inflationary pressures. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 63 | fiscal | 1 | 0.0780883 | pact | 1 | 0.9997371 |
| 63 | growth | 2 | 0.0356204 | growth pact | 2 | 0.9992988 |
| 63 | fiscal policy | 3 | 0.0296456 | consolidation | 3 | 0.9990362 |
| 63 | pact | 4 | 0.0283569 | budgetary | 4 | 0.9987732 |
| 63 | consolidation | 5 | 0.0243151 | sound fiscal | 5 | 0.9978948 |
| 63 | country | 6 | 0.0240808 | fiscal consolidation | 6 | 0.9973716 |
| 63 | stability | 7 | 0.0223235 | excessive deficit | 7 | 0.9970583 |
| 63 | growth pact | 8 | 0.0206834 | sound | 8 | 0.9970187 |
| 63 | sound | 9 | 0.0191018 | deficit | 9 | 0.9958758 |
| 63 | deficit | 10 | 0.0151772 | public finance | 10 | 0.9957927 |
| 63 | budgetary | 11 | 0.0142985 | sound fiscal policy | 11 | 0.9953423 |
| 63 | position | 12 | 0.0140056 | fiscal | 12 | 0.9952465 |
| 63 | public | 13 | 0.0135956 | fiscal policy | 13 | 0.9951613 |
| 63 | strengthen | 14 | 0.0119555 | fiscal position | 14 | 0.9949556 |
| 63 | fiscal consolidation | 15 | 0.0113697 | position | 15 | 0.9949085 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2005-03-23 | 0.480 | fiscal policies and the stability and growth pact i would now like to make a few remarks on fiscal policies. while some progress on fiscal consolidation and the correction of excessive deficits is envisaged in euro area countries’ updated stability programmes, further consolidation in a number of countries is needed. with respect to the stability and growth pact, discussions now need to be brought to a convincing conclusion with an outcome that safeguards fiscal discipline. the fiscal framework enshrined in the treaty and in the stability and growth pact is a cornerstone of economic and monetary union, crucial for the economic rationale and the overall cohesion of emu. as the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament knows, since the beginning of these discussions the ecb has made its views clear. improvements in the implementation of the stability and growth pact, and in particular its preventive arm, would be welcome. but the corrective arm should not be weakened. the credibility of the excessive deficit procedure as a means to deter and correct excessive deficits needs to be fully preserved. this is necessary in order to anchor expectations of fiscal discipline, which is fundamental not only for macroeconomic stability and cohesion in the euro area but also for enhancing confidence and fostering growth prospects in all member states. |
| Lucas Papademos: Presentation of the European Central Bank’s Annual Report for 2004 | Period_1 | 2005-04-28 | 0.437 | the stability and growth pact i should like now to address a number of economic policy issues, starting with the eu fiscal framework. in 2004 the debate concerning a reform of the stability and growth pact intensified, subsequent to the judgement of the european court of justice annulling the conclusions of the ecofin council of november 2003 and following the commission’s proposals to strengthen economic governance and clarify the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. throughout that debate, the ecb clearly and consistently stated its position, namely that improvements in the implementation of the pact, particularly the strengthening of its “preventive arm”, were possible and, indeed, welcome. at the same time, the ecb warned against any weakening of the pact’s “corrective arm” and of the provisions governing the excessive deficit procedure, as these could be detrimental to the credibility of the fiscal framework. in march 2005 the european council unanimously approved a number of changes to the pact. there are some aspects of the reform which can potentially help to strengthen the “preventive arm” of the pact, provided they are implemented effectively. the agreed amendments, however, also allow – against the advice of the ecb – for greater flexibility as regards the “corrective arm” of the pact. specifically, the reform of the excessive deficit procedure implies a shift towards a more judgemental approach to the enforcement of fiscal discipline, for example … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2006 to the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-07-13 | 0.393 | fiscal policies as regards fiscal policies, the ecb shares the view expressed in the draft resolution that fiscal consolidation is key and all the more necessary in good times in order to achieve long- term growth. in a benign environment, budget balances in 2006 were generally better than expected. it is imperative that forthcoming budget plans build on this favourable outcome, assigning higher than expected revenues to deficit reduction and speeding up progress towards the achievement of medium-term budgetary objectives. the ecb is concerned about recent developments which point to a relaxation of fiscal targets in some countries, the aforementioned risk of pro-cyclical policies and a repetition of past policy mistakes. it is imperative that all governments comply with the provisions of the stability and growth pact on fiscal consolidation and that all the countries concerned honour the commitments made at the eurogroup meeting in berlin on 20 april 2007. as agreed in berlin, taking advantage of the favourable cyclical conditions would enable most euro area countries to achieve their medium-term objectives in 2008 or 2009, and all of them should aim for 2010 at the latest. these pledges should be reflected in the 2008 budget plans so as to avoid repeating governments’ past failure to adjust fiscal balances in economic “good times”. the governing council also welcomes the emphasis placed by the ecofin council on measures to improve the quality and efficiency of public fin… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2002-07-10 | 0.377 | regarding fiscal policies in the euro area, we have seen some worrying developments in the past few months. against this background we call upon all member countries to honour the commitments made to achieve budgets that are close to balance or in surplus by 2003-04, in compliance with the framework of the stability and growth pact. this is necessary in order to maintain and further strengthen confidence in the policy framework of the euro area and to establish fiscal positions in all countries that allow automatic stabilisers to operate efficiently without endangering sound fiscal positions in the longer term. moreover, governments are encouraged to push ahead with reforms relating to the size and structure of public expenditure and revenue, which will also create room for tax cuts and absorb the fiscal costs of population ageing. in the field of structural reforms allow me to refer briefly to the adoption of the broad economic policy guidelines. if implemented in a determined manner, structural reforms will contribute to expanding the euro area’s potential for non-inflationary growth and to reducing its high level of unemployment. we are now at your disposal for questions. |
| Willem F Duisenberg: The introduction of the euro: a (critical) retrospect and a preview | Period_1 | 2002-03-18 | 0.373 | fiscal policy the economic environment with which we at the ecb were confronted was also the day-to-day reality of the fiscal policy-makers in the individual euro area countries. in 2001, mainly as a result of the economic slowdown, the average budgetary balance in the euro area deteriorated for the first time since 1993. automatic stabilisers played a significant role in budgetary outcomes in 2001. major tax cuts also contributed to the deterioration, as they were often implemented without adequate offsetting expenditure restraints. as a result, a large majority of countries failed to meet the budgetary balances targeted in the stability programmes for 2001. by the same token, most countries rightly refrained from introducing a discretionary fiscal relaxation in response to the economic slowdown. moreover, countries with remaining fiscal imbalances reaffirmed their commitment to attaining safe budgetary positions by 2003 or 2004. developments in 2001 and the projected outcomes for 2002 confirm the vulnerability of public finances – especially in the countries with remaining imbalances. the european commission recommended issuing an early warning to germany and portugal. the ecofin council considered the subsequent reaffirmation and even strengthening of the fiscal commitments made by these two countries a sufficient response to the concerns. vigilance is now needed to ensure both strict adherence to medium-term plans and rigorous implementation of the procedures of the st… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2014-09-04 | 0.216 | efforts now clearly need to gain momentum to achieve higher sustainable growth and employment in the euro area. determined structural reforms in product and labour markets as well as action to improve the business environment are warranted. as regards fiscal policies, comprehensive fiscal consolidation in recent years has contributed to reducing budgetary imbalances. euro area countries should not unravel the progress made with fiscal consolidation and should proceed in line with the stability and growth pact. the pact acts as an anchor for confidence, and the existing flexibility within the rules allows the budgetary costs of major structural reforms to be addressed and demand to be supported. there is also leeway to achieve a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies. a full and consistent implementation of the euro area’s existing fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance framework is key to bringing down high public debt ratios, to raising potential growth and to increasing the euro area’s resilience to shocks. we are now at your disposal for questions. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Price stability as the basis of a sustained recovery | Period_2 | 2014-07-04 | 0.189 | what are the priorities to restore strong and sustainable growth? governments should not view the current period of low interest rates and favourable market sentiment as an invitation to abandon the path of fiscal prudence, but rather to accelerate reforms aimed at freeing up growth opportunities. first, the crisis has shown that fiscal credibility needs to be earned. delivering on past commitments under the eu framework is essential for this. this means that governments have to continue on their path towards resilient public finances. they should stick to the rules they have agreed under the new eu fiscal framework and not stretch them to the point where the credibility of this framework would be harmed. in the long term, there is no trade-off between growth and sound public finances. lower levels of public debt are needed to support a sustainable recovery. there is such a trade-off in the short term but, in order to mitigate negative growth effects, consolidation efforts should focus on those budget items that do not add to, or perhaps even stand in the way of, dynamic and inclusive growth. second, structural reforms should focus on those areas that may hinder productive potential. this means overturning excessive regulations that protect vested interests and harm the common good; and creating a stable institutional landscape that enhances productivity and allows private operators to focus on innovation, growth and job creation. the euro area faces a major investment sho… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2012-12-06 | 0.166 | economic and monetary union to be decided at the european council meeting on 13–14 december 2012. initiatives to accelerate structural reforms that help restore competitiveness are particularly important to revive the growth potential of euro area countries and to increase employment. more generally, all euro area countries must ensure that their product and labour markets possess the adjustment capacity required for their smooth and effective functioning within a monetary union. finally, continued fiscal consolidation is expected to restore sound fiscal positions, in line with the commitments under the stability and growth pact and the 2012 european semester recommendations. significant progress has already been made in reducing domestic and external imbalances and in improving competitiveness. continued policy actions on the european, structural and fiscal reform fronts should be mutually reinforcing and send a strong signal to markets. we are now at your disposal for questions. |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2015-07-17 | 0.164 | improve the business environment for firms need to gain momentum in several countries. a swift and effective implementation of these reforms, in an environment of accommodative monetary policy, will not only lead to higher sustainable economic growth in the euro area but will also raise expectations of permanently higher incomes. fiscal policies should support the economic recovery while remaining in compliance with the stability and growth pact. full and consistent implementation of the pact is key for confidence in our fiscal framework. we are now at your disposal for questions. |
| Mario Draghi: Interview with Neue Zürcher Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-01-23 | 0.164 | what must happen so that euro area finds its way back to sustainable growth? countries should not unravel their budget consolidation efforts, but the consolidation should become more growth-friendly than what we have seen so far. in other words: less current expenditure and lower taxes and more expenditure on infrastructure and on human capital. all this should be accompanied by the implementation of structural reforms. only structural reforms will bring europe back onto a sustainable growth path. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.079 | country is eligible to tpi, it will activate tpi, and, as i said earlier on, there is no ex-ante limit to that programme. now, i’m happy to go through the four specific criteria if any of you are interested. so there are four of them, and i think it’s important that we understand that on this occasion, like on any occasion having to do with either monetary policy stance or monetary policy transmission, the ecb determines in its own discretion, not being hostage to anyone. so the four criteria that it will use will be indicative, will be elements of information that it will take into account in order to make its decision. so the first one is compliance with eu fiscal framework, and that can take one of two forms, either not be in excessive deficit procedure, or having failed to take the effective action in response to [european] council recommendations. so that’s on the fiscal framework, and obviously borrows from another european institutions, which is both the commission and the council. the second is the absence of severe macroeconomic imbalances, and again, it borrows from other european institutions in relation to the excessive imbalance procedure. the third is fiscal sustainability, so this is making sure that the trajectory of public debt is sustainable. and to do that the governing council will take into account analysis by the european commission, by the esm, by the imf, by other institutions, but it will certainly be together with the ecb internal analysis. fourth… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.066 | sound fiscal policy helps to anchor inflation expectations sound fiscal policy is also a key factor for stabilising debt dynamics. the fiscal support measures taken during the pandemic resulted in a sharp increase in public debt ratios, which were already elevated before the pandemic started. euro area public debt as a ratio to gdp has increased by around 20 percentage points from 2007 to 2019, and by around another 10 percentage points by 2021. initially, higher inflation had a beneficial effect on debt-to-gdp ratios, due to a temporary windfall from the boost in nominal growth (slide 11, left-hand side).[15] |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-21 | 0.059 | confront semiconductor shortages and strengthen europe’s technological leadership”, press release, 8 february. 7. international energy agency (2021), “the role of critical minerals in clean energy transitions”. 8. refers to firms which developed or introduced new products, processes or services as part of their investment activities. see european investment bank (2022), investment survey. 9. ferdinandusse, m., nerlich, c., and delgado téllez, m. (2022), “fiscal policies to mitigate climate change in the euro area”, economic bulletin, issue 6, european central bank. 10. darvas, z. and wolff, g.b. (2021), “a green fiscal pact: climate investment in times of budget consolidation”, policy contribution, issue no 18/21, bruegel, september. 11. latest data point q2 2022. based on the methodology described in the report on “financial integration and structure in the euro area”, april 2022, european central bank. |
| Christine Lagarde: Price stability and policy transmission in the euro area | Period_3 | 2022-06-29 | 0.056 | governing council. the new instrument will have to be effective, while being proportionate and containing sufficient safeguards to preserve the impetus of member states towards a sound fiscal policy. this decision lies squarely within the ecb’s tradition. in the past, the ecb has made use of separate instruments to target inflation and to preserve the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. measures to preserve transmission could be used at any level of interest rates – so long as they were designed not to interfere with the monetary policy stance. at times when inflation fell too low, it made sense to shift from “separation” to “combination” so that all tools reinforced the required policy easing. that is why, for example, we linked asset purchases tightly to forward guidance on rates. but with high inflation now being the main challenge, there are merits in separating policy tools again. preserving policy transmission throughout the euro area will allow rates to rise as far as necessary. in this sense, there is no trade-off between launching this new tool and adopting the necessary policy stance to stabilise inflation at our target. in fact, one enables the other. |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.053 | 2.1 a reality check: the financial and sovereign debt crises this weakness was laid bare by the financial crisis. the euro area adopted a flawed policy mix, causing an economic gap to emerge with other major economies. during the crisis, fiscal policies – after intervening for a short space of time to support the economy – procyclically turned towards fiscal consolidation, mainly through uncoordinated interventions inconsistent with the fiscal stance that would have been appropriate at european level. between 2011 and 2013 procyclical fiscal consolidation triggered contractionary forces that turned out to be self- defeating also in terms of debt sustainability. the onus of stabilising the european economy fell on the ecb’s monetary policy alone, forcing the euro area to undergo a slow and fragile recovery, with members of emu suffering economic and social losses. the severe tensions experienced during that phase led to the creation of a fiscal backstop to contain the sovereign debt crisis and to the launch of banking union to strengthen our financial system. but |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 64 | remain | 1 | 0.0272099 | policy relevant | 1 | 0.9981568 |
| 64 | medium | 2 | 0.0267166 | remain firmly | 2 | 0.9974565 |
| 64 | expect | 3 | 0.0231224 | remain firmly anchor | 3 | 0.9963143 |
| 64 | medium term | 4 | 0.0218539 | expect price | 4 | 0.9958666 |
| 64 | support | 5 | 0.0201625 | relevant horizon | 5 | 0.9957382 |
| 64 | govern | 6 | 0.0151589 | policy relevant horizon | 6 | 0.9956473 |
| 64 | analysis | 7 | 0.0150884 | firmly | 7 | 0.9956142 |
| 64 | expectation | 8 | 0.0138904 | firmly anchor | 8 | 0.9947855 |
| 64 | govern council | 9 | 0.0136085 | economic datum | 9 | 0.9929275 |
| 64 | council | 10 | 0.0131856 | expect price stability | 10 | 0.9921937 |
| 64 | continue | 11 | 0.0129037 | govern council aim | 11 | 0.9919561 |
| 64 | inflation expectation | 12 | 0.0118466 | rate remain | 12 | 0.9918473 |
| 64 | firmly | 13 | 0.0116352 | term remain | 13 | 0.9916092 |
| 64 | anchor | 14 | 0.0109305 | expectation remain firmly | 14 | 0.9915513 |
| 64 | relevant | 15 | 0.0098029 | council aim | 15 | 0.9914729 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2010-02-05 | 0.536 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference today. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council decided to leave the key ecb interest rates unchanged. the current rates remain appropriate. taking into account all the information and analyses that have become available since our meeting on 14 january 2010, price developments are expected to remain subdued over the policy- relevant horizon. the latest information has also confirmed that euro area economic activity continued to expand around the turn of the year. looking ahead, the governing council expects the euro area economy to grow at a moderate pace in 2010. the recovery process is likely to be uneven and the outlook remains subject to uncertainty. the outcome of the monetary analysis confirms the assessment of low inflationary pressure over the medium term. all in all, we expect price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby supporting the purchasing power of euro area households. medium to longer-term inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with the governing council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. the latest information confirms that economic activity in the euro area continued to expand … |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2010-05-07 | 0.496 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference here in lisbon. i would like to thank governor constâncio for his kind hospitality and express our special gratitude to his staff for the excellent organisation of today’s meeting of the governing council. we will now report on the outcome of this meeting. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council decided to leave the key ecb interest rates unchanged. the current rates remain appropriate. taking into account all new information since our meeting on 8 april 2010, we expect price developments to remain moderate over the policy-relevant horizon. global inflationary pressures – driven mainly by price developments in commodity markets and in fast-growing economic regions of the world – are still being counteracted by low domestic price pressures. the latest information has also confirmed that the economic recovery in the euro area continued in the early months of 2010. we expect the euro area economy to expand at a moderate pace in 2010, but growth patterns could be uneven in an environment of high uncertainty. our monetary analysis confirms that inflationary pressures over the medium term remain contained, as suggested by weak money and credit growth. overall, we expect price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby supporting the purchasing power of euro area households. inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line wi… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2010-01-20 | 0.477 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our first press conference in 2010. let me take this opportunity to wish you all a happy new year. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by commissioner almunia. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council decided to leave the key ecb interest rates unchanged. the current rates remain appropriate. taking into account all the information and analyses that have become available since our meeting on 3 december 2009, price developments are expected to remain subdued over the policy- relevant horizon. the latest information has also confirmed that towards the end of 2009 euro area economic activity continued to expand. however, some of the factors supporting the growth in real gdp are of a temporary nature. overall, the governing council expects the euro area economy to grow at a moderate pace in 2010, recognising that the recovery process is likely to be uneven and that the outlook remains subject to uncertainty. the outcome of the monetary analysis confirms the assessment of low inflationary pressure over the medium term, given the ongoing parallel decline in money and credit growth. all in all, we expect price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby supporting the purchasing power of euro area households. medium to longer-term inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line wit… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2010-08-11 | 0.471 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council views the current key ecb interest rates as appropriate. it therefore decided to leave them unchanged. considering all the new information which has become available since our meeting on 8 july 2010, we continue to expect price developments to remain moderate over the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, benefiting from low domestic price pressures. the available economic data and survey-based indicators suggest a strengthening in economic activity in the second quarter of 2010, and the available data for the third quarter are better than expected. looking further ahead, and taking into account a number of temporary factors, we continue to expect the euro area economy to grow at a moderate and still uneven pace, in an environment of uncertainty. our monetary analysis confirms that inflationary pressures over the medium term remain contained, as suggested by weak money and credit growth. overall, we expect price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby supporting the purchasing power of euro area households. inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. the firm anchoring of inflation expectations remains of the essence. monetary policy … |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2009-11-06 | 0.461 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference today. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by commissioner almunia. on the basis of its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council decided to leave the key ecb interest rates unchanged. the current rates remain appropriate. the incoming information and analyses that have become available since our meeting in early october have confirmed our expectations. while annual hicp inflation was -0.1% in october, according to eurostat’s flash estimate, it is expected to turn positive again in the coming months and to remain at moderately positive rates over the policy-relevant horizon. at the same time, the latest information continues to signal an improvement in economic activity in the second half of this year. the governing council expects the euro area economy in 2010 to recover at a gradual pace, recognising that the outlook remains subject to high uncertainty. medium to longer-term inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with the governing council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. the outcome of the monetary analysis confirms the assessment of low inflationary pressure over the medium term, as money and credit growth continues to slow down. against this background, we expect price stability to be maintained over the medium term, ther… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2012-01-13 | 0.102 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. let me wish you all a happy new year. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council decided today to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged, following the 25 basis point decreases on 3 november and 8 december 2011. the information that has become available since early december broadly confirms our previous assessment. inflation is likely to stay above 2% for several months to come, before declining to below 2%. at the same time, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains moderate. as expected, ongoing financial market tensions continue to dampen economic activity in the euro area, while, according to some recent survey indicators, there are tentative signs of a stabilisation in activity at low levels. the economic outlook remains subject to high uncertainty and substantial downside risks. in such an environment, cost, wage and price pressures in the euro area should remain modest and inflation rates should develop in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. overall, it is essential for monetary policy to maintain price stability over the medium term, thereby ensuring a firm anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. such anchoring… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2012-11-09 | 0.101 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. owing to high energy prices and increases in indirect taxes in some euro area countries, inflation rates are likely to remain above 2% for the remainder of 2012. they are expected to fall below that level in the course of next year and to remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. consistent with this picture, the underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be subdued. inflation expectations for the euro area remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. economic activity in the euro area is expected to remain weak, although it continues to be supported by our monetary policy stance and financial market confidence has visibly improved on the back of our decisions as regards outright monetary transactions (omts). at the same time, the necessary process of balance sheet adjustment in large parts of the financial and non-financial sectors as well as high uncertainty continue to weigh on the economic outlook. it is essential for governments to support confidence by forcefully implementing the necessary steps to reduce both fiscal and structural imbalances and to proceed with financi… |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2014-07-18 | 0.098 | inadequate implementation of structural reforms in the member states and weaker than expected domestic demand. looking at price developments, we see that euro area hicp inflation declined sharply from late 2011 to october last year, and has since been fluctuating around very low levels below 1%. according to the latest data (eurostat’s flash estimate), euro area annual hicp inflation stood at 0.5% in june 2014, unchanged from may. annual hicp inflation is expected to remain at low levels over coming months, before increasing gradually in 2015 and 2016. at the same time, medium to long-term inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with price stability. upside and downside risks to the outlook for price developments are both seen as limited and broadly balanced over the medium term. we will monitor the possible repercussions of geopolitical risks and exchange rate developments closely in this context. the exchange rate is not a policy target for the ecb. nevertheless, the exchange rate remains an important driver of future inflation in the euro area. certainly, the appreciation that took place since mid-2012 had an impact on price stability. in the present context, an appreciated exchange rate is a risk to the sustainability of the recovery. |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2012-10-05 | 0.096 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. i would like to thank governor kranjec for his kind hospitality and express our special gratitude to his staff for the excellent organisation of today’s meeting of the governing council. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. owing to high energy prices and increases in indirect taxes in some euro area countries, inflation rates are expected to remain above 2% throughout 2012, but then to fall below that level again in the course of next year and to remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. consistent with this picture, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains subdued. inflation expectations for the euro area continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. economic growth in the euro area is expected to remain weak, with ongoing tensions in some euro area financial markets and high uncertainty still weighing on confidence and sentiment. our decisions as regards outright monetary transactions (omts) have helped to alleviate such tensions over the past few weeks, thereby reducing concerns about the materialisation of destructive scenarios. it is now essential that governments continue to implement the necessary steps to reduce both fi… |
| Peter Praet: Interview in Financial Times | Period_2 | 2013-12-12 | 0.087 | the european central bank has forecast inflation of 1.3 per cent in 2015, which is usually seen as the policy-relevant horizon. how can you justify not doing more now when inflation is forecast to be almost a third below your target two years from now? we aim at an inflation rate of close but below 2% over the medium term. given the subdued outlook for prices, we are already doing a lot. we have cut rates. since july 2012 our overnight rate has been in general lower than that controlled by any other major central bank. we have offered our forward guidance. we have extended the conduct of our main refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures full allotment until at least 7 july 2015. so, after a prolonged period of low inflation, we would expect inflation rates to return back to rates closer to 2%. however, this will take some time given the nature of the shock, namely the unwinding of real and financial imbalances, and the possibly longer than normal transmission lag of monetary policy in such an environment. but we have also said that we are ready to act again should risks to the downside materialise. what matters, in particular, is that medium to long term inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with price stability. mr draghi said last thursday that there had been a brief discussion of negative interest rates and that any further ltro would have to involve an extension of lending to the real economy. are these two policies for which you feel as t… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.085 | our forward guidance provides protection against the risks of too low inflation by setting clear conditions that prevent a premature tightening. a full risk-management approach ensures that policy also remains sufficiently robust when the risk distribution is increasingly skewed in the other direction, so as to ensure that inflation expectations remain firmly anchored at our target. at present, upside risks to inflation largely stem from two sources. first, a too narrow focus on the supply side of the economy. by all likelihood, the output gap in the euro area will turn positive next year and will be significantly positive in 2023 and beyond, with |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.060 | but by the end of 2022, we expect consumption to be almost 3% above its pre-pandemic level. and if that positive outlook is appropriately supported by the right policy mix, it could produce a virtuous circle, where people become more optimistic, upgrade their expectations of future income, and then spend more of the savings they have built up. this would help close the output gap from the demand side and put upward pressures on wages. at the same time, there are forces that point to a slower pick-up in services inflation. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.054 | monetary policy must stay focused on price stability fiscal policy is hence at risk of contributing to inflation at a time when price pressures remain unabated. inflation in the euro area has continued to surprise on the upside, and significantly so. while fears of a technical recession have increased, economic data surprises have recently also turned positive (slide 13, left-hand side). in this situation, monetary policy must remain firmly focused on its mandate and restore price stability as quickly as possible. determined policy action by the ecb has already led to a notable tightening of financing conditions. euro area real gdp-weighted sovereign yields have increased across the maturity spectrum since the turnaround in monetary policy in december 2021. yet, real rates remain in negative territory for most tenors, meaning policy is likely too accommodative (slide 13, right-hand side). markets’ expectations of a “pivot” have recently worked against our efforts to withdraw policy accommodation, bringing the actual policy stance further away from the stance that is required to bring inflation back to target. |
| Christine Lagarde: Commitment and persistence - monetary policy in the economic recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.048 | our review confirmed that we see negative and positive deviations from our 2% inflation target as equally undesirable. but for inflation to return sustainably to target when interest rates are near the effective lower bound, we need to be persistent in our monetary policy. in particular, we must not rush into a premature tightening when faced with passing or supply-driven inflation shocks. in the words of abraham lincoln, “commitment is what transforms a promise into a reality” — and this is the spirit we need to ensure that we reach our 2% target on a durable basis. at a time when purchasing power is already being squeezed by higher energy and fuel bills, an undue tightening would represent an unwarranted headwind for the recovery. however, as positive demand forces in the economy gain strength, the inflation outlook over the medium term is looking better than it did before the pandemic. so, we should continue nurturing these forces by not withdrawing policy support prematurely. current drivers of inflation in the euro area what are the drivers of inflation in the euro area today? to begin with, there is still some inflation that is purely “mechanical” and results from base effects. inflation fell dramatically last year during the lockdowns — averaging 0.3% — and that automatically leads to higher inflation this year, because we measure inflation on a year-on-year basis. |
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.046 | monetary policy decisions to support a timely return of inflation to 2%, our monetary policy aims to reduce support for demand and to ensure inflation expectations remain anchored at our medium-term target. accordingly, we decided to raise the three key ecb interest rates by 75 basis points in october – the third major rate hike in a row – and we expect to raise interest rates again. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 65 | asset | 1 | 0.1066404 | asset price | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 65 | asset price | 2 | 0.0722477 | bubble | 2 | 0.9996496 |
| 65 | bubble | 3 | 0.0312985 | boom | 3 | 0.9996495 |
| 65 | boom | 4 | 0.0263524 | price bubble | 4 | 0.9984658 |
| 65 | credit | 5 | 0.0250871 | bust | 5 | 0.9982467 |
| 65 | imbalance | 6 | 0.0212913 | estate | 6 | 0.9980725 |
| 65 | financial | 7 | 0.0157700 | real estate | 7 | 0.9980724 |
| 65 | development | 8 | 0.0147348 | asset price bubble | 8 | 0.9980275 |
| 65 | risk | 9 | 0.0127794 | financial imbalance | 9 | 0.9978534 |
| 65 | house | 10 | 0.0123193 | lean | 10 | 0.9977210 |
| 65 | real | 11 | 0.0113991 | price boom | 11 | 0.9975449 |
| 65 | financial imbalance | 12 | 0.0113991 | asset | 12 | 0.9971885 |
| 65 | estate | 13 | 0.0110540 | asset price boom | 13 | 0.9971066 |
| 65 | real estate | 14 | 0.0109390 | wind | 14 | 0.9968459 |
| 65 | identify | 15 | 0.0101338 | imbalance | 15 | 0.9961362 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Asset price bubbles and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-06-14 | 0.500 | some stylized facts about asset price boom periods and monetary policy let me now turn to present some empirical stylized facts about asset price bubbles. my goal is then to focus on the link to monetary policy. a number of researchers have devoted some efforts to analyzing historical boom-busts cycles in asset prices in order to detect regularities with regard to the costliness of booms, and to assess the potential for identifying dangerous booms at an early stage. different studies emphasize different aspects, and use different methodologies. however, they coincide on pointing out a range of characteristics, and i would like to call your attention to some of them. a recently conducted imf study acknowledges the importance of housing price booms and compares equity and housing bust periods. it reaches the conclusion that although housing price busts are overall less frequent, they are more likely conditional on the existence of a boom. historically, housing price booms have been followed by busts about 40 percent of the time, while equity price booms are followed by busts only 25% of the cases. housing price peak to trough periods are longer on average, and, despite the fact that the decline in prices is somewhat smaller, the associated output losses are notably bigger. the output losses incurred during a typical housing price bust amounts to 8 percent of gdp, which is double the average loss during an equity price bust. the reason is a different exposure of the banking s… |
| Jürgen Stark: Main challenges for monetary policy in a globalised world | Period_1 | 2008-03-31 | 0.383 | fourth, although central banks can influence asset prices by means of monetary policy actions, the relatively large swings in policy rates that could be needed to curb boom and bust cycles in asset prices could pose a significant threat to macroeconomic stability in the short term. building on these generally agreed conclusions, two possible monetary policy approaches have been suggested. on the one hand, some argue that central banks should lean against asset price bubbles, as such bubbles have the potential to create lasting distortions in the economy. in a world in which asset price bubbles are very difficult to identify and the curbing of boom and bust cycles in asset prices can prove very costly in terms of inflation and output, leaning against a possible bubble can be seen as an insurance policy in case a bubble is indeed being created. the proponents of this view argue that even if a central bank does not wish to target asset prices directly, some insurance is desirable, given that boom and bust cycles in asset prices may be damaging to economic stability. others, by contrast, advocate a sort of flexible inflation-targeting approach. they argue that the premium for this “insurance policy” is too expensive, since, by reacting to changes in asset prices, the central bank could seriously destabilise the economy in normal times when no bubbles were present. as a result, they argue, a policy of leaning against asset prices could lead to serious communication and accounta… |
| Juergen Stark: In search of a robust monetary policy framework | Period_1 | 2010-11-25 | 0.376 | traditionally, however, there has been a great deal of scepticism about “leaning against the wind” for at least four reasons. 10 first, it has been argued that it is not evident that asset price boom-bust cycles are necessarily a bad thing for real long-term growth in all countries. the benefits from the realisation of additional investment projects could, on average, outweigh the costs incurred during the bust phases. second, as i have already mentioned, it is considered very difficult to identify an asset price bubble in real time. in particular, a tight policy response to asset price increases may end up destabilising the economy unnecessarily if the asset price valuation is driven by fundamentals. third, it has been claimed that the policy interest rate is “too blunt a tool” to contain potential bubbles. raising policy rates will depress the prices of many assets – including those not booming – as well as the real economy and consumer prices. furthermore, in times of market euphoria, the policy rate might have to be raised quite significantly in order to have a measurable effect on booming asset prices. when taken seriously, these considerations lead to doubts about the effectiveness and efficiency of an active “leaning against the wind” approach. a fourth argument basically refers to cost-benefit considerations. in essence, the argument postulates that the costs of “cleaning up afterwards” (namely by loosening the monetary policy stance after the bust) are smaller tha… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Asset price bubbles and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-06-14 | 0.361 | leaning against the wind the leaning against the wind principle describes a tendency to cautiously raise interest rates even beyond the level necessary to maintain price stability over the short to medium run, when a potentially detrimental asset price boom is identified. the basic assumption behind the leaning against the wind principle is a non-linearity best described as an asymmetric effect of positive and negative asset price shocks. a negative shock is likely to have a larger effect than a positive one. the reasons are that credit constraints can depend on the value of collateral and that in case of a financial crisis the whole financial intermediation process can in the worst case completely fail. the central bank conducts a slightly tighter policy in order to better ensure price stability over extended horizons by possibly containing the future growth of the bubble - or at least not to accommodate it - than it would otherwise if confronted with a similar macroeconomic outlook under more normal market conditions. by doing so the central bank would tolerate to be significantly below its definition of price stability. this behaviour has been compared to buying an insurance against a potentially harmful asset boom-bust cycle, where the insurance premium to be paid is some additional tightening leading to a lower level of inflation than would be required by the monetary policy strategy.24 proponents of the leaning against the wind policy have typically been very careful… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Asset price bubbles and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-06-14 | 0.348 | times of low risk premia.3 the claim can be derived in a most standard stock valuation model, where the price-dividend ratio is a convex function of the mean dividend growth rate. the mean dividend growth rate in turn depends obviously on future expected earnings of the company. heightened uncertainty about future earnings, will increase the price dividend ratio. it has further been claimed that assuming apparently reasonable parameter values with regard to the discount rate, expected earnings growth and most importantly the variance of expected earnings growth, one can reproduce the nasdaq valuation of the late 90s and its volatility. there would thus be no reason to refer to a dotcom bubble. i do not mention this example because i believe the nasdaq valuation of the late 90s has not been excessive. however, if one takes the narrow definition of bubble very often used by these economic researchers4, there exists a fundamental difficulty in calling an observed asset price boom a bubble: it must be proved that given the information available at the time of the boom, investors processed this information irrationally. this is as the above example shows a formidable task. some economists would even argue that apparent evidence of irrationality should always be interpreted as a sign of hidden costs (to acquire or process information in a rational way) or model misspecification (which is responsible for the divergence between the model based fundamental price and the observed pr… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Narratives about the ECB’s monetary policy - reality or fiction? | Period_2 | 2020-02-12 | 0.292 | it is normal for asset prices to rise during phases of low interest rates. equity prices, for example, reflect firms’ discounted earnings expectations. if the interest rate falls, equity prices will go up, because future earnings will have a greater bearing on current valuations. however, earnings expectations themselves also tend to increase when interest rates are lowered, because investors anticipate stronger economic growth. and, indeed, the current price/earnings ratio in the euro area is a long way off from the excesses of the dotcom bubble of 2000, and it is closer to its historical median than in other economies (slide 25, left-hand side). nonetheless, central banks need to keep a close eye on such valuations, as purely liquidity-driven price gains can result in risks for financial stability in the long term. asset price bubbles pose a particular risk when they are largely credit-driven. this is typically more likely to apply to real estate than to equities. that is why developments in real estate prices are rightly coming under particular scrutiny. residential real estate prices in germany have risen appreciably in recent years, especially in the larger cities, and the deutsche bundesbank has repeatedly pointed to possible price excesses. two factors are significant here. first, prices always reflect the interplay of supply and demand. the pronounced price increase in german towns and cities reflects a noticeably stronger demand for housing that was unmatched by a… |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.200 | prior to the crisis, there was a common view that central banks should focus on inflation stabilisation and only care about financial developments should these have direct implications for inflation dynamics. another view was that by ensuring price stability, monetary policy would also cater for financial stability. the crisis proved that this was not true as a period of moderate inflation coincided with the build‐up of financial imbalances and asset price bubbles. it was hard to argue that conventional monetary policy using interest rates could and should be used to address those imbalances or prick asset price bubbles. indeed, it is difficult to identify bubbles and virtually impossible to calibrate interest rates to produce the desired effects on asset prices. in many cases, the required increase in interest rates would create unnecessary recessionary episodes. the use of monetary policy to “lean against the wind” may be very costly, as svensson (2016) has demonstrated. in this sense, inflation targeting cannot be blamed for failing to prevent the financial crisis.7 |
| Jürgen Stark: Globalisation and monetary policy - from virtue to vice? | Period_2 | 2011-11-30 | 0.180 | moreover, the record shows that as far back as 2004 both policymakers and academics were alerting on some of the emerging tail risks which have subsequently materialised. to name a few examples, borio and white (2004)24 cautioned on the greater prominence of credit and asset price boom-and-bust cycles even in a low inflation environment; rajan (2005)25 did a careful review of some worrying trends associated with globalised financial markets; and rogoff (2006)26 noted that the “great moderation” had not been associated with lower asset price volatility. the record also shows that monetary authorities echoed many of these and other concerns (such as the possible disorderly unwinding of global imbalances) in their public discourse, including through speeches and official publications27. thus, even if novel, it is not correct to say that policymakers were unaware of the potential risks associated with a globalised environment. so why did such risks still materialise in the end? part of the answer was the insufficient policy traction with the authorities that were competent to heed such warnings. however, it is also true that while the onset of the crisis can be largely seen as the result of vulnerabilities and imbalances which had been growing steadily and which had been identified fairly early on in the process, they combined in ways that few would have anticipated. this was especially the case as regards the functioning of the financial system as its wider interconnections. … |
| Yves Mersch: Speaking points for an event organised by MNI Connect | Period_2 | 2016-10-13 | 0.158 | is expected to rise to 1.2% in 2017 and 1.6% in 2018 with a significant contribution coming from our measures taken since june 2014, namely 0.5 percentage points per year. overall, the implementation of our measures has been smooth. some considerations regarding our measures notwithstanding the effectiveness of our measures, we also need to consider their potential side-effects. a protracted period of low interest rates weigh on banks’ profitability via lower net interest income and this can potentially impinge on the transmission of monetary policy given the key role played by banks. although, banks on the whole, have been able to weather the declining margins by increasing lending volumes, lowering provisioning needs and attaining capital gains from their fixed income holdings. that being said, euro area banks need to do their part in terms of improving profitability. such measures include reducing operational costs, a greater use of financial technology and addressing the stock of non-performing loans in a more resolute manner. we also need to be mindful of the risk that a protracted period of low-interest rate environment may create financial imbalances and foster asset price bubbles, particularly in the real estate market. while there is no single metric to assess the sustainability of real-estate valuations, to date there is no indication suggesting overheating in this sector. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Narratives about the ECB’s monetary policy - reality or fiction? | Period_2 | 2020-02-12 | 0.154 | the european capital markets union can play a significant role here. monetary policy and asset price bubbles the last narrative i would like to discuss this evening is the claim that loose monetary policy leads to price bubbles in the financial and real estate markets. fears that monetary policy entails risks for financial stability should indeed be taken very seriously. in fact, one objective of the current expansionary monetary policy is to revive risk appetite among investors, and thus promote growth and investment activity. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.105 | equity and housing markets equity markets in the euro area have largely moved sideways after the sharp correction experienced at the onset of russia’s invasion of ukraine (chart 15). that correction was mostly driven by downward revisions in longer-term earnings expectations amid mounting recession fears. since then, equity markets have been driven by two largely offsetting factors: while rising risk-free discount rates in the context of monetary policy normalisation have put downward pressure on equity valuations, lower equity risk premia have worked in the opposite direction. if equity risk premia were to increase in the context of a slowing economy, tighter financial conditions and elevated uncertainty, the correction in equity markets would be sharper than experienced so far. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.103 | this analysis draws from a bvar model that decomposes asset price movements into underlying drivers based on cross-asset price restrictions. for more details see brandt, l., schroder, m., saint guilhem, a., and van robays, i. (2021), “what drives euro area financial market developments? the role of us spillovers and global risk”, working paper series, no 2560, ecb, may. |
| Luis de Guindos: Euro area current policy challenges | Period_3 | 2022-09-16 | 0.093 | vulnerabilities in euro area residential real estate markets are also rising in light of continued price increases and vigorous mortgage lending growth. in the first quarter of 2022 euro area residential real estate price growth stood at 9.8%, the highest nominal growth rate since the early 1990s. however, since the beginning of the year, household survey responses on the intention to buy a house have declined, and banks have lowered their expectations regarding mortgage loan demand, pointing to a greater potential for house price corrections. turning to financial institutions, vulnerabilities in the non-bank financial sector have also increased this year. the risk that forced selling by investment funds could amplify a market correction remains high, amid low liquidity buffers. duration risk has started to materialise and remains elevated, and further bond portfolio revaluation losses may arise in the context of rising yields. on a better note, systemic vulnerabilities in the banking sector are assessed as moderate. bank profitability has improved owing partly to higher longer-term interest rates. this should, however, not overshadow rising fragilities related to the worsening macroeconomic outlook. higher probabilities of default on corporate exposures and a related increase in provisioning, point to some early signs of higher bank credit risk due to high energy prices. while the situation is stable overall, with little sign of fragmentation in funding markets, bank fund… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.091 | ten-year euro area gdp-weighted sovereign yield spread over ois refinitiv, bloomberg and ecb calculations. note: the latest observation is for 25 march 2022. in a monetary union that lacks an area-wide common safe asset, flight-to-safety episodes have a geographic dimension, in view of the high substitutability across national financial systems that is enabled by the absence of currency risk.[6] the nature of such episodes is that heightened risk aversion not only may involve a reassessment of the pricing of fundamentals-based risks but also may induce a self-fulfilling withdrawal to so-called safe haven jurisdictions in the belief that other investors may also opt to make the same geographic reallocation decision. in the absence of active market stabilisation by the central bank, the intrinsic self-validating nature of flight-to-safety dynamics creates the risk of asset price movements and cross-border financial flows that, in terms of their magnitude, are unwarranted by fundamentals, but that also reflect a switch across multiple self-fulfilling beliefs-driven equilibria. while it is always challenging to distinguish between fundamentals-driven and beliefs-driven repricing and reallocation dynamics (especially in real time), the specific circumstances of the pandemic crisis suggest that there was a compelling case for the central bank to act as a market stabiliser. first, as outlined above, it was clear that flight-to-safety pressures were operating at a global level, wi… |
| Luis de Guindos: Policy mix of the future - the role of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.075 | and sectors in the euro area. it fine-tunes the overall policy mix and complements the single monetary policy in support of overall financial stability across the euro area. despite the overall good resilience of the euro area banking sector, certain countries have in recent years seen a build-up of financial vulnerabilities, notably related to residential real estate prices and growing household and firm indebtedness. some further careful and targeted tightening of macroprudential policy would be beneficial in selected countries at present. given the deteriorated outlook for economic growth, some countries might benefit from further increasing the resilience of their financial sectors before credit risks start materialising. this includes for example taking measures to preserve capital in the banking sector which could then be used to absorb losses. lithuania has been active in applying a comprehensive set of macroprudential policies to address current vulnerabilities. this year, authorities have activated a sectoral systemic risk buffer of 2% on residential real estate exposures and have tightened the loan-to-value limit for second and subsequent housing loans to 70%. of course, the benefits of further policy action across countries, would need to be evaluated against the risk of procyclical effects, which is becoming more likely as the economic outlook worsens. let me conclude. policy interaction has been a critical element for navigating the pandemic. complementary act… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 66 | negative | 1 | 0.0602311 | deflation | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 66 | fall | 2 | 0.0589163 | zero | 2 | 0.9993867 |
| 66 | deflation | 3 | 0.0477405 | territory | 3 | 0.9988604 |
| 66 | zero | 4 | 0.0387998 | bind | 4 | 0.9983348 |
| 66 | positive | 5 | 0.0348554 | deflationary | 5 | 0.9982470 |
| 66 | bind | 6 | 0.0344610 | negative territory | 6 | 0.9980706 |
| 66 | inflation rate | 7 | 0.0282814 | disinflation | 7 | 0.9976343 |
| 66 | risk | 8 | 0.0277555 | prolong | 8 | 0.9975464 |
| 66 | close | 9 | 0.0213130 | negative | 9 | 0.9973647 |
| 66 | level | 10 | 0.0206556 | prolong period | 10 | 0.9972838 |
| 66 | prolong | 11 | 0.0189463 | negative inflation | 11 | 0.9972335 |
| 66 | territory | 12 | 0.0180260 | fall | 12 | 0.9971895 |
| 66 | bring | 13 | 0.0178945 | positive | 13 | 0.9968399 |
| 66 | period | 14 | 0.0172371 | spiral | 14 | 0.9959697 |
| 66 | cut | 15 | 0.0172371 | cut | 15 | 0.9959231 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2009-01-29 | 0.198 | medium-term price developments and the process of disinflation let me now look more closely at the medium-term outlook for price developments in the euro area, and in particular at the process of disinflation we are currently observing. i will thereby address the first topic proposed. it is essential here to draw a clear distinction between disinflation and deflation. disinflation is a process of falling inflation rates. this process often stems from cost-saving developments on the supply side or terms of trade improvements. such developments can sometimes go hand in hand with negative demand shocks as is the case at present. however, they are per se benign in nature. this is because they sustain real incomes. in the current context, we are witnessing a process of disinflation in the euro area, mainly as a result of a sharp fall in oil and commodity prices. to that extent it is therefore a welcome development. the spike in oil and commodity prices that began in 2007 and lasted until mid- 2008 was both inflationary and contractionary. in consequence, the recent decline in these prices is both disinflationary and expansionary. by way of example, car fuel prices fell by 15.4% in december 2008 year on year. their weight of almost 5% in the hicp basket means that this explains a significant part of the recent inflation decline. if such favourable supply- side developments are especially vigorous, disinflation can even temporarily lead to negative inflation rates. it is therefor… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the European economy and the ECB’s monetary policy concept | Period_1 | 2004-07-20 | 0.196 | the may 2003 clarification: “hicp inflation below but close to 2%” at the same time, we felt the need to convey even more clearly to the public that the governing council does not view all positive inflation rates of below 2% as equally desirable. on 8 may 2003 we made it clear that, in order to fulfil its price stability objective, the governing council aims to maintain hicp inflation below but close to 2% over the medium term. this was fully in line with our past practice and with medium-term market expectations. thus, the announcement did not change inflation expectations. the main argument for maintaining a low positive rate of inflation is that it helps to reduce to very low levels the probability that nominal interest rates will approach their lower bound of zero. obviously, the likelihood of nominal interest rates hitting the zero lower bound in the euro area is rather remote. this notwithstanding, introducing a preventive margin for inflation rates is advisable, not least since available evidence indicates that even a relatively small safety margin for inflation rates above zero is sufficient to largely eliminate concerns that the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates will become binding. there are other arguments for aiming at positive rates of inflation, such as the possibility of measurement bias in the price index and the inflation differentials in the euro area. overall, our assessment is that aiming at inflation below but close to 2% over the medium ter… |
| Jürgen Stark: Delivering price stability - benefits and challenges | Period_1 | 2007-12-04 | 0.190 | why should central banks tolerate small positive rates of inflation? this insight brings me to my first question to experts. inflation is a tax on nominal wealth, so if asked individually about whether that tax should be positive or zero – or even negative, thus becoming a subsidy – agents in the economy would tend to choose the lowest possible tax. but assuming that the economy faces various frictions, and that those frictions interact with zero or negative inflation in ways that might be costly for the economy as a whole, theory argues that a “benign optimizer” would not necessarily opt for a zero or negative inflation tax. how are we to weigh inflation costs to individual agents against the benefits of price stability – defined as low but positive inflation – as an insurance mechanism against various macroeconomic pathologies? this conference makes some progress on two families of such pathologies, those associated with the so-called lower bound to the nominal interest rate, and those possibly arising from downward nominal wage rigidities. the lower limit to the nominal interest rate is an area of investigation in which research is advanced and, i note in passing, converging to a consensus view. here, the argument in favour of a low but positive long term inflation rate is well known: it relates to the risk that the zero-floor to the setting of nominal interest rates might at times interfere with the ability of the central bank to stabilise inflation in the face of expe… |
| Jean Claude Trichet: The ECB’s monetary policy strategy after the evaluation and clarification of May 2003 | Period_1 | 2003-12-02 | 0.184 | rationales for aiming for positive inflation (1): the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates the first argument is that maintaining a low positive rate of inflation reduces to very low levels the probability that nominal interest rates will approach their lower bound at zero. the event of nominal interest rates hitting the zero lower bound is linked to an increased uncertainty about the effectiveness of monetary policy. if this event were to coincide with a strong decline in demand, such a situation could complicate the central bank’s ability to avoid a deflationary episode. examples where countries reached the lower bound for nominal interest rates are rare. and even if this event were to materialise, a number of effective monetary policy actions are still possible at zero nominal interest rates and various plausible solutions for escaping from a liquidity trap have been proposed. this notwithstanding, prevention is better than cure and a safety margin for inflation rates above zero proves helpful to avoid that the effectiveness of these alternative policies has to be tested in reality. in order to calibrate the adequate safety margin for inflation rates in this respect, we took into account the studies which have tried to assess the likelihood of nominal interest rates hitting the zero lower |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Careful with (the D) words! | Period_1 | 2008-11-27 | 0.180 | scenario, expectations of price changes turn negative and induce agents to postpone consumption and investment decisions. it’s the negative inflation expectations that pushes the (ex-ante) real interest rate up, even when the nominal interest rate is brought down to zero, above its equilibrium level. it is not clear what could push agents to expect negative inflation, and thereby enter a deflation scenario, rather than a standard disinflation. one possibility is that agents are not fully rational and form adaptive expectations. as they observe the start of the disinflation, with a negative inflation rate necessary to achieve the new equilibrium, they may think that the negative price change is likely to persist for some time. negative inflation expectations might thus become entrenched. given the zero bound on interest rates, the negative inflation pushes real rates up, thereby adding recessionary forces to the economy, which might further fuel price declines. another hypothesis is that the disinflation process is not sufficiently quick to stabilise the economy at the new equilibrium. as in the case of asset markets that do not function properly, when the equilibrium price is not achieved rapidly enough and the adjustment process is slow, the price dynamics will take longer and might even overshoot, generating destabilising patterns. the same could occur for the real economy, as a lack of flexibility in markets delays the adjustment of the price level, which may take more … |
| Peter Praet: Steering the economy in a challenging environment | Period_2 | 2013-11-19 | 0.194 | potential if it falls into a self-sustaining deflationary spiral. if prices are expected to fall, demand will be deferred to a future point in time when prices will be lower. but the fact is: that point in time will never come. and demand, income and production will keep falling with prices. in may 2003, the governing council went beyond this numerical characterisation of price stability. the governing council provided more clarity on its policy orientation within the range. indeed, while all positive inflation rates below 2% may be equally attractive from a pure – and narrowly static – welfare perspective, additional considerations regarding the dynamic stability of the macroeconomic system argued for selecting some specific values within the range. this is why in may 2003 it was decided that, over the medium term, the governing council would aim for inflation rates below, but close to, 2% in the medium term. in other words, within the price stability interval, a medium-term inflation rate not too far from 2% was considered a superior goal for monetary policy. what are the further considerations that suggested clarifying a policy aim within the price stability interval? two main considerations led to that decision. the first was to make sure that the steady state inflation in the euro area as a whole would incorporate a sufficient buffer away from zero. if the steady state inflation is close to zero, the steady state nominal interest rate that the central bank has to set … |
| Peter Praet: Monetary policy lessons from the financial crisis - some remarks | Period_2 | 2015-09-28 | 0.182 |
|
| Peter Praet: Economic developments in the euro area | Period_2 | 2015-02-12 | 0.179 | the deteriorating inflation situation in parallel, the inflation gap had widened as the inflation outlook had materially worsened towards the end of last year. when we took the decision in january most indicators of realised and expected inflation in the euro area stood at, or close to, their historical lows. while the main driver of inflation developments in the months before was the sharp fall of global oil prices, the conditions we faced made this shock different from a classic positive supply shock, and we could not afford to “look through” the effects on inflation. indeed, several factors suggested that the present situation was more worrying than past episodes of oil-induced disinflation, particularly the most recent case in 2009 following the collapse of lehman brothers. first, the persistence of low inflation across a range of statistical metrics was higher than in 2009. this reflects the fact that, at that time, disinflation was very abrupt with inflation rates expected to quickly revert back into positive territory. the current episode is characterised by a prolonged downward inflation trend, and we expect inflation to remain in negative territory until latter stages of this year. second, since last summer market measures of inflation expectations have become more sensitive to realised inflation, even at maturities and at horizons that we would normally expect to be more resilient. this is in stark contrast with 2009, where inflation expectations hardly moved, ev… |
| Philip R Lane: Low inflation - macroeconomic risks and the monetary policy stance | Period_2 | 2020-02-12 | 0.158 | one danger is that low inflation that persists over the longer term provides only a small buffer against deflation: if inflation is low, it only takes a relatively small shock to tip the economy into deflation. the macroeconomic implications of deflation are well known. first, the expectation of falling prices delays purchases and investment. second, the combination of falling output prices and downwardly rigid nominal wages damages the profitability of businesses and reduces the demand for labour. third, deflation means that the real burden of nominal debt increases over time, making debt repayments more difficult for households, firms and governments. however, even in the absence of pronounced risks of deflation, there are substantial macroeconomic costs to persistently undershooting the inflation objective. |
| Peter Praet: Interview in Süddeutsche Zeitung | Period_2 | 2015-02-02 | 0.155 | mr praet, the ecb has decided to spend €1.1 trillion on purchases of government bonds. has the euro area now become safer? i expect economic growth to develop along favourable lines in the coming months. the low oil price and neutral fiscal stance will help, financial markets are more confident, the exchange rate of the euro will support exports and structural economic reforms are having positive effects in some countries. all is not perfect, but thanks also to our decision, there will be a positive impact on the economy. the ecb is buying government bonds to boost inflation and thereby economic growth. are low petrol prices bad? that is a natural argument. when petrol prices are falling, people are happy. however, monetary policy does not focus on individual prices, but rather on the overall price level. on average, prices in the euro area fell by 0.6% in january, and inflation rates will remain negative in the coming months. in germany, prices fell by 0.5%, year on year, in january. we need to make sure that the euro are does not slip into a self-reinforcing downward spiral of falling prices and wages. the bundesbank does not see that as a problem. if inflation in the euro area were to rise to 4%, everybody would expect the ecb to do something about it. consequently, the ecb also has to step in when inflation falls to nearly zero. price stability is threatened from above and below. we have a mandate under european law to maintain price stability. for very good reasons, t… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.071 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.066 | so how can we evaluate the medium-term balance of risks from today’s standpoint? risks of persistent inflation dynamics to begin with, we need to assess whether we are likely to see propagation mechanisms that could transform the current price level shock into destabilising inflation dynamics, in particular a wage-price spiral. typically, a sustained increase in wages requires the economy to be operating persistently above potential. this is not currently the case in the euro area. estimates of the output gap suggest that it will take time before it is convincingly positive (chart 6, left-hand side). |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.058 | the second reason for optimism concerns the services sector. contact-intensive services have rebounded sharply since the spring and have remained an important source of growth since then. but activity in these sectors has not yet fully returned to its pre-crisis level. by the end of the third quarter, value added in contact-intensive services was still approximately 8% below its pre-pandemic level (slide 7, right-hand chart).©! new or existing containment measures and labour shortages mean that activity will only resume gradually. but as the pandemic abates and economies reopen further, activity in more contact- intensive services is likely to keep expanding. all in all, stagnation looks like a distant threat — a view that is shared by most of the forecasting community. according to consensus economics, revisions to expected growth have been moderate over the past few weeks, in particular for the euro area (slide 8). real gdp in the euro area is expected to grow by 5% in 2021 and by 4.3% in 2022, well above estimated potential growth. the euro area inflation outlook: rising uncertainty favours a risk- management approach let me now turn to the inflation part of the stagflation concern. the first oil price shock hit the euro area economy in a strong inflationary environment. in 1972, before the shock, euro area inflation was already at 6.3%, [6] in 1974, it rose to 13.2%. wage growth stood at 12% in 1972 and increased to around 18% in 1974. the monetary policy response to t… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.050 | our monetary policy decisions have also contributed to substantially raising real rates over most horizons beyond the very short term. for instance, the forward real rate at the 1yr1yr horizon has gone up by about 300 bps since december 2021 (chart 11). while this increase in the near term has primarily been driven by the real expectations component embedded in forward real rates, longer-term real forward rates increased mostly due to higher real term premia. furthermore, the 10-year real overnight index swap (ois) rate recently edged into positive territory – to levels not seen for over a decade.[34] these positive levels are particularly remarkable as the whole term structure of euro area real rates had been negative for many years reflecting a host of domestic and global factors. |
| Christine Lagarde: New challenges in a changing world | Period_3 | 2023-01-24 | 0.048 | the third big challenge facing europe is the high inflation environment. and this, of course, is the challenge that concerns me the most. inflation in europe is far too high, partly due to our vulnerability to the changing geopolitics of energy. decoupling from russia last year pushed up energy inflation in the euro area to extraordinary levels. but while energy inflation has recently been coming down, underlying inflation continues to rise. as a result, it is vital that inflation rates above the ecb’s 2% target do not become entrenched in the economy. we must bring inflation down. and we will deliver on this goal. in less than half a year, we have raised the ecb interest rates by 250 basis points, the fastest increase in our history. and we have made it clear that ecb interest rates will still have to rise significantly at a steady pace to reach levels that are sufficiently restrictive, and stay at those levels for as long as necessary. in other words, we will stay the course to ensure the timely return of inflation to our target. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 67 | energy | 1 | 0.0810572 | bottleneck | 1 | 0.9991234 |
| 67 | supply | 2 | 0.0473755 | energy price | 2 | 0.9982467 |
| 67 | rise | 3 | 0.0329555 | supply bottleneck | 3 | 0.9980248 |
| 67 | cent | 4 | 0.0317977 | chain | 4 | 0.9979849 |
| 67 | energy price | 5 | 0.0314819 | cent | 5 | 0.9977190 |
| 67 | demand | 6 | 0.0204301 | energy | 6 | 0.9976289 |
| 67 | cost | 7 | 0.0177987 | energy cost | 7 | 0.9971464 |
| 67 | service | 8 | 0.0173777 | disruption | 8 | 0.9971087 |
| 67 | pandemic | 9 | 0.0168514 | supply chain | 9 | 0.9968399 |
| 67 | bottleneck | 10 | 0.0160093 | industrial good | 10 | 0.9968390 |
| 67 | good | 11 | 0.0130622 | supply | 11 | 0.9966608 |
| 67 | food | 12 | 0.0130622 | reopen | 12 | 0.9964023 |
| 67 | expect | 13 | 0.0124307 | gas | 13 | 0.9957507 |
| 67 | chain | 14 | 0.0123254 | shortage | 14 | 0.9955317 |
| 67 | production | 15 | 0.0122202 | energy industrial good | 15 | 0.9949464 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy in a changing world ¿ commitment, strategy and credibility | Period_1 | 2006-12-07 | 0.082 | integration into the global market economy of emerging asia and of the former socialist countries in central and eastern europe. in fact, the share of both regions in world exports has essentially doubled over the past 15 years to 22% and 4%, respectively. globalisation affects the functioning of the world economy and of the national economies through many channels and in various ways. today, i will concentrate on its effects on inflation, which are both direct and indirect. the increasing economic opening up of many countries has led to the emergence of two major and fairly direct effects on world inflation dynamics, which partly offset each other. on one hand, raw materials and basic commodities, most importantly oil and other sources of energy, have become scarcer relative to world demand, leading to substantial upward pressure on prices. [see chart 3] for example, brent crude oil prices have almost tripled over the last three years, reflecting to a very large extent the impact of rising demand, especially in emerging market economies [see chart 4], although supply-side factors have also played a role during some periods. on the other hand, the integration of an enormous reserve of low-cost, skilled labour in the international economy and the increasing production of manufactured goods in emerging market economies have put downward pressure on import prices of manufactured goods as well as on wage demands in industrial economies. as a consequence, the prices of a wide r… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Current challenges for the euro area | Period_1 | 2008-10-30 | 0.081 | i price stability: current situation and prospects let me first share with you some reflections on the prospects for price stability. starting with the current situation, euro area hicp inflation has remained at a high level since last autumn. this spike in euro area hicp inflation had its origins in external forces, in particular the very strong global rise in several commodity prices – notably those of energy and food. given the magnitude of these increases in global commodity prices, there has been a sizeable direct pass-through into the food and energy components of inflation. much of the ongoing inflationary pressure at this stage also derives from the indirect effects on inflation of cost pressures in the production chain. in addition, there is a concern that second-round effects could materialise if consumers or firms attempt to compensate for any loss in purchasing power stemming from the increase in commodity prices by pushing for higher wages or prices. available evidence on price and wage-setting behaviour in the euro area suggests some cause for concern in two respects: • first, the indirect impacts on inflation have been strong, given both the scale of the rise in energy and food prices and the fact that these commodities are an extensive input into the production of other goods and services. strong producer price inflation was not confined to the direct energy and food price components of producer prices. |
| Mr Duisenberg reports at a press conference on the outcome of the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 8 Apr 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-04-13 | 0.073 | you said there were no monetary risks of inflation at the moment. can we infer from today’s decision that there were monetary risks of deflation or is it purely a growth-oriented decision that you have taken today? duisenberg: no, we also see no risks of deflation emerging. we see that inflation has now remained, on a euro area-wide basis, constant at a rate of 0.8% four months in a row up to now. we see some risks on the upside, i.e. mainly the impact of rising energy prices, but that is by definition, as it was when it was on the downside, a temporary factor. we see some risks deriving from some wage settlements here and there in europe, those are the upside risks. we see some downside risks from a rather subdued outlook for general economic development in the entire euro area. but as such, the main thing is that we do not see the situation of price stability in which we entered the euro area, and which prevails until this moment, would be in any way endangered in the future. that gave us the leeway to take the measure i have just announced. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy in challenging times | Period_1 | 2008-06-06 | 0.054 | first of all, let me say that i am in the purdah period, so that nothing i will say should be interpreted in any respect as signalling intentions of the governing council as regards the monetary policy stance. economic policymakers are currently grappling to understand the root, duration sand impact of a number of significant and sizeable shocks affecting the world economy, including rising commodity prices – of which sharp increases in world food and oil prices have been prominent components – as well as a period of prolonged financial turbulences associated with an adjustment in financial market perceptions of risk. understanding those economic shocks and how they affect the economy is plainly a vital challenge for policymakers. in my remarks today, i would like to stress that, rather than a single deep correction with a single source, the global economy in which we live is facing a multiplicity of interdependent shocks in key areas. a proper understanding of the nature of these shocks and their interrelations is a precondition to examine the required reaction of economic and, in particular, monetary policies. whilst i consider the achievements of science and the acceleration of technological progress key to decipher the present world developments, the range of other factors at stake are well illustrated by considering the drivers behind the recent sharp increases in global agricultural commodity prices. underlying some of those factors is what we might characterise as a… |
| Lucas Papademos: Globalisation and central bank policies | Period_1 | 2008-01-25 | 0.054 | curves. a reduced correlation – or even a lack of it – could simply be a consequence of the effective monetary policies of central banks which have succeeded in anchoring inflation expectations to price stability. 11 direct effect of globalisation on domestic inflation the two more direct effects of globalisation on world and domestic inflation dynamics have been more visible but have partly offset each other, and the relative impact may be changing over time. on the one hand, raw materials and basic commodities, notably oil and other sources of energy, have become scarcer relative to world demand, leading to substantial upward pressure on prices. [see chart 1] for example, brent crude oil prices have increased almost tenfold over the last nine years, reflecting to a very large extent the impact of rising demand, especially in emerging market economies [see chart 2], although supply-side factors have also played a role during some periods. on the other hand, the integration of a large reserve of low-cost, skilled labour in the international economy and the increasing production of manufactured goods in emerging market economies have put downward pressure on import prices of manufactured goods as well as on wage demands in industrial economies. as a consequence, the prices of a wide range of manufactured goods have been declining since 2000. this is reflected in the unit value of imports of manufactured products in the euro area, which in mid-2007 was virtually at the same … |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-06-10 | 0.189 | overall, we see the risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook as broadly balanced. on the one hand, an even stronger recovery could be predicated on brighter prospects for global demand and a faster-than-anticipated reduction in household savings once social and travel restrictions have been lifted. on the other hand, the ongoing pandemic, including the spread of virus mutations, and its implications for economic and financial conditions continue to be sources of downside risk. according to eurostat’s flash release, euro area annual inflation increased from 1.3 per cent in march to 1.6 per cent in april and 2.0 per cent in may 2021. this rise was due mainly to a strong increase in energy price inflation, reflecting both sizeable upward base effects as well as month- on-month increases, and, to a lesser extent, a slight increase in non-energy industrial goods inflation. headline inflation is likely to increase further towards the autumn, reflecting mainly the reversal of the temporary vat reduction in germany. inflation is expected to decline again at the start of next year as temporary factors fade out and global energy prices moderate. we expect underlying price pressures to increase somewhat this year owing to temporary supply constraints and the recovery in domestic demand. nevertheless, the price pressures will likely remain subdued overall, in part reflecting low wage pressures, in the context of still significant economic slack, and the appreciation of the euro … |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-07-22 | 0.155 | though supply bottlenecks are holding back production in the near term. the reopening of large parts of the economy is supporting a vigorous bounce-back in the services sector. but the delta variant of the coronavirus could dampen this recovery in services, especially in tourism and hospitality. as people return to shops and restaurants and resume travelling, consumer spending is rising. better job prospects, increasing confidence and continued government support are reinforcing spending. the ongoing recovery in domestic and global demand is boosting optimism among businesses. this supports investment. for the first time since the start of the pandemic, our bank lending survey indicates that funding of fixed investment is an important factor driving the demand for loans to firms. we expect economic activity to return to its pre-crisis level in the first quarter of next year. but there is still a long way to go before the damage to the economy caused by the pandemic is offset. the number of people in job retention schemes has been declining but remains high. overall, there are still 3.3 million fewer people employed than before the pandemic, especially among the younger and lower skilled. ambitious, targeted and coordinated fiscal policy should continue to complement monetary policy in supporting the recovery. in this context, the next generation eu programme has a key role to play. it will contribute to a stronger and uniform recovery across euro area countries. it will al… |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2021-06-22 | 0.140 | christine lagarde: hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at the hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament (by videoconference), frankfurt am main, 21 june 2021. * * * dear chair, honourable members of the economic and monetary affairs committee, ladies and gentlemen, i am very happy to appear before this committee again today. while we are still meeting in a virtual setting, the health situation and economic prospects across europe have improved on the back of significant progress in vaccinations − with more than 100 million people in the european union now fully vaccinated. this makes me hopeful that we will meet again in person in brussels in the near future. in my remarks today i will first discuss the economic outlook for the euro area before turning to the ecb’s monetary policy, including the recent decisions taken by the governing council. finally, as per your explicit request, i will update you on our ongoing strategy review. the current macroeconomic and inflation outlook the outlook for the economy is indeed brightening as the pandemic situation improves, the vaccination campaigns progress, and confidence begins to rise. we expect economic activity to accelerate as of this quarter amid support from fiscal and monetary stimulus and a vigorous bounce-back of services activity in particular, … |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges for global economic growth | Period_2 | 2014-06-02 | 0.129 | global level have led to increased efforts towards bilateral and regional deals, the recent impetus towards trade growth seems to have lessened. a second factor stems from waning integration through global supply chains. anecdotal evidence suggests that in the wake of a series of supply disruptions, firms are aiming to reduce the complexity and length of their supply chains. perhaps, therefore, we might be approaching some natural limits of global trade integration. this would have profound implications for the global economy. for euro area countries, which are highly open to trade and where an important component of the recovery remains driven – for now – by external factors, the prospects for trade are also crucial. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-01-21 | 0.118 | euro area annual inflation remained unchanged at -0.3 per cent in december. on the basis of current energy price dynamics, headline inflation is likely to increase in the coming months, also supported by the end of the temporary vat reduction in germany. however, underlying price pressures are expected to remain subdued owing to weak demand, notably in the tourism and travel-related sectors, as well as to low wage pressures and the appreciation of the euro exchange rate. once the impact of the pandemic fades, a recovery in demand, supported by accommodative fiscal and monetary policies, will put upward pressure https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2021/html/ecb.is210121~e601112a72.en.html 2/4 |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.388 | inflation inflation increased further to 8.6 per cent in june. surging energy prices were again the most important component of overall inflation. market-based indicators suggest that global energy prices will stay high in the near term. food inflation also rose further, standing at 8.9 per cent in june, in part reflecting the importance of ukraine and russia as producers of agricultural goods. persistent supply bottlenecks for industrial goods and recovering demand, especially in the services sector, are also contributing to the current high rates of inflation. price pressures are spreading across more and more sectors, in part owing to the indirect impact of high energy costs across the whole economy. accordingly, most measures of underlying inflation have risen further. we expect inflation to remain undesirably high for some time, owing to continued pressures from energy and food prices and pipeline pressures in the pricing chain. higher inflationary pressures are also stemming from the depreciation of the euro exchange rate. but looking further ahead, in the absence of new disruptions, energy costs should stabilise and supply bottlenecks should ease, which, together with the ongoing policy normalisation, should support the return of inflation to our target. the labour market remains strong. unemployment fell to a historical low of 6.6 per cent in may. job vacancies across many sectors show that there is robust demand for labour. wage growth, also according to forward-l… |
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.353 | inflation is also being fuelled by the global shift in consumer spending from services to manufactured goods at a time when the pandemic has disrupted production. this has translated into global supply chain bottlenecks, high durable goods prices and strong pipeline pressures. this effect, which also represents a supply shock for the euro area, is now being reabsorbed, but at a different pace in different economies (chart 6). these global supply-driven increases in prices — above all energy and industrial goods, but also food — explain a good part of the currently high headline inflation (chart 7, left panel). |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-09-08 | 0.346 | inflation inflation rose further to 9.1 per cent in august. energy price inflation remained extremely elevated, at 38.3 per cent, and it was again the dominant component of overall inflation. market-based indicators suggest that, in the near term, oil prices will moderate, while wholesale gas prices will stay extraordinarily high. food price inflation also rose in august, to 10.6 per cent, partly reflecting higher input costs related to energy, disruptions of trade in food commodities and adverse weather conditions. while supply bottlenecks have been easing, these continue to gradually feed through to consumer prices and are putting upward pressure on inflation, as is recovering demand in the services sector. the depreciation of the euro has also added to the build-up of inflationary pressures. price pressures are spreading across more and more sectors, in part owing to the impact of high energy costs across the whole economy. accordingly, measures of underlying inflation remain at elevated levels and the latest staff projections see inflation excluding food and energy reaching 3.9 per cent in 2022, 3.4 per cent in 2023 and 2.3 per cent in 2024. resilient labour markets and some catch-up to compensate for higher inflation are likely to support growth in wages. at the same time, incoming data and recent wage agreements indicate that wage dynamics remain contained overall. most measures of longer-term inflation expectations currently stand at around two per cent, although re… |
| Christine Lagarde: Finding resilience in times of uncertainty | Period_3 | 2022-03-31 | 0.320 | not been so easy to restart supply after the lockdowns triggered by the virus. that has caused a global mismatch between surging demand and constrained supply, leading to shortages and supply chain disruptions. given the interconnectedness of the world economy, this has cascaded across markets, creating strong inflationary pressures. since june last year, for example, energy and food have accounted for, on average, around two- thirds of inflation in the euro area. this reflects, in part, the decision by opec+ to cut oil supply by 9.7 million barrels per day in 2020, followed by the failure of some members to return supply to its previous levels. that has in turn contributed to the rising price of natural gas, which has flowed into food prices, by making fertiliser more expensive, and into the prices of energy- intensive industrial goods. these spillover effects across markets have led inflation to reach 5.9% in the euro area at the last reading, with energy inflation above 30%. cyprus has seen similar price pressures, with inflation rising by 5.8% – driven mainly by higher energy and food prices (26.2% and 6.8%, respectively). we had been expecting these disruptions to ease as economic conditions returned to normal after the pandemic. however, the russia-ukraine war has now introduced considerable uncertainty into the outlook for the economy. the economic uncertainty created by the war the economic impact of the war is best captured by what economists call a “supply shock”… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.316 | inflation inflation rose further to 8.1 per cent in may. although governments have intervened and have helped slow energy inflation, energy prices stand 39.2 per cent above their levels one year ago. market-based indicators suggest that global energy prices will stay high in the near term but will then moderate to some extent. food prices rose 7.5 per cent in may, in part reflecting the importance of ukraine and russia among the main global producers of agricultural goods. prices have also gone up more strongly because of renewed supply bottlenecks and because of recovering domestic demand, especially in the services sector, as our economy reopens. price rises are becoming more widespread across sectors. accordingly, measures of underlying inflation have been rising further. the labour market continues to improve, with unemployment remaining at its historical low of 6.8 per cent in april. job vacancies across many sectors show that there is robust demand for labour. wage growth, including in forward-looking indicators, has started to pick up. over time, the strengthening of the economy and some catch-up effects should support faster growth in wages. while most measures of longer-term inflation expectations derived from financial markets and from expert surveys stand at around two per cent, initial signs of above-target revisions in those measures warrant close monitoring. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 68 | hicp | 1 | 0.0674700 | hicp inflation | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 68 | hicp inflation | 2 | 0.0574408 | annual hicp inflation | 2 | 0.9995619 |
| 68 | annual | 3 | 0.0526613 | annual hicp | 3 | 0.9993866 |
| 68 | inflation rate | 4 | 0.0344049 | hicp | 4 | 0.9992986 |
| 68 | annual hicp inflation | 5 | 0.0318976 | flash | 5 | 0.9989484 |
| 68 | annual hicp | 6 | 0.0315059 | flash estimate | 6 | 0.9984222 |
| 68 | month | 7 | 0.0247675 | annual | 7 | 0.9980701 |
| 68 | energy | 8 | 0.0221035 | eurostat flash | 8 | 0.9978958 |
| 68 | estimate | 9 | 0.0188910 | eurostat | 9 | 0.9978097 |
| 68 | flash | 10 | 0.0177157 | eurostat flash estimate | 10 | 0.9976767 |
| 68 | decline | 11 | 0.0175590 | inflation rate | 11 | 0.9971032 |
| 68 | accord | 12 | 0.0170105 | hicp inflation rate | 12 | 0.9964903 |
| 68 | eurostat | 13 | 0.0169322 | annual inflation | 13 | 0.9963618 |
| 68 | increase | 14 | 0.0162270 | accord | 14 | 0.9962293 |
| 68 | flash estimate | 15 | 0.0159919 | owe | 15 | 0.9957068 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2008-04-11 | 0.432 | real economy. moreover, downside risks also stem from the dampening impact on consumption and investment of further unanticipated increases in energy and food prices, as well as from protectionist pressures and the possibility of disorderly developments owing to global imbalances. with regard to price developments, according to eurostat’s flash estimate, the annual hicp inflation rate was 3.5% in march 2008, after 3.3% in february. this outturn confirms the ongoing strong and lately further increasing short-term upward pressure on inflation, resulting largely from sharp increases in energy and food prices in recent months. looking ahead, the annual hicp inflation rate is likely to remain significantly above 2% in the coming months, moderating only gradually over the course of 2008. accordingly, we are currently experiencing a rather protracted period of temporarily high annual rates of inflation. |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2008-12-05 | 0.253 | relate mainly to the potential for a more significant impact on the real economy of the turmoil in financial markets, as well as concerns about protectionist pressures and possible disorderly developments owing to global imbalances. it is crucial that all parties concerned make their contribution to lay sound foundations for a sustainable recovery. for this to materialise as early as possible, it is of the utmost importance to maintain discipline and a medium-term perspective in macroeconomic policy- making. this is the best way to support confidence. the significant measures announced by governments to deal with the financial turmoil should be implemented swiftly so as to help ensure trust in the financial system and to prevent constraints on credit supply to companies and households. with regard to price developments, annual hicp inflation has declined substantially since july. according to eurostat’s flash estimate, hicp inflation was 2.1% in november, after 3.2% in october and 4.0% in july. the significant decline in headline inflation since the summer mainly reflects the considerable easing in global commodity prices over the past few months, which more than offsets the impact of the sharp rise in unit labour costs in the first half of this year. looking forward, lower commodity prices and weakening demand lead us to conclude that inflationary pressures are diminishing further. the annual hicp inflation rate is expected to continue to decline in the coming months and … |
| Jürgen Stark: Economic prospects and the role of monetary policy in the current situation | Period_1 | 2009-03-13 | 0.234 |
|
| Lucas Papademos: Tackling the financial crisis - policies for stability and recovery | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.233 | the inflation outlook for the euro area the preservation of price stability over the medium term is the overriding policy objective for the ecb. by achieving this objective, we contribute to financial stability and support sustainable growth. since mid-2008, annual (hicp) inflation in the euro area declined steadily from 4% in july 2008 to 1.1% in january 2009 (according to eurostat’s flash estimate). this decline in headline inflation reflects largely the substantial fall in global commodity prices and associated “pipeline” price pressures over this period. annual inflation rates are projected to decline further in the coming months, mainly due to expected lower commodity prices and base effects stemming from past energy prices, but also owing to diminishing domestic inflationary pressures in an environment of subdued economic activity. around the middle of this year, annual inflation may reach very low levels, but then it is expected to increase again and be in line with our definition of price stability, that is, inflation rates of below, but close to, 2%. several available indicators of medium-term inflation expectations support this assessment. this likely time profile of inflation should be seen against the background of an extended period of significant economic downturn in the euro area and all other advanced economies. |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2008-06-10 | 0.219 | this outlook is also reflected in the june 2008 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections. the projections foresee average annual real gdp growth in a range between 1.5% and 2.1% in 2008 and between 1.0% and 2.0% in 2009. in comparison with the march ecb staff projections, the current range projected for real gdp growth in 2008 is within the upper part of the range published in march 2008, mainly as a consequence of the better than expected outcome in the first quarter. for 2009, the range has been adjusted downwards, following the increase in commodity prices over recent months. the year-on-year growth rates which i have just mentioned need to be interpreted with particular caution on this occasion. while the annual rates suggest that growth may be weaker in 2009 than in 2008, they mask the fact that on a quarterly basis real gdp growth is projected to reach a trough in 2008, before gradually recovering thereafter. in order not to draw the wrong conclusions about the growth dynamics implied in the staff projections it is important to keep this distinction in mind. in the governing council’s view, the uncertainty surrounding this outlook for economic growth remains high, and downside risks prevail. in particular, risks continue to relate to the potential for the financial market turbulence to have a more negative impact on the real economy than anticipated. moreover, downside risks stem from the dampening impact on consumption and investment of further unanticipated incre… |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2014-07-18 | 0.193 | inadequate implementation of structural reforms in the member states and weaker than expected domestic demand. looking at price developments, we see that euro area hicp inflation declined sharply from late 2011 to october last year, and has since been fluctuating around very low levels below 1%. according to the latest data (eurostat’s flash estimate), euro area annual hicp inflation stood at 0.5% in june 2014, unchanged from may. annual hicp inflation is expected to remain at low levels over coming months, before increasing gradually in 2015 and 2016. at the same time, medium to long-term inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with price stability. upside and downside risks to the outlook for price developments are both seen as limited and broadly balanced over the medium term. we will monitor the possible repercussions of geopolitical risks and exchange rate developments closely in this context. the exchange rate is not a policy target for the ecb. nevertheless, the exchange rate remains an important driver of future inflation in the euro area. certainly, the appreciation that took place since mid-2012 had an impact on price stability. in the present context, an appreciated exchange rate is a risk to the sustainability of the recovery. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Growth in a more resilient Euro area | Period_2 | 2017-10-18 | 0.143 | there are reasons to believe that the strengthening of economic activity, which so far has been significantly supported by accommodative monetary policy, will progressively be supported by more structural factors. euro area governments have undertaken substantial policy actions and reforms to redress pre-crisis related macroeconomic imbalances and increase economic resilience.3 for instance, euro area countries which had previously experienced large current account deficits are now in surplus. moreover, both ecb staff and imf estimates indicate that the largest driver of this adjustment is non-cyclical in nature, which implies a higher likelihood of sustainability as the recovery continues. additionally, business cycle synchronisation across euro area countries has increased in recent years.4 finally, most countries that had large budget deficits have now positive primary surpluses. in sum, the euro area is now in a better state to withstand future economic or financial shocks. despite robust growth dynamics, inflation developments have been subdued. euro area headline inflation stood at 1.5% in september 2017, according to eurostat’s flash estimate and is expected to temporarily decline towards the turn of the year owing to energy-related base-effects. measures of underlying inflation have not yet showed convincing signs of a sustained upward trend (see chart 3). 4/7 |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-09-06 | 0.133 | largely reflecting incoming data. for 2014 there has been a downward revision of 0.1 percentage point. the risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area continue to be on the downside. recent developments in global money and financial market conditions and related uncertainties may have the potential to negatively affect economic conditions. other downside risks include higher commodity prices in the context of renewed geopolitical tensions, weaker than expected global demand and slow or insufficient implementation of structural reforms in euro area countries. according to eurostat’s flash estimate, as expected, euro area annual hicp inflation was 1.3% in august 2013, down from 1.6% in june and july. on the basis of current assumptions for energy and exchange rate developments, annual inflation rates are expected to remain low in the coming months, owing in particular to energy price developments. taking the appropriate medium-term perspective, underlying price pressures are expected to remain subdued, reflecting the broad-based weakness in aggregate demand and the modest pace of the recovery. medium to long-term inflation expectations continue to be firmly anchored in line with price stability. this assessment is also reflected in the september 2013 ecb staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual hicp inflation at 1.5% in 2013 and 1.3% in 2014. in comparison with the june 2013 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the projectio… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2015-09-03 | 0.132 | by the necessary balance sheet adjustments in a number of sectors and the sluggish pace of implementation of structural reforms. this assessment is also broadly reflected in the september 2015 ecb staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real gdp increasing by 1.4% in 2015, 1.7% in 2016 and 1.8% in 2017. compared with the june 2015 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for real gdp growth has been revised down, primarily due to lower external demand owing to weaker growth in emerging markets. the risks to the euro area growth outlook remain on the downside, reflecting in particular the heightened uncertainties related to the external environment. notably, current developments in emerging market economies have the potential to further affect global growth adversely via trade and confidence effects. according to eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual hicp inflation was 0.2% in august 2015, unchanged from june and july. compared with the previous month, this reflects a further decline in energy price inflation, compensated for by higher price increases for food and industrial goods. on the basis of the information available and current oil futures prices, annual hicp inflation rates will remain very low in the near term. annual hicp inflation is expected to rise towards the end of the year, also on account of base effects associated with the fall in oil prices in late 2014. inflation rates are foreseen to pick up further d… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-12-05 | 0.132 | according to eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual hicp inflation increased in november 2013 to 0.9%, from 0.7% in october. the increase was broadly as expected and reflected, in particular, an upward base effect in energy prices and higher services price inflation. on the basis of prevailing futures prices for energy, annual inflation rates are expected to remain at around current levels in the coming months. over the medium term, underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued. at the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. broadly in line with this assessment, the december 2013 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area foresee annual hicp inflation at 1.4% in 2013, at 1.1% in 2014 and at 1.3% in 2015. in comparison with the september 2013 ecb staff macroeconomic projections, the projection for inflation for 2013 has been revised downwards by 0.1 percentage point and for 2014 it has been revised downwards by 0.2 percentage point. the risks to the outlook for price developments are seen to be broadly balanced over the medium term. upside risks relate to higher commodity prices and stronger than expected increases in administered prices and indirect taxes, while downside risks stem from weaker than expected economic activity. concerning the staff macroeconomic projections, le… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.153 | conducted detailed analysis to examine the relative importance of these drivers.!¥! the pandemic has added a whirlwind of short-term disruptions on top of these long-term trends. initially, the pandemic had put further downward pressure on inflation in the euro area. inflation declined substantially in 2020, with rates temporarily entering negative territory in the second half of the year. much of that decline was attributable to specific pandemic-related, temporary factors, including a substantial decline in commodity prices and the temporary cut in german vat rates. with the onset of the recovery, inflation picked up rapidly. in fact, the current spike in inflation owes much to the continued impact of those same factors that pushed down inflation earlier in the annual comparison. consequently, their impact on inflation rates will be transitory. 41 indeed, more than half of measured headline inflation in the euro area, based on the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp), is currently due to rising energy prices and the reversal of the german vat cut (chart 3). inflation has also been affected by changes in the weights in the consumption basket. consumption patterns changed markedly last year owing to the impact of lockdowns, leading to a shift in consumption weights that are used to calculate eurostat’s inflation index. these changing weights can have a notable impact on the measurement of inflation: hicp inflation would have been even higher in recent months using la… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Looking through higher energy prices? Monetary policy and the green transition | Period_3 | 2022-01-11 | 0.137 | as a result, energy price inflation in the euro area, as measured by the energy sub-index of the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp), reached a historical high in november last year, with electricity and gas jointly accounting for more than a third of the total increase, also a new historical high (slide 6). energy, in turn, has been the prime factor behind the sharp rise in overall consumer price inflation in the euro area, with the hicp standing at 5.0% in december 2021 according to eurostat’s flash estimate, which was the highest level recorded since the euro was introduced in 1999 (slide 7). between april |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.114 | adjusted inflation figures including the owner-occupied house price indices would currently be slightly higher than the annual hicp inflation rate. preliminary estimates indicate that the difference was around 0.2 percentage points in the second quarter of 2021, slightly higher than the average since 2012.9] this reflects strong euro area house price dynamics in the recent period, which remained unabated during the covid-19 crisis and continued to be supported by strong fundamentals and favourable financing conditions. at the same time, it is important to highlight that during periods when there is downward pressure on housing prices, such adjustments may also result in a lower hicp inflation rate. effectively discharging the ecb’s accountability obligations let me now conclude by discussing an issue which | believe is of crucial importance to both our institutions: namely, how to effectively discharge the ecb’s accountability obligations. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Looking through higher energy prices? Monetary policy and the green transition | Period_3 | 2022-01-11 | 0.089 | significantly contributing to the projected decline in hicp headline inflation over the medium term (slides 5 and 8). such technical assumptions, however, are surrounded by significant uncertainty. in the past, futures prices have often significantly under- or overpredicted energy price inflation. these risks are arguably even larger today. to see this, it is enough to look at the profile of the projected inflation path: the decline of headline inflation to levels below 2% at the end of the projection horizon hinges on the assumption, derived from futures curves, that in 2023 and 2024 energy is not expected to contribute to headline inflation. history suggests that such a profile would be unusual. since 1999, energy has contributed, on average, 0.3 percentage points to annual headline inflation. sensitivity analysis conducted by eurosystem staff suggests that it is enough for oil prices to remain at november 2021 levels for hicp inflation in 2024 to reach our target (slide 8). the scale of the energy transition, and the political determination behind it, implies that these estimates could be conservative. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.085 | provides some empirical context for the discussion by showing the evolution of headline and core inflation since 2014. it underlines that, until quite recently, the euro area has been confronted with a low-inflation problem, with inflation persistently well below two per cent. at the same time, chart 1 also shows the sharp increase in inflation in recent months. the flash inflation estimate for february that was published today stands at 5.8 per cent. the upward pressure on overall inflation from the extraordinary 31.7 per cent rate of energy inflation is operating through both direct and indirect channels, since the increases in the sectoral inflation rates for food, goods and services in part reflect the impact of higher energy prices for production costs in all sectors of the economy. in recent weeks, | have emphasised that much of the sharp increase in the last six months can be attributed to the large- scale shock to energy prices and pandemic-related factors (including supply bottlenecks).!4] in any event, it is essential for a central bank to ensure that its monetary policy stance fully takes into account the implications of the shift in the inflation environment. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 69 | council | 1 | 0.2411894 | council | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 69 | govern | 2 | 0.2177124 | govern | 2 | 0.9997372 |
| 69 | govern council | 3 | 0.2118432 | govern council | 3 | 0.9995619 |
| 69 | decision | 4 | 0.0356759 | ecb govern | 4 | 0.9994741 |
| 69 | decide | 5 | 0.0271881 | ecb govern council | 5 | 0.9990362 |
| 69 | meet | 6 | 0.0233957 | council decide | 6 | 0.9985982 |
| 69 | ecb govern | 7 | 0.0135534 | council meet | 7 | 0.9984227 |
| 69 | ecb govern council | 8 | 0.0123796 | govern council meet | 8 | 0.9984225 |
| 69 | view | 9 | 0.0109348 | govern council decide | 9 | 0.9983354 |
| 69 | council decide | 10 | 0.0096707 | decide | 10 | 0.9983344 |
| 69 | govern council decide | 11 | 0.0084065 | decision | 11 | 0.9979827 |
| 69 | account | 12 | 0.0079551 | meet | 12 | 0.9978958 |
| 69 | council meet | 13 | 0.0074133 | unanimously | 13 | 0.9971066 |
| 69 | govern council meet | 14 | 0.0064200 | govern council decision | 14 | 0.9969319 |
| 69 | context | 15 | 0.0056977 | background | 15 | 0.9968457 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The monetary policy of the ECB during the financial crisis | Period_1 | 2011-06-08 | 0.189 | into the long-term inflation expectations, which could trigger second-round effects on wages and prices. it is against this background that the governing council decided in april to raise interest rates. i stressed in reporting this decision it had been taken unanimously. the action of the governing council is motivated by a common goal. that decision in april confirmed that the separation principle is strictly applied and that our non-conventional measures do not restrict in any way our ability to toughen the monetary policy stance when facing inflationary pressures. thus, when the governing council decided in march and april that it was time to raise interest rates, in parallel, at the same time, it decided to keep, in the second quarter, the provision of unlimited fixed-rate liquidity for a period of three months. let me remind you of what i said earlier: nothing of what i have just said can or should be interpreted in terms of future decisions of the governing council next thursday. |
| Willem F Duisenberg: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2001 to the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2002-07-02 | 0.130 | other indicators and analyses in the context of our two-pillar strategy, and we do not try to hide the complexity of monetary policy-making behind the production of a single governing council forecast. the projections reflect the expert judgement of eurosystem staff and we prefer to keep this distinct from the judgement of the governing council regarding the overall assessment of the risks to price stability. therefore, our decision to clearly separate the production of the projections from the analysis of the governing council is fully transparent as it honestly reflects the decision-making process within the ecb. as regards communication, we have always taken an approach that ensures a high level of transparency and clarity of our message. our monthly press conferences are key in this respect. the timeliness and detail of our communication is without comparison. at the same time, we have not changed our view regarding the publication of minutes. we fear that, given the multi-country context in which the governing council works, published minutes - or a procedure in which dissenting views of council members are published (even without mentioning names) - could lead to undue pressure on national central bank governors to deviate from a euro area perspective. this cannot be in the interest of the euro area, no more than if the governing council were to end its approach of speaking with one voice. the draft resolution also suggests that the balance of votes within the govern… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2007 to the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2008-07-14 | 0.130 | transparency i would also like to welcome the committee’s recognition that making the minutes of the ecb governing council’s meetings available to the public would not be advisable. such a measure would draw attention to individual positions when in a euro area of 15 – and very soon 16 – countries, what counts is the position of the collegial decision maker, the governing council. it could also lead to pressures on governing council members to abandon their necessarily euro area perspective when taking monetary policy decisions. as already emphasised on previous occasions, i see the introductory statement i present on behalf of the governing council at the monthly press conference as an equivalent to what other central banks call “summary minutes”. together with the ensuing q&a session, the introductory statement provides in real time a comprehensive overview, on the part of the governing council, of the current monetary policy stance. this communication instrument has served us very well in guiding financial market expectations. |
| Mr Duisenberg reports on the outcome of the latest meeting of the ECB Governing Council (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 4 Nov 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-11-09 | 0.129 | 1 january 2002. in this regard, i am now pleased to announce that the governing council has decided to negotiate the contract with publicis. further information on this matter can be found in a separate press release which will be issued this afternoon. finally, i should like to draw your attention to the fact that the second meeting of the governing council to be held in december has been rescheduled. as announced yesterday, the meeting has been brought forward from thursday 16 december 1999, to wednesday 15 december 1999, in order to enable several governing council members to attend a first gathering of a new forum consisting of ministers of finance and central bank governors (the so-called “g20”), which is to be held in berlin on 16 december 1999. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: A few remarks on communication by central banks | Period_1 | 2008-01-18 | 0.120 | how the ecb addresses its audience let me turn to how the governing council of the ecb explains its monetary policy decisions to the public. our communications aim to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy. in this respect, the governing council fully subscribes to the basic principles of modern central bank communication described earlier. a high degree of transparency vis-à-vis our monetary policy has helped the public to hold the governing council accountable for its policy |
| Vítor Constâncio: “We are certainly not almighty”- interview with Börsen-Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-09-16 | 0.210 | but the new ecb projections for growth and inflation have been revised only marginally. why did the governing council nevertheless decide to take quite far-reaching decisions? these are not the governing council’s projections –this is very important. these are the ecb’s staff projections and in that sense they are just one element for the governing council’s decision. the risks to the downside for growth and inflation were seen as more important by the governing council. |
| Mario Draghi: Interview with Neue Zürcher Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-01-23 | 0.177 | yet people had the impression that, on many decisions taken by the ecb’s governing council during the crisis, a small number of northern european countries which are possibly more stability-oriented were outvoted by the rest. do you not find it problematic if a minority are always outvoted? it was not like that at all. the three-year financing operations for banks, ltros, were approved by the overwhelming majority of the governing council, including most of the members you are hinting at; omts were approved by all members of the governing council except one; the various interest rate cuts during the crisis were mostly unanimously supported, or with an overwhelming majority. for the last interest rate cut in november, the difference was not so much about whether to do it, but when. up until now, there has not been the same minority constantly opposing the rest of the governing council and, in my view, there will not be in the future. |
| Vítor Constâncio: “We are certainly not almighty”- interview with Börsen-Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-09-16 | 0.162 | but this would lead to even more dissent within the governing council. last week’s decision was not unanimous – although it is always stressed that the governing council is unanimous in its commitment to do what is necessary against the risks of low inflation. this phrase does not mean that in a particular moment everybody has to agree to a concrete package. the most significant thing about this phrase – which was decided upon unanimously – is that no unconventional instrument is a priori excluded. but calibration and timing can occasionally be a source of discussion. but with the most recent decision the consensus decision-making is ultimately history now? since 2010, we have had some decisions which were not taken unanimously. in such difficult times, there are different views. i would not qualify this as surprising or even negative as |
| Peter Praet: Interview in Handelsblatt | Period_2 | 2015-12-28 | 0.160 | mr praet, rather than the next big flood of money that was expected from the european central bank (ecb), there was only a very small expansion of the existing stimulus. did you have to back down? does the majority of the ecb’s governing council no longer support your and mario draghi’s policy? quite the opposite: we had a very strong majority! by way of explanation: the relevant working groups provide the executive board with an analysis of the different measures and the board discusses a monetary policy package, which i then put forward to the governing council. what was agreed last week is exactly in line with what i proposed to the council on thursday, taking into account what was discussed in the committees. you had already met the other members of the ecb’s governing council for dinner on wednesday though. did you encounter so much resistance then that you scaled back your proposals before thursday’s meeting? the dinner always takes place, but these issues are not discussed during the meal. it is true that at first i was not sure how the proposals would be received. but in the end, the discussion was not very controversial. not everyone was in favour of my proposals, but it is not the case that we said “we want this”, and then got less. that is just not true. if you didn’t want to achieve anything more, why did you create such high expectations beforehand? we had already talked about reviewing our measures when the governing council met in malta in october. the marke… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy communication in turbulent times | Period_2 | 2014-04-24 | 0.154 | some record or account of its policy deliberations. i would like to share with you my views on this matter today. a written account of our policy deliberations would provide a more detailed explanation of the reasoning behind the governing council’s decisions, and give a sense of the discussion and the main arguments. this would allow the public and markets to further improve their understanding of the governing council’s reaction function, our assessment of the economy and our policy responses in light of evolving conditions. for this reason, i am convinced that it would be useful. yet, we need also to be careful. we need to take proper account of the specific institutional setting of the euro area and the unique communication challenges in a multi-country monetary union. 7 this implies, first, that any modifications we introduce in reporting on our monetary policy deliberations must not put at risk or call into question the independence of the members of the governing council. they act in a personal capacity in the interest of the euro area, rather than as representatives of their countries of origin. to my mind this precludes the attribution of positions to individual council members, which could all too easily be misconstrued or misinterpreted through a national perspective and expose the members to external pressures, perceived or real. second, we need to ensure that any account of our proceedings preserves the collegiality of the governing council’s deliberations. fo… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.123 | the flexible reinvestment under pepp, and, more importantly, the unanimous support of the governing council for the transmission protection instrument - led us to decide a larger-than-what-had-been- signalled rate hike on the occasion of this meeting. that is really what, if you want to go behind the curtain of the governing council debates, this is what took place. i would add that in relation to the rate hikes we had the debate, weighted the pros and cons, and at the end of the discussion all members of the governing council rallied to the consensus of 50 basis points. so it’s a strong indication on both accounts in relation to the higher step that we are taking to exit from negative interest rates, and on the other front, which is making sure that our monetary policy stance is transmitted smoothly throughout the entire euro area. now, the tpi is, obviously, an instrument that will help us deliver on our mandate of price stability, bringing inflation in the medium term back to 2%, and under that tpi all members of the euro area can be eligible; all of them. you will find in the press release later, after this press conference, the detail of the eligibility conditions, but all members of the euro area are eligible. the governing council, in its discretion, in its assessment will determine on the basis of the eligibility criteria, on the basis of the indicators that will signal or not unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics, whether or not a country is eligible and whether… |
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.090 | risks of a premature tightening measures of market-based inflation rate expectations compensation (percentages per annum) ser ee oem ——realised €str mem—- current €str + 10 bps ———eéstr forward curve (8 sep 21) mee 14 ils 55 ils ome es tr forward curve (4 feb 22} 7 — —_ ee fee — — €str forward curve (24 feb 22) noe ie ff l8: wet aug uf oo 0.60 22 —— ~<a 1 0.60 2.1 | 2.1 045 | 945 2.0 | 2.0 se a— feb | 0.90 0.15 2d 0.19 19 k 4+ 19 o00 } ! ! /} 7 00 -0.15 -0.15 18 | | 1.8 -0.30 | -0.30 16 | 1 1.6 -0.75 1 075 dec-21 jan-22 feb-22 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 sources: left panel: refinitiv and ecb calculation; right panel: refinitiv, bloomberg and ecb calculations. notes: left panel: the chart shows the one-year inflation linked-swap (ils) rate four years ahead and the five- year ils rate five years ahead. the solid vertical line refers to the day before the december governing council meeting (15 dec), the day before the february governing council meeting (2 feb) and the day of the russian’s invasion of ukraine (24 feb). the solid vertical line refers to the day before the december governing council meeting (15 dec). latest observation: 24 february 2022. right panel: the lift-off date is defined as the month during which the €str forward rate exceeds by at least 10 bps the current €str rate (respective red vertical lines). latest observation: 24 february 2022 for realised €str. conclusion let me conclude. whenever we are uncertain about the consequences of our actions,… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.086 | conclusion summing up, inflation continues to be undesirably high and is expected to remain above our target for some time. the latest data indicate a slowdown in growth, clouding the outlook for the second half of 2022 and beyond. at the same time, this slowdown is being cushioned by a number of supportive factors. the governing council has today decided to raise the key ecb interest rates and approved the tpi. at our upcoming meetings, further normalisation of interest rates will be appropriate. our future policy rate path will continue to be data-dependent and will help us deliver on our two per cent inflation target over the medium term. we stand ready to adjust all of our instruments within our mandate to ensure that inflation stabilises at our two per cent target over the medium term. our new tpi will safeguard the smooth transmission of our monetary policy stance throughout the euro area as we keep adjusting the stance to address high inflation. we are now ready to take your questions. *** my first question is on your forward guidance and what the frontloading means for september, because you previously have been guiding us and the market that september will see a 50 basis points hike unless there are clear signs of inflation going down. the second question is on italy. we are seeing yields rising with the political uncertainty at centre stage. what’s your message to the market? is the tpi big enough and bold enough to prevent a potential escalation of the situation… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in an uncertain world | Period_3 | 2022-03-17 | 0.086 | when the governing council met last week, we weighed up these competing forces. we concluded that the challenges facing monetary policy are changing. we have become increasingly confident that the inflation dynamics of the past decade are unlikely to return. as a result, we decided it was appropriate to continue dialling back our net asset purchases, which were intended to combat an environment where disinflationary risks dominate. but we also agreed that we needed a policy framework tailored to the current environment of heightened uncertainty and the new challenges it presents. to that end, we decided that our policy should be governed by three principles: optionality, gradualism and flexibility. |
| Luis de Guindos: Challenges for monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-07-05 | 0.073 | third, looking further ahead, we indicated that a gradual but sustained path of further increases in interest rates will be appropriate, based on our current assessment. the pace at which we adjust our monetary policy will depend on the incoming data and how we assess inflation to be developing in the medium term, in line with our commitment to our target of 2% over the medium term. wage increases and developments in inflation expectations need to be monitored closely, as they will be crucial for our deliberations beyond september. let me stress that, ever since the gradual process of policy normalisation was initiated in december 2021, the governing council has pledged to act against potential fragmentation risks. accordingly, the governing council decided on 15 june that we will apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions coming due under the pandemic emergency purchase programme with a view to preserving the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, a precondition for the ecb to be able to deliver on its price stability mandate. we also tasked the eurosystem committees, together with ecb staff, with accelerating the completion of a new anti-fragmentation instrument for consideration by the governing council. fiscal policy should do its part by guaranteeing sound public finances in the medium term and delivering targeted and temporary support to vulnerable groups in the short run. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 70 | current | 1 | 0.1349216 | situation | 1 | 0.9995619 |
| 70 | situation | 2 | 0.1178685 | current | 2 | 0.9993863 |
| 70 | environment | 3 | 0.0577608 | economic situation | 3 | 0.9993863 |
| 70 | risk | 4 | 0.0400324 | environment | 4 | 0.9989482 |
| 70 | future | 5 | 0.0371621 | current economic | 5 | 0.9985974 |
| 70 | time | 6 | 0.0363179 | current situation | 6 | 0.9985967 |
| 70 | good | 7 | 0.0322657 | current environment | 7 | 0.9979840 |
| 70 | economic situation | 8 | 0.0256809 | current economic situation | 8 | 0.9977184 |
| 70 | reason | 9 | 0.0229794 | reason | 9 | 0.9974580 |
| 70 | numb | 10 | 0.0180830 | option | 10 | 0.9972834 |
| 70 | imply | 11 | 0.0165634 | imply | 11 | 0.9971953 |
| 70 | level | 12 | 0.0148750 | prospect | 12 | 0.9970209 |
| 70 | addition | 13 | 0.0128489 | future | 13 | 0.9969280 |
| 70 | current economic | 14 | 0.0126800 | worsen | 14 | 0.9968874 |
| 70 | prospect | 15 | 0.0113293 | financial situation | 15 | 0.9968408 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: European economy - current state and prospects | Period_1 | 2004-09-29 | 0.097 | i am very honoured to have been invited here today. i would like to thank you, mr chairman, and the executive board of financial services ireland for your invitation, and for giving me this opportunity to share my views on the state of the european economy and the prospects for the future. i will like first to discuss the current economic and financial situation in the euro area and prospects for the future, and then i will focus on some of the conditions which need to be in place to ensure sustainable growth, including the role of fiscal policy. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Overview of recent euro area developments and the effects of globalisation on prices and real estate | Period_1 | 2008-01-11 | 0.087 | it is a great pleasure for me to be invited as a guest speaker here today. let me briefly sketch out the main topics i want to address. first, i will present to you our views on the current economic situation in the euro area. then, i will explain the ecb’s liquidity operations following the tensions in the money markets since august last year as well as our views on the stability of the euro area financial system. to conclude, i will say a word upon the effects of globalisation on price developments and on developments in the real estate sector. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Current challenges for the euro area | Period_1 | 2008-10-30 | 0.081 | i price stability: current situation and prospects let me first share with you some reflections on the prospects for price stability. starting with the current situation, euro area hicp inflation has remained at a high level since last autumn. this spike in euro area hicp inflation had its origins in external forces, in particular the very strong global rise in several commodity prices – notably those of energy and food. given the magnitude of these increases in global commodity prices, there has been a sizeable direct pass-through into the food and energy components of inflation. much of the ongoing inflationary pressure at this stage also derives from the indirect effects on inflation of cost pressures in the production chain. in addition, there is a concern that second-round effects could materialise if consumers or firms attempt to compensate for any loss in purchasing power stemming from the increase in commodity prices by pushing for higher wages or prices. available evidence on price and wage-setting behaviour in the euro area suggests some cause for concern in two respects: • first, the indirect impacts on inflation have been strong, given both the scale of the rise in energy and food prices and the fact that these commodities are an extensive input into the production of other goods and services. strong producer price inflation was not confined to the direct energy and food price components of producer prices. |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation and deflation risks - how to recognise them? How to avoid them? | Period_1 | 2009-07-01 | 0.078 | thorough examination of the risks, in much the same way as a disease calls for a sound diagnosis if it is to be properly treated. i will start the discussion by explaining how deflationary risks should be monitored and assessed by central banks, in particular with respect to the current situation. i will then turn to inflation expectations, over the short and medium term, to assess in particular how well they are anchored to the objective of price stability. then i will consider how monetary and credit aggregates can be of use in the current conditions to assess the balance of risks. i will conclude with the monetary policy actions required to ensure price stability in an environment subject to downward and upward pressures to price stability. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Ten years of the euro - successes and challenges | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.074 | reasons for a medium-term economic recovery 2009 will be a very difficult year. i have already said this on various occasions. i see however at least four reasons why we can be confident that the world economy and the industrialised nations will recover: • the vigorous reactions of central banks and governments to the extraordinary situation – not only in europe, but worldwide – will progressively produce their effects. they may not yet have been sufficiently taken into account in the expectations of private sector participants. • the growth potential of the emerging market economies, for example, in asia, is considerable. their current deceleration of growth is temporary. many of these countries have an enormous potential to develop domestic demand. • technological progress is very rapid and will continue and even accelerate. it is a major source of future long term growth. • prices for oil and other commodities have fallen sharply since mid-2008. their rise was an important factor in the current economic weakness. their present low levels will be an expansionary contribution to the global economy for these reasons it seems to be a reasonable working hypothesis that after an exceptionally difficult 2009 we will see an economic recovery in 2010. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Monetary policy and the euro area problem | Period_2 | 2015-11-25 | 0.098 | ladies and gentlemen, i am honoured by mr maleki’s invitation to speak at the opening conference of the 18th euro finance week. in my remarks today i would like to characterise the current economic situation in the euro area. furthermore, i will address the roles that monetary policy, supply-side reforms and fiscal policies have played – and can play in the future – in shaping this situation. |
| Mario Draghi: Remarks at the Annual Reception of the Association of German Banks | Period_2 | 2012-03-28 | 0.077 | the current economic situation as this audience knows very well, in november last year, the prospects for the euro area financial sector were very bleak. banks were experiencing a period of heightened stress. the inter-bank market was closed except to the strongest institutions in the safest countries, and funding markets were impaired. unable to raise funds beyond short maturities, many banks were reducing medium- term lending to the real economy. at the same time came the requirement to increase capital ratios to 9%. this increased the risks of substantial deleveraging, including the risk of banks cutting back on loans, notably those to small and medium-sized enterprises. we could see the intensity of the deleveraging pressures in bank lending surveys and other data. in the fourth quarter of 2011, there was a significant tightening of credit standards on loans to both companies and households. there was no doubt that the euro area was on the brink of a major credit crunch, with potentially adverse consequences for the economy and employment. at that time, many observers had little confidence in the capacity of the euro area to reverse the situation. yet today, only four months on, the picture looks different. there are signs of stabilisation in both financial markets and overall economic activity – albeit still at low levels. conditions in bank funding markets have improved. for example, euro area banks have already issued about 70 billion euro in senior unsecured debt s… |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2015-06-18 | 0.073 | mr chairman, honourable members of the committee on economic and monetary affairs, ladies and gentlemen, i am happy to be back to this committee for my regular hearing. today, i would like to share with you the ecb’s assessment of the current economic and monetary conditions in the euro area. i will then touch on the subject chosen for our exchange of views, namely the risks and side-effects of our asset purchase programme. finally, i will say a few words about the current situation in greece. |
| Peter Praet: The low interest rate environment in the euro area | Period_2 | 2015-09-17 | 0.073 | challenges of the low interest rate environment let me start, however, by briefly touching on the challenges the current situation poses for the pension fund sector, as well as for the insurance sector given its similar focus on fixed income assets and the prevalence of long-term liabilities. large euro area insurers show quite reasonable profitability, 1 albeit the aggregate picture masks substantial heterogeneity 1 see ecb (2015), “financial stability review”, may. |
| Fabio Panetta: Asymmetric risks, asymmetric reaction - monetary policy in the pandemic | Period_2 | 2020-09-22 | 0.070 | the current economic situation today, our monetary policy can gradually focus less on preventing financial and productive collapse and more on securing the return of inflation to our aim. this was the explicit goal of our decision to expand and extend the pepp in june. and our pandemic support measures are contributing to that goal. the |
| Isabel Schnabel: New narratives on monetary policy – the spectre of inflation | Period_3 | 2021-10-12 | 0.063 | the recovery and be most harmful to those who are already suffering from the current spike in inflation. finally, i will explain why the higher inflation we are seeing now may actually be positive news. there are good reasons to assume that the current constellation of fiscal and monetary policy in the euro area may finally chart the path out of the low interest rate environment. new monetary policy strategy as yardstick and compass the assessment of current and future inflation lies at the heart of our monetary policy decisions that we take to maintain price stability in the euro area as a whole. about every six weeks – and most recently last week – we look at a broad range of economic indicators to assess the future path of inflation. so how do we assess the current situation? will the much-invoked “flood of money” really cause the “great inflation”? yardstick and compass of our assessment of the risks to price stability is our new monetary policy strategy, which was adopted unanimously by the governing council in july.2 the key element of this strategy is a new, symmetric inflation target of 2% over the medium term, which replaced our previous target of below, but close to, 2%. to many, this adjustment may seem insignificant. however, it is anything but, and the reason is simple – our new target makes it abundantly clear that we consider sustained negative and positive deviations of inflation from our target as equally undesirable. this clarification matters because the… |
| Isabel Schnabel: New narratives on monetary policy – the spectre of inflation | Period_3 | 2021-10-12 | 0.062 | jeopardise the achievement of our inflation target. and it would doubtlessly exacerbate the economic and social consequences of the pandemic. the pandemic as a way out of the low interest rate environment? so we will act carefully and cautiously in the current environment. but this is not to say that interest rates will necessarily remain low for an indefinite period of time. although we assume in our baseline scenario that inflation will fall back below 2% in the medium term, we are very diligently monitoring whether the underlying forecast assumptions might not underestimate the possibility of higher inflation over the coming years. as inflation expectations are still low, the prospect of persistently excessive inflation, as feared by some, remains highly unlikely in the euro area. the real question is whether we can reach our inflation target of 2% any sooner than we are now forecasting. inflation of 2% in the medium term would be good news for the euro area. it would pave the way out of the low interest rate environment. in current circumstances, three developments call for our particular attention.4 longer-term supply bottlenecks could increase price pressure the first development relates to the special effects of the pandemic. there are growing indications that the current supply disruptions and commodity shortages could be prolonged. producer prices are continuing to surge – in germany as strongly as not seen since 1975 (slide 15) –, the global shortage of microchip… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.049 | central banks are facing a higher sacrifice ratio the third, and closely related, observation that supports a more forceful policy response relates to the potential costs of acting too late – that is, when high inflation has become fundamentally entrenched in expectations, a situation that neither the united states nor the euro area are facing today. in the early 1980s, many central banks had to tolerate large and costly increases in unemployment to restore confidence in the nominal anchor. there are at least three reasons to believe that a similar endeavour could be even more costly today in terms of lost output and employment. one is that our economies have become less interest rate-sensitive over time, meaning that more withdrawal of monetary accommodation would be required for a given desired decline in inflation. the growing importance of intangible capital is partially responsible for this. in the united states, its share in total investment has tripled since 1980. and in the euro area, it has increased from about 12% in 1995 to 23% today. research finds that intangible capital-intensive firms tend to be net savers because intangible capital is more difficult to mobilise as collateral for bank lending, making the cost of credit less important.[33] these effects are reinforced by the structural shift towards services, which tend to be, on average, less responsive to monetary policy than more capital-intensive sectors, such as manufacturing.[34] the second reason why a… |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-11-29 | 0.049 | having lower financial buffers to cover the rising cost of living. currently, the gap between the effective inflation rate experienced by the lowest and highest income groups is by far at its highest level on record in the euro area.3 the divergence in inflation rates across euro area member countries is also at a record high, mainly due to different degrees of exposure to the energy shock and to the pandemic. we are monitoring these divergences carefully and expect them to normalise as the impact of these shocks fades over time. the different shocks over the past year have also had an impact on real economic activity. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.048 | the second, complementary option is to steadily reshuffle our sovereign bond portfolio towards green bonds as governments expand their supply of green bonds over time. greening our lending operations finally, we need to intensify efforts to green our lending operations, including the collateral framework. as a first step we will limit the share of assets issued by entities with a high carbon footprint that can be pledged as collateral by individual counterparties when they borrow from the eurosystem. we will also consider climate-related risks when determining haircuts for corporate bonds. but these measures will have only a small impact on the overall collateral provided by our counterparties. a systematic greening of the ecb’s collateral framework is therefore an important tool to ensure that all of our monetary policy actions are aligned with the paris agreement, especially in an environment in which we have started shrinking our balance sheet, as this reduces the set of options available to support the green transition during the current tightening cycle. green targeted lending operations, for example, could be an instrument worth considering in the future when policy needs to become expansionary again, provided the underlying data gaps are resolved. but they are not an option for the immediate future given the current need for a restrictive monetary policy. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 71 | money | 1 | 0.0789109 | hayek | 1 | 0.9993863 |
| 71 | issue | 2 | 0.0210774 | payment | 2 | 0.9990359 |
| 71 | payment | 3 | 0.0189045 | money | 3 | 0.9988597 |
| 71 | account | 4 | 0.0179016 | proposal | 4 | 0.9986858 |
| 71 | currency | 5 | 0.0179016 | electronic | 5 | 0.9973216 |
| 71 | process | 6 | 0.0168987 | transaction | 6 | 0.9967145 |
| 71 | stable | 7 | 0.0145586 | issuer | 7 | 0.9959214 |
| 71 | hayek | 8 | 0.0143915 | compete | 8 | 0.9958298 |
| 71 | note | 9 | 0.0142243 | store | 9 | 0.9957394 |
| 71 | proposal | 10 | 0.0140572 | stable | 10 | 0.9956965 |
| 71 | result | 11 | 0.0130543 | unit | 11 | 0.9956616 |
| 71 | good | 12 | 0.0130543 | discovery | 12 | 0.9953822 |
| 71 | provide | 13 | 0.0120514 | impose | 13 | 0.9950005 |
| 71 | time | 14 | 0.0120514 | note | 14 | 0.9943751 |
| 71 | function | 15 | 0.0103799 | arrangement | 15 | 0.9943469 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mr Issing’s speech entitled ‘Hayek - currency competition and European monetary union’ (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 May 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-06-09 | 0.534 | money language which would be provided by a single numeraire, would degenerate. this would probably result in very poor co-ordination in the economy, with the efficiency of the decentralised decision-making of firms and households, which is the hallmark of capitalist economies, being jeopardised and the productive potential of the economy being gravely endangered. the purely private provision of a public good (the unit-of-account function of money) would, in this case, be sub-optimal since private issuers cannot easily underpin the single numeraire. nor do they have an incentive to do so since they cannot capture the vast social benefits of the common monetary language provided by the unit-of-account function of money. there are further issues that any proposal in the spirit of hayek would have to confront. first, the use of money in transactions makes it subject to network externalities. network externalities, in turn, may inhibit free competition and may make it difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge an incumbent issuer who has resorted to inflationary issuance. in other words, networking externalities would inhibit hayek’s discovery process from working as he envisaged it. network externalities also provide a rationale for regulation. second, the assumption of complete, symmetric and free information implicitly assumed in the hayek proposal does not apply to banking. the remark is equally valid in terms of banking activities (for example, a fundamental activity in ba… |
| Mr Issing’s speech entitled ‘Hayek - currency competition and European monetary union’ (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 May 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-06-09 | 0.518 | “dollarisation”, whereby a country voluntarily relinquishes its own currency in favour of adopting a foreign currency, the “dollar”. it appears to me, therefore, that under the hayek proposal, we are likely to get either one or other of the following unfavourable outcomes. on the one hand, we could see the emergence of floating exchange rates between different privately issued moneys, resulting in an uncertain discovery process without any guarantee of a stable outcome, along with a deterioration in economic communication and co-ordination in the economy overall. on the other hand, any attempt by private issuers to pre- empt these outcomes by fixing the exchange rates between their currencies would probably trigger gresham’s law and result in accelerating inflation. 4. the importance of inside money since the birth of central banking, governments – via the central bank – have supplied financial instruments that have simultaneously fulfilled all of the three functions of money i have already mentioned. they have suppressed competition in the supply of currency and bank reserves (that is, so- called outside money). however, they have not suppressed competition in the supply of the other components of money, that is, so-called inside money, which has been supplied exclusively by the private sector. until just recently, inside money consisted exclusively of bank deposits which were supplied competitively by banks. however, governments have nevertheless restricted the supply of… |
| Mr Issing’s speech entitled ‘Hayek - currency competition and European monetary union’ (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 May 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-06-09 | 0.453 | suffers from a comparable absurdity – or a worse one, in view of the associated macroeconomic disorders.” money used as a unit of account has characteristics of a public good. given the unit-of-account function, the medium-of-exchange and store-of-value functions have traditionally, but not exclusively, been supplied by private enterprise. just as stable money is of crucial importance for a stable price level in a macroeconomic context, a stable price level is of equal significance for the efficient performance of money in a microeconomic context. a stable price level is, in principle, of central importance in ensuring that the three famous microeconomic functions which money provides are allowed to operate with maximum efficiency.12 from the point of view of the public involvement in the economy, the unit of account is of the greatest importance. efficient co-ordination in the economy cannot occur unless the various agents involved (that is, virtually everybody) speak the same money language. the institution that allows them to do so is money itself, but more specifically the unit-of-account function of money. the decentralised plans of hundreds of millions of consumers and millions of producers and distributors cannot mesh harmoniously in the aggregate if this common money language, as encapsulated in the unit-of-account function of money, is missing. the efficiency of this language in performing this vital co-ordination role depends crucially on whether the unit of acco… |
| Mr Issing’s speech entitled ‘Hayek - currency competition and European monetary union’ (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 May 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-06-09 | 0.451 |
|
| Mr Issing’s speech entitled ‘Hayek - currency competition and European monetary union’ (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 May 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-06-09 | 0.426 | advantage of the market order is that prices will convey to the acting individuals the relevant information, only the constant observation of the course of current prices of particular commodities can provide information on the direction in which more or less money ought to be spent. money is not a tool of policy that can achieve particular foreseeable results by control of its quantity. but it should be part of the self-steering mechanism by which individuals are constantly induced to adjust their activities to circumstances on which they have information only through the abstract signals of prices. it should be a serviceable link in the process that communicates the effects of events never wholly known to anybody and that is required to maintain an order in which the plans of participating persons match” (p. 192/193). nevertheless, despite hayek’s claims for this discovery process, most economists would argue that free competition with respect to money couldn’t guarantee either a stable or an efficient outcome. this is the fundamental point. in order to try to understand and assess hayek’s proposal, it is essential to take a closer look at money and its role in the economy. this is best done by, as it were, first breaking money up into its constituent functions. the classic textbook treatment of the functions of money is still valid: money fulfils three functions, namely that of (i) a unit of account, (ii) a means of payment and (iii) a store of value. the use of money a… |
| Yves Mersch: Central banking in times of technological progress | Period_2 | 2017-08-07 | 0.174 | add caution. far more detailed research is needed into the most beneficial system for all parties, and not just for financial institutions. as just one example, suppose central banks stopped providing cash and instead shifted to just providing digital base money (dbm) – an electronic claim on the central bank. would the system involve each individual having an account at the central bank, or involve a decentralised system where each individual has an electronic wallet and the central bank is unaware of transactions that take place. either system could be implemented using a distributed ledger, but the set up would be quite different in each scenario.17 in any case, just as cash has a number of technological safeguards to protect from counterfeiting, dbm would require significant safeguards to protect individuals from theft and from loss of personal information. prudence should underpin our decision on what technology to adopt. adopting untried technology that ultimately proves unreliable could seriously endanger public trust in the currency and in the central bank. any new payments system technology should be rigorously tested before implementation, with due regulation and oversight thereafter. as to the often stated link between cash and illicit payments, there is no evidence. even the available anecdotal hints attribute only a relatively minor role to illicit activity compared to the overall honest use of cash as a private means of payment. moreover, for all the buzz cur… |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Monetary policy in uncertain times - the European Central Bank and the crisis | Period_2 | 2016-09-15 | 0.161 | all beginnings are difficult. it’s true of monetary policy as well. let’s consider for a moment europe’s first central bank. in 1656 johan palmstruch founded stockholm banco, introduced paper money and triggered an economic crisis. what happened? at the outset stockholm banco conducted normal banking operations: it took deposits and made loans. the deposits at that time mainly consisted of copper coins, and the most common denomination weighed almost 20 kg. but in 1662 the swedish state issued new coins which contained less copper. the old coins stored at stockholm banco thus became more valuable and the depositors asked for them back. the bank then found itself with a serious liquidity problem because the desired coins had been issued as loans. faced with this situation, johan palmstruch had an idea – an idea with consequences. those who asked for their coins back received paper money instead. this paper money was backed by the copper coins, which had not disappeared but had simply been lent out. the people and the state accepted the paper money; the crisis was averted. at the same time, stockholm banco could now make loans in the form of paper money. it then did that, but somewhat too generously: it produced more paper money than were backed by the coins. the people lost trust in the value of the paper money and sweden experienced inflation. to control it, stockholm banco stopped issuing loans and paper money. this in turn led to an economic crisis. in 1667 the swedish s… |
| Mario Draghi: The European Central Bank - rebuilding trust, restoring prosperity and re-establishing price stability | Period_2 | 2015-11-11 | 0.117 | the mandate of the ecb what is our mandate? central banks have different mandates, depending on the jurisdiction and institutional framework in which they operate. ours is not like that of the united states or of japan, for example. broadly speaking, central banks exist to preserve the integrity of money. this function of central banks comes from historical experience, which shows that sound money is crucial to economic prosperity and social stability. in the words of john kenneth galbraith: “when money is bad, people want it to be better. when it is good, they think of other things”. we want sound money precisely so that people can think of other things and do other things: work, save, invest, innovate. if today we only rarely ask ourselves if money is “good” or “bad”, it is because for most of our lives it has generally been stable. the youngest amongst you have not suffered first-hand from the damage caused by the inflationary episodes of the 1970s. few of us have felt the consequences of deflation, as in the 1930s. that is a sign that, in recent times, central banks have largely succeeded in delivering their mandates. the mandate entrusted to the ecb is to safeguard price stability in the euro area – i.e. ensuring the value of money over time. specifically, our objective is an annual rate of inflation below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. note that this definition of price stability is symmetric: inflation should be neither too high for too long, nor too low fo… |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.102 | there are in my view however, substantial drawbacks to consider, and reasons why many policymakers are reluctant to seriously consider this proposal. cash has survived throughout the centuries as a reliable transaction technology and as a store of value. its elimination would be a major break with a long‐standing social convention. it remains popular: a recent survey carried out for the ecb found that 80% of transactions in the euro area at the point of sale are in cash. people who prefer to hold currency may perceive its abolition as an assault on their freedom and in particular, on their right of anonymity. and savers may think the abolition of cash, coupled with a negative nominal interest rate on deposits, as an unfair wealth tax. |
| Mario Draghi: The European Central Bank - rebuilding trust, restoring prosperity and re-establishing price stability | Period_2 | 2015-11-11 | 0.101 | economies, the bulk of the money stock takes the form of bank deposits. money is the liability of the banking system as a whole, and it circulates electronically. for money to be “single”, then, the payments system has to work smoothly across the jurisdiction – that is actually one of our statutory tasks – and the banking system that creates money has to be sound. it is above all for this reason that we attach great importance to high-quality banking supervision, a task that has been entrusted to the ecb since november last year. and it is for the same reason that we act as lender of last resort to solvent banks in the event of a liquidity crisis. these functions are not designed to protect individual banks per se. they aim to ensure confidence in deposits and their continuous fungibility with banknotes and other forms of money across the union. moreover, as monetary policy impulses are transmitted in part through bank lending channels, sound banks are a prerequisite for ensuring price stability. if only for that reason, countering fragmentation in the banking system falls without doubt within our mandate. the ecb’s mandate, in its broadest sense, is based on a consensus rooted in society. politicians receive their mandates from elections which reflect the preferences of the electorate. the ecb’s mandate, by contrast, is inscribed in a document with a constitutional status: the treaty. a constitution rests on those shared values deeply felt by citizens; that is why constit… |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.079 | furthermore, very good progress has been made as regards the imf’s new resilience and sustainability trust (rst), which has now become operational. for contributions by eu national central banks, it is essential that claims on the rst maintain reserve asset quality. in our assessment, the modalities of the loan and deposit accounts of the rst, as well as the deposit and investment account of the poverty reduction and growth trust, are acceptable in that regard. however, we note that the channelling of special drawing rights by eu national central banks to multilateral development banks or individual countries would not be compatible with the eu’s legal framework. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.055 |
|
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in an uncertain world | Period_3 | 2022-03-17 | 0.044 | as the euro area is a net importer of energy, rising energy prices represent a terms of trade “tax” that transfers purchasing power to the rest of the world. higher energy prices already created a negative income effect of 1.4% of gdp in the last quarter of 2021 compared with the same period in 2019, which was only partly offset by higher export prices.[“4] |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.031 | effects on other countries. the costs in turn relate to the possibility that european policies fail to reflect the heterogeneity of preferences across member states.[25] theory therefore suggests that the eu should provide for public goods that cannot be offered more effectively or efficiently at the national level, and for which the preferences of citizens are sufficiently homogenous across europe. in my view, such eu public goods do include the investment needs i have just listed. the ensuing call for more fiscal resources on a permanent basis at the european level may lead to further important steps towards the creation of a european fiscal union. in line with the dictum of monnet, the crisis thus offers a possibility to create stronger fiscal capacity at the european level that could also be used to pursue the delivery of common public goods while not neglecting related “first-best” objectives such as optimal risk-sharing, countercyclical stabilisation, and promotion of growth and convergence. recognising that it is an illusion that emu can function smoothly without a centralised fiscal capacity, we should address the imbalances in the institutional framework of monetary union, whereby a single monetary policy coexists with a fiscal policy that is fragmented across national lines. this would strengthen our capacity to counter systemic shocks when interest rates are at the lower bound. and it would allow us to cushion the effects of idiosyncratic shocks that may emerge … |
| Luis de Guindos: Policy mix of the future - the role of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.031 | macroprudential policy addresses risks to financial stability. our strategy review acknowledges that financial stability is a necessary condition for price stability. with an impaired transmission mechanism in times of financial turmoil, maintaining price stability is not possible. at the same time, monetary policy itself can have implications for financial stability. accommodative monetary policy can reduce credit risk and prevent debt deflation. but it could also trigger excessive risk taking or encourage higher leverage in the financial system. in times of monetary policy tightening, the converse arguments apply. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 72 | challenge | 1 | 0.1636830 | conclude | 1 | 0.9998248 |
| 72 | conclude | 2 | 0.0623803 | challenge | 2 | 0.9997371 |
| 72 | environment | 3 | 0.0558906 | conclusion | 3 | 0.9993867 |
| 72 | conclusion | 4 | 0.0422780 | policymaker | 4 | 0.9988610 |
| 72 | time | 5 | 0.0254998 | adapt | 5 | 0.9988604 |
| 72 | bring | 6 | 0.0243918 | conclude remark | 6 | 0.9982447 |
| 72 | policymaker | 7 | 0.0196432 | environment | 7 | 0.9980701 |
| 72 | attention | 8 | 0.0169524 | pose | 8 | 0.9979847 |
| 72 | remark | 9 | 0.0167941 | attention | 9 | 0.9978088 |
| 72 | pose | 10 | 0.0163192 | bring | 10 | 0.9974565 |
| 72 | address | 11 | 0.0158444 | confront | 11 | 0.9974154 |
| 72 | adapt | 12 | 0.0133118 | rapidly | 12 | 0.9973715 |
| 72 | change | 13 | 0.0128370 | tackle | 13 | 0.9973701 |
| 72 | rapidly | 14 | 0.0122038 | cope | 14 | 0.9971510 |
| 72 | respond | 15 | 0.0101461 | economic environment | 15 | 0.9970636 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: The science of monetary policy ¿ past advances and future challenges | Period_1 | 2007-09-24 | 0.153 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Central banks and the public - the importance of communication | Period_1 | 2008-11-21 | 0.112 | conclusions let me conclude. the fundamental changes in central bank communication have helped to enhance the effectiveness, predictability and credibility of monetary policy and have notably contributed to lowering both inflation rates and volatility in the real economy. for its part, the ecb has established a practise of making its policy transparent and in setting new benchmarks in the area of central banking communication. that being said, in each occasion, a central bank has to carefully assess the relevance, clarity and timeliness of the information as ill-designed communication has the power to harm the economy. transparency is a key ingredient of an effective monetary policy, but not an end in itself. communication is an ongoing challenge and effective communication will always be characterised by a high degree of flexibility and adaptability in order to respond swiftly to a rapidly changing economic environment. |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Could monetary policy have helped prevent the financial crisis? | Period_1 | 2010-04-13 | 0.110 | concluding remarks in conclusion, what are the main lessons from recent experience that we should seek to incorporate in any revision to the framework for monetary policy-making? first and foremost, monetary policy should have remained more closely focused on the maintenance of price stability over the medium term. this implies that this objective must be defined clearly and pursued symmetrically. monetary policy should not be burdened with additional objectives, which it is ill-equipped to pursue. the institutional independence of the central bank is essential to building the credibility required to pursue price stability in a consistent and coherent manner. dual mandates for monetary policy place this independence at risk. independence accords central banks the necessary flexibility to deal with a rapidly changing world without putting their credibility at risk. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The changing role of communication | Period_1 | 2008-12-18 | 0.107 | conclusions let me conclude. the fundamental changes in central bank communication have helped to enhance the effectiveness, predictability and credibility of monetary policy and have notably contributed to lowering both inflation rates and volatility in the real economy. for its part, the ecb has established a practise of making its policy transparent and in setting new benchmarks in the area of central banking communication. that being said, on each occasion, a central bank has to carefully assess the relevance, clarity and timeliness of the information. transparency is a key ingredient of an effective monetary policy. communication is an ongoing challenge and effective communication will always be characterised by a degree of flexibility and adaptability in order to respond swiftly to a rapidly changing economic environment. thank you very much for your attention. |
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy communication and effectiveness | Period_1 | 2008-01-16 | 0.102 |
|
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy in the crisis - confronting short-run challenges while anchoring long-run expectations | Period_2 | 2013-05-23 | 0.114 | conclusion let me conclude. the crisis has exposed the balancing act lying at the heart of monetary policy. on the one hand, central banks are key participants in addressing short-term challenges that the economy faces. on the other hand, their crisis-fighting efforts have to be designed and communicated in full consistence with their long-run price stability mandates. to successfully manage this balancing act, monetary policy-makers must clearly distinguish between their objective, which serves to firmly anchor market expectations, and their conduct of policy, which should flexibly adjust to the specific challenges at hand. the ecb’s strategic framework contains the necessary elements to achieve this balance. financial conditions have generally improved in the euro area over recent months. the ecb will continue to effectively accompany the recovery that should materialise provided that reform efforts continue both at the level of each euro area economy and to strengthen the governance and efficiency of our economic and monetary union. i thank you for your attention. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges for future monetary policy frameworks - a European perspective | Period_2 | 2016-11-09 | 0.095 | conclusion let me conclude. a number of potential changes to monetary policy frameworks could be necessary to meet the challenges of the new economic environment. i provided my thoughts on some of them, but omitted many others. other challenges stem from a prolonged period of low, albeit not negative, interest rates resulting from the decline in potential growth and the demographic effects on savings.14 indeed, the apparent difficulties to reach higher levels of inflation and real equilibrium interest rates may hamper the capacity of monetary policy to deal with future recessionary episodes.15 some economists maintain that monetary policy can do almost everything, even if it would require the use of very negative rates, either because they are against the use of fiscal policy or because they genuinely believe in some form of new monetarism. central bankers should, however, avoid such hubris and accept that, at present, the contributions of fiscal, regulatory and competition policies are necessary to foster investment and improve the supply side of our economies. in view of the dimension of the challenges the world faces, i think this word of humility is a good coda for a central bank talk. thank you for your attention |
| Mario Draghi: A central banker’s perspective on European economic convergence | Period_2 | 2012-12-10 | 0.087 | the institutional challenge is the first major challenge with which we are currently confronted. we have already made much progress in addressing the challenge. but a great deal of work remains to be done. the economic challenge the second and complementary challenge is economic. the benefits of adopting the euro are greater the more consistent the economic structures of existing and prospective members are. convergence can be broadly defined as a process in which cross-country differences in economic structures are reduced over time. the success of the convergence process ultimately depends on the sustainability of the underlying policies. shortcomings in the process of convergence across euro area members have been at the root of the challenges we have faced since 2010. but i am pleased to report that progress in addressing those shortcomings is being made. external imbalances and fiscal imbalances are starting to be unwound. efforts to regain price and non-price competitiveness are bearing early fruit. deleveraging is generally proceeding in an orderly way, even though credit flows to the real economy seem to be negatively affected in parts of the euro area. debt is being reduced in some countries, while others are devising strategies to make debt reduction sustainable over time. and financial sector weaknesses are being addressed along with their links to sovereign risk. as i have said, progress is being made but much still needs to be done. the recent experiences of s… |
| Mario Draghi: The European Central Bank - rebuilding trust, restoring prosperity and re-establishing price stability | Period_2 | 2015-11-11 | 0.083 | conclusion the ecb’s response to the exceptional challenges posed by the crisis has preserved the integrity of money in the euro area. monetary stability is however only one necessary condition for the prosperity of the economy. indeed, so much attention has been paid to our commitment to a sound currency that, to paraphrase galbraith, little thought has been given to other things. we must now look ahead, and move from stability towards prosperity. we need a new pact that prevents the re-emergence of the type of challenges we have addressed, and that above all strengthens the constitutional architecture of the euro area. this is not a new conclusion. it was already reached in the summer of 2012, when the european council mandated the president of the council, the commission, the eurogroup and me, and subsequently the president of the european parliament, to outline a credible path that completes our monetary union and makes it “more perfect”. since then, we have made various proposals, all of which go in that direction. i hope that what i have said to you today will convince you of the urgency of this reflection, of the need to turn it without undue delay into an institutional process able to secure concrete results, in line with a clear calendar for action. this is a long and complex journey which can only be based on the strong determination of the member states. |
| Philip R Lane: The ECB’s monetary policy in the pandemic - meeting the challenge | Period_2 | 2020-10-07 | 0.082 | 07/10/2020 the ecb’s monetary policy in the pandemic: meeting the challenge meeting the monetary policy challenge the pandemic represents a significant monetary policy challenge. weak demand and rising economic slack have added to disinflationary pressures in an environment that is already characterised by low inflation. as i set out in my speech at this year’s jackson hole conference, chart 9 sketches in a stylised form the challenge the ecb is facing in reaching its inflation aim.[9] the future inflation path |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a high inflation environment - commitment and clarity | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.098 | conclusion let me conclude. the environment we confront today is complex. we are facing shocks from various sides, while navigating a new global map that is causing those shocks to persist for longer. but what monetary policy ultimately has to achieve is simple: we must not, and will not, let high inflation become entrenched. we are committed to bringing inflation back down to our medium-term target, and we are determined to take the necessary measures to do so. the more confident the public is that inflation will return to 2% in a timely manner, the smoother the adjustment process will be. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a high inflation environment - commitment and clarity | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.090 | monetary policy in a high inflation environment: commitment and clarity lecture by christine lagarde, president of the ecb, organised by eesti pank and dedicated to professor ragnar nurkse tallinn, 4 november 2022 inflation in the euro area is far too high, reaching double digits for the first time in october. here in estonia inflation has surged as high as 25%. the combination of shocks we are facing – war, energy, disrupted supply chains, re-allocation of demand – means that inflation is likely to stay above our target for some time. in such challenging times, central banks have to rely on their inner compass – their loyalty to their mandate – to ensure price stability. they have to be prepared to take the necessary decisions, however difficult, to bring inflation back down – because the consequences of letting too-high inflation become entrenched would be much worse for everyone. so what does this imply? the answer can be found in the writing of ragnar nurkse, to whom this lecture series is dedicated. though well known for his work on international financial architecture, he also made an important contribution to our understanding of inflation based on the experiences of the interwar years.[1] in particular, he showed that fighting inflation is both complex and simple. complex because, in times of great volatility, economies can face a series of shocks which produce rising and persistent inflation. witness the 1920s when inflation was driven, in part, by tumbling exchan… |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.082 | conclusion let me conclude. we find ourselves in an exceptionally volatile environment, with multiple and complex risks for the inflation outlook and the appropriate monetary policy response. we are normalising our monetary policy to keep inflation expectations anchored and bring inflation back to 2% over the medium term. but we cannot ignore the sizeable challenges that we are facing. so we must calibrate our monetary policy carefully to ensure that inflation durably returns to our target, while also guiding market expectations and limiting excess volatility. our policy stance must remain evidence-based and adapt to changes in the medium-term inflation outlook, avoiding an excessive focus on short-run developments and fully taking into account the risks emanating from the domestic and global economic and financial environment. |
| Christine Lagarde: New challenges in a changing world | Period_3 | 2023-01-24 | 0.078 | conclusion let me conclude. the transition from one year to the next is traditionally associated with quiet reflection, when we take stock of things that have come to pass. but as the poet rainer maria rilke once wrote: a new year is “full of things that have never been”. as we head into 2023, a changing world brings with it new challenges, but also opportunities. and let there be no doubt: with more self-confidence, more assertiveness and the right policies in place fuelling green and digital growth, europe can adapt and thrive. but some things never change: namely, the ecb’s commitment to price stability. we will play our part in europe’s next chapter by bringing inflation back to our 2% target. thank you. 1. see lagarde, c. (2022), “a new global map: european resilience in a changing world”, keynote speech at the peterson institute for international economics, 22 april. 2. lagarde, c. (2021), “globalisation after the pandemic”, per jacobsson lecture at the imf annual meetings, 16 october. 3. this view is traditionally associated with the economic historian charles p. kindleberger. his 1973 book, the world in depression 1929–1939, proved a catalyst for what eventually became known as hegemonic stability theory. for a brief discussion, see the economist (2013), “railroads and hegemons”, 10 october. 4. georgieva, k. (2023), “confronting fragmentation where it matters most: trade, debt, and climate action”, 16 january. see also aiyar, s. et al. (2023), “geoeconomic fragment… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Looking through higher energy prices? Monetary policy and the green transition | Period_3 | 2022-01-11 | 0.071 | and yet, the roots of today’s shock are likely to go deeper. while in the past energy prices often fell as quickly as they rose, the need to step up the fight against climate change may imply that fossil fuel prices will now not only have to stay elevated, but even have to keep rising if we are to meet the goals of the paris climate agreement. in my remarks today, | will discuss the challenges that such prospects pose to both fiscal and monetary policymakers in an environment in which the supply of cheaper and greener sources of energy will only gradually be able to meet rapidly rising demand. | will argue that governments will need to push the energy transition forward, while at the same time protecting the most vulnerable members of society from energy poverty. central banks, in turn, will have to assess whether the green transition poses risks to price stability and to which extent deviations from their inflation target due to a rise in the contribution from energy to headline inflation are tolerable and consistent with their price stability mandates. | will explain that there are instances in which central banks will need to break with the prevailing consensus that monetary policy should look through rising energy prices so as to secure price stability over the medium term. fast rise in carbon prices helps accelerate the green transition the world economy will have to undergo a far-reaching transformation to be able to live up to the paris agreement to limit the increa… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 73 | rule | 1 | 0.0793818 | rule | 1 | 1.0000000 |
| 73 | economy | 2 | 0.0337423 | optimal | 2 | 0.9992115 |
| 73 | simple | 3 | 0.0205919 | simple | 3 | 0.9992113 |
| 73 | change | 4 | 0.0181166 | taylor | 4 | 0.9985097 |
| 73 | approach | 5 | 0.0181166 | policy rule | 5 | 0.9977184 |
| 73 | optimal | 6 | 0.0178071 | discretion | 6 | 0.9976762 |
| 73 | base | 7 | 0.0173430 | preference | 7 | 0.9969327 |
| 73 | good | 8 | 0.0162600 | taylor rule | 8 | 0.9967930 |
| 73 | structure | 9 | 0.0145582 | approach | 9 | 0.9961786 |
| 73 | follow | 10 | 0.0140941 | structure | 10 | 0.9949932 |
| 73 | reason | 11 | 0.0128564 | equation | 11 | 0.9947738 |
| 73 | set | 12 | 0.0122376 | john | 12 | 0.9942468 |
| 73 | function | 13 | 0.0113093 | extreme | 13 | 0.9938162 |
| 73 | time | 14 | 0.0109999 | apply | 14 | 0.9935959 |
| 73 | depend | 15 | 0.0109999 | representation | 15 | 0.9935756 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jürgen Stark: Contribution to the session on “Implications for the conduct of monetary policy” | Period_1 | 2008-03-11 | 0.253 | extent that they have a medium-term influence on price stability. this is because another fundamental law of monetary economics is alive and well in the globalised economy: flexible exchange rates are a sine qua non for price stability. does a globalised world call for more international monetary coordination? with a growing set of prices and asset valuations being determined internationally, information on international developments is crucial for monetary policy-making. in this light, the financial turmoil in particular has shown the value that growing financial globalisation places on a timely and open international exchange of information among central banks and regulators. central banks should therefore cooperate by exchanging information and by designing a solid international financial architecture. beyond that, however, the scope for monetary policy-makers to coordinate is limited. this is the case as each central bank has just one policy instrument, and this instrument can only achieve a single domestic objective, price stability. as a consequence, each central bank is well advised to react to foreign developments only if these become relevant for domestic price stability. i therefore fully agree with john taylor’s conclusion that central banks should not mechanically follow other central banks’ policy decisions. not least as a result of this consensus, i question the strong conclusions that john taylor draws from some of his empirical analysis. in brief, john tayl… |
| Lucas Papademos: Policy-making in EMU - strategies, rules and discretion | Period_1 | 2004-04-23 | 0.229 | shocks, including those of a more permanent nature relating to structural change and innovation in financial markets. this may lead to undesirably high volatility in interest rates, prices and output. for good reasons, such monetary targeting rules have never been applied in practice, at least not in their strictest form. several more sophisticated rules have been developed since then. in recent years, the most prominent are the taylor-rules, based on a proposal by john b. taylor in 1993. in their simplest forms, such rules express the monetary policy instrument - the short-term nominal interest rate - as a function of the deviation of a few key macroeconomic variables, typically actual or expected inflation and actual output, from their target levels. there are, however, a number of reasons suggesting that great caution should be exercised in giving such rules an important role in the actual conduct of monetary policy. first, central banks would not be able to exploit - that is, use fully and effectively - all available information if they were to follow and respond to the developments in just two variables. in addition, our imperfect knowledge of the state of the economy and the possibility of non-linearities in the economy’s structure and agents’ behaviour make the normative use of such simple rules questionable. indicators that are crucial for the application of these rules - in particular the output gap and the equilibrium real interest rate - are not observable and c… |
| Lucas Papademos: Policy-making in EMU - strategies, rules and discretion | Period_1 | 2004-04-23 | 0.179 | inflation forecasts or projections, while useful and indeed indispensable ingredients of a monetary policy framework, cannot be the only input in decision-making. the same inflation forecast figures can be associated with quite different states of the economy, reflecting the effects of different factors and shocks, and thus potentially requiring different policy responses on the part of the central bank. for this reason too, monetary authorities carefully take into account the specific determinants of the economic situation and outlook as well as the nature and size of the threats to price stability. such an analysis may require adapting, to a certain extent, the appropriate monetary policy horizon for restoring price stability in response to the nature and magnitude of shocks. in this respect, it is notable that quite a few “inflation-targeting central banks” have recently relaxed their emphasis on a fixed horizon, in favour of the more flexible medium-term notion, thereby moving closer to the approach adopted by the ecb. all in all, the uncertainty and our imperfect knowledge of the state, structure and dynamics of the economy severely limit the usefulness of relying on a single model and on simple and fully defined policy reaction functions for determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. if monetary policy bases its decisions on just one single equation or set of equations, it effectively assumes to have perfect knowledge of the key structural aspects of an ever… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Activism and alertness in monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-16 | 0.172 | more infrequently – than its more “activist” counterpart. moreover, as analysts typically append a partial adjustment mechanism to the representation of how the central bank interest rate responds to the economic state, there is an additional source of “activism” – or “passivity” – that would emerge from these simple empirics. this is the inertia coefficient attached to the lagged interest rate dependent variable, which in these rules moderates the pace of reaction of the policy rate to its fundamental determinants. in any case, in the naive theory of this world, plain comparison of the frequencies of policy moves and the size of interest rate adjustments would suffice to tell the strategies of these two central banks apart. a smoother policy path would signal a “more passive” strategy. but of course the world is not that simple, and in fact there are serious pitfalls lurking behind strategic inferences drawn on the basis of comparisons of variances in policy rates. it is not too difficult to portray situations in which such inferences could be highly misleading. i will give three examples, all relaxing one important qualification upon which my earlier example was predicated: the assumption that our two central banks are confronted with the same economic environment. first, imagine two central banks which are equally responsive to economic conditions: in the reaction- rule jargon that i am using here, these are two central banks that share exactly the same reaction paramet… |
| Jürgen Stark: Contribution to the session on “Implications for the conduct of monetary policy” | Period_1 | 2008-03-11 | 0.163 | • however, such a behaviour might generate a spurious correlation between the residuals of a simple taylor type policy rule for the euro area and interest rates in other economies. i suspect that this is what lies behind john taylor’s result concerning the deviations from a euro area “policy rule” and the us federal funds rate. having inside knowledge, i can in fact rule out that john taylor’s results constitute any sign of a leader-follower structure or any sign of a focus on the side of the ecb on the dollar-euro exchange rate, or in fact on any exchange rate, as a target of policy. neither is the case. i agree with john taylor, however, that any development in that direction would be deeply worrying. only a clear assignment of responsibilities ensures clarity about the central bank’s objective, which is at the heart of successful monetary policy. yet international complementarities exist in monetary policymaking, to the extent that an international architecture which has each central bank keeping its own house in order is also conducive to an environment of global monetary stability. such architecture provides the best basis for a friendly and open exchange of views and information at an international level. today there is frequent interaction as, for example, the bis provides a much-appreciated forum for discussion among central bankers. in addition, there are further occasions for fruitful exchanges – this very symposium being one of them. |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.178 | in the long‐run steady state when is constant, the expression in parenthesis has to equal zero, ∗ ∗ which implies the verification of the fisher equation or ∗ ∗ where ∗ is the long‐run equilibrium inflation rate dependent on i which is fixed by the monetary authorities. a more advanced way of presenting the neo‐fisherian view is reflected on a series of papers by schmitt‐grohé and uribe52 (2001 with benhabib), 2014 and 2017). the authors show that in simple dsge models with a zlb and taylor rule type of equation, obeying the taylor principle of an inflation coefficient higher than one, there are two or more equilibria and there is a path from the good equilibrium with positive inflation to a bad equilibrium of very low or negative inflation. in a liquidity trap, the taylor rule does not work and the fisher equation takes charge, leading to a steady‐state equilibrium of low inflation. the only way to steer the economy to the good equilibrium is to increase the interest rate and wait for agents with rational expectations to lead the economy for the good long‐run level. |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.153 | policies might perform reasonably well in normal times, they are likely to perform rather poorly when policy rates are constrained by the effective lower bound. following a recession, they imply a much earlier tightening of policy rates than inflation targeting.15 simple interest rate rules there have been some proposals, especially in the united states, to give a much more prominent role to simple interest rate rules, the most famous example being the taylor rule, as a guideline for monetary policy decisions.16 the taylor rule has been shown to provide a reasonably good ex‐post account of movements in the policy interest rate. it suggests that, at any point in time, the short‐ term interest rate is equal to a constant, plus a weighted sum of the deviations of inflation from target and output from potential, i.e. the output gap. |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.135 | while i do not dispute the informational content that interest rate rules might provide, i strongly oppose the idea that central banks’ policy rate decisions should be based on these rules. the key reason is that any specific rule is unlikely to be suited for all possible contingencies. the environment in which monetary policymakers have to act is much more complex than what is assumed in model‐ based analysis of policy rules. a simple rule that responds to one or two macroeconomic variables and ignores all other indicators of price developments is not able to account for the complexities of the real world. it would be especially odd, given the criticism that monetary policy does not take enough account of financial developments, to put in place a strategy that completely ignores them. |
| Peter Praet: Monetary policy and balance sheet adjustment | Period_2 | 2014-05-28 | 0.130 | the ecb’s policy framework there are clear limits to the leeway that we – central banks – can afford within our mandates. our medium-term price stability objective implies that we cannot stretch our policy horizon forever – even if the economy is undergoing a lengthy deleveraging process. monetary policy needs to act forcefully if and when the adjustment process threatens the fulfilment of our mandate. we should preserve the virtues of constrained discretion: 6 a delicate and fragile blend of opposing attributes of monetary policy-making, which central banks acquired in the form of mandates in the 1990s, and which has served us well since then on our long journey back from the inflation years. let’s not forget that – since the early 1990s when the industrial world eradicated inflation – the emphasis in the “constrained discretion” oxymoron has always been on constrained. in the early 1990s rules won a long battle over discretion. and rules meant a numerical definition of the inflation objective and a flexible but certain horizon for accomplishing the objective. pushing on a string when the transmission of monetary policy stimulus is impeded by the countervailing forces of deleveraging can be counterproductive. at the same time, accepting low or even negative inflation rates in such a situation may render the balance sheet adjustment more painful and drawn-out. and it may destabilise inflation expectations. a protracted period of too low inflation, which is typical for epis… |
| Peter Praet: Have unconventional policies overstretched central bank independence? Challenges for accountability and transparency in the wake of the crisis | Period_2 | 2017-03-30 | 0.120 | (tltros), our asset purchase programme for public and private sector securities (app), and our policy of charging a zero interest rate on main refinancing operations and a negative rate on excess reserves. as the floor of our monetary policy corridor – which by then had become the key instrument steering monetary conditions in the money market – was reduced to negative levels, other short to medium-term market yields dipped below the zero line as well. given the novelty, scope and size of the measures taken, and given their potential interaction with other public policies, communication of these measures proved to be much more difficult than before the crisis, when we only had to explain how changes in the main policy interest rates affect the economy and ultimately the price level. likewise, holding the ecb accountable for its monetary policy has also become more difficult. let me illustrate this difficulty by considering how observers have been using taylor rules to compare our policy interest rates with rule-based benchmarks. in a taylor rule, such benchmarks are pinned down mainly by the deviation of inflation from target and by a measure of economic slack. on this basis, observers held central banks accountable for monetary policy decisions, as the relation between policy objective and instrument is transparent and not equivocal. in a nutshell, empirical regularities lay the ground for a prescriptive monetary policy rule – even though oversimplified – against which ce… |
| Frank Elderson: Proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank concrete | Period_3 | 2022-03-25 | 0.091 | circumstances and challenges that we face in the pursuit of price stability. making the strategy concrete let me explain how this can be envisaged in practice with an analogy in construction that may speak more to the minds of a general audience than concepts from the world of monetary theorists and lawyers. very much like price stability ensures a solid foundation to support a well- functioning economy, in construction concrete is the bedrock of any structure: homes, office buildings, bridges, wind and solar power stations, and so on. this bedrock is made up of four simple ingredients: cement, gravel, sand and water. every ingredient plays its part. cement is the key bonding agent that holds the concrete together. it is the gravel and sand that give it its strength and structural integrity. the water activates the bonding process and also makes the concrete malleable and allows for flexible application. the optimal concrete mix ratio depends highly on where the concrete will be used. generally, the amount of sand and gravel is important for strength and durability, whereas cement and water add to workability. as one might expect, dry environments call for a relatively higher proportion of water in the concrete mixture, while the opposite holds for moist surroundings. exposure to mechanical or chemical erosion also call for relatively less water to maintain durability. environments subject to freezing and thawing benefit from concrete that contains some air pockets, determ… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.070 | going forward, the contribution of fiscal policy, and therefore the appropriate policy mix, will remain important. fiscal policy is likely to stay supportive, with the cyclically-adjusted primary balance expected to be -4.1% this year, -1.6% next year and -1.5% in 2023. but the scope of pandemic-related fiscal transfers will need to change from a blanket-based approach to a more targeted action plan. fiscal policy will need to be surgical, meaning focused on those who have suffered particular hardship. it will need to be productivity-enhancing, meaning that it facilitates structural changes in the economy and shifts activity towards future-oriented sectors, and delivers on the agreed reform programmes under the recovery and resilience facility. and, taking a medium-term perspective, fiscal policy will need to follow a rules-based framework that underpins both debt sustainability and macroeconomic stabilisation. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.049 | our main steering tool in this process is the tilting parameter – that is, the weight we put on the climate score in our benchmark allocation for new purchases. however, the tilting parameter lost part of its punch when we decided to stop net asset purchases (slide 5). the forthcoming reduction in reinvestments will further significantly constrain the ability of a flow-based approach to decarbonise our corporate bond portfolio at a pace that is consistent with our climate ambitions.[21] the decarbonisation of our corporate bond portfolio depends not only on our tilting parameter but also considerably on the rate at which the firms in our portfolio decarbonise their businesses.[22] for example, assuming full reinvestment, we would achieve only half of the total decarbonisation of our corporate bond holdings by 2030 if firms were to stop taking steps to decarbonise their activities (slide 6, left-hand side). this effect depends to a significant extent on the actions of a few high-emitting companies (slide 6, right-hand side). together, this implies that by ending our reinvestments, the speed of decarbonisation of our portfolio would slow down substantially and be largely out of our control. a flow-based tilting approach is thus insufficient to achieve our goal. the paris agreement requires a stable decarbonisation trajectory in our portfolio irrespective of our monetary policy stance or companies’ individual actions. we therefore need to move from a flow-based to a stock-bas… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.046 |
|
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.043 | stronger anchor for inflation expectations, a strategic commitment to simplifying the communication of monetary policy also makes it easier for the ecb to be held accountable and for it to build trust among the general public. regarding the symmetry of the inflation target, the recognition that deviations from the target in either direction are equally undesirable implies that a risk-management approach to the calibration of monetary policy should balance equally the risks of inflation being too high and too low. at the same time, the symmetry of the target does not necessarily imply symmetry in policy responses to these risks, in view of the constraints imposed by the effective lower bound in reacting to below-target inflation. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 74 | projection | 1 | 0.1076839 | projection | 1 | 0.9997371 |
| 74 | staff | 2 | 0.0805079 | macroeconomic projection | 2 | 0.9996494 |
| 74 | macroeconomic | 3 | 0.0378149 | staff macroeconomic projection | 3 | 0.9992990 |
| 74 | ecb staff | 4 | 0.0323283 | staff projection | 4 | 0.9992111 |
| 74 | macroeconomic projection | 5 | 0.0318139 | staff macroeconomic | 5 | 0.9990362 |
| 74 | eurosystem | 6 | 0.0296707 | staff | 6 | 0.9988601 |
| 74 | staff macroeconomic projection | 7 | 0.0282133 | eurosystem staff | 7 | 0.9987733 |
| 74 | staff macroeconomic | 8 | 0.0281276 | foresee | 8 | 0.9978096 |
| 74 | staff projection | 9 | 0.0276132 | ecb staff | 9 | 0.9978069 |
| 74 | eurosystem staff | 10 | 0.0243555 | ecb staff macroeconomic | 10 | 0.9975449 |
| 74 | outlook | 11 | 0.0231553 | eurosystem staff macroeconomic | 11 | 0.9973697 |
| 74 | foresee | 12 | 0.0226410 | foresee annual | 12 | 0.9969308 |
| 74 | expect | 13 | 0.0210978 | revise | 13 | 0.9967574 |
| 74 | revise | 14 | 0.0182688 | ecb staff projection | 14 | 0.9966683 |
| 74 | june | 15 | 0.0180116 | eurosystem staff projection | 15 | 0.9964918 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-06-14 | 0.172 | favourable level of business confidence in the euro area, private sector domestic demand should contribute increasingly to economic growth, benefiting from the still accommodative monetary policy stance and the measures adopted to improve the functioning of the financial system. however, activity is expected to continue to be dampened somewhat by the process of balance sheet adjustment in various sectors. this assessment is also reflected in the june 2011 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real gdp growth in a range between 1.5% and 2.3 % in 2011 and between 0.6% and 2.8% in 2012. compared with the march 2011 ecb staff macroeconomic projections, the range for 2011 has been revised upwards, while the range for 2012 remains broadly unchanged. the june 2011 eurosystem staff projections are broadly in line with recent forecasts by international organisations. in the governing council’s assessment, the risks to this economic outlook remain broadly balanced in an environment of elevated uncertainty. on the one hand, favourable business confidence could provide more support to domestic economic activity in the euro area than currently expected and higher foreign demand could also contribute more strongly to growth than expected. on the other hand, downside risks relate to the ongoing tensions in some segments of the financial markets that may potentially spill over to the euro area real economy. downside risks also relate to further… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2008-06-10 | 0.153 | this outlook is also reflected in the june 2008 eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections. the projections foresee average annual real gdp growth in a range between 1.5% and 2.1% in 2008 and between 1.0% and 2.0% in 2009. in comparison with the march ecb staff projections, the current range projected for real gdp growth in 2008 is within the upper part of the range published in march 2008, mainly as a consequence of the better than expected outcome in the first quarter. for 2009, the range has been adjusted downwards, following the increase in commodity prices over recent months. the year-on-year growth rates which i have just mentioned need to be interpreted with particular caution on this occasion. while the annual rates suggest that growth may be weaker in 2009 than in 2008, they mask the fact that on a quarterly basis real gdp growth is projected to reach a trough in 2008, before gradually recovering thereafter. in order not to draw the wrong conclusions about the growth dynamics implied in the staff projections it is important to keep this distinction in mind. in the governing council’s view, the uncertainty surrounding this outlook for economic growth remains high, and downside risks prevail. in particular, risks continue to relate to the potential for the financial market turbulence to have a more negative impact on the real economy than anticipated. moreover, downside risks stem from the dampening impact on consumption and investment of further unanticipated incre… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2009-12-08 | 0.152 | significant macroeconomic stimulus under way and the measures adopted to restore the functioning of the financial system. however, a number of the supporting factors are of a temporary nature and activity is likely to be affected for some time to come by the ongoing process of balance sheet adjustment in the financial and the non-financial sector, both inside and outside the euro area. for this reason, the euro area economy is expected to grow only at a moderate pace in 2010, and the recovery process is likely to be uneven. eurosystem staff project annual real gdp growth of between –4.1% and –3.9% in 2009, between +0.1% and +1.5% in 2010, and between +0.2% and +2.2% in 2011. the range for 2010 has been revised upwards compared with the september 2009 ecb staff macroeconomic projections. forecasts by international organisations are broadly in line with the december 2009 eurosystem staff projections. the governing council continues to view the risks to this outlook as broadly balanced. on the upside, there may be stronger than anticipated effects stemming from the extensive macroeconomic stimulus being provided and from other policy measures taken. confidence may also improve further and foreign trade may recover more strongly than projected. on the downside, concerns remain relating to a stronger or more protracted than expected negative feedback loop between the real economy and the financial sector, renewed increases in oil and other commodity prices, the intensification … |
| Jean Claude-Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-12-28 | 0.143 | economic and monetary developments since my previous appearance before the european parliament early october, incoming information has fully confirmed our view that, in a context of vigorous money and credit growth and sound economic fundamentals in the euro area, the risks to price stability over the medium term are clearly on the upside, as i have said, on behalf of the governing council, after our meeting on thursday, 6 december. the recent substantial increase in oil and food prices, together with unfavourable base effects from energy prices, owing to the marked decline in oil prices a year ago, are having a strong upward impact on inflation in the current context. looking ahead, the inflation rate is expected to remain significantly above 2% in the near future, and it is likely to moderate only gradually in the course of 2008. hence the period of temporarily high inflation rates would be somewhat more protracted than previously expected. looking further ahead, the december eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections foresee annual hicp inflation to be between 2.0% and 2.2% in 2007, to then rise to between 2.0% and 3.0% in 2008, before moderating to a range of 1.2% and 2.4% in 2009. compared with the september staff projections, the ranges for 2007 and 2008 have shifted upwards. these staff projections are based on two key assumptions. the first is that recent oil and food price dynamics and their impact on hicp inflation will not have broadly-based second-round effects… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2010-03-05 | 0.142 | in the fourth quarter of 2009, after growing by 0.4% in the third quarter. available indicators suggest that the economic recovery in the euro area is on track, although it is likely to remain uneven. in particular, a number of special factors are at play, including adverse weather conditions in parts of the euro area in the first quarter of 2010. given this uneven pattern, it is more appropriate to look through the quarterly volatility and to compare growth developments on a half-yearly basis. looking ahead, the governing council expects real gdp growth to remain moderate in 2010, owing to the ongoing process of balance sheet adjustment in various sectors and the expectation that the low capacity utilisation is likely to dampen investment and that consumption is being dampened by weak labour market prospects. this assessment is also reflected in the march 2010 ecb staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real gdp growth in a range between 0.4% and 1.2% for 2010 and between 0.5% and 2.5% for 2011. compared with the eurosystem staff projections published in december 2009, the range for real gdp growth in 2010 is slightly narrower, while for 2011 the range has been revised slightly upwards, reflecting notably stronger activity worldwide. the governing council continues to view the risks to this outlook as broadly balanced, in an environment marked by continued uncertainty. on the upside, confidence may improve more than expected, and both the g… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Securing sustained economic growth in the euro area | Period_2 | 2016-10-12 | 0.223 | staff economic projections overall, the impact of our measures has been significant, but the euro area recovery has certainly not been as fast as we had hoped. this is in part due to the headwinds stemming from the global economy, the structural slowdown in world trade and the financial crisis legacies lingering in many euro area countries which continue to dampen economic activity. these factors explain why the risks to the outlook remain to the downside. nevertheless, the narrative of a continued yet moderate recovery is largely echoed in the latest (september 2016) ecb staff macroeconomic projections for euro area activity, which are almost unchanged compared to june 2016. real gdp is projected to grow at an annual rate of 1.7% in 2016, 1.6% in 2017 and 1.6% in 2018. since the projections cut-off date, the flow of high frequency data has been consistent with the materialisation of this baseline scenario. crucially, this projection is predicated on the current supportive financial conditions persisting. in fact, it is estimated that, cumulatively, the impact of our measures will contribute more than one and a half percentage points to real gdp growth between 2015 and 2018. regarding inflation, the latest ecb staff projections foresee a rise to 1.2% in 2017 and 1.6% in 2018. the contribution of our measures to this projected increase in inflation, is significant, representing, on average, an impact on the inflation rate of about half a percentage point each year between 2… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Growth in a more resilient Euro area | Period_2 | 2017-10-18 | 0.221 | ecb computations, sapi task force, september 2017 mpe, bmes.2 looking ahead, the latest ecb staff projections continue to expect domestic demand to remain the key driver of euro area growth. annual real gdp is projected to increase by 2.2% in 2017, 1.8% in 2018 and 1.7% in 2019. the risks to the growth outlook are broadly balanced. according to the latest imf weo projections, euro area real gdp is expected to grow by 2.1% in 2017 before moderating to 1.9% in 2018 and 1.7% in 2019, which is in line with the ecb projections. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2020-12-11 | 0.214 | moves towards our aim in a sustained manner, in line with our commitment to symmetry. let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. following a sharp contraction in the first half of 2020, euro area real gdp rebounded strongly and rose by 12.5 per cent, quarter on quarter, in the third quarter, although remaining well below pre- pandemic levels. the second wave of the pandemic and the associated intensification of containment measures observed since mid-october are expected to result in a renewed significant decline in activity in the fourth quarter, although to a much lesser extent than observed in the second quarter of this year. economic developments continue to be uneven across sectors, with activity in the services sector being more adversely affected by the new restrictions on social interaction and mobility than activity in the industrial sector. although fiscal policy measures are supporting households and firms, consumers remain cautious in the light of the pandemic and its ramifications for employment and earnings. moreover, weaker balance sheets and uncertainty about the economic outlook are weighing on business investment. looking ahead, the news of prospective roll-outs of vaccines allows for greater confidence in the assumption of a gradual resolution of the health crisis. however, it will take time until widespread immunity is achieved, while further resurgences in infections, with challenges to public health and e… |
| Philip R Lane: The ECB’s monetary policy in the pandemic - meeting the challenge | Period_2 | 2020-10-07 | 0.210 | [2] the june eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections expected average annual output to decline by 8.7 percent in 2020 but expand by 5.2 percent in 2021 and a further 3.3 percent in 2022. the incoming data have been broadly in line with our expectations: the latest september ecb staff macroeconomic projections see an output decline of 8.0 percent in 2020 and expansions of 5.0 percent in 2021 and 3.2 percent in 2022. [3] see also dossche, m. and zlatanos, s. (2020), “covid-19 and the increase in household savings: precautionary or forced?”, economic bulletin, issue 6, ecb. |
| Philip R Lane: The ECB’s monetary policy in the pandemic - meeting the challenge | Period_2 | 2020-10-07 | 0.175 | 07/10/2020 the ecb’s monetary policy in the pandemic: meeting the challenge haver and ecb staff calculations. notes: aggregation based on data for germany, spain, france, italy and the netherlands. the latest observations are for the second quarter of 2020. this assessment underpins the baseline scenario of the september ecb staff macroeconomic projections. despite the recovery in the second half of the year, output at the end of 2020 is projected to remain about 5.2 percent below the level of output at the end of 2019. economic activity is foreseen to return to pre-pandemic levels only towards the end of 2022, with output expected to expand by 5.0 percent in 2021 and 3.2 percent in 2022. in any event, the range of possible outcomes in the projections remains very wide. this is illustrated by the alternative projection scenarios (the baseline projection is flanked by mild and severe scenarios), as shown in chart 2. in view of the uncertain economic and financial outcomes of the pandemic, the balance of risks is tilted to the downside. realised and projected output (indexed real gdp, q4 2019 = 100) https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201006~e1d38a1ccc.en.html 2/12 |
| Philip R Lane: Inflation in the near-term and the medium-term | Period_3 | 2022-02-18 | 0.238 | unemployment rate in the euro area (percentages of the labour force) = realised values ® december 2021 eurosystem staff projections 13 12 11 10 9 8 @ 7 ° e 6 — — ww wy) co co ™ ™ co co oo) oo) a | oo - — ™n (nn eo) ap) — — as = ss f ©c© & % % s& sg §| | sf se sf os es a & a & 5 3 &§ 365 5s &§ 3s &§ sse sse sese ses eb sources: eurostat and december 2021 ecb/eurosystem staff projections. note: the latest observations are for december 2021. chart 9 unemployment rate in ecb/eurosystem staff projections (percentages of the labour force) ™ december 2019 ™ september 2021 ™ june 2020 ™ december 2021 iy 10 rs | 9 8 6 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 sources: ecb/eurosystem staff projections and ecb staff calculations. the projected tightening of the labour market in part reflects the success of macroeconomic policies during the pandemic, with fiscal policy focused on protecting household incomes, mitigating corporate vulnerabilities and maintaining the link between firms and workers through a focus on wage subsidy schemes and short-time working schemes rather than solely focusing on improving unemployment support programmes. it also is predicated on favourable aggregate demand conditions, including |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.216 | shows the evolution of the projected inflation path (as summarised by the end-of-horizon projected inflation rate). over the period 2018-2019, the end-of horizon projections for inflation had gradually declined before the pandemic, such that the risk of downside de-anchoring was already elevated before the pandemic. the chart shows the sharp deterioration in the inflation outlook following the pandemic shock, with the end-of-horizon projection for hicp dropping to 1.3 per cent in the june 2020 forecast. end-of-horizon projections for hicp inflation and hicp inflation excluding energy and food ecb/eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections and ecb calculations. note: the latest observations are for the march 2022 ecb staff macroeconomic projections. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-06-22 | 0.206 | these developments are reflected in longer-term inflation expectations, which have increased, with most measures derived from financial markets and from expert surveys standing at around 2%. initial signs of above-target revisions to these measures, however, warrant close monitoring. the baseline inflation projections by eurosystem staff have been revised up significantly. these projections indicate that inflation will remain undesirably elevated for some time. they foresee annual inflation at 6.8% in 2022 before it is projected to decline to 3.5% in 2023 and 2.1% in 2024. this means that headline inflation at the end of the projection horizon is projected to be slightly above our target. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.148 | the second factor that can underpin the anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations at the two per cent target is the re-assessment of the labour market. as shown in chart 27, a supportive macroeconomic environment and targeted labour market policies resulted in the labour market performing much stronger than had been expected during the pandemic, limiting the risk of long-term scarring effects. the latest ecb staff macroeconomic projections foresee a substantial further decline of the euro area unemployment rate over 2022-2024 to levels not seen in decades. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.138 | monetary policy statement press conference christine lagarde, president of the ecb, luis de guindos, vice-president of the ecb amsterdam, 9 june 2022 jump to the transcript of the questions and answers good afternoon, the vice-president and i welcome you to our press conference. i would like to thank president knot for his kind hospitality and express our special gratitude to his staff for the excellent organisation of today’s meeting of the governing council. high inflation is a major challenge for all of us. the governing council will make sure that inflation returns to our two per cent target over the medium term. in may inflation again rose significantly, mainly because of surging energy and food prices, including due to the impact of the war. but inflation pressures have broadened and intensified, with prices for many goods and services increasing strongly. eurosystem staff have revised their baseline inflation projections up significantly. these projections indicate that inflation will remain undesirably elevated for some time. however, moderating energy costs, the easing of supply disruptions related to the pandemic and the normalisation of monetary policy are expected to lead to a decline in inflation. the new staff projections foresee annual inflation at 6.8 per cent in 2022, before it is projected to decline to 3.5 per cent in 2023 and 2.1 per cent in 2024 – higher than in the march projections. this means that headline inflation at the end of the projection hori… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 75 | country | 1 | 0.0528949 | differential | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 75 | differential | 2 | 0.0328563 | dispersion | 2 | 0.9997372 |
| 75 | dispersion | 3 | 0.0258605 | inflation differential | 3 | 0.9987727 |
| 75 | difference | 4 | 0.0257420 | diversity | 4 | 0.9978968 |
| 75 | average | 5 | 0.0242005 | standard deviation | 5 | 0.9970160 |
| 75 | growth | 6 | 0.0204062 | difference | 6 | 0.9970152 |
| 75 | percentage | 7 | 0.0187462 | growth differential | 7 | 0.9969711 |
| 75 | standard | 8 | 0.0177976 | deviation | 8 | 0.9966696 |
| 75 | factor | 9 | 0.0176791 | catch | 9 | 0.9963639 |
| 75 | unite | 10 | 0.0170862 | synchronisation | 10 | 0.9954772 |
| 75 | level | 11 | 0.0163748 | output growth | 11 | 0.9951812 |
| 75 | trend | 12 | 0.0155448 | samuelson | 12 | 0.9951739 |
| 75 | inflation differential | 13 | 0.0148333 | percentage | 13 | 0.9951671 |
| 75 | deviation | 14 | 0.0113948 | region | 14 | 0.9949165 |
| 75 | observe | 15 | 0.0112762 | balassa | 15 | 0.9949015 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the euro area and its future | Period_1 | 2008-07-15 | 0.611 | – this rate has broadly stabilised at around 1 percentage point. this dispersion level is similar to that of the 14 us metropolitan statistical areas, but is somewhat higher than that of the four us census regions. hence, impressive progress has been made, and i would argue that, prima facie, inflation dispersion in the euro area is not high by international standards. however, inflation differentials in the euro area are very persistent; in this respect, the euro area does indeed differ from the united states. most euro area countries that have exhibited higher than average inflation rates in recent years have been in this position for at least a decade. these include spain and greece. similar persistence – but on the opposite side – is observed in low-inflation countries such as germany. only in some euro area countries, such as portugal and the netherlands, have differentials moved from being relatively high to being in line with – or even below – the euro area average. such corrections are welcome, but the point is that they are slow to materialise. if we look at the cost side, the factors generating inflation differentials are, in most countries, primarily domestic rather than external. in particular, we have witnessed sustained divergence in wage developments across the euro area and smaller differences in labour productivity growth. these differences in the growth of labour costs have been the main sources of persistence in inflation differentials. various reasons c… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Further integrating euro area economies ¿ some reflections | Period_1 | 2006-07-14 | 0.587 | the point is that they have been quite slow in coming. whereas some wage or inflation differentials are justified – and prove that monetary union promotes adjustments – there is a need to better understand the reasons for this apparent sluggish adjustment process. if we look at the cost side, in most countries domestic factors dominate external factors in generating inflation differentials. in particular, we have witnessed a sustained divergence of wage developments across the euro area, and narrower differences in labour productivity growth. these differentials in the growth of unit labour costs have been the main sources of persistence. this suggests a link with differing levels of wage rigidities across the euro area. however, changes in profit margins have also contributed to inflation differentials. furthermore, imperfect competition and associated price rigidities across countries may also have been a factor. if we look at product groups, there has been a relatively higher price dispersion in the area of services. this is probably associated with the dispersion in wage developments in the services sector. by contrast, inflation dispersion has been relatively low for tradable non-energy industrial goods. then, of course, products with relatively volatile price developments (such as energy, unprocessed food and processed food) has also shown a high dispersion of price changes across countries. hence, there is a certain degree of structural diversity in inflation and co… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Economic integration in the euro area | Period_1 | 2006-04-06 | 0.570 | rigidities across the euro area. however, changes in profit margins also contributed to inflation differentials. imperfect competition and associated price rigidities across countries may also have been a factor in explaining inflation differentials. if i look at product groups, there has been a relatively higher price dispersion in the area of services. this is probably associated with the dispersion in services wage developments. by contrast, inflation dispersion was relatively low for tradeable goods. then, of course, products with relatively volatile price developments (energy, unprocessed food and processed food) also showed a high dispersion of price changes across countries. hence, there is a certain degree of structural diversity in inflation and cost developments among euro area national economies. a portion of this diversity is undesirable and, if uncorrected, may engender negative effects and externalities for the euro area as a whole. we can conclude that, while differing wage and price rigidities play an important role, increased competition, particularly in the services sector, is very welcome to the extent that it has a dampening effect on inflation differentials. 4.b the second snapshot of diversity in the euro area concerns growth dispersion. growth dispersion in the euro area has been broadly stable since the early 1970s. between 1999 and 2005 no signs of increased divergence emerged. the average dispersion of annual real gdp growth (measured as the unwei… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Economic management in a large currency zone like the euro area | Period_1 | 2007-10-08 | 0.548 | diversity in perspective diversity within the euro area should be put in perspective, and i shall now look at three main types of divergence. whenever possible, i will compare the euro area with the united states, as the world’s only other industrialised economy of a comparable size. a) inflation dispersion in the euro area declined considerably in the 1980s and 1990s and is now on a par with that of the united states. impressive progress has been made, and inflation dispersion among euro area countries has broadly stabilised at a low level since the launch of the euro. to give you an example, the unweighted standard deviation of annual hicp inflation rates still stood at around 6 percentage points in late 1990, but this rate has broadly stabilised at around 1 percentage point since the launch of the euro. this dispersion level is similar to that of the 14 us metropolitan statistical areas (msas), but is somewhat higher than that of the four us census regions. although such comparisons are subject to some well-known caveats, i would argue that inflation dispersion in the euro area has not been high by international standards. one feature of euro area inflation differentials is their persistence over long periods of time; in this respect, the euro area differs from the united states. in other words, inflation in most euro area countries displays significant inertia. most euro area countries exhibiting higher than average inflation rates in recent years have been in this pos… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The process of economic, monetary and financial integration in Europe | Period_1 | 2006-12-04 | 0.490 | the credit channel smoothes out 23% of such shocks, and the federal government 13%. 9 25% of the shock is not smoothed out. hence, in the united states, financial markets and financial institutions would contribute 62% to the absorption of state idiosyncratic shocks. the effect is very substantially higher than the effect of the federal budget. this is a very important result which puts into perspective the argument against the single currency based upon the absence of a significant federal budget and therefore the absence of a significant role for the fiscal channel to absorb asymmetric shocks at the level of the different states. we see in the case of the us that the fiscal channel is in fact modest. much more important is the financial channel, and it is an additional reason for the ecb to speed up financial integration. my fourth lesson is that the observations about the divergences within the euro area should also be put in perspective. the existence of a degree of diversity is a natural phenomenon in any vast continental currency area. and understanding what lies behind the diversity is an important aspect of economic management. i will provide you with three main snapshots of this diversity. my first snapshot is that inflation dispersion declined considerably in the run-up to the euro and, since the setting-up of the euro, it has been on a par with inflation dispersion in the us. impressive progress has been made, and inflation dispersion among euro area countries h… |
| Philip R Lane: Interview in the Financial Times | Period_2 | 2020-02-03 | 0.138 | and there is no problem with inflation getting high. when you are in this kind of low zone – where the advanced economies and many emerging markets are – where inflation is super low and interest rates and our policy instruments are already quite extended, then a negative shock to inflation is going to be more visible because we cannot instantly correct it. the policy space is such that it takes time to restore inflation back to target when you have a low inflation and a low interest rate world with relatively small, temporary shocks to inflation, which are more visible and more persistent. so you’re not saying it hasn’t had any impact at all, you’re just saying the impact might be more visible here in europe, where we have very low inflation… first of all, low inflation means a small shock compared to the overall inflation rate looks bigger, and, second, our ability to quickly eliminate those shocks is less. since 2014, the mantra of the ecb has been patience: that we are intent on getting inflation back to target. our monetary policy remains effective and we do respond to shocks, but it does take longer when you can only do relatively small policy moves. when you look at, geographically within the euro zone, different countries and different areas, it does seem like there are some countries where inflation is above your target, and others where it’s very low. are there any common themes that you spot there? i know you prefer to look at the euro zone as a whole, but… when… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy in a pandemic - ensuring favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2020-12-01 | 0.108 | (net percentages of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards and contributing factors) ecb (october 2020 euro area bank lending survey). notes: “actual” values are changes that have occurred, while “expected” values are changes anticipated by banks. net percentages are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “eased somewhat” and “eased considerably”. the net percentages for responses to questions related to contributing factors are defined as the difference between the percentage of banks reporting that the given factor contributed to a tightening and the percentage reporting that it contributed to an easing. “cost of funds and balance sheet constraints” is the unweighted average of “costs related to capital position”, “access to market financing” and “liquidity position”; “risk perceptions” is the unweighted average of “general economic situation and outlook”, “industry or firm-specific situation and outlook/borrower’s creditworthiness” and “risk related to the collateral demanded”; “competition” is the unweighted average of “competition from other banks”, “competition from non- banks” and “competition from market financing”. the net percentages for the “other factors” refer to further factors which were mentioned by banks as having contributed to changes in credit standards, currently mainly related to the policy interventi… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy in a pandemic - ensuring favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2020-12-01 | 0.090 | 01/12/2020 monetary policy in a pandemic: ensuring favourable financing conditions changes in demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises and contributing factors (net percentages of banks reporting an increase in demand and contributing factors) ecb (october 2020 euro area bank lending survey). notes: “actual” values are changes that have occurred, while “expected” values are changes anticipated by banks. net percentages for the questions on demand for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “increased considerably” and “increased somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “decreased somewhat” and “decreased considerably”. the net percentages for responses to questions relating to contributing factors are defined as the difference between the percentage of banks reporting that the given factor contributed to increasing demand and the percentage reporting that it contributed to decreasing demand. “other financing needs” is the unweighted average of “mergers/acquisitions and corporate restructuring” and “debt refinancing/restructuring and renegotiation”; “use of alternative finance” is the unweighted average of “internal financing”, “loans from other banks”, “loans from non-banks”, “issuance/redemption of debt securities” and “issuance/redemption of equity”. the latest observation is for the third quarter of 2020 for actual demand and the fourth quarter of 2020 for expected demand. change in the expect… |
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.089 | in any event, structural factors can only have a lasting negative impact on inflation if they seep into inflation expectations. this leads me to the third factor that may explain the apparent disconnect between the real economy and inflation. empirically, it is not straightforward to gauge the anchoring of inflation expectations. there can be differing interpretations depending on the approach used to define anchoring, as well as the measure and horizon of inflation expectations considered. |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.072 | 2 see, for instance, vega and winkelried (2005), walsh (2009) and svensson (2010). 3 it is fair to say, though, that among the group of industrial countries also those countries that did not adopt inflation targeting have seen on average, lower and less volatile inflation rates over past 20 years than before. how important inflation targeting has been in bringing down inflation rates is still the subject of an active academic debate in relation to other factors such as “good luck”. 4 see svensson, lars ( 1997) 5 bean, charles (2009) and (2013) |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.074 | in 2009 volatility was already about four times higher than average volatility since 2000. output growth volatility is defined as the eight-quarter rolling standard deviation of quarterly gdp growth rates. 6. schnabel, i. (2020), “when markets fail – the need for collective action in tackling climate change”, speech at the european sustainable finance summit, frankfurt am main, 28 september. in a recent survey conducted by the ecb, around 80% of firms saw increased risks of interruptions to their production because of climate change. see ecb (2022), “the impact of climate change on activity and prices – insights from a survey of leading firms”, economic bulletin, issue 4. 7. european drought observatory, drought in europe, august 2022. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.061 | in comparing inflation dynamics across regions, chart 22 shows that the increase in core inflation has been much higher in the united states relative to the euro area. two basic factors behind this are the larger contribution from supply bottlenecks to inflation and the higher levels of domestic demand in the united states, which is shown in chart 23. |
| Isabel Schnabel: The globalisation of inflation | Period_3 | 2022-05-16 | 0.061 | this can also be seen when looking at the evolution of financial market expectations. about a year ago, investors were pricing in a long-term inflation outlook in the euro area that was significantly different from that in the united states. a widely used measure of longer term market based inflation expectations, the expected average inflation rate over a five year period starting in five years’ time as priced by financial markets, was about a full percentage point lower in the euro area (slide 4, right-hand side). last week, the difference was just 20 basis points, a fraction of the pre-pandemic average, suggesting that future expected inflation trends are also assessed to be broadly similar despite the prevailing differences in the relative importance of the current drivers of underlying price pressures, including wage growth. common shocks and spillovers from idiosyncratic shocks are driving global price synchronisation global price synchronisation is not a new phenomenon. analysis by ecb staff shows that not only headline, but also core inflation was highly correlated across economies already before the pandemic (slide 5). these correlations were sometimes not easy to detect simply because, contrary to headline inflation, underlying price pressures are often moving through the global economy at varying speeds, as it takes time for changes in supply and demand in one country to affect prices elsewhere. of course, such correlations say little about the ultimate source o… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.054 | : credit standards on loans to euro area firms (left panel) and households for house purchase (right panel) and contributing factors ecb (bls). notes: net percentages are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “eased somewhat” and “eased considerably”. “risk perceptions” for loans to firms is the unweighted average of “general economic situation and outlook”, “industry or firm-specific situation and outlook/borrower’s creditworthiness” and “risk related to the collateral demanded”. “risk perceptions” for loans to households for house purchase is the unweighted average of “general economic situation and outlook”, “housing market prospects, including expected house price developments” and “borrower’s creditworthiness”. “other” refers to further factors, like “cost of funds and balance sheet constraints” and “competition”. latest observation: july 2022 euro area bank lending survey (bls). |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.052 | however, an inflation increase due to a supply-side shock cannot be expected to significantly alleviate the debt burden over the medium term. ecb staff simulations show that the resulting decline in real growth, higher interest payments and deteriorating primary deficits would increase public debt ratios over longer horizons (slide 11, right-hand chart). rising interest rates as a result of tighter monetary policy or higher public debt lift up the interest rate- growth differential for a given rate of potential growth. the negative interest rate-growth differential before the pandemic helped to contain, or even reduce, debt-to-gdp ratios. the differential still stands near historic lows but is about to become less favourable (slide 12, left-hand chart). against this backdrop, current circumstances call for responsible fiscal policy. governments need to be clear that current budget deficits are backed by future primary surpluses, via either future higher tax rates or lower spending. if governments do not credibly signal their commitment to responsible fiscal policies, the private sector may eventually expect that higher inflation is needed to ensure the sustainability of public debt.[16] this would be the case if high unfunded budget deficits ended up eroding the credibility of the central bank to pursue its monetary policy objectives, endangering price stability.[17] if, by contrast, the central bank is fully credible – because it has earned a reputation of safeguarding pr… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 76 | european | 1 | 0.0680348 | european parliament | 1 | 0.9996494 |
| 76 | parliament | 2 | 0.0421292 | parliament | 2 | 0.9994742 |
| 76 | report | 3 | 0.0395241 | annual report | 3 | 0.9991236 |
| 76 | committee | 4 | 0.0369191 | committee | 4 | 0.9988607 |
| 76 | european parliament | 5 | 0.0343141 | monetary affair | 5 | 0.9988601 |
| 76 | president | 6 | 0.0311302 | affair | 6 | 0.9987734 |
| 76 | annual | 7 | 0.0220125 | hear | 7 | 0.9981163 |
| 76 | affair | 8 | 0.0165130 | honourable | 8 | 0.9975431 |
| 76 | annual report | 9 | 0.0153552 | draft | 9 | 0.9971957 |
| 76 | hear | 10 | 0.0149211 | report | 10 | 0.9970143 |
| 76 | discuss | 11 | 0.0149211 | honourable member | 11 | 0.9969735 |
| 76 | statement | 12 | 0.0140527 | draft resolution | 12 | 0.9969308 |
| 76 | monetary affair | 13 | 0.0133291 | ecb annual report | 13 | 0.9969280 |
| 76 | remark | 14 | 0.0131844 | ecb annual | 14 | 0.9965797 |
| 76 | resolution | 15 | 0.0120266 | president | 15 | 0.9963124 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: European Central Bank’s Annual Report 2005 | Period_1 | 2006-05-02 | 0.372 | madam chairwoman, members of the committee on economic and monetary affairs, it is an honour for me to present to you the ecb’s annual report for 2005. the presentation of the annual report is a core element of the ecb’s accountability vis-à-vis the european parliament. as we have always stressed, the ecb places the greatest value on the fulfilment of its accountability obligations, and i am looking forward to a fruitful dialogue with you. in my introductory statement, i will first briefly review economic and monetary developments in 2005 and in early 2006, focusing on the monetary policy decisions of the ecb. i will then address a number of the policy issues examined in detail in the annual report which i consider to be of particular relevance. |
| Lucas Papademos: Presentation of the European Central Bank’s Annual Report for 2004 | Period_1 | 2005-04-28 | 0.354 | madam chairman, members of the committee on economic and monetary affairs, it is an honour for me to present to you today the ecb’s annual report 2004. the presentation of the annual report is an essential part of the ecb’s accountability vis-à-vis the european parliament. as you know, the ecb accords the utmost importance to the fulfilment of its accountability obligations, and i am looking forward to a fruitful dialogue with you. in my introductory statement, i will first briefly review economic and monetary developments over the past year and give our assessment of the economic outlook and the monetary policy stance. i will then focus on a number of policy issues examined in the annual report which i consider to be of particular importance. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2007 to the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2008-07-14 | 0.318 | other issues raised in the european parliament’s draft resolution on the ecb’s annual report 2007 mister president, honourable members of the european parliament, in your draft resolution you raise a large number of issues of relevance to the ecb. i would like to assure you that we will consider your remarks and requests with great care and report back to you accordingly. i will now briefly elaborate on some of these points. |
| Lucas Papademos: European Central Bank’s Annual Report 2006 | Period_1 | 2007-04-24 | 0.307 | madam chair, honourable members of the committee on economic and monetary affairs, it is a great privilege and pleasure for me to present to you today the ecb’s annual report 2006. as you know, this is a key aspect of the ecb’s accountability obligations towards the european parliament and we welcome this opportunity to explain our policy decisions and report on our activities to you. in my introductory remarks, i will first briefly review the economic and monetary developments in 2006 and early 2007 and explain the reasons behind the monetary policy decisions that we have taken. i would then like to address a number of policy issues examined in the annual report, including issues pertaining to the stability and integration of europe’s financial system. before doing so, however, i would like to recall that on 1 january 2007 the euro area welcomed its 13th member, slovenia. accession to the euro area is rightly considered a tremendous success for that country. thanks to the diligent preparations of all parties concerned, the currency changeover from the slovenian tolar to the euro went very smoothly, to the great satisfaction of everybody involved, especially the people of slovenia. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2005 to the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2006-10-31 | 0.291 | other issues raised in the european parliament’s draft resolution on the ecb’s annual report 2005 mister president, honourable members of the european parliament, in your draft resolution you raise a large number of issues of relevance to the ecb and i would like to assure you that we will consider them with great care. on two issues i already should like to share our assessment, in view of their topical nature and the exchanges of views i and my fellow members of the executive board had with you on these issues. in the draft resolution, the ecb is called upon to carry out further analysis in the area of hedge funds. amid the increasing attention being paid to the activities of hedge funds, i think that it would be unfair |
| Vítor Constâncio: Presentation of the European Central Bank Annual Report 2016 to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2017-04-18 | 0.363 | vítor constâncio: presentation of the european central bank annual report 2016 to the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament introductory remarks by mr vítor constâncio, vice-president of the european central bank, to the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament, brussels, 10 april 2017. * * * mr chairman, honourable members of the committee on economic and monetary affairs, ladies and gentlemen, i am honoured to be here today before your committee to present the ecb annual report for 2016. the annual report is an essential element of our democratic accountability. it supports the democratic debate regarding our decisions. and our accountability does not stop with our reporting obligations. this occasion ensures that our annual report will be discussed by the representatives of the people of europe. we take our accountability to the european parliament extremely seriously. this is the beginning of a well-established process. our exchange today, and the regular dialogue between our two institutions, will feed into the european parliament resolution on the ecb annual report. this is very important for us because we want to make sure that we deliver on the democratic mandate that was conferred upon the ecb. the ecb is independent so that it can act in line with this mandate, without political interference. and it is democratically and legally accountable to ensure that it does act in line with this mandate. as is cus… |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2019-09-24 | 0.342 | mario draghi: hearing at the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament introductory statement by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, before the hearing at the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament, brussels, 23 february 2019. * * * introduction madam chair, honourable members of the economic and monetary affairs committee, ladies and gentlemen, i would like to start by congratulating all of you on your election, and you, madam chair, on your recent appointment as chair of this committee. it is a pleasure to appear before this committee in this new legislative term and before my term as ecb president comes to an end. the legitimacy of the ecb’s independence, as enshrined in the eu treaties, crucially relies on our accountability. and the treaties have conferred this parliament with a central role in holding the ecb accountable. hearings before this committee play an essential role here. in my time as president, i have found them to be extremely beneficial. when i appeared before the econ committee for the first time, in december 2011, the euro area was rife with financial instability; it was falling into a second recession, which eventually led to sustained disinflation and, at times, heightened risks of outright deflation.1 the euro area has come a long way since the crisis, in part thanks to the support provided by the ecb’s monetary policy. the unemployment rate in the euro area was 7.5% in … |
| Mario Draghi: Introductory statement to the plenary debate of the European Parliament on the European Central Bank’s Annual Report 2016 | Period_2 | 2018-02-06 | 0.332 | mario draghi: introductory statement to the plenary debate of the european parliament on the european central bank’s annual report 2016 introductory statement by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, to the plenary debate of the european parliament on the european central bank’s annual report 2016, strasbourg, 5 february 2017. * * * mr president of the european parliament, mr vice-president of the commission, honourable members of the european parliament, i am very pleased to be here to discuss with you the ecb’s activities and your draft resolution on the ecb’s annual report 2016. today’s debate represents a good opportunity to take stock of progress made and discuss the way forward. a decade ago, the global financial crisis was starting. today, while further efforts are needed to overcome its legacy, the euro area economy is expanding and employment is rising. your draft resolution points out that monetary policy has played a key role in this recovery process. the ecb has indeed acted decisively, in line with its mandate. we have addressed financial fragmentation and supported the economy, enabling inflation to gradually converge towards our objective. the draft resolution also notes that the independence of the ecb has allowed us to take resolute action within our mandate. but independence is just one of the cornerstones of our institutional framework. accountability is its necessary counterpart. and you, as the representatives of the people of the eu… |
| Luis de Guindos: Presentation of the European Central Bank Annual Report 2018 to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2019-04-01 | 0.325 | luis de guindos: presentation of the european central bank annual report 2018 to the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament introductory remarks by mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, to the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament, brussels, 1 april 2019. * * * mr chairman, honourable members of the committee on economic and monetary affairs, ladies and gentlemen, i am honoured to appear for the first time before this committee in my capacity as ecb vice- president and i am delighted to present the ecb annual report for 2018. the annual report is the ecb’s main vehicle for discharging its accountability obligations, as stipulated in the eu treaties, but of course our relationship with the european parliament has long evolved well beyond the treaty requirements. as part of this healthy and constructive relationship, and in line with what is now well-established practice, we are today also publishing written feedback on your resolution on our previous annual report. among other issues, we report the full amounts of profit made through the securities markets programme, in response to the resolution’s request for the ecb to disclose them. in my remarks today, i will discuss the monetary policy decisions taken by the ecb in 2018 and their impact on the euro area economy. as stated in the annual report, ample monetary stimulus is still necessary for inflation to converge to levels that are … |
| Vítor Constâncio: Presentation of the European Central Bank Annual Report 2016 to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2017-04-18 | 0.287 | 4 see the box entitled “diversity of banks’ business models and adjustment to the low interest rate environment”, annual report 2016, ecb, 2017. 5 see presentation of the ecb annual report on supervisory activities 2016 to the european parliament’s economic and monetary affairs committee – introductory statement by danièle nouy, chair of the supervisory board of the ecb, brussels, 23 march 2017 6 “the decisions facing europe” , second jean monnet lecture by the president of the european parliament, emilio colombo, florence, 9 november 1978 5/5 |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.284 | hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament introductory statement by christine lagarde, president of the ecb, at the hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament (by videoconference) frankfurt am main, 15 november 2021 we are nearing the end of the year, which means that you will soon reach the midway point of this legislative term. for my part, | have just completed the first two years of my mandate at the ecb. i’m sure that, on taking office, none of us thought that a global pandemic would be at the top of our agendas. but in the face of turbulence, we came together as europeans and mounted an unprecedented response to protect people’s lives and livelihoods. the challenge is not over yet. not only the course of the pandemic, but also the decisions taken by policymakers will continue to determine the strength of the recovery. and that is why our regular hearings are so important. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-11-29 | 0.281 | christine lagarde: hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament introductory statement by ms christine lagarde president of the european central bank, at the hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament, brussels, 28 november 2022. accompanying charts of the speech over the past 12 months, the ecb has embarked on a swift and comprehensive process of normalising monetary policy. first, we ended net asset purchases in a matter of a few months. next, we started raising our policy rates at their fastest pace ever. in my short remarks today, i will briefly look back on the past year and focus on the key actions taken by the ecb, and the eu more broadly, to address people’s concerns. i will also address the two topics selected by this committee for today’s hearing, namely the global monetary policy cycle and inflation differentials. |
| Luis de Guindos: Presentation of the European Central Bank annual report 2021 | Period_3 | 2022-05-04 | 0.255 | luis de guindos: presentation of the european central bank annual report 2021 introductory remarks by mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, at the econ committee of the european parliament, brussels, 28 april 2022. * * * i am very happy to appear again in person before this committee to present the ecb’s annual report for 2021.1 the last time i joined you here in brussels physically was 1 april 2019 and many things have happened since then. the annual report and today’s hearing are an important pillar of the ecb’s accountability relationship with this parliament. that is why today we are also publishing our written feedback to your resolution on our annual report for 2020.2 in response to the call included in your resolution last year, the ecb annual report now comprises a new chapter outlining all our sustainability-related activities and initiatives. as a result, our existing environmental reporting framework has been expanded to also incorporate social and governance-related considerations in an integrated format. in my remarks today, i will first discuss the economic outlook for the euro area and the recent monetary policy decisions taken by the ecb. i will then briefly update you on our current financial stability assessment, notably considering the impact of the russia-ukraine war. finally, i will discuss the importance of a strong, resilient and well-integrated european financial sector, in particular at the present juncture. the evolution… |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-06-22 | 0.242 | hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament speech by christine lagarde, president of the ecb, at the hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament brussels, 20 june 2022 it is a pleasure to be here again for our second regular hearing this year and my first in brussels since the start of the pandemic two years ago. the economic and geopolitical landscape facing europe has changed dramatically following the unjustified aggression by russia towards ukraine. over the past few weeks and months, europe – thanks also to the work of this parliament – has responded forcefully by imposing sanctions and implementing measures to reduce its dependence on russia and to cushion the economic impact of the war. over the same period, the conditions facing monetary policy have changed markedly. at our june meeting we therefore decided to take further steps in normalising our monetary policy. let me start by discussing our updated assessment of the outlook before going on to explain our decisions in greater detail. in view of the new rules that require me to give a shorter introductory statement, i will only be able to present a few elements of our assessment and decisions taken at our meeting on 8-9 june 2022. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-09-26 | 0.229 | hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament speech by christine lagarde, president of the ecb, at the hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament brussels, 26 september 2022 it is a pleasure to be back here in brussels with you for our third hearing this year. russia’s unjustified war of aggression on ukraine continues to cast a shadow over europe. my thoughts are with the ukrainian people suffering the senseless atrocities of the war. the economic consequences for the euro area have continued to unfold since we last met in june and the outlook is darkening. inflation remains far too high and is likely to stay above our target for an extended period. at our meeting earlier this month, the governing council therefore took the major step to frontload the transition from the prevailing highly accommodative level of policy rates towards levels that will ensure the timely return of inflation to our two per cent medium-term target. in line with the topics chosen for this hearing, i will provide you with a brief overview of the economic outlook and then explain our recent monetary policy decisions in greater detail. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 77 | treaty | 1 | 0.0529284 | independence | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 77 | independence | 2 | 0.0475356 | independent | 2 | 0.9993867 |
| 77 | institutional | 3 | 0.0312447 | treaty | 3 | 0.9991231 |
| 77 | mandate | 4 | 0.0289977 | bank independence | 4 | 0.9990795 |
| 77 | independent | 5 | 0.0229308 | central bank independence | 5 | 0.9988604 |
| 77 | objective | 6 | 0.0188862 | institutional | 6 | 0.9983336 |
| 77 | responsibility | 7 | 0.0188862 | maastricht treaty | 7 | 0.9979840 |
| 77 | principle | 8 | 0.0175379 | independent central | 8 | 0.9978953 |
| 77 | political | 9 | 0.0143921 | independent central bank | 9 | 0.9976323 |
| 77 | set | 10 | 0.0132686 | maastricht | 10 | 0.9974592 |
| 77 | bank independence | 11 | 0.0132686 | statute | 11 | 0.9967989 |
| 77 | central bank independence | 12 | 0.0128192 | responsibility | 12 | 0.9967092 |
| 77 | establish | 13 | 0.0118081 | enshrine | 13 | 0.9965343 |
| 77 | ensure | 14 | 0.0116957 | institutional framework | 14 | 0.9964955 |
| 77 | public | 15 | 0.0114710 | principle | 15 | 0.9952566 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jürgen Stark: Monetary policy and the euro | Period_1 | 2008-04-16 | 0.405 | the ecb’s independence let me now focus on the second feature of the institutional framework for the single currency. in order to ensure that the single monetary policy will effectively pursue price stability, the provisions of the treaty have granted the ecb far-reaching independence. central bank independence is a necessary precondition for monetary policy to be credibly and effectively geared to price stability, since it protects monetary policy from detrimental political interferences. in the absence of central bank independence, monetary policy can at any time be exposed to political pressures, motivated, for example, by short-term or short-sighted policy considerations, to boost output temporarily in the short run at the expense of higher inflation in the longer run. the public will, however, understand this problem and expect higher inflation from the outset, so that the perceived short-term trade-off between inflation and output will be negated and a permanently higher inflation rate will ensue as the only certain outcome. the only way out of this dilemma is to delegate monetary policy to an independent central bank with a clear mandate to safeguard price stability. the concept of independence includes • the institutional independence of the ecb and the national central banks of the eurosystem from any political interference is guaranteed in article 108 of the treaty. there the treaty explicitly stipulates that, when exercising their powers, neither the ecb nor any… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Ten years of the euro - successes and challenges | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.320 | granted that the euro would be able to establish itself so quickly as a stable and internationally recognised currency. this was only possible because the ecb and the national central banks of the eurosystem have solid institutional foundations. these foundations are the treaty negotiated in maastricht in 1991 and the statute of the escb. the treaty and the statute of the escb are clear: the primary objective of the eurosystem is to ensure price stability. the ecb and the national central banks of the eurosystem are independent so that they can pursue this goal. neither the ecb, nor the national central banks, nor the members of their decision-making bodies may seek or receive any instructions from anybody. this applies to european as well as national institutions. they, for their part, are obliged to respect the principle of central bank independence. the priority given to price stability and the independence of the central bank are the results of a long, historical learning process in monetary policy. it is theoretically well founded and empirically proven that independent central banks are better able to ensure low inflation rates than those which are subject to political influence. independence guarantees above all that central banks can focus on securing price stability over the medium and long term and are not exposed to short-term political influences, or to vested interests’ pressures. in germany the primary mandate of price stability and the independence of the ce… |
| Jürgen Stark: Monetary policy and the euro | Period_1 | 2008-04-16 | 0.314 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: Monetary policy and the euro | Period_1 | 2008-04-16 | 0.272 | democratic legitimacy it is important to note that the far-reaching independence granted to the ecb by the treaty does not mean that it lacks democratic legitimacy. the principle of democratic legitimacy must be looked at in conjunction with the complementary principles of the separation of powers, the rule of law and the relationship to the ec treaty. the independence of the central bank from political influence represents an attempt to ensure that the power of the state serves the public interest. the ecb has been established by the treaty, which has been ratified by all member states and the members of the ecb decision-making bodies are all appointed by the member states’ democratically elected representatives. furthermore, the competency for monetary policy is transferred within the limits of a clearly defined, single mandate to maintain price stability against which the ecb can be held accountable by the european citizens. problems of accountability could only arise if the ecb – having only one instrument at its disposal – had the mandate to pursue several objectives. then, it would have to explain potential conflicts between the objectives and, if necessary, to justify its own prioritisation of objectives in a democratic manner. in order to foster the ecb’s accountability to the citizens of the euro area, the treaty specifies a number of reporting requirements for the ecb and provides for regular hearings before the european parliament. yet, in its communication with… |
| Willem F Duisenberg: The first lustrum of the ECB | Period_1 | 2003-06-27 | 0.272 | bolster the success of economic and monetary union (emu). throughout the five years of its existence, the ecb has stated that a strong euro is good for a strong europe. i would now like to add that a strong europe is good for a strong euro. if the european union is re-writing its rulebook by giving itself a constitution, does this mean profound changes to the provisions relating to the ecb and to monetary union in general? throughout the process of drafting the constitution, the ecb has consistently advocated that the economic constitution of the eu - the basic set of rules and provisions for emu as laid down in the maastricht treaty - is sound both in terms of the objectives set and the allocation of responsibilities between different actors and levels of government. the convention appears to have followed a similar reasoning, as it appears that the future constitution will take over the provisions relating to emu in an essentially unchanged form. the single monetary policy is, by its very nature, indivisible and is thus centralised; hence it remains an exclusive competence of the union. the task of conducting monetary policy, as well as all other central banking tasks, has been assigned to an independent central bank with a clear primary objective of maintaining price stability. in addition to the ecb, the escb is also mentioned in the first part of the constitution, thus acknowledging the federal nature of the monetary authority of the european union and its sui generis… |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Stormy times - how is the ECB handling them? | Period_2 | 2015-11-30 | 0.218 | to achieve this, the ecb needs to be independent; also independent from political influence. the independence of central banks is a relatively new, but now undisputed, achievement. the deutsche bundesbank was the trailblazer in this regard: since 1957 it has been the very model of an independent central bank. since the 1990s most industrialised countries have adopted this model in one form or another. indeed, the ecb itself was also modelled on the bundesbank. why does a central bank need to be independent? on a matter as important as money, people justifiably want to see tight controls. history has shown independent central banks to be the most successful in keeping the value of money stable. the underlying principle is that responsibility for maintaining price stability should be in the hands of independent experts, rather than politicians, who are forced to think in terms of legislative periods and who may be tempted to solve problems with the printing press or, at least, to make life slightly easier for themselves through excessively low interest rates. comparative surveys have indeed shown significant positive effects of a country’s central bank being accorded independence, such as macroeconomic stability and, in particular, lower rates of inflation. to enable a central bank to fulfil its mandate of ensuring price stability, it uses monetary policy instruments in a way that is designed to have the best possible impact on price developments. this cannot happen without … |
| Mario Draghi: The European Central Bank - rebuilding trust, restoring prosperity and re-establishing price stability | Period_2 | 2015-11-11 | 0.161 | economies, the bulk of the money stock takes the form of bank deposits. money is the liability of the banking system as a whole, and it circulates electronically. for money to be “single”, then, the payments system has to work smoothly across the jurisdiction – that is actually one of our statutory tasks – and the banking system that creates money has to be sound. it is above all for this reason that we attach great importance to high-quality banking supervision, a task that has been entrusted to the ecb since november last year. and it is for the same reason that we act as lender of last resort to solvent banks in the event of a liquidity crisis. these functions are not designed to protect individual banks per se. they aim to ensure confidence in deposits and their continuous fungibility with banknotes and other forms of money across the union. moreover, as monetary policy impulses are transmitted in part through bank lending channels, sound banks are a prerequisite for ensuring price stability. if only for that reason, countering fragmentation in the banking system falls without doubt within our mandate. the ecb’s mandate, in its broadest sense, is based on a consensus rooted in society. politicians receive their mandates from elections which reflect the preferences of the electorate. the ecb’s mandate, by contrast, is inscribed in a document with a constitutional status: the treaty. a constitution rests on those shared values deeply felt by citizens; that is why constit… |
| Peter Praet: Have unconventional policies overstretched central bank independence? Challenges for accountability and transparency in the wake of the crisis | Period_2 | 2017-03-30 | 0.157 | peter praet: have unconventional policies overstretched central bank independence? challenges for accountability and transparency in the wake of the crisis keynote address by mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the “symposium on building the financial system of the 21st century: an agenda for europe and the united states”, frankfurt am main, 29 march 2017. * * * i would like to thank claus brand for his contribution to this speech. evolution in consensus on the role of central banks and central bank independence in the course of monetary history, consensus on the role of monetary policy and on the appropriate degree of independence of the central bank has fluctuated considerably. during major crises, the pendulum has tended to swing from one extreme to the other. in the heyday of the gold standard, i.e. the decades preceding world war i, there was a commonly accepted understanding of how to preserve monetary and financial stability. the gold standard provided what we call a “nominal anchor”. it effectively ensured central bank independence from other public policies by subjecting monetary policy to an automatic rule.1 at the same time, there was a clear understanding of the role of central banks as a lender of last resort. under that regime, central banks enjoyed sufficient discretion to take effective action in the event of banking panics. adherence to the oft-quoted bagehot principle (“lend freely at a high rate against good col… |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2014-07-18 | 0.136 | mr chairman, honourable members, allow me to start by congratulating all of you on your election to this house, and you, mr chairman, on your appointment as chair of the committee in the new legislative period. the architects of monetary union conceived the ecb as a central bank with a clear mandate and with strong provisions for its independence. but for a public institution in a democratic society, independence can never come without being commensurately transparent and accountable to the elected representatives of the people. our regular exchanges of views are a key channel for the ecb to discharge its duty of central bank accountability; hence, they plays an essential role in providing the ecb with the necessary legitimacy to fulfil the tasks assigned to it by the treaties. to underscore our commitment to transparency, the ecb has recently decided to go a step further by publishing regular accounts of the monetary policy meetings of the governing council, which is intended to start in january next year. it is in this spirit that i am looking forward to our exchange of views over the next five years. and, therefore, without further ado, let me go into the substance for today: first, i will share with you our assessment of the economic outlook for the euro area. second, i will explain the package of policy measures we adopted at the beginning of june. finally, i will briefly touch upon the challenges that await us in the next five years. |
| Mario Draghi: The European Central Bank - rebuilding trust, restoring prosperity and re-establishing price stability | Period_2 | 2015-11-11 | 0.136 | consequence of the central bank renouncing to apply strictly and in full the provisions of the treaty. the ecb’s support for greece is based on its statute but also on the assumption in the treaty that the status of each member of the euro area remains inviolate. indeed, the same conviction and the same independence from the political process led us in the summer of 2012, when the sovereign debt crisis endangered the integrity of the euro area, to resolutely declare our determination to defend the single currency. to sum up, the balance we achieved with our interventions during the greek crisis was fully within our mandate; it respected the political commitment to the single currency contained in the treaty, but at the same time we implemented that commitment within the limits of our statute. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.127 | second, central bank independence is important for safeguarding stable prices. today, central banks in almost all advanced economies and many emerging market economies are politically independent. the “great moderation” that took off in the 1980s built on these two pillars — a narrow, well-defined mandate and central bank independence. over time, a clear commitment to price stability has anchored inflation expectations at very low levels. maintaining this level of trust is what will guide the response of central banks to the challenges we are facing today. |
| Frank Elderson: Proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank concrete | Period_3 | 2022-03-25 | 0.114 | police had exceeded their mandate. to put it simply: the ruling made it clear that the police were only responsible for public security, and not for safeguarding aesthetic interests. the verdict signified an important step in the development of modern societies. acknowledging that their actions intrude on the lives of citizens, public sector authorities began limiting their actions to what is strictly necessary to achieve the established objectives. since then, proportionality has evolved to become a fundamental principle in many legal systems. the proportionality principle is a cornerstone of the institutional structure of the european union, laid down in article 5 of the treaty on the european union. and all its institutions are bound by it in the pursuit of their respective mandates. it requires them to carefully assess the necessity and suitability of policy action to deliver on the mandate, while also considering whether this policy action is less intrusive compared with other options for achieving the same goal. needless to say, this requirement also applies to the ecb. proportionality in policy deliberations thus, systematically assessing the proportionality of our monetary policy actions is exactly what we set out to do – and made even more explicit in our new monetary policy strategy – when the ecb governing council meets to discuss monetary policy every six to seven weeks. it is important to note that the scope of the proportionality assessment of policy decision… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.072 | monetary policy tightening and the green transition speech by isabel schnabel, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the international symposium on central bank independence, sveriges riksbank, stockholm stockholm, 10 january 2023 the green transition will fundamentally transform our societies.[1] protecting our planet requires unprecedented large-scale investments in technical innovations and renewable energies to bring our economies on a path towards net zero greenhouse gas emissions. as our experience over the past two decades demonstrates, the relatively large upfront costs incurred in these capital-intensive expenditures are particularly susceptible to changes in the cost of credit. low and declining interest rates have measurably contributed to the fall in the “levelised cost of electricity”, or lcoe, of renewable energies.[2] as a result, the cost of electricity from renewable sources is now comparable to, or lower than, that of conventional power plants.[3] these developments now risk being reversed by the marked rise in global interest rates over the past year. since fossil fuel-based power plants have comparably low upfront costs, a persistent rise in the cost of capital may discourage efforts to decarbonise our economies rapidly. put simply, renewable energies are more competitive when interest rates are low.[4] while simulations suggest that the lcoe of a gas-fired power plant would change only marginally if discount rates were to double, that of offshor… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.070 | europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law lectio magistralis by fabio panetta, member of the executive board of the ecb, on the occasion of the conferral of an honorary degree in law by the university of cassino and southern lazio cassino, 6 april 2022 i am deeply honoured and proud to receive this honorary degree in law from the university of cassino and southern lazio. it comes forty years after i graduated with my first degree in economics, but the emotion is the same. what’s more, it is an honorary degree in a subject that has formed an important part of my work experience. in a certain way, i have always been a student of the law. i joined the banca d’italia in 1985 and since then i have devoted my entire professional life to working in public institutions. as central bankers, we must always act “within our mandate”. this is the cornerstone of our independence and the source of our legitimacy. we are servants of the law and can only use the powers that have been delegated to the central bank to fulfil the mandate it has been democratically assigned. it has been my privilege to work with eminent figures who have contributed to progress in italy and europe. i was a junior economist when i met carlo azeglio ciampi, then governor of the banca d’italia, who went on to become prime minister and president of the italian republic. as a member of the executive board of the european central bank (ecb), i am now at the heart of european policymaking. our tasks derive from t… |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-02-10 | 0.055 | christine lagarde: hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament introductory statement (via video conference) by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at the hearing of the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament, frankfurt am main, 7 february 202 2. * * * accompanying charts: www.bis.org/review/r220210b_charts.pdf on this day in 1992, the leaders of twelve european countries decided to transform the european community into the european union by signing the maastricht treaty. thirty years on, europe continues to benefit from many of the accomplishments of that treaty. the treaty established european citizenship, including the right to move and settle freely in the eu. it granted this parliament extended powers through its right of co-decision and strengthened europe’s voice in the world through a common defence and security policy. and, perhaps most importantly, the treaty laid the foundation for our economic and monetary union, leading to the introduction of the euro and the establishment of the ecb. as we are celebrating 20 years of euro banknotes and coins this year, there is no doubt that the single currency has been a success. it has brought stability and made us more resilient in the face of the multiple adverse shocks we have experienced. over the past 20 years, the ecb has ensured price stability, with an average inflation rate of 1.7 per cent since early 1999. we are dete… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 78 | paper | 1 | 0.0609928 | journal | 1 | 0.9997372 |
| 78 | journal | 2 | 0.0339263 | reserve bank | 2 | 0.9992109 |
| 78 | economics | 3 | 0.0274979 | federal reserve bank | 3 | 0.9989479 |
| 78 | review | 4 | 0.0220846 | american | 4 | 0.9986856 |
| 78 | reserve | 5 | 0.0194626 | economic review | 5 | 0.9985974 |
| 78 | federal | 6 | 0.0191242 | american economic | 6 | 0.9983344 |
| 78 | federal reserve | 7 | 0.0187859 | nber | 7 | 0.9979849 |
| 78 | bank | 8 | 0.0176863 | hole | 8 | 0.9978084 |
| 78 | international | 9 | 0.0164176 | economics | 9 | 0.9976304 |
| 78 | reserve bank | 10 | 0.0145567 | jackson hole | 10 | 0.9975019 |
| 78 | american | 11 | 0.0144722 | jackson | 11 | 0.9974144 |
| 78 | federal reserve bank | 12 | 0.0137955 | american economic review | 12 | 0.9973697 |
| 78 | nber | 13 | 0.0125267 | symposium | 13 | 0.9965822 |
| 78 | economic review | 14 | 0.0120193 | monetary economics | 14 | 0.9964940 |
| 78 | evidence | 15 | 0.0118501 | kansas | 15 | 0.9960980 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Three questions on monetary policy easing | Period_1 | 2009-03-10 | 0.530 | de long, bradford j. (1997), “america’s peacetime inflation: the 1970s”, in romer, christina d., and romer, david h., editors, reducing inflation: motivation and strategy, the university of chicago press for the national bureau of economic research. dolado, juan , pedrero, ramon marıa-dolores, and ruge-murcia, francisco j. (2004), “nonlinear monetary policy rules: some new evidence for the u.s.”, studies in nonlinear dynamics and econometrics, volume 8, issue 3, article 2. eickmeier, sandra, and hofmann, boris (2009), “monetary policy and private sector (im)balances in the u.s.”, bundesbank and european central bank, mimeo. friedman, milton (1972), “have monetary policies failed?”, american economic review, papers and proceedings, 62 (1-2), 11-18. kydland, finn, and prescott, edward (1977), “rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans”, journal of political economy, 85(3), 473-491. jarociński, marek and smets, frank (2008), “house prices and the stance of monetary policy” federal reserve bank of st. louis review, 90(4), 339-365. lubik, thomas, and frank schorfheide (2004), “testing for indeterminacy: an application to u.s. monetary policy”, american economic review, 94(1), 190-217. maćkowiak, bartosz and smets, frank (2008), “on implications of micro price data for macro models”, ecb working paper no. 960, november 2008. mccallum, bennett (1995), “two fallacies concerning central bank independence”, american economic review, papers and proceedings, 85(… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Careful with (the D) words! | Period_1 | 2008-11-27 | 0.503 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Three questions on monetary policy easing | Period_1 | 2009-03-10 | 0.500 | atkins, ralph, and barber, lionel (2007), “under fire, on target”, on the financial times, 18 may 2007, page 9. barro, robert j., and gordon, david (1983a), “a positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model”, journal of political economy, 91(4), 589-610. barro, robert j., and gordon, david (1983b), “rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy”, journal of monetary economics, 12(1), 101-121. batini, nicoletta, and nelson, edward (2001), “the lag from monetary policy actions to inflation: friedman revisited”, international finance, 4(3), 381-400. bernanke, benjamin, reinhart, vincent., and sack, brian (2004), “monetary policy alternatives at the zero bound: an empirical assessment”, finance and economics discussion series 2004-48, federal reserve board. blanchard, olivier, and giavazzi, francesco (2005), “credibility does not require dogmatism – only clarity of purpose”, at: http://www.voxeu.eu/ blinder, alan (1998), central banking in theory and practice, cambridge, the mit press. blinder, alan s., ehrmann, michael, de haan, jakob, fratzscher, marcel, and jansen, david- jan (2008), “central bank communication and monetary policy: a survey of theory and evidence”, journal of economic literature, 46(4), 910-945. boivin, jean, and giannoni, marc (2006), “has monetary policy become more effective?”, review of economics and statistics, 88(3), 445-462. boivin, jean, and giannoni, marc, and mojon, benoit (2009), “has the euro changed the monetary tr… |
| Jürgen Stark: Lessons for central bankers from the history of the Phillips Curve | Period_1 | 2008-06-16 | 0.481 | the ultimate lesson that i draw from the vicissitudes of the phillips curve in the half of a century behind us is that we should all beware of models that short-circuit the workings of a complex market economy in a single equation. thank you. references benati, luca (2008a), “investigating inflation persistence across monetary regimes”, quarterly journal of economics, august 2008, forthcoming. benati, l. (2008b), “money, inflation, and new keynesian models”, ecb working paper, forthcoming, bernanke, benjamin s. (2006), “the benefits of price stability”, speech delivered at the center for economic policy studies and on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the woodrow wilson school of public and international affairs, princeton university, princeton, new jersey, february 24, 2006. bertocchi, graziella, and michael spagat (1993), “learning, experimentation, and monetary policy”, journal of monetary economics, 32, pp. 169-183. christiano, lawrence j., martin eichenbaum, and charles evans (2005), “nominal rigidities and the dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy”, journal of political economy, 113(1), pp. 1-45. cogley, timothy w. and argia sbordone (2008), “trend inflation, indexation, and inflation persistence in the new keynesian phillips curve”, american economic review, forthcoming ellison, martin and natacha valla (2001), “learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions”, journal of monetary economics, 48(1), 153… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Lessons for monetary policy from the recent crisis | Period_1 | 2011-01-20 | 0.478 | 3 see eggertson g. and m. woodford (2003), “the zero bound on interest rates and optimal monetary policy,” brookings papers on economic activity, 34, pp. 139–211; and walsh c. (2010), “using monetary policy to stabilize economic activity,” in financial stability and macroeconomic policy, 2009 jackson hole symposium, federal reserve bank of kansas city, pp. 245–296. 4 see orphanides a. and s. van norden (2002), “the unreliability of output-gap estimates in real time,” review of economics and statistics 84, pp. 569–583; and orphanides a. and s. van norden (2005), “the reliability of inflation forecasts based on output gap estimates in real time,” journal of money, credit, and banking, 37, pp. 583–601. 5 see bini smaghi l. (2010), “could monetary policy have helped prevent the financial crisis?,” bank of canada, toronto 9 april 2010. 6 see ecb (2010), “the “great inflation”: lessons for monetary policy”, monthly bulletin, may 2010; and orphanides a., (2002), “monetary policy rules and the great inflation,” american economic review, 92, pp. 115–120. 7 see taylor j. (2007), “housing and monetary policy,” in housing, housing finance, and monetary policy, proceedings of federal reserve bank of kansas city symposium, jackson hole, wyoming. 8 see chen n., imbs j. and a. scott (2009), “the dynamics of trade and competition,” journal of international economics, 77, pp. 50–62. 9 see rogoff k. (2006), “impact of globalization on monetary policy,” in federal reserve bank of kansas city,… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Developing models for policy analysis in central banks | Period_2 | 2017-09-28 | 0.491 | 14 see, for instance, garcía-schmidt, m. and m. woodford (2015), “are low interest rates deflationary? a paradox of perfect-foresight analysis”, nber working paper no. 21614; gabaix, x. (2016), “a behavioral new keynesian model”, nber working paper no. 22954; and farhi, e. and i. werning (2017), “monetary policy, bounded rationality and incomplete markets”, nber working paper no. 23281. 15 blanchard, o., g. lorenzoni and j. p. l’huillier (2017), “short-run effects of lower productivity growth. a twist on the secular stagnation hypothesis”, journal of policy modeling, 2017, issn 0161–8938. 16 blanchard, o., e. cerutti and l. summers (2016), “inflation and activity – two explorations and their monetary policy implications”, ecb, inflation and unemployment in europe, conference proceedings of the ecb forum on central banking, pp. 25–46. 17 for a summary see constâncio, v. (2015)“understanding inflation dynamics and monetary policy” remarks at the federal reserve bank of kansas city economic symposium, jackson hole, wyoming. see also constâncio, v. (2017), “understanding and overcoming low inflation”, remarks at the conference on “understanding inflation: lessons from the past, lessons for the future?”, frankfurt am main, 21 and 22 september 2017. 18 bernanke, b. (2010), “the economic outlook and monetary policy”, speech at the federal reserve bank of kansas city economic symposium, jackson hole, wyoming. 19 daly, m. c. and b. hobijn, (2014), “downward nominal wage rigidities … |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges for future monetary policy frameworks - a European perspective | Period_2 | 2016-11-09 | 0.473 | tool”, both presented at the jackson hole economic policy symposium, federal reserve bank of kansas city. 14 see fischer, s. (2016), “why are interest rates so low? causes and implications”, remarks at the economic club of new york, october; gagnon, e., b. k. johannsen and d. lópez-salido (2016) “understanding the new normal: the role of demographics”, federal reserve board finance and economics discussion series 2016– 080. 15 yellen, j. (2016), “the federal reserve’s monetary policy toolkit: past, present and future”, remarks at the jackson hole economic policy symposium, federal reserve bank of kansas city; see also reifschneider, d. (2016), “gauging the ability of the fomc to respond to future recessions”, federal reserve board finance and economics discussion series 2016–068. 6/6 |
| Vítor Constâncio: Past and future of the European Central Bank monetary policy | Period_2 | 2018-05-11 | 0.458 | alves, n. and c.r. marques (2004), “money in the ecb’s monetary policy strategy: a reassessment”, banco de portugal, mimeo, december 2004, later published as banco de portugal working paper no. 20/2007 “is the euro area m3 abandoning us?“. bernanke, b. (2017), “monetary policy in a new era”, conference on rethinking macroeconomic policy, peterson institute for international economics, 12-13 october 2017. beyer, a. and r. farmer (2002), “natural rate doubts”, ecb working paper 121. blanchard, o. and l. summers (1986), “hysteresis and the european unemployment problem”, nber macroeconomics annual, vol. 1. blanchard, o., g. dell’ariccia and p. mauro (2010), “rethinking macroeconomic policy”, journal of money, credit and banking, 42:199–215 and blanchard, o. and d. leigh (2013), “growth forecast errors and fiscal multipliers”, american economic review, 103(3): 117-20. blanchard, o., e. cerutti and l. summers (2015), “inflation and activity − two explorations and their monetary policy implications”, ecb forum on central banking on inflation and unemployment in europe, sintra 2015. blanchard, o. (2017), “the need for different classes of macroeconomic models”, peterson institute for international economics real time economic issues watch, 12 january 2017. blanchard, o. (2017), “should we reject the natural rate hypothesis?”, peterson institute for international economics working paper 17/14. brayton, f. and p. a. tinsley (1996), “a guide to frb/us: a macroeconomic model of the u… |
| Peter Praet: Forward guidance and the European Central Bank | Period_2 | 2013-08-07 | 0.409 | campbell, j., c. evans, j. fisher and a. justiniano, (2012). “macroeconomic effects of federal reserve forward guidance”, brookings papers on economic activity, spring 2012. clouse, j., d. henderson, a. orphanides, d. small and p. tinsley, (2000). “monetary policy when the nominal short-term interest rate is zero”, be press journal of macroeconomics: topic in macroeconomics, 3 (1): article 12. eggertsson, g. and m. woodford, (2003). “the zero bound on interest rates and optimal monetary policy”, brookings papers on economic activity, 2003 (1). gürkaynak, r. b. sack and e. swanson, (2005). “do actions speak louder than words? the response of asset prices to monetary policy actions and statements”, international journal of central banking, 1 (1), 55–93. krugman, p. (1998). “it’s baaack: japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap,” brookings papers on economic activity 1998 (2). woodford, m. (2003). interest and prices: foundations of a theory of monetary policy, princeton university press. woodford, m. (2012). “methods of policy accommodation at the interest-rate lower bound”, speech delivered at the federal reserve bank of kansas city economic symposium, held in jackson hole, wy, august 30 – september 1, 2012. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Past and future of the European Central Bank monetary policy | Period_2 | 2018-05-11 | 0.407 | frameworks”, lecture at the instituto superior de economia e gestão, lisbon. see also duffie, d. and a. krishnamurthy (2016), “pass-through efficiency in the fed’s new monetary policy setting”, presented at the annual economic policy symposium, federal reserve bank of kansas city; greenwood r., s. hanson and j. stein (2016), “the federal reserve’s balance sheet as a financial-stability tool”, 2016 economic policy symposium proceedings. jackson hole: federal reserve bank of kansas city. see for instance blanchard, o., g. dell’ariccia and p. mauro (2010), “rethinking [50] macroeconomic policy”, journal of money, credit and banking, 42: 199–215 and krugman, p. (2014), “inflation targets reconsidered”, ecb forum on central banking, may 2014. constâncio, v. (2016), “challenges for future monetary policy frameworks: a european [51] perspective”, speech at the 19th annual international banking conference “achieving financial stability: challenges to prudential regulation”, federal reserve bank of chicago, 4 november 2016. availabe at http://populardemocracy.org/news-and-publications/prominent-economists- [52] question-fed-inflation-target. bernanke, b. (2017), “monetary policy in a new era”, conference on rethinking [53] macroeconomic policy, peterson institute for international economics, 12-13 october 2017. svensson, l.e.o. (1999), “price-level targeting versus inflation targeting: a free lunch?”, [54] |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.408 |
|
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.379 |
|
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.363 |
|
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.325 |
|
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.314 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 79 | shock | 1 | 0.1811811 | supply shock | 1 | 0.9995617 |
| 79 | demand | 2 | 0.1003463 | aggregate demand | 2 | 0.9994743 |
| 79 | supply | 3 | 0.0839193 | shock | 3 | 0.9994741 |
| 79 | aggregate | 4 | 0.0327476 | supply | 4 | 0.9989482 |
| 79 | aggregate demand | 5 | 0.0222296 | demand shock | 5 | 0.9986845 |
| 79 | supply shock | 6 | 0.0217569 | hit | 6 | 0.9984227 |
| 79 | hit | 7 | 0.0177388 | demand | 7 | 0.9980695 |
| 79 | persistent | 8 | 0.0167933 | aggregate | 8 | 0.9979827 |
| 79 | adverse | 9 | 0.0152570 | adverse | 9 | 0.9970187 |
| 79 | lead | 10 | 0.0145479 | persistent | 10 | 0.9969302 |
| 79 | temporary | 11 | 0.0130116 | shock hit | 11 | 0.9969271 |
| 79 | nature | 12 | 0.0130116 | adverse shock | 12 | 0.9963183 |
| 79 | output | 13 | 0.0124207 | push | 13 | 0.9960120 |
| 79 | negative | 14 | 0.0111207 | temporary | 14 | 0.9960090 |
| 79 | demand shock | 15 | 0.0105298 | economic shock | 15 | 0.9957927 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.191 | closely related to the present discounted value of future expected short-term rates, thus giving a prominent role to central bank credibility and communication. 26 given that inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon even in a globalised world, theories asserting that china is exporting deflation or inflation should be viewed as overly simplistic. globalisation forces materialise as external shocks, which should in principle affect relative prices, rather than the overall inflation rate in the long run. however, as is often the case in economics, matters become particularly complex when we move to analyse higher frequencies. in the medium run, whether terms-of-trade developments – like increases in oil and commodity prices or cheaper imports – exert positive or negative pressure on inflation will depend on their net effect on aggregate demand and aggregate supply. soaring import prices will in fact tend to produce two competing effects. the first effect, which can be denoted as supply effect, derives from the lower potential output growth associated with an adverse terms-of-trade shock, for instance brought about by an exogenous increase in the prices of oil or other commodities which are used as intermediate input in domestic production. 27 thus, for a given level of aggregate demand, the fall in potential output will tend to be such that actual output exceeds potential, leading to a positive output gap and upward pressure on inflation. there is a widespread perceptio… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Economic policies on the two sides of the Atlantic (why) are they different? | Period_1 | 2008-11-11 | 0.169 | 3.3 shocks as with monetary policy, the difference in the shocks hitting the two economies may explain the varying degrees of fiscal activism. in theory, an economy which is hit principally by demand shocks should make greater use of anti-cyclical budget policies than an economy hit mainly by supply shocks. this is a topic on which, as far as i know, no empirical studies have been conducted to date and it is thus a particularly interesting field of research. a hypothesis worth examining is the extent to which the greater frequency of demand shocks in the united states has justified greater fiscal activism in an anti-cyclical direction. in the euro area, by contrast, the adoption of active budget policies ought to have been discouraged by the greater frequency of supply shocks. |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Economic policies on the two sides of the Atlantic (why) are they different? | Period_1 | 2008-11-11 | 0.140 | years the euro area has been worse hit by “supply shocks” than the united states. a supply shock tends to have an effect on growth with the opposite sign to that of inflation. one example is the decline in total factor productivity (tfp) in the early part of this decade which brought upward pressure to bear on inflation at a time when economic activity was slowing down, as occurred following the bursting of the dot.com bubble. indeed, available evidence seems to suggest that the exacerbation of negative supply shocks is a recurring feature of economic slowdown phases in the euro area. as a result of that phenomenon, inflation in the euro area tends to react to an economic slowdown less rapidly than it does in the united states. this difference may explain why, especially in cyclical slowdown phases, monetary policy action in the euro area tends to be less aggressive than it is in the united states. in the united states, on the other hand, analysis seems to show that demand shocks tend to prevail, which puts pressure on inflation and on economic activity simultaneously. supply shocks like those related to productivity tend to have a considerable impact on demand if agents expect them to have an impact on permanent income, affecting consumption. for example, the increase in productivity in the second half of the 1990s led to strong growth in consumption in the united states, financed by debt. in this context, the monetary policy reaction can be more decisive, and transmitted… |
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy in a changing world ¿ commitment, strategy and credibility | Period_1 | 2006-12-07 | 0.131 | partly as a result of these developments, estimates of the potential output growth in the euro area have been revised downwards over the past few years and are now close to the lower bound of the range of 2.0 % to 2.5% of potential growth, published by the ecb in 1998, just before the launch of the euro. 4 [see chart 10] however, annual productivity growth (per person employed) in the euro area has increased more recently, rising from 0.4% in early 2005 to 1.4% in the second quarter of 2006, and we expect this level to remain broadly stable over the coming quarters. this improvement is confined to the industrial sector, which is more affected by cyclical developments. in the services sector, labour productivity growth has remained subdued, with an annual rate of growth of only 0.6% in the second quarter of 2006. nevertheless, these recent developments may turn out to be the initial signs of an overall improvement of the euro area’s productivity performance. what are the policy implications of the observed recent improvement in productivity growth in the euro area? the crucial question is whether this recent improvement is temporary, influenced by the current upturn in the cycle, or permanent. to disentangle temporary and persistent changes in productivity – and to do so in real-time – is a formidable challenge for policymakers who have to make forward- looking assessments. but we have to face this challenge, because temporary and persistent shocks to productivity growth ma… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The euro area and its monetary policy | Period_1 | 2007-09-11 | 0.121 | as i mentioned before, this evidence poses a puzzle. by placing the great burden of macroeconomic adjustment on volumes rather than prices, nominal rigidities tend to increase – not decrease – the volatility of real activity that an economy would experience at any level of inflation volatility. indeed, symmetrically, stabilising inflation at levels consistent with the central bank’s objective is more costly – and thus less likely to happen – in economies where prices are slow to respond to innovations. bearing in mind the microeconomics of price adjustments in continental europe, one would thus expect to see the euro area in the upper- right-hand quadrant of the volatilities scatterplot. instead, as the scatterplot makes clear, the volatilities of both inflation and detrended output have been remarkably low under emu, lower than in more flexible economies. what can reconcile the facts with the structural evidence? a first possibility is that, since january 1999, the euro area has simply been lucky, and has been hit by a sequence of smaller and more favourable shocks than other economies. reduced shock volatility may have created a steadier economic picture, and thus steady inflation and output. structural analysis does not support this conjecture, however. as a matter of long-run regularities, the variance of the shocks hitting the euro area economy is not statistically different than that, say, in the united states, the epitome of a flexible economy. 5 more to the point, … |
| Peter Praet: Current issues of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2014-07-04 | 0.241 | how should monetary policy respond to such negative shocks in energy prices? in general, the optimal monetary policy response to risks to price stability depends on the specific nature of the shock. for a wide variety of shocks – such as demand shocks – a prompt reaction will not only preserve price stability but will also stabilise the economy. for instance, a negative global demand shock pushes down both inflation and growth. here, a decisive monetary policy stimulus helps to stabilise output and inflation at the same time – there is no trade-off between the two. but for other types of shocks, such as supply shocks, a trade-off may occur between stabilising inflation and stabilising growth, requiring a different monetary policy response. for instance, a positive oil supply shock exerts downward pressures on prices but goes along with an expansion of real activity. lower energy prices boost real disposable incomes. the |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy and climate change | Period_2 | 2018-11-09 | 0.237 | climate change and the monetary policy strategy to appreciate how climate change may affect monetary policy, it is useful to first recall the basic principles of how central banks decide on their actions. broadly speaking, implementing monetary policy is the practice of identifying the nature, persistence and magnitude of the shocks hitting our economy. policymakers typically differentiate between two broad categories of shocks. the first is demand shocks. these are shocks that are “benign” or manageable from the perspective of monetary policy because they pull inflation, growth and employment in the same direction – a “divine coincidence” which does not pose a dilemma to central banks.6 the second category relates to supply-side shocks. these shocks are less easy to accommodate for central banks as they pull output and inflation in opposite directions. this generates a trade-off for central banks between stabilising inflation and stabilising output fluctuations. climate-related shocks – and this is my first corollary – typically fall into this second category of shocks.7 droughts and heatwaves often lead to crop shortfalls, putting upward pressure on food prices.8 hurricanes and floods destroy production capacity, thereby raising input and output prices. and unusually cold winters can be seen as malign productivity shocks – that is, they may raise input prices for the same level of output. so, much like other supply shocks, weather-related disturbances typically pose a di… |
| Isabel Schnabel: How long is the medium term? Monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2020-03-02 | 0.199 | notes: the chart presents the decomposition of euro area hicp inflation into structural shocks based on the new area- wide model (nawm) ii. the mark-up shock group consists of the shocks to the wage mark-up, the domestic price and export price mark-ups, as well as the import price mark-up. the supply shock group comprises the persistent and the transitory component of the model’s permanent technology shock, and the transitory technology shock. the demand and financial shock group includes the shocks to government consumption, import demand, export demand preferences, monetary policy, as well as the domestic and external risk premium shocks, the shock to the survival rate of the wholesale banks, and the shock to the mark-down parameter of the retail banks. the “other” shock group comprises the investment- specific technology shock, shocks to foreign variables, measurement errors, and shocks in bridge equations. see coenen, g., karadi, p., schmidt, s. and warne, a. (2018), “the new area-wide model ii: an extended version of the ecb’s micro-founded model for forecasting and policy analysis with a financial sector”, ecb working paper no 2200. |
| Isabel Schnabel: How long is the medium term? Monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2020-03-02 | 0.184 | the first type is demand shocks, which pull both output and inflation in the same direction. the euro area sovereign debt crisis is a good example. as credit conditions tightened in parts of the euro area, both the public and private sector cut back sharply on spending, thereby pushing down prices and wages. such demand shocks typically call for determined policy action. by acting swiftly and forcefully, central banks minimise the adverse impact of a decline in consumption and investment on prices and wages. supply shocks – the second type – are different, as they typically pull inflation and output in opposite directions. a sharp exogenous increase in oil prices, for example, pushes inflation up while harming growth and employment. to minimise volatility in economic activity, supply shocks therefore usually require a smoother and more protracted policy response. |
| Mario Draghi: How central banks meet the challenge of low inflation | Period_2 | 2016-02-05 | 0.173 | the response to too low inflation there are some who argue that, so long as we are experiencing mainly positive global supply shocks, there is no need for central banks to be overly responsive. we can simply redefine the medium-term horizon over which price stability is maintained and “wait it out” until inflation returns to our objective. indeed, the reason central banks do not define the medium-term as a period of calendar time is that the horizon for action depends on the nature of the shock. this viewpoint is correct, as far as it goes. central banks do typically refrain from reacting to supply shocks that have opposing effects on output and inflation, so as not to overreact and reinforce the effect on growth, in either direction. and that might even be the case when faced with a succession of supply shocks, such as the steep falls in oil prices we have experienced recently. each shock should in principle have a short duration and should not have a persistent effect on inflation. however, since there is always a backward-looking component in inflation developments, the longer inflation stays too low, the greater the risk that inflation does not return automatically to target. specifically, if agents start to look at the track record of recent inflation, rather than the inflation objective, it affects their benchmarks for wage and price setting decisions. what happens then is that low inflation feeds into inflation expectations and creates second-round effects. in that … |
| Christine Lagarde: Commitment and persistence - monetary policy in the economic recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.229 | lf we are facing a demand shock, where domestic wages and prices are being pushed up by excess demand, tightening policy can help cool the economy and bring down inflation. a supply shock, however, will tend to push up inflation and depress output. in this situation, tighter monetary policy would only exacerbate the contractionary effect on the economy. |
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.222 | the persistence of the shocks when inflation is driven mainly by supply shocks, monetary policy should respond when the shocks are persistent to keep inflation expectations anchored and avoid that inflation becomes entrenched. understanding the reasons for the persistence of current shocks and whether they may permanently lower potential is also crucial for designing the adequate policy response. there are two alternative explanations for the persistence of the supply shocks we have experienced. the first is that the economy has been hit by a sequence of temporary supply shocks, which have jointly created a persistent effect on inflation. in this case, potential output should remain broadly unchanged. and the lingering effect of the supply shocks on economic activity through real incomes and confidence could result in a negative output gap. |
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.188 | the origin of the shocks the origin of the shocks – that is, whether they originate more on the demand side or on the supply side – matters considerably for monetary policy. a central bank would typically want to adjust policy gradually in the face of supply shocks.[5] but it should react immediately to demand shocks that risk bringing medium- term inflation above target. this question is crucial today because the shocks that have hit the euro area economy in recent years have affected both demand and supply, making the main drivers of inflation harder to identify. we have faced both a series of external supply shocks[6] and a deterioration in the terms of trade which have pushed up costs for firms and weakened demand. this has resulted in an extraordinary rise in energy and food prices, especially after russia’s invasion of ukraine. together, energy and food currently directly account for more than two-thirds of headline inflation (chart 1). |
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.173 | (month-on-month percentage changes, annualised, seasonally and working-day adjusted) ™ hicp excluding food and energy = 3-month moving average 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 na rm : ny rey aia , , : i) 0 an } y bin pp dative 7 + -2 -4 -6 -8 -10 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 source: ecb three types of inflation: the good, the bad and the ugly for illustrative purposes, we can identify three different types of inflation. the first is “good” inflation, which comes about when demand is robust, output is at potential, employment is high, inflation is converging towards 2% and inflation expectations are anchored at 2%. 2] such inflation is consistent with wages rising at a pace that reflects our target and productivity gains, thereby supporting real disposable income. it does not distort economic decisions and creates a buffer in nominal interest rates that allows monetary policy to address subsequent negative shocks. after a deep recession like the one caused by the pandemic, monetary policy should accompany the economy towards a strong recovery as a necessary condition for “good” inflation. in the euro area, with monetary policy holding down nominal yields, real yields have eased, leading to a fast recovery and strong employment gains.!! the second type, “bad” inflation, occurs when negative supply shocks raise prices and depress economic activity. this outcome is typically seen, for example, following a sharp supply shock that raises energy prices, which for t… |
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.170 | the complexity of monetary policy keynote speech by fabio panetta, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the cepr-eabcn conference on “finding the gap: output gap measurement in the euro area” held at the european university institute florence, 14 november 2022 the output gap – the difference between actual and potential output[1] – plays an important conceptual role in central banking. in normal conditions, the output gap represents a gauge of inflationary pressure by signalling the amount of slack in the economy.[2] in turn, this provides a yardstick against which central banks calibrate monetary policy. by steering demand so that actual output matches potential central banks can stabilise inflation around their targets. from the global financial crisis until the start of the pandemic, variations in the output gap reflected prominently the role played by demand factors. the implication for monetary policy was relatively straightforward. the shocks to demand pushed output, employment and inflation in the same direction, leading to a positive correlation between output gaps and inflation. monetary policy could aim to close the inflation gap without facing major trade-offs in terms of the output gap. central banks ultimately faced the difficulty, not so much of diagnosing, but of delivering: once inflation fell too low, their conventional instruments were constrained as interest rates approached their lower bound.[3] central banks had to deploy non-standard policy to… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 80 | risk | 1 | 0.0316916 | upside risk | 1 | 0.9992986 |
| 80 | price stability | 2 | 0.0260966 | upside | 2 | 0.9990361 |
| 80 | stability | 3 | 0.0239271 | credit growth | 3 | 0.9963202 |
| 80 | upside | 4 | 0.0231278 | vigilance | 4 | 0.9959198 |
| 80 | medium | 5 | 0.0215293 | ample liquidity | 5 | 0.9939377 |
| 80 | growth | 6 | 0.0206158 | indirect tax | 6 | 0.9927269 |
| 80 | strong | 7 | 0.0206158 | ample | 7 | 0.9925918 |
| 80 | remain | 8 | 0.0201591 | monetary expansion | 8 | 0.9922016 |
| 80 | upside risk | 9 | 0.0181608 | administer price | 9 | 0.9917996 |
| 80 | development | 10 | 0.0164481 | set behaviour | 10 | 0.9913575 |
| 80 | credit | 11 | 0.0147924 | vigorous | 11 | 0.9905887 |
| 80 | continue | 12 | 0.0147354 | underlie rate | 12 | 0.9902277 |
| 80 | analysis | 13 | 0.0139932 | strong monetary | 13 | 0.9896097 |
| 80 | wage | 14 | 0.0131939 | expansion | 14 | 0.9895990 |
| 80 | expansion | 15 | 0.0102251 | expect wage | 15 | 0.9894340 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| European Central Bank: Press conference ¿ introductory statement | Period_1 | 2007-07-06 | 0.697 | at the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, risks to the outlook for price stability remain on the upside. these risks relate notably to the domestic side. in particular, as capacity utilisation in the euro area economy is high and labour markets continue to improve, constraints are emerging which could lead in particular to stronger than expected wage developments. in addition, pricing power in market segments with low competition may increase in such an environment. such developments would pose significant upward risks to price stability. it is therefore crucial that all parties concerned meet their responsibilities. wage agreements in particular should be sufficiently differentiated to take into account price competitiveness positions, the still high level of unemployment in many economies and sector-specific productivity developments. the governing council stresses the importance of avoiding wage developments that would eventually lead to inflationary pressures and harm the purchasing power of all euro area citizens. in addition, upside risks to price stability arise from increases in administered prices and indirect taxes beyond those anticipated thus far, and the potentially procyclical stance of fiscal policy in some countries. finally, on the external side, upside risks stem from the possibility of further unexpected oil price rises. the monetary analysis confirms the prevailing upside risks to price stability at medium to longer horizons. the underlying rate of mo… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-03-22 | 0.661 | around 2%. the new ecb staff macroeconomic projections point to annual hicp inflation averaging between 1.5% and 2.1% in 2007 and between 1.4% and 2.6% in 2008. at the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, the outlook for price developments remains, in the governing council’s view, subject to upside risks. these stem from the possibility of renewed oil price increases and additional increases in administered prices and indirect taxes beyond those announced and decided thus far. more fundamentally, stronger than currently expected wage developments would pose significant upward risks to price stability, particularly in view of the favourable momentum of real gdp growth. it is therefore crucial that the social partners continue to meet their responsibilities and that wage agreements take into account present relative price competitiveness positions, the still high level of unemployment in many countries as well as productivity developments. the governing council will monitor the upcoming wage negotiations in the euro area countries very carefully. turning to the monetary analysis, this confirms the prevailing upside risks to price stability at medium to longer horizons. annual m3 growth was unchanged at 9.8% in january, remaining at the highest rate observed since the introduction of the euro. at 10.6%, the annual growth rate of loans to the private sector also remained strong in january. this reflects the continuation of the upward trend in the growth of borrowing by non-fin… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference ¿ introductory statement | Period_1 | 2007-06-07 | 0.599 | consistent with this view, eurosystem staff projects average annual hicp inflation of between 1.8% and 2.2% in 2007 and between 1.4% and 2.6% in 2008. compared with the march 2007 ecb staff projections, the range projected for inflation in 2007 is somewhat higher, largely reflecting higher oil prices. the projected range for inflation in 2008 is unchanged. in this context, let me remind you of the conditional nature of these projections, which are based on a series of technical assumptions, including assumptions for future short and long-term interest rates that are based on market expectations derived from the yield curve, as well as assumptions for oil and non-energy commodity prices. at the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, risks to the outlook for price stability remain on the upside in the governing council’s view. these risks relate notably to the domestic side. in particular, capacity utilisation in the euro area economy is increasing and labour markets are gradually improving. accordingly, there is a risk that wage developments will be stronger than expected, which would pose significant upward risks to price stability. in addition, pricing power in market segments with low competition may increase in such an environment. it is therefore crucial that all parties concerned meet their responsibilities. wage agreements in particular should be sufficiently differentiated to take into account price competitiveness positions, the still high level of unemployment in ma… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2006 to the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-07-13 | 0.599 | the outlook for price stability over the medium term remains subject to upside risks. as capacity utilisation in the euro area economy is high and labour markets are gradually improving, constraints are emerging which could lead in particular to stronger than expected wage developments. in addition, pricing power in market segments with low competition may increase in such an environment. the governing council stresses the importance of avoiding wage developments that would eventually lead to inflationary pressures and harm the purchasing power of all euro area citizens. in addition, upside risks to price stability arise from increases in administered prices and indirect taxes beyond those anticipated thus far and the potentially pro-cyclical stance of fiscal policy in some countries. finally, on the external side, upside risks stem from the possibility of further unexpected oil price rises. the governing council’s assessment that upside risks to price stability prevailed has been confirmed throughout the period from the start of 2006 to mid 2007 by cross-checking with the monetary analysis. the marked dynamism of monetary and credit growth in 2006 reflected a continuation of the persistent upward trend in the underlying rate of monetary expansion in the euro area that has been observed since mid-2004, adding further to liquidity accumulation. also in 2007, the underlying rate of monetary expansion remains strong, as reflected in the continued rapid growth of m3 as well as… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference ¿ introductory statement | Period_1 | 2007-03-12 | 0.551 | are likely to fall during the spring and summer before rising again towards the end of the year and then most likely hovering again at around 2%. the new ecb staff macroeconomic projections foresee annual hicp inflation averaging between 1.5% and 2.1% in 2007 and between 1.4% and 2.6% in 2008. compared with the december 2006 eurosystem staff projections, the upper bound of the range projected for inflation in 2007 is somewhat lower, largely reflecting the fall in oil prices. by contrast, the projected range for inflation in 2008 is slightly higher, largely on account of the anticipated stronger economic growth, which could exert more intense pressure on factor utilisation and factor costs. in this context, let me remind you of the conditional nature of these projections, which are based on a series of technical assumptions, including market expectations for future short and long-term interest rates as well as for oil and non- energy commodity prices. at the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, the outlook for price developments remains, in the governing council’s view, subject to upside risks. these relate to the possibility of renewed oil price increases and additional increases in administered prices and indirect taxes beyond those announced and decided thus far. more fundamentally, stronger than currently expected wage developments would pose significant upward risks to price stability, not least in view of the favourable momentum of real gdp growth observed over the pa… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2012-04-05 | 0.125 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. the information that has become available since the beginning of march broadly confirms our previous assessment. inflation rates are likely to stay above 2% in 2012, with upside risks prevailing. over the policy-relevant horizon, we expect price developments to remain in line with price stability. consistent with this picture, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains subdued. survey indicators for economic growth have broadly stabilised at low levels in the early months of 2012, and a moderate recovery in activity is expected in the course of the year. the economic outlook remains subject to downside risks. medium-term inflation expectations for the euro area economy must continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. over the last few months we have implemented both standard and non- standard monetary policy measures. this combination of measures has contributed to a stabilisation in the financial environment and an improvement in the transmission of our monetary policy. we need to carefully monitor further developments. it is also important to keep in mind that all our non-standard monetary pol… |
| Peter Praet: The European Central Bank’s fight against low inflation - reasons and consequences | Period_2 | 2016-04-11 | 0.059 | i would like to thank jonathan yiangou, john hutchinson and federic holm-hadulla for their contributions to this speech. accompanying slides can be found on the european central bank’s website. in the last half century central banks have come a long way in how they approach their macro-stabilisation functions. as recently as the late 1970s, views still diverged across advanced economy central banks as to the efficacy of monetary policy in delivering price stability. some, such as the bundesbank and the swiss national bank, were already committed to using monetary measures to control inflation. but others, such as the federal reserve and various european central banks, remained more pessimistic in their outlook, believing that monetary policy was an inefficient means to tame inflation and that other policies should be better employed. 1 illustrating this view, fed chairman william miller observed in his first fomc meeting in march 1978 that “inflation is going to be left to the federal reserve and that’s going to be bad news. an effective program to reduce the rate of inflation has to extend beyond monetary policy and needs to be complemented by programs designed to enhance competition and to correct structural problems”. 2 in this context of timidity about the effectiveness of policy, inflation expectations were allowed to de-anchor, opening the door to bouts of double-digit price rises. the outcome was a phase of so-called “stagflation”, where both inflation and unemploym… |
| Philip R Lane: The compass of monetary policy - favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2021-03-02 | 0.055 | stance delivers the timely and robust convergence of inflation to our medium-term aim: in this context, our |
| Isabel Schnabel: How long is the medium term? Monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2020-03-02 | 0.051 | hahn, e. (2019), “how are wage developments passed through to prices in the euro area? evidence from a bvar model”, applied economics, published online 1 november 2019. notes: the x-axis refers to the quarters since the shock. the magnitude of the shock is normalised to a 1% increase in compensation per employee over the first four quarters. it is assumed that indirect taxes net of subsidies respond proportionally to real gdp such that this component does not contribute to the changes in the gdp deflator. |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2012-11-09 | 0.050 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. owing to high energy prices and increases in indirect taxes in some euro area countries, inflation rates are likely to remain above 2% for the remainder of 2012. they are expected to fall below that level in the course of next year and to remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. consistent with this picture, the underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be subdued. inflation expectations for the euro area remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. economic activity in the euro area is expected to remain weak, although it continues to be supported by our monetary policy stance and financial market confidence has visibly improved on the back of our decisions as regards outright monetary transactions (omts). at the same time, the necessary process of balance sheet adjustment in large parts of the financial and non-financial sectors as well as high uncertainty continue to weigh on the economic outlook. it is essential for governments to support confidence by forcefully implementing the necessary steps to reduce both fiscal and structural imbalances and to proceed with financi… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a high inflation environment - commitment and clarity | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.089 | the risk of second-round effects monetary policy cannot prevent the first-round effects of many of these shocks. but especially when the shocks are persistent, we must ensure they do not produce second-round effects that cause too-high inflation to become entrenched. since the euro area is a net importer of energy, we are facing a large and unavoidable shock to real income owing to the deterioration in our terms of trade. this terms-of-trade “tax” amounted to around 2 percentage points of gdp in the second quarter of this year.[12] the question that workers, firms and governments confront today is how this burden should be distributed within the economy and over time. fair burden-sharing between wage income and profit margins is certainly justified. fiscal policy can help spread the burden across different income groups. at the ecb, given our mandate of price stability, we need to ensure that this process does not lead to an inflationary dynamic. if inflation expectations become de-anchored and engrained in wage negotiations and price setting, that could lead to a wage-price spiral which in turn sustains the de-anchoring. and the result would ultimately be both lower real incomes and higher inflation over time. so how acute is the risk of second-round effects today? there are factors on the horizon which are likely to reduce demand and therefore, all else being equal, make it harder for firms to pass on cost increases into prices. as wholesale energy prices are passed thro… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-12-20 | 0.080 | the risks to the inflation outlook are primarily on the upside. in the near term, existing pipeline pressures could lead to stronger than expected rises in retail prices for energy and food. over the medium term, risks stem primarily from domestic factors such as a persistent rise in inflation expectations above our target or higher than anticipated wage rises. by contrast, a decline in energy costs or a further weakening of demand would lower price pressures. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-11-29 | 0.073 | higher interest rates also have an immediate effect on people’s and businesses’ expectations about future inflation, thereby guarding against the risk of second-round effects. persistently high inflation could lead to de-anchored inflation expectations, which then become engrained in wage negotiations and price setting. not only would the resultant wage-price spirals prove self-defeating in supporting real incomes economy-wide, but it would also hamper the productive capacity of the economy as a whole. strong labour markets – with the unemployment rate still at the historically low level of 6.6 per cent in september – are likely to support higher wages. incoming data suggest that wages are picking up, and we will continue to assess their implications for the medium-term inflation outlook. while monetary policy is geared towards bringing inflation back to our medium-term target, the economic outlook will also depend on the actions taken by other stakeholders. |
| Frank Elderson: Proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank concrete | Period_3 | 2022-03-25 | 0.065 | now, even with all this analytical infrastructure in place, the current exceptional uncertainty means that we need to be humble about how accurately we can predict the future state of the economy. it is difficult to assess the exact quantitative impact of the tragic developments that began unfolding just as we were casting off the impact of two years of another unforeseeable event with dramatic consequences – the covid-19 pandemic. that being said, the new ecb staff projections that were prepared for our monetary policy meeting two weeks ago and included two complementary scenarios to cater for the uncertainty paint a clear picture of what qualitative impact to expect. the analysis confirms that the present circumstances represent new headwinds to growth, emerging at a time when previous, pandemic-induced, headwinds were finally waning. in particular, there are two important channels through which the war weighs on the euro area economic outlook: negative confidence effects, which have an impact on both international trade and on financial markets, and high energy prices. this is reflected in a downward adjustment of growth in the baseline of the latest staff projections. at the same time, it should be noted that the outlook that prevailed before the russian invasion was quite favourable, showing the euro area economy emerging from the pandemic on solid footing. this implies that in our updated baseline outlook, and also in more adverse and severe scenarios for the impact … |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.057 | at present, most measures of longer-term inflation expectations stand at around two per cent, although recent above-target revisions to some indicators warrant continued monitoring. for that purpose we look at a wide spectrum of market-based and survey-based expectations indicators (chart 21). market-based indicators suggest that inflation will return to levels compatible with our target in the course of 2024. our survey of monetary analysts likewise suggests that inflation will be close to target in 2024, while inflation will remain elevated next year. meanwhile, the three-year-ahead inflation expectations of households have risen above target, although the term structure of expectations remains downward-sloping. while it is well-known that consumer expectations exhibit high sensitivity to near-term inflation, the above-target revisions should not be taken lightly. overall, the evidence suggests that the euro area is not experiencing a broad-based de-anchoring of medium-term inflation expectations. as indicated above, it is an essential task for monetary policy to ensure that this remains the case. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 81 | development | 1 | 0.0538054 | reference | 1 | 0.9992114 |
| 81 | money | 2 | 0.0433011 | pillar | 2 | 0.9986856 |
| 81 | analysis | 3 | 0.0354494 | monetary aggregate | 3 | 0.9985981 |
| 81 | growth | 4 | 0.0333273 | prominent role | 4 | 0.9978049 |
| 81 | aggregate | 5 | 0.0281282 | prominent | 5 | 0.9977216 |
| 81 | pillar | 6 | 0.0275977 | monetary development | 6 | 0.9976345 |
| 81 | reference | 7 | 0.0244146 | aggregate | 7 | 0.9967519 |
| 81 | indicator | 8 | 0.0236718 | money growth | 8 | 0.9963612 |
| 81 | role | 9 | 0.0168812 | monetary pillar | 9 | 0.9960432 |
| 81 | price development | 10 | 0.0161384 | price development | 10 | 0.9959638 |
| 81 | monetary aggregate | 11 | 0.0151835 | indicator | 11 | 0.9958739 |
| 81 | information | 12 | 0.0147591 | broad monetary aggregate | 12 | 0.9955589 |
| 81 | signal | 13 | 0.0147591 | monetary growth | 13 | 0.9953544 |
| 81 | monetary development | 14 | 0.0145469 | broad monetary | 14 | 0.9952566 |
| 81 | broad | 15 | 0.0143347 | money | 15 | 0.9951597 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Willem F Duisenberg: European Economic and Monetary Union: a success story | Period_1 | 2001-06-26 | 0.408 |
|
| Mr Noyer reports on monetary policy-making in Europe (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 19 Nov 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-11-24 | 0.353 | decisions by the governing council. however, others criticise the eurosystem for not basing monetary policy decisions almost exclusively on deviations of m3 growth from the reference value, as they are convinced that money is the best indicator for monetary policy. i reject the criticisms of both camps. let me explain why. first, i disagree with the view that money should play no or only a small role in the ecb’s strategy. empirical studies show that m3 for the euro area has a stable relationship with the price level over the medium term. such a stable relationship with price developments has not been found for any other indicator variable at this place in time. moreover, there is evidence that monetary aggregates contain useful information for future macroeconomic developments. this is the reason why monetary growth is analysed very closely by the governing council. at the same time, i do not think that the ecb should focus uniquely on money. the problem with doing this is that in the short run, the relationship between money and prices can be distorted by portfolio shifts and institutional factors. short-term developments in money therefore need to be analysed very carefully. against this background, the governing council of the ecb has always communicated to the public that it cannot and will not react mechanically to deviations of actual monetary growth from the reference value. let me also point out that the governing council has, from the very beginning, rejected the… |
| Mr Duisenberg reviews the first year of experience with the Eurosystem’s monetary policy strategy (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 11 Oct 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-10-19 | 0.352 | these are largely technical issues. let me state categorically, as i have often done in the past, that neither prolonged inflation nor prolonged deflation in the euro area would be deemed by the governing council to be consistent with the maintenance of price stability. i cannot see how our commitment to symmetry could be stated more clearly. our decision to lower interest rates in april 1999, so as to address downside risks to price stability that had emerged during the first quarter, was a clear practical demonstration of this commitment. others criticise the “prominent role for money” in our strategy, which is reflected by the announcement of a reference value for m3 growth and our thorough analysis of the monetary aggregates. critics argue that m3 growth should not play a prominent role in our strategy and should not influence monetary policy decisions in a meaningful way. i do not agree with these criticisms of the role of money in our strategy. there is little doubt that monetary aggregates in the euro area exhibit a close relationship with inflation. last month, the ecb published an empirical study which demonstrates that m3 has a stable relationship with the price level in the euro area over the medium term. no other single non-monetary indicator variable has such a stable relationship with price developments at this horizon. therefore monetary growth needs to be analysed very closely by the governing council and we believe that monetary developments constitute an … |
| Mr Noyer: Monetary policymaking in the euro area (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 23 Mar 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-03-01 | 0.334 | the two pillars of the monetary policy strategy of the eurosystem the intrinsic challenge for central banking is the need to look ahead. were monetary policy only to react when inflationary pressures are already visible, it would always be too late, as interest rate changes show their full impact on prices only after around six to eight quarters. moreover, it would have to react much more strongly than in the event of a timely action. the past experience with stop-go policies, widespread in the 1960s and 1970s, clearly illustrates the negative side effects in terms of a high volatility of inflation and output. a forward-looking monetary policy requires a structured approach in order to interpret and synthesise all the information relevant for an assessment of the outlook for price developments; in other words, it requires a well-founded monetary policy strategy. the strategy of the eurosystem is based on two pillars, the first being a prominent role for money and the second a broadly based assessment of the outlook for price developments. to give money a prominent role in its monetary policy analysis is quite a natural thing for a central bank geared towards price stability to do, because inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon. the important role assigned to money is reflected in the announcement of a reference value of 4½% for the annual growth of the broad monetary aggregate m3. current m3 growth is analysed and interpreted in relation to this reference value. und… |
| From the EMI to the ECB (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 30 May 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-05-31 | 0.329 | first, the range of approaches employed by ncbs in what is now the euro area was considerable. nevertheless, once the commitment to price stability was affirmed, each of these approaches achieved a large measure of success. the convergence of inflation rates to low and stable levels across the euro area in the 1990s was a significant - and, in many quarters, unexpected - achievement. in my view, this experience offers a powerful illustration that there are several ways to achieve and maintain price stability. the strategy adopted by a central bank should reflect the circumstances that it faces, including the initial conditions and consequent need for transition. those who claim that there is only one acceptable or efficient way to operate monetary policy fly in the face of history and experience. second, on the basis of our investigations of these various approaches conducted at the emi, we concluded that the differences among various central bank strategies - differences which are often highlighted in the academic and journalistic debate - are much less important than the similarities. certain key elements - for example, affirming a commitment to the objective of price stability; defining this objective clearly; evaluating a broad range of indicators, including monetary aggregates, real and financial variables and macroeconomic forecasts - were, in fact, common to all successful strategies. taking note of these two observations, the governing council of the ecb adopted a … |
| Vítor Constâncio: Past and future of the European Central Bank monetary policy | Period_2 | 2018-05-11 | 0.262 | the announcement of a reference value for the growth of a broad monetary aggregate; and (iii) a broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price developments and the risks to price stability in the euro area as a whole.” there was clearly a dominant first pillar with a reference value initially set at 4.5% growth rate for m3. the text further explained: “to signal the prominent role it has assigned to money, the governing council has announced a quantitative reference value for monetary growth as one pillar of the overall stability oriented strategy”. so, some trace of technical monetarism[2] was implicitly present. in 2006, explaining the origin of the “two pillars”, otmar issing quoted former president wim duisenberg’s reply to a question by a journalist in 1999: “it is not a coincidence that i have used the words that money will play a prominent role. so, if you call it the two pillars, one pillar is thicker than the other is or stronger than the other, but how much i couldn’t tell you”.[3] the reference value for the monetary aggregate m3 was considered a relevant variable for inflation assessment and was related to the theoretical approach of technical monetarism in that money predicts inflation and differs from credit or other aggregates. the reference value for m3 annual growth was calculated to be 4.5% and was used to produce a monetary overhang: the difference between actual m3 growth and the reference value, with higher numbers representing higher risks f… |
| Mario Draghi: A route for Europe | Period_2 | 2012-05-25 | 0.197 | long-term growth of monetary aggregates and credit consistent with the potential for economic expansion. in this sense, the monetary pillar of the strategy can be interpreted as a strategic reinforcement that helps to prepare correction mechanisms in situations where macroeconomic imbalances are having difficulty in manifesting themselves in inflationary pressures. the monetary analysis gave important warning signals in the years preceding the crisis regarding the existence of deep macroeconomic and financial imbalances. in the autumn of 2005, in conditions of inflation observed and projected to be “normal”, the ecb’s monetary analysis began to record a change in the composition of m3 growth: from a model of growth explained by money demand factors – that we would define as irrelevant to the evolution of spending and prices – to a dynamic associated with increased credit creation – that is, to banks’ money supply factors. these changes were accepted as indications that the tenor of monetary policy, despite the moderation of inflationary pressures observed and projected, had become too lax. a new cycle of monetary policy tightening was initiated in december of that year, based on considerations inspired by the monetary pillar, where monetary and financial stability is an intermediate objective for attaining a more balanced development of macroeconomic variables and hence price stability over the long term. in a globalised world, the international financial crisis has not sp… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Monetary policy challenges in the euro area | Period_2 | 2015-02-03 | 0.193 | this medium-term approach to the inflation target, as demonstrated by lars svensson2, an eminent supporter of a “flexible inflation targeting” framework, is equivalent to an optimal policy rule resulting from optimising an objective function containing simultaneously the deviation of inflation from the target and the output gap. this means that a medium-term strategy for the inflation target does not ignore what is happening with the output stabilisation or the slack in the economy. more trivially, it is clear that there are many situations, like the present one, where aiming at the inflation target by influencing aggregate demand is fully aligned with the goal of stabilising the output gap. these two features of monetary policy in the euro area – an overriding emphasis on price stability accompanied by a publicly announced, numerical definition of the inflation objective – are also key characteristics of inflation targeting strategies. according to an influential definition, the inflation targeting approach “is characterised, as the name suggests, by the announcement of official target ranges for the inflation rate at one or more horizons, and by explicit acknowledgment that low and stable inflation is the overriding goal of monetary policy.”3 in practice however, the debate on the monetary policy strategy of the ecb has mostly focused on its differences from the theoretical notion of “flexible inflation targeting”.4 specifically, the ecb itself has emphasised its relianc… |
| Peter Praet: Economic recovery in the euro area - the role of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2013-12-16 | 0.159 | signals from the monetary pillar let me now turn to the signals we have received from the monetary pillar. in a nutshell, these signals confirm the subdued medium-term inflation outlook deriving from the economic analysis. while monetary dynamics have been weak, essentially since the onset of the crisis, growth in broad money moderated further in recent months. the annual growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate m3 decreased to 1.4% in october 2013 (or 1.7 % adjusting for one-off effects), which is the latest available data point, from 2.0% in september 2013. this marks a continuation in the deceleration from previous months. after m3 still grew at 2.8% in the second quarter of 2013, the third quarter recorded a significant drop in this growth rate to 2.2%. a key driver of these recent developments in m3 is that, in the current environment, monetary assets only yield little remuneration. as a consequence, money holders are incentivised to engage in two types of substitution: either they hold very liquid instruments, such as overnight deposits. this shows up in still robust growth in the narrow monetary aggregate m1, which stood at 6.6% in october 2013, slightly down from 6.7% in september. or they diversify away from short-term deposits and marketable instruments towards better remunerated – but riskier and less liquid – instruments. to the extent these instruments are outside m3, this dampens the growth in the broader monetary aggregate. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy in the crisis - confronting short-run challenges while anchoring long-run expectations | Period_2 | 2013-05-23 | 0.144 | which from time to time have released signals which conflicted with those which we extracted from our inflation forecast. under our monetary pillar, in particular, monetary and financial trends have acquired such a prominent analytical status that, we think, they allowed a better identification of the origin of macroeconomic disturbances. this in turn has provided for a more robust approach to policy overall. this monetary pillar “spare tyre” has been relevant in conditions of persistent supply shocks. let me give an example. since the 1990s and for much of the last decade, inflation in a large number of mature industrial economies remained quiescent. many underlying determinants can explain these worldwide conditions. a regained control of inflation expectations by the major monetary authorities was certainly a prime cause of price stability. but other factors contributed to a sustained trend of disinflation. they include the delayed impact on productivity of the digital and internet revolutions that burst upon the scene in the early 1990s as well as the supply chain implications of china’s emergence as the world’s manufacturing powerhouse. positive supply side shocks were either generated domestically or imported through an expanded trade intensity of production. in the euro area, despite the upward pressures that the ongoing adjustment in relative price levels across member states was exerting on the euro area price index, “price pressures” – defined as the difference b… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a high inflation environment - commitment and clarity | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.059 | the labour market has remained resilient so far, with forward-looking indicators showing little sign of weakening.[15] inflation expectations have been creeping up. in parallel, governments are facing pressures to increase indexation, for instance by tying pensions and public sector wages to inflation, which could add to wage pressures in the private sector too.[16] this outlook is confirmed by evidence from the latest collective bargaining rounds and our corporate telephone survey, both of which point to a rise in negotiated wages next year of around 4%. here in estonia, wage growth is currently running at around 10%. these developments do not constitute excessive second-round effects so far, and at longer horizons inflation expectations remain anchored. but with inflation likely to remain high for an extended period, we need to monitor inflation expectations and wage negotiations very carefully to ensure that wage growth does not settle persistently at levels that are incompatible with our target. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.045 | in an environment of measurable movements in inflation expectations, insights regarding their role in monetary policy transmission remain crucial for the policy deliberations of central banks. in the post- pandemic context, it is particularly challenging to discern whether changes in measures of expectations indicate a more fundamental change that may durably impact the transmission of monetary policy. so what can research tell us? recent research in this area — including several papers presented at this conference — has helped shed light on how different types of inflation expectations are formed, how reliable the various measures are, and what these findings may imply for the conduct of monetary policy. how reliable are surveys of professional forecasters, for example? one of the conference papers identifies an intriguing mechanism whereby even rational forecasters might report a biased measure of their true expectations, with individual forecasts over-reacting to private information, while under- reacting to publicly available information.!! |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.033 | policy implications so what does this imply for the ecb’s normalisation process today? subject to incoming data – we are and should remain data-driven – both the economic outlook and the principles i have outlined justify ending net asset purchases and then gradually exiting negative rates. this would allow us to continue to normalise policy by removing the part of our monetary accommodation that is no longer needed today. in particular, negative rates may imply distortions which were only necessary and proportionate when inflation was threatening to be too low over the medium term, relative to our target.the first adjustment is already under way. the ecb has already made two major announcements on asset purchases, first in december last year, and then again in march, when we signalled our expectation that net asset purchases would be concluded in the third quarter of this year. at the same time, the stock effects associated with our reinvestment policy will ensure that accommodation is withdrawn gradually. this will avoid creating financial stability risks in an already very volatile and uncertain environment. the second adjustment – the adjustment to our deposit facility rate – would allow the recent rise in medium-term inflation expectations to be reflected in our monetary policy. it would be consistent with a progressive removal of accommodation, still allowing us to steer output back towards potential but confirming the direction of normalisation that has already led … |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.032 | curve brings about an appreciation of the euro.[19] simple correlations between the exchange rate and interest rate expectations suggest that this relation has held up reasonably well historically and more recently in terms of the euro-us dollar bilateral exchange rate as well as in the cross-section of the effective exchange rates of major currencies. ecb model-based decompositions of financial asset price movements across the united states and the euro area point to a prominent role of us monetary policy tightening in driving the increase in euro area yields, the correction in euro area equity markets, and the recent euro depreciation. in fact, us monetary policy spillovers have had at least as much of an impact on euro area asset prices and the euro-dollar exchange rate over the last 12 months as ecb monetary policy actions.[20] at the same time, while both rate normalisation and balance sheet normalisation in the euro area, all other things being equal, can be expected to exert appreciation pressure on the euro exchange rate, rate policies exert a stronger exchange rate effect than balance sheet policies.[21] |
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.030 | first, we see no real evidence of a broad-based skill mismatch across the economy. we are seeing high job vacancy rates, especially in the high-contact services that have recently reopened, but we are also seeing strong growth in employment. this suggests that the economy is largely following the normal movement along the beveridge curve! seen during recoveries, undergoing a typical matching process (chart 7, left-hand side)./12] |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 82 | ensure | 1 | 0.0615012 | ready | 1 | 0.9992986 |
| 82 | measure | 2 | 0.0480552 | manner | 2 | 0.9989486 |
| 82 | time | 3 | 0.0451139 | timely | 3 | 0.9988609 |
| 82 | continue | 4 | 0.0424528 | exit | 4 | 0.9987727 |
| 82 | support | 5 | 0.0327885 | ensure | 5 | 0.9987719 |
| 82 | manner | 6 | 0.0325084 | timely manner | 6 | 0.9986845 |
| 82 | stand | 7 | 0.0315279 | stand | 7 | 0.9985981 |
| 82 | provide | 8 | 0.0299873 | stand ready | 8 | 0.9985974 |
| 82 | ready | 9 | 0.0298472 | counter | 9 | 0.9975467 |
| 82 | timely | 10 | 0.0266258 | effectively | 10 | 0.9967145 |
| 82 | economy | 11 | 0.0225640 | exit strategy | 11 | 0.9956071 |
| 82 | remain | 12 | 0.0213034 | continue | 12 | 0.9956045 |
| 82 | exit | 13 | 0.0193425 | sustain manner | 13 | 0.9950814 |
| 82 | stand ready | 14 | 0.0147205 | provide | 14 | 0.9949036 |
| 82 | timely manner | 15 | 0.0127596 | crucial | 15 | 0.9946509 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2009-10-12 | 0.148 | as the transmission of monetary policy works with lags, we expect that our policy action will progressively feed through to the economy in full. hence, with all the measures taken, including our latest 12-month longer-term refinancing operation of 30 september, monetary policy is providing strong ongoing support to the economy. once the macroeconomic environment improves, the governing council will make sure that the measures taken are unwound in a timely fashion and that the liquidity provided is absorbed in order to counter effectively any threat to price stability over the medium to longer term. by so doing, the governing council will continue to ensure a firm anchoring of medium-term inflation expectations. such anchoring is indispensable to supporting sustainable growth and employment and contributing to financial stability. accordingly, we will continue to monitor very closely all developments over the period ahead. as regards fiscal policies, the need for ambitious and realistic fiscal exit and consolidation strategies is becoming increasingly pressing. it is vital that governments put in place concrete structural measures and convincingly communicate that they are committed to ensuring the sustainability of public finances. governments should design their consolidation plans in line with the provisions of the stability and growth pact, ensuring that consolidation starts as soon as possible and at the latest when the recovery takes hold. these plans should also be a… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2009-07-08 | 0.141 | quarterly growth rates is expected by mid-2010. available indicators of inflation expectations over the medium to longer term remain firmly anchored in line with the governing council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis corroborates the assessment of low inflationary pressure, as money and credit indicators continue to be weak. against this background, we expect the current episode of extremely low or negative inflation rates to be short-lived and price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby continuing to support the purchasing power of euro area households. as the transmission of monetary policy works with lags, our policy action should progressively feed through to the economy in full. hence, with all the measures taken, monetary policy will provide ongoing support for households and corporations. the governing council would like to recall that the eurosystem provided a significant amount of liquidity to euro area banks at its recent first 12-month longer-term refinancing operation. this operation at a fixed interest rate of 1% is expected to strengthen further the liquidity position of banks and to support the normalisation of money markets and the extension of credit to the economy alongside the other measures of enhanced credit support. once the macroeconomic environment improves, the governing council will ensure that t… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2009-06-09 | 0.127 | contrast, longer-term lending to non-financial corporations remained positive. the past reductions in key ecb rates have continued to be passed on to lending rates to both non- financial corporations and households. the resulting improvement in financing conditions should provide ongoing support for economic activity in the period ahead. however, given the challenges which lie ahead, banks should take appropriate measures to further strengthen their capital bases and, where necessary, take full advantage of the government measures to support the financial sector, in particular as regards recapitalisation. to sum up, the current key ecb interest rates are appropriate taking into account our decisions of early may, including the enhanced credit support measures, and all the information and analyses which have become available since then. we confirmed our expectation that price developments over the policy-relevant horizon will remain dampened by the marked weakening of economic activity in the euro area and globally. recent survey information indicates that, following two quarters of very negative growth, economic activity over the remainder of this year is expected to decline at much less negative rates. after a stabilisation phase, positive quarterly growth rates are expected by mid-2010. this assessment incorporates adverse lagged effects, such as a further deterioration in labour markets, which are likely to materialise over the coming months. at the same time, available… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2009-08-11 | 0.121 | expansion continues to decelerate. against this background, we expect the current episode of extremely low or negative inflation rates to be short-lived and price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby continuing to support the purchasing power of euro area households. as the transmission of monetary policy works with lags, our policy action should progressively feed through to the economy in full. hence, with all the measures taken, including our covered bond purchases, monetary policy will provide ongoing support for households and corporations. once the macroeconomic environment improves, the governing council will take care that the measures taken are quickly unwound and that the ample liquidity provided is absorbed. hence, any threat to price stability over the medium to longer term will be effectively countered in a timely fashion. the governing council will continue to ensure a firm anchoring of medium-term inflation expectations. such anchoring is indispensable to supporting sustainable growth and employment and contributes to financial stability. accordingly, we will continue to monitor very closely all developments over the period ahead. regarding fiscal policy, we welcome the position of the eurogroup that, given the current economic outlook and projected public deficit and debt developments, further fiscal stimulus is not warranted. budget plans for 2010, which are currently being finalised in a number of countries, and medium-term consolidati… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2009-11-06 | 0.119 | area economy. looking ahead, and taking into account the improved conditions in financial markets, not all our liquidity measures will be needed to the same extent as in the past. accordingly, the governing council will make sure that the extraordinary liquidity measures taken are phased out in a timely and gradual fashion and that the liquidity provided is absorbed in order to counter effectively any threat to price stability over the medium to longer term. by so doing, the governing council will continue to ensure a firm anchoring of medium- term inflation expectations. such anchoring is indispensable to supporting sustainable growth and employment and contributing to financial stability. accordingly, we will continue to monitor very closely all developments over the period ahead. as regards fiscal policies, many euro area governments are faced with high and sharply rising fiscal imbalances. if not addressed by a clear and credible exit strategy, this could seriously risk undermining public confidence in the sustainability of public finances and the economic recovery. the very large government borrowing requirements carry the risk of triggering rapid changes in market sentiment, leading to less favourable medium and long- term interest rates. this in turn would dampen private investment and thereby weaken the foundations for a return to sustained growth. moreover, high public deficits and debts may complicate the task of the single monetary policy to maintain price stabi… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges for euro area monetary policy in early 2018 | Period_2 | 2017-12-29 | 0.163 | insurance companies, bidding up the price at which we need to pay. liquidity conditions are expected to become more challenging in certain market segments the longer the purchasing programme remains active. as such, we have to be mindful not to exert an undue influence on price formation. another potential complication relates to our public sector purchases. a key safeguard that we have set up for these purchases is to operate so-called “blackout periods”, where we do not buy around the date of a new issuance. this facilitates price formation and ensures that article 123 of the treaty is fully respected – the monetary financing prohibition. mindful of self-imposed constraints in this respect the remaining space for both net and gross purchases will largely be in newly issued bonds. this poses some potential complications that we have to monitor very closely. conclusion let me conclude. the recovery in the euro area continues at a robust pace, employment has risen strongly. both wages and underlying inflation appear to have turned the corner. at its october meeting, the governing council chose to reduce the rate of net asset purchases, which, as i have explained today, prevented an unwarranted increase in monetary stimulus. we will continue to monitor developments in the economy and set policy in a way that is consistent with our price stability mandate. in doing so, we must also take into account the balance of risks when setting policy. if we withdraw our monetary policy … |
| Yves Mersch: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy amid the pandemic | Period_2 | 2020-10-19 | 0.136 | looking ahead, in the current environment of elevated uncertainty the ecb governing council will assess incoming information very carefully, including developments in the exchange rate, while ensuring that this incoming information, such as information on containment measures which is already included in our baseline, is only accounted for once in our assessment. the governing council continues to stand ready to adjust all of its instruments, as appropriate, to ensure that inflation moves towards its aim in a timely and sustained manner. |
| Fabio Panetta: Healing after the pandemic - supporting and sustaining the recovery | Period_2 | 2020-09-15 | 0.128 | the funding from next generation eu creates an extraordinary opportunity. for the first time in history, the european union will issue common debt to counter a common shock. this will bring fiscal policy more in tune with monetary policy at the european level, and may represent an important step for european integration: we borrow together to recover from the crisis and to invest in our future. all eu countries will benefit from this common response. but to be effective, european measures require careful planning and decisive action at the national level. in time, the need to buffer the immediate impact of the pandemic will be replaced by the need for investment and reform to support a sustainable recovery. as the national support measures are phased out, a well-planned and coordinated approach will be necessary if we want to avoid cliff effects. policies will have to find the right balance to achieve the twin goals of stabilisation and modernisation. particularly in the case of greece, the significant resources that are expected to be provided by next generation eu represent an opportunity to strengthen the country’s growth potential. these resources should be channelled into much needed growth-enhancing and job-creating investment projects and should be accompanied by a continuation of the ongoing reform process. conclusions let me conclude. europe has responded to a major challenge, but is not out of the woods yet. the ecb’s governing council stands ready to adjust all … |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox - evidence from the euro area | Period_2 | 2020-02-23 | 0.116 | while the automatic stabilisation function embedded in the forward guidance accommodates any short- term volatility in the outlook, the governing council continues to stand ready to adjust all of its instruments, as appropriate, to ensure that inflation moves towards its aim in a sustained manner, in line with its commitment to symmetry. scatterplot of the contribution of demand factor to short-term rates (x-axis) versus long-term rates (y-axis). |
| Yves Mersch: Challenges facing monetary policy in the euro area | Period_2 | 2018-03-26 | 0.113 | market, bigger than ever before. we sometimes buy bonds from institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, which could push up the price we need to pay given the growing scarcity. we should avoid a situation whereby liquidity conditions in certain market segments are unnecessarily made more challenging by an unwarranted extension of the purchase programme. so we have to be mindful not to exert an undue influence on price formation. another potential complication relates to our public sector purchases. a key safeguard that we have set up for these purchases is to operate so-called “blackout periods”, where we do not buy around the date of a new issuance. this facilitates price formation and ensures that article 123 of the treaty – the monetary financing prohibition – is fully respected. conclusion the economic recovery in the euro area has been better than expected and employment has risen strongly. both wages and underlying inflation appear to have turned the corner. all the conditions are in place for a sustained adjustment in inflation towards our aim. so it’s just a question of time now. more haste, less speed, however. the improving inflation trajectory means that we can gradually scale back our net purchases and keep monetary policy sufficiently accommodative to continue to support the convergence of inflation towards our aim. we will continue to monitor developments in the economy and set policy in a way that remains consistent with our pric… |
| Luis de Guindos: Presentation of the European Central Bank annual report 2021 | Period_3 | 2022-05-04 | 0.092 | impact of the sanctions and on possible further measures. beyond the humanitarian and economic impact, the recent events have also exposed major strategic vulnerabilities in europe. and we can only address these by remaining united. europe’s recent history has shown that when faced with significant shocks, we are capable of coming together, learning our lessons and emerging stronger. the initiatives taken on european level so far to address this crisis suggest that this time will be no different. the war in ukraine has reminded us yet again that peace in europe cannot be taken for granted. but it has also reminded us of the european union’s very raison d’être – to preserve peace. because, in the words of jean monnet, “it is better to fight around the negotiating table than on the battlefield”. thank you for your attention, i now stand ready to take your questions. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a high inflation environment - commitment and clarity | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.088 | back to our target. how much further we need to go, and how fast we need to get there, will be determined by the following factors. the first and most important is the inflation outlook: we will raise rates to levels that bring inflation back down to our medium-term target in a timely manner. the inflation outlook is forward-looking and incorporates all the different forces we are facing: the outlook for the economy, the persistence of the shocks and the reaction of wages and inflation expectations. current inflation numbers are relevant insofar as they provide additional insights about the persistence of inflation. the second factor is the corresponding policy stance and its transmission lags into demand and inflation. monetary policy is inherently forward-looking, as interest rate changes will only reach their full effect over the next year or two. as a result, while the impact of policy decisions will strengthen over time, it will be seen in the hard data only with a time lag. but this lag in transmission and the prevailing uncertainty also means that the rate path ahead will look different depending on the contingencies we face. if we were to see, for example, inflation becoming more persistent and expectations being at risk of de-anchoring, we could not wait until the full impact of the policy measures materialises. we would need to take additional actions until we are more confident that inflation will return to target in a timely manner. there is also another import… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.085 | the anchoring of inflation expectations it is an essential task for monetary policy to ensure that medium-term inflation expectations are anchored at the two per cent target. the scale and speed of the rise in inflation since the middle of 2021 constitutes a major shock and has created an environment in which there is more intense questioning of the future inflation path. the longer and larger the deviation from the two percent target, the greater the risk that medium-term inflation expectations become de-anchored. all else equal, the monetary policy that stabilises inflation at target in a timely manner is also the monetary policy that stabilises expectations at target. first, by ensuring that the monetary policy stance will sufficiently dampen demand to return inflation to the target in a timely manner, price setters and wage setters are on notice that demand conditions will not sustain excessive price increases and wage increases. second, clear communication of the effectiveness of our monetary policy measures and of our determination to adjust monetary policy in response to the evolving inflation outlook also helps households, firms, experts and markets to cut through the noise in the current highly uncertain environment and thereby helps to maintain the anchor for inflation expectations. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-21 | 0.084 | ensuring price stability for monetary policy, this changing environment creates considerable challenges. inflation in the euro area is far too high, having reached double digits in october for the first time since the start of the monetary union. and with inflation likely to remain high for an extended period, we need to monitor the evolution of inflation expectations very carefully. additionally, although recent data on gdp growth have surprised on the upside, the risk of recession has increased. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-09-27 | 0.082 | moreover, to further enhance our transparency and ensure that we are aware of citizens’ expectations and concerns in relation to our policies, we have modernised our communication policy and we will make outreach events a structural feature of our interaction with the public. but our efforts to ensure that we are accountable to european citizens do not stop there. this parliament will continue to be our main interlocutor and your role in making sure that the people’s voices are heard by the ecb and that the ecb’s voice is heard by the people remains crucial to foster understanding of and trust in our policies. finally, two years after my first appearance before this committee, i remain fully convinced of the need for an “open mind” to ensure that the ecb keeps delivering on its mandate in rapidly changing circumstances. we therefore intend to assess the appropriateness of our monetary policy strategy periodically, with the next assessment expected in 2025. thank you for your attention. i now stand ready to take your questions. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 83 | sector | 1 | 0.2468592 | sector | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 83 | private | 2 | 0.0939806 | private sector | 2 | 0.9998247 |
| 83 | private sector | 3 | 0.0592221 | private | 3 | 0.9995619 |
| 83 | economy | 4 | 0.0542145 | public sector | 4 | 0.9989482 |
| 83 | good | 5 | 0.0349205 | bank sector | 5 | 0.9988610 |
| 83 | public | 6 | 0.0334477 | financial sector | 6 | 0.9986858 |
| 83 | bank sector | 7 | 0.0237271 | public | 7 | 0.9978958 |
| 83 | financial sector | 8 | 0.0226961 | direct | 8 | 0.9978096 |
| 83 | financial | 9 | 0.0215179 | notably | 9 | 0.9975468 |
| 83 | include | 10 | 0.0169521 | inter | 10 | 0.9975449 |
| 83 | public sector | 11 | 0.0156266 | alia | 11 | 0.9975431 |
| 83 | additional | 12 | 0.0122391 | additional | 12 | 0.9974589 |
| 83 | improve | 13 | 0.0115027 | restructure | 13 | 0.9972831 |
| 83 | result | 14 | 0.0110609 | inter alia | 14 | 0.9969728 |
| 83 | direct | 15 | 0.0109136 | private investment | 15 | 0.9956556 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Christian Noyer: Challenges ahead - the accession process | Period_1 | 2001-11-20 | 0.110 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: The economic crisis and the response of fiscal and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2009-06-15 | 0.108 | implications of policy measures the current crisis has increased the role of the government in the economy. some bank rescue operations have involved outright nationalisations, so governments now have significant exposure to the financial sector. similarly, the large fiscal stimuli packages adopted by many countries have led to a large increase in the size of the public sector in the economy. at the same time, the turmoil is being interpreted by some as a crisis of the market economy. it has encouraged critics of the market economy to speak out and demand a much larger role in the economy for governments. the financial system clearly needs a fundamental overhaul. financial institutions have to take a different approach and adopt appropriate incentives. risk-takers should be liable and not only reap the rewards of their actions but also bear responsibility for their consequences. we need to strengthen the regulation of the financial system, and in particular, we must improve the international cooperation between national supervisors of the financial sector. but let me hasten to add that policy-makers must not get carried away by recent events; they should act in a measured way, and not throw the baby out with the bathwater. while governments have had no alternative but to support systemically relevant financial institutions, they should, as a rule, keep their assistance to specific sectors or firms to a minimum. and when they do intervene, they should prepare clear and cred… |
| Christian Noyer: The ECB and the accession process | Period_1 | 2001-10-15 | 0.107 | the strengthening of the financial and banking sectors although the restructuring process in accession countries has made substantial progress, the financial sectors of accession countries still need to be further developed in terms of size, depth and functioning. this applies, in particular, to the banking sector that largely dominates the financial sector of these economies. the challenges ahead are numerous: inter alia, the weakness of banking intermediation, reflected in the low level of credit to the private sector, the relatively large proportion of bad loans in banks’ balance sheets in some countries or the exceptionally high spreads between lending and deposit rates that will progressively vanish in the next years. fortunately, the privatisation process and the increasing participation of foreign investors in the banking system have supported the rehabilitation and transformation of formerly state banks into efficient and profitable banking institutions. efforts to strengthen the financial and banking systems need to be made in the next years, also for the fulfilment of the so-called “economic” copenhagen criterion, which requires the existence of functioning market economies and the ability to cope with competitive pressures. compliance with this criterion for eu accession will require the adoption of eu legislation in the area of financial services, including those related to banking, insurance and investment firms, as i have mentioned before. all in all, in orde… |
| Mr Noyer considers the role of the central bank in encouraging and safeguarding savings (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 21 Jan 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-01-26 | 0.085 | its development also requires a certain convergence in tax systems. ultimately, the health of the financial sector is essential to the protection of savings. although the eurosystem has no direct authority in the field of prudential supervision, it monitors risk developments in the banking sector, as it does more generally with regard to developments in assets prices, where these could potentially affect overall monetary and financial stability. in these areas, the role of the eurosystem is always to uphold confidence in the currency, to contribute to the smooth functioning of the financial system and to encourage prudent macroeconomic policies, which influence the will and capacity to save. |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Growth and inflation in the euro area - the importance of productivity in the services sector | Period_1 | 2008-10-30 | 0.080 | dynamics and some characteristics of inflation in services more generally. i will touch on inflation at an area-wide level, but also – and mainly – on inflation differentials within monetary union. at an area-wide level, unit labour costs resulting from wage and productivity developments are a key predictor of inflation. wage increases not covered by productivity gains push up production costs, which eventually add to price pressures. when looking at price developments across sectors, it appears that in the euro area, the prices of services have increased faster than the prices of goods over the last two decades. evidence of this inflation gap can be found by looking at the main hicp components and gross value added deflators. for instance, when using the gdp deflator at factor cost, inflation in private sector services has been on average 0.8 percentage points higher than in the manufacturing sector. 11 similar developments have been found for the us and other industrialised economies, but the gap in the euro area has been more persistent than in the us. the persistent divergence between services and goods inflation in the euro area clearly reflects a weakness in productivity growth in services activities. turning to individual euro area countries, several ecb studies show that the differences in unit labour cost developments across individual euro area countries have also clearly been associated with differences in their hicp inflation rates over the last ten years. 12 c… |
| Mario Draghi: Interview with Neue Zürcher Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-01-23 | 0.114 | yet this means that the ecb’s audit of the banks could itself become a systemic risk. if the ecb were to notice very large capital shortfalls or a large number of banks that are not capable of surviving, this would potentially trigger a new banking crisis. i see it completely differently. if there are problems in europe’s banking sector, they are there, regardless of whether we uncover them or not. in the financial system in general, light is always better than darkness. only by uncovering weaknesses in the banking sector can measures be taken to correct them, be it through recapitalisation, restructuring or winding up banks. without transparency, the weaknesses will remain and put a strain on the whole economy. after all, weak banks do not lend. we have learnt the lessons from japan in the 1990s that a weak banking sector inhibits growth for years. |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.103 | radical proposals, even if digitalisation may gain ground and eventually prevail – as we start to observe in some countries. helicopter money another old idea which has received renewed attention recently is friedman’s proposal of using “helicopter money”. friedman’s helicopter money drop is supposed to exert upward pressure on real activity and inflation because of a wealth effect: real money holdings of private agents rise at a given price level, making private agents wealthier and inducing them to spend. in a more modern context, one would need to increase private agents’ claims on the public sector, relative to private agents’ liabilities to the public sector. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Delo | Period_2 | 2014-02-17 | 0.093 | absolutely, it will be the same philosophy. we will discuss all the parameters with the 18 supervisors – the so-called “national competent authorities” of the 18 euro area countries – within the ecb’s new supervisory board, which met for the first time on 30 january. this will be the place where all the assumptions, parameters and choices will be discussed. this will be the first important contribution made by the single supervisory mechanism to the euro area. the principles will be the same and they will be very strict, to make sure that we know everything about the situation of the banks this time – and to be sure that measures are taken to prepare for the future. several critical reviews of the oliver wyman financial consultancy appeared recently in the foreign press. why has the ecb decided to use oliver wyman, of all companies, to carry out such a demanding task and what were the selection criteria? there was an open, competitive selection process and oliver wyman came first. taxpayers in slovenia have paid over €3 billion, nearly 9% of gdp, for the recapitalisation of troubled state-owned banks alone. banks are now full of capital. but on the other hand they are not lending money to companies for their working capital and investments. how do you see this controversy? part of the explanation has to do with the weakness of aggregate demand not only in slovenia but also across the euro area. slovenia is a very open economy, selling a lot to european markets. the overall… |
| Peter Praet: Ensuring a sustained adjustment in inflation | Period_2 | 2018-07-19 | 0.092 | resources of the public sector were mobilised, putting strains on the public finances of those countries whose banking sectors were large relative to their economies. as a result of this assistance to the financial sector, government debt in the euro area as a whole increased by more than five percentage points of gdp. at the level of individual countries, government debt increased in some cases by more than 10 or even 30 percentage points of gdp, not including further – very sizeable – contingent liabilities resulting from state guarantees to banks. the second phase intensified the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. this loop was a source of vulnerability for the euro area for two reasons: first, any impairment of the banking sector’s liabilities – including capital − challenged fiscal sustainability in the eyes of investors; and, second, the value of bonds held as bank assets shrank as their market value eroded. the main consequence of this negative feedback loop was a fragmentation of financial markets along national lines. a lack of liquidity, coupled with the erosion of capital due to losses on sovereign exposures, eventually led to entire national banking systems being unable to access market funding. cross-border bank funding contracted, and has never really recovered since. financial fragmentation impaired monetary policy transmission. markets started to price in redenomination risk for some sovereign bonds, which in turn prevented our accommodati… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Radio Classique | Period_2 | 2017-01-30 | 0.081 | benoît cœuré: interview with radio classique interview with mr benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the european central bank, and radio classique, conducted by mr nicolas pierron on 23 january 2017. * * * mario draghi, president of the european central bank, is to be investigated by the ombudsman of the european union, following a complaint from an ngo. he is suspected of entrusting the private sector with insider information in the context of a group called the g30. how do you respond to these allegations? the mere fact that those questions are being asked shows that we are transparent, since all meetings of the members of the executive board of the ecb with representatives of the private sector, whether bankers or not, are made public. as a matter of fact, my calendar, my diary, is published every month on the ecb’s website. as for the substance of your question, for us to be able to understand what is happening in the economy we have to meet private sector actors, including bankers. and yet, this has to be done in a transparent way, which is the case with the g30. so this won’t go any further? the ombudsman of the european union is pursuing the matter, she’s doing her job and we shall see what she has to say. but the same ombudsman, ms o’reilly, acknowledged that the ecb had made significant progress in its transparency and its communication policy, notably with the publication of the minutes of governing council decisions and also, as i said, with the public… |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.104 |
|
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.094 | in particular, capital key deviations peaked in the early weeks of the pepp, while subsequent purchasing was generally aligned with the capital key, in view of the rapid stabilisation of spreads in the wake of the pepp announcement. annual net issuance of public and private sector securities ecb and eba. notes: the dotted line shows ecb staff projections of debt issuance of securities issued by the public sector and the non-financial corporate sector and projections of the european banking authority (eba) for (unsecured) securities issued by the banking sector. the latest observation is for 18 march 2022. |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.085 |
|
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.063 | schnabel, i. (2022), “the globalisation of inflation”, speech at a conference organised by the österreichische vereinigung für finanzanalyse und asset management, vienna, 11 may. 15. jordà et al. (2022), “wage growth when inflation is high”, frbsf economic letter 2022-25, 6 september; and carstens, a. (2022), “the return of inflation”, speech at the international center for monetary and banking studies, geneva, 5 april. 16. overall, however, only around 3% of private sector workers in the euro area have their wages and minimum wages automatically indexed to inflation. see koester, g. and grapow, h. (2021), “the prevalence of private sector wage indexation in the euro area and its potential role for the impact of inflation on wages”, published as part of the ecb economic bulletin, issue 7/2021. 17. this is consistent with new survey evidence in the united states. see hajdini et al. (2022), “low passthrough from inflation expectations to income growth expectations: why people dislike inflation”, federal reserve bank of cleveland working paper series no 22-21. 18. deviations of output from the trend are only a good predictor for inflation insofar as they are a good proxy for real marginal costs. see sbordone, a. m. (2002), “prices and unit labor costs: a new test of price stickiness”, journal of monetary economics, vol. 49, issue 2, pp. 265-292. |
| Luis de Guindos: Policy mix of the future - the role of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.053 | and sectors in the euro area. it fine-tunes the overall policy mix and complements the single monetary policy in support of overall financial stability across the euro area. despite the overall good resilience of the euro area banking sector, certain countries have in recent years seen a build-up of financial vulnerabilities, notably related to residential real estate prices and growing household and firm indebtedness. some further careful and targeted tightening of macroprudential policy would be beneficial in selected countries at present. given the deteriorated outlook for economic growth, some countries might benefit from further increasing the resilience of their financial sectors before credit risks start materialising. this includes for example taking measures to preserve capital in the banking sector which could then be used to absorb losses. lithuania has been active in applying a comprehensive set of macroprudential policies to address current vulnerabilities. this year, authorities have activated a sectoral systemic risk buffer of 2% on residential real estate exposures and have tightened the loan-to-value limit for second and subsequent housing loans to 70%. of course, the benefits of further policy action across countries, would need to be evaluated against the risk of procyclical effects, which is becoming more likely as the economic outlook worsens. let me conclude. policy interaction has been a critical element for navigating the pandemic. complementary act… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 84 | purchase | 1 | 0.0278880 | reinvest | 1 | 0.9967976 |
| 84 | continue | 2 | 0.0274769 | principal payment | 2 | 0.9967478 |
| 84 | asset | 3 | 0.0175439 | mature | 3 | 0.9966707 |
| 84 | ecb interest rate | 4 | 0.0135021 | principal | 4 | 0.9964948 |
| 84 | ecb interest | 5 | 0.0132281 | mature security | 5 | 0.9963521 |
| 84 | key | 6 | 0.0131596 | ecb interest rate | 6 | 0.9955162 |
| 84 | asset purchase | 7 | 0.0127486 | ecb interest | 7 | 0.9953410 |
| 84 | key ecb | 8 | 0.0126801 | key ecb | 8 | 0.9949036 |
| 84 | president | 9 | 0.0126116 | key ecb interest | 9 | 0.9946439 |
| 84 | govern council | 10 | 0.0126116 | mature security purchase | 10 | 0.9945864 |
| 84 | interest | 11 | 0.0122691 | security purchase | 11 | 0.9939474 |
| 84 | key ecb interest | 12 | 0.0121320 | start raise | 12 | 0.9937137 |
| 84 | interest rate | 13 | 0.0118580 | statement | 13 | 0.9935901 |
| 84 | council | 14 | 0.0106935 | vice president | 14 | 0.9935078 |
| 84 | govern | 15 | 0.0102824 | monthly pace | 15 | 0.9933944 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mr Duisenberg reports on the current position and future prospects of the European System of Central Banks (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-12-04 | 0.074 | there will be a monthly press conference. such a press conference will start with a detailed introductory statement, as has been the case so far, and these introductory statements will also be published immediately, without delay. in this statement the vice-president and i will present the governing council’s view of the economic situation and the underlying arguments for its monetary policy decisions, followed by a question and answer session. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview in The Wall Street Journal | Period_1 | 2011-01-24 | 0.052 | wsj: if 2008 and 2009 were years of crisis, and 2010 was a year of stabilization and recovery. how do you see 2011? what should davos participants be focused on this year? trichet: since the start of the recovery, in the third quarter of 2009, the real economy has surprised up on the upside. this is encouraging. i see 2011 as a year of continuous hard work, to make the financial sector more resilient and to improve the soundness of fiscal policies. the crisis, which started in 2007 and intensified in september 2008 revealed the fragility of the financial sector first and then the relative vulnerability of public finances in the advanced economies. wsj: what worries you most? trichet: to consider that because we managed to avoid a depression and are now experiencing the recovery, we could lose momentum in the reforms that are still urgently needed. that is the main danger. wsj: this year austerity becomes pan-european. but a recent united nations report said austerity risks a renewed economic downturn. do you agree? trichet: no, we do not. i do not buy the very simple reasoning that would suggest that pursuing sounder fiscal policy would hamper growth. on the contrary, i think that appropriate fiscal retrenchment in countries that need it is part of growth enhancement, because sustainable public finances makes a difference in terms of improving confidence of households, enterprises, investors and savers, which is decisive to foster growth and job creation. wsj: does the u.s… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2004-02-25 | 0.035 | purchasing power will be protected in the years to come, thanks in particular to the vigilance of the governing council of the ecb. from that standpoint, perhaps it is time to be more confident, and for households to consume and to invest more, which in turn would be good for growth and job creation. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Jackson Hole Conference - monetary policy and ‘credible alertness’ | Period_1 | 2005-09-01 | 0.033 | this pattern of events has repeated itself more than once over this period and uncertainty has still to fully dissipate. the governing council, on the basis of its comprehensive economic and monetary analyses, has constantly monitored and assessed macroeconomic conditions and the outlook for price stability, and, in its judgment, overall, they have required keeping the policy rate at 2% in each meeting over this period. in the monthly press conference following the governing council meeting in which we discuss monetary policy, i have very regularly made the point that we were not making any promises to the markets about future policy moves and that we stood ready to act as soon as is necessary to maintain price stability. |
| Jürgen Stark: Economic prospects and the role of monetary policy in the current situation | Period_1 | 2009-03-13 | 0.032 | monetary policy let me now turn to the second part of my speech, namely the role of monetary policy in the current situation. the financial crisis has contributed to a pace in disinflation and economic deceleration which has been unprecedented. this has required us taking unprecedented decisions to contain adverse spillover effects of financial market tensions on the real economy and thereby to maintain inflation over the medium term in line with price stability. in a coordinated move, the ecb and other major central banks announced reductions in their policy interest rates on 8 october 2008. overall, since october 2008, we lowered the key ecb interest rates by 275 basis points. the overnight money market rates fell even more steeply over this period, as the ecb significantly enlarged its liquidity provision to euro area banks. since october last year we have provided the banking sector with unlimited funds at maturities up to six months, against an expanded range of eligible collateral. these decisions |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2019-10-24 | 0.569 | mario draghi: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 24 october 2019. * * * ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by the commission vice-president, mr dombrovskis, and the incoming president, ms lagarde. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. we expect them to remain at their present or lower levels until we have seen the inflation outlook robustly converge to a level sufficiently close to, but below, 2% within our projection horizon, and such convergence has been consistently reflected in underlying inflation dynamics. as decided at our last meeting in september, we will restart net purchases under our asset purchase programme (app) at a monthly pace of €20 billion as from 1 november. we expect them to run for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of our policy rates, and to end shortly before we start raising the key ecb interest rates. we also intend to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the app for an extended period of time past the date when we start raising the key ecb interes… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2019-12-12 | 0.545 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 12 december 2019. * * * ladies and gentlemen, welcome to our press conference. today is the first time that i have had the privilege and pleasure of chairing the monetary policy meeting of the governing council of the ecb. i am delighted to proceed now with reporting on the outcome of our meeting, together with the vice-president. the governing council meeting was also attended by the commission executive vice-president, mr dombrovskis. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. we expect them to remain at their present or lower levels until we have seen the inflation outlook robustly converge to a level sufficiently close to, but below, 2% within our projection horizon, and such convergence has been consistently reflected in underlying inflation dynamics. on 1 november we restarted net purchases under our asset purchase programme (app) at a monthly pace of €20 billion. we expect them to run for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of our policy rates, and to end shortly before we start raising the key ecb interest rates. we also intend to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the app for an e… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2020-01-23 | 0.536 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 23 january 2020. * * * ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. we expect them to remain at their present or lower levels until we have seen the inflation outlook robustly converge to a level sufficiently close to, but below, 2% within our projection horizon, and such convergence has been consistently reflected in underlying inflation dynamics. we will continue to make net purchases under our asset purchase programme (app) at a monthly pace of €20 billion. we expect them to run for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of our policy rates, and to end shortly before we start raising the key ecb interest rates. we also intend to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the app for an extended period of time past the date when we start raising the key ecb interest rates, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. today the governin… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2020-09-10 | 0.499 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 10 september 2020. * * * ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by the commission executive vice-president, mr dombrovskis. the incoming data since our last monetary policy meeting in july suggest a strong rebound in activity broadly in line with previous expectations, although the level of activity remains well below the levels prevailing before the coronavirus (covid-19) pandemic. while activity in the manufacturing sector has continued to improve, momentum in the services sector has slowed somewhat recently. the strength of the recovery remains surrounded by significant uncertainty, as it continues to be highly dependent on the future evolution of the pandemic and the success of containment policies. euro area domestic demand has recorded a significant recovery from low levels, although elevated uncertainty about the economic outlook continues to weigh on consumer spending and business investment. headline inflation is being dampened by low energy prices and weak price pressures in the context of subdued demand and significant labour market slack. against this backgrou… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2018-12-13 | 0.493 | mario draghi: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 13 december 2018. * * * ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by the president of the eurogroup, mr centeno. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. we continue to expect them to remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. regarding non-standard monetary policy measures, our net purchases under the asset purchase programme (app) will end in december 2018. at the same time, we are enhancing our forward guidance on reinvestment. accordingly, we intend to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the app for an extended period of time past the date when we start raising the key ecb interest rates, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. while incoming information has been weaker than exp… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-12-20 | 0.328 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 15 december 2022. good afternoon, the vice-president and i welcome you to our press conference. the governing council today decided to raise the three key ecb interest rates by 50 basis points and, based on the substantial upward revision to the inflation outlook, we expect to raise them further. in particular, we judge that interest rates will still have to rise significantly at a steady pace to reach levels that are sufficiently restrictive to ensure a timely return of inflation to our two per cent medium-term target. keeping interest rates at restrictive levels will over time reduce inflation by dampening demand and will also guard against the risk of a persistent upward shift in inflation expectations. our future policy rate decisions will continue to be data-dependent and follow a meeting- by-meeting approach. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.256 | monetary policy statement press conference christine lagarde, president of the ecb, luis de guindos, vice-president of the ecb amsterdam, 9 june 2022 jump to the transcript of the questions and answers good afternoon, the vice-president and i welcome you to our press conference. i would like to thank president knot for his kind hospitality and express our special gratitude to his staff for the excellent organisation of today’s meeting of the governing council. high inflation is a major challenge for all of us. the governing council will make sure that inflation returns to our two per cent target over the medium term. in may inflation again rose significantly, mainly because of surging energy and food prices, including due to the impact of the war. but inflation pressures have broadened and intensified, with prices for many goods and services increasing strongly. eurosystem staff have revised their baseline inflation projections up significantly. these projections indicate that inflation will remain undesirably elevated for some time. however, moderating energy costs, the easing of supply disruptions related to the pandemic and the normalisation of monetary policy are expected to lead to a decline in inflation. the new staff projections foresee annual inflation at 6.8 per cent in 2022, before it is projected to decline to 3.5 per cent in 2023 and 2.1 per cent in 2024 – higher than in the march projections. this means that headline inflation at the end of the projection hori… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2021-10-28 | 0.255 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 28 october 2021. * * * good afternoon, the vice-president and i welcome you to our press conference. the euro area economy continues to recover strongly, although momentum has moderated to some extent. consumers continue to be confident and their spending remains strong. but shortages of materials, equipment and labour are holding back production in some sectors. inflation is rising, primarily because of the surge in energy prices but also as the recovery in demand is outpacing constrained supply. we foresee inflation rising further in the near term, but then declining in the course of next year. market interest rates have increased since our last meeting in early september. however, overall financing conditions currently remain favourable for firms, households and the public sector. favourable financing conditions are essential for the economy to continue its recovery and to counter the negative impact of the pandemic on the inflation path. we continue to judge that favourable financing conditions can be maintained with a moderately lower pace of net asset purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp) than in the second and third quarters of this year. we also confirmed our other measures, namely the level of the key… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.254 |
|
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2021-09-09 | 0.237 | christine lagarde: ecb press conference - introductory statement introductory statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, and mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, frankfurt am main, 9 september 2021. * * * good afternoon, the vice-president and i welcome you to our press conference. the rebound phase in the recovery of the euro area economy is increasingly advanced. output is expected to exceed its pre-pandemic level by the end of the year. with more than 70 per cent of european adults fully vaccinated, the economy has largely reopened, allowing consumers to spend more and companies to increase production. while rising immunity to the coronavirus means that the impact of the pandemic is now less severe, the global spread of the delta variant could yet delay the full reopening of the economy. the current increase in inflation is expected to be largely temporary and underlying price pressures are building up only slowly. the inflation outlook in our new staff projections has been revised slightly upwards, but in the medium term inflation is foreseen to remain well below our two per cent target. financing conditions for firms, households and the public sector have remained favourable since our previous quarterly assessment in june. favourable financing conditions are essential for the economy to continue its recovery and to offset the negative impact of the pandemic on inflation. based on a joint assessment of financi… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 85 | development | 1 | 0.0409674 | moderation | 1 | 0.9947428 |
| 85 | growth | 2 | 0.0377714 | economic growth | 2 | 0.9940199 |
| 85 | remain | 3 | 0.0177475 | monetary development | 3 | 0.9935167 |
| 85 | continue | 4 | 0.0152038 | upward | 4 | 0.9925279 |
| 85 | stability | 5 | 0.0142907 | economic development | 5 | 0.9923337 |
| 85 | level | 6 | 0.0139645 | upward risk | 6 | 0.9921413 |
| 85 | month | 7 | 0.0131166 | consumer price inflation | 7 | 0.9921314 |
| 85 | economic growth | 8 | 0.0130514 | wage moderation | 8 | 0.9919394 |
| 85 | price stability | 9 | 0.0122035 | excess liquidity | 9 | 0.9918844 |
| 85 | inflationary | 10 | 0.0120730 | juncture | 10 | 0.9917937 |
| 85 | medium term | 11 | 0.0106381 | liquid | 11 | 0.9913621 |
| 85 | regard | 12 | 0.0105729 | development | 12 | 0.9913397 |
| 85 | outlook | 13 | 0.0104424 | pillar | 13 | 0.9910499 |
| 85 | uncertainty | 14 | 0.0103772 | oil price development | 14 | 0.9904159 |
| 85 | upward | 15 | 0.0095293 | inflationary | 15 | 0.9897626 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2002-01-03 | 0.503 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i will report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council of the ecb, which was also attended by the president of the ecofin council, mr. rato, as well as by commissioner solbes. as usual, we examined recent monetary, financial and economic developments. the governing council concluded that recent developments are in line with the interest rate decisions taken in the course of last year. we have therefore decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. we also confirmed that the current level of key ecb interest rates remains appropriate for the maintenance of price stability over the medium term. starting with the analysis under the first pillar of our monetary policy strategy, the three-month average of the annual growth rates of m3 rose to 7.4% in the period from september to november 2001, from 6.7% in the period from august to october. these high levels of the growth rate of m3 over the past few months reflect a particularly marked preference for liquid holdings by euro area investors in an economic and financial environment characterised by exceptionally high uncertainty worldwide. however, this should remain a temporary phenomenon which does not indicate future inflationary pressures. this judgement notwithstanding, the continued acceleration of m3 and the ongoing process of building up liquidity will require a thorough analysis of monetary developments in the months to come. regarding the second pill… |
| Willem F Duisenberg: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2002-01-25 | 0.441 |
|
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2002-04-05 | 0.426 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council of the ecb. as usual, we examined recent monetary, financial and economic developments. the governing council concluded that the current level of key ecb interest rates remains appropriate for the maintenance of price stability over the medium term and, accordingly, decided to leave them unchanged. starting with the analysis under the first pillar of our monetary policy strategy, the three-month average of the annual growth rates of m3 stood at 7.8% in the period from december 2001 to february 2002, compared with 8.0% in the period from november 2001 to january 2002. the high level of the annual growth rates of m3 continues to reflect the past portfolio shifts to liquid positions. these shifts primarily occurred during autumn 2001, when the economic and financial environment was characterised by high uncertainty. however, in the meantime, some normalisation in the development of m3 has taken place. this is indicated by a significant slowdown in the short-term dynamics of m3 in early 2002, a period in which the annual rate of growth of loans to the private sector has also continued to decline. however, the period of moderation in monetary growth has as yet been too short to allow a definitive assessment. against this background, the governing council continues to hold the view that the information from the first pillar does not thus far point to risks to… |
| Willem F Duisenberg: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2002-05-29 | 0.410 | economic and monetary developments the evidence which has become available since my last testimony to your committee on 23 january 2002 has indeed made us confident that a recovery is under way in the euro area. at the same time, recent developments in consumer price inflation in the euro area have been less favourable than we expected, mainly due to specific and partly temporary factors. related to this, the outlook for price stability appears to be somewhat less favourable now than it was at the turn of the year. however, there are still uncertainties on the strength of the economic recovery and they, in turn, imply the existence of uncertainties regarding the inflation outlook - and these uncertainties have not diminished since the governing council meeting on 2 may. let me now elaborate on this assessment of the economic outlook for the euro area. starting with the analysis under the first pillar of the ecb’s monetary policy strategy, the annual growth rate of m3 remained high in the first quarter of 2002. the high annual growth rate still reflects the portfolio shifts to liquid positions which occurred last autumn, when the economic and financial environment was characterised by high uncertainty, and euro area investors showed a particularly marked preference for liquid holdings. at the same time, we saw some moderation in the short-term dynamics of m3 in early 2002. however, m3 growth has only recently started to decline and, for the time being, the reversal of the e… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference introductory statement | Period_1 | 2001-11-08 | 0.393 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are here to report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council of the ecb. the governing council conducted a comprehensive and in-depth examination of monetary and economic developments. against the background of the available evidence, it analysed the implications for the maintenance of price stability in the euro area, taking a forward-looking and medium-term perspective. as a result, the governing council decided to lower the key ecb interest rates by 50 basis points. at this new level, the key ecb interest rates continue to be appropriate to ensure a favourable outlook for price stability over the medium term. in assessing the information which has accumulated over the past few weeks we concluded that inflationary pressures have further diminished. this was particularly apparent from the information under the second pillar of the ecb’s monetary policy strategy, while information relating to the first pillar was also judged consistent with today’s decision. the governing council considered today’s assessment to be in line with available forecasts and its view of economic developments in the period ahead. it is expecting these views to be broadly confirmed by further incoming information on the economic situation. the ecb will publish its own projections in the december issue of the monthly bulletin. let me elaborate somewhat on the assessment provided under the two pillars of the monetary policy strategy of t… |
| Peter Praet: Interview in De Tijd and L’Echo | Period_2 | 2014-10-28 | 0.075 | growth in the euro area has come to a standstill. when should we expect a revival? we are now seeing a loss of momentum. it is striking that growth is abating in an early phase of the business cycle. we take that seriously, but we shouldn’t exaggerate: our base scenario for a gradual economic recovery is still realistic. the risks have increased and deserve our attention. regarding recent developments, the widest gap between expectations and reality was seen in germany. france was weak and has remained so. growth projections for germany have been lowered, for both 2014 and 2015. the weakness there reflects the slowdown in trade with china and brazil and the impact of the ukrainian crisis, but also technical factors such as a higher than usual number of days leave in the motor industry. we can’t ignore the feeble economic climate. that is one of the reasons why we took measures in june and september and further loosened monetary policy. but we shouldn’t over-dramatise. so you don’t fear a recession? no, i wouldn’t say that. confidence indicators for the third and fourth quarter suggest marginal growth in the euro area. that is rather worrying, as the momentum is certainly not strong enough for self-sustaining growth. meanwhile, inflation and inflation expectations are still falling. is there a likelihood of deflation? the risk of deflation is limited. i find it difficult to accept the high probability of deflation (30%) published by the international monetary fund for the e… |
| Peter Praet: Interview in Expresso | Period_2 | 2018-07-05 | 0.063 | peter praet: interview in expresso interview with mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, in expresso, conducted by mr joão silvestre on 18 june 2018 and published on 23 june 2018. * * * is the asset purchase programme (app) really going to conclude at the end of this year? what we did last week was to express an anticipation that net asset purchases would end at the end of the year. we didn’t say we were now deciding to stop the programme in december. we still have six months to go. we translated the increased confidence we expressed about developments in the economy and inflation into an anticipation about the app. and, at the same time, we also enhanced the forward guidance on interest rates. but, in any event, to anticipate the end of the programme is to give a strong signal. what exactly do you mean by giving a strong signal? we undertook a careful review of the progress made towards a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation to levels below, but close to, 2%. it was a strong signal because, in spite of a recent moderation in euro area economic growth, we concluded that progress towards our aim has been substantial so far, and actually sufficiently substantial for us to be in a position to express this anticipation of an end to net asset purchases at the end of the year. we think that the underlying strength of the economy gives grounds that inflation convergence will continue in the period ahead, even after a gradual winding d… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox - evidence from the euro area | Period_2 | 2020-02-23 | 0.061 | altavilla, c. et al., op. cit. notes: average investment for corporate clients of banks whose average non-financial counterparty deposit rate has been negative at least once, distinguishing between firms with a ratio of current assets over total assets in the top decile (high liquid asset holdings, blue line) and in the bottom decile (low liquid asset holdings, red line) of the distribution. investment orthogonal to firm fixed effects, normalised to 1 in 2014. the latest observation is for 2018. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Narratives about the ECB’s monetary policy - reality or fiction? | Period_2 | 2020-02-12 | 0.057 | since the euro was introduced, inflation in the euro area has tended to be too low rather than too high (slide 3). the annual inflation rate for the euro area as a whole has averaged 1.7% since 1999. and the rate for germany has been 1.4%, significantly lower than during the period before the introduction of the euro. stable prices have been accompanied by significant economic growth (slide 4). over the past decade, in no other large industrialised nation has real per capita income growth been stronger than in germany. in |
| Isabel Schnabel: Narratives about the ECB’s monetary policy - reality or fiction? | Period_2 | 2020-02-12 | 0.054 | it is normal for asset prices to rise during phases of low interest rates. equity prices, for example, reflect firms’ discounted earnings expectations. if the interest rate falls, equity prices will go up, because future earnings will have a greater bearing on current valuations. however, earnings expectations themselves also tend to increase when interest rates are lowered, because investors anticipate stronger economic growth. and, indeed, the current price/earnings ratio in the euro area is a long way off from the excesses of the dotcom bubble of 2000, and it is closer to its historical median than in other economies (slide 25, left-hand side). nonetheless, central banks need to keep a close eye on such valuations, as purely liquidity-driven price gains can result in risks for financial stability in the long term. asset price bubbles pose a particular risk when they are largely credit-driven. this is typically more likely to apply to real estate than to equities. that is why developments in real estate prices are rightly coming under particular scrutiny. residential real estate prices in germany have risen appreciably in recent years, especially in the larger cities, and the deutsche bundesbank has repeatedly pointed to possible price excesses. two factors are significant here. first, prices always reflect the interplay of supply and demand. the pronounced price increase in german towns and cities reflects a noticeably stronger demand for housing that was unmatched by a… |
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.064 | accumulated cost pressures over the last year have continued to drive up processed food prices, while the drought in summer and the elevated fertiliser prices over the past year are largely responsible for the rise in unprocessed food prices. the increase in core inflation, now at 5%, was accounted for by both its main components: inflation in services and non-energy industrial goods. price pressures are evident in more and more sectors, owing partly to the impact of high energy costs feeding through to the whole economy. in fact, over half the items in the harmonised index of consumer prices have recorded inflation rates above 4%. |
| Luis de Guindos: Euro area current policy challenges | Period_3 | 2022-09-16 | 0.057 | euro area current policy challenges speech by luis de guindos, vice-president of the ecb, at the cirsf (research centre on regulation and supervision of the financial sector) annual international conference 2022 “the future of the eu financial system in a new geo-economic context” lisbon, 15 september 2022 i am very pleased to be taking part in this event again and to be back to lisbon in person. following our monetary policy decisions last week, i would like to start with an overview of the euro area economic outlook that underpinned the governing council’s deliberations. i will then share our assessment of the stability of the euro area financial system at the current juncture – the core focus of today’s conference –and outline the ways in which recent economic developments are affecting financial stability in the euro area. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.050 | both credit supply and demand are indicative for future loan growth developments (chart 20). a shift in credit standards tends to lead annual loan growth to firms by about five to six quarters, making loan growth a rather late economic indicator in the transmission of monetary policy compared with survey and market rate indicators. the net tightening of credit standards on loans to firms which we have seen since the fourth quarter of 2021 will likely translate into a dampening impact on the annual growth rate of loans in the coming quarters. while currently still strong, banks expect loan demand by firms to decrease in the coming quarters, related to weakening economic growth and diminishing frontloading effects, in line with the usual delay in loan growth developments compared to real economic activity. |
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.046 | the inflation outlook is stronger today than it was before the pandemic. therefore, once the current crisis has abated, ensuring that monetary policy accompanies the recovery with a light touch may be consistent with a further adjustment in our net asset purchases. beyond that, additional modifications to our stance should be considered carefully, for three main reasons. |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.044 | 2.2 a paradigm shift: the pandemic but it took another crisis to make a qualitative leap. european leaders recognised in spring 2020 that a strong, symmetric fiscal response to offset the economic damage caused by the pandemic was in the economic interests of all euro area countries. [11] fiscal and state aid rules were suspended, and powerful common instruments were introduced. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 86 | european | 1 | 0.0672676 | board | 1 | 0.9992115 |
| 86 | central | 2 | 0.0552581 | executive | 2 | 0.9992111 |
| 86 | european central bank | 3 | 0.0493239 | executive board | 3 | 0.9992109 |
| 86 | european central | 4 | 0.0491826 | peter | 4 | 0.9985974 |
| 86 | board | 5 | 0.0440962 | peter praet | 5 | 0.9985971 |
| 86 | bank | 6 | 0.0435311 | praet | 6 | 0.9984229 |
| 86 | central bank | 7 | 0.0421182 | benoît | 7 | 0.9981149 |
| 86 | member | 8 | 0.0357602 | benoît cœuré | 8 | 0.9978084 |
| 86 | executive | 9 | 0.0320867 | interview | 9 | 0.9976343 |
| 86 | executive board | 10 | 0.0298261 | european central bank | 10 | 0.9975424 |
| 86 | speech | 11 | 0.0264351 | central bank ecb | 11 | 0.9974583 |
| 86 | praet | 12 | 0.0158385 | european central | 12 | 0.9972792 |
| 86 | remark | 13 | 0.0148495 | cœuré | 13 | 0.9969334 |
| 86 | peter | 14 | 0.0123063 | praet member | 14 | 0.9968869 |
| 86 | peter praet | 15 | 0.0110347 | peter praet member | 15 | 0.9964925 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mr Erçel discusses the monetary policy of the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 1999-01-08 | 0.151 | the ecb’s governing council, consisting of the governors of the national central banks of the euro area and the ecb’s executive board, will determine the basic outlines of the ecb’s monetary policy. the chosen strategy will be carried out by the ecb’s executive board, consisting of a governor, vice governor and four members appointed by the president or prime minister of countries in the european monetary system. |
| Willem F Duisenberg: Assessment of the euro cash changeover and the ECB view on recent monetary and economic developments | Period_1 | 2002-01-17 | 0.119 | thank you very much for inviting me to participate in today’s new year reception. in my speech today, i will address two issues, neither of which is likely to come as a surprise to you. first, i should like to assess the euro cash changeover, which started a fortnight ago. second, i should like to share with you the view of the governing council of the european central bank (ecb) on recent monetary and economic developments. |
| Mr Duisenberg reports on the current position and future prospects of the European System of Central Banks (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-12-04 | 0.115 | the euro area. further, you may also recall that, as required by its statute, the escb will publish its consolidated balance sheet on a weekly basis. my colleagues on the executive board of the ecb and i intend to be very active in giving speeches dealing with all issues of relevance for the conduct of monetary policy. i am convinced that the governors of the national central banks will also play their role in this respect. |
| Lucas Papademos: Economic outlook in the euro area | Period_1 | 2008-06-17 | 0.108 | introduction it is a great pleasure for me to participate in the asem finance ministers’ meeting. in my statement, i will focus on the economic outlook in the euro area, with special emphasis on inflation prospects and risk, the monetary policy stance of the european central bank (ecb), recent financial market developments and our assessment of the outlook for financial stability. |
| Mr Duisenberg reports on the current position and future prospects of the European System of Central Banks (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-12-04 | 0.096 | mr duisenberg reports on the current position and future prospects of the european system of central banks keynote address to the president of the european central bank, dr w.f. duisenberg, at a conference organised by the royal institute of international affairs on european economic and monetary union markets and politics under the euro in london on 27/11/98. ladies and gentlemen, i should like to express my appreciation at being invited to deliver a speech at this conference organised by the royal institute of international affairs. it is a great pleasure for me to be here, in london, today. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Consolidating the euro area’s economic recovery | Period_2 | 2015-05-19 | 0.307 | 5 “ opinion on a proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council on structural measures improving the resilience of eu credit institutions”, 19 november 2014. 6 “ investing in europe: towards a new convergence process”, speech by benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the ecb, athens, 9 july 2014. 7 “ the political dimension of european economic integration”, speech by benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the 19th université d’automne de la ligue des droits de l’homme, paris, 23 november 2013. 8 as regards capital markets, for example. see, in this regard, “completing the single market in capital”, speech by benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the ecb, paris, 19 may 2014. |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.188 | reflections on monetary policy page 1 of 18 reflections on monetary policy keynote speech by philip r. lane, member of the executive board of the ecb, at bloomberg, london, 16 september 2019 i will divide this speech into two parts. first, i wish to review the current economic and financial environment. second, i will discuss the monetary policy decisions taken by the governing council in last week’s meeting.[1] |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox - evidence from the euro area | Period_2 | 2020-02-23 | 0.182 | the monetary policy toolbox: evidence from the euro area keynote speech by philip r. lane, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the 2020 us monetary policy forum introduction i would like to thank chicago booth for inviting me to speak at the 2020 u.s. monetary policy forum, sponsored by the initiative on global markets at the university of chicago booth school of business, new york, new york.[1] |
| Benoît Cœuré: Heterogeneity and the European Central Bank’s monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-04-02 | 0.171 | benoît cœuré: heterogeneity and the european central bank’s monetary policy speech by mr benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the bank of france symposium & 34th suerf colloquium on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the euro on “the euro area: staying the course through uncertainties”, paris, 29 march 2019. * * * from the beginning of the euro area’s existence, it was well known that it did not meet all of the classic requirements of an optimal currency area. some critics have seen heterogeneity across member states as the factor that would ultimately cause the collapse of the single currency. but the euro is still here, despite years of crisis. while managing heterogeneity between regions and countries has been a challenge – at times tremendously so – this challenge is not insurmountable. no single currency area in the world is free of heterogeneity, including the ones widely regarded as most homogeneous. in my remarks this morning, i will argue that the ecb has always found ways to accommodate heterogeneity, particularly at times when it threatened to impair the uniform transmission of monetary policy. but i will also argue that if we want to minimise episodes of demoralising output and employment losses, as we experienced after the financial and euro area crises, and if we want to avoid overburdening monetary policy, then policymakers need to act more forcefully to reduce the major sources of euro area heterogeneity – that i… |
| Philip R Lane: Interview with Sky TG24 | Period_2 | 2019-11-27 | 0.165 | philip r lane: interview with sky tg24 transcript of the interview with mr philip r lane, member of the executive board of the european central bank, and sky tg24, conducted by mr alessandro marenzi, sky tg24, with the participation of mr federico fubini, corriere della sera, and mr franco bruni, bocconi university, and broadcast on 23 november 2019. * * * alessandro marenzi: sette anni fa draghi disse: faremo tutto quello che serve per preservare l’euro. [..] dopo sette anni c’è ancora questo problema di preservare l’euro o non si pone nemmeno più la questione? philip lane: what we have seen in the last seven years is a very long track record of a very stable currency. remember what we have seen in these years: we’ve seen the interest rates in europe very low, the spreads between governments much more narrow, and the inflation is controlled. so, yes, a very stable currency, and in the surveys the european population is increasingly happy with the euro as a currency. alessandro marenzi: i tassi bassi o negativi si stanno sperimentando nel concreto. [..] quanto durerà questa situazione e quali rischi ci sono in una situazione così paradossale per certi aspetti? philip lane: let me emphasise that the reason why the interest rates are so low is a very high level of saving but a low level of investment. your question there is really: are we going to see high savings and low investment remain for a long time? we think at the ecb it depends very much on the policies of european … |
| Frank Elderson: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy - delivering our mandate in all circumstances | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.243 | frank elderson: the european central bank’s monetary policy strategy - delivering our mandate in all circumstances keynote speech by mr frank elderson, member of the executive board of the european central bank and vice-chair of the supervisory board of the ecb, at the european parliament conference on “greening monetary policy in times of soaring inflation”, brussels, 28 september 2022. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.173 | the monetary policy strategy of the ecb: the playbook for monetary policy decisions speech by philip r. lane, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the hertie school, berlin | welcome the invitation to speak at the hertie school, which has such a strong record in european public policy research, including research on the institutional architecture of the euro area. | especially wish to acknowledge the exceptional contributions of the late professor henrik enderlein, who played a founding role in the development of the jacques delors centre. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.146 | speech by isabel schnabel, member of the executive board of the ecb, at a virtual event organised by goldman sachs frankfurt am main, 17 november 2021 the recovery from the pandemic has been exceptional on many accounts. in the euro area, it has been faster and stronger than any recovery since the second world war. it has also been bumpier than most previous recoveries, with recurring phases of accelerating and decelerating growth. and it has been characterised by an unusually distinct mismatch between supply and demand, causing the prices of many products, including energy, to rise measurably. |
| Frank Elderson: Proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank concrete | Period_3 | 2022-03-25 | 0.140 | frank elderson: proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the european central bank concrete keynote speech by mr frank elderson, member of the executive board of the european central bank and vice-chair of the supervisory board of the ecb, at the institute of international & european affairs webinar, frankfurt am main, 24 march 2022. * * * as no doubt all of you joining me here today, we at the european central bank look with horror at the distressing reports from ukraine. the human suffering and destruction we see in our part of the world remains difficult to fathom. our hearts and minds are with the people of ukraine. with those who are still in harm’s way, and with those who have been forced to seek refuge elsewhere, mainly in the european union. these events are a stark reminder about what the european union stands for: peace in europe, being united in diversity, shared principles and the rule of law. the rule of law that also governs the institutions – including the ecb – that within their mandate serve european citizens. today, i want to outline to you how the ecb will continue to contribute to this greater purpose by delivering on the mandate bestowed upon us by the european treaties. the mandate to deliver price stability in the euro area. you may be aware that last summer the ecb announced a new monetary policy strategy after concluding a comprehensive review. a review in which we engaged with a wide range of stakeholder… |
| Isabel Schnabel: The globalisation of inflation | Period_3 | 2022-05-16 | 0.131 | isabel schnabel: the globalisation of inflation speech by ms isabel schnabel, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at a conference organised by the österreichische vereinigung für finanzanalyse und asset management, vienna, 11 may 2022. * * * accompanying slides can be found on the european central bank’s website. there are two competing views on the impact of globalisation on domestic inflation. one view is that the global component of inflation by and large reflects price swings in energy and commodity markets.1 globalisation may affect underlying inflation, but these effects are judged to be economically small. the alternative view is that global economic slack matters for domestic underlying inflation and that globalisation may have lowered the sensitivity of inflation to domestic slack, that is the slope of the phillips curve.2 although the strength of such global factors may differ across economies, a failure to properly account for them may result in significant forecasting errors. this is the “globalisation of inflation” hypothesis. in my remarks today, i will argue that the pandemic, and more recently russia’s invasion of ukraine, are providing tangible evidence in favour of the second hypothesis. large global excess savings and exceptionally strong global excess demand for many internationally traded goods and commodities have contributed to raising the pricing power of firms across advanced economies. this has fed into underlying price pre… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 87 | change | 1 | 0.1432154 | structural change | 1 | 0.9994741 |
| 87 | structural | 2 | 0.0381331 | change | 2 | 0.9989476 |
| 87 | economy | 3 | 0.0318633 | price change | 3 | 0.9985967 |
| 87 | set | 4 | 0.0289791 | price set | 4 | 0.9985102 |
| 87 | factor | 5 | 0.0258442 | frequency | 5 | 0.9975893 |
| 87 | impact | 6 | 0.0212046 | online | 6 | 0.9969280 |
| 87 | structural change | 7 | 0.0190728 | rate change | 7 | 0.9966178 |
| 87 | adjustment | 8 | 0.0168157 | commerce | 8 | 0.9965307 |
| 87 | datum | 9 | 0.0165649 | sticky | 9 | 0.9964014 |
| 87 | affect | 10 | 0.0153109 | pattern | 10 | 0.9958822 |
| 87 | shock | 11 | 0.0148093 | persistence | 11 | 0.9957048 |
| 87 | structure | 12 | 0.0146839 | structural | 12 | 0.9955133 |
| 87 | price set | 13 | 0.0115490 | set behaviour | 13 | 0.9953069 |
| 87 | response | 14 | 0.0111728 | rigidity | 14 | 0.9946113 |
| 87 | process | 15 | 0.0107966 | alter | 15 | 0.9946089 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The euro area and its monetary policy | Period_1 | 2007-09-11 | 0.273 | find the euro area at bottom-left corner, close to the zero point: low inflation volatility has not come at the cost of larger swings in activity. now, moderate real and nominal volatilities are hard to square – at first sight – with the second element of my diagnosis: a structural environment in the euro area characterised by pervasive rigidities. while the sources of structural rigidities in the euro area are manifold, i will single out one dimension on which we have access to high-quality information, nominal rigidities. here i can build on an extensive body of empirical research into price flexibility that has been assembled by staff of the european central bank (ecb) and of the entire european system of central banks in a monumental analytical effort to identify the main microeconomic facts on which the workings of emu are founded. 3 this research comes to one main conclusion. in the euro area, prices are distinctly less flexible than, say, in the united states. prices change infrequently. the frequency of price adjustments – the share of prices in a representative sample of product categories that are changed each month – is low relative to the us record [table 1]. the average duration of a consumer price spell – a measure of the time that it takes for retailers to re-price their products – is 13 months. according to surveys, the average producer price spell is 11 months. in the united states, comparable figures indicate durations of less than 7 months and slightly m… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Activism and alertness in monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-16 | 0.250 | more infrequent price revisions make the setting of prices less responsive to economic news, including, as i already pointed out, changes in monetary conditions. in general, sticky price revision processes reduce the odds that the imbalances created by economic shocks can be rectified by adjustments in prices. conversely, they make the burden of adjustment to a shock fall disproportionately on changes in output, incomes and employment. also, stickier prices tend – all other things being equal – to increase the persistence of inflation. this is because the impact of a shock that today modifies firms’ real cost conditions tends to be spread out over an extended future, as staggered price adjustments catch up only slowly with the changed underlying circumstances. despite sluggish price-setting mechanisms, however, inflation persistence in the euro area is low by international standards. this is the second important finding of the new body of evidence that i mentioned: an inflationary shock dissipates quickly in the euro area despite rigidities, and inflation has a tendency to return to its long-run norm reasonably quickly. the half-life of the effect of a shock to inflation is considerably less than one year, which is close to the figure that one obtains, for example, for the united states, again notwithstanding vastly different patterns of price-updating practices across the two areas. what explains this apparently inconsistent evidence? another ecb study, estimating a struc… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Issues in monetary policy - views from the ECB | Period_1 | 2004-04-30 | 0.232 | central banks and uncertainty the ecb, like all central banks, is faced with several dimensions of acute uncertainty. the economy is continuously hit by disturbances that are often difficult to identify in real time. even when policy-makers are able to correctly assess the source and the nature of a disturbance affecting the economy, tracking its propagation profile and assessing its final impact on the key variables of interest to policymakers is a daunting task. econometric theory has spent decades devising sophisticated tools to isolate different types of shocks from the tangle that appears in the data. but inference is often non-robust across various identification schemes. and real-time identification remains central banks’ holy grail. as a consequence, central bankers are given little guidance by theory in their daily endeavour to filter out noisy data. the task of policy-makers is further complicated if they suspect that customary cyclical movements are compounded by an ongoing change in the deep structure of the economy. for one thing, structural change amplifies the identification problem. it is difficult to ascertain whether the dynamic force that we see appearing on the screen is going to be reversed and eventually vanish, or will become ingrained in the underlying economic mechanism for many years to come. but more importantly, in case a structural change is truly under way, macroeconomic relationships derived from empirical regularities and historical averages… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Activism and alertness in monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-06-16 | 0.228 | structures this structural feature brings me to the second category of my remarks: the structure of the economy on this side of the atlantic. i will concentrate on two factors that critically affect the relationship between inflation and the fundamental shocks that drive the economy and determine its state: price flexibility and the anchoring of price-setting. extensive empirical research on price flexibility and inflation persistence in the euro area has recently been produced in a concerted effort that has occupied staff of the ecb and of the entire european system of central banks. 8 it comes to two main conclusions. first, in the euro area, prices are distinctly less flexible than, say, in the united states. prices change infrequently: the average duration of a consumer price spell – a measure of the time that it takes for retailers to reprice their products – is 13 months [table 1]. according to surveys, it is 11 months for producers. in the united states, comparable figures indicate durations of less than 7 months and slightly more than 8 months respectively. 9 |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-03-22 | 0.220 | and what feature of the economic structures and institutions is responsible for what particular aspect of the transmission of monetary policy impulses. structural analysis has concentrated – more fundamentally – on two related aspects. first, it has constructed measures of price and wage rigidity: these have been expressed by the frequency of price and wage adjustments. in economies with more rigid goods and labour markets – where, for example, labour practices and contractual institutions hamper a prompt transmission of shocks to wages – the macroeconomic adjustment to shocks takes longer to run its course and, more importantly, falls disproportionately on production and employment. second, structural analysis has provided evidence of the sensitivity of inflation expectations to past inflation developments. the relevance of inflation expectations to the transmission mechanism is more subtle but central. an inflationary shock tends to be more persistent if wage and price rigidities are greater, unless inflation expectations are found to be insensitive to the inflation history and more solidly anchored around the objective of the central bank. again, this has important implications for monetary transmission. a shock to inflation is faster to dissipate – even if prices and wages are relatively more rigid – if inflation expectations are more firmly anchored. now, while the statistical approach has generally failed to spot significant differences across the two areas, structur… |
| Yves Mersch: Central banking in times of technological progress | Period_2 | 2017-08-07 | 0.393 | of course, change in consumption habits and expenditure patterns are not a particularly new problem for statistical agencies to deal with. it has long been recognised that regularly updating weights and the goods and services included in the basket results in an index that better describes the prices faced by consumers. consumer price indices, including the harmonised index of consumer prices used in the euro area, have already made large strides in adapting their methodology to account for changes in technology. and technology has itself been a benefit in price collection. gone are the days of price collectors walking through shops with a clipboard with reams of paperwork requiring multiple input steps. price collection on the ground is now carried out with electronic tablets directly updating databases, and the opportunity to use web scraping technology has facilitated a much cheaper and widespread source of price quotes. research can now be carried out on data sets not of hundreds of price quotes, but of a billion.5 the use of scanner data has enabled a much greater idea of not only more granular purchases, but also seasonality in purchases. but the technological changes to price and wage setting behaviour have much deeper relevance for central banks than just the measurement of inflation. the speed and extent that inflation reacts to shocks – both domestic and global – affects the optimal response of monetary policy to those shocks. allow me to give a few examples of h… |
| Yves Mersch: Remarks at the “Challenges in Understanding the Monetary Transmission Mechanism” conference | Period_2 | 2019-03-25 | 0.318 | e-commerce may result in suppliers changing prices more frequently. 10 not only are amazon’s prices more flexible than prices of brick-and-mortar stores, amazon’s competitors are forced to adjust prices more often for products that are also offered by amazon.11more frequent price changes result in a steeper phillips curve – prices react more quickly and strongly to changes in costs and output. this could also mean that inflation reacts much faster to monetary policy.12 since online stores effectively offer the same price across locations, e-commerce may restrict the ability of businesses to set prices that deviate substantially from those of large online retailers while reflecting local conditions. so prices may change more often, but they may be more uniform, which in turn may restrict the ability of prices to reflect idiosyncratic and regional shocks.13 e-commerce changes not only how firms set prices but also how consumers shop. it has revolutionised the transparency of pricing both within and across countries, allowing consumers to easily compare prices and swap one product for another. this can result in higher demand elasticities, eroding the monopolistic and monopsonistic power of suppliers and reducing mark-ups. profit margins at amazon (less than 4%) are much lower than at walmart (more than 20%). 14 such a change in demand elasticities and mark-ups can be viewed as a flattening of the phillips curve. finally, the emerging prevalence of e-commerce can create new o… |
| Philip R Lane: International inflation co-movements | Period_2 | 2020-05-25 | 0.307 | ecb and bloomberg. structural change and inflation outcomes the structure of the economy matters for wage and price-setting dynamics and the transmission of shocks to the real economy. two categories of structural change may have contributed to greater co-movement in inflation outcomes. first, structural changes that increase international interdependence mean that a shock in one region may also affect economic performance and inflation outcomes in other regions. second, structural changes that affect national economies in similar ways mean that there may be a common pattern in observed inflation even if shocks are mainly domestic in origin. in contrast, other types of structural change have the potential to contribute to divergent inflation outcomes across countries. economic and financial globalisation influences inflation outcomes through several mechanisms.[8],[9] |
| Yves Mersch: Remarks at the “Challenges in Understanding the Monetary Transmission Mechanism” conference | Period_2 | 2019-03-25 | 0.185 | lower prices. fragmentation of labour time is shown in the diverging results of compensation per employee and compensation per hour worked. for some workers this is a positive development, allowing them to participate in the workforce where previously they were excluded.6 for others, the greater individualisation can lead to insecurity, affecting households’ income. more individualised roles can also weaken the power of collective bargaining to maintain the labour share of income.7 while the productivity-enhancing aspects of digitalisation might tend to raise potential output growth, the effects operating through labour and capital are more uncertain, and might even work in different directions. there may be some substitution of labour for capital, with possible repercussions for the bargaining power of workers, and a shift in investment to the it sector as a result of digitalisation and servicification. if there is a skill bias in the transition to digital technology, this could lead to a greater mismatch in labour markets, and therefore a higher nairu and lower potential output growth. on the other hand, digital production and supply chains, and digital communication and connectivity, would tend to lower the nairu and raise potential output, because of the productivity increases resulting from faster collection and evaluation of data, and the greater efficiency of digitally underpinned production. the overall effect of digitalisation and new technologies on demand and su… |
| Philip R Lane: International inflation co-movements | Period_2 | 2020-05-25 | 0.178 | while available estimates point to digitalisation having had only a small impact on aggregate price dynamics, the effects may become larger as digitalisation becomes more pervasive. so far, the steady- state impact of digitalisation on market structures and pricing dynamics remains quite uncertain. for example, while 43 percent of respondents to a survey on price setting in the united kingdom cited increased competition as a reason for increasing the frequency of price setting over the previous decade, 42 percent cited it as a reason for reducing the frequency.[23], [24] |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.375 | challenges this claim, finding no noticeable slowdown in the rate of price resets (chart 8). work in progress in the eurosystem shows that the rate of price changes may even have increased during the pandemic. chart 8 frequency of price changes: a comparison of ipn (data: 1996-2001) and prisma (data: 2011-2017) results (percentages) @ processed food @ services g non-energy industrial goods om 45° 0.50 0.45 ® £0.40 : @ 0.35 — 5 0.30 paar ee ® ; gp (0:25 * ; o * °, = 20 ° ® < 0.15 = a2. : e° q 0.10 e°.@ e° c #0005 | ome - 0.00 es 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 ipn (data: 1996-2001) source: gautier et al. (2021), “new facts on consumer price rigidity in the euro area’, working paper series, ecb (forthcoming). note: the chart shows the frequency of price changes documented by the eurosystem inflation persistence network (ipn) and the price-setting microdata analysis (prisma) network for a set of 50 product categories covered by both studies. from 2003, the ipn conducted an in-depth study of inflation persistence and price rigidity in the euro area by analysing a broad set of macro and micro data covering the period from 1996 until 2001. the ipn has concluded its work. the prisma network was set up in 2018 to deepen the understanding of price-setting behaviour and inflation dynamics in the eu by collecting and studying various types of microdata, including data underlying official price indices such as the consumer price index (cpi) and the producer price index … |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.295 | digging deeper into the micro evidence since the golosov-lucas paper was published, economists have been studying numerous micro price datasets from different countries. researchers have been busy constructing models that can match various features of the micro data, including the average frequency and size of price changes. in 2018 the european system of central banks established prisma – the price-setting microdata analysis network – to collect and study various kinds of micro data, aiming to deepen our understanding of price-setting behaviour and inflation dynamics. today, peter karadi will present the findings from a research project undertaken as part of the prisma network. in the paper, peter and his co-authors raphael schoenle and jesse wursten set out to measure the selection effect in micro data. to give you a preview of their findings in a nutshell, the selection effect is absent. the probability that a given price will change increases, to a certain extent, when that price is further from the optimum. however, the probability of price adjustment conditional on an aggregate shock does not seem to depend on the distance from the optimum.[6] the authors also discuss which models can match such price-setting behaviour. the promising candidates are state-dependent models with random menu costs and models of information- constrained price-setting.[7] in both classes of models, the selection effect can be weak: some prices fail to adjust even though the distance from t… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.209 | early micro evidence on the effects of policy rates with the advent of more and more granular data, research shifted its focus to micro data on prices. researchers documented how individual firms set prices, aiming at building models that would be consistent with both the price-setting behaviour at the micro level and the effects of monetary policy in the macro data. meeting these two objectives simultaneously proved challenging. when economists studied the micro data underlying the consumer price index in the united states and other countries, they found that individual price changes are infrequent but typically large in absolute terms, in the order of 10%.[4] in their famous paper “menu costs and phillips curves”, mikhail golosov and robert lucas investigated the implications of this evidence for the effects of monetary policy in a dynamic equilibrium model with idiosyncratic shocks and a fixed cost of nominal price changes. when calibrated to match the average frequency and size of price changes in the micro data in a low- inflation environment, the model predicted monetary policy having a strong effect on inflation and a weak effect on output – that is a steep phillips curve, in contrast to the relationship found in the macro data.[5] the key reason behind this result was the “selection effect”. in a menu cost model, after a change in the policy rate, prices further away from their optimum adjust sooner than others. in the golosov-lucas model, this selection effect is … |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.193 | 0 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t -45 -40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 = 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 competitor-reset-price gap (in %) karadi, p., schoenle, r. and wursten, j. (2021), “measuring price selection in microdata: it’s not there”, working paper series, no 2566, ecb. note: the figure shows the probability of a price change as a function of mispricing in the euro area and the united states. the v-shape of the curve is consistent with state-dependent price setting: the probability of adjustment steadily increases with the extent of mispricing. the extent of mispricing is proxied as a distance from the average price of the same product among those competitors that reset their prices in the same month. the measure also controls for the persistent heterogeneity among products and stores by eliminating the impact of product-store fixed effects. additional details on the methodology are available in ecb working paper no 2566. from a policymaker’s perspective, it is encouraging to witness the efforts to translate the impact of micro-level distributions into macroeconomic representations of policy transmission, for example through the creation of informative statistics based on micro-level data, as done in one of the conference papers.!’9! these findings generate constructive input for our policy discussions on the transmission of monetary policy and, ultimately, help us to improve our knowledge regarding the underlying drivers of inflation dynamics in the euro area.!2°… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.115 | the second source of uncertainty | would like to discuss today relates to potential behavioural changes induced by the pandemic. microeconomic rigidities such as those stemming from wage- and price-setting behaviour have profound implications for the transmission of monetary policy. collectively, these rigidities play a crucial but subtle role in determining the location and slope of the phillips curve — a reduced form description of how changes in aggregate demand put pressure on inflation. this relationship can arise from underlying structural relations in a wide class of state-of-the- art sticky price models, as one paper at this conference will show.!13! |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 88 | change | 1 | 0.0536420 | climate | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 88 | transition | 2 | 0.0496075 | green | 2 | 0.9995619 |
| 88 | climate | 3 | 0.0494394 | digital | 3 | 0.9992991 |
| 88 | energy | 4 | 0.0354867 | climate change | 4 | 0.9992990 |
| 88 | green | 5 | 0.0322928 | transition | 5 | 0.9992111 |
| 88 | digital | 6 | 0.0227108 | carbon | 6 | 0.9989485 |
| 88 | climate change | 7 | 0.0223746 | green transition | 7 | 0.9984225 |
| 88 | relate | 8 | 0.0200212 | emission | 8 | 0.9978084 |
| 88 | carbon | 9 | 0.0180039 | fossil | 9 | 0.9975893 |
| 88 | investment | 10 | 0.0166591 | fossil fuel | 10 | 0.9970192 |
| 88 | accelerate | 11 | 0.0149781 | fuel | 11 | 0.9968021 |
| 88 | plan | 12 | 0.0127927 | climate relate | 12 | 0.9968001 |
| 88 | eu | 13 | 0.0127927 | gas | 13 | 0.9964954 |
| 88 | green transition | 14 | 0.0124565 | accelerate | 14 | 0.9964925 |
| 88 | risk | 15 | 0.0122884 | digitalisation | 15 | 0.9964079 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy in challenging times | Period_1 | 2008-06-06 | 0.079 | first of all, let me say that i am in the purdah period, so that nothing i will say should be interpreted in any respect as signalling intentions of the governing council as regards the monetary policy stance. economic policymakers are currently grappling to understand the root, duration sand impact of a number of significant and sizeable shocks affecting the world economy, including rising commodity prices – of which sharp increases in world food and oil prices have been prominent components – as well as a period of prolonged financial turbulences associated with an adjustment in financial market perceptions of risk. understanding those economic shocks and how they affect the economy is plainly a vital challenge for policymakers. in my remarks today, i would like to stress that, rather than a single deep correction with a single source, the global economy in which we live is facing a multiplicity of interdependent shocks in key areas. a proper understanding of the nature of these shocks and their interrelations is a precondition to examine the required reaction of economic and, in particular, monetary policies. whilst i consider the achievements of science and the acceleration of technological progress key to decipher the present world developments, the range of other factors at stake are well illustrated by considering the drivers behind the recent sharp increases in global agricultural commodity prices. underlying some of those factors is what we might characterise as a… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Willem F Duisenberg Fellowship of the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study | Period_1 | 2008-03-05 | 0.052 | i would like to turn now to some of the reform policies pursued in the netherlands that led to the remarkable performance of the dutch labour market over the last quarter of a century. speaking of structural reforms, and the successful reforms carried out by the netherlands, it seems fitting that professor boeri, who is known as a forceful exponent of economic liberalisation and structural reform in europe, and in particular in his own country, will be conducting his fellowship at the netherlands institute for advanced study located in wassenaar, where, 25 years ago, the decisive wassenaar agreement was signed, steering the course towards change and initiating the remarkable and substantial recovery of the dutch economy. the main outcome of the wassenaar agreement was the establishment of wage moderation, which, in turn, helped firms to restore profitability and stimulate both investment and employment. 3 prior to this agreement, the netherlands had been gripped in a wage-price spiral. however, through this agreement, which considerably diminished wage indexation, a platform for the remarkable turnaround of labour-market performance was created. in addition, a continuum of supportive policy frameworks aimed at reforming labour market institutions was adopted, thereby ensuring the underpinning of wage moderation. 4 the expansion of the part-time and temporary agency work sector in the netherlands, combined with the implementation of effective policies, has resulted in both … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Issues in monetary policy - views from the ECB | Period_1 | 2004-04-30 | 0.052 | mrs president, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, it is a great honour and a pleasure to be invited to speak to the economic club of new york on the eve of a defining moment in europe’s history. only five years ago we engaged in a grand enterprise of institutional design that irreversibly tied together the economic and monetary destiny of eleven, then twelve, nations. in five days from now, the european union will complete its largest ever expansion. what was originally a community of six countries in western europe will become a union of 25, spanning a geographic area that used to be divided by an iron curtain. today we can watch some 450 million europeans dismantling the barbed wire of political hatred and economic seclusion that had split the continent for more than half a century. we can watch europe, once again, engaging in a concerted effort to overcome differences and manage diversity. taking issue with this historical transition, i intend to focus my remarks on the challenges of executing monetary policy in such a rapidly changing world. a world in which high-speed structural change - whether spurred by spontaneous economic forces or institutional evolution - may put time-tested economic models at risk, and defy policy-makers’ search for easy policy recipes. i will describe the mechanisms that the ecb has set in place to protect itself against the risk of serious misperceptions and policy mistakes. my conjecture is that these mechanisms can explain a great deal of… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Jackson Hole Conference - monetary policy and ‘credible alertness’ | Period_1 | 2005-09-01 | 0.051 | released, expectations of the short-term interest rates will adjust in the equilibrating direction that markets expect to see implemented by the central bank. such a credibility asset can turn out to be very beneficial in cases of major shocks and risks. it is clear that a world in which central banks’ inclinations and market views are perfectly aligned is unlikely to emerge in reality. however, decades of academic reflection and central banks’ quest for stability have not past in vain. our keen preoccupation with making ourselves understood by words and deeds has established a new climate of mutual understanding with academics, investors, market participants and public opinion at large. we have stepped up the number of gatherings in which we document our strategies and carefully explain our actions to broad audiences. on the markets’ side, our constant drive toward a continuous and all-round exchange with the public has been tangibly rewarded with high marks. the leverage of central bank pronouncements and actions over private economic behaviour has strengthened to an extent that we could not have remotely imagined only a decade ago. there is no shortcut to fully revealing a central bank’s strategy. this disclosure – which we perform in an ongoing process of interactions with a large and complex audience – helps to clarify the policy environment and anchors expectations. but unless deeds support words, words will be unconvincing. so, there is no better way to establish a … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Towards a more integrated Europe - challenges ahead for the euro area and Central and Eastern Europe | Period_1 | 2011-10-24 | 0.050 | the changes that europe has seen over the last two decades have been enormous right from the start, the countries of central and eastern europe embarked on a hugely ambitious path of reform. leaving aside differences across countries, a long and challenging process of economic transformation brought countries in the region significant improvements in incomes and living standards. full membership of the eu – or the prospects of accession – provided an important stimulus for the process of transformation as well as an anchor of stability. in western europe, completion of the three stages of emu led to the establishment of the european central bank (ecb) and the introduction of the euro in january 1999. having started originally with 11 participating countries, the euro area has since expanded to include 17 eu member states including some previous transition economies, namely estonia, slovenia and slovakia. the changes europe has seen over these past 20 years are enormous. equally enormous have been the challenges along the way, not least of course due to the global financial crisis. but there have also been enormous achievements. in my remarks today, i would like to take stock of some of those achievements and focus on three main aspects of the process of economic convergence in central and eastern europe. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy and climate change | Period_2 | 2018-11-09 | 0.193 | 10 academic studies project that the risks of extreme heatwaves and floods will increase by around another 50% this century. see mann et al. (2018), “projected changes in persistent extreme summer weather events: the role of quasi-resonant amplification”, science advances, vol 4(10). and evidence of such an increase is already visible. according to the european academies’ science advisory council, the number of global floods and other hydrological events has quadrupled since 1980 and doubled since 2004. see european academies’ science advisory council (2018), “extreme weather events in europe – preparing for climate change adaptation: an update on easac’s 2013 study”, march; and stott, p. (2016), “how climate change affects extreme weather events”, science, vol 352(6293), pp. 1517–1518. 11 see, for example, weitzman, m. (2011), “fat-tailed uncertainty in the economics of catastrophic climate change”, review of environmental economics and policy, 5 (2), pp. 275–292; and weitzman, m. (2009), “additive damages, fat-tailed climate dynamics, and uncertain discounting”, economics — the open-access, open-assessment e-journal 3: 1–29. 12 see, for example, stapleton et al. (2017), “climate change, migration and displacement – the need for a risk- informed and coherent approach”, report by the overseas development institute and the united nations development programme, november. 13 see ecb (2018), “labour supply and employment growth”, economic bulletin, issue 1. |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy and climate change | Period_2 | 2018-11-09 | 0.190 | benoît cœuré: monetary policy and climate change speech by mr benoît cœuré, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at a conference on “scaling up green finance: the role of central banks”, organised by the network for greening the financial system, the deutsche bundesbank and the council on economic policies, berlin, 8 november 2018. * * * 2018 has seen one of the hottest summers in europe since weather records began.1 i would like to thank torsti silvonen, fabio tamburrini and sam langfield for their contributions to this speech. i remain solely responsible for the opinions contained herein. increasing weather extremes, rising sea levels and arctic melting are now clearly visible consequences of human-induced warming.2 climate change is not a theory. it is a fact. while only one dimension of the human cost, the consequences in macroeconomic terms look set to be large. without further mitigation, cumulative emissions pose significant risks of economic disruption.3 while there is a wide recognition that environmental externalities should be primarily corrected by first-best policies, such as taxes4 , all authorities, including the ecb, need to reflect on, and consider, the appropriate response to climate change. in recent years, central bankers, led by bank of england governor mark carney, have started discussing the financial stability implications of climate change.5 the first tangible results are trickling in. the financial stability board’s task for… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy and climate change | Period_2 | 2018-11-09 | 0.183 | we are doing this by supporting ongoing work in various international and european fora aimed at enhancing the pricing of climate change and transition risks and promoting the reorientation of financial flows towards sustainable investment products.27 a tangible side effect of these measures is that, once adopted, they will automatically be reflected in our collateral framework. that is, once markets and credit risk agencies price climate risks properly, the amount of collateralised borrowing counterparties can obtain from the ecb will be adjusted accordingly. we have also joined the central banks and supervisors network for greening the financial system. ecb staff are contributing in all three work streams. my presence here today emphasises that we take our membership seriously. the network will play an important role in coordinating work among central banks and in defining and promoting best practices. finally, we are also supporting work on sustainable finance-related topics at the level of the g20. central bank asset portfolios differ in their ability to support sustainable investment the second step relates to incorporating these best practices into our own activities. most central banks typically own and manage three different types of asset portfolios: one dedicated to pension funds, a second related to the central bank’s own funds, and a third covering foreign exchange reserves. more recently, some central banks, including the ecb, have also built up separate monet… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy and climate change | Period_2 | 2018-11-09 | 0.178 | 3 see stern, n. (2007), “the economics of climate change: the stern review”, cambridge university press. estimating the economic damage requires assumptions on society’s time preference which are controversial. discussing these assumptions is beyond the scope of this speech. 4 see nordhaus, w. d. (2007), “to tax or not to tax: alternative approaches to slowing global warming”, review of environmental economics and policy, 1(1), pp. 26–44. 5 see carney, m. (2015), “breaking the tragedy of the horizon – climate change and financial stability”, speech given at lloyd’s of london, 29 september. 6 the global financial crisis of 2008 is a good example. as house prices fell and firms struggled to access external finance, consumption and investment collapsed while unemployment rose, pushing down prices and wages. 7 see also mckibbin et al. (2017), “climate change and monetary policy: dealing with disruption”, cama working paper, no. 77/2017, december. some climate-related shocks may also turn into adverse demand shocks. rising sea levels, for example, could lead to abrupt repricing of real estate prices in some exposed regions, causing large negative wealth effects that, if uninsured, may weigh on demand and prices. also, climate-related shocks have uneven macroeconomic effects, with adverse consequences concentrated in countries with relatively hot climates, such as most low-income countries. see imf (2017), “the effects of weather shocks on economic activity: how can low-income c… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy and climate change | Period_2 | 2018-11-09 | 0.169 | is left unchecked or humankind rises to the climate change challenge. this is my second corollary. let me start with the more disturbing scenario in which both the private and the public sector fail to take prompt action to cut co2 emissions in line with the cop21 commitments. on this trajectory, climate change is likely to affect the conduct of monetary policy in three important ways. the first relates to our ability to correctly identify the shocks hitting the economy. in recent years, for example, we have repeatedly observed an unusual blip in economic activity in the united states in the first quarter. this has often been attributed to a harsh winter, despite best efforts to seasonally adjust the data. but causality is inherently difficult to establish. indeed, statistical analysis has challenged the hypothesis that cold temperatures are behind the observed deceleration in first-quarter growth.9 similarly, last month, we saw a puzzling persistence in petroleum prices in germany despite a parallel fall in oil prices. one hypothesis is that this year’s hot summer caused the water levels in german rivers to fall to levels that only allow petrol tankers to carry half their capacity, creating supply bottlenecks. uncertainty also extends to the effects of regulatory responses by governments to the growing challenges posed by climate change. german growth in the third quarter is currently projected to have stalled or even contracted, probably largely due to bottlenecks in the… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Looking through higher energy prices? Monetary policy and the green transition | Period_3 | 2022-01-11 | 0.312 | transition phase may bring protracted period of higher energy inflation while such relative price changes are desirable and intended, they may weigh on the economy if firms and households cannot substitute more expensive carbon-intensive energy with greener and cheaper alternatives.2! higher carbon prices work in part by stimulating investments and innovation in low-carbon technologies. but these investments will take time. at present, renewable energy has not yet proven sufficiently scalable to meet rapidly rising demand. in the eu, renewable energies currently account for only around 20% of energy consumption. the fit for 55 package proposes increasing this share in the eu to 40% by 2030. the combination of insufficient production capacity of renewable energies in the short run, subdued investments in fossil fuels and rising carbon prices means that we risk facing a possibly protracted transition period during which the energy bill will be rising. gas prices are a case in point. last year’s adverse weather conditions, which constrained the production of renewable energy, have led to significant demand and supply imbalances in the gas market as global growth accelerated, pushing gas prices to new record highs (slide 5). the green transition may reinforce these imbalances in the future. in many countries, especially in asia but also in the euro area, gas — being half as polluting as coal - is seen as a stopgap solution in the secular shift to a greener energy system.u4 |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.300 | climate actions are still falling short of the paris objectives over the past few years, we have embarked on a demanding journey to make our monetary policy framework climate change-proof. in 2021, we decided on a comprehensive and ambitious set of measures as part of our first climate change action plan and we have begun to deliver on those commitments.[19] we have started to integrate climate change considerations into our macroeconomic models. we will soon publish new experimental statistical indicators related to climate change. and we will increasingly address climate risks in our risk control and collateral frameworks, including by eventually making climate-related corporate disclosures compulsory for bonds to remain eligible as collateral in our refinancing operations. the eurosystem itself will start to disclose the climate change-related exposures of parts of its own balance sheet around the end of the first quarter of this year. moreover, we are now tilting our corporate bond portfolio towards issuers with better climate scores, with a view to removing the existing bias towards emission-intensive firms.[20] although our current actions in relation to climate change are ambitious, they are still falling short of the paris objectives as they are not sufficient to ensure a decarbonisation trajectory that is consistent with carbon neutrality of our operations by 2050. three areas, in particular, require additional efforts. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.251 | conclusion let me conclude. many central banks globally are responding to current high inflation by tightening financing conditions. while a higher cost of credit will make the financing of renewable energies and green technologies more expensive, it would be misleading to use higher interest rates as a scapegoat for a further delay in the green transition, for two main reasons: first, restoring price stability in a timely manner provides the conditions under which the green transition can thrive sustainably. and second, the largest barrier to a rapid decarbonisation remains the lack of progress by governments in implementing prior climate commitments. governments must remain in the lead in accelerating the green transition. by promoting green technologies and renewable energies, they will enhance the productive capacity of the economy and thereby help restore price stability over the medium term. in line with our mandate, we stand ready to further intensify our efforts to support the fight against climate change, building on the achievements of our climate change action plan. our long-term goal is to make sure that all our monetary policy actions are aligned with the objectives of the paris agreement. this means greening our stock of bond holdings, including public sector bonds, as well as our lending operations and collateral framework. greening monetary policy requires structural changes to our monetary policy framework rather than adjustments to our reaction function. … |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economy and the energy transition | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.240 | longer inflation levels stay above our target, the greater the risk of second-round effects – through wage increases or the de-anchoring of inflation expectations. amid the present uncertainty, future decisions on policy rates will continue to be data-dependent and follow a meeting-by-meeting approach. to keep the green transition on track, concrete policy actions are needed to make the most of the opportunities provided by the current energy crisis. expanding the share of renewable energy supplies would reduce dependency on fossil fuels. it would also benefit price stability, given the declining prices for renewable energy observed during the past decade. in addition, to bring down energy costs sustainably over the medium term, governments should act to dismantle the regulatory barriers preventing the uptake of renewable energy, prioritise upgrading the electricity grid and foster investment in renewables. an important role for fiscal policy is to support the green transition via public green investment. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.236 | fiscal policy needs to accelerate the green transition in this environment, fiscal policy needs to remain in the driving seat when it comes to fighting climate change. regrettably, many governments failed to use the past years of low interest rates to accelerate investments in greener and more sustainable energy carriers at a pace commensurate with the challenges we are facing. hence, the largest impediment to a rapid decarbonisation is not the cost of capital, but rather the considerable lack of progress by governments in implementing prior climate commitments. the oecd, for example, estimates that global fiscal support for the production and consumption of coal, oil and gas almost doubled in 2021. russia’s invasion of ukraine has almost certainly led to a further increase in inefficient fossil fuel subsidies to ensure short-term energy security. governments must end the reliance on fossil fuels as quickly as possible. they should step up their efforts at a time when average interest costs – thanks to the long period of low interest rates and the extension in bond maturities – are still projected to remain below growth rates for some time to come, thereby supporting their capacity to foster private and public investments.[14] viable support schemes for renewable energies and green technologies, such as first-loss guarantees, interest rate subsidies and government-sponsored financing facilities, should be continued and expanded where feasible. unlike untargeted, broad-base… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 89 | cash | 1 | 0.0421298 | banknote | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 89 | banknote | 2 | 0.0361332 | cash | 2 | 0.9997371 |
| 89 | eurosystem | 3 | 0.0316705 | changeover | 3 | 0.9996495 |
| 89 | changeover | 4 | 0.0272079 | euro banknote | 4 | 0.9992990 |
| 89 | national | 5 | 0.0240004 | coin | 5 | 0.9989486 |
| 89 | coin | 6 | 0.0220481 | cash changeover | 6 | 0.9988609 |
| 89 | euro banknote | 7 | 0.0213508 | national central | 7 | 0.9980725 |
| 89 | introduction | 8 | 0.0163303 | national central bank | 8 | 0.9978096 |
| 89 | public | 9 | 0.0159120 | euro cash | 9 | 0.9972806 |
| 89 | cash changeover | 10 | 0.0157725 | eur | 10 | 0.9970201 |
| 89 | national central | 11 | 0.0154936 | circulation | 11 | 0.9968435 |
| 89 | national central bank | 12 | 0.0146569 | preparation | 12 | 0.9966269 |
| 89 | currency | 13 | 0.0140990 | euro cash changeover | 13 | 0.9965775 |
| 89 | citizen | 14 | 0.0124256 | credit institution | 14 | 0.9957909 |
| 89 | general | 15 | 0.0117283 | eurosystem | 15 | 0.9956031 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Willem F Duisenberg: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2002-01-25 | 0.667 |
|
| Willem F Duisenberg: Assessment of the euro cash changeover and the ECB view on recent monetary and economic developments | Period_1 | 2002-01-17 | 0.582 | a first assessment of the euro cash changeover on 1 january 1999 the euro was established as a new currency. two weeks ago, the euro banknotes and coins were issued and became legal tender in the countries participating in the euro area. with their arrival, the process of introducing a single european currency, as agreed in maastricht in 1991, is complete. paying with a single currency in daily transactions throughout the euro area can be regarded as an achievement of historic proportions and as a major step in the process of european integration. the eurosystem, the ecb and the 12 national central banks (ncbs) of the euro area as well as all other parties involved were quite confident – although of course not 100% certain – that the euro cash changeover would be a success, given the enormous efforts and preparations which went into this unprecedented operation. now, two weeks after the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins, i can even say that, given the scale of the task, the operation has so far progressed very smoothly, even beyond our own expectations. here and there some minor mishaps have occurred and may continue to occur, but this is quite normal for such a massive operation, involving more than 300 million people in 12 countries. the introduction of euro banknotes and coins has been a complex and ambitious undertaking which requires – in addition to understanding and co-operation on the part of the public – organisational, logistical, technical and economi… |
| Willem F Duisenberg: Assessment of the euro cash changeover and the ECB view on recent monetary and economic developments | Period_1 | 2002-01-17 | 0.580 | third, a crucial factor for the success of the euro cash changeover was the decision to allow the frontloading and sub-frontloading of banknotes and coins to the banking sector and to other target groups from 1 september 2001. this four-month lead time was required in order to ensure that sufficient euro banknotes and coins were available for widespread circulation from 1 january 2002. in fact, the scale and timing of frontloading and sub-frontloading varied considerably between different countries, depending on the national changeover scenario chosen, the national infrastructure (e.g. the extent of the central bank branch network and its role in the money supply, the storage facilities available in bank branches) as well as the size and geography of the country. in almost all euro area countries the national authorities provided euro coins to credit institutions from september 2001 because their bulk made them more difficult to transport and their lower value meant that the risk to credit institutions was lower than for banknotes. five countries (i.e. austria, finland, germany, luxembourg and spain) started frontloading banknotes at the same time; the remaining seven countries postponed the distribution of banknotes until november and december 2001 in most cases. all countries supplied credit institutions and the retail sector with both euro banknotes and coins prior to 1 january 2002. the participation of retailers in sub-frontloading operations varied by country, sector… |
| Christian Noyer: The stability-oriented monetary policy of the ECB | Period_1 | 2001-09-14 | 0.542 | smooth cash changeover can only be achieved in a short period of time by systematic and co-ordinated interaction on the part of all the main participants. third, the successful introduction of euro cash is preceded by a goal-oriented information campaign to prepare the general public and professional cash handlers in europe for the new currency. the president of the ecb launched this campaign on 30 august and at the same time presented the details of the new banknotes to the public. this new currency which will be in some 100 days’ time in our pockets, is our money, a tangible reality and a symbol of european integration in every sense of the word. the euro banknotes are produced with state-of-the-art security standards and combine many of the highly effective security features already used in the national banknotes of the euro area member states together with some additional features. finally, a series of legal and organisational measures is being taken to ensure both a successful currency changeover and unimpeded circulation in the future. production of the euro banknotes started in july 1999. the euro banknotes are currently being produced by 15 different printing works throughout europe, including the printing works of a number of national central banks (ncbs). the role of the ecb can be described as that of a central co-ordinating, controlling and monitoring body, focusing in particular on the timely production of the euro banknotes and on the organisation of the chan… |
| Willem F Duisenberg: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2000 to the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2001-07-03 | 0.491 | insurance against potential production risks, in march 2001 the ecb decided to establish a eurosystem central reserve. this reserve will amount to about 10% of the launch and logistical stocks. on 1 january 2001 the eurosystem launched the “euro 2002 information campaign”, which is designed to complement other information campaigns being conducted at the national level. the main objective of the campaign is to familiarise the general public and specific target groups with the visual appearance of the euro banknotes and their security features and to raise the awareness of citizens about the overall changeover modalities. the information campaign is progressing on schedule. it will become fully visible for citizens once the mass media part of the campaign starts on 30 august 2001, after the unveiling of the final visual appearance of the euro banknotes and their security features. the eurosystem is fully aware of the importance the successful introduction of the euro banknotes and coins will have for overall confidence in the single currency, and the careful and comprehensive preparations being made by the eurosystem are commensurate with this task. we should all bear in mind the fact that the cash changeover is an unprecedented challenge and a huge logistical exercise and that all the parties involved will have to assume their part of the overall responsibility for making the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins a success. at this point, i should like to comment br… |
| Yves Mersch: Central banking in times of technological progress | Period_2 | 2017-08-07 | 0.167 | add caution. far more detailed research is needed into the most beneficial system for all parties, and not just for financial institutions. as just one example, suppose central banks stopped providing cash and instead shifted to just providing digital base money (dbm) – an electronic claim on the central bank. would the system involve each individual having an account at the central bank, or involve a decentralised system where each individual has an electronic wallet and the central bank is unaware of transactions that take place. either system could be implemented using a distributed ledger, but the set up would be quite different in each scenario.17 in any case, just as cash has a number of technological safeguards to protect from counterfeiting, dbm would require significant safeguards to protect individuals from theft and from loss of personal information. prudence should underpin our decision on what technology to adopt. adopting untried technology that ultimately proves unreliable could seriously endanger public trust in the currency and in the central bank. any new payments system technology should be rigorously tested before implementation, with due regulation and oversight thereafter. as to the often stated link between cash and illicit payments, there is no evidence. even the available anecdotal hints attribute only a relatively minor role to illicit activity compared to the overall honest use of cash as a private means of payment. moreover, for all the buzz cur… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Rheinische Post | Period_2 | 2016-02-15 | 0.119 | what is your personal view? personally i think that we now have fewer reasons for keeping the €500 note than we did when the euro was first introduced, because electronic payments have become much more important. we have been told that the banknote is increasingly being used for criminal activities. that’s why i believe that the €500 banknote will eventually be withdrawn, but it has to be done carefully. let me emphasise that this does not mean that we should do away with cash in general. cash is crucial in our everyday lives. so even if the €500 note no longer exists, people will still be able to use all of the other banknotes. given the high importance of cash for the citizens, there is no discussion whatsoever about getting rid of it in general. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Interview in Börsen-Zeitung | Period_2 | 2016-01-13 | 0.119 | does the refugee crisis also call into question “the whole edifice”? first, please allow me to say one thing: i very much admire how germany behaved in response to the initial shock of the refugee crisis – the willingness to welcome large numbers of refugees without solidarity from other european countries. now, as regards your question, we were all, and are still, concerned about the possible consequences, especially given the rapid turn of events in the beginning. however, it is my impression that the process is now under better control. at the end of the day, this could be a very good thing for europe. what exactly do you mean by that? europe is facing a serious demographic problem. the proportion of the population which is of working age is already receding significantly and, if nothing happens, this trend will continue. that puts downward pressure on potential growth and makes the financing of social security and pension systems an increasingly difficult task. an influx of people that are able to work, who can be integrated into the labour market, can help prevent this, but the practicalities are not straightforward and not a task a central bank can advise on. the refugee crisis has superseded the crisis in greece. during the summer it was said for the first time that, with greece, a country could make an exit from the euro area. to what extent did this damage trust in the euro? only a country can decide on its own to leave the euro, it cannot be legally expelled, alt… |
| Peter Praet: Interview in Handelsblatt | Period_2 | 2015-12-28 | 0.083 | you have often used market-based inflation expectations to argue for monetary easing. are markets still a useful source of information for monetary policy? i never take only one indicator. and we don’t conduct monetary policy on the basis of market prices. that is only one part of the information we look at. even when there’s no news, the markets are still subject to a lot of volatility anyway. a number of german politicians have recently voiced strong criticism of a secret agreement on the purchase of securities by the national central banks. some of those banks have purchased on a large scale, others not. why is there this difference? there’s no secret agreement. when the currency union was founded governments decided to transfer functions and tasks that are necessary for monetary policy to the eurosystem and to leave other tasks as the responsibility of the national central banks. they invest, for instance, to cover the pensions of their employees or to build up capital and reserves. some central banks also manage the investment portfolios of other central banks outside the euro area and invest this money so that it stays in circulation. it’s vital that the governing council of the ecb is in full control of the size of the eurosystem balance sheet, and that is the case. if that’s the case, why not do it publicly? personally, i see no problem in being more transparent on this matter. but the decision has to be taken by the governing council. could the ecb force the natio… |
| Yves Mersch: Central banking in times of technological progress | Period_2 | 2017-08-07 | 0.072 | in the labour market the internet allows for more services being offered with less intermediation at lower prices. fragmentation of labour time is shown in the diverging results of compensation per employee and compensation per hour worked. for some workers this is a positive development,13 allowing them to participate in the workforce where previously they may have been unable. but for others, the greater individualisation of roles can lead to insecurity, in turn affecting households’ income and spending. more individualised roles can also weaken the ability of collective bargaining to maintain the labour share of income.14 these changes combined could lower the nairu,15 changing the phillips curve relationship between unemployment and wage pressure, and hence how monetary policy should react.16 payment systems the second area where i wanted to discuss the impact of technology on central banks is that of payment systems. let me begin with cash, something that central banks have issued since their inception. for cash to carry out its roles as a medium of exchange and store of value, the public has to have trust in its integrity. to maintain that integrity and protect the currency from counterfeiters, central banks have for centuries not only adopted innovations at the cutting edge of printing technology to protect their notes from counterfeiting, but actively driven innovation in that area. our latest €50 note – issued earlier this year – is no exception, incorporating an … |
| Christine Lagarde: Welcome address marking the change in office of the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank | Period_3 | 2022-01-11 | 0.105 | seriously. but people can trust that our commitment to price stability is unwavering, which is critical for the firm anchoring of inflation expectations and for confidence in the currency. the whole governing council is united in pursuit of this goal. at the same time, one of the key strengths of the eurosystem is the way that it brings together different perspectives to form a consensus. our rich quality of debate and diversity of views ensures that our decisions are robust. in this respect, i shall certainly miss my times with jens. he has always been a very articulate voice on the governing council, presenting his views with precision and clarity. and he has embodied the best of the bundesbank tradition of faithfulness to the mandate. alongside the challenges of ensuring price stability, our institutions have cooperated intensively during his term. the bundesbank plays a crucial role in many eurosystem projects, for example acting as one of the three providing central banks of target2, and as a centre of digital financial innovation together with the banque de france. we have enjoyed an exceptionally fruitful working relationship over these past two years. jens, your steadfastness, your intellect, and your loyalty have been crucial to our successful management of the pandemic emergency. i wish you the very best in your next adventure. i now look forward to working closely with joachim in his new adventure as bundesbank president. joachim brings with him a rich expertise… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Asset purchases – from crisis to recovery | Period_3 | 2021-09-23 | 0.080 | 7 see krishnamurthy, a. and vissing-jorgensen, a. (2012), “the aggregate demand for treasury debt”, journal of political economy, vol. 120. 8 after deductions for the general reserve fund, the ecb’s net profit is distributed to euro area national central banks in proportion to their paid-up shares. 9 see also rajan, r. (2021), “the dangers of endless quantitative easing”, project syndicate, 2 august. |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.069 | furthermore, very good progress has been made as regards the imf’s new resilience and sustainability trust (rst), which has now become operational. for contributions by eu national central banks, it is essential that claims on the rst maintain reserve asset quality. in our assessment, the modalities of the loan and deposit accounts of the rst, as well as the deposit and investment account of the poverty reduction and growth trust, are acceptable in that regard. however, we note that the channelling of special drawing rights by eu national central banks to multilateral development banks or individual countries would not be compatible with the eu’s legal framework. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.061 |
|
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy and the money market | Period_3 | 2022-09-15 | 0.051 | average spread of short-term repo rates to €str over 2022 brokertec/mts and ecb calculations. notes: gc refers to general collateral and cash-driven repo transactions. non-gc refers to non-general collateral and collateral-driven repo transactions. the chart displays the average spread of the respective repo rate to the €str since the beginning of 2022. the latest observations are for 13 september 2022. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 90 | european | 1 | 0.1258483 | monetary union | 1 | 0.9997372 |
| 90 | union | 2 | 0.1242933 | european union | 2 | 0.9996494 |
| 90 | monetary union | 3 | 0.0754245 | union | 3 | 0.9994742 |
| 90 | europe | 4 | 0.0634295 | emu | 4 | 0.9985102 |
| 90 | european union | 5 | 0.0281107 | european integration | 5 | 0.9984658 |
| 90 | emu | 6 | 0.0254451 | union emu | 6 | 0.9979382 |
| 90 | member | 7 | 0.0235570 | europe | 7 | 0.9978069 |
| 90 | common | 8 | 0.0223353 | european monetary | 8 | 0.9975888 |
| 90 | eu | 9 | 0.0214467 | monetary union emu | 9 | 0.9975878 |
| 90 | integration | 10 | 0.0165599 | common | 10 | 0.9975454 |
| 90 | political | 11 | 0.0138943 | european | 11 | 0.9975408 |
| 90 | institutional | 12 | 0.0137832 | prosperity | 12 | 0.9965831 |
| 90 | institution | 13 | 0.0133390 | sovereignty | 13 | 0.9964031 |
| 90 | share | 14 | 0.0094517 | european country | 14 | 0.9962318 |
| 90 | complete | 15 | 0.0075636 | political | 15 | 0.9962286 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung | Period_1 | 2011-10-19 | 0.235 | mr trichet, do you believe in destiny? i have used that term on a few occasions – including the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the ecb, when i quoted konrad adenauer. he once said that europe is a community with a common destiny. he also said that “it’s up to us to shape that destiny”, and i believe he was right. you have also talked about a common destiny in connection with the euro and the sovereign debt crisis. is destiny not the opposite of a free political decision on whether or not to pursue a particular form of european integration? that is certainly not the way that i interpret the word “destiny”, and it’s definitely not konrad adenauer’s understanding, either. it’s certainly not a question of predetermination. it relates, instead, to the fundamental importance of the close unity, interdependence and friendship by which the people of europe choose to bind themselves in today’s world. and in that respect, we share a “common destiny”. many politicians have described our currency union as a matter of war and peace. is that an exaggeration? the process of integration has enabled europe to enjoy more than half a century of peace, prosperity and stability. were we to begin regressing, we would place this stability in jeopardy. from an economic perspective, the rationale for pursuing integration is far stronger today than it was in the immediate aftermath of the war. back then, china, india and latin america did not have the considerable economic importance tha… |
| Mr Issing’s speech entitled ‘Hayek - currency competition and European monetary union’ (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 May 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-06-09 | 0.222 | of money as new opportunities are presented for the banking and financial industries in the euro area as a whole. in the sequencing of events on the road to the political integration of europe, i once had a distinct preference for political union preceding monetary union. as i have argued elsewhere,25 historical experience shows that national territories and monetary territories normally coincide. now, of course, the reality is that, if political union is ever to occur, monetary union will have preceded it. however, with the establishment of the ecb and the introduction of the single currency, intentionally or not, a process towards further political integration has been triggered. although this process is not without risks, it nevertheless provides a golden opportunity for europe to find its proper political shape. in hayek’s terminology, “imposing” monetary union on europe was an act of constructionism. but, to continue in his way of argumentation, this should also have started a search process for an appropriate political framework so that, finally, the economic and monetary regime, and the field of politics, together form a viable, if not optimal, institutional arrangement. there are no patterns from the past available which could easily be imitated. further political integration might, subsequently, develop in a quite divergent direction. in some areas, more centralisation of decision-making should be necessary, whereas in other fields, responsibility might remain, or… |
| Willem F Duisenberg: European Economic and Monetary Union: a success story | Period_1 | 2001-06-26 | 0.214 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Towards a more integrated Europe - challenges ahead for the euro area and Central and Eastern Europe | Period_1 | 2011-10-24 | 0.210 | president of the republic of poland, president of the european parliament, president of the national bank of poland, ministers, governors, commissioner rehn distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, let me start by thanking my dear friend and colleague, president belka, for inviting me to address such a distinguished audience today. twenty years ago, the dissolution of the soviet union marked one of the most important events in european history – the final stage of the revolutions that began two years earlier in 1989; the end of communism in the countries of central and eastern europe; and the beginning of their transition to democracy and market economies. it is also almost 20 years since the european council met in the city of maastricht in the netherlands to agree on strengthening the pillars of the european union (eu) and laying the foundations for the transition to europe’s economic and monetary union (emu). |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2011-10-06 | 0.205 | an important debate is underway on how to ensure that europe continues to deliver well into the future. important and much needed reforms have been adopted over the past few months. but this is not the end of the road. on the contrary: further steps must be taken on our way to an ever closer economic union. in the short to medium term, it is essential to implement and enhance the newly agreed legislation as far as possible. here, this parliament has a pivotal role. on economic governance, there is no doubt that you will make extensive use of tools such as the “economic dialogue” to support economic integration with the required legitimacy. this will open up the process of fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance and, by enhancing transparency, it should encourage member states to abide by the new rules as strictly as possible. i am also confident that, both in the financial supervisory and governance package, you will seize the opportunity of the review clause to go one step further. in 2013 and 2014, you will have a rendez-vous with the council to take stock and explore possible improvements. this will once again be an occasion to bring forward european integration in key policy areas. you have always pushed the frontiers of what is impossible by putting forward new ideas which have eventually become political reality. as a citizen of europe, i very much hope that the parliament will maintain this track record. when i received the karlspreis a few months ago, i was reflectin… |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2014-03-04 | 0.269 | creating a more perfect union also requires filling the remaining gaps in the architecture of economic and monetary union. a genuine and comprehensive economic and monetary union as outlined in the four presidents report should still remain our long-term objective. this does not mean pushing integration as far as we can. this is neither economically necessary nor politically realistic. it means aligning economic governance and policies of member states where appropriate to ensure that positive spillovers are enforced while negative externalities are minimised. sharing sovereignty in crucial policy areas is certainly one way to accomplish this. it is not for a central bank to prescribe solutions. this is a political prerogative. but it is my hope both as a central banker and as a european citizen that the upcoming electoral campaign will serve as an opportunity to engage in a debate on solutions for europe’s common way forward. thank you for your attention. i am now looking forward to your questions. |
| Mario Draghi: A central banker’s perspective on European economic convergence | Period_2 | 2012-12-10 | 0.256 |
|
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2015-06-18 | 0.194 | conclusion the situation in greece reminds us again that the economic and monetary union is an unfinished construction as long as we do not have all tools in place to ensure that all euro area members are economically, fiscally and financially sufficiently resilient. to complete the economic and monetary union, we need a quantum leap towards a stronger, more efficient institutional architecture. as you know, my colleagues and i are currently working on a report that will aim at showing a roadmap for this. we are in the final stages of this process, and i hope you understand that also out of respect for my colleagues, i will not be able to tell you more than what i have already said repeatedly: that we will need to put our institutional framework on a much stronger footing; that we need, as i just said, a quantum leap. i am now looking forward to our discussion. |
| Yves Mersch: Ways towards more dynamic growth | Period_2 | 2015-07-22 | 0.188 | final thoughts the euro area economy is recovering slowly but steadily, thanks in part to our most recent monetary policy measures. these measures were 1. necessary, 2. appropriate and 3. they are effective. i am confident that the economic recovery will continue to make progress. especially in a monetary union, neither individual policy areas nor the different political and decision-making levels should allow themselves to think in isolation from each other. the well-being of each individual member state depends not just on the situation in each country, but also on the rest of the union. the crisis has demonstrated this all too clearly, and policy- makers have reacted. the institutional structure of the monetary union is significantly stronger. in the meantime, however, the enthusiasm for reform has clearly weakened. the five presidents’ report should be reason enough to bring back more dynamism into the discussion about the further integration of the monetary union. we will not be able to complete europe’s integration project today. recent experience has made this clear: the convergence process is undermined if the claims to sovereignty of member states gloss over their individual responsibility and even if compliance with agreed rules, which are in their own long-term interest, is refused. only if all members of the monetary union agree on a common way forward can we take the next steps in the right direction today – steps to more dynamic growth, greater prosperity and… |
| Mario Draghi: How domestic economic strength can prevail over global weakness | Period_2 | 2016-01-26 | 0.183 | agreement on a backstop for the single resolution fund. and a european deposit insurance scheme would signal progress in completing banking union. that brings me to the final area for action: completing our monetary union. the five presidents’ report has laid out a long-term vision for economic and monetary union (emu) and a sequence of steps towards it. now we need to realise the short-term steps that will lend credibility to that long-term vision – first and foremost, by finishing all three pillars of banking union. removing the fragility of emu, by making progress with both the short-term steps and the long- term vision, would bring about a vital boost to confidence in europe. |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.271 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.256 | this is why european countries have increasingly adopted common objectives and embedded them in european law. and this is why we built economic and monetary union (emu). not because a common law and a single economic area are an end in themselves, but because they are a means to an end offering peace, freedom and prosperity. but we should not take the success of the european project for granted. europe emerged from the lessons of history repeated time and again across the centuries. but any progress made has not been free from uncertainty or errors, including in the recent past. so we should always measure the european project against our common objectives, asking ourselves whether it properly addresses our shared aspirations and our collective needs. today, i would like to assess the progress of european economic governance in this respect. and i shall discuss the challenges faced by the euro area economy and monetary policy in the new geopolitical landscape. |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.204 | after the treaty of rome, the development of the european project contributed to economic growth in the member states for many years: the progressive abolition of customs tariffs favoured specialisation, made it possible to reap the benefits of economies of scale, and stimulated efficiency and competition, with positive effects on employment and welfare. empirical estimates find that without the single market, our real gdp per capita would be around one-fifth lower today.[2] the european economic community subsequently evolved into the european union, becoming an area where europeans work together on a wide set of policies and enjoy freedom and peace. in 1999 we went one step further with emu. this was a logical step to buttress the single market: the euro eliminates exchange rate risk, facilitates trade and supports confidence in price stability. intra- euro area exports have increased by more than a quarter as a share of gdp since 1999.[3] and firms’ integration in value chains is three times tighter within europe than with the rest of the world. in fact, the regional integration of supply linkages in europe is higher than in any other continent and has continued to increase in recent years.[4] thanks to its size, emu has the economic firepower that gives it policy autonomy and the instruments required to react to external shocks.[5] it also puts the second most important global currency at our disposal. as the experience of recent weeks shows, this is a key ingredient o… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.193 | conclusion i’d like to conclude by reminding the young students that are in this room today that not far from here, in monte cassino, 78 years ago there was war. thousands of italians, many of them civilians, as well as germans, french, poles, brits, americans and many others, lost their lives in the valleys near here, in what was the tragedy of the second world war. today monte cassino has returned to the vocation that the monks chose for it: a place of meditation and study. and we should thank the european project for this. the war on our doorstep reminds us of what we owe european integration: three-quarters of a century of peace, during which we have built our wealth. ukrainians know that well. they are fighting for their country, and for the very freedoms that we hold dear. and they want to join the european union because this will give them peace, freedom and prosperity. our forebears built the european project patiently: for us, and for generations to come. their hope was that future generations would continue to overcome the divisions of the past. so we should not just ask what europe is doing for us. we should also ask ourselves what we can do for europe. i have sought to address this question with you today, a question which i often ask myself in my day- to-day work. the answer is that we need to take an active part in the european debate, contributing to a european union that is designed for the benefit of all its members. the versailles declaration renews our e… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.164 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 91 | labour | 1 | 0.1079875 | labour market | 1 | 0.9993866 |
| 91 | wage | 2 | 0.0991833 | worker | 2 | 0.9992113 |
| 91 | labour market | 3 | 0.0703421 | unemployment rate | 3 | 0.9991234 |
| 91 | unemployment | 4 | 0.0685206 | unemployment | 4 | 0.9988607 |
| 91 | market | 5 | 0.0652823 | labour force | 5 | 0.9988597 |
| 91 | job | 6 | 0.0289525 | skill | 6 | 0.9985097 |
| 91 | employment | 7 | 0.0255118 | labour | 7 | 0.9981568 |
| 91 | worker | 8 | 0.0238927 | wage | 8 | 0.9977177 |
| 91 | increase | 9 | 0.0194400 | wage growth | 9 | 0.9976343 |
| 91 | unemployment rate | 10 | 0.0180232 | labour supply | 10 | 0.9971949 |
| 91 | force | 11 | 0.0170112 | labour force participation | 11 | 0.9970160 |
| 91 | wage growth | 12 | 0.0155945 | job | 12 | 0.9969288 |
| 91 | growth | 13 | 0.0146837 | force participation | 13 | 0.9964895 |
| 91 | labour force | 14 | 0.0121538 | labour market slack | 14 | 0.9964496 |
| 91 | skill | 15 | 0.0098262 | wage pressure | 15 | 0.9962293 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2008-07-01 | 0.320 | second, there is a need for making labour market institutions more flexible to facilitate a better matching of the skills of those who seek a job with the characteristics of labour demand. to help match demand and supply, wage developments should reflect local labour market conditions. third, there is a need to increase knowledge and the transferability of skills. bringing unemployed or inactive people into jobs will, over time, enhance individuals’ labour productivity and thus real wages. good quality education is of the utmost importance and the recognition and incentives for young people, workers and firms to invest in education and training must be enhanced. the efficiency and service orientation of education institutions should be improved. in addition, the labour market should play a stronger role in signalling to education systems and workers which skills are in short supply. finally, the euro area should make better use of skills from outside the euro area. immigration policy should be closely aligned with the skills needed by the labour market, and ensure the successful integration of immigrants into the active workforce and society as a whole. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.229 | wages turning briefly to recent euro area wage developments, globalisation may have been one contributing factor to an extended period of wage moderation within the euro area (for instance, through offshoring or the threat of offshoring), across both manufacturing and service sector. while productivity growth in the euro area has also been moderate over the last decade, real wage growth has also been low. over 1985-1995 both productivity (output per person) and real wage growth rates averaged around 1.9%. over the period 1996-2006, average productivity growth was approximately 1%, with average real wage growth around 0.4%. while such a development might be taken to be related to a necessary moderation in a period of persistent high level of unemployment and to an additional moderation driven by globalisation, extreme caution should be made in drawing such conclusions as regards globalisation, given several caveats related to measurement issues and the fact that much of the associated decline in the wage share took place well before the recent phase of globalisation. 19 an increase in the real wage elasticity of labour demand appears to have occurred in the last years, particularly for low-skilled workers, which may signal a trend fostered by additional supply of low-skilled labour at a global level. 20 moreover, in addition to observable factors, an unobservable “threat effect” – whereby workers in industrialised economies perceive themselves to have a weaker position and … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2008-07-01 | 0.225 | labour supply and employment in the euro area within this context, let me draw your attention to the latest eurosystem’s structural issues report, which will be posted this morning on our website. the report this year focuses on the main developments in labour supply and employment in the euro area countries since the early 1980s. let me briefly mention some key developments. since the start of monetary union, the euro area has witnessed an increase of 15.7 million in the number of people employed. this compares to around 5 million in the preceding period 1990-98. the total labour market participation rate rose to nearly 71%, and the employment rate rose to over 65%. the period since 1999 is also characterised by a change in labour supply composition. women have entered the labour market in increasing numbers. in addition, older workers have tended to remain in the labour market for longer, which is welcome in view of population ageing. immigrants have contributed positively to labour supply, helping to fill skills shortages. the share of workers with tertiary level education has increased. these are encouraging developments, resulting from the implementation of structural reforms in product and labour markets, increased immigration and wage moderation. nevertheless, progress has been quite uneven across countries and significant challenges remain. from a monetary policy perspective, four conclusions can be drawn. first, there is a need to further increase the labour marke… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: EMU after seven years - successes and challenges | Period_1 | 2006-05-09 | 0.219 | satisfactory. the low labour participation rates in the euro area are significantly influenced by structural distortions like the legal and regulatory environment, the tax systems and social institutions. for example, marginal tax rates that are too high discourage labour market entry and have a downward effect on average hours worked. moreover, restrictions on the maximum number of hours worked, imposed either by social partners’ agreements or by law, are also often not in line with preferences of a number of individual employees. furthermore, benefit systems that are too generous discourage job search and early retirement schemes encourage early withdrawal from the labour market. rigidities caused by regulations, in particular wage rigidity and a high degree of job protection for older workers, reduce the incentives for firms to hire people in this age group. indeed, in 2005 the employment rate for workers aged 55-64 in the euro area was just two-thirds of the corresponding figure in the us. in addition, female labour force participation rates in the euro area could also be supported by specific measures, like the adequate provision of childcare facilities, aiming at reconciling motherhood with professional life. finally, a more extensive use of flexible forms of work such as part-time and temporary work may also provide further working incentives for those categories of workers that would 1 not find it feasible to become full-time employed. i do not deny that much has b… |
| Willem F Duisenberg: The introduction of the euro: a (critical) retrospect and a preview | Period_1 | 2002-03-18 | 0.184 | years suggests that labour market reforms have been progressing in the right direction, and, in particular, it suggests that the process of wage moderation in the euro area during this period has been beneficial. at the same time, however, the need for further reform is evident from the still high and persistent levels of unemployment and from low labour market participation in several euro area countries. for example, despite continued high unemployment, firms continue to report difficulties in recruiting suitably qualified workers, suggesting that improvements are needed in matching labour supply and demand. |
| Mario Draghi: Accompanying the economic recovery | Period_2 | 2017-07-07 | 0.337 | uncertainty over slack and its impact on inflation a second explanation for the discrepancy between real developments and inflation is uncertainty surrounding the size of the output gap and its impact on inflation. this might be happening for a variety of reasons. one possible reason is that we are currently experiencing positive supply developments. in particular, we do observe that, as the recovery strengthens, the supply of labour is rising too. labour force participation has been growing consistently over the last few years, buoyed especially by increases in participation rates of older workers. we also see some evidence that labour supply has become more elastic due to immigration, particularly in strongly growing economies such as germany. 2 since 2007, the euro area participation rate has risen by around 1.5 percentage points, whereas in the united states it has fallen by more than 3 percentage points in the same period.3 structural reforms in labour markets have been a factor in this labour supply boost. similarly, past reforms in product markets may also have had a positive effect on the supply side by reducing price mark-ups, increasing productivity and raising growth potential. another reason why there is some uncertainty over slack is the correct notion of unemployment – that is, there may be residual slack in the labour market that is not being fully captured in the headline unemployment measures. unemployment in the euro area has risen during the crisis, but … |
| Benoît Cœuré: Scars or scratches? Hysteresis in the euro area | Period_2 | 2017-05-24 | 0.308 | a different perspective on labour market slack one of the features of the recent employment recovery is that many new jobs have been of a lower “quality” compared with those seen before the crisis. while employment ratios have rebounded strongly, employment of full-time workers with permanent contracts has in fact declined. the latest eu labour force survey (lfs) data suggest that “core” employment – that is, full-time positions on open-ended permanent contracts – now account for just over two thirds of all employees. you can see on slide 4 that this is the lowest share since the survey was first conducted. the lfs also suggests that of the net employment created since the crisis, around a third has been for workers on temporary contracts, and around a quarter part-time. of course, a fraction of those seeking part-time employment do so as a way to balance work and other commitments. but, for others, the choice for part-time work is involuntary. currently there are more than seven million underemployed part-time workers across the euro area – those who would like to work more hours but cannot – an increase of around one million since the crisis. this may have important implications for inflation dynamics. while the main objective for workers in permanent work is typically higher wages, those in temporary or part-time positions may pursue objectives other than wage increases, such as full- time employment or an increase in hours worked. or if they do seek higher wages, they … |
| Benoît Cœuré: Scars or scratches? Hysteresis in the euro area | Period_2 | 2017-05-24 | 0.267 | yet, the compositional effects we are seeing in the labour market may also reflect more crisis- related factors, in particular uncertainty about the strength and durability of the recovery and pessimism about the long-term impact of the downturn on growth. as blanchard and co-authors have recently postulated, a revision to future potential growth prospects may cause firms to cut back on investment plans, causing muted growth expectations to become self-fulfilling.11 on the right-hand side of slide 5 you can see blanchard and co.’s analysis replicated for the euro area. and we see signs that such effects might have also been at play in the euro area: there is a positive correlation between potential growth revisions and investment error forecasts. this might suggest that investment, and therefore demand, is influenced by long-term animal spirits – changes in expectations concerning the steady-state path of the economy. but the logic may also run in reverse and create a vicious feedback loop: this would be the case if the pessimism-induced period of low demand ultimately affected long-run potential growth. i would call this an “anxiety trap” that could ultimately lead to the more subtle forms of hysteresis i mentioned earlier. the reason is that if the effect of low expectations and high uncertainty is to quell animal spirits, large demand shocks can have long-lasting effects: the increase in risk aversion slows down capital accumulation, thereby reducing productivity growth… |
| Peter Praet: Interview in De Standaard | Period_2 | 2017-07-25 | 0.238 | means for quantitative easing. i can’t say anything about that yet. we do say that we still need a long period of accommodative policy before we are ready. as the economic prospects brighten, higher expected returns on business investment will make borrowing conditions increasingly attractive. this will reinforce accommodation and make sure that inflation sustainably converges towards our objective of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. growth is picking up and unemployment is going down, but wages are not really increasing. doesn’t that totally contradict traditional economic theory? wages are also a reflection of the past. wage increases are partly based on current inflation rates and they are relatively low at the moment. let us also not forget that the level of unemployment is still high. that merely underlines that the process of reflation is a long one that remains highly dependent on accommodative monetary policy. but will the wages still evolve in the same way as before, now that all kinds of new factors are emerging such as computerisation, flexible jobs, etc? are the ecb’s instruments still reliable? well, how do you measure the impact of china on international competition, of e-commerce, of automation? we have many internal discussions about that, about whether something in the inflation process has broken down. the phillips curve (which shows that wages rise when unemployment falls) is not broken, but it is flatter and the process is slower. wage infl… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Scars or scratches? Hysteresis in the euro area | Period_2 | 2017-05-24 | 0.227 | potential growth rate – something laurence ball called “super-hysteresis” effects. in fact, on the right-hand side of the first slide you can see that potential output growth had been slowing in the euro area well before the crisis, mainly reflecting a long-term slowdown in total factor productivity (tfp). so the question i would like to ask today is not so much why potential output growth appears to be decelerating in the long run, or whether we are entering a period of secular stagnation – the jury is still out on this. it is whether the crisis, and the persistent shortfall in aggregate demand, has accelerated, or not, the decline in potential growth. the first point to consider is whether the crisis has had a significant effect on labour participation – that is, the size of the total labour force. hysteresis effects might be caused by unemployed workers becoming discouraged and discontinuing their search for employment, leading them to become detached from the workforce and lose their skills over time. although this would reduce unemployment, it would lead to a permanent reduction in labour supply and growth potential. so is there any evidence of this in the euro area? the overall picture suggests not: the euro area has not been affected by strong adverse participation effects, as was seen for example in the united states – where the unemployment rate would have been significantly higher during the crisis had it not been for workers dropping out of the labour force. you… |
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.242 | and although the labour market is recovering, there is still slack: we have half a million fewer jobs than before the pandemic, approximately 2.4 million workers are still under job retention schemesl4] and hours worked are down by around 4% from their pre-pandemic levels!2! (chart 6, right-hand side). moreover, in the second quarter of this year, there were 1.4 million fewer workers in the labour force than in the last quarter of 2019. some of those who were discouraged from working or looking for work during the pandemic may seek to rejoin the labour force as the recovery takes hold.[6! wage pressures could still emerge before the economy reaches full capacity if there are widespread matching inefficiencies in the labour market — for instance owing to structural changes triggered by the pandemic — or if the inflation spike impacts wage bargaining dynamics. but neither appears to be the case today. ]_ higher wages would instead help sustain consumer demand. chart 6 pre-crisis and recent estimates of the output labour market indicators gap in the euro area (percentages) (percentages of potential output) m pre-crisis estimate @ unemployment rate ™ recent estimate ® share of job retention schemes (percentage of labour force) 5 = labour force participation rate (right-hand scale) 25 66 0 20 65 , el 15 -5 64 10 : hht |: 5 -15 0 62 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 1801 1901 2001 2101 2103 left-hand panel. sources: eurostat, deutsche bundesbank, september nipe and ecb staff calculations. note: the latest observations are for october 2021. right-hand panel. sources: ecb calculations based on data from eurostat, federal employment agency germany, ifo institute munich, ministere du travail, de l’emploi et de i’insertion, instituto nazionale previdenza sociale (inps), and ministerio de inclusion, seguridad social y migraciones. notes: the latest observations are for the third quarter of 2021 for germany, spain and france… |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.189 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 92 | bank | 1 | 0.0620772 | tltro | 1 | 0.9997371 |
| 92 | negative | 2 | 0.0469030 | deposit facility | 2 | 0.9987732 |
| 92 | deposit | 3 | 0.0336867 | tltros | 3 | 0.9986858 |
| 92 | tltro | 4 | 0.0240927 | facility | 4 | 0.9984222 |
| 92 | facility | 5 | 0.0221348 | negative rate | 5 | 0.9983350 |
| 92 | operation | 6 | 0.0217432 | deposit | 6 | 0.9982458 |
| 92 | lend | 7 | 0.0204705 | tltro iii | 7 | 0.9981579 |
| 92 | measure | 8 | 0.0198831 | deposit facility rate | 8 | 0.9981574 |
| 92 | tltros | 9 | 0.0187083 | facility rate | 9 | 0.9978948 |
| 92 | target | 10 | 0.0185125 | iii | 10 | 0.9978097 |
| 92 | deposit facility | 11 | 0.0182188 | package | 11 | 0.9969323 |
| 92 | package | 12 | 0.0159672 | deposit rate | 12 | 0.9960980 |
| 92 | iii | 13 | 0.0157714 | refinance operation tltro | 13 | 0.9956986 |
| 92 | negative rate | 14 | 0.0140092 | refinance operation tltros | 14 | 0.9955188 |
| 92 | fund | 15 | 0.0136176 | term refinance operation | 15 | 0.9954411 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Towards a more integrated Europe - challenges ahead for the euro area and Central and Eastern Europe | Period_1 | 2011-10-24 | 0.031 | finally, the ecb is also making a key contribution. for example, by providing extensive liquidity provision to parent banks established in the euro area, the subsidiaries of those banks in central and eastern europe are indirectly benefiting from this ample liquidity. ladies and gentlemen, let me draw to a close. i am sure that the three aspects of convergence that i have mentioned will be better understood thanks to the discussions, which will take place during this impressive conference. achieving sustainable convergence requires the conduct of sound economic policies, both before and after adoption of the euro. the present global crisis is demonstrating, once again, to which extent continuous resolute sound macro policies are the best way to improve economic and financial resilience in times of unexpected challenges and shocks. thank you very much for your attention. |
| Lucas Papademos: The effects of globalisation on inflation, liquidity and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2007-06-13 | 0.030 | 17 international monetary fund, 2007. 18 see ecb financial stability review, june 2007; ecb monthly bulletin, july 2007, forthcoming; ferrero et al., 2007; von landesberger, 2007. 19 ferguson et al. 20 over the same horizon, the net foreign liability position of the euro area only increased from 6.5% to 10% of gdp. 21 see, for example, the description of the link between m&a activity and asset prices in pepper, 2006. |
| Mr Erçel discusses the monetary policy of the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 1999-01-08 | 0.028 | mr erçel discusses the monetary policy of the european central bank opening speech by the governor of the central bank of the republic of turkey, mr gazi erçel, at the economic research foundation, istanbul. 18/12/98 european economic and monetary union (emu) will come to life at the beginning of next year. the european central bank (ecb) will commence operations, and the euro will become an official reserve currency. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Further integrating euro area economies ¿ some reflections | Period_1 | 2006-07-14 | 0.028 | we also need to monitor and fully understand the factors behind the persistence of diversities among euro area countries: this persistence is in some cases fully justified. in other cases it has to be corrected in order to avoid the accumulation of differences over time. this is particularly true as regards the cost competitiveness indicators. euro area policy-makers need to discuss the underlying factors and the necessary corrective measures in the appropriate institutional fora: this should ensure a smooth functioning of the euro area in the coming years. in such a rapidly changing world, with many simultaneous developments brought about by the progress of science and technology, the globalisation process and the profound changes in europe – which have been the subject of my reflections – this hard work would have been in any case necessary. the euro has brought price stability, favourable medium and long-term interest rates, and a remarkable degree of resilience in a complex environment marked by shocks, three achievements that lend support to these urgently needed structural reforms. i thank you for your attention. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2011-07-04 | 0.025 | it is also for this reason that the ongoing negotiations on the governance package should produce an ambitious outcome. i have been emphasising time and again why we are very much in agreement with the european parliament on this – the need for a quantum leap in economic governance through the currently discussed legislative package. at this stage, i would like to recall two points: first, we should not be content with a stronger stability and growth pact only at the later stages of an excessive deficit procedure. we need to halt any fiscal excesses early on and correct them. the obvious way is a higher degree of automaticity early on in the procedures, that is, more reverse qualified majority voting in the preventive arm of the pact; and therefore the prospect of more timely sanctions, possibly of a reputational nature. second, we would benefit considerably from an equally ambitious macroeconomic imbalances framework that detects imbalances early on, through a well focused and rigorously applied scoreboard; and then corrects them, again in a timely fashion. here, we need to focus on those countries that ultimately pose a risk to other euro area countries through in particular persistent and excessive competitiveness losses. |
| Luis de Guindos: Measures to support monetary policy transmission through banks | Period_2 | 2019-09-25 | 0.431 | we believe that these changes represent a significant easing of banks’ medium-term funding conditions, which in turn should contribute to improving the lending conditions banks offer to the real economy. the more accommodative pricing should strengthen support for bank funding, so that banks continue to offer loans to firms and households on favourable terms. the extended maturity of tltro iii will be better aligned with bank-based financing of investment projects, thereby further supporting banks’ financing to the real economy. finally, in view of the lengthened maturity, the option to voluntarily repay the amounts borrowed before maturity at a quarterly frequency will provide greater flexibility for banks’ funding plans. the two-tier system let me now turn to the second measure. banks in the euro area continue to benefit from the negative interest rate policy through the larger intermediation volumes and lower credit risk for borrowers associated with more favourable macroeconomic developments. this has helped support bank profitability across the euro area since the deposit facility rate turned negative in 2014. in addition, banks have been able to generate higher non-interest income as the compression of yields is reflected in higher asset valuations. banks’ funding costs in wholesale markets have also decreased, mitigating the impact of lower rates on net interest income. however, the negative interest rate policy also entails costs for banks, and these are likely to … |
| Philip R Lane: Low inflation - macroeconomic risks and the monetary policy stance | Period_2 | 2020-02-12 | 0.385 | nonetheless, the governing council closely monitors the risk that the impact of negative rates on bank profitability may impair the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. in order to reinforce the bank-based transmission of monetary policy, the governing council decided in september last year to exempt part of the bank holdings of excess liquidity with the eurosystem from the negative deposit rate. the interest rate on such holdings is now tiered: excess liquidity holdings up to six times the minimum reserve holding are not charged the negative deposit facility rate of -0.5 percent. the annual gross savings for banks from the two-tier system are estimated to amount to up to €4 billion in 2020 compared with the counterfactual projection if the system had not been introduced. these savings more than offset the additional gross excess liquidity charge of around €1 billion that resulted from the september cut of the deposit facility rate by 10 basis points. concluding remarks let me conclude. confronted by marked adverse developments in inflation dynamics, the ecb’s governing council embarked on a fundamental pivot in its policy in 2014 by adopting the package of unconventional monetary policy measures that i have discussed. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox - evidence from the euro area | Period_2 | 2020-02-23 | 0.355 | nonetheless, the governing council is closely monitoring the risk that the impact of negative rates on bank profitability may impair the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. moreover, the ecb decided last september to introduce a two-tier system for remunerating excess liquidity holdings, with the aim of supporting the bank-based transmission of monetary policy. the interest rate on such holdings is now tiered, with excess liquidity holdings up to six times the minimum reserve requirements receiving zero interest and holdings beyond that level remunerated at the deposit facility rate of -0.5 percent. |
| Luis de Guindos: Measures to support monetary policy transmission through banks | Period_2 | 2019-09-25 | 0.297 | luis de guindos: measures to support monetary policy transmission through banks welcome address by mr luis de guindos, vice-president of the european central bank, to the money market contact group, frankfurt am main, 24 september 2019. * * * in its most recent policy meeting, the ecb’s governing council decided on a comprehensive easing package because the downward revisions in the projected inflation path warranted a vigorous policy response. the easing package comprised five measures: lowering the deposit facility rate, strengthening the forward guidance on the likely path of policy rates, restarting the net asset purchases within the asset purchase programme, changing the terms of the third series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltro iii) and introducing a two-tier system for reserve remuneration. we believe that the measures announced last week complement each other and together constitute an effective response to the environment that the ecb currently faces. these decisions were taken against the following background. first, as a result of continued global uncertainties and their impact on confidence, our latest ecb staff macroeconomic projections were revised down. we face a more protracted economic slowdown than previously anticipated and see persistent downside risks to the growth outlook. second, inflation continues to fall short of expectations. headline inflation remains well below our medium-term aim, while core inflation has been hovering aro… |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.273 | reflections on monetary policy page 15 of 18 complementing the tltro iii operations, the two-tier system for reserve remuneration – which will take effect on 30 october 2019 – supports the bank-based transmission mechanism, as it will mitigate the adverse side effects of negative interest rates on banks. this system has been calibrated to strike a balance between, on the one hand, offsetting the direct cost of negative interest rates on bank profitability, thereby helping to sustain the pass-through of low policy rates to bank lending rates, and on the other, preserving the positive contribution of negative rates to the accommodative stance of monetary policy and the continued sustained convergence of inflation to our aim. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.180 | the calibration of the tltro iii programme in response to the pandemic has provided significant monetary accommodation in a manner that is designed to protect credit supply. in particular, an important innovation was to set the minimum borrowing rate at 50 basis points below the average interest rate on the deposit facility. this lowered funding costs for bank-intermediated credit, even without a generalised reduction in the main traditional policy rates. the remarkable expansion in the scale of tltro iii operations, which have increased by about €2.2 trillion during the pandemic, is visible in chart 1. ecb estimates indicate that tltro iii liquidity can be expected to boost loan volumes considerably, to the tune of four percentage points cumulatively by 2022, and also contributed to a substantial lowering of lending rates to non-financial corporations. the euro area bank lending survey confirms that tltro funding has boosted loan generation and eased credit terms and conditions (charts 10 and 11). |
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.178 | we also changed the terms and conditions of the third series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations. the tltro iii programme addressed the need for significant stimulus during the pandemic, strengthening the transmission of rates to the economy via banks. but now the environment has changed completely – and we need to ensure that the lower cost of tltro funding does not impede monetary transmission when policy needs to be normalised. recalibrating the programme’s conditions ensures consistency with the broader monetary policy normalisation process. |
| Luis de Guindos: The euro area economy and the energy transition | Period_3 | 2022-11-04 | 0.171 | to support the timely return of inflation to our 2% medium-term target, our monetary policy aims to reduce support for demand and to ensure that inflation expectations remain anchored at our target. last week we decided to raise the three key ecb interest rates by 75 basis points – the third major rate hike in a row – and we expect to raise interest rates further. we also changed the terms and conditions of the third series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltro iii) to ensure that its calibration is consistent with the broader monetary policy normalisation process and to reinforce the transmission of our policy rate increases to bank lending conditions. finally, we decided to set the remuneration of minimum reserves held by credit institutions with the 1/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.132 | measures, including asset purchase programmes contribute to a reduction in income inequality through positive employment and wage effects, while their implications for wealth inequality can be mixed, as asset holdings tend to exhibit heterogeneity.[10] for corporates, the protection of favourable financing conditions likely contributed to the survival of many firms that would otherwise have been forced to shut down towing to the catastrophic loss of revenues during the pandemic. low bond rates and banking rates, together with supportive credit terms and conditions, played a direct role in underpinning the survival of many firms. yet more powerful was the indirect role by which favourable financing conditions enabled large-scale fiscal borrowing that in turn enabled governments to provide an array of subsidies and credit guarantees to firms. while favourable financing conditions and fiscal subsidies might have kept alive some zombie firms, the return to pre-pandemic gdp levels by the end of 2021 suggests that a comprehensive approach to supporting firm survival was broadly appropriate. in assessing the implications of our monetary policy for the conduct of fiscal policy, it is essential to recognise that fiscal policy has been front and centre in averting the propagation of the economic fallout from the pandemic, as it is especially well-suited to provide targeted economic support. fiscal policy also plays an important role as driver of aggregate demand, where the positive … |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.132 | requires – when the economy is in the proximity of the lower bound – especially forceful or persistent monetary policy measures to avoid negative deviations from the inflation target becoming entrenched. monetary policy was already accommodative before the pandemic shock. the prospect of persistent below-target inflation had resulted in a further easing of the monetary stance in september 2019: the deposit facility rate had been lowered to minus 0.5 per cent and net asset purchases were resumed at a rate of €20 billion per month under the ecb’s baseline asset purchase programme (app). these measures were reinforced by forward guidance that tied future monetary policy decisions to the inflation outlook and developments in underlying inflation dynamics. in addition, credit supply was supported by the third series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (the tltro iii programme). in its initial response to the pandemic crisis in spring 2020, the ecb adopted a comprehensive package of complementary measures. the central elements included: the escalation of asset purchases through the 12 march 2020 decision to add an extra € 120 billion to the already-running app and the 18 march 2020 launch of the pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp), a revision in the structure and pricing of the tltro programme, an easing of the collateral framework, and a set of supportive supervisory measures (taken by the supervisory wing of the ecb). in combination with the forceful fiscal… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 93 | short | 1 | 0.1618459 | term interest | 1 | 0.9995619 |
| 93 | short term | 2 | 0.1190408 | term interest rate | 2 | 0.9995617 |
| 93 | interest | 3 | 0.0966369 | short term | 3 | 0.9994742 |
| 93 | interest rate | 4 | 0.0867492 | short | 4 | 0.9994741 |
| 93 | term interest | 5 | 0.0579621 | short term interest | 5 | 0.9992990 |
| 93 | term interest rate | 6 | 0.0575866 | term rate | 6 | 0.9990362 |
| 93 | short term interest | 7 | 0.0277983 | short term rate | 7 | 0.9989484 |
| 93 | term rate | 8 | 0.0217906 | interest rate | 8 | 0.9986852 |
| 93 | influence | 9 | 0.0171596 | interest | 9 | 0.9985971 |
| 93 | short term rate | 10 | 0.0130293 | influence | 10 | 0.9985106 |
| 93 | level | 11 | 0.0112770 | future short | 11 | 0.9968862 |
| 93 | good | 12 | 0.0112770 | extent | 12 | 0.9952638 |
| 93 | result | 13 | 0.0100254 | usual | 13 | 0.9943868 |
| 93 | future | 14 | 0.0093996 | term policy | 14 | 0.9943309 |
| 93 | extent | 15 | 0.0075222 | obvious | 15 | 0.9941252 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Macro-prudential supervision and monetary policy - linkages and demarcation lines | Period_1 | 2011-05-24 | 0.223 |
|
| Lucas Papademos: Interview with Financial Times and Financial Times Deutschland | Period_1 | 2005-12-21 | 0.190 | in principle, a tightening of monetary policy – global and domestic - would be expected to contain aggregate demand growth. the extent, however, of this effect depends on the initial conditions and on the influence of a variety of other factors. in the us, despite the substantial increase in interest rates since the middle of 2004 which followed a fairly long period of low interest rates, economic growth has remained robust because of the cumulative impact of the previous monetary accommodation and of other factors that have at least partly counterbalanced the effects of higher interest rates. an important channel through which monetary policy influences the economy is through its effects on long-term interest rates. if long-term interest rates remain at a low level – as a result of favourable inflation expectations influenced by a credible monetary policy oriented towards price stability and as a consequence of the impact of other factors– then the effect on economic activity of a rise in short-term interest rates is going to be more muted. moreover, the expected strength of euro area economic growth in the coming year is mainly based on the projected evolution of internal demand. which effect is stronger - the impact of higher short-term rates on growth, or the beneficial effects of low long-term rates? well, it depends of course on the term-structure of debt and the proportion of long-term debt with variable rates. but the general point that i would like to emphasise is… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Macro-prudential supervision and monetary policy - linkages and demarcation lines | Period_1 | 2011-05-24 | 0.138 | finance and the macro-economy interact. in these models, short-term monetary policy instruments seem to be more powerful than previously thought – and therefore, more disruptive if misused. but why would short-term rates be important in their own right? the bulk of finance for financial institutions, whether banks, broker-dealers, the so-called shadow banking system or hedge funds, is very much short-term. for example, broker-dealers fund themselves primarily in the repo market, mainly at overnight maturities, while shadow banks fund themselves in the commercial paper market and the majority of commercial banks rely on retail finance – chequing and savings deposits – which usually consists of sight or short- maturity instruments. wholesale funding for commercial banks is, typically, very short-term as well. so, when a central bank decides on the short-term interest rate, it directly affects the marginal price of leverage for virtually the entire financial sector. problems arise when, due to low interest rates that make short-term funding cheap, the total debt raised by financial institutions goes beyond what may be considered as socially optimal. this is frequently the case for the unregulated or so-called “shadow” banking system, not subject to the stringent requirements of the regulated banking sector.2 low funding rates can inspire risky business strategies. for example, extreme forms of maturity transformation can become attractive, particularly if the risk adjustment … |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Could monetary policy have helped prevent the financial crisis? | Period_1 | 2010-04-13 | 0.136 | similar institutions will adopt a similar risk-taking strategy. herding will emerge. risk management behaviour will become more correlated across financial intermediaries. risk will rise not only at the individual bank level, but also across the system as a whole. 16 moreover, since the financial sector is now exposed to greater liquidity risk as a result of such behaviour, central banks are more likely to be called upon to intervene in the future. and the magnitude of such interventions will need to increase if they are to be effective. a “ratcheting-up” of risk within the banking sector can occur over time, creating increasing vulnerability. 17 low interest rates also encourage a higher level of leverage. because financial intermediaries – whether banks, broker-dealers, shadow banks, or hedge funds – finance themselves with short-term liabilities, central bank decisions on the level of short-term rate affect their marginal price of leverage. as a result, the behaviour of financial intermediaries – which, by their nature, have high levels of leverage – can be strongly influenced by even small changes in short-term rates. 18 low levels of interest rates encourage higher levels of leverage and, as a result, an accumulation of additional risk on bank balance sheets. through all these channels, a prolonged period of low short-term interest rates can support the accumulation of risks and financial imbalances on the balance sheets of both financial intermediaries and the privat… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy and private expectations | Period_1 | 2005-02-28 | 0.121 | union. this interest rate move was a strong sign of determination. the policy message was reinforced through a consistent communication campaign which the central banks concerned, together with the european monetary institute, launched in the last few months of the year to explain the meaning of their action. the essence of the message was the following. the assumption made by some observers and by part of the market literature, according to which the entry interest rates in the euro on 1 january 1999 would be some kind of average of the interest rates of the composing currencies was totally wrong. on the contrary, the very construction of the euro was based on total continuity with the most credible national currencies. the concept of the transition was based upon “benchmarking”, namely convergence towards the best performers and not convergence towards a mean. the modest interest rate increase that took place in a small number of economies was designed exclusively to preserve monetary stability and inflationary expectations for the corresponding currencies which were the benchmark for the euro. the ecb itself, the soon to be born monetary authority, would be uncompromising in its role as guardian of price stability, in close continuity with its forebears. it was therefore fully justified that interest rate convergence inside the future euro area would take place progressively on the basis of a merge of the different yield curves of the various currencies with the benchma… |
| Peter Praet: Forward guidance and the European Central Bank | Period_2 | 2013-08-07 | 0.232 | this statement, in particular the formulation “for an extended period of time”, marks a change in the ecb’s communication of monetary policy. it is a form of forward guidance, a communication instrument by which central banks convey their monetary policy orientation going forward, conditional on their assessment of the economic outlook. the standard view is that monetary policy influences the economy and, ultimately, price setting primarily by affecting interest rates at intermediate and medium-term maturities. indeed, longer-term interest rates determine the borrowing conditions that are most relevant for a large component of aggregate spending: first and foremost, durable consumption and investment. the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates suggests that longer-term interest rates reflect the expected path of the very short-term interest rates which the central bank controls. this is because trading in financial markets removes persisting arbitrage opportunities across securities with similar risk characteristics and different maturities. as a consequence, returns are equalised across the term structure, except for premia that remunerate investors holding relatively longer term securities. therefore, it is not so much by changing their very short-term interest rate instruments that central banks can impact the decisions that matter most for the economy. it is rather by influencing expectations about the evolution of those short-term interest rates i… |
| Peter Praet: Speech on the occasion of the “Annual Danish Top Executive Summit 2013” | Period_2 | 2013-01-30 | 0.213 | central bank’s mandate exemplifies the notion of courage. i am very sceptical whether increasing the numerical definition of price stability helps in either of these dimensions. engaging in communication regarding the future path of policy rates let me now turn to the second example of an innovative proposal for monetary policy that i would like to discuss today. unlike the previous proposal, this one does not relate to the objective of the central bank. instead, it focuses on how the central bank can actually achieve its assigned objective, when the chances that the objective will be hit diminish. as i already mentioned, central banks typically conduct monetary policy by steering nominal short-term interest rates. these are the rates over which they can exert significant influence through the monopoly supply of central bank reserves. it is, however, widely accepted that it is primarily long-term interest rates that matter for the main economic decisions that the central bank wants to influence. how is it then that monetary policy can have an impact on the economy? well, one can think of long-term interest rates as comprising two elements: expectations regarding the future evolution of short-term rates; and premia. premia relate to the compensation investors demand for holding on to an asset for a specific period of time (the term premium). moreover, they relate to the compensation for risks, such as the possibility of incurring capital losses due to difficulties they may … |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.192 | as central banks began in the 80s to abandon technical monetarism and adopt interest rates as the main policy instrument to influence economic and financial conditions, their monetary base has adjusted towards the level consistent with banks’ demand for reserves, given the current short‐term interest rate. the central bank balance sheet, which is to a large extent determined by bank reserves in the perspective of the traditional transmission channels, cannot therefore be used as a monetary policy instrument separate from the short‐term interest rate. 29 for example, eggertsson and mehrotra (2014), caballero, farhi and gourinchas (2015) and eggertsson, mehrotra, singh and summers (2016). 30 see, for instance, golob (1994). |
| Peter Praet: Maintaining price stability with unconventional monetary policy measures | Period_2 | 2017-10-03 | 0.178 | indications coming from models and past empirical regularities with its own judgement. in engaging in this layer of judgemental deliberations, our intent is to come to a firm assessment of the balance between the likely efficacy of our measures and their potential costs in term of financial distortions. how do our main policy instruments work? ensuring an appropriate interest rate environment throughout the yield curve is instrumental in fostering the financing conditions that are most conducive to our objective. a central bank can seek to influence the level and shape of the yield curve by acting on two components of the long- term interest rates: the expectations component and the term premium. the expectations component reflects market expectations of the future path of the policy-controlled short-term interest rates. all else equal, a path that is lower and shallower tends to produce a lower level of the long-term yield and a flatter curve. the term premium reflects the excess return that an investor demands as a compensation for holding a bond with a long, say ten-year, residual maturity relative to rolling over a short-term bill for ten years. locking themselves into a long- dated fixed income investment for a period of time is not equivalent to rolling over a short-term investment for the same period, because holding a long-dated bond exposes the investor to the risk that interest rates may increase unexpectedly during the holding period. an unexpected increase in i… |
| Benoît Cœuré: What yield curves are telling us | Period_2 | 2018-02-01 | 0.156 | and a model-based breakdown of the yield into its two main components: the average of the current and expected future short-term interest rates over the maturity of the bond and the term premium. all series are shown as cumulative changes since the start of last year. two facts can be drawn from this chart. the first is that the recent marked flattening of the curve reflects what markets call a “bear flattening” – that is, short-term rates have been rising faster than long-term rates. this is evident from the fact that the ten-year yield – the blue solid line – today is about the same as it was a year ago. short-term interest rates, meanwhile, have risen by around 90 basis points. at face value, this would suggest that the repricing of interest rate expectations at the short end of the us curve has not been passed through to long-term rates. this interpretation is incorrect, however. indeed, and this is my second point, the broad stability of the ten-year yield masks two sharply diverging developments: a marked fall in the term premium – the yellow area – and an appreciable repricing by markets of the expected future path of short-term interest rates – the dark orange area. you can see this clearly on the slide. put simply, if it weren’t for the parallel fall in the term premium, ten-year treasuries would trade some 50 basis points above their january 2017 levels and we wouldn’t be having a discussion about flattening. us long-term yields have resisted upward pressure only… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.092 | it is therefore not surprising that uncertainty around the future path of short-term interest rates as priced by investors has increased over the past few weeks (slide 12). such a rise in uncertainty and risk premia is to be expected when the market considers it increasingly likely that inflation will meet the conditions for lift-off, without putting into question the credibility of our forward guidance. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy and the money market | Period_3 | 2022-09-15 | 0.088 | moreover, there has been a widening of the spread between short-term government bill rates and swaps with the same maturity (chart 1). this can be mainly attributed to demand/supply imbalances in the market for short-term government bills, which is partially driven by the level of excess liquidity and increased demand for short-term high-quality assets. this increased demand is also motivated by the current interest rate uncertainty and high level of volatility. these demand/supply imbalances of high- quality collateral with short-term maturities can also be observed in other jurisdictions of major central banks for similar reasons.[4] the increase of the dfr by 75 basis points to 0.75 per cent that we decided last week will only become effective with the start of the new maintenance period today. to preserve the effective transmission of last week’s rate hike by 75 basis points and safeguard the orderly functioning of money markets, the governing council also decided last week to temporarily remove the zero per cent interest rate ceiling for remunerating government deposits held with the eurosystem. until 30 april 2023, the remuneration ceiling government deposits will remain at the €str or the dfr, whichever is lower. this temporary adjustment was in recognition that the faster than initially expected pace of monetary policy normalisation gave only little time for government deposit holders to adjust and plan for alternative arrangements. the temporary adjustment allows … |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right sequence | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.087 | the experience of the past few years demonstrates, for example, that balance sheet policies have a significantly larger impact on house prices than changes in short-term policy rates, thereby contributing to the measurable rise in residential real estate prices (slide 9).6 similarly, years of balance sheet expansion have caused the bond free float in some economies to decline to very low levels (slide 10, left-hand chart). as such, an end to net asset purchases enhances the availability of safe assets that the market requires to function well (slide 10, right- hand chart).7 ending net asset purchases when inflation is robustly converging to our target also credibly underlines that our actions are solely guided by our mandate, refuting concerns about fiscal dominance. finally, in the current environment of large imported inflation, reversing the current exceptional measures has the potential to mitigate inflationary pressures even without the usual long lag in policy transmission. over the past years, these measures have contributed to large capital outflows from the euro area, thereby putting downward pressure on the euro exchange rate (slide 11). the exit from these measures can thus support the currency and, for a net importer of energy, provide tangible and immediate support to euro area households and firms by improving the terms of trade. choice of policy instruments the second aspect relates to the choice of policy instruments at different stages of the normalisation… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-12-20 | 0.080 | at its february meeting the governing council will announce the detailed parameters for reducing the app holdings. the governing council will regularly reassess the pace of the app portfolio reduction to ensure it remains consistent with the overall monetary policy strategy and stance, to preserve market functioning, and to maintain firm control over short-term money market conditions. by the end of 2023, we will also review our operational framework for steering short-term interest rates, which will provide information regarding the endpoint of the balance sheet normalisation process. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.075 | : money market rate (€str) and dfr ecb. the latest observation is for 30 september 2022. the risk-free curve the €str forward curve, which reflects the market pricing of the future path of short-term interest rates, has shifted up since december 2021. at the time of the december meeting, the €str forward curve signalled no material expectations of a rate hike throughout 2022 (chart 9), which was also reflected in the survey of monetary analysts (sma) available at the time. in line with the evolving inflation outlook and shifts in the monetary policy stance, rate expectations had already moved up sizeably by the time of our first rate hike in july, and have moved up further since.[33] as the €str curve has shifted upwards, a noticeable gap between the number of hikes reflected in market pricing and surveys has opened up. this gap can be attributed in large part to risk premia in the market pricing. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 94 | financial | 1 | 0.0923503 | financial integration | 1 | 0.9997371 |
| 94 | market | 2 | 0.0713685 | integration | 2 | 0.9995619 |
| 94 | integration | 3 | 0.0641718 | border | 3 | 0.9994742 |
| 94 | financial integration | 4 | 0.0275804 | cross border | 4 | 0.9992990 |
| 94 | cross | 5 | 0.0267695 | cross | 5 | 0.9982467 |
| 94 | border | 6 | 0.0256545 | european financial | 6 | 0.9973692 |
| 94 | cross border | 7 | 0.0205865 | payment | 7 | 0.9966670 |
| 94 | increase | 8 | 0.0152143 | integrate | 8 | 0.9964950 |
| 94 | payment | 9 | 0.0138966 | financial service | 9 | 0.9963565 |
| 94 | financial market | 10 | 0.0132885 | risk share | 10 | 0.9963202 |
| 94 | share | 11 | 0.0119708 | smooth | 11 | 0.9957036 |
| 94 | service | 12 | 0.0116667 | capital market | 12 | 0.9952675 |
| 94 | process | 13 | 0.0113626 | infrastructure | 13 | 0.9951369 |
| 94 | european | 14 | 0.0110585 | retail | 14 | 0.9950061 |
| 94 | smooth | 15 | 0.0104503 | european financial integration | 15 | 0.9947666 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: European financial integration and the management of inflation expectations by the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 2005-04-21 | 0.422 | the link between financial integration and economic growth is typically derived by first establishing the link between financial development and economic growth, and then the link between financial integration and financial development. if we were to describe it with the picture of a chain reaction, the sequence would be: financial integration positively impacts on financial development that in turn has a positive impact on economic growth. but let us look at each individual element separately. there is strong evidence to suggest that financial development, i.e. the level at which the financial system fulfils its respective functions, which i mentioned earlier, is positively linked with economic growth.3 this link is established via two main channels: financial development can lead to a more efficient allocation of capital and it can reduce the cost of capital. let me give just one example for each of the two channels. as regards the efficient allocation of capital, economic growth is spurred by the fact that in a more developed financial system, the intermediaries are more effective in dealing with problems of asymmetric information, so more funds will be allocated to more profitable projects and the productivity of the economy will increase. as regards the reduction in the cost of capital, more developed financial systems can raise the fraction of savings channelled to investment. so i now turn to the link between financial integration and financial development. the econ… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: European financial integration and the management of inflation expectations by the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 2005-04-21 | 0.418 | 2.2.2 financial institutions and the regulatory and supervisory framework given its pivotal role in channelling funds into the eu economy, a well-integrated banking sector is a prerequisite for achieving a truly single financial market. i would like to describe the degree of integration in the euro area banking sector along three dimensions: first, cross-border consolidation or ownership; second, magnitude of cross-border activities; and, third, cross-border competition (i.e. the price component), where i would like to look at aspects of retail banking. as regards the integration in ownership of euro area banks, banking consolidation has mainly taken place at the domestic level, and it witnessed peaks in the late 1990s when around 80% of all m&as in the eu banking sector involved domestic banks only. however, between 1999 and 2001 in particular, cross-border banking consolidation increased in both absolute and relative terms. as regards cross-border activity of banks in the euro area, cross-border holdings of securities and inter-bank loans have experienced substantial growth. for example, at the end of 2003, around 45% of the securities issued by non-banks were held cross-border, twice as many as five years earlier. around 25% of all interbank loans were granted cross-border, also up from around 20% in 1998. in contrast, cross-border loans to non-banks remained unchanged and low at less than 5% of all loans to non-banks. this brings me to a third indicator of banking inte… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The process of economic, monetary and financial integration in Europe | Period_1 | 2006-12-04 | 0.409 | result of domestic mergers; only in the last couple of years have cross-border banking mergers started to take place. in this respect, a number of euro area banks have considerably expanded their interests outside the euro area. however, in general, cross-border activity within the euro area has remained relatively limited, even though it is gaining in importance. this trend is expected to continue, thereby increasing the level of competition and efficiency in the euro area financial system. but further work is needed in order to achieve the goal of a single market in financial services. to this end, the ecb and the eurosystem are actively involved in several initiatives that will help foster financial integration, five of which i would like to highlight. first, the launch of target2 – the new payment platform for the financial system – is planned for the end of 2007. second, we are participating in the short-term european paper (step) initiative to promote the convergence of better market standards and practices in the european short-term securities markets. third, at the end of 2005, we contributed to the european commission’s green paper on mortgage credit in the eu. this is an important segment of the banking and retail markets, with an outstanding volume of more than €4 trillion in residential mortgage debt in the eu, corresponding to around 40% of eu gdp. fourth, the project for a single european payment area under which all banking transactions conducted across the … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Two successes of the euro - the single monetary policy and European financial integration | Period_1 | 2006-05-19 | 0.397 | as a second measure of the euro’s success in fostering financial integration, i would like to mention the work of “the institutions behind the euro”, namely the ecb and the whole eurosystem, which provide numerous contributions to european financial integration. overall, we are of the view that financial integration is first and foremost a market-driven process. in addition to this, we see it as a basic task of public authorities to create a framework that is conducive to fostering financial integration. in this respect, the ecb has defined four kinds of activity with which the ecb and the eurosystem contribute to this process: (1) we try to enhance knowledge and raise awareness of the state of and need for european financial integration, and we measure the progress made – the most obvious example in this respect is the launch of our regular monitoring on the basis of quantitative indicators of financial integration in the euro area, which i mentioned earlier; (2) we act as a catalyst for private sector activities by facilitating collective action and assisting with possible coordination problems; (3) we provide central banking services that also foster european financial integration; and (4) we provide advice on the legislative and regulatory framework for the european financial system. let me now also give some concrete examples of the latter three kinds of activity. we can assume the crucial role of acting as a catalyst for market participants’ activities due to the fac… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: European financial integration and the management of inflation expectations by the European Central Bank | Period_1 | 2005-04-21 | 0.390 | 2.1 why financial integration should be pursued as we all know, financial systems - composed of financial institutions, markets and the infrastructure - serve some basic purposes: among other things, to trade, hedge, diversify and pool risk, to allocate resources and to mobilise savings. these functions determine the economic benefits that can be derived from financial integration. two widely accepted economic benefits of financial integration are: the better sharing and diversification of risk and the potential for higher economic growth. let me explain this in more detail. financial integration increases the opportunities to share risk and smooth consumption over time. the increase in the available set of financial instruments resulting from financial integration, as well as the increased cross-ownership of assets, offers additional possibilities to the agents to diversify portfolios and share idiosyncratic risk across regions.1 as we know from theory, when risk is fully shared in an area, a co-movement in consumption results between agents belonging to different regions of that same area, while consumption does not co-move with region-specific shocks. the evidence suggests that consumption growth rates in the euro area are less correlated than are gdp growth rates, which means that the opportunities to share risk could still be further exploited in the euro area, thereby creating opportunities for further economic benefits from enhanced financial integration.2 let me no… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Heterogeneity and the European Central Bank’s monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-04-02 | 0.288 | let me take each aspect in turn, starting with financial integration. european capital markets indeed appeared to be becoming more integrated, and hence provided for increased cross-border risk-sharing, before 2008. you can see this clearly on my next slide, which shows a composite indicator of euro area financial integration produced by the ecb. but since the crisis broke, integration has reversed. it currently stands at 0.2 on a scale where zero represents full fragmentation. as a result, cross-border risk-sharing in the euro area is almost non-existent. on my next slide you can see that, currently, around 80% of a country-specific output shock remains unsmoothed, while in the united states it is at most 40% for a state-specific shock.4 3 / 14 |
| Vítor Constâncio: Monetary policy and the European recovery | Period_2 | 2015-06-02 | 0.259 | others are booming. it is understood that the high degree of effective risk-sharing in the u.s. is essential in making it a successful monetary union. 3 there are three main mechanisms whereby risk-sharing can take place between member states in an economic area. first, countries can share risk via cross-ownership of productive assets, a mechanism facilitated by developed capital markets. second, a system of taxes and transfers can serve as a vehicle for further income smoothing. third, member states can smooth consumption by adjusting their asset portfolios, for example, by lending and borrowing in international credit markets. the u.s. have traditionally been characterised by a very high degree of income and consumption smoothing across states that has only been increasing over time. the available evidence suggests that about 75% of income shocks in individual states are smoothed, with 13% smoothed by the federal tax-transfer and grant system, 39% smoothed by insurance or cross-ownership of productive assets, and 23% smoothed by borrowing or lending. in other words, 62% of state-specific shocks in the u.s. are smoothed through market transactions, almost five times the contribution of the federal government to income smoothing. 4 with comparatively less developed financial markets and more rigid labour markets, with low mobility of labour, and an absent federal system of taxes and transfers similar to that in the u.s., pre-euro europe exhibited much lower levels of risk-… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Presentation of the ECB Annual Report 2014 to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2015-04-23 | 0.187 | are well allocated and used productively. in this regard, the capital markets union agenda can also make an important contribution. a capital markets union has great potential – but only if pursued with ambition the commission intends to establish the main building blocks of a capital markets union (cmu) in the current legislative period. from our perspective, such a project, if comprehensive and well designed, could indeed bring significant benefits to the eu. cmu is a means of enhancing the integration of capital markets and making that integration more robust. integrated capital markets can strengthen financial stability by increasing private risk sharing, thereby facilitating the absorption of shocks throughout the eu. at the same time, well-functioning capital markets facilitate the transmission of our monetary policy. financial integration therefore features prominently in the eurosystem’s mission statement. cmu is also an agenda for an increase in the diversity and size of capital markets through the further development of certain market segments. deeper and more diverse capital markets provide alternative sources of funding. for example, financing tools could be developed to better account for the specific needs of small and medium-sized enterprises, infrastructure projects or long-term financing. moreover, the reduction of the economy’s dependence on bank financing would widen the set of tools available for the conduct of monetary policy. however, there is a real … |
| Vítor Constâncio: Effectiveness of Monetary Union and the Capital Markets Union | Period_2 | 2017-04-10 | 0.181 | risk-sharing via cross-border ownership of assets increased substantially following the introduction of the euro, smoothing between 30% and 40% of country-specific shocks to gdp by the mid-2000s. but the contribution of capital markets declined substantially during the financial and especially during the sovereign debt crisis. the contribution of credit markets has been lower, and it even became negative during the financial crisis when european banking sector was particularly hit. in the absence of a european supra-national system of taxes and transfers, it is more pressing than ever to boost europe’s risk-sharing potential through financial market mechanisms. the risk-sharing benefits of integrated financial markets could in principle be large. another major benefit of the cmu is the contribution to convergent growth among member countries, resulting from the improved circulation and allocation of savings across the union. in this perspective, brexit makes it more crucial that the cmu is effectively implemented and that european growth can avail itself of the services of an integrated financial system. this is particularly true of a cmu focused on stimulating equity financing. indeed, equity and foreign direct investment (fdi), and longer-maturity debt in general, are leading to a more resilient form of financial integration. deeper equity markets constitute an unquestionable advantage to the us, notably in relation to the role of venture capital in promoting innovation…. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Monetary policy and the European recovery | Period_2 | 2015-06-02 | 0.157 | they are active in the market. this level-playing field would contribute to stimulate cross- border risk-taking between eu member states. a final point to underline is that despite other positive effects stemming from greater financial diversification and market-based finance, more financial integration can also entail financial stability risks. it can exacerbate the size and speed of contagion. in addition, the “push” towards market-based financing may lead to the build-up of risks in this part of the economy, typically less regulated and lacking information. this brings me back to the importance of an effective macro-prudential supervision and regulation, i.e. one that considers all systemically important financial entities and activities. in order to make cmu a success with stronger capital markets and deeper cross-border financial integration in bank- and market-based financing, we need to further strengthen the european macro-prudential framework. |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.104 | as regards the digital economy, the ecb will continue to support and contribute to the g20 initiative to make international payments faster, cheaper, safer and more inclusive. this requires improvements in various areas, including the interoperability of payment systems and exchanging data across borders. and several legal issues need to be resolved, such as aligning cross-border regulatory, supervisory and oversight frameworks. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.085 | spillovers the deeply integrated nature of the global economy implies that our analysis needs to incorporate international monetary policy spillovers. for instance, changes in the interest rate locally affects domestic consumption and investment, which in turn affects the demand for imports from trading partners, and hence output abroad (“demand channel”). via the financial channel, changes in the interest rates of major central banks can propagate across borders via asset price spillovers to bond yields, corporate earnings expectations and financial risk premia. since the bulk of cross-border capital flows are denominated in us dollar, as the us dollar plays a dominant role, and as us monetary policy is a key driver of the global financial cycle, us interest rate changes have more pronounced repercussions on the rest of the world, including the euro area. [22] this is also reflected in ecb staff analysis, which indicates that a fed tightening elicits large contractionary effects on real activity and eventually inflation in the euro area. these contractionary effects are, in fact, as large as the domestic effects in the united states.[23] overall, given the open nature of the euro area economy, cross-border channels are crucial in evaluating how our policy stance transmits to the euro area, while also influencing global economic and financial conditions. |
| Luis de Guindos: Presentation of the European Central Bank annual report 2021 | Period_3 | 2022-05-04 | 0.072 | 2 see feedback on the input provided by the european parliament as part of its resolution on the ecb annual report 2020. 3 see ecb (2022), “financial integration and structure in the euro area”, april. 4 see bongini, p., ferrando, a., rossi, e. and rossolini, m. (2021), “sme access to market-based finance across eurozone countries”, small business economics, vol. 56, pp. 1667-1697; and hsu, p., tian, x. and xu, y. (2014), “financial development and innovation: cross-country evidence”, journal of financial economics, vol. 112, no 1, pp. 116-135. 4/4 |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.068 |
|
| Luis de Guindos: Presentation of the European Central Bank annual report 2021 | Period_3 | 2022-05-04 | 0.064 | assets. commodity markets have been the main transmission channel for stress up to now. elevated commodity prices increase financial stability concerns associated with high inflation and low growth. furthermore, the extreme volatility of prices has led to some stress in commodity derivatives markets, although there has been no major incident so far. financial institutions have limited net exposures on commodity derivatives and banks acting as clearing members are generally safeguarded by robust credit-risk management frameworks. bigger net exposures are held by energy producers and suppliers, commodity traders, as well as energy-dependent firms who use commodity derivatives to hedge their core business risk. the significant drop in outstanding contracts suggests that these entities might be scaling down this hedging activity. therefore, further episodes of high volatility in commodity prices could adversely affect their operational capacity and thereby exacerbate tensions in the supply of commodities. the importance of a strong, resilient and well-integrated financial sector in the eu sound financial regulation and integration have allowed europe to manage the turbulence caused by the russian invasion. underpinned by regulatory and supervisory reforms, financial integration in the eu has not only enhanced the resilience of our economy and financial sector, but also improved our ability to act together. close collaboration in various aspects of eu decision-making allowed eu… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 95 | balance | 1 | 0.1399586 | sheet | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 95 | sheet | 2 | 0.1050766 | balance sheet | 2 | 0.9996496 |
| 95 | balance sheet | 3 | 0.1017413 | bank balance | 3 | 0.9994742 |
| 95 | bank | 4 | 0.0776992 | balance | 4 | 0.9994741 |
| 95 | credit | 5 | 0.0361466 | bank balance sheet | 5 | 0.9992114 |
| 95 | bank balance | 6 | 0.0214156 | repair | 6 | 0.9980725 |
| 95 | bank balance sheet | 7 | 0.0207207 | ecb balance | 7 | 0.9980710 |
| 95 | assessment | 8 | 0.0193310 | ecb balance sheet | 8 | 0.9978519 |
| 95 | increase | 9 | 0.0123824 | comprehensive assessment | 9 | 0.9974154 |
| 95 | size | 10 | 0.0122434 | deleveraging | 10 | 0.9969773 |
| 95 | measure | 11 | 0.0097419 | central bank balance | 11 | 0.9969308 |
| 95 | result | 12 | 0.0091860 | size | 12 | 0.9968435 |
| 95 | repair | 13 | 0.0087691 | constraint | 13 | 0.9967574 |
| 95 | constraint | 14 | 0.0082132 | credit | 14 | 0.9966638 |
| 95 | comprehensive | 15 | 0.0080743 | comprehensive | 15 | 0.9964944 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jürgen Stark: Issues paper for the conference “The financial crisis and its consequences for the world economy” | Period_1 | 2008-12-16 | 0.126 | the o&d business model of financial intermediation should not disappear but it should become more transparent. it should also be considered whether the originator should always keep a certain percentage of an offloaded credit package on the own balance sheet. in order to increase the capital buffers that banks need to hold with regard to illiquid structured products and off-balance sheet activities, the capital adequacy provisions within the basel ii framework should be also enhanced in these areas. |
| Jean Claude-Trichet: Hearing at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-12-28 | 0.119 | financial stability i would now like to share with you our assessment of the financial stability situation, as described in the recent financial stability review. i will discuss briefly the role of financial institutions and supervisory authorities in coping with the present financial market correction. with financial systems undergoing a process of de-leveraging and re-intermediation, uncertainty surrounding the financial stability outlook for the euro area has heightened and may persist until it becomes clearer how the potential balance sheet effects of the turbulence will be spread across individual financial institutions. clarity is also needed concerning liquidity commitments to off-balance sheet vehicles, and the magnitude of assets that may be re-intermediated back onto the balance sheets of euro area financial institutions. the process of improving clarity, which started when q3 2007 financial statements became available, will be advanced further when institutions publish their annual audited accounts for 2007 as a whole. |
| Lucas Papademos: Tackling the financial crisis - policies for stability and recovery | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.103 | additional measures to support the asset side of banks’ balance sheets it may be necessary, however, in order to safeguard banking sector stability and restore an adequate flow of credit to the economy,, that these measures, which were aimed at supporting the liability side of banks’ balance sheets be complemented in certain cases by additional measures designed to support the asset side. various approaches have been considered, ranging notably from (i) asset removal schemes involving the removal of the “problem” assets from the balance sheets, through direct government purchases or by transferring them to “bad banks” or asset management vehicles; to (ii) asset insurance schemes that limit the valuation losses of impaired assets by invoking a government guarantee while keeping them on the balance sheets of institutions concerned, and (iii) including various hybrid schemes that combine features of asset insurance and asset removal. the appropriate design and the effective implementation of asset support measures require addressing a number of complex issues. past experience and the assessment of alternative schemes on the basis of a number of criteria, suggest that there is no single approach that would be uniformly superior independently of the circumstances of the financial institutions concerned. rather, the measures would need to be designed on a case-by-case basis and in a pragmatic manner. in fact, hybrid schemes have often been chosen as the most appropriate. the cho… |
| Lucas Papademos: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2008 to the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2009-04-23 | 0.087 | financial stability and supervision let me now focus on the financial sector and issues related to its regulation and supervision. the synchronised deceleration in activity in all economies has added to the stresses on the financial system in europe and the euro area. the weakening of economic activity has impaired the quality of bank loans, which has adversely affected banks’ capital positions. as financial institutions continue to deleverage their balance sheets, they reduce their securities holdings and tighten the credit standards applied to new loans. this feeds back to the real economy and in turn constrains the ability of the private sector to service its debts. therefore, there are emerging signs of a negative feedback loop between the real economy and the banking sector. initially, the banking system in europe faced the financial turmoil with solvency positions generally well above regulatory minimum requirements, following several years of strong profitability. however, as the financial market tensions intensified in the autumn of 2008, banks’ balance sheets came under significant pressure, as the values of structured finance products declined further, securitisation activity came to a virtual standstill, credit losses started to rise and income from fees and commissions as well as trading dropped. as a result, the banking sector has been facing significant challenges. for example, the declared cumulated write-downs and credit-market losses of european banks so f… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Overview of recent euro area developments and the effects of globalisation on prices and real estate | Period_1 | 2008-01-11 | 0.083 | financial stability i would now like to share with you our assessment of the financial stability situation, as described in the recent financial stability review. i will discuss briefly the role of financial institutions and supervisory authorities in coping with the present financial market correction. with financial systems undergoing a process of de-leveraging and re-intermediation, uncertainty surrounding the financial stability outlook for the euro area has heightened and may persist until it becomes clear how the potential balance sheet effects of the turbulence will be spread across individual financial institutions. clarity is also needed concerning liquidity commitments to off-balance sheet vehicles, and the magnitude of assets that may be |
| Peter Praet: Current issues of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2014-07-04 | 0.296 | does such ample provision of liquidity pose risks to financial stability? that being said, monetary policy needs to be aware of the potential implications that a protracted period of monetary accommodation may have for financial stability. there are two major risks: first, postponement in bank balance sheet repair; and second, bubbles in asset prices. the first risk is that cheap funding allows banks to back-load the deleveraging of their balance sheets. after a financial crisis, banks have to undergo a thorough clean-up. otherwise, they may continue to roll over legacy loans, thus restricting the resources available for new lending in support of the real economy – so-called “ever-greening”.3 this risk is being countered through the ecb’s on-going comprehensive assessment of banks’ balance sheets – consisting of the asset quality review and a stress test – which will be |
| Peter Praet: Interview in De Tijd and L’Echo | Period_2 | 2014-10-28 | 0.253 | what is your view of the new belgian government’s plans? now that i have a european mandate, i am, in a manner of speaking, no longer a belgian. in theory, i can take a neutral standpoint. but nobody will believe that i’m no longer a belgian. i still read belgian newspapers and also take a professional interest in belgium. i am a displaced european. i look at belgium as i would at any other country. belgium has used the small fiscal margin cautiously. just as for other countries, it’s good to announce all reforms at the start of the cabinet term and then to implement them properly. what is your general assessment of the results? are they better or worse than you expected? given that banks since july 2013, in the run-up to the publication of the results of the comprehensive assessment, have already taken more than 200 bln in balance sheet repairing measures, the result is more or less what was to be expected. at the same time, this test is only a very good first step and the results will be taken into consideration in the day-to-day supervision which the ecb will conduct as of 4 november. will the test be sufficient the restore trust in the banks? was the adverse scenario of the stress test sufficiently severe? the inflation in 2014 is much lower than the stress test assumes and a deflation scenario was not tested. a deflation scenario is not an explicit part of the test and we do not expect it to happen. but the adverse scenario of the stress test does include inflation ve… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy in a prolonged period of low inflation | Period_2 | 2014-05-26 | 0.252 | calibrating the policy response what is the right policy response to these developments? essentially, we are confronting three issues that might warrant a response. first, the common effect of exogenous factors, including the exchange rate, on euro area inflation. second, the asymmetric effect of endogenous developments, such as tight access to credit for parts and sectors of the euro area. and third, the risk that those effects combine to generate a more persistent regime of excessively low inflation. let me elaborate on those three issues. first, to the extent that developments in the exchange rate, money or capital markets result in an unwarranted tightening of monetary and financial conditions, this would require adjustment of our conventional instruments, so as to secure the degree of monetary accommodation intended by the governing council. at the other end of the spectrum would be a too prolonged downward departure of inflation and/or inflation expectations from our projected baseline scenario, for example due to the interaction between exchange rate developments and medium-term inflation expectations as i explained earlier. this would call for a more expansionary stance, which would be the context for a broad-based asset purchase programme. an intermediate situation is one where credit supply constraints interfere with the transmission of monetary policy and impair the effects of our intended monetary stance. this would require targeted measures to help alleviate c… |
| Mario Draghi: Bank restructuring and the economic recovery | Period_2 | 2014-03-14 | 0.244 | conclusion ladies and gentlemen, i can summarise what i said tonight in a few words: the comprehensive assessment of bank balance sheets, which we initiated last year, is a bank-level supervisory exercise ahead of the start of the operations of the single supervisory mechanism. but it also has significant macroeconomic consequences and, as such, forms an integral part of the strategy for the recovery of the euro area. in fact, just the prospect of the comprehensive assessment has already caused banks to raise new capital and to shed non-core or non-profitable exposures. this is very welcome: corrective action does not need to wait until the end of our comprehensive assessment. it is to everybody’s benefit that it takes place pre-emptively. in this way, i believe that we are already starting to witness some of the positive effects of frontloading bank balance sheet adjustment. i expect that we will see those effects gradually strengthen over the year, including in the form of a better transmission of our monetary policy impulse. in turn, i expect the necessary process of creative destruction to gain pace. |
| Peter Praet: Monetary policy and balance sheet adjustment | Period_2 | 2014-05-28 | 0.223 | balance sheet restructuring previous crises have shown that prompt and decisive balance sheet repair after a period of excessive credit growth is the best way to restore sustainable growth. 1 post-recession growth may not even be significantly weaker than normal if the overleveraged financial sector aggressively cuts back excess credit in the recovery phase. 2 like balance sheet imbalances, structural impediments to growth and to an efficient allocation of resources are generally very relevant for the conduct of monetary policy and need to be tackled decisively. trying to stimulate growth through standard aggregate demand policies may be ineffective and, under certain circumstances, even counterproductive in balance sheet recessions, when structural breaks on potential growth predominate. 3 it is for this reason that the changes to euro area and eu governance introduced in response to the crisis are so important and need to be implemented with determination. the reforms undertaken in many stressed countries, especially those benefiting from official external assistance, should eventually lay the foundations for a robust recovery. most importantly, the steps being taken to create a banking union should help to address existing balance sheet problems. the initial focus is on banks’ balance sheets. the comprehensive assessment of their balance sheets currently being done by the ecb is a critical element. thousands of supervisors are carefully scrutinising the books of the eur… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.155 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.154 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.134 | but the natural rate of interest is particularly hard to estimate at the moment, not least because the pandemic has scrambled all the typical models used to calculate it. all we can say with confidence is that the natural rate of interest has declined significantly compared with the period before the global financial crisis and that estimates are imprecise and widely dispersed. as such, they cannot serve as an actual guide for policy. the picture is further clouded when it comes to the “normal” size and composition of the central bank’s balance sheet. it is unlikely that the prevailing size and composition prior to the global financial crisis are still valid benchmarks – we can surmise that the optimal balance sheet is different in size and composition today. but there has so far been little empirical work in this area[6], so it cannot serve as an actual guide for policy either. this uncertainty means we should think about normalisation in terms of changes in the degree of accommodation we are providing based on the medium-term inflation outlook, rather than the distance of our policy tools from their unobservable theoretical levels. so, if we were to see shocks that would lead to the medium-term inflation path being revised upwards, we would change our policy stance to reduce accommodation more rapidly – and vice versa – so as to keep inflation on target over the medium term. |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.094 | normal does not mean theoretical second, the normalisation process should not be assessed against unobservable reference points, such as the natural (or neutral) rate of interest[3] and some optimal or “normal” size and composition of the central bank’s balance sheet in the long run. these concepts are only vague guideposts at the best of times, and they are particularly fraught with uncertainty in the current environment. before the pandemic, the real natural rate of interest for the euro area was estimated to range from just over 0% to less than -2%, depending on the model used.[4] in fact, proxies of real rates are already at the higher end of that range – for instance, the one-year forward real rate nine years ahead [5] recently increased significantly, reaching 0%. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right sequence | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.093 | the experience of the past few years demonstrates, for example, that balance sheet policies have a significantly larger impact on house prices than changes in short-term policy rates, thereby contributing to the measurable rise in residential real estate prices (slide 9).6 similarly, years of balance sheet expansion have caused the bond free float in some economies to decline to very low levels (slide 10, left-hand chart). as such, an end to net asset purchases enhances the availability of safe assets that the market requires to function well (slide 10, right- hand chart).7 ending net asset purchases when inflation is robustly converging to our target also credibly underlines that our actions are solely guided by our mandate, refuting concerns about fiscal dominance. finally, in the current environment of large imported inflation, reversing the current exceptional measures has the potential to mitigate inflationary pressures even without the usual long lag in policy transmission. over the past years, these measures have contributed to large capital outflows from the euro area, thereby putting downward pressure on the euro exchange rate (slide 11). the exit from these measures can thus support the currency and, for a net importer of energy, provide tangible and immediate support to euro area households and firms by improving the terms of trade. choice of policy instruments the second aspect relates to the choice of policy instruments at different stages of the normalisation… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 96 | transmission | 1 | 0.1346529 | transmission mechanism | 1 | 0.9996494 |
| 96 | mechanism | 2 | 0.0593531 | transmission | 2 | 0.9995617 |
| 96 | channel | 3 | 0.0593531 | policy transmission | 3 | 0.9994742 |
| 96 | economy | 4 | 0.0428472 | monetary policy transmission | 4 | 0.9992990 |
| 96 | transmission mechanism | 5 | 0.0315250 | mechanism | 5 | 0.9987286 |
| 96 | policy transmission | 6 | 0.0298880 | impulse | 6 | 0.9986858 |
| 96 | monetary policy transmission | 7 | 0.0270233 | channel | 7 | 0.9986408 |
| 96 | financial | 8 | 0.0252500 | monetary transmission | 8 | 0.9983780 |
| 96 | affect | 9 | 0.0229310 | policy transmission mechanism | 9 | 0.9981589 |
| 96 | impulse | 10 | 0.0147462 | transmit | 10 | 0.9980725 |
| 96 | transmit | 11 | 0.0142006 | transmission channel | 11 | 0.9980282 |
| 96 | condition | 12 | 0.0132457 | policy impulse | 12 | 0.9973701 |
| 96 | effectiveness | 13 | 0.0124272 | impair | 13 | 0.9969336 |
| 96 | real | 14 | 0.0118815 | monetary policy impulse | 14 | 0.9969314 |
| 96 | time | 15 | 0.0110631 | effectiveness | 15 | 0.9966692 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-03-22 | 0.173 | monetary policy transmission in the euro area and the us in my remarks today i would also like to discuss differences and similarities in the transmission of monetary policy in the euro area and the us. optimal monetary-policy actions depend on the nature of the shocks hitting the economy, the present and future expected economic environment and, importantly, on the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy actions. these elements have a precise bearing on comparative exercises highlighting parallels and differences between monetary policies in different currency areas. for example, in order to compare the monetary policy decisions of the federal reserve and the european central bank, we must analyse, among other things, the structure of the economies in which they are operating, because economic structures and institutions determine the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanisms and, therefore, indirectly influence the design of policy. is the monetary transmission mechanism in the united states significantly different from that of the euro area? applied economics has approached this question from two different angles: statistical and structural analysis. statistical analysis has studied the business cycle properties of aggregate data, such as gdp and inflation for the us and the euro area. by applying a battery of statistical tests, this approach seeks to assess whether macroeconomic time series display similar or different dynamic patterns over the cycl… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Three questions on monetary policy easing | Period_1 | 2009-03-10 | 0.142 | expectations about economic and financial conditions, more than would be justified by the facts. over recent months the deterioration in economic conditions, as reflected by the sharp fall in all leading indicators, and the rapid decrease in inflation, has created room for fast and substantial cuts in interest rates. the ecb has cut its key policy rate by 275 basis points since october last year. it has done so with unprecedented moves, including one move taken outside the regular monetary policy meetings. but it has also done so within its traditional monetary policy framework, in order to provide market participants with the appropriate analytical anchor to understand its decisions. another issue to take into account is the transmission of the easing impulse of monetary policy to the rest of the economy. it is not sufficient that the policy rate is reduced to ensure that monetary conditions are eased accordingly; the stance of monetary policy has to be measured also on the basis of overall financing conditions. the monetary transmission mechanism might be impaired, in particular because of financial instability or problems incurred by the banking sector. under these circumstances, it is not sufficient to ease monetary policy by lowering official interest rates. measures aimed at improving the transmission of the monetary impulse to the rest of the economy need to be implemented, in order to affect the interest rates that are really relevant for borrowing and lending. imp… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: The challenges facing monetary policy | Period_1 | 2011-01-27 | 0.139 | the monetary policy transmission mechanism the fourth challenge concerns the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the face of financial turmoil, particularly with regard to sovereign debts. this challenge is particularly acute in the euro area, where, unlike in the rest of the world, money is separate from public budgets. in the euro area, the public debt problems created by the crisis cannot be inflated away. the treaty rules it out. the conduct of the ecb rules it out. the other method of adjustment is the consolidation of public finances via a primary budget surplus that helps stabilise and then reduce the weight of public debt on gdp. in all countries this objective must be achieved, not only in the euro area. financial markets assess the risks associated with such adjustments to public finances, and the possibility that governments fail to implement them. in this case, a credit risk is taken into |
| Jürgen Stark: Main challenges for monetary policy in a globalised world | Period_1 | 2008-03-31 | 0.127 |
|
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary stability and financial integration in Europe | Period_1 | 2005-05-19 | 0.123 | have direct implications for the transmission of monetary policy impulses. the degree of financial integration is important in determining how effectively this transmission will work in practice. for example, it cannot be ruled out that single monetary policy decisions may sometimes be channelled to countries in a non-uniform manner on account of the fact that the financial system of the euro area – that is, financial institutions, markets and the infrastructure – are not yet fully integrated in all aspects. this brings me to the second part of my address: european financial integration. |
| Peter Praet: Current issues of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2014-07-04 | 0.145 | economies. in spain in particular we observe a large discrepancy between the actual and the counterfactual scenario for loans extended to the manufacturing sector. second, lending rates have not declined in line with improvements in financial markets. lending conditions for smes remain particularly challenging in spain and italy. customers in these countries face sustained high bank lending rates for small loans, standing on average between one and two percentage points above comparable rates in germany. while these lending rates reflect credit risk, which has increased in these economies, this is not entirely a passive variable. indeed, lending rates can themselves become a propagator and amplifier of economic distress. on a macroeconomic level, borrower’s credit risk is endogenous. it depends on macroeconomic outcomes and, crucially, on the prevailing lending rate itself. high lending rates contribute to higher loan delinquencies; and in equilibrium, higher delinquencies justify high lending rates ex post. the result may be a mutually reinforcing spiral of high lending rates, high credit risk and poor macroeconomic outcomes. we see some signs of this: borrowers with similar risk profile are being charged higher lending rates if located in a stressed country, pointing to the continued impairment of the bank lending channel in these countries. to sum up, bank credit flows to firms – particularly small ones – are disappointing. there is always a lag between corporate bank f… |
| Benoît Cœuré: The monetary policy of the European Central Bank | Period_2 | 2012-03-27 | 0.143 | monetary policy transmission let me briefly elaborate on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. you can see here on slide 2 why the monetary transmission mechanism is so important for central banks. the ecb has a statutory objective of price stability, which has been defined as a year-on-year positive inflation rate below 2%. within that range, the governing council aims at an inflation rate not too far from 2%. we say: “an inflation rate below, but close to, 2%”. however, in order to exert an influence on agents’ decisions which affect prices and inflation, the ecb has to start from the top of this chart and try to reach out to the bottom. the path that connects the two extremes – starting from the policy interest rate that the ecb controls through its monetary policy operations – is long and convoluted. this is the transmission mechanism: a long and uncertain chain of events during which various asset prices react to actions taken by the ecb – on the top layer of decisions in this chart – to change the overnight rate at which banks lend to each other in the money market. long-term interest rates form important links in this chain. aggregate demand is a function of credit market conditions, and credit market conditions are a function of medium to long-term interest rates: interest rates on mortgages, on non-financial corporations’ loans funding long- term investment projects, and so on. the interest rate channel of monetary policy is the specific transmission path… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges to monetary policy in 2012 | Period_2 | 2011-12-15 | 0.131 |
|
| Mario Draghi: How central banks meet the challenge of low inflation | Period_2 | 2016-02-05 | 0.127 | transmitting the stance the first relates to monetary policy transmission. many central banks have faced impairments in the transmission process during the crisis – that is why, for example, the fed began intervening in markets for mortgage-backed securities, or the bank of england launched its funding-for-lending programme. but it is clear that those impairments have been more severe in the euro area. and moreover, they have had a distinct regional dimension that was not visible in other jurisdictions. |
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.124 | clearly, the three factors i have discussed are not mutually exclusive. so it is crucial that we gain a much deeper understanding of their relevance and interactions in order to draw appropriate conclusions for how we conduct our monetary policy. as part of this, we need to understand how they might have interacted with monetary policy approaching the lower bound. this brings me to the final area i would like to discuss today: monetary policy transmission and effectiveness. monetary policy transmission and effectiveness as monetary policy everywhere has approached the lower bound, all major central banks have faced questions about their policy space and the traction of their tools on the economy. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.162 |
|
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.136 | in recognition of the strategic importance of protecting the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the december 2021 monetary policy statement affirmed: “within our mandate, under stressed conditions, flexibility will remain an element of monetary policy whenever threats to monetary policy transmission jeopardise the attainment of price stability.” in addition to this general recognition of the value of flexibility under stressed conditions, the monetary policy statement also noted that, even after the end of net purchases under the pepp at the end of march 2022, the accumulated pepp portfolio can play a stabilising role: “/n particular, in the event of renewed market fragmentation related to the pandemic, pepp reinvestments can be adjusted flexibly across time, asset classes and jurisdictions at any time.” |
| Christine Lagarde: Price stability and policy transmission in the euro area | Period_3 | 2022-06-29 | 0.126 | transmitting the policy stance for these changes in our monetary policy stance to be effective, we need to preserve the orderly transmission of our stance throughout the euro area. the ecb is conducting monetary policy in an incomplete monetary union, in which its policy has to be transmitted through 19 different financial and sovereign bond markets. the yields on those sovereign bonds provide the benchmark for pricing all other private sector assets in the 19 member states – and ultimately also for ensuring that our monetary policy impulse reaches individual firms and households. if spreads in some countries respond in a rapid and disorderly way to an underlying change in risk-free rates, over and above what would be justified by economic fundamentals, our capacity to deliver a single monetary policy is impeded. in this situation, a change in the policy stance can be followed by an asymmetric response of financing conditions, regardless of the credit risk of individual borrowers. in such conditions – when we have what we describe as unwarranted fragmentation – preserving policy transmission is a precondition for returning inflation to our target. the normalisation of our monetary policy will naturally lead to rising risk-free rates and sovereign yields. and, as euro area sovereigns are starting from different fiscal positions, it can also lead to a rise in spreads. but in order to preserve the orderly transmission of our policy stance throughout the euro area, we need to … |
| Christine Lagarde: Price stability and policy transmission in the euro area | Period_3 | 2022-06-29 | 0.117 | governing council. the new instrument will have to be effective, while being proportionate and containing sufficient safeguards to preserve the impetus of member states towards a sound fiscal policy. this decision lies squarely within the ecb’s tradition. in the past, the ecb has made use of separate instruments to target inflation and to preserve the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. measures to preserve transmission could be used at any level of interest rates – so long as they were designed not to interfere with the monetary policy stance. at times when inflation fell too low, it made sense to shift from “separation” to “combination” so that all tools reinforced the required policy easing. that is why, for example, we linked asset purchases tightly to forward guidance on rates. but with high inflation now being the main challenge, there are merits in separating policy tools again. preserving policy transmission throughout the euro area will allow rates to rise as far as necessary. in this sense, there is no trade-off between launching this new tool and adopting the necessary policy stance to stabilise inflation at our target. in fact, one enables the other. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.110 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 97 | country | 1 | 0.0648555 | italy | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 97 | government | 2 | 0.0323676 | france | 2 | 0.9996495 |
| 97 | italy | 3 | 0.0304959 | greece | 3 | 0.9992991 |
| 97 | france | 4 | 0.0271535 | spain | 4 | 0.9991239 |
| 97 | greece | 5 | 0.0256828 | portugal | 5 | 0.9990361 |
| 97 | spain | 6 | 0.0255492 | greek | 6 | 0.9987288 |
| 97 | europe | 7 | 0.0244796 | ireland | 7 | 0.9985105 |
| 97 | germany | 8 | 0.0220731 | italian | 8 | 0.9978084 |
| 97 | portugal | 9 | 0.0169927 | netherlands | 9 | 0.9972834 |
| 97 | european | 10 | 0.0155220 | trichet | 10 | 0.9964954 |
| 97 | ireland | 11 | 0.0153883 | slovenia | 11 | 0.9962757 |
| 97 | situation | 12 | 0.0152546 | belgium | 12 | 0.9962279 |
| 97 | time | 13 | 0.0148535 | germany | 13 | 0.9962262 |
| 97 | greek | 14 | 0.0148535 | french | 14 | 0.9957053 |
| 97 | reform | 15 | 0.0147198 | election | 15 | 0.9956157 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview in Der Spiegel | Period_1 | 2010-05-19 | 0.286 | spiegel: mr trichet, how have you been sleeping these last few days? trichet: i always sleep well! spiegel: not had any nightmares? trichet: no. spiegel: nevertheless, the financial world has changed since the weekend before last. the countries of the euro area have put together a previously unimaginable rescue package with a value of over €700 billion in order to save reeling member states from default. even your institution has relented on a few of its firmest principles and now intends to purchase even poorly rated government bonds. trichet: no, we have not relented on our principles. price stability is our primary mandate and compass. that being said, it is clear that since september 2008 we have been facing the most difficult situation since the second world war – perhaps even since the first world war. we have experienced – and are experiencing – truly dramatic times. spiegel: that’s been evident from the way that you and others have been behaving over the last few days. trichet: at times like these, you have to keep your composure and analyse the situation as lucidly as possible. back in august 2007, we were the first major institution in the world to correctly judge what was happening on the capital markets with the start of the turbulence. and we reacted swiftly. spiegel: what exactly happened between thursday and sunday of the week before last, when europe’s heads of state and government launched the largest financial rescue package in the history of europe? tric… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview in Der Spiegel | Period_1 | 2010-05-19 | 0.230 | that triggered a very bold and comprehensive financial support by governments. and now we see the signature of some governments put into question. this is a problem for almost all industrialised countries. in the g7, the major economies have a yearly deficit of around 10 % of gdp. in the euro area as a whole it averages 7% of gdp. in this situation with extremely elevated deficits across the globe, the markets have singled out a weak link: greece. also taking into account the fact that its statistics were incorrect at one time, market pressure was concentrated there and a drastic adjustment programme was necessary. spiegel: apparently it was not only greece that came under attack. portugal was next… trichet: in the market, there is always a danger of contagion – like the contagion we saw among the private institutions in 2008. and it can occur quickly. sometimes it is a question of half days. this is an issue for the industrialised world as a whole. spiegel: allegedly, even asian central banks have lost confidence in the euro. and they are key players. trichet: a currency which keeps its value fully in line with its definition of price stability – with annual inflation rate of less than 2%, close to 2% – over almost 12 years is a currency which inspires confidence. spiegel: in the case of greece, the debate in berlin just a few weeks ago was about providing assistance to the tune of €3 billion. now talk is of three-figure sums. what has the federal government’s hesitation … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview in Bild | Period_1 | 2011-01-17 | 0.223 | germany is the biggest contributor to the rescue of the euro. are we europe’s paymaster? germany is a very important country in europe. the measures to combat the debt crisis are borne jointly by the member states. germany is an important anchor for europe, not only on account of its economic size, but also and above all owing to its own creditworthiness, its sound fiscal policy and its competitiveness. why does europe not just let default countries go bankrupt? first, i would say: debts should be repaid. it is the rule of law. now, the international monetary fund has been around for many years to help marshalling adjustments in countries with difficulties, in order for them to recover their creditworthiness and honour their commitments. europe is in line with this approach, for the sake of the financial stability of the euro area as a whole. many experts believe that greece’s bankruptcy is unavoidable. the greek government has taken measures within a strong programme negotiated with the european commission and the international monetary fund. we expect greece to implement these measures to the letter. compliance with the announced adjustment programme is checked every three months. after ireland, will other countries be taken under the eu rescue umbrella? we are asking all countries to bring their fiscal house in order. this is the best way for them to win back their creditworthiness. have the right lessons been learned from the financial crisis? we are on the road to far… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview in The Wall Street Journal | Period_1 | 2011-01-24 | 0.215 | trichet: as i said, they have to improve the stabilization fund in both quality and quantity. by quality i mean having a tool that is as flexible as possible. wsj: you have said bond purchases are meant to ensure the transmission of monetary policy. if efsf buys bonds, wouldn’t that take a monetary function away from the ecb and give it to a fiscal authority? trichet: as all our non-standard measures, the securities purchase is indeed meant to help restoring a better transmission mechanism of our monetary policy. it is clear that if markets are functioning better more generally then we have less problems in the transmission of monetary policy. in any case, the main tool to improve the situation is to restore the credibility of individual governments themselves. wsj: should countries be able to borrow money from the efsf for bank recapitalization without having to apply for a full bailout? trichet: these are the responsibilities of the governments. we are asking to demonstrate full responsibility for economic and financial stability through a quantum leap as regards the economic governance in the euro area, a quantum leap in conditionality and greater flexibility in their utilization of the mechanism. wsj: you have said there is a sense of urgency to improve the efsf. governments appear to have put off any changes until march at the earliest. do you think leaders are showing a sufficient sense of urgency? trichet: since the beginning of the turbulence, i have said we needed… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with L’Espresso | Period_1 | 2006-09-21 | 0.204 | you were in cernobbio, italy, in early september. what was the mood among italian entrepreneurs, politicians and economists? i saw further confirmation of the great potential of italy and of the italian corporate sector, but i also found unanimous agreement that one of the most important problems facing italy is the insufficient labour productivity and consequently the rise of unit labour costs. it is a european problem, and not only an italian problem, but in italy it is particularly visible: we have to do all that we can to implement the lisbon agenda aiming at accelerating productivity growth. but the italian industrial structure is weak nowadays. what should be done? research carried out in italy and in europe, more generally, has concluded that we are not benefiting sufficiently from productivity gains in sectors that use new technology (and not only in the sectors that produce the technology themselves) and this seems to be due to overly rigid labour, goods and services and financial markets. structural reforms that would allow the economy to be made more flexible are the primary tools for achieving a leap in productivity. in the united states this was made possible in the mid-1990s. and, consequently? one should never underestimate the importance of investment in research and development, which are today insufficient both in italy and in the euro area as a whole. you have mentioned structural reforms, which are currently at the heart of the italian political debate … |
| Mario Draghi: The European Central Bank - rebuilding trust, restoring prosperity and re-establishing price stability | Period_2 | 2015-11-11 | 0.253 | emergency liquidity assistance for greek banks in its decisions the ecb is bound both by the statute and by the other provisions of the treaty. the choices of the governing council concerning greece were another example of strict adherence to the letter and spirit of both. this was apparent a few months ago when, amid a worsening economic and political situation, the government and the greek banks lost access to market funding and depositors started to withdraw their money from the banks. the banks became completely dependent on emergency liquidity assistance, a form of “lending of last resort”, from the eurosystem. ela became the sole channel through which greek banks could continue to function and make payments, and through which deposits could continue to flow to other parts of the euro area. at the peak we were lending €127 billion euro to the greek banking system, or 71% of the country’s gdp. in keeping with article 123 of the treaty which prohibits the ecb from monetary financing, the governing council imposed strict limits on the use of government securities as collateral for loans that the greek banks received from the ecb. otherwise the government would have obtained refinancing from domestic banks which would have in turn used the government securities to obtain our funding. we nevertheless continued to supply the necessary liquidity so as to ensure the functioning of the greek banking system and the continuation of lending to businesses and households. this was … |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Radio Classique | Period_2 | 2017-01-30 | 0.231 | and the convergence you’re talking of – what does it mean for france? french growth is now picking up but it remains lower than that of germany and the euro area, so the reforms in france have to continue in order to consolidate growth. and that will allow france’s voice to be heard in the euro area. what are these reforms? i am not going to enter into a debate which is now an election debate. the reforms are… is it necessary to copy what germany has been doing for a decade, wage moderation alongside a more flexible labour market? yes, there is a need for a labour market which works in a more flexible way, but there must also be productivity, innovation and education enhancement policies, notably in higher education, to ensure that france remains at the forefront of innovation. and germany, for its part, must it also make efforts? yes, germany has implemented major reforms in the past from which it benefits today, but its demographic prospects are more difficult than those of france, so it too must continue with reforms, and in particular it must invest. last question, on the budget deficit. should europe be more tolerant of the sacrosanct 3% objective? i don’t believe that this is an issue that concerns europe. indeed, france has been above 3% for many years now, so it clearly shows that the problem doesn’t lie so much with europe, and it shows that there hasn’t really been austerity in france. france today, in 2017, is on the threshold of being able to pass below 3%. d… |
| Mario Draghi: Interview in Il Sole 24 Ore | Period_2 | 2015-11-03 | 0.230 | speaking of greece, you have acknowledged that even with the implementation of the programme, athens will need debt restructuring. do you think that this should be done gradually, so as to preserve the incentive for the greek government to comply with its obligations? greek debt is sustainable if, first, the government complies with the obligations under the programme that it has agreed to, taking responsibility for or ownership of the programme. second, for the debt to be sustainable a certain degree of relief is required; the latter should be such as to remove any doubt as to the future sustainability of the debt itself, once the first condition has been met. what type of “debt relief” to provide and how to calibrate it so that incentives for compliance with the programme are not distorted are decisions for the member states, namely for those whose balance sheets will be affected by the decision. the ecb has nothing to say in this regard. the past four years have been extremely stressful for all involved – and for you in particular, i imagine, especially given your level of responsibility. what helped you through the worst times? the power of convictions, and the certainty or hope that the decisions we take ease hardship for europeans. |
| Mario Draghi: Interview with Bild Zeitung | Period_2 | 2012-03-23 | 0.230 | part ii bild: there is no end to the crisis in greece. yet again, more than €100 billion of credit is to be given to them. but isn’t the country a bottomless pit? draghi: the greeks have passed very many important reforms in parliament. if they also implement these, the country has a chance to get itself out of the current downward spiral. bild: but the parties that reject the reforms will be the ones that win in the upcoming elections. draghi: to overcome the crisis, greece needs a stable political situation. bild: why should taxpayers in germany and other euro area countries be liable if it goes wrong? draghi: the fact is that european taxpayers have taken on a lot for greece. their money must be protected. this is also why the ecb did not take part in the debt relief – because the cost would have been borne by taxpayers. bild: how much time does greece have left? |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2015-11-13 | 0.215 | the ecb and the macroeconomic adjustment programmes let me now turn to a topic that the chair has asked me specifically to address, namely the macroeconomic adjustment programmes and the ecb’s role in their negotiation and monitoring. benoît cœuré spoke on this topic here last year, so i will be brief; but of course, we can discuss more during the q&a session if you wish. to understand our role in the programme work, one needs to recall the initial conditions in which the programme setup was established. in spring 2010 there was no framework in place at the european level to negotiate and monitor adjustment programmes. in this situation, member states turned to the imf and the commission for help, and they also asked the ecb to contribute its expertise at a time when europe needed it most. this setup was codified in the esm treaty and by the co-legislators in the two-pack; the ecj confirmed its legality. in line with this, the ecb has since provided its advice in programmes in five member states. but we should not forget that the respective national governments are responsible for programme implementation, while the final responsibility for programme design and the disbursement of financial assistance lies with the eurogroup. since 2010, three countries have now successfully completed their programmes, and ireland is a particularly good example of how such programmes can deliver the necessary adjustment and restore financial stability, economic competitiveness and fiscal s… |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.122 | forward looking euro area wage tracker (annual percentage changes; percentage share) calculated based on microdata on wage agreements in germany, italy, spain and the netherlands. data fort the netherlands is based on the database maintained by the dutch employer association awvn. for italy the data comes from istat (contratti collettivi e retribuzioni contrattuali), for spain from the ministerio de trabajo y economía social and for germany from bundesbank. notes: experimental euro area wage tracker includes weighted average of germany, italy (data from july 2021 to september 2022) spain and the netherlands. the orange line shows the weighted average of wage increases in agreements that have not yet expired, weighted by the number of workers covered by these agreements. the green lines show weighted averages of wage increases in agreements that were concluded in 2022, weighted by the number of workers covered by these agreements. latest observations: last agreements signed in nl es, it and de in march 2022 |
| Fabio Panetta: Patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-30 | 0.084 | beveridge curve negotiated wages (y-axis: job vacancy rate, percentages of jobs; x- (annual percentage changes) axis: u7 rate, percentages of the labour force) @ beveridge curve — u7 versus jvr me fo are =n any 278 20213 -<=-euro area (excluding = - ; bonuses) : —=netherlands 2.50 201904 a 5 5 “ne 2.25 4 4b 2.00 202002 ~ ~ | 1.75 — 150 201103 ° “ty a -y it | | eta 1.25 1.00 0 “talelelclalelelclale 0 = = “tole tr ai) 5 10 15 °20 95 big|gb|gig|g|g|gia|a]a} is cs als 5|a ’alle: slale g| 2019 2020 2021 | 2019 9020 2021 left-hand panel. sources: ecb calculations based on data from eurostat, federal employment agency germany, ifo institute munich, ministere du travail, de l’emploi et de i’insertion, instituto nazionale previdenza sociale (inps), and ministerio de inclusion, seguridad social y migraciones. notes: the highlighted area marks the coronavirus (covid-19) crisis period from the first quarter of 2020 to the second quarter of 2021. the latest observations are for the third quarter of 2021 for germany, spain and france and the second quarter of 2021 for italy for the number of workers in job retention schemes (jrs); and the third quarter of 2021 for the unemployment rate and job vacancy rate. right-hand panel. notes: the latest observations are for the third quarter of 2021 based on july and august data for the euro area and germany, the third quarter of 2021 based on full quarter data for italy and the fourth quarter of 2021 based on october data for spain, france and th… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.070 | in particular, under the next generation eu (ngeu) programme a european fiscal instrument was created with the necessary resources to support the recovery.[12] the interventions were based on national recovery and resilience plans detailing reform and investment strategies consistent with shared objectives at european level, such as the green and digital transitions.[13] high debt countries, such as italy and spain, obtained european resources amounting, respectively, to 11% and 6% of gdp. this created the basis for a european social contract for exiting the pandemic: eu member states committed to make their economies more competitive in exchange for european funding.[14] in this way, not only would ngeu enhance medium-term growth prospects but it would also contribute to convergence. through its allocation key, ngeu supports growth in those eu member states hardest hit by the pandemic and with below-average gdp per capita in particular. in so doing, it improves debt sustainability and contributes to fiscal convergence.[15] and by stabilising markets, it has supported a faster-than-expected recovery for all member states. in the process, two paradigm shifts have occurred. first, the new european common fiscal instruments were designed with explicit recognition that the eu is more than the sum of its parts. funded collectively, the ngeu package has created a critical fiscal policy space akin to the federal budget support existing in other economies. this reflected the growi… |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.063 |
|
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.055 | country is eligible to tpi, it will activate tpi, and, as i said earlier on, there is no ex-ante limit to that programme. now, i’m happy to go through the four specific criteria if any of you are interested. so there are four of them, and i think it’s important that we understand that on this occasion, like on any occasion having to do with either monetary policy stance or monetary policy transmission, the ecb determines in its own discretion, not being hostage to anyone. so the four criteria that it will use will be indicative, will be elements of information that it will take into account in order to make its decision. so the first one is compliance with eu fiscal framework, and that can take one of two forms, either not be in excessive deficit procedure, or having failed to take the effective action in response to [european] council recommendations. so that’s on the fiscal framework, and obviously borrows from another european institutions, which is both the commission and the council. the second is the absence of severe macroeconomic imbalances, and again, it borrows from other european institutions in relation to the excessive imbalance procedure. the third is fiscal sustainability, so this is making sure that the trajectory of public debt is sustainable. and to do that the governing council will take into account analysis by the european commission, by the esm, by the imf, by other institutions, but it will certainly be together with the ecb internal analysis. fourth… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 98 | question | 1 | 0.0876741 | question | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 98 | view | 2 | 0.0726053 | debate | 2 | 0.9994743 |
| 98 | issue | 3 | 0.0542040 | answer | 3 | 0.9994741 |
| 98 | concern | 4 | 0.0491328 | view | 4 | 0.9990356 |
| 98 | debate | 5 | 0.0323254 | concern | 5 | 0.9987729 |
| 98 | fact | 6 | 0.0300071 | argument | 6 | 0.9985977 |
| 98 | answer | 7 | 0.0260950 | issue | 7 | 0.9984215 |
| 98 | raise | 8 | 0.0247910 | observer | 8 | 0.9982470 |
| 98 | discussion | 9 | 0.0191402 | argue | 9 | 0.9979849 |
| 98 | relate | 10 | 0.0185606 | discussion | 10 | 0.9973701 |
| 98 | argue | 11 | 0.0182709 | opinion | 11 | 0.9973697 |
| 98 | limit | 12 | 0.0168219 | aspect | 12 | 0.9971964 |
| 98 | argument | 13 | 0.0162424 | wrong | 13 | 0.9968390 |
| 98 | regard | 14 | 0.0146486 | raise | 14 | 0.9965783 |
| 98 | relevant | 15 | 0.0118956 | fact | 15 | 0.9964886 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: Central banks in the 21st century | Period_1 | 2006-06-13 | 0.139 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Careful with (the D) words! | Period_1 | 2008-11-27 | 0.109 |
|
| Lucas Papademos: Central banks in the 21st century | Period_1 | 2006-06-13 | 0.089 |
|
| Lucas Papademos: The science of monetary policy ¿ past advances and future challenges | Period_1 | 2007-09-24 | 0.089 |
|
| Otmar Issing: Monetary and financial stability - is there a trade-off? | Period_1 | 2003-03-31 | 0.086 | policy implications i have at previous occasions already stated my doubts that price stability should be added to the list of 16 causes triggering financial instability. i do not deny the fact that financial fragility can be significant in times of low inflation. but the latter statement that low inflation is not a sufficient condition for financial stability and the former that low inflation causes financial instability, are worlds apart. here i would like to focus on two particular aspects, which is the trade-off question with respect to the “new environment” hypothesis and the related relevance of the problems associated with identifying asset 17 price bubbles. in the spirit of tinbergen if the central bank has one policy instrument, i.e. monetary policy, it can only achieve one independent goal, which is price stability. an intuitive division of labour is to assign the objective of financial stability to a financial regulatory authority, which sets up a prudential supervisory framework. this regulatory authority can but must not be the central bank. in this scenario with two authorities following one objective each, none of the authorities would be subject to a policy trade-off, as the number of instruments matches the number of objectives. nevertheless this reasoning cannot be used to exclude all conflict situations. in practice central banks’ responsibilities concerning financial stability vary a lot. for example, no general financial stability objective can be deriv… |
| Philip R Lane: Q&A with Reuters | Period_2 | 2019-10-01 | 0.106 | what you should pay attention to is: we’ve got an open-ended programme, we’ve given you conditions under which it will come to an end. and i think the kind of concerns that we would be unable to run the programme, i don’t think you should be too concerned about that. honestly, at the governing council, any potential collision with the current limits is so far in the future that if we’re stuck at that situation, i don’t think that’s top of the list of headaches to worry about. but do you think you have the authority to exceed the one-third cap? again, remember: this is self-imposed, this is an ecb decision about these limits. there’s very good reasons for the limit, but we also have our ultimate mandate, which is to deliver price stability. so we don’t want to raise the limits. there’s good reasons to have these limits and as of now we don’t see a reason to raise the limits. we think the current policy is sustainable within the limits and therefore for now it’s a non-issue. but we’re also clear that all of our decisions have to be in the context of what is needed to get inflation to the target. audience member: have you done or seen any studies of the underground economy and whether or not you factor the underground economy at all into your forecasts and, as part of that question, are you not concerned about the growth of cyber currencies? in all economies there’s an unofficial sector. so people earning money in the unofficial sector will spend it, to some degree anyway. so… |
| Philip R Lane: Q&A with Bloomberg | Period_2 | 2019-10-01 | 0.104 | philip r lane: q&a with bloomberg q&a with mr philip r lane, member of the executive board of the european central bank, conducted by ms stephanie flanders, at bloomberg, london, 16 september 2019. * * * the following is a transcript of an on stage question and answer following mr lane’s speech, reflections on monetary policy. i did take the precaution of inviting mainly economists today, so i think they will have found your speech very exciting and interesting. whether a broader cross-section of london would have had the same reaction, we don’t know, but it doesn’t matter. you’ve often said, particularly in times of unconventional policies, how important communications are for monetary policy. a lot of the communications that we’ve been talking about over the last few days, since the package was announced, have been negative communications from members of the council who have made very clear their opposition to at least one part. in some cases that’s been – the criticism and the opposition seems to have been – not just from what you might call the usual suspects. are you worried that the amount of talk about that opposition has distracted from the package or limited its usefulness in the short-term? lane: of course it’s natural, every central bank that i know of does a range of these different views at the moment. how do you deal with below target inflation? so if you look around the world, this debate is everywhere. it’s about the imperative to move as quickly as you can… |
| Jürgen Stark: Globalisation and monetary policy - from virtue to vice? | Period_2 | 2011-11-30 | 0.099 | complementarities between globalised economic performance and policymaking second, following the broad acceptance of the premise that the globalised world would be durable in nature, academics and policymakers devoted their attention to fleshing out the practical implications of globalisation in different policy environments. insofar as monetary policy was concerned, the debate was broadly captured by the relative weight of improved policymaking versus globalised factors in accounting for successful economic outcomes. a first dimension in this regard was backward looking in nature and stemmed from the sharp reduction in the variability of both inflation and output during the 1990s. this phenomenon, which became known as “the great moderation”, coincided with both the intensification of |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2018-03-14 | 0.093 | risks globally. that’s what we refer to with that. it’s quite clear that if we have retaliation, we may have effects on confidence that i mentioned before. this would certainly at the very least introduce higher uncertainty in the future growth path. more generally, i think there are two main risks that one can see today. one is this one that i mentioned related to trade. there is also another risk that is less mentioned these days. that’s the risk of financial deregulation in other major jurisdictions. we should not forget what the situation was before the crisis – in the years leading to the crisis. like today, we had an expansionary monetary policy which was justified by the conditions at that time, as ours is justified by the conditions today. but in the 10–12 years before the crisis there had been a systematic disruption of financial regulation in the major jurisdictions. this combination, we may disagree whether the source was predominantly one or the other, but certainly nobody would disagree about the combination of the two. i would flag this as one major risk for the years ahead: that we repeat the same mistake. now, i should say also that the ‘we’ is not right in this context because in the eurozone both national legislators and european legislators and the european commission are certainly not on that path. we are talking about a global market and so massive deregulation in one part of the market is going to affect the whole world. on your first question, the in… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Inflation expectations and the conduct of monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-07-15 | 0.088 | the second question is why we are seeing this divergence in views, and whether it is temporary or likely to persist. let me try to answer each of these two questions in turn. which expectations matter most? existing research casts some doubt on the macroeconomic relevance of professional inflation forecasts, including those of financial markets. there are three related strands in the literature that suggest that household inflation expectations are often better predictors of future inflation outcomes.13 |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2021-10-28 | 0.088 | currently pushing up inflation. while inflation will take longer to decline than previously expected, we expect these factors to ease in the course of next year. we continue to foresee inflation in the medium term remaining below our two per cent target. our policy measures, including our revised forward guidance on the key ecb interest rates, are crucial to helping the economy shift to a sustained recovery and, ultimately, to bringing inflation over the medium term to our target. we are now ready to take your questions. *** president lagarde, thank you very much for taking my questions. i was wondering, because the markets were – well, everybody was anticipating that this meeting was all about inflation, so what have you been discussing, and what was on top of your agenda? was there at least a slightly different assessment to the nature of inflation, given that inflation is at a 30-year high now for the eurozone. my second question would be on the market expectation about the rate hike. economists were saying that the market has not fully absorbed your new forward guidance. perhaps you can tell us more about it and why the market is wrong to expect a rate hike already by next year. lagarde: thank you very much. actually, we talked about inflation, inflation, inflation. that has been a topic that has occupied a lot of our time and a lot of our debates. we went i think in-depth into analysing the factors that are driving inflation. we looked at, obviously, what is happening… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.061 | money it receives could be interrupted by this political crisis, so also threatening the growth outlook in the whole euro zone? my second question. very often in the last decade at least, the rises of rates on government bonds were caused by political crises. so if i’m not wrong, you mentioned the four criteria, and italy would meet these criteria at this moment. but this is, of course, a crisis which is caused by a political reason, by a political cause, a government crisis, self-inflicted by italy. would you think that this could be considered as an unwarranted rise of rates on the government bonds if it went on? the spread is already rising this morning. let me just remind you that the ecb does not take a stance on political matters. political matters are for the democratic process of each and every member state, and that is certainly the case for the country that you are referring to. differences in local financing [conditions] can legitimately arise. among other [reasons], due to the country-specific macroeconomic landscape, and that has happened in the past. so the governing council will make the assessment of whether a country meets the eligibility criteria or not at the time when it has to make those determinations. and it will do so having a threefold assessment, if you will. first of all, it will determine a comprehensive assessment of market and transmission indicators. there’s a whole range of such indicators. second, it will at that time evaluate the eligibili… |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.056 | policy normalisation, transmission lags and global spillovers in recent months, the public debate has stressed the risks of doing too little to curb inflation, since this would require a more painful future adjustment. but this should not make us underappreciate the risk of doing too much. first, we should bear in mind that it takes time before the full impact of our measures is felt in the economy.[16] moreover, monetary policy is transmitted to different variables with different lags. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.048 | while all hicp components added to this high number, energy price inflation in the euro area is standing at close to 40%, illustrating the magnitude of relative price changes in the recent period. central banks around the world are responding forcefully to these developments. the ecb raised its policy rates by 50 basis points in july and by another 75 basis points last week. based on our current assessment, over the governing council’s next several meetings, we expect to raise interest rates further towards levels that will ensure the timely return of inflation to our 2% medium-term target. the current normalisation phase refocuses the attention of monetary policymakers on one of the classic questions in macroeconomics: how do central bank policy rates affect inflation and aggregate economic activity? over the past 40 years, economists have made significant progress in answering this question. i would like to summarise the key lessons learned and pose a few questions that remain open. |
| Christine Lagarde: Introductory statement - European Parliament plenary debate on the ECB Annual Report | Period_3 | 2022-02-17 | 0.048 | consider influential factors relevant for our medium-term horizon. third, we must be clear about our actions. our audience should be able to understand what we are trying to achieve with our measures, as well as why they are effective, efficient and remain proportionate to our aim. clearly communicating these three a’s to different audiences often means being more simple and straightforward. but being more simple does not mean being simplistic. it means being more inclusive when we talk. following on from our strategy review, we are using clearer, more narrative-driven language, together with visuals people can relate to. finally, in all our communication, we need to be open about what we can and cannot do as a central bank. for example, our monetary policy cannot fill pipelines with gas, clear backlogs at ports or train more lorry drivers. conclusion let me conclude. we are very aware that many people across the euro area are concerned about the rising cost of living at the moment – as you also highlight in the report. and the burden is primarily borne by those with lower incomes, who must face the day-to-day hardship of having to cope with higher prices. we remain committed to delivering on our price stability mandate – as we have done over the past 20 years. our target is an inflation rate of 2 per cent over the medium term. to achieve this, we will take action at the right time. but it is also our task to openly engage with people’s concerns with regards to monetary po… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | investment | 1 | 0.0663268 | resource | 1 | 0.9993863 |
| 100 | increase | 2 | 0.0492968 | productive | 2 | 0.9985100 |
| 100 | reduce | 3 | 0.0439961 | investment | 3 | 0.9979809 |
| 100 | firm | 4 | 0.0419660 | efficient | 4 | 0.9978972 |
| 100 | capital | 5 | 0.0389209 | allocation | 5 | 0.9976339 |
| 100 | create | 6 | 0.0250488 | capital | 6 | 0.9974559 |
| 100 | cost | 7 | 0.0248232 | incentive | 7 | 0.9970209 |
| 100 | resource | 8 | 0.0235826 | reduce | 8 | 0.9968381 |
| 100 | good | 9 | 0.0213270 | human | 9 | 0.9967983 |
| 100 | benefit | 10 | 0.0176052 | create | 10 | 0.9964886 |
| 100 | efficient | 11 | 0.0172669 | efficiency | 11 | 0.9964079 |
| 100 | market | 12 | 0.0154623 | firm | 12 | 0.9963985 |
| 100 | economy | 13 | 0.0151240 | invest | 13 | 0.9963195 |
| 100 | productive | 14 | 0.0142218 | human capital | 14 | 0.9963092 |
| 100 | incentive | 15 | 0.0137706 | efficient allocation | 15 | 0.9959108 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Current challenges for the euro area | Period_1 | 2008-10-30 | 0.281 | r&d and policies geared towards improving human capital. a more entrepreneur- friendly economic environment is also needed, to ensure that new and dynamic firms emerge which can reap the benefits of pursuing creative and innovative ventures. we know that r&d, as well as human capital, makes valuable contributions to productivity growth. in 2006, r&d investment relative to gdp was only 1.9% in the euro area, compared with 2.7% in the united states. cooperation between universities, public sector research institutes and industry must also intensify in order to raise the efficiency of public r&d spending. unfortunately, in several euro area countries investment in human capital is still too low for a “knowledge-intensive” economy. this is a matter of concern since the employability and flexibility of the labour force requires human capital to be continuously adjusted to labour market needs. this investment should start “early”, by enhancing the quality and efficiency of our schools and universities, and should be continued through lifelong training and learning. • increasing competition. establishing efficient and well-functioning product and services markets can boost productivity trends by enhancing the incentive to invest and innovate. the long-run dividends offered by competition-enhancing policies cannot be overstated, since “little else other than productivity growth matters in the long run”, as nobel prize winner robert solow once put it. moreover, such policies will s… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the euro area and its future | Period_1 | 2008-07-15 | 0.207 | effective competition in the energy market and the implementation of the services directive. 16 (3) supporting an innovative environment: the reforms that i have mentioned need to be accompanied by measures supporting innovation through higher investment in research and development and policies geared towards improving human capital. europe needs many new and dynamic firms that are willing to reap the benefits of opening markets and to pursue creative or innovative ventures. notably, it is new and smaller firms – rather than large ones – that are the job creators. this requires an entrepreneur-friendly environment with less “red tape”, and easier access to the finance these firms need. europe is lagging significantly behind in this field; its venture capital financing, for instance, remains only a fraction of that in the united states, relative to the size of its economy. we know that research and development, as well as human capital, make valuable contributions to tfp growth. in 2006, r&d investment relative to gdp was only 1.9% in the euro area, compared with 2.7% in the united states. 17 cooperation between universities, public sector research institutes and industry must also intensify to raise the efficiency of public r&d spending. unfortunately, in several euro area countries, investment in human capital is still too low for a “knowledge-intensive” economy. instead, the employability and flexibility of the labour force requires human capital to be continuously adjus… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2007-03-22 | 0.190 | social benefits of price stability let me now turn to my last point today in which i would like to emphasise the critical role of our quantitative definition of price stability in orienting expectations. i have mentioned how persistent conditions of price stability can change the transmission channels in ways that can partly alleviate structural shortcomings of the economy. in the euro area, notwithstanding structural rigidities that impede price and wage adjustments – rigidities that cannot be corrected by a central bank – well- anchored inflation expectations partly compensate for and make the transmission mechanism less inefficient than it would be otherwise. but welfare analysis has also drawn attention to other, and perhaps even more fundamental, channels through which price stability can enhance growth prospects and contribute to the living standards of citizens. first, in a market economy, the price system plays a key role in the efficient allocation of resources to alternative uses. price pressures in a specific market can signal profitable investment opportunities to firms. price stability improves the quality of the signals that prices convey to both households and firms, which can then easily recognise changes in the relative prices of different goods, allowing them to make well-informed consumption and investment decisions. by contrast, in an inflationary environment, prices only provide blurred signals: price increases in a specific market can either indicate … |
| Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Challenges for the Euro at ten | Period_1 | 2008-12-12 | 0.156 | retraining, and shedding workers, and continued investment in research and development (r&d). in 2006, the fraction of r&d investment relative to gdp in the euro area was only 1.9 per cent, compared with 2.7 per cent in the united states. this is a first dimension along which improvements ought to be made. it is also necessary to intensify cooperation between industry, universities, and public sector research institutes, in order to raise the efficiency of public r&d spending. as for investment in human capital, in several euro area countries its rate of accumulation is still insufficient, in particular when compared with the needs of contemporary, knowledge-intensive economies. the effectiveness of the accumulation of human capital should be enhanced at all stages of the education process, by improving the quality and efficiency of our schools and universities, and should be continued through lifelong training and learning. a further step ought to be increasing competition in both labour and product markets, thus providing strongest incentives to invest and innovate, and to ultimately boost productivity. more generally, it is necessary to support a more innovative and entrepreneur-friendly economic environment. europe needs to create an environment which is more apt at fostering new and dynamic firms willing to reap the benefits of opening markets and to pursue creative or innovative ventures. finally, a key requirement is for firms to be able to access relatively easily … |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Building Europe in a globalised world | Period_1 | 2007-10-25 | 0.145 | ones. in many euro area countries, structural reforms have been too slow to facilitate the reallocation of resources to their most productive uses and to foster labour productivity growth and technological progress. the implementation of structural reforms is envisaged under a wide-ranging programme for economic, social and environmental reform in the eu, a programme known as the lisbon strategy. in particular, member states are required to reduce tax burdens on low-wage earners, to bring wage developments into line with productivity, to raise the skill level of the workforce as well as to adopt active ageing strategies to encourage older workers to stay in the workforce. this strategy should increase the flexibility of, and lower the adjustment costs for, european firms and workers confronted with globalisation. improving competitiveness is the main condition for making globalisation a success for the citizens of europe. as for fiscal policies, in the global economy, capital and labour mobility puts pressure on tax bases. rather than a “race to the bottom”, with only tax rates reduced, we begin to see tax reforms that make a country more “competitive” and more attractive for investment and human capital. on the expenditure side, the influence of globalisation appears to be more limited. we should expect a tendency towards smaller but more efficient budgets, with “higher-quality” public spending. this implies, for example, more emphasis on “tomorrow” – i.e. investment and … |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2016-06-23 | 0.255 | macroprudential role, has an important role to play in ensuring that banking markets efficiently allocate resources to the most productive investment opportunities across the euro area. progress on the capital markets union is also essential to develop a favourable environment for productive investment in the eu. it will help diversify the sources of funding needed to spur investment – notably for smes and long-term projects – by complementing bank financing with deeper, more developed capital markets. the legislative acts regarding simple, transparent and standardised securitisation you are discussing are tangible examples of how eu legislation can broaden financing opportunities for eu companies, foster cross-border investment and ultimately have a positive impact on the eu investment outlook. at national level, reforms to improve business framework conditions and reduce regulatory and administrative bottlenecks also need to be further pursued. it is the whole institutional framework that helps to transform financial resources into productive investments, which, in turn, increase productivity and, ultimately, create jobs. inefficient public procurement, taxation systems, judicial systems and insolvency frameworks, identified in some countries, need to be fully addressed. country-specific recommendations can be a powerful tool to identify and address barriers to investment in individual countries. moreover, those countries where public finances allow, should undertake pub… |
| Mario Draghi: On the importance of policy alignment to fulfil our economic potential | Period_2 | 2016-06-09 | 0.211 | what is more, the secular shift from manufacturing to services can be consistent with higher productivity if resources are well allocated. in fact, there are very large differences between the most and least productive firms within each sector, even more so than across sectors.[21] this implies that, even in a services-oriented economy, aggregate productivity can still be improved. so the euro area faces a twin policy challenge: to get more firms in each sector to the productivity frontier, and to get more labour and capital to those productive firms. and crucially, this would not only boost output, but also employment and wage equality, since labour would be concentrating in firms that are both growing and demanding higher value skills. to achieve this there are, in my view, three policy priorities. first is addressing the structural barriers to knowledge diffusion within europe. this has many facets, but critical are policies that increase trade openness and facilitate firms’ participation in value chains, as well as a competitive business environment that favours the adoption of superior managerial practices and organisational structures.[22] the most powerful “quick win” we could make here would be to complete the single market, especially in services, since that would automatically accelerate diffusion from the european frontier where we already have many world leading industries.[23] for firms to integrate effectively into the single market, however, they need to be … |
| Peter Praet: Price stability - a sinking will-o’-the-wisp? | Period_2 | 2015-04-17 | 0.205 | price incentive, the imbalance will be rectified at some point, and real rates will catch up with (a higher) potential rate over time. 6 if the second interpretation is correct, we are in the fortunate position that the policy conclusions are not so different. the necessary policies that are required to capitalise on the low interest rate environment are the same policies that can repair dynamic inefficiency. in essence, no matter how you read the chart 4 – or if indeed a combination of interpretations is correct – the safest template for policy action involves largely the same combination of policy strategies. while monetary policy is attempting to shadow the equilibrium real rate, which has been reduced in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the counterpart economic policy authorities should concentrate on lifting potential. what is needed is to boost growth via increased investment, as investment not only creates current demand but future supply. public investment on infrastructure, if sufficient fiscal space exists, as well as on education and training can promote a new wave of innovations and put more of the labour force to work. at the same time, removing barriers that restrict the reallocation of workers across firms while enhancing the effectiveness of national competition authorities to drive out rent seeking behaviour would reduce market functioning impediments and, thereby, increase the profitability of investment. the european capital union would greatly fac… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Challenges for euro area monetary policy in early 2018 | Period_2 | 2017-12-29 | 0.186 | this is a particular risk at present when, as i described earlier, any future increase in interest rates needs to be gradual, and hence moving late could result in policy remaining too loose for too long. certainly as the time comes to reconsider our monetary policy stance during the course of 2018, we should reflect at length on the degree to which we wish to pre-commit ourselves. risks to monetary policy extend beyond the immediate outlook for inflation. our policies have reduced the spread over risk-free interest rates paid by households and firms for their borrowing, and unblocked the flow of credit to the real economy. such spreads are at their lowest ever level. yet reduced spreads may encourage investment in businesses that are only profitable at low interest rates, and such loans risk turning sour as interest rates rise. indeed, banks and investors may be tempted to “search for yield”, without being adequately recompensed for the risk they are taking on. the normal place for monetary policy is not at the long end of the yield curve, but at the short end. the focus of monetary policy is of course on our price stability mandate, and ensuring financial stability risks are adequately mitigated is the role of microprudential supervision and macroprudential policy. while there is little evidence at present of area-wide credit-fuelled bubbles, there are some notable localised pockets, such as in commercial real estate, and evidence of “search for yield” behaviour. the fin… |
| Peter Praet: Economic developments in the euro area | Period_2 | 2015-02-12 | 0.180 | the pivotal role of governments still, it is clear that if our measures are to generate a faster and more sustained recovery then governments also have to play their part. in particular, at both the micro and macro levels, structural reforms are pivotal to encourage firms to capitalise on the easing of financial conditions and undertake new investment projects. at the micro level, any investment project will happen if the return on investment sufficiently exceeds the cost of capital. monetary policy can increase the wedge between the two on the downside, by lowering the cost of capital. but structural reforms can increase the wedge on the upside, by raising returns – for example by reducing costs arising from unnecessary red tape. at the macro level, monetary policy can influence investment through lowering the real interest rate. but there also has to be a fundamental reason to invest, which comes down chiefly to developments in labour participation and total factor productivity. here again structural reforms can complement monetary policy by, for instance, reactivating structurally unemployed workers and improving allocative efficiency across firms, thus raising potential growth. indeed, perhaps the biggest risk we face with our new measures is that they fall on barren ground because governments are not doing enough to raise confidence in the future. if firms are simultaneously revising down their growth expectations as we expand our monetary policy, we will not see the … |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.097 | a balance will need to be found between remaining open, in order to support economic efficiency, while avoiding dependencies on suppliers that may become unreliable. this is the objective of the eu’s drive towards an “open strategic autonomy”. 3.1 the versailles declaration: implications for europe’s economic governance the versailles declaration of 11 march recognised that this conflict will have far-reaching effects on the structure and governance of the european economy.[20] in this declaration, eu leaders defined russia’s aggression against ukraine as a “tectonic shift in european history”. the declaration identifies security as a key common public good. and it identifies three conditions to achieve it: reducing energy dependence, bolstering defence capabilities and building a more robust economic base. the adjustment to the new state of international political and trade relations will be costly and will require conspicuous investment. the financing needs associated with the green transition are massive if one considers all relevant components of investment, including clean energy and energy efficiency, as well as both the private and the public sectors. even before the invasion of ukraine, the attainment of the eu’s 2030 climate targets[21] required energy-related investments of €402 billion (2.9% of 2019 gdp) per year on average in the decade 2021-2030, according to the european commission’s estimates.[22] compared with the previous decade, it implies additional annu… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.092 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.092 | tensions in the repo market[30], but we will continue to monitor the situation closely. the importance of a consistent policy mix as recently seen in other economies, an inconsistent policy mix can prove destabilising. so a successful normalisation process requires other policies to be consistent with monetary policy. for instance, well- designed energy and fiscal policies can make a key contribution to dampening short-term inflationary pressures, thereby helping to keep inflation expectations anchored[31] and reducing the amount of monetary tightening necessary. to take a concrete example, the measures that have been taken to find alternatives to russian gas, reduce gas demand and refill gas storage are likely playing an important role in bringing down gas prices. likewise, joint initiatives at european level, common purchases and the redistribution of surplus energy sector profits can mitigate the impact of supply disruptions on energy prices. at the same time, energy policies should preserve price incentives and support energy efficiency. fiscal policies should aim to cushion the impact on the most exposed and fragile households and firms, while not hindering the necessary trend reduction of energy demand and adding to inflationary pressures. at the same time, they should protect economic potential and ensure that the energy shock does not permanently reduce productive capacity. just as excessively high energy demand would risk keeping inflation high for longer, so woul… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.081 | for instance, today’s supply shortages may induce firms to diversify their supply chains or re-shore some of their production. previous pandemics like sars were found to have had this effect.!2°! that process could lead to higher cost structures that prioritise resilience over efficiency, which are then passed on to consumers. geopolitics might also interfere in trade patterns and accelerate these shifts. in parallel, faster digitalisation in europe could initially create skill mismatches and scarcities, leading to wage increases even in the presence of persistent slack. the rate of job reallocations in major economies is estimated to double between 2019 and mid-2022.!26! this dynamic could also be reinforced by a renewed focus on inequality, which could lead to upward pressure on wages via rising minimum wages. |4/1 the green transition |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.073 | finally, governments should reinforce their efforts to deepen capital markets and create a green capital markets union. ecb research has long shown that stock markets are more effective than banks in supporting the decarbonisation of the economy.[16] yet, eu equity markets remain fragmented and often illiquid. reliance on bank lending at a time of rising constraints on banks’ balance sheets considerably reduces the set of options for firms to push ahead with their green agenda. the european commission’s recent package of legislative measures, including the proposed harmonisation of key aspects of corporate insolvency law and the removal of red tape for companies to list and raise capital on public exchanges, is an important step in the right direction.[17] but further decisive steps are needed to fast-track the establishment of a european green capital markets union.[18] |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 101 | demand | 1 | 0.0993018 | domestic demand | 1 | 0.9993427 |
| 101 | growth | 2 | 0.0816424 | external | 2 | 0.9989486 |
| 101 | domestic | 3 | 0.0557966 | demand | 3 | 0.9989476 |
| 101 | expect | 4 | 0.0369677 | domestic | 4 | 0.9988604 |
| 101 | factor | 5 | 0.0362660 | prospect | 5 | 0.9977220 |
| 101 | external | 6 | 0.0311203 | weak | 6 | 0.9976769 |
| 101 | domestic demand | 7 | 0.0248050 | external demand | 7 | 0.9975408 |
| 101 | weak | 8 | 0.0248050 | global demand | 8 | 0.9963166 |
| 101 | reflect | 9 | 0.0190745 | weaken | 9 | 0.9962325 |
| 101 | decline | 10 | 0.0190745 | factor | 10 | 0.9962233 |
| 101 | good | 11 | 0.0189575 | protracted period | 11 | 0.9958308 |
| 101 | prospect | 12 | 0.0182558 | driver | 12 | 0.9957508 |
| 101 | strong | 13 | 0.0155660 | growth prospect | 13 | 0.9955675 |
| 101 | fall | 14 | 0.0150982 | foreign demand | 14 | 0.9955175 |
| 101 | remain | 15 | 0.0142795 | external environment | 15 | 0.9954720 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: The economic outlook and the ECB’s monetary policy - some key issues | Period_1 | 2004-11-12 | 0.218 | the economic outlook and monetary policy in the euro area i will start by discussing the current state of the euro area economy and the medium-term economic outlook. the performance of the euro area economy this year is characterised by the ongoing recovery of economic activity at a pace somewhat faster than previously envisaged. inflation, however, has remained above (though relatively close to) 2%. this outcome is not in line with our notion of price stability and is higher than the average inflation expected a year ago for 2004. the sharp rise in oil prices since the beginning of this year, by about 60% (in us dollar terms), has been the main reason for the higher than earlier expected inflation. let me elaborate a bit on the pace of the economic recovery, the factors that have contributed so far to the pick-up in growth, and the conditions and basic factors that are expected to influence the medium- term economic prospects. since the start of the economic recovery in the second half of 2003, we have seen robust growth rates in the first half of 2004, with real gdp increasing by 0.7% and 0.5% in the first and second quarters, respectively. the recovery in growth has so far been driven partly by buoyant external demand and partly by domestic demand. private consumption increased moderately but investment was subdued. although short-term indicators have become more mixed over the past couple of months, the underlying determinants of economic activity remain favourable, an… |
| Mr Duisenberg reports on the current position and future prospects of the European System of Central Banks (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 27 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-12-04 | 0.180 | recent economic developments and prospects let me turn to the current economic situation. the euro area experienced a strengthening of economic growth in 1997, to 2.5%, and a further acceleration has been anticipated for this year. the global environment has, of course, deteriorated in the meantime, but this has not so far had an observable impact on growth, which has, in any event, been increasingly led by domestic demand. inflation has remained subdued and even fallen somewhat over the past year, partly as a result of the impact of weaker global demand on oil and commodity prices. however, the favourable pattern of inflation has also been supported by domestic factors, such as a very moderate development in unit labour costs and industrial producer prices. |
| Mr Noyer gives a review of the economic situation in the euro area (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 8 Mar 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-02-13 | 0.172 | no estimate for real gdp is yet available for the final quarter of last year, but on the basis of available indicators growth should have continued to be strong. taken together, the year 1999 has been characterised by a rather swift and strong rebound from the slowdown in growth in the course of 1998 and early 1999 following the crises in asia and russia. indeed, when reviewing the magnitude of the disturbances in the external environment as they appeared at the time, the likely outcome of 2% for euro area growth in 1999 as a whole is not bad at all. judging from the currently available evidence, there seems to be a broad consensus in the forecasting community that the prospects for a strengthening of growth in the years 2000 and 2001 are favourable. on average, the latest forecasts point to real gdp growth of about 3% in the euro area in each of these years. it should be noted, however, that most of the currently available forecasts were made in the autumn of last year and that some of their underlying assumptions and initial conditions may thus no longer fully reflect current perceptions. for example, the imf has since revised its projections for world growth upwards and such a scenario could well provide for somewhat larger impulses on euro area export growth than have been incorporated so far. similarly, the quasi-technical assumptions for variables such as exchange rates, interest rates and certain commodity prices, which forecasts tend to be built on, might need to b… |
| Willem F Duisenberg: European Economic and Monetary Union: a success story | Period_1 | 2001-06-26 | 0.153 | euro exchange rates. the projections by eurosystem experts are therefore “conditional” and not directly comparable with the “unconditional” projections published by other institutions such as the european commission, the imf and the oecd, for example. moreover, the projections are published in the form of ranges, in order to take account of the degree of uncertainty. the ranges reflect the average forecast error from previous periods and therefore differ between each of the projected variables and the projection horizon. compared with december 2000, growth expectations for 2000 and 2001 have been reduced. it is probable that in 2001 real gdp growth in the euro area will decline as compared with the strong increase observed in 2000, before recovering slightly in 2002. overall, this year and next year it will broadly be in line with trend potential growth for the euro area. at the same time, hicp inflation will probably be somewhat higher in 2000 than was expected at the end of last year. the expectation that inflation will fall in 2001 and will remain below 2% in 2002, has, however, remained unchanged, meaning that the ecb will meet its objective of maintaining price stability in the medium term. i should now like to go into some detail on the prospects for growth in the euro area. eurostats first estimate of the growth of real gdp in the first quarter of 2001 has confirmed that economic growth in the euro area has moderated since the second half of 2000. moreover, industri… |
| Jürgen Stark: Economic prospects and the role of monetary policy in the current situation | Period_1 | 2009-03-13 | 0.121 |
|
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy in the euro area | Period_2 | 2019-03-27 | 0.229 | mario draghi: monetary policy in the euro area speech by mr mario draghi, president of the european central bank, at the conference “the ecb and its watchers xx”, frankfurt am main, 27 march 2019. * * * the last year has seen a loss of growth momentum in the euro area, which has extended into 2019. this has been predominantly driven by pervasive uncertainty in the global economy that has spilled over into the external sector. so far, the domestic economy has remained relatively resilient and the drivers of the current expansion remain in place. however, the risks to the outlook remain tilted to the downside. the monetary policy measures we took at the last governing council meeting reflect this assessment. in the face of a weaker growth outlook, they help maintain the accommodative policy stance that we managed to preserve last year as we rotated our instruments from net asset purchases to forward guidance. our policy thereby continues to accompany the economy on its path towards our inflation objective. the outlook for the euro area economy we expected the expansion to slow in 2018 as the business cycle matured and growth retreated towards potential. but as the economy weakened in the second part of last year, it was not yet certain whether we were witnessing a temporary departure from this scenario, or a more lasting deterioration in the growth outlook. the drivers of the deceleration back then appeared, to some extent, to be idiosyncratic and short-lived, relating to th… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy in the euro area | Period_2 | 2019-03-27 | 0.186 | demand will remain as resilient today. the demand component typically affected most by a weaker global environment is investment. ecb internal analysis shows that the more exposed euro area listed firms are to foreign markets, the more sensitive they are to uncertainty when making their investment decisions. and there are some signs that external demand may be affecting investment via manufacturing value chains within the euro area. in particular, both extra and intra-euro area trade slowed steeply last year, whereas in 2016 intra- euro area trade was robust to the external slowdown. such a recoupling of intra- and extra-euro area trade growth in a downward direction has not occurred since the start of the global financial crisis. intra-euro area exports of intermediate and capital goods were hit particularly hard, with capital goods exports registering their strongest contraction since the sovereign debt crisis. a further rise in global uncertainty could therefore lead to a deceleration in trade and investment. but for now expectations for investment remain relatively robust. though professional forecasters have slightly downgraded their projections for investment growth this year – from around 3% to around 2.5% – the fundamentals are in place for investment to rebound, if global growth stabilises. capacity utilisation stands close to its long-term maximum, financing conditions remain very favourable and corporate leverage5 (as a percentage of total assets) has fallen to … |
| Mario Draghi: The outlook for the euro area economy | Period_2 | 2018-11-16 | 0.148 | strong trade growth recorded last year. trade dynamics are now normalising as global growth retreats towards potential. insofar as world trade stabilises at a lower level, its drag on growth could also be temporary. but there are two conditions that could make it longer-lasting. the first is if trade uncertainty rises and dampens euro area export performance, in particular owing to protectionism. the preliminary trade agreement reached between the us, canada and mexico reduces some uncertainty, but other disputes remain. some indicators suggest this is feeding into the trade outlook. the manufacturing pmi for the euro area fell to a two-year low in october, with export- oriented economies recording particularly large drops. new export orders contracted for the first time since 2013. the second condition is if uncertainty about external demand spills over into domestic demand through confidence and investment channels. for now, there is little tangible evidence that the moderation in growth has affected business investment. but there is some evidence that those euro area firms that are most likely to be affected by proposed tariffs have reduced their rate of capital spending. moreover, the slowdown in imports has particularly affected capital and intermediate goods, which might signal that firms are scaling back their investment decisions. so we need to monitor these trade risks very carefully over the coming months. however, we still see the overall risks to the growth out… |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.141 | reflections on monetary policy page 3 of 18 tirpák, m. (2019), markit, thomson financial datastream, fred, kita and ecb calculations. latest update: august 2019 (pmi, philadelphia semiconductor index and us tech pulse index) and july 2019 (korean semiconductor exports). turning to the euro area, real gdp growth slowed from 0.4 percent, quarter on quarter, in the first quarter of this year, to 0.2 percent in the second quarter. this slowdown was due to a contraction of net exports, reflecting the weakness in the external environment, while domestic demand remained resilient. |
| Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2015-11-13 | 0.136 | economic developments and monetary policy incoming data confirm that the recovery in the euro area is progressing moderately. so far, economic activity in the euro area has shown some degree of resilience in the face of external influences that tend to weaken demand. while external demand has receded, euro area exports market shares have increased. the lower cost of energy and our monetary policy measures are supporting consumption and, increasingly, new capital formation. however, downside risks stemming from global growth and trade are clearly visible. moreover, inflation dynamics have somewhat weakened, mainly due to lower oil prices and the delayed effects of the stronger euro exchange rate seen earlier in the year. in addition, price pressures – such as from producer prices – remain very subdued. signs of a sustained turnaround in core inflation have somewhat weakened. while the recovery will gradually strengthen the impulse underlying the inflation process, the protracted economic weakness of the past years continues to weigh on nominal wage growth, and this could moderate price pressures as we move forward. from today’s perspective, this suggests that a sustained normalisation of inflation could take longer than we anticipated in march when we first appraised the overall impact of our measures. we will closely monitor the risks to price stability and thoroughly assess the strength and persistence of the factors that are slowing the return of inflation to levels belo… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.131 | services inflation is closely linked to the strength of the domestic economy. it depends heavily on wage growth, as wages make up around 40% of the inputs for consumer services — double the share for goods. and robust domestic demand is crucial for a strong pass-through from wages to services prices.!1¥! so the key question today is whether the transition out of the pandemic could lift the outlook for domestic demand and thereby contribute to more dynamic services inflation. here we see forces that point in different directions. first, owing mainly to lockdowns, households are sitting on a large stock of savings that they have accumulated during the pandemic. our new consumer expectations survey suggests that households |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.113 | economic activity euro area real gdp growth was robust in the first half of 2022, supported by the reopening of economies in the second quarter as pandemic-related restrictions were lifted. however, the outlook has since darkened due to high inflation, waning reopening effects, weakening global demand and falling confidence. these factors are likely to cause a significant slowdown in euro area gdp growth in the second half of the year 1/4 bis - central bankers’ speeches |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.105 | euro area and world gdp imf world economic outlook and ecb calculations. in relation to the composition of domestic demand, chart 2 shows that consumption and investment remain below pre-pandemic levels, whereas government spending (the sum of public consumption and public investment) has been substantially above the pre-pandemic level since the second half of 2020. the still-subdued level of private expenditure in the euro area stands in contrast to the much stronger recovery in domestic demand in the united states. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-21 | 0.095 | the changing environment one of the most important macroeconomic stories of the past 30 years has been the rising interconnectedness of the global economy and its implications for global supply and demand. china’s entry into the global economy led to a massive increase in global labour supply. global supply chains became more unbundled and efficient, lowering inventory levels and reducing costs. and energy markets changed fundamentally as new producers emerged, notably us shale oil and gas, making global oil and gas supply significantly more elastic.[1] at the same time, globalisation allowed growth to become less beholden to swings in domestic demand, as countries could rotate demand towards the rest of the world when faced with domestic slumps. this proved especially valuable for europe in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis: between 2010 and 2014, external demand as a share of euro area gdp more than doubled.[2] these two forces meant that inflation became unusually low and stable. a floor under demand meant that major busts in domestic demand resulted in less volatile inflation. and elastic supply meant that major booms, such as the one we saw before the great financial crisis, did not produce serious inflationary pressures. |
| Fabio Panetta: The complexity of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.081 | euro area employment across sectors ecb staff calculations based on eurostat data. note: the latest observations are for the first quarter of 2022. as a result, the output and unemployment gaps are giving different signals today. according to our projections, real gdp is expected to remain below its pre-pandemic path over the projection horizon, whereas the labour market is expected to remain resilient.[11] however, the relative contributions of supply and demand conditions are likely to change over time. in particular, the release of pent-up demand largely explains the recent contribution of demand to inflation. this is different from a cyclical upswing that “feeds on itself”[12], or a sustained increase in consumption as seen in the united states as a result of a highly expansionary fiscal policy and rapidly rising wages (chart 4, panel a). that is why, in the euro area, the demand-driven contribution to core inflation has emerged more slowly over time (chart 4, panel b). but forward-looking indicators point to a significant weakening in demand, which suggests that its contribution is likely to fade out (chart 5). |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 102 | stability | 1 | 0.1501238 | definition | 1 | 0.9995619 |
| 102 | price stability | 2 | 0.1303424 | stability objective | 2 | 0.9992986 |
| 102 | definition | 3 | 0.0556253 | price stability objective | 3 | 0.9989482 |
| 102 | objective | 4 | 0.0459041 | quantitative | 4 | 0.9985981 |
| 102 | define | 5 | 0.0245402 | define | 5 | 0.9985977 |
| 102 | medium | 6 | 0.0235229 | quantitative definition | 6 | 0.9985089 |
| 102 | quantitative | 7 | 0.0216013 | price stability | 7 | 0.9980695 |
| 102 | close | 8 | 0.0213752 | harmonise | 8 | 0.9979840 |
| 102 | stability objective | 9 | 0.0194536 | consumer price hicp | 9 | 0.9977196 |
| 102 | aim | 10 | 0.0191145 | stability | 10 | 0.9974528 |
| 102 | price stability objective | 11 | 0.0170798 | objective | 11 | 0.9971032 |
| 102 | consumer | 12 | 0.0141409 | price hicp | 12 | 0.9968435 |
| 102 | medium term | 13 | 0.0131235 | consumer price | 13 | 0.9967580 |
| 102 | hicp | 14 | 0.0125584 | define price | 14 | 0.9967528 |
| 102 | inflation rate | 15 | 0.0125584 | define price stability | 15 | 0.9964463 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean Claude Trichet: The ECB’s monetary policy strategy after the evaluation and clarification of May 2003 | Period_1 | 2003-12-02 | 0.386 | 2.2 the ecb’s definition of price stability to make the treaty mandate operational, the governing council of the ecb has provided a quantitative definition of price stability. price stability is defined as a year-on-year increase in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) for the euro area as a whole of below 2%. by referring to increases in the hicp it was made clear from the beginning, in 1998, that deflation is excluded from the definition of price stability. the governing council also specified that price stability is to be maintained over the medium term. in the light of past experience, it is clear that the announcement of the quantitative definition of price stability was an extremely valuable element of the ecb’s strategy. first, the ecb’s definition of price stability has been instrumental in enhancing the transparency of the policy framework and thereby the accountability of the ecb. |
| Christian Noyer: France, Europe, the euro and the ECB | Period_1 | 2002-03-22 | 0.282 | key aspects of the ecb’s monetary policy strategy to achieve its treaty mandate, the ecb has designed a medium term-oriented monetary policy strategy. to enhance clarity, to anchor expectations and to offer a yardstick against which the ecb can be held accountable, the governing council of the ecb provided a numerical definition of price stability as “a year-on-year increase in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) for the euro area of below 2%”. this is very close to the objectives of most participating national central banks before the start of stage three of economic and monetary union (emu). the banque de france, for example, in 1998 had defined price stability as consumer price inflation “not exceeding 2%”. the governing council also emphasised that price stability has to be maintained over the medium term. the focus on the medium term guarantees that an appropriate orientation be imparted to monetary policy. this ensures measured policy reactions to the threats to price stability and prevents |
| Mr Noyer: Monetary policymaking in the euro area (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 23 Mar 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-03-01 | 0.282 | the phrase “below 2%” clearly delineates the upper bound for the rate of measured inflation in the hicp, which is consistent with price stability. at the same time, the use of the word “increase” in the definition clearly signals that deflation, i.e. prolonged declines in the level of the hicp, would not be deemed consistent with price stability. the main reason for not aiming at a measured inflation rate of zero is what is known as the “measurement bias”, which can exist in consumer price indices. these biases arise mainly from changing spending patterns and quality improvements in those goods and services which are included in the basket used to define a specific price index. such biases cannot always be fully corrected in the construction of price indices. the measurement bias typically causes consumer price indices (cpis) to overstate slightly the “true” rate of inflation. while the measurement bias of the hicp is likely to be lower than that observed in the national cpis of the countries comprising the euro area, we cannot completely neglect it. nevertheless, there are as yet no conclusive studies on the size of the measurement bias of the hicp for the euro area. this is the main reason why the governing council of the ecb did not announce an explicit lower bound for its definition of price stability. in the literature there are also some economic arguments in favour of a slightly positive rate of inflation. first, it has been argued that the existence of downward nom… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Key issues for monetary policy - an ECB view | Period_1 | 2004-10-13 | 0.279 | quantitative definition of price stability first, the ecb provided a quantitative definition of price stability - a year-on-year increase in the harmonised index of consumer prices of below 2% over the medium term. we further clarified that in the pursuit of price stability the ecb aims at inflation rates below but close to 2%. this provides a sufficient safety margin against the risk of deflation. these announcements had not only the advantage of anchoring inflation expectations and enhancing the ecb’s transparency and accountability, but were also instrumental in preserving continuity at the time of transition from the previous national currencies to the euro: the euro area was given the very same definition of price stability adopted implicitly or explicitly by the most credible national currencies. a different definition of price stability would have immediately led to higher inflationary expectations, therefore higher market interest rates all along the yield curve, and to additional substantial risk premia to protect against higher uncertainty over future inflation. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the European economy and the ECB’s monetary policy concept | Period_1 | 2004-07-20 | 0.274 | the ecb’s definition of price stability in order to make the treaty mandate operational, and to enhance the transparency of the policy framework and thereby the accountability of its monetary policy, the governing council of the ecb has provided a quantitative definition of price stability. price stability has been defined as a year-on-year increase of below 2% in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) for the euro area as a whole. by referring to increases in the hicp it was made clear that deflation is excluded from the definition of price stability. |
| Peter Praet: The European Central Bank’s fight against low inflation - reasons and consequences | Period_2 | 2016-04-11 | 0.159 | the ecb’s objective the treaty on the functioning of the european union establishes the ecb’s primary objective as maintaining price stability. but unlike some other central banks, we have not been given a specific numerical inflation target by a legislature or ministry. to enhance accountability, in 1998 the ecb governing council decided that price stability should be defined in quantitative terms, as a year-on-year increase in the harmonised index of consumer prices for the euro area of below 2%, and that it should be maintained over the medium-term. following a thorough evaluation of its monetary policy strategy in 2003, the governing council further clarified that, within this definition of price stability, it aims to maintain inflation rates “below, but close to, 2% over the medium-term”. in other words, since that clarification in 2003 the numerical range for the definition of price stability has been supplemented with a focal point at which the governing council aims, while the temporal horizon over which price stability has to be achieved has remained flexible. however, as inflation has consistently been ratcheting down to the bottom of the price stability range in the course of the past four years and our measures, as a consequence, have become more expansionary, how we interpret our objective and the relevant horizon for delivery have been called more into question. there have been two main issues raised. first, some have asked if the central bank should not be e… |
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.145 | the arguments in favour of central banks aiming for positive inflation rates with a sufficient buffer away from zero were articulated during our strategy review in 2003. it compensates for possible measurement bias, helps countries rebalance their economies within a monetary union and creates a buffer against deflation, as well as leading to higher nominal interest rates over the medium term. that helps ensure that monetary policy is not forced too often towards the effective lower bound – the level of interest rates at which further cuts do not have the desired positive impact – when faced with shocks that push inflation too low. since 2003, the ecb has used a double-key formulation to set our objective, defining price stability as a year-on-year increase in inflation of “below 2%”, while aiming for inflation of “below, but close to, 2%”. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp200930~169abb1202.en.html 1/7 |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy - lifting the veil of effectiveness | Period_2 | 2019-12-18 | 0.129 | but until this happens – and the pace will depend a lot on our broader economic policy framework, which i won’t discuss this morning[12] – central banks are likely to have to navigate in a low-growth, low-inflation environment with the risk of repeatedly failing to deliver inflation in line with their aim. monetary policy in a low-inflation environment what, then, can, or should, central banks do in this environment? let me propose four elements for future reflection: how we define price stability, how we treat inflation expectations, how we measure inflation and how we implement monetary policy. some proposals are more far-reaching than others. but all share one aim: to bring monetary policy closer to the people – to dismantle the veil of effectiveness and to foster acceptance of policies and instruments that too often are used as scapegoat for shortcomings and deficiencies elsewhere in our public policy apparatus. rethinking the definition of price stability consider first the ecb’s definition of price stability as inflation rates of “below, but close to, 2%”. a simple answer to the current challenges would be to lower the inflation aim. if my dissection of the current inflation drivers is vaguely on the right track, then it is clear that this strategy would be wrong on many levels. it would misjudge the current low-inflation episode as permanent and thereby dismiss the lessons of history on the slow pace of diffusion of new technologies.[13] it would create perilous tim… |
| Peter Praet: Monetary policy and balance sheet adjustment | Period_2 | 2014-05-28 | 0.126 | the ecb’s policy framework there are clear limits to the leeway that we – central banks – can afford within our mandates. our medium-term price stability objective implies that we cannot stretch our policy horizon forever – even if the economy is undergoing a lengthy deleveraging process. monetary policy needs to act forcefully if and when the adjustment process threatens the fulfilment of our mandate. we should preserve the virtues of constrained discretion: 6 a delicate and fragile blend of opposing attributes of monetary policy-making, which central banks acquired in the form of mandates in the 1990s, and which has served us well since then on our long journey back from the inflation years. let’s not forget that – since the early 1990s when the industrial world eradicated inflation – the emphasis in the “constrained discretion” oxymoron has always been on constrained. in the early 1990s rules won a long battle over discretion. and rules meant a numerical definition of the inflation objective and a flexible but certain horizon for accomplishing the objective. pushing on a string when the transmission of monetary policy stimulus is impeded by the countervailing forces of deleveraging can be counterproductive. at the same time, accepting low or even negative inflation rates in such a situation may render the balance sheet adjustment more painful and drawn-out. and it may destabilise inflation expectations. a protracted period of too low inflation, which is typical for epis… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy communication in turbulent times | Period_2 | 2014-04-24 | 0.124 | reaffirming the price stability objective the crisis has of course not altered our price stability mandate, which is defined in primary law, in the treaty. nonetheless, the events of recent years have made it important for the ecb to reaffirm that mandate – specifically, to explain its medium-term orientation and its euro area perspective. furthermore, the governing council will be equally active in responding to medium-term developments in inflation that fall short of our objective as to those that exceed it. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.111 |
will now turn to the treatment of owner-occupied
housing for inflation measurement, as requested by this committee. the
ecb considers that price stability is best maintained by aiming for two
per cent inflation over the medium term, with the harmonised index of
consumer prices (hicp) being the appropriate price measure. it is thus
of primary importance to the ecb that the hicp appropriately represents
the consumption patterns of euro area households. shelter being a
primary need, the cost of housing is an issue that is foremost in many
people’s minds. this was reflected in our ecb listens events!4! and in
your resolution adopted earlier this year.
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 103 | fiscal | 1 | 0.1639700 | fiscal policy | 1 | 0.9988601 |
| 103 | fiscal policy | 2 | 0.0693558 | space | 2 | 0.9985542 |
| 103 | support | 3 | 0.0448040 | generation | 3 | 0.9985104 |
| 103 | stabilisation | 4 | 0.0159407 | fiscal | 4 | 0.9985084 |
| 103 | economy | 5 | 0.0155814 | fiscal space | 5 | 0.9983326 |
| 103 | national | 6 | 0.0128268 | policy mix | 6 | 0.9980701 |
| 103 | space | 7 | 0.0128268 | generation eu | 7 | 0.9980695 |
| 103 | strong | 8 | 0.0125873 | stabilisation | 8 | 0.9976311 |
| 103 | investment | 9 | 0.0122280 | national fiscal | 9 | 0.9970592 |
| 103 | public | 10 | 0.0118687 | structural policy | 10 | 0.9970212 |
| 103 | government | 11 | 0.0111501 | public investment | 11 | 0.9970168 |
| 103 | generation | 12 | 0.0110303 | mix | 12 | 0.9969334 |
| 103 | european | 13 | 0.0107908 | fiscal stance | 13 | 0.9967577 |
| 103 | recovery | 14 | 0.0106710 | fiscal support | 14 | 0.9965317 |
| 103 | eu | 15 | 0.0105513 | coordinate | 15 | 0.9953566 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jürgen Stark: Towards a stability-oriented policy framework | Period_1 | 2010-02-26 | 0.135 | fiscal policy for many commentators, the financial crisis has underlined the need for a return of the state in managing macroeconomic developments. of course, together with central bank liquidity support, discretionary government intervention has been key in forestalling a repeat of a 1930s-style depression. however, we are observing a drift in public liabilities that will prove hard to correct with the usual stabilisers. in some countries, this drift actually has nothing to do with the financial crisis. it is rooted in the policy hyper-activism that was already in place before the crisis. and this despite the obvious dangers of an overreactive fiscal stance, which cannot be decided and implemented without long lags. here, fiscal rules, such as the stability and growth pact in the european union can help. if given enough authority, rules can induce symmetric behaviour. it remains to be seen how the discretionary fiscal measures adopted in response to the crisis can be wound down and reversed to support fiscal sustainability in the longer run. since the ecb has started to gradually phase out its extraordinary liquidity support measures, fiscal authorities should also start to withdraw stimulus to safeguard public solvency over the medium term. to support this, we have the right mechanisms in place in europe. governments will have to comply with and, as experience shows, even re-enforce the fiscal rules enshrined in the stability and growth pact. |
| Jürgen Stark: Central banking after the financial crisis | Period_1 | 2011-02-23 | 0.128 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: The economic crisis and the response of fiscal and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2009-06-15 | 0.121 | discretionary use of fiscal policy in addition to providing financial support to the banking sector, euro area governments reacted forcefully to counter the negative impact of the financial turmoil on the real economy. besides the operation of automatic stabilisers, which provide a significant cushion to the euro area economy by way of lower tax revenues and higher spending on unemployment benefits, the discretionary use of fiscal policy helped to mitigate the effects of the global economic downturn. however, fiscal stimulus measures need to remain temporary and be combined with measures that ensure fiscal sustainability over the medium run. this will preserve trust in the sustainability of public finances and support both the recovery and long-term economic growth. |
| Jürgen Stark: The economic crisis and the response of fiscal and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2009-06-15 | 0.108 | the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus measures also depends on the extent to which private investors respond positively to tax policy, with their investments likely to be more responsive in the case of “temporary” tax breaks, as they provide an incentive to bring forward future investment plans. at the same time, there is a risk that fiscal stimulus measures may crowd out private investment by putting upward pressure on interest rates. as regards the size of the fiscal multiplier, empirical studies (e.g. perotti (2002), blanchard and perotti (2002), imf weo (2008)) show that in the short term (i.e. after one quarter) public spending multipliers are larger than tax multipliers. by contrast, in the long term, revenue measures are associated with higher growth and faster recoveries. these results reflect the theoretical keynesian prediction that some of the higher disposable income from a tax cut is saved, while government purchases of goods and services directly affect the aggregate demand. however, the evidence on the relative effectiveness of the different measures is mixed. for the euro area, the measures adopted by governments are estimated to have a short-lived impact on real gdp growth, limited to the year in which they are introduced. besides these factors, the effectiveness of any stimulus package will depend to a large extent on its design and implementation. fiscal stimulus measures should be “timely, temporary and targeted”. “timely” means that the measures take ef… |
| Jürgen Stark: The economic crisis and the response of fiscal and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2009-06-15 | 0.107 | fiscal policy measures let me now turn to the fiscal policy reaction to the economic crisis. fiscal authorities in the euro area have demonstrated their willingness and capacity to act rapidly and in a coordinated manner in exceptional circumstances. it is important to distinguish between measures intended to support the banking sector and fiscal policy measures aimed at stimulating demand. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-03-11 | 0.348 | other european institutions, remain essential to support bank lending conditions and access to financing, in particular for those most affected by the pandemic. to sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed that an ample degree of monetary accommodation is necessary to support economic activity and the robust convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2 per cent over the medium term. regarding fiscal policies, an ambitious and coordinated fiscal stance remains critical in view of the sharp contraction in the euro area economy. to this end, support from national fiscal policies should continue given weak demand from firms and households relating to the ongoing pandemic and the associated containment measures. at the same time, fiscal measures taken in response to the pandemic emergency should, as much as possible, remain temporary and targeted in nature to address vulnerabilities effectively and to support a swift recovery. the three safety nets endorsed by the european council for workers, businesses and governments provide important funding support. the governing council recognises the key role of the next generation eu package and stresses the importance of it becoming operational without delay. it calls on member states to ensure a timely ratification of the own resources decision, to finalise their recovery and resilience plans promptly and to deploy the funds for prod… |
| Luis de Guindos: Improving macroeconomic stabilisation in the euro area | Period_2 | 2019-10-07 | 0.294 | challenges that a sustained low interest rate environment poses for banks. reforming the fiscal framework so there is a role for fiscal policy to play in helping to counter common shocks at the european level. to the extent that member states have created fiscal space, it would therefore be desirable for fiscal policy in the euro area to support business cycle stabilisation more actively. our current assessment is that the fiscal stance is only mildly expansionary at the aggregate level. but the current institutional framework is insufficient to deliver that required stimulus. fiscal policy remains a national responsibility in economic and monetary union (emu), with some common rules applicable to individual countries. in its first incarnation, the stability and growth pact focused almost exclusively on fiscal sustainability, with little emphasis on fiscal stabilisation.5 in recent years it has undergone several reforms, some of them with the explicit aim of providing greater prominence to stabilisation considerations, both at the country level and at the euro area level. the result has been rules which are now viewed as complex and opaque, with little evidence that they have delivered a more countercyclical fiscal policy stance in the euro area.6 the stability and growth pact has limited flexibility and does not lend itself to incorporating area- wide stabilisation elements. national fiscal rules, with a focus on domestic issues, tend to neglect positive cross-border spil… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-06-10 | 0.292 | flows and positive base effects. overall, our policy measures, together with the measures adopted by national governments and other european institutions, remain essential to support bank lending conditions and access to financing, in particular for those most affected by the pandemic. to sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed that an ample degree of monetary accommodation is necessary to support economic activity and the robust convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2 per cent over the medium term. regarding fiscal policies, an ambitious and coordinated fiscal stance remains crucial, as a premature withdrawal of fiscal support would risk weakening the recovery and amplifying the longer-term scarring effects. national fiscal policies should thus continue to provide critical and timely support to the firms and households most exposed to the ongoing pandemic and the associated containment measures. at the same time, fiscal measures should remain temporary and countercyclical, while ensuring that they are sufficiently targeted in nature to address vulnerabilities effectively and to support a swift recovery in the euro area economy. the three safety nets endorsed by the european council for workers, businesses and governments provide important funding support. the governing council reiterates the key role of the next generation eu package. it calls on member states to … |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-01-21 | 0.269 | the governing council recognises the key role of the next generation eu package and stresses the importance of it becoming operational without delay. it calls on member states to accelerate the ratification process, to finalise their recovery and resilience plans promptly and to deploy the funds for productive public spending, accompanied by productivity-enhancing structural policies. this would allow the next generation eu programme to contribute to a faster, stronger and more uniform recovery and would increase economic resilience and the growth potential of member states’ economies, thereby supporting the effectiveness of monetary policy in the euro area. such structural policies are particularly important in addressing long-standing structural and institutional weaknesses and in accelerating the green and digital transitions. we are now ready to take your questions. related topics coronavirus key ecb interest rates pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp) asset purchase programme (app) targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltros) monetary policy fiscal policy policies inflation uncertainties economic development forward guidance euro area https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2021/html/ecb.is210121~e601112a72.en.html 3/4 |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2021-01-21 | 0.254 | regarding fiscal policies, an ambitious and coordinated fiscal stance remains critical, in view of the sharp contraction in the euro area economy. to this end, continued support from national fiscal policies is warranted given weak demand from firms and households relating to the worsening of the pandemic and the intensification of containment measures. at the same time, fiscal measures taken in response to the pandemic emergency should, as much as possible, remain targeted and temporary in nature. the three safety nets endorsed by the european council for workers, businesses and governments provide important funding support. |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.223 | in particular, under the next generation eu (ngeu) programme a european fiscal instrument was created with the necessary resources to support the recovery.[12] the interventions were based on national recovery and resilience plans detailing reform and investment strategies consistent with shared objectives at european level, such as the green and digital transitions.[13] high debt countries, such as italy and spain, obtained european resources amounting, respectively, to 11% and 6% of gdp. this created the basis for a european social contract for exiting the pandemic: eu member states committed to make their economies more competitive in exchange for european funding.[14] in this way, not only would ngeu enhance medium-term growth prospects but it would also contribute to convergence. through its allocation key, ngeu supports growth in those eu member states hardest hit by the pandemic and with below-average gdp per capita in particular. in so doing, it improves debt sustainability and contributes to fiscal convergence.[15] and by stabilising markets, it has supported a faster-than-expected recovery for all member states. in the process, two paradigm shifts have occurred. first, the new european common fiscal instruments were designed with explicit recognition that the eu is more than the sum of its parts. funded collectively, the ngeu package has created a critical fiscal policy space akin to the federal budget support existing in other economies. this reflected the growi… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.199 |
|
| Isabel Schnabel: Managing policy trade-offs | Period_3 | 2022-04-13 | 0.179 | common fiscal capacity, high debt levels leave the euro area vulnerable to sudden and costly shifts in investor sentiment. all this means that fiscal policy should follow a two-pronged strategy. first, governments should prioritise spending on investments that will raise productivity and potential output, thereby reducing the burden of high legacy debt. a key lesson from the war is that europe needs major public investment in green energy infrastructure and military defence.8 implementing faithfully the structural reforms linked to the recovery and resilience facility will be an important part of this endeavour. increased public investment will at least partly offset the negative output effects stemming from depressed consumer and business confidence. second, governments should provide temporary and well-targeted support to protect those seeking refuge from the war and those who are most vulnerable to the sharp increase in energy prices and the sanctions imposed in response to russia’s invasion of ukraine. importantly, both types of measures need to remain consistent with each other. in particular, this means supporting the green transition by retaining, as much as possible, incentives to reduce carbon emissions rather than muting price signals. several member states have already taken important action at national level. the general escape clause that remains active this year implies that there is short-term budgetary flexibility. preliminary estimates suggest that these m… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.177 | effects on other countries. the costs in turn relate to the possibility that european policies fail to reflect the heterogeneity of preferences across member states.[25] theory therefore suggests that the eu should provide for public goods that cannot be offered more effectively or efficiently at the national level, and for which the preferences of citizens are sufficiently homogenous across europe. in my view, such eu public goods do include the investment needs i have just listed. the ensuing call for more fiscal resources on a permanent basis at the european level may lead to further important steps towards the creation of a european fiscal union. in line with the dictum of monnet, the crisis thus offers a possibility to create stronger fiscal capacity at the european level that could also be used to pursue the delivery of common public goods while not neglecting related “first-best” objectives such as optimal risk-sharing, countercyclical stabilisation, and promotion of growth and convergence. recognising that it is an illusion that emu can function smoothly without a centralised fiscal capacity, we should address the imbalances in the institutional framework of monetary union, whereby a single monetary policy coexists with a fiscal policy that is fragmented across national lines. this would strengthen our capacity to counter systemic shocks when interest rates are at the lower bound. and it would allow us to cushion the effects of idiosyncratic shocks that may emerge … |
| Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement | Period_3 | 2022-10-17 | 0.176 | fiscal policy remains key to buffering the shock from the war and should continue to provide a lifeline to households and firms facing a steep rise in energy bills. at the same time, fiscal support measures should be temporary and targeted at the most vulnerable households and firms – those who are bearing the brunt of higher energy prices – to limit the risk of fuelling inflationary pressures and to make public spending more efficient. and these measures need to be supported by an accelerated clean energy transition, including through additional public investment. with monetary policy normalising, the focus of fiscal policy will need to shift progressively towards measures that preserve debt sustainability without endangering the recovery in the medium term. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 104 | role | 1 | 0.1940721 | role | 1 | 0.9999124 |
| 104 | play | 2 | 0.1160313 | play | 2 | 0.9999124 |
| 104 | level | 3 | 0.0486106 | key role | 3 | 0.9986849 |
| 104 | key | 4 | 0.0423351 | crucial | 4 | 0.9983353 |
| 104 | good | 5 | 0.0312324 | key | 5 | 0.9982463 |
| 104 | include | 6 | 0.0281751 | determine | 6 | 0.9978972 |
| 104 | contribute | 7 | 0.0223824 | crucial role | 7 | 0.9978953 |
| 104 | provide | 8 | 0.0220606 | central role | 8 | 0.9975431 |
| 104 | crucial | 9 | 0.0177161 | major | 9 | 0.9974583 |
| 104 | major | 10 | 0.0154633 | include | 10 | 0.9974565 |
| 104 | determine | 11 | 0.0144979 | active | 11 | 0.9973701 |
| 104 | account | 12 | 0.0136933 | contribute | 12 | 0.9971933 |
| 104 | factor | 13 | 0.0117624 | role play | 13 | 0.9970168 |
| 104 | key role | 14 | 0.0104752 | mind | 14 | 0.9963639 |
| 104 | broad | 15 | 0.0093488 | shape | 15 | 0.9963192 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: The role of money in the conduct of monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-11-16 | 0.111 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation and deflation risks - how to recognise them? How to avoid them? | Period_1 | 2009-07-01 | 0.075 | movements in various measures of economic slack have played a fairly modest role in the inflation process in the euro area in recent years. 6 the same phillips curve analysis suggests that changes in inflation expectations play a major role in shaping inflation developments, anchoring inflation and potentially mitigating the harmful outcomes resulting from temporary shocks. in such a setting, expectations pin down the level of inflation in the long run, while changes in the output gap lead to short-run accelerations or decelerations of inflation around that level. there are many caveats to using a phillips curve framework to relate inflation developments to economic slack – for instance, measures of both inflation expectations and the output gap are subject to considerable uncertainty, non-linearities may arise, and the relationship may change over time. moreover, the actual impact of slowing real economic activity on inflation depends crucially on the nature of the economic downturn, the types of shock hitting the economy, their magnitude and duration. wage and price rigidities may also contribute to help to moderate inflationary responses to changing economic conditions in the short run. overall, the current weakness in real economic activity would be expected to dampen inflationary pressures in the euro area but not to lead to outright deflation. the approach underscores that while economic slack may contribute to movements of inflation in the short run, well-anchored i… |
| Lucas Papademos: The science of monetary policy ¿ past advances and future challenges | Period_1 | 2007-09-24 | 0.074 | iii.2. expectations another priority in our research agenda is to enhance our understanding of the way expectations are formed by different agents in the economy, and how they can be managed successfully so as to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy. inflation expectations play a crucial role in determining the impact of monetary policy on the economy and in shaping the dynamic response of prices and output to shocks. forecasts of future price developments and policy simulations based on macroeconometric models depend critically on the modelling of expectations. by now it is widely accepted that expectations should, by and large, be formed “rationally” in the sense that they should take into account all relevant available information concerning the structure and functioning of the economy and the factors and policies – notably monetary policy – that may affect future price developments. this broad formulation about the nature and formation of expectations is perfectly reasonable, appropriate and superior to any mechanical backward-looking specification of expectations formation. in practice, however, there are crucial issues that must be addressed on how exactly “all available relevant information concerning the economy’s structure and functioning” is obtained and processed by economic agents. often the hypothesis of “rational expectations” in incorporated in theoretical and econometric models by making simplifying and rather unrealistic assumptions about the avail… |
| Press Conference - introductory statement (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 19 Oct 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-10-19 | 0.073 | there are indeed challenges to be taken up by means of appropriate and determined action, but there are good reasons for remaining confident. monetary policy will ensure that risks stemming from import price developments will not translate into more permanent inflationary tendencies, thereby also helping to preserve steady gdp and employment growth in the medium term. governments have increasingly come to recognise the benefits of sound public finances and adequate policies over the long term so as not to overburden future generations. however, continued determination is required. while overall budget positions have improved significantly, this has been helped considerably by the relatively low level of interest rates and the strong upturn in growth. these favourable conditions should be used to intensify the process of fiscal consolidation. governments should demonstrate their commitment to structural budget consolidation by accompanying the forthcoming tax reforms with spending restraint. this would ensure the full benefits of such reforms. governments have also acted in the field of product markets in order to make them more competitive to the benefit of consumers. a favourable impact on prices, growth and employment of opening up sectors to competition has become clear with regard to the telecommunications and energy sectors. the challenge is now to further reduce the level of regulation so as to stimulate activities in other sectors of the economy, too. governments an… |
| Otmar Issing: Evaluation of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy | Period_1 | 2003-07-27 | 0.073 | how was the evaluation conducted? accordingly, we went through several steps. the first was to revisit all the technical issues. all aspects of the strategy were scrutinized, going through a lively internal debate and resulting in a series of technical studies now available on our web site. the key role here was played by the staff of the ecb and of the national central banks, the latter contributing through the eurosystem monetary policy committee. use was made of research accumulated during the recent years, in the ecb and outside, on a number of issues relevant for the strategy, such as the transmission of monetary policy, the determinants of prices, the leading indicator properties of money, credit and other key indicators, and the like. the second step was to reflect on how the strategy has contributed to the debate within the ecb decision making bodies, naturally with a particular focus on the council. in the decade leading up to the emu, a broad consensus on the principles of sound monetary policy making emerged among the ncb’s now forming the monetary union. even so, the ecb governing council is a large body, with a wealth of diverse experiences and views. the strategy must provide a commonly accepted framework within which these experiences and views all contribute to policy decisions. the strategy should also ensure that the relevant information is taken into account fully and orderly. from this point of view, the ultimate test for the success of the strategy are… |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.085 | finally, as i have outlined today, our monetary policy decisions are driven by our assessment of the macroeconomic and financial environment. as noted in last week’s introductory statement, other policy pillars play a critical role in determining the long-term and short-term prospects for the euro area economy. growth-enhancing institutional and structural reforms and a more growth-friendly composition of public finances can play important roles in boosting the long-run potential of the euro area economy. at the cyclical level, fiscal policy can contain the impact of adverse shocks through the operation of automatic stabilisers and, where feasible and effective, through the timing of discretionary fiscal measures. all else being equal, the more fiscal policy contributes to boosting long-term growth potential and providing cyclical stabilisation, the quicker will be the effects of monetary policy interventions on inflation and the economy. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp190916~ca7… 16.09.2019 |
| Vítor Constâncio: Monetary policy and the euro area problem | Period_2 | 2015-11-25 | 0.071 | ladies and gentlemen, i am honoured by mr maleki’s invitation to speak at the opening conference of the 18th euro finance week. in my remarks today i would like to characterise the current economic situation in the euro area. furthermore, i will address the roles that monetary policy, supply-side reforms and fiscal policies have played – and can play in the future – in shaping this situation. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_2 | 2020-06-09 | 0.070 | the measures considered and determining whether alternative instruments might be more efficient in attaining the objective. in my first hearing before this committee in september 2019, i referred to this assessment as a “cost-benefit analysis”. more generally, the ecb continually monitors the proportionality of its instruments. such assessments are conducted regularly, as reflected in the monetary policy accounts, in speeches, and not least in the regular exchanges with the european parliament such as the one today. the ecb’s strategy review will also play an important part in these ongoing efforts for instance, consider our decision to expand the volume of the pepp: on the basis of solid analysis, we determined that asset purchases are a particularly effective tool in the current environment. given the still fragile state of transmission, they are also more efficient than alternative instruments, as they have a more direct impact on the borrowing conditions faced by households and firms. given the continued disruptions caused by the pandemic, the net effects to be gained from the pepp expansion are overwhelmingly positive. the additional asset purchases will contribute to easing credit conditions for the private sector and thus support viable businesses in continuing to operate and in retaining as many workers as possible. this will help to preserve jobs, which is the most important factor determining the income and financial security of individuals and families in the eu… |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Monetary policy - end of history? | Period_2 | 2018-07-27 | 0.068 | about creating equal opportunities for everyone. in this context, education and equal access to it should be at the top of the to-do list of any government. so, a lot remains to be done, not just on equality but on growth in general. after all, growth also plays a big role in fighting inequality. and when it comes to long-term growth, research shows that the quality of institutions plays a major role. 8 at the same time, the quality of institutions differs between countries. so, some countries have scope to improve judicial systems, public administration and insolvency regimes. this would make their economies more resilient and help them to grow. and i’m not just referring to institutions at the national level. european institutions are not free of deficiencies either. they too need to improve. if we want european citizens to trust europe, we need to make sure we deliver on our promises. and there is a long way to go: according to the latest eurobarometer survey, only 41% of europeans tend to trust the eu. and the latest election results show that anti-european parties are still on the rise – think of germany, think of italy. so there is a need for reform and a need to explain thoroughly how the european union benefits each and every european citizen. conclusion ladies and gentlemen, history does not end for monetary policy. it did not end with the great moderation, and it will not end with the exit from our unconventional measures. there are still many questions that need… |
| Yves Mersch: Asset price inflation and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2020-01-28 | 0.066 | the limits of macroprudential policy the risks to asset prices from loose monetary policy have brought macroprudential policies into sharper focus. these policies are exercised at the national level by the relevant competent authority where central banks are supposed to play a leading role. the idea here is that macroprudential policies can offset the build-up of risk, leading to an overall optimal policy mix. certainly, macroprudential policies can be effective in restraining increases in residential property prices, but they are no panacea. |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.060 |
|
| Philip R Lane: Inflation in the near-term and the medium-term | Period_3 | 2022-02-18 | 0.059 | moving from near-term to medium-term inflation dynamics, there is a clear potential linkage: if currently-high inflation causes a rethink about the likely level of medium-term inflation, a persistent shift in inflation expectations can play a significant role in determining inflation dynamics. there are several mechanisms at work here. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.055 | the second source of uncertainty | would like to discuss today relates to potential behavioural changes induced by the pandemic. microeconomic rigidities such as those stemming from wage- and price-setting behaviour have profound implications for the transmission of monetary policy. collectively, these rigidities play a crucial but subtle role in determining the location and slope of the phillips curve — a reduced form description of how changes in aggregate demand put pressure on inflation. this relationship can arise from underlying structural relations in a wide class of state-of-the- art sticky price models, as one paper at this conference will show.!13! |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.053 |
|
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox and the effective lower bound | Period_3 | 2021-11-16 | 0.053 | “durably for the rest of the projection horizon.” the third condition is that the governing council “judges that realised progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at two per cent over the medium term.” let me highlight today two key features of this rate forward guidance. first, requiring that we see inflation reaching two per cent not only “well ahead of the end of our projection horizon” but also “durably for the rest of the projection horizon” ensures that interest rate policy will not react to inflation shocks that are expected to fade away before the end of our projection horizon. second, the condition that “realised progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at two per cent over the medium term” serves an important purpose in our analysis of the incoming data: it sharply differentiates between the volatile components of headline inflation and the dynamics of underlying inflation, which is the persistent component that is the best guide to medium-term inflation dynamics. the inclusion of a condition that is based on realisations of underlying inflation takes into account the intrinsic uncertainty of economic forecasts, especially during periods of structural change that generate “disparate confounding dynamics”.1 since the services sector constitutes a large share of the overall price level and since wages (adjusting for productivity) are the princip… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 105 | instrument | 1 | 0.1040561 | unconventional | 1 | 0.9997371 |
| 105 | mandate | 2 | 0.0521684 | policy instrument | 2 | 0.9991239 |
| 105 | tool | 3 | 0.0504299 | tool | 3 | 0.9990359 |
| 105 | unconventional | 4 | 0.0449470 | stability mandate | 4 | 0.9990356 |
| 105 | measure | 5 | 0.0342485 | instrument | 5 | 0.9988597 |
| 105 | policy instrument | 6 | 0.0222127 | unconventional measure | 6 | 0.9987729 |
| 105 | effective | 7 | 0.0206079 | conventional | 7 | 0.9985105 |
| 105 | conventional | 8 | 0.0186020 | unconventional monetary | 8 | 0.9984654 |
| 105 | objective | 9 | 0.0175321 | price stability mandate | 9 | 0.9984222 |
| 105 | limit | 10 | 0.0175321 | unconventional monetary policy | 10 | 0.9978962 |
| 105 | stability mandate | 11 | 0.0155262 | mandate | 11 | 0.9977177 |
| 105 | unconventional measure | 12 | 0.0151250 | monetary policy instrument | 12 | 0.9975454 |
| 105 | deliver | 13 | 0.0149912 | policy tool | 13 | 0.9971505 |
| 105 | achieve | 14 | 0.0147238 | deploy | 14 | 0.9968455 |
| 105 | price stability mandate | 15 | 0.0143226 | court | 15 | 0.9962733 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: China and the European Union - global economic challenges and policy responses | Period_1 | 2008-09-17 | 0.120 | notable exception is china which continues to experience robust growth, only moderately lower than the growth of 11.5% recorded in 2007. to address these multiple challenges, policy instruments must be used in an effective and consistent way. effectiveness requires to choose the appropriate policy instrument that can materially contribute to the achievement of an objective in a sustained manner. consistency requires using the available instruments in a way that is mutually reinforcing. the effective and consistent use of policy instruments should produce outcomes that have a durable overall positive impact on economic performance. let me elaborate on these propositions by examining the appropriate policy responses to the global economic challenges we face in the euro area and in china, and by assessing their effects on the eu-china economic relationship. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Asset price bubbles and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-06-14 | 0.073 | methodological discussion has not yet converged. and finally, central banks’ lack sufficient control of asset prices. in the long run asset prices are driven by fundamental factors and not monetary policy. pricking asset price bubbles the focus of serious academic debate has moved away from this approach more recently, but the view that central banks should act decidedly against suspected asset price bubbles occasionally surfaces among market observers. the roots of this position can be traced back to the so-called “liquidationist” view, which was widely entertained by mainstream economists in the context of the heated debate over the stock market boom of the 1920s in the us. the view had some prominent advocates within the board of governors of the federal reserve system who substantiated their inclination for a strong policy reaction to market dynamics on the grounds that the central bank, by acting decidedly, would force liquidation of the most stretched positions without dealing further damage on sound investment strategies and the economy more broadly. while often advanced by economists who are otherwise most distrustful of the central bank’s ability to manage economic events, this position is now widely rejected by today’s profession.23 the monetary policy instrument is just a too blunt tool to allow the type of surgical intervention that the “pricking” of the bubble would require. |
| Lucas Papademos: China and the European Union - global economic challenges and policy responses | Period_1 | 2008-09-17 | 0.067 | these two issues are intimately linked because the sustainability of growth depends on establishing an environment of low inflation, of price stability. moreover, to “maintain the stability of the value of the currency and thereby promote economic growth” requires the preservation of domestic price level stability. to secure these goals, monetary policy has to be fully geared towards achieving the internal price stability objective, as is the case in the euro area. but to successfully achieve price stability requires allowing for greater exchange rate flexibility, since pegging the exchange rate vis-à-vis another currency or a basket or currencies, or tightly managing the exchange rate, effectively limits the room of manoeuvre for monetary policy. these arguments underscore the importance of the steps that have been taken by the chinese authorities since the exchange rate reform in july 2005: they have formally delinked from the hard peg against the us dollar, allowed an appreciation of the renminbi in effective terms, promoted the development of the local foreign exchange market, and set up a policy framework that has the potential to deliver even greater exchange rate flexibility. as a result of these measures, the renminbi has appreciated by almost 17% in real and around 15% in nominal effective terms. these developments are welcome and should be praised since they contribute to the achievement of external and internal stability. but are these steps sufficient in the li… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: The challenges facing monetary policy | Period_1 | 2011-01-27 | 0.046 | introduction from the start of the crisis in summer 2007, monetary policy has faced a number of challenges, linked particularly to the interaction between the development of the real economy and the turbulence in the financial markets. this has forced central banks to operate not only by way of conventional measures, in particular the key interest rate at which liquidity is injected into the system, but also via unconventional measures, designed to bypass the malfunctioning that has arisen in the financial system. the combination of these measures depends on the intensity of the crisis and on the ways it has developed in both the real and financial world. at a time of general uncertainty, central banks have had not only to try to anticipate events but also to use a more efficient combination of instruments to respond to those events. this challenge remains unchanged, even when looking ahead, given the persistent uncertainty about the gradual recovery in economic activity in advanced countries, including the euro area, and the situation on financial markets particularly in the markets for government securities. i would like to consider some of the challenges that central banks face at a time like the present, also drawing on the experience that we have gained in respect of similar cyclical phases. it should however be noted that this crisis, although it presents features that are similar to those in the past, is much greater in its nature and intensity. in terms of falling … |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Could monetary policy have helped prevent the financial crisis? | Period_1 | 2010-04-13 | 0.045 |
|
| Mario Draghi: Delivering a symmetric mandate with asymmetric tools - monetary policy in a context of low interest rates | Period_2 | 2016-06-08 | 0.219 | to the lower bound. in those conditions, any perception that the central bank might tolerate persistent downward inflation misses would be especially costly. it would lead first of all to a dis-anchoring of inflation expectations, which would cause real yields to rise mechanically. this would be contractionary and could not be offset by lowering policy rates even further. and with fixed nominal debts, lower inflation would trigger redistribution from borrowers to creditors, which would prolong the debt overhang and exacerbate the contraction due to the different propensities to consume and invest of those two groups. this is not an argument for raising inflation targets, as that would only create redistribution in the other direction. but it is an argument for central banks to fulfil their objectives. however, while our mandate is symmetric, and our commitment to our mandate is symmetric, there is an asymmetry in the tools we can use to achieve it, which stems from the existence of a lower bound for interest rates. when inflation is too high, we can always raise interest rates to a level that will rein in demand and eventually prices. and as this is widely understood from historical experience, our credibility relies only on one parameter: our willingness to fight excessive inflation. our ability to do so is taken for granted. when inflation is too low, however, there are limits to how far interest rates can be cut, because of the existence of a non-interest bearing substi… |
| Mario Draghi: Global and domestic inflation | Period_2 | 2015-12-08 | 0.194 | 2017 and the decision to re-invest the principal payments on maturing securities for as long as necessary will add eur 680 billion – some 6.5% of the euro area gdp – in liquidity to the system by 2019, relative to the situation that would have prevailed under previous policies. this will strengthen our forward guidance on interest rates and ensure that liquidity will remain very supportive in the long term. there was very broad support among members of the council for recalibrating our instruments to put inflation trends back on the path towards 2% that we envisaged when we launched our purchase programme. there was also very broad agreement with the extent of the recalibration, which was based on technical work carried out by the staff of the whole eurosystem in our committees. the analysis we did before the inception of our asset purchases, and the evidence accumulated since, give us confidence that the additional measures announced yesterday provide material upward pressure on price dynamics to reach our objective as initially intended. arguably, the only difference between our current situation and a more traditional situation is that our monetary policy stance is not determined primarily on the basis of just one tool – interest rates – but on the basis of an array of tools, which include also the pace of asset purchases, and forward guidance on both interest rates and asset purchases. but similar to the times when we steered policy primarily through interest rates, we… |
| Yves Mersch: Interview in Wall Street Journal | Period_2 | 2016-02-03 | 0.184 | is unconventional monetary policy becoming conventional? unconventional measures play an important role. they have been effective, but in a specific circumstance of a very prolonged recessionary and deflationary environment. i do not consider that this is the new normal. if you ask me about secular stagnation, it’s a theory that we obviously take very seriously. but to say we accept it as the new normal would not be in line with what the ecb-president has said at his last press conference: “we continue to fight.” normally you don’t fight the normal, you fight the abnormal. |
| Mario Draghi: The European Central Bank’s recent monetary policy measures - effectiveness and challenges | Period_2 | 2015-05-19 | 0.175 | ladies and gentlemen, over the past year the ecb has taken a series of major monetary policy measures, culminating in our decision in january this year to expand our asset purchases towards public sector securities. while the aim of these measures is the same as it has always been – maintaining price stability over the medium-term – their form is unprecedented for our central bank. and as such our policy decisions have become more complex in two key ways. first, as interest rates have reached their effective lower bound in the euro area, we have become more constrained in our ability to deploy conventional monetary policy tools. this has required us to develop new instruments to achieve the same results. second, because the use of these new instruments can have different consequences than conventional monetary policy, in particular with respect to the distribution of wealth and the allocation of resources, it has become more important that those consequences are identified, weighed and where necessary mitigated. in my remarks today i would like to discuss how our monetary policy has evolved within this new environment – both in terms of how we have deployed our instruments and how we are managing their consequences. |
| Yves Mersch: Monetary policy in the euro area - scope, principles and limits | Period_2 | 2016-06-24 | 0.164 | our recent monetary policy measures respect the law since the onset of the crisis, however, we have had to adopt new, unconventional tools to fulfil our mandate – and this has naturally brought the question of the scope and limits of monetary policy more to the fore. clearly, restricting ourselves only to the instruments used in normal times would have been a breach of our mandate. it could have had disastrous consequences for the euro area economy, and threatened our ability to achieve price stability. but that does not imply the reverse – i.e. that every conceivable tool would have been justified. 2 article 5 (4), treaty on european union. 3 article 127.1, tfeu. |
| Christine Lagarde: Price stability and policy transmission in the euro area | Period_3 | 2022-06-29 | 0.109 | governing council. the new instrument will have to be effective, while being proportionate and containing sufficient safeguards to preserve the impetus of member states towards a sound fiscal policy. this decision lies squarely within the ecb’s tradition. in the past, the ecb has made use of separate instruments to target inflation and to preserve the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. measures to preserve transmission could be used at any level of interest rates – so long as they were designed not to interfere with the monetary policy stance. at times when inflation fell too low, it made sense to shift from “separation” to “combination” so that all tools reinforced the required policy easing. that is why, for example, we linked asset purchases tightly to forward guidance on rates. but with high inflation now being the main challenge, there are merits in separating policy tools again. preserving policy transmission throughout the euro area will allow rates to rise as far as necessary. in this sense, there is no trade-off between launching this new tool and adopting the necessary policy stance to stabilise inflation at our target. in fact, one enables the other. |
| Frank Elderson: Proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank concrete | Period_3 | 2022-03-25 | 0.103 | police had exceeded their mandate. to put it simply: the ruling made it clear that the police were only responsible for public security, and not for safeguarding aesthetic interests. the verdict signified an important step in the development of modern societies. acknowledging that their actions intrude on the lives of citizens, public sector authorities began limiting their actions to what is strictly necessary to achieve the established objectives. since then, proportionality has evolved to become a fundamental principle in many legal systems. the proportionality principle is a cornerstone of the institutional structure of the european union, laid down in article 5 of the treaty on the european union. and all its institutions are bound by it in the pursuit of their respective mandates. it requires them to carefully assess the necessity and suitability of policy action to deliver on the mandate, while also considering whether this policy action is less intrusive compared with other options for achieving the same goal. needless to say, this requirement also applies to the ecb. proportionality in policy deliberations thus, systematically assessing the proportionality of our monetary policy actions is exactly what we set out to do – and made even more explicit in our new monetary policy strategy – when the ecb governing council meets to discuss monetary policy every six to seven weeks. it is important to note that the scope of the proportionality assessment of policy decision… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.103 | in terms of policy instruments, there is a clear hierarchy. if the economy is not in the shadow of the effective lower bound and under non-stressed conditions, the set of policy interest rates is sufficient to deliver the inflation target. in particular, away from the effective lower bound, policy rates can be adjusted in either direction in response to upside or downside risks to the inflation target. however, in recognition of the effective lower bound on policy rates, the governing council can also employ forward guidance, asset purchases and longer-term refinancing operations, as appropriate. the governing council will continue to respond flexibly to new challenges as these arise and consider, as needed, new policy instruments in the pursuit of its price stability objective. 1. these remarks draw on lane, p.r. (2022), “the monetary policy strategy of the european central bank”, special issue of revue d’economie financiére: new doctrines in central banking, |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.080 | normal does not mean conventional third, normalisation does not imply adjusting unconventional instruments more rapidly than conventional ones. in the review of the ecb’s monetary policy strategy that we completed last year, we were clear that both types of instrument are essential and permanent components of our toolkit. what matters is finding the combination of tools to deliver the necessary policy stance in the most effective and proportionate way. in the ecb’s case, we currently have three main levers that we can, in principle, use to adjust policy. the first is interest rates, which have a greater influence on the short and medium-term segments of the risk-free yield curve. the second is asset purchases, which have a greater influence on the longer end of the yield curve and risk premia. the third is the provision of liquidity through our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltros). tltros influence the transmission of benchmark yields to bank lending conditions, as well as overall liquidity conditions in the financial markets. this, in turn, helps to control rates at the short end of the money market and affects risk premia.[7] |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.072 | lagarde: to your first point, that helps me to yet again come back to tpi, because in a monetary union there is an inherent risk, particularly the monetary union that we have here in the euro area, there’s an inherent risk that a large shock can create fragmentation risks, and that can lead to self-fulfilling market dynamics that are not warranted. it matters for the singleness of our monetary policy in our monetary union. , but those impediments can have different sources, and that is the reason why we have several tools. as i said earlier on, we have the flexible reinvestment of pepp, which has been deployed, and is currently operational. we have omt, which was decided back then for another unwarranted, disorderly market dynamic, but having to do with more country-specific matters, and closely associated with the redenomination risk, because that’s really what it was designed for at the time, if you remember. so we were short of this particular tool, which is the one that we have in front of us, the transmission protection instrument, that is not related to redenomination risks, but to the unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics that can impair the proper transmission of monetary policy throughout the euro area. which is, as i said again, it’s with no limitation ex ante, which has been designed carefully with adequate attention paid to the safeguards that are necessary for that instrument to be valid, and with a creditor seniority that is pari passu with any other credit… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106 | risk | 1 | 0.2556355 | downside | 1 | 0.9996496 |
| 106 | uncertainty | 2 | 0.0917056 | downside risk | 2 | 0.9995619 |
| 106 | downside | 3 | 0.0409621 | surround | 3 | 0.9992991 |
| 106 | outlook | 4 | 0.0405540 | uncertainty | 4 | 0.9991234 |
| 106 | downside risk | 5 | 0.0310311 | risk | 5 | 0.9990353 |
| 106 | surround | 6 | 0.0234127 | uncertainty surround | 6 | 0.9988597 |
| 106 | relate | 7 | 0.0209640 | materialise | 7 | 0.9982040 |
| 106 | economy | 8 | 0.0206919 | heighten | 8 | 0.9982034 |
| 106 | time | 9 | 0.0201477 | economic outlook | 9 | 0.9979411 |
| 106 | remain | 10 | 0.0152502 | outlook | 10 | 0.9977190 |
| 106 | economic outlook | 11 | 0.0142980 | scenario | 11 | 0.9973714 |
| 106 | materialise | 12 | 0.0142980 | tail | 12 | 0.9972818 |
| 106 | scenario | 13 | 0.0141619 | heighten uncertainty | 13 | 0.9972806 |
| 106 | uncertainty surround | 14 | 0.0137538 | tail risk | 14 | 0.9967519 |
| 106 | view | 15 | 0.0117132 | considerable | 15 | 0.9966707 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy communication and effectiveness | Period_1 | 2008-01-16 | 0.098 | with those of the central bank. 2 however, at a practical level, there are serious concerns about the feasibility and desirability of announcing a specific likely future path of policy rates. 3 in a world of uncertainty – and the current period of heightened uncertainty and financial market volatility offers a characteristic example – providing markets with a likely future path of policy rates, particularly beyond the short term, may entail a number of risks that may ultimately undermine the initial intention to further reduce financial market and aggregate output volatility. let me highlight some factors and risks that raise doubts about the feasibility and desirability of announcing, as a general rule, the likely future path of policy rates: • the first factor is the uncertainty faced by policy-makers which makes it very difficult, in general and particularly in certain circumstances, to define in a reasonably precise and reliable manner the likely future path of policy rates, or to put it differently, the extent and timing of future adjustments of the monetary policy stance. the uncertainty faced is not limited to that surrounding the future evolution of a large number of exogenous variables that will affect the economic outlook and the risks to the attainment of the policy objectives. this type of uncertainty is considerable and increases with the length of the forecast horizon. more significantly, there is uncertainty about the economy’s structure and functioning whic… |
| Mr Duisenberg reports at a press conference on the outcome of the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 8 Apr 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-04-13 | 0.091 | you said there were no monetary risks of inflation at the moment. can we infer from today’s decision that there were monetary risks of deflation or is it purely a growth-oriented decision that you have taken today? duisenberg: no, we also see no risks of deflation emerging. we see that inflation has now remained, on a euro area-wide basis, constant at a rate of 0.8% four months in a row up to now. we see some risks on the upside, i.e. mainly the impact of rising energy prices, but that is by definition, as it was when it was on the downside, a temporary factor. we see some risks deriving from some wage settlements here and there in europe, those are the upside risks. we see some downside risks from a rather subdued outlook for general economic development in the entire euro area. but as such, the main thing is that we do not see the situation of price stability in which we entered the euro area, and which prevails until this moment, would be in any way endangered in the future. that gave us the leeway to take the measure i have just announced. |
| Lucas Papademos: The adoption of the euro and economic performance in Monetary Union | Period_1 | 2007-11-28 | 0.087 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: Economic prospects and the role of monetary policy in the current situation | Period_1 | 2009-03-13 | 0.080 | indicates that medium-term inflation expectations in the euro area are solidly anchored at levels consistent with the aim of the governing council of keeping inflation at rate of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. such a firm anchoring represents the strongest and most reassuring safeguard against any risk of a downward spiral of inflation and inflation expectations. the fact that we have a clear mandate and a clear definition of price stability is helpful in anchoring inflation expectations. as in the case of growth, a considerable degree of uncertainty surrounds the inflation projections of the ecb staff. risks to these projections are broadly balanced. they relate in particular to the risks to the outlook for economic activity as well as to risks to commodity prices. |
| Lucas Papademos: Interview with Financial Times and Financial Times Deutschland | Period_1 | 2005-12-21 | 0.072 | will the ecb raise interest rates again in coming months? the change in the ecb’s monetary policy stance in early december was both necessary and prudent. it was necessary in order to preserve price stability over the medium term in view of several upside risks to price stability that had been identified and in order to send a clear signal that the ecb is determined to continue pursuing a credible policy that will preserve price stability over the medium term and continue to anchor inflation expectations to price stability. it was prudent to act promptly in view of increased upside risks, taking into account the long lags involved between a change in monetary policy and its effects on price developments. it was also prudent to decide on a moderate change in the stance, taking into account the uncertainty surrounding the evolution and effects of other determinants of inflation dynamics. with regard to the future, we did not decide ex ante to engage in a series of interest rate increases. in the future we will assess, as usual, all relevant information and analyse it in order to reach a conclusion about the outlook for price stability over the medium and long term. on the basis of this assessment, decisions will be taken with regard to the monetary policy stance but there is no reason or case for communicating anything more than what we have said. what should be perfectly clear is the ecb’s commitment and determination to fulfil its mandate to deliver price stability. in gen… |
| Fabio Panetta: Asymmetric risks, asymmetric reaction - monetary policy in the pandemic | Period_2 | 2020-09-22 | 0.147 | the second element of a forward-looking policy response relates to how we assess and react to the balance of risks. in this respect, the governing council’s view is that the risks to growth are currently on the downside. this expression worries me more today – given the sheer size of the downside risks we face – than it would in less extreme times.[3] moreover, given the disinflationary nature of the covid-19 shock,[4] the low inflation expectations and the current levels of spare capacity, i consider a surge of inflation in the medium term above our aim just a remote possibility. as an example, even in a very benign scenario such as the “mild” scenario in the latest ecb staff projections – which assumes a rapid evaporation of the pandemic – inflation would reach 1.8% in 2022. faced with such a sizeable downward skew, there is a strong case for our reaction function to be asymmetric, as the risks of a policy overreaction are much smaller than the risks of policy being too slow or too shy to react and the worst-case scenarios materialising. against this background, macroeconomic policies – above all monetary and fiscal policies – must remain complementary and the support they provide may be needed for a long time. |
| Philip R Lane: Q&A with Reuters | Period_2 | 2019-10-01 | 0.111 | below the target, when you already have done a lot of accommodation, it is important, not to react to every little blip in the data. but when you see a significant deviation from the target it’s important to respond, and that’s what we’ve done. thank you for laying out the context. so eurozone data continue to be skewed to the downside, particularly in germany, where there seems to be a risk that this broad industrial weakness could be slipping into services. how significant is that? is there a case to be made that germany is already in recession? so let me make two points about that. one, germany of course is very much an anchor country for the euro area, but germany has a really unusual economic structure. it is not representative of the wider euro area because it’s such a manufacturing powerhouse. so the manufacturing slowdown is disproportionately affecting germany. at the ecb we look at aggregate euro area data, we don’t go country by country, it’s the aggregate that matters. so of course germany is a significant factor but it’s not the case that… so i think it would be a mistake, in fact i see it every day, it’s tempting to read the german headlines and say this is a proxy for the euro area. but when you have a shock that is specific to manufacturing and when germany has a much bigger manufacturing sector than, say, france or spain in proportion, it would not be a good idea to extrapolate. when we say services are resilient, of course those service sectors which are … |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.108 | as a result of continued global uncertainties and their impact on confidence, the short-term growth outlook has been revised down in the latest ecb staff macroeconomic projections. real gdp growth is now projected to be 1.1 percent in 2019, 1.2 percent in 2020 and 1.4 percent in 2021. compared with the june eurosystem staff projections, growth for this year was revised down by 0.1 percentage points, and for next year by 0.2 percentage points. notwithstanding the downward revisions to the growth outlook, the balance of risks remains tilted to the downside. furthermore, i would characterise the distribution of risks as bimodal. in one scenario, global trade tensions and brexit could be resolved positively, while in another scenario, trade-related uncertainty could linger and risks associated with a disorderly brexit could materialise. hicp and hicp excluding food and energy eurostat and ecb calculations.notes: hicp stands for harmonised index of consumer prices. based on monthly observations.latest observation: august 2019 (flash estimate). |
| Fabio Panetta: Asymmetric risks, asymmetric reaction - monetary policy in the pandemic | Period_2 | 2020-09-22 | 0.107 | conclusion let me conclude. our monetary policy response to the pandemic has removed adverse tail risks, preserved very accommodative financial conditions in all parts of the euro area and leveraged complementarity with other policies. but the macroeconomic situation remains fragile and uncertain and the projected inflation path is still clearly short of our aim. our policy must therefore remain forward-looking in terms of how we evaluate and recalibrate the amount of policy support needed, and how we assess and react to the balance of risks. all macroeconomic policies need to consider the horizon of their measures. i am now looking forward to hearing your views. [1] altavilla, c., barbiero, f., boucinha, m. and burlon, l. (2020), “ the great lockdown: pandemic response policies and bank lending conditions”, working paper series, no 2465, ecb, frankfurt am main, september. [2] see dossche, m. and zlatanos, s. (2020), “covid-19 and the increase in household savings: precautionary or forced?”, economic bulletin, issue 6, ecb. [3] the “severe” scenario in the september 2020 ecb staff macroeconomic projections offers an example of the magnitude of the downside risks to growth that we face. in such a scenario, gdp growth in 2021-22 would be 4.3 percentage points lower than in the baseline scenario in cumulative terms. [4] panetta, f. (2020), “the price of uncertainty and uncertainty about prices: monetary policy in the post-covid-19 economy”, keynote speech at a capital marke… |
| Peter Praet: Interview in Handelsblatt | Period_2 | 2018-11-23 | 0.096 | peter praet: interview in handelsblatt interview with mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, in handelsblatt, conducted by mr jan mallien and mr frank wiebe on 19 november 2018 and published on 23 november 2018. * * * mr praet, economic sentiment indicators have recently fallen steeply and markets are increasingly nervous. how concerned are you about the euro area economy? growth in the euro area is normalising. we shouldn’t forget that it was exceptionally high over the past two years. that was mainly due to the strength of the export sector. following the turbulence in financial markets in china in mid-2015, central banks and fiscal authorities around the world conducted expansionary policies, and this supported trade. the momentum from exports has now abated. there are also a number of risks, such as protectionism, vulnerabilities in some emerging markets and financial market volatility. what impact are the trade disputes having? our main scenario is that trade conflicts would be mainly confined to the united states and china. moreover, one of the united states’ main concerns is to improve the protection of intellectual property. we are not yet seeing much of an impact on sentiment in the euro area, but that could change, of course. how great are the risks of brexit, of the united kingdom’s departure from the eu? the risks related to a hard brexit should not be underestimated. the consequences would be greater for the united kingdom … |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.120 | risk assessment risks relating to the pandemic have declined but the war continues to be a significant downside risk to growth. in particular, a major risk would be a further disruption in the energy supply to the euro area, as reflected in the downside scenario included in the staff projections. furthermore, if the war were to escalate, economic sentiment could worsen, supply-side constraints could increase, and energy and food costs could remain persistently higher than expected. the risks surrounding inflation are primarily on the upside. the risks to the medium-term inflation outlook include a durable worsening of the production capacity of our economy, persistently high energy and food prices, inflation expectations rising above our target and higher than anticipated wage rises. however, if demand were to weaken over the medium term, it would lower pressures on prices. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-09-08 | 0.105 | risk assessment in the context of the slowing global economy, risks to growth are primarily on the downside, in particular in the near term. as reflected in the downside scenario in the staff projections, a long-lasting war in ukraine remains a significant risk to growth, especially if firms and households faced rationing of energy supplies. in such a situation, confidence could deteriorate further and supply-side constraints could worsen again. energy and food costs could also remain persistently higher than expected. a further deterioration in the global economic outlook could be an additional drag on euro area external demand. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.096 | notably, the current estimates are well below the unconditional estimate which reflects average tail risks over a long horizon. an analysis of the underlying drivers suggests that the intensification of the downside risks to real gdp growth can be traced back predominantly to heightened financial and geopolitical risk, a bleaker macroeconomic outlook, and some deterioration in credit and financial conditions. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-12-20 | 0.094 | risk assessment risks to the economic growth outlook are on the downside, especially in the near term. the war against ukraine remains a significant downside risk to the economy. energy and food costs could also remain persistently higher than expected. there could be an additional drag on growth in the euro area if the world economy were to weaken more sharply than we expect. |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.085 | historical lows.[13] and financial and credit indicators also point to significant downside risks to gdp growth (chart 4).[14] downside risks to euro area real gdp growth lower tail of the distribution of real gdp growth forecasts for q1 and q3 2023 based on “gdp-at-risk” models (quarter-on-quarter change in percentage points) |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 107 | yield | 1 | 0.0600888 | premia | 1 | 0.9996494 |
| 107 | risk | 2 | 0.0485927 | yield curve | 2 | 0.9993866 |
| 107 | curve | 3 | 0.0445134 | premium | 3 | 0.9992988 |
| 107 | market | 4 | 0.0322756 | risk premia | 4 | 0.9985979 |
| 107 | premia | 5 | 0.0315339 | yield | 5 | 0.9982447 |
| 107 | yield curve | 6 | 0.0309159 | inflation risk | 6 | 0.9978093 |
| 107 | investor | 7 | 0.0239935 | term premium | 7 | 0.9976751 |
| 107 | premium | 8 | 0.0220156 | rebalance | 8 | 0.9974591 |
| 107 | portfolio | 9 | 0.0217684 | term premia | 9 | 0.9974559 |
| 107 | channel | 10 | 0.0209031 | curve | 10 | 0.9973664 |
| 107 | asset | 11 | 0.0196670 | portfolio | 11 | 0.9971945 |
| 107 | risk premia | 12 | 0.0157113 | duration | 12 | 0.9970211 |
| 107 | expect | 13 | 0.0155877 | investor | 13 | 0.9969295 |
| 107 | component | 14 | 0.0142280 | term structure | 14 | 0.9966264 |
| 107 | maturity | 15 | 0.0139807 | portfolio rebalance | 15 | 0.9961001 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation and deflation risks - how to recognise them? How to avoid them? | Period_1 | 2009-07-01 | 0.238 | 7 see ejsing, j., j.a. garcia and t. werner (2007) “the term structure of euro area break-even inflation rates: the impact of seasonality”, ecb working paper no 830; gurkaynak, r., b. sack and j. wright (2009), “the tips yield curve and inflation compensation”, american economics journal: macroeconomics, forthcoming.” 8 other inflation derivatives allow investors to hedge against inflation rates exceeding certain threshold (inflation cap) or being below a certain level (inflation floor) and thereby convey information about the value of the perceived risk of hitting those thresholds by estimating option-implied densities and measures of perceived market uncertainty. since the lowest maturity of caps and floors are two years (in some cases three years), the volatility is an average of the one and two-year (and three-year) caplet volatility. on average the term structure of volatility is relatively flat, making this a reasonable approximation for the one-year volatility. 9 hördahl, p. and o. tristani (2007) “inflation risk premia in the term structure of interest rates”, ecb working paper series no 734, and garcia, j. a., and t. werner (2009), “inflation risks and inflation risk premia”, ecb working paper series, forthcoming. 10 ciccarelli, m. and j.a. garcia (2009), “what drives euro area break-even inflation rates?”, ecb working paper series no 996. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy and private expectations | Period_1 | 2005-02-28 | 0.099 | union. this interest rate move was a strong sign of determination. the policy message was reinforced through a consistent communication campaign which the central banks concerned, together with the european monetary institute, launched in the last few months of the year to explain the meaning of their action. the essence of the message was the following. the assumption made by some observers and by part of the market literature, according to which the entry interest rates in the euro on 1 january 1999 would be some kind of average of the interest rates of the composing currencies was totally wrong. on the contrary, the very construction of the euro was based on total continuity with the most credible national currencies. the concept of the transition was based upon “benchmarking”, namely convergence towards the best performers and not convergence towards a mean. the modest interest rate increase that took place in a small number of economies was designed exclusively to preserve monetary stability and inflationary expectations for the corresponding currencies which were the benchmark for the euro. the ecb itself, the soon to be born monetary authority, would be uncompromising in its role as guardian of price stability, in close continuity with its forebears. it was therefore fully justified that interest rate convergence inside the future euro area would take place progressively on the basis of a merge of the different yield curves of the various currencies with the benchma… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Monetary policy and private expectations | Period_1 | 2005-02-28 | 0.084 | direct measures of inflation expectations in the euro area are provided by a number of surveys. these are regularly analysed in the ecb’s monthly bulletin. one comes from the ecb survey of professional forecasters. this is a quarterly survey conducted by the ecb. it asks experts affiliated with financial or non-financial institutions based within the european union to forecast euro area inflation up to five years ahead. importantly, survey respondents also provide a quantitative assessment of the uncertainty surrounding their forecasts in the form of ranges. the dispersion and asymmetry around the mean provide useful information about shifts in inflation expectations that might be in the pipeline. another measure of inflation expectations is provided by the survey conducted by consensus economics, a private firm. it asks private sector economists to give their short-term and long-term inflation expectations. a further source of information is the european commission’s monthly business and consumer survey. it asks a large number of manufacturing firms about their selling price expectations and consumers about their inflation expectations. this survey has some limitations however. it provides qualitative information only.9 in addition, it is available only for a very short time period ahead (12 months). despite these limitations, detected changes in the direction towards which firms’ and consumers’ expectations are heading may provide useful information. the information that… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Careful with (the D) words! | Period_1 | 2008-11-27 | 0.081 | strengthening the solvency situation of the banking system. third, the exhaustion of all ammunitions earlier in the process, when there is no evidence of a deflationary shock, reduces the margin of manoeuvre in case other adverse shocks occur. for instance, if foreign exchange markets do not display a major appreciation of the exchange rate, which in the past has always been associated with deflation, monetary policy should maintain some room to counter such undesired development. finally, if deflation risks eventually subside, too loose a monetary policy stance can fuel excessive risk taking, which would give rise to a new asset bubble that would lead down the road to even greater problems. let me spend a few words on this objection. the counter argument is that the real problem of lowering rates would emerge if rates were kept at low levels for too long, something central banks have been reproached in the first half of this decade. to avoid this scenario, the solution is not to avoid cutting rates to a low level but to raise them quickly enough, when the deflation fears evaporate. however, this strategy is not time consistent. in order to be credible, a policy of low interest rates aimed at ensuring against a deflation risk must affect the whole yield curve. this requires that the central bank commits to maintain low rates for a prolonged period of time. 5 only in this way is the incentive created to invest in risky assets rather than holding money. however, the longer a… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Inflation and deflation risks - how to recognise them? How to avoid them? | Period_1 | 2009-07-01 | 0.078 | indicates (slide 12). all survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations stood at 1.9% in april. financial instruments are the third way of obtaining information about market participants’ inflation expectations. they also contain information about inflation risks, since investors not only demand compensation for the level of expected inflation but also for bearing the risk associated with the inflation outlook. in practice, yields on inflation-linked bonds are used as a basis to derive indicators of inflation expectations. 7 however, since the beginning of the crisis, bond markets have been exposed to significant disturbances that have made the measurement of inflation expectations and the associated risks more difficult than usual. thus, it is useful to complement this measure with expectations extracted from inflation derivatives. in particular, inflation-linked swap rates provide a measure of the expected inflation rates at short horizons (one and two years ahead, for example). 8 one-year inflation swap rates fell sharply in the second half of 2008 (slide 13), following the decline in oil prices and the worsened macroeconomic outlook, and remained between 0.0% and 0.5% until recently. however, they have returned to levels above 1% since early april 2009. the chart also displays market uncertainty about the future inflation outcomes in the euro area, represented by the coloured areas. unsurprisingly, uncertainty has increased since october 2008. furthermore… |
| Peter Praet: Maintaining price stability with unconventional monetary policy measures | Period_2 | 2017-10-03 | 0.322 | indications coming from models and past empirical regularities with its own judgement. in engaging in this layer of judgemental deliberations, our intent is to come to a firm assessment of the balance between the likely efficacy of our measures and their potential costs in term of financial distortions. how do our main policy instruments work? ensuring an appropriate interest rate environment throughout the yield curve is instrumental in fostering the financing conditions that are most conducive to our objective. a central bank can seek to influence the level and shape of the yield curve by acting on two components of the long- term interest rates: the expectations component and the term premium. the expectations component reflects market expectations of the future path of the policy-controlled short-term interest rates. all else equal, a path that is lower and shallower tends to produce a lower level of the long-term yield and a flatter curve. the term premium reflects the excess return that an investor demands as a compensation for holding a bond with a long, say ten-year, residual maturity relative to rolling over a short-term bill for ten years. locking themselves into a long- dated fixed income investment for a period of time is not equivalent to rolling over a short-term investment for the same period, because holding a long-dated bond exposes the investor to the risk that interest rates may increase unexpectedly during the holding period. an unexpected increase in i… |
| Peter Praet: Opening remarks - “Money markets, monetary policy implementation and central bank balance sheets” | Period_2 | 2017-11-06 | 0.304 | the third dimension is optionality: retaining the option to re-calibrate the app if warranted is consistent with the forward guidance on the app. key channels of the app there are two key channels through which the app operates. the first is the extraction of duration risk, which propagates through portfolio rebalancing. the second key channel is the signalling channel on interest rates. the duration risk channel and the signalling channel correspond to the two components of the long-term interest rates through which a central bank can seek to influence the level and shape of the yield curve: the expectations component and the term premium. how does the app influence the term premium? by accumulating a portfolio of long-duration assets, the central bank extracts duration risk from private hands, frees up risk bearing capacity in the markets, spurs a rebalancing of private portfolios towards the remaining securities, and thereby lowers term premia and yields across a range of financial assets. duration extraction is thus the catalyst for the portfolio rebalancing channel, which is the main mechanism by which easing through quantitative interventions is then transmitted further through the economy. now, what matters in particular for term premia is the entire stock of duration which the central bank removes from the hands of price-sensitive investors by taking this stock of duration on its balance sheet. as a result, the continued monetary support from assets purchases is no… |
| Peter Praet: Monetary policy in a low interest rate environment | Period_2 | 2018-06-19 | 0.301 | 1 i would like to thank john hutchinson for his support in preparing this speech. 2 expected inflation can be further decomposed into “risk neutral” inflation expectations and inflation risk premia. 3 for the united states such analysis can be undertaken from the late 1990s when treasury inflation-protected securities became available, while inflation swaps started being traded quite a bit later. see, for example, abrahams, m., adrian, t., crump, r. k., moench, e. and yu, r., (2016), “decomposing real and nominal yield curves”, journal of monetary economics, volume 84, december, pp. 182–200. in the euro area, these decompositions can also be undertaken using model-based analysis, albeit only over a shorter time period due to the later availability of suitable inflation-linked instruments. 4 whereas the inflation risk premia and the real term premia, taken together, display a trend decline over recent decades, the analysis of their individual dynamics is subject to data limitations as estimates are based on inflation-linked bonds or swaps which have only recently become more widespread. but it is likely that the inflation risk premia declined significantly in the 1980s and 1990s alongside the decline in inflation expectations, with investors accepting lower compensation for bearing inflation risk. the decline in inflation risk premia from mid-2014, by contrast, pointed to the increased prominence that market participants assigned to 6/7 |
| Peter Praet: Maintaining price stability with unconventional monetary policy measures | Period_2 | 2017-10-03 | 0.300 | desired compensation for hedging will decrease, which will drive down the term premium and the whole yield curve. this same mechanism will spur propagation. duration extraction is the catalyst for the portfolio rebalancing channel, which is the chief mechanism by which easing through quantitative interventions propagates through the entire economy. in practice, distinguishing between the effects of the app and of forward guidance on the two components of long-term interest rates is less straightforward. the credibility of promises to follow a certain course of action for setting the policy rates in the future is almost certainly enhanced by the asset purchase programmes today, as these purchases are a concrete demonstration of a desire to provide additional stimulus. in other words, there is a signalling channel inherent in asset purchases, which reinforces the credibility of the forward guidance on policy rates via the expectations channel. conversely, forward guidance may affect the term premium component of longer-term yields by reducing the uncertainty about the future path of short-term interest rates and thereby reducing duration risk in the market. accordingly, the net stimulus provided by asset purchases depends in part on expectations of how policymakers will adjust short-term interest rates in the future. but these additional complexities do not alter, and in fact reinforce, the key insight – namely that the different policy tools must be seen as mutually complem… |
| Philip R Lane: Reflections on monetary policy | Period_2 | 2019-09-16 | 0.276 | reflections on monetary policy page 14 of 18 fourth, new net purchases and a prolonged reinvestment horizon mitigate the passive tightening in the monetary policy stance that happens mechanically as the app portfolio ages. one of the channels through which asset purchases work is the duration channel. by absorbing duration risk from the market, the app reduces the risk compensation required by investors, which puts downward pressure on term premia and yields. as the bonds we hold in our portfolio come closer to maturing, however, the overall amount of duration risk that is tied up in our portfolio progressively falls. as a result, the downward impact on risk premia – and thereby on long-term interest rates – resulting from the duration channel weakens over time. adding to the stock of asset purchases – both directly and through the reinvestment channel – will keep this portfolio ageing effect at bay (chart 16).[9] estimated effect of app recalibration vintages on euro area ten-year term premium |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.232 |
|
| Isabel Schnabel: Asset purchases – from crisis to recovery | Period_3 | 2021-09-23 | 0.217 | pepp prevented the collapse of the financial system. protecting the monetary policy stance through duration extraction as the dust of the initial shock settled, the purpose of the pepp shifted from market stabilisation to ensuring an appropriate monetary policy stance. in june 2020, our staff projections suggested that inflation would be well below our target in the medium term, and noticeably below the pre- pandemic level. at that point, portfolio rebalancing became the main transmission channel of our asset purchases. although we could afford to reduce our monthly emergency interventions over the second half of 2020 by 45% compared with their peak in light of calmer financial markets, exceptionally large public and private duration supply in response to the pandemic was a recurring source of upward pressure on bond yields that would not have been consistent with our commitment to counter the effect of the pandemic on the inflation trajectory. ecb estimates suggest that the gdp-weighted ten-year yield of the four largest euro area countries would have been more than 50 basis points higher in response to the increase in public debt (slide 5, left-hand chart). duration extraction offset this effect, and engineered a decline in the so-called “bond free float” – the share of bonds held by price-sensitive investors –, thereby keeping yields at levels consistent with countering the downward impact of the pandemic on the projected path of inflation (slide 5, right-hand chart). i… |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.198 |
|
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.190 | the transmission channels of monetary policy let me start by outlining the main transmission channels of monetary policy. conceptually, the monetary policy transmission process can be divided into upstream stages of transmission and downstream effects.[3] the upstream stages include our steering of the short-term money market conditions and how these propagate to the risk-free and sovereign yield curves (mainly through expectations of the future path of policy rates). the downstream effects are captured by the adjustments in the cost and volume of external finance available to the firms and households that are dependent on banks for access to credit. i will begin with the upstream stages of the transmission mechanism and then turn to the downstream effects. monetary policy works through its influence on the entire yield curve.[4] changes in the policy rates directly affect only very short-term money-market interest rates. but the expectations of future policy rates are a primary determinant of medium and long-term interest rates, together with term premia. it is the adjustment in term interest rates along the risk-free and sovereign curve that matters most for the economy, as these directly affect the conditions under which firms, banks and governments can borrow in financial markets and indirectly affect the cost of borrowing of firms and households to the extent that they rely on bank borrowing, since banks price their loans off the risk-free or sovereign yield curve. in… |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.171 | normal does not mean conventional third, normalisation does not imply adjusting unconventional instruments more rapidly than conventional ones. in the review of the ecb’s monetary policy strategy that we completed last year, we were clear that both types of instrument are essential and permanent components of our toolkit. what matters is finding the combination of tools to deliver the necessary policy stance in the most effective and proportionate way. in the ecb’s case, we currently have three main levers that we can, in principle, use to adjust policy. the first is interest rates, which have a greater influence on the short and medium-term segments of the risk-free yield curve. the second is asset purchases, which have a greater influence on the longer end of the yield curve and risk premia. the third is the provision of liquidity through our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltros). tltros influence the transmission of benchmark yields to bank lending conditions, as well as overall liquidity conditions in the financial markets. this, in turn, helps to control rates at the short end of the money market and affects risk premia.[7] |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 108 | pressure | 1 | 0.1663795 | inflationary | 1 | 0.9997372 |
| 108 | inflationary | 2 | 0.0869445 | inflationary pressure | 2 | 0.9997372 |
| 108 | inflationary pressure | 3 | 0.0572221 | pressure | 3 | 0.9995617 |
| 108 | time | 4 | 0.0399937 | downward pressure | 4 | 0.9992109 |
| 108 | downward | 5 | 0.0395991 | downward | 5 | 0.9990362 |
| 108 | upward | 6 | 0.0339440 | upward pressure | 6 | 0.9986852 |
| 108 | level | 7 | 0.0306561 | upward | 7 | 0.9985979 |
| 108 | increase | 8 | 0.0305246 | exert | 8 | 0.9984222 |
| 108 | lead | 9 | 0.0192143 | disinflationary | 9 | 0.9972400 |
| 108 | downward pressure | 10 | 0.0185568 | visible | 10 | 0.9970212 |
| 108 | reduce | 11 | 0.0184252 | price pressure | 11 | 0.9960131 |
| 108 | strong | 12 | 0.0177677 | exert downward pressure | 12 | 0.9958287 |
| 108 | upward pressure | 13 | 0.0176362 | term inflationary | 13 | 0.9957877 |
| 108 | result | 14 | 0.0164525 | lead | 14 | 0.9956105 |
| 108 | exert | 15 | 0.0147428 | reduce | 15 | 0.9953482 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Building Europe in a globalised world | Period_1 | 2007-10-25 | 0.114 | – has grown eightfold over the last 25 years and now stands at more than 130% of world gdp. globalisation is triggering major transformations all over the world, not only in europe. for instance, globalisation has had an impact on inflation. economic theory has identified numerous channels through which globalisation can influence price developments. without doubt, globalisation and the associated rise in world trade have contributed to import price moderation 2 , notably in the manufacturing sector, which is primarily due to increased imports from low-cost countries. furthermore, the widespread opening-up of emerging countries and of almost all former centrally planned economies has significantly increased the labour pool available, leading to dampening pressures on labour costs, especially for unskilled labour. 3 globalisation can also exert indirect downward pressure on inflation, as increasing international competition may limit the pricing power of domestic corporations. however, at the same time, the sudden emergence of fast-growing economies in the global economy is exerting very significant upward pressures on commodity prices. this has been particularly visible since 2003. in addition, the prices of certain agricultural products have also risen recently. despite intensive research, there remains significant uncertainty about the overall role and impact of globalisation. even though the net effect of these counterbalancing forces is mostly believed to have reduced … |
| Jürgen Stark: Main challenges for monetary policy in a globalised world | Period_1 | 2008-03-31 | 0.097 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Charting a new global landscape ¿ the growing impact of emerging markets on the world economy | Period_1 | 2007-06-04 | 0.094 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy and asset prices | Period_1 | 2009-10-19 | 0.086 | developments may end up in long-lasting subdued inflationary pressure, or even declining inflation for an extended period of time. disinflationary pressure is indeed the result found in a formal analysis of this type of situation made in a recent research paper at the ecb. 10 the paper shows that if the central bank concentrates exclusively on inflation forecasts as a summary statistic for the state of the economy, it will tend to adopt an accommodative stance. this occurs because the central bank, expecting a decrease in inflation, will cut the policy rate to keep inflation on target. this accommodative policy can trigger an asset price and credit boom that inflates the original economic expansion. eventually, it may turn out that the expectations of a new era, which triggered the over-accumulation of capital, do not come true. the revision of these beliefs can in turn lead to an asset price bust and to recession. clearly, the boom and bust would have been much smaller had the central bank followed a different monetary policy, based on enlarging its information set to include credit developments. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The role of central banks in a globalised economy | Period_1 | 2007-06-21 | 0.082 |
|
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.148 | in the case of a price level target, if there is downward pressure on the inflation rate so that the price level falls below its target path, then future inflation has to be temporarily higher in order to bring the price level back on track. in theory, the private sector would internalise these dynamics and increase its inflation expectations every time there is downward pressure on the price level. in turn, higher expected inflation would mitigate the downward pressure on today’s inflation rate. this expectations channel of monetary policy transmission associated with level targeting strategies is especially compelling in a low interest rate environment where the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates limits the scope for counteracting downward pressure on inflation rates by reducing current policy rates.10 indeed, in the united states, some central bankers have publicly called for a temporary adoption of a level target.11 |
| Mario Draghi: Interview with Neue Zürcher Zeitung | Period_2 | 2014-01-23 | 0.100 | are you more concerned about deflation than inflation? actually, i would say neither. the risks of deflation or inflation are limited at this point in time. but wouldn’t inflationary pressures rapidly increase in the case of a strong economic recovery? not necessarily. in the us, for example, and certainly in the euro area the recovery after the crisis has not been accompanied by inflationary pressures; unemployment is too high for that and production capacities are underutilised. |
| Peter Praet: Maintaining price stability in the euro area | Period_2 | 2017-02-03 | 0.092 | only have lasting effects on the economy if left unattended by monetary policy. overall, these observations have three important implications for monetary policy. first, the evidence confirms that the core phillips curve connection linking inflation formation to resource utilisation remains a key ingredient in explaining the prevailing disinflationary pressures. second, this finding implies that monetary policy, which typically affects the level of slack by steering financing and credit conditions in the economy, also retains significant influence on inflation outcomes. third, domestic slack has not been the only disinflationary factor. to understand the drivers of low inflation, we thus need to look further afield – for instance, at shocks that have driven a wedge between the underlying relationship between inflation and economic slack in recent years. cost and mark-up shocks cost and mark-up shocks are forces that may have reinforced the disinflationary pressures exerted by economic slack during the crisis, while offsetting the inflationary pressures generated by the gradual reabsorption of slack thereafter. in the phillips curve framework, such shocks would materialise as downward shifts of the curve that counteract upward movements along the curve on account of the compression of slack. one such force is a shock to the cost structure of firms, deriving, for instance, from fluctuations in import prices. the fall in oil prices to historically low levels between 2014 and … |
| Peter Praet: Assessment of quantitative easing and challenges of policy normalisation | Period_2 | 2018-03-20 | 0.089 | ecb, ecb calculations.5 event studies – which measure the impact of central banks’ bond purchases in a narrow interval around the time of the announcement – play a part in informing our view on the efficacy of our purchases. but we also use model counterfactuals to complement the impact metrics that we derive from event studies, and to test whether or not the impact of our announcements endures beyond the very short term. in this context, dynamic term structure models of the type that have become standard in contemporary fixed income finance, augmented with a factor capturing central bank bond holdings, have consistently confirmed the inference we draw from event studies. they indicate that our purchases have had a sizeable and durable influence on long- term yields.6 at present, the current and anticipated size of our app portfolio – which has been increased in various recalibration steps and is expected to be maintained “for an extended period of time” after the end of net asset purchases – is still putting downward pressure on euro area long-term yields. the longer the expected period of reinvestment, the stronger the downward pressure on yields. if one takes current surveys of market participants’ views about the time over which the ecb is anticipated to roll over its app securities, and assumes the modal expectation of a two- year period, one finds that the downward pressure that app asset holdings – current and expected – are exerting on longer-term interest rates is… |
| Peter Praet: Assessment of quantitative easing and challenges of policy normalisation | Period_2 | 2018-03-20 | 0.087 | eser, lemke, nyholm, radde, and vladu (mimeo).7 downward pressure on yields is expected to be very persistent and to decline only gradually, but consistently, as we move forward in time, because of what is referred to as the “portfolio ageing” effect. the effects of our purchases of long-dated assets on market yields are principally due to the fact that we withdraw duration from private hands, and as the securities we hold in our portfolio draw closer to maturity and “lose duration” progressively, the overall amount of duration contained in our portfolio has a tendency to melt away. and this gradual loss of duration will reduce downward pressure on yields [chart 3].8 there has been a strong pass-through of our non-standard measures to financing conditions. for example, model-based counterfactual simulations attribute more than half of the 126 basis point decline in lending rates to non-financial corporations since june 2014 directly to our non- standard measures [chart 2]. the app has supported the provision of loans to customers at better terms and conditions.9 banks themselves – when asked to assess the effects of our measures on their intermediation business – have reported that the app has positively impacted their market financing conditions. as a consequence of this generalised easing in financing conditions, our measures have had substantial macroeconomic effects. taking into account all of the monetary policy measures taken between mid-2014 and october 2017, the ov… |
| Frank Elderson: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy - delivering our mandate in all circumstances | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.086 | monetary policy puts upward pressure on prices by sustaining demand when supply is constrained. it will also guard against the risk of a persistent upward shift in inflation expectations. at the same time, with many of the sources of today’s inflation originating from supply constraints, government policies that redirect public and private investment to supporting sustainable growth can help mitigate inflationary pressures in the medium to longer term. in any case, these investments are crucial to achieving the eu’s aim of meeting the goals outlined in the paris agreement. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.081 | expected to largely fade out over the course of next year. overreacting to such short-term volatility would be harmful and risk jeopardising the ongoing economic recovery, which is why the ecb’s monetary policy remains focused on fulfilling its medium-term price stability mandate. nonetheless, significant uncertainty remains as to how persistent some of the current price pressures will prove to be. the ecb therefore continues to carefully monitor inflationary developments in the euro area, with a particular focus on second-round effects, to determine whether the headwinds that have exerted downward pressure on inflation for much of the past decade are still present, or whether they may reverse in the aftermath of the pandemic. the cyclical and specific pandemic factors will increasingly be overlaid by structural changes, which can go in different directions.!2”! structural factors such as globalisation, the fight against climate change, demographic trends and digitalisation are likely to continue to affect prices and price-setting, and hence the transmission of our policy, but the direction is still unclear.!22! high-quality academic research into the underlying drivers of inflation dynamics hence remains a vital input for our monetary policy deliberations. | therefore look forward to hearing more about the insightful papers and novel research findings that will be presented at this conference. thank you. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2022-09-26 | 0.076 | the outlook for the euro area economy the euro area economy grew by 0.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2022, mainly owing to strong consumer spending on services as the economy reopened. economies with large tourism sectors benefited especially, as people travelled more over the summer. the still robust labour market also continued to support economic activity. notwithstanding this, we expect activity to slow substantially in the coming quarters. there are four main reasons behind this. first, high inflation is dampening spending and production throughout the economy, and these headwinds are reinforced by gas supply disruptions. second, the strong demand for services that came with the reopening of the economy is losing steam. third, the weakening in global demand, also in the context of tighter monetary policy in many major economies, and the worsening terms of trade will mean less support for the euro area economy. fourth, uncertainty remains high, as reflected in falling household and business confidence. these developments have led to a downward revision of the latest staff projections for economic growth for the remainder of the current year and throughout 2023. staff now expect the economy to grow by 3.1 per cent in 2022, 0.9 per cent in 2023 and 1.9 per cent in 2024. inflation rose further to 9.1 per cent in august. energy and food price inflation remained extremely elevated and were the dominant contributors to overall inflation. price pressures are spreading ac… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.074 | composition of our balance sheet than it was in a phase when our asset purchase programmes resulted in a rapid increase in our securities holdings during a relatively short period. however, the signalling effects emanating from a given rate adjustment may well be larger than it is estimated to have been the case prior to the financial crisis. first, the exit from the negative interest rate policy may have strengthened the transmission of a rate hike throughout the term structure of interest rates. this would be the case if the unwinding of the outsized downward pressure on long- term yields that is estimated to have been associated with rate cuts in the negative territory was symmetric.[8] second, the retirement of rate forward guidance after years in which forward indications about the likely future path of interest rates had suppressed rate volatility almost entirely may invite markets to react to a rate increase by pulling back more sharply from longer-term securities as dealers and other providers of trading liquidity are less willing to put capital at risk to make two-sided markets in a context of perceived higher interest rate uncertainty. this may exert greater upward pressure on term premia and the level of long-term yields. the risk of snap-back in term premia and the sudden repricing of rate expectations warrant close monitoring from a market functioning and broader financial stability perspective. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.073 | but the pandemic has also introduced new trends that could affect inflation dynamics in the years to come. those trends could produce both upward and downward price pressures. so, monetary policy must remain focused on steering the economy safely out of the pandemic emergency and lifting inflation sustainably towards our 2% target. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 109 | continue | 1 | 0.0219599 | regular economic | 1 | 0.9967478 |
| 109 | quarter | 2 | 0.0194509 | vice | 2 | 0.9962262 |
| 109 | remain | 3 | 0.0173183 | vice president | 3 | 0.9960527 |
| 109 | real | 4 | 0.0131784 | rate unchanged | 4 | 0.9958739 |
| 109 | analysis | 5 | 0.0121121 | regular | 5 | 0.9953968 |
| 109 | demand | 6 | 0.0117358 | interest rate unchanged | 6 | 0.9946401 |
| 109 | president | 7 | 0.0101677 | key ecb | 7 | 0.9933237 |
| 109 | vice | 8 | 0.0099795 | press conference | 8 | 0.9932948 |
| 109 | inflation rate | 9 | 0.0098540 | key ecb interest | 9 | 0.9929787 |
| 109 | base | 10 | 0.0095404 | sheet adjustment | 10 | 0.9929613 |
| 109 | vice president | 11 | 0.0090386 | ecb interest | 11 | 0.9916626 |
| 109 | recovery | 12 | 0.0086623 | unchanged | 12 | 0.9913108 |
| 109 | explain | 13 | 0.0085368 | lady | 13 | 0.9911311 |
| 109 | support | 14 | 0.0084114 | balance sheet adjustment | 14 | 0.9909508 |
| 109 | key ecb | 15 | 0.0082859 | ecb interest rate | 15 | 0.9909154 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-05-09 | 0.295 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference here in helsinki. i would like to thank governor liikanen for his kind hospitality and express our special gratitude to his staff for the excellent organisation of today’s meeting of the governing council. we will now report on the outcome of the meeting, which was also attended by commissioner rehn. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged following the 25-basis point increase on 7 april 2011. the information that has become available since then confirms our assessment that an adjustment of the very accommodative monetary policy stance was warranted. we continue to see upward pressure on overall inflation, mainly owing to energy and commodity prices. while the monetary analysis indicates that the underlying pace of monetary expansion is still moderate, monetary liquidity remains ample and may facilitate the accommodation of price pressures. furthermore, recent economic data confirm the positive underlying momentum of economic activity in the euro area, with uncertainty continuing to be elevated. all in all, it is essential that recent price developments do not give rise to broad-based inflationary pressures. inflation expectations in the euro area must remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. such anchoring… |
| European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-01-13 | 0.286 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. let me wish you all a very happy new year. i would also like to take this opportunity to welcome estonia as the seventeenth country to adopt the euro as its currency. accordingly, mr lipstok, the governor of eesti pank, became a member of the governing council on 1 january 2011. following the adoption of the euro by estonia there are now 331 million citizens using the euro as their currency. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting, which was also attended by commissioner rehn. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council confirmed that the current key ecb interest rates still remain appropriate. it therefore decided to leave them unchanged. taking into account all the new information and analyses which have become available since our meeting on 2 december 2010, we see evidence of short-term upward pressure on overall inflation, mainly owing to energy prices, but this has not so far affected our assessment that price developments will remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. at the same time, very close monitoring is warranted. recent economic data are consistent with a positive underlying momentum of economic activity, while uncertainty remains elevated. our monetary analysis indicates that inflationary pressures over the medium term should remain contained. overall, we expect price stability to be m… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-11-07 | 0.262 | ladies and gentlemen, welcome to our press conference. today is the first time that i have had the privilege and pleasure of chairing the meeting of the governing council of the ecb. i am delighted to proceed now with our well-established practice of real-time communication and to report on the outcome of our meeting, together with the vice-president. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council decided to reduce the key ecb interest rates by 25 basis points. while inflation has remained elevated and is likely to stay above 2% for some months to come, inflation rates are expected to decline further in the course of 2012 to below 2%. at the same time, the underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be moderate. after today’s decision, inflation should remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. owing to their unfavourable effects on financing conditions and confidence, the ongoing tensions in financial markets are likely to dampen the pace of economic growth in the euro area in the second half of this year and beyond. the economic outlook continues to be subject to particularly high uncertainty and intensified downside risks. some of these risks have been materialising, which makes a significant downward revision to forecasts and projections for average real gdp growth in 2012 very likely. in such an environment, price, cost and wage pressures in the euro area should also moderate; today’s decision takes this in… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-04-08 | 0.260 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. before we report on the outcome of today’s meeting, we wish to express our sincere sympathy to the people of japan, after the tragic events and lamentable loss of life. all our thoughts are with those who have suffered directly or indirectly from the natural and nuclear disaster. let me now start reporting on the outcome of today’s meeting. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council decided to increase the key ecb interest rates by 25 basis points, after maintaining them unchanged for almost two years at historically low levels. the adjustment of the current very accommodative monetary policy stance is warranted in the light of upside risks to price stability that we have identified in our economic analysis. while our monetary analysis indicates that the underlying pace of monetary expansion is still moderate, monetary liquidity remains ample and may facilitate the accommodation of price pressures. all in all, it is essential that the recent price developments do not give rise to broad-based inflationary pressures over the medium term. our decision will contribute to keeping inflation expectations in the euro area firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. such anchoring is a prerequisite for monetary policy to contribute to economic growth in the euro area. at the same… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_1 | 2011-07-11 | 0.243 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting. based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the governing council decided to increase the key ecb interest rates by 25 basis points, after raising rates by 25 basis points in april 2011 from historically low levels. the further adjustment of the current accommodative monetary policy stance is warranted in the light of upside risks to price stability. the underlying pace of monetary expansion is continuing to gradually recover, while monetary liquidity remains ample with the potential to accommodate price pressures in the euro area. all in all, it is essential that the recent price developments do not give rise to broad-based inflationary pressures over the medium term. our decision will contribute to keeping inflation expectations in the euro area firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. such anchoring is a prerequisite for monetary policy to contribute to economic growth in the euro area. at the same time, interest rates across the entire maturity spectrum remain low. thus, our monetary policy stance remains accommodative, lending support to economic activity and job creation. as expected, recent economic data indicate some deceleration in the pace of economic growth in the second quarter of 2011. while the underlying momentum of econom… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2014-01-10 | 0.628 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. let me wish you all a happy new year. i would also like to take this opportunity to welcome latvia as the eighteenth country to adopt the euro as its currency. accordingly, mr rimšēvičs, the governor of latvijas banka, became a member of the governing council on 1 january 2014. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. incoming information and analysis have continued to confirm our previous assessment. underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued over the medium term. in keeping with this picture, monetary and credit dynamics remain subdued. at the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term are firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. such a constellation continues to suggest that we may experience a prolonged period of low inflation, to be followed by a gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below, but close to, 2% later on. against this background, the governing council strongly emphasises that it will maintain an accommodative stance of monetary policy for as long as necessary, which will assist the gradual economic recovery in the euro area. accordingly, we firmly reiterate our forward guidance t… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-07-05 | 0.621 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by the commission vice-president, mr. rehn. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. incoming information has confirmed our previous assessment. underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued over the medium term. in keeping with this picture, monetary and, in particular, credit dynamics remain subdued. inflation expectations for the euro area continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. at the same time, recent confidence indicators based on survey data have shown some further improvement from low levels. our monetary policy stance is geared towards maintaining the degree of monetary accommodation warranted by the outlook for price stability and promoting stable money market conditions. it thereby provides support to a recovery in economic activity later in the year and in 2014. looking ahead, our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. the governing council expects the key ecb interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time. this expectation is based on the overall subdued outlook for inflation extending into the medium t… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-12-05 | 0.595 | ladies and gentlemen, i am very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. i will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by the commission vice-president, mr rehn. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. incoming information and analysis have confirmed our assessment and monetary policy decisions of last month. underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued over the medium term. in keeping with this picture, monetary and credit dynamics remain subdued. at the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. such a constellation suggests that we may experience a prolonged period of low inflation, to be followed by a gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below, but close to, 2% later on. our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary, and will thereby continue to assist the gradual economic recovery in the euro area. in this context, the governing council confirmed its forward guidance that it continues to expect the key ecb interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time. this expectation continues to be based on an overall subdued outlook for inflation extending into the medium term, given the broad-based… |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2013-10-03 | 0.580 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. i would like to thank governor noyer for his kind hospitality and express our special gratitude to his staff for the excellent organisation of today’s meeting of the governing council. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting, which was also attended by the commission vice-president, mr rehn. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. incoming information and analysis have further underpinned our previous assessment. underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued over the medium term. in keeping with this picture, monetary and, in particular, credit dynamics remain subdued. inflation expectations for the euro area continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. at the same time, real gdp growth in the second quarter was positive, after six quarters of negative output growth, and confidence indicators up to september confirm the expected gradual improvement in economic activity from low levels. our monetary policy stance continues to be geared towards maintaining the degree of monetary accommodation warranted by the outlook for price stability and promoting stable money market conditions. it thereby provides support to a gradual recovery in economic activity. looking ahead, our monetary … |
| Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_2 | 2014-04-04 | 0.575 | ladies and gentlemen, the vice-president and i are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. we will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the governing council, which was also attended by the commission vice-president, mr rehn. based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ecb interest rates unchanged. incoming information confirms that the moderate recovery of the euro area economy is proceeding in line with our previous assessment. at the same time, recent information remains consistent with our expectation of a prolonged period of low inflation followed by a gradual upward movement in hicp inflation rates. the signals from the monetary analysis confirm the picture of subdued underlying price pressures in the euro area over the medium term. inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. looking ahead, we will monitor developments very closely and will consider all instruments available to us. we are resolute in our determination to maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation and to act swiftly if required. hence, we do not exclude further monetary policy easing and we firmly reiterate that we continue to expect the key ecb interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time. this expectation is based on an overall subdued outlook for inflation extendin… |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy and the money market | Period_3 | 2022-09-15 | 0.044 | the temporary change in the remuneration ceiling for government deposits gives government deposit holders extra time to undertake a smooth and gradual return of their deposits to the market. from the ecb’s perspective, it remains the case that encouraging market intermediation of these deposits remains desirable in the long term. in the meantime, the temporary change will allow us to assess the adjustments of money markets across market segments to the return to positive interest rates and thereby also reduce uncertainty about the pass-through of the changes in the ecb interest rates to money markets. |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-06-09 | 0.038 | looking further ahead, we expect to raise the key ecb interest rates again in september. the calibration of this rate increase will depend on the updated medium-term inflation outlook. if the medium-term inflation outlook persists or deteriorates, a larger increment will be appropriate at our september meeting. third, beyond september, based on our current assessment, we anticipate that a gradual but sustained path of further increases in interest rates will be appropriate. in line with our commitment to our two per cent medium-term target, the pace at which we adjust our monetary policy will depend on the incoming data and how we assess inflation to develop in the medium term. within the governing council’s mandate, under stressed conditions, flexibility will remain an element of monetary policy whenever threats to monetary policy transmission jeopardise the attainment of price stability. the decisions taken today are set out in full in a press release available on our website. i will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing, and will then explain our assessment of financial and monetary conditions. |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.036 | long-term inflation expectations (annual percentage changes; percentages of respondents) ecb survey of professional forecasters. notes: respondents are asked to report their point forecasts and to separately assign probabilities to different ranges of outcomes. this chart shows the distribution of point forecast responses. a similar message is conveyed by market measures of inflation compensation, as shown in chart 11. the left panel of chart 11 shows that the estimated “true” (that is, corrected for risk premia) longer- term inflation expectations of market participations re-anchored over the course of 2021 at around 2 per cent, after an extended period substantially below the target. in terms of inflation risk, there has been a significant shift from an inflation risk discount until mid-2021 to an increasing inflation risk premium in recent months. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-21 | 0.035 | confront semiconductor shortages and strengthen europe’s technological leadership”, press release, 8 february. 7. international energy agency (2021), “the role of critical minerals in clean energy transitions”. 8. refers to firms which developed or introduced new products, processes or services as part of their investment activities. see european investment bank (2022), investment survey. 9. ferdinandusse, m., nerlich, c., and delgado téllez, m. (2022), “fiscal policies to mitigate climate change in the euro area”, economic bulletin, issue 6, european central bank. 10. darvas, z. and wolff, g.b. (2021), “a green fiscal pact: climate investment in times of budget consolidation”, policy contribution, issue no 18/21, bruegel, september. 11. latest data point q2 2022. based on the methodology described in the report on “financial integration and structure in the euro area”, april 2022, european central bank. |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.035 | euro area and world gdp imf world economic outlook and ecb calculations. in relation to the composition of domestic demand, chart 2 shows that consumption and investment remain below pre-pandemic levels, whereas government spending (the sum of public consumption and public investment) has been substantially above the pre-pandemic level since the second half of 2020. the still-subdued level of private expenditure in the euro area stands in contrast to the much stronger recovery in domestic demand in the united states. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 110 | december | 1 | 0.0940052 | december | 1 | 0.9997371 |
| 110 | month | 2 | 0.0905370 | january | 2 | 0.9994743 |
| 110 | january | 3 | 0.0638320 | month | 3 | 0.9994742 |
| 110 | key | 4 | 0.0620979 | march | 4 | 0.9991239 |
| 110 | march | 5 | 0.0477049 | https | 5 | 0.9987719 |
| 110 | meet | 6 | 0.0353929 | october | 6 | 0.9985982 |
| 110 | start | 7 | 0.0326183 | press key | 7 | 0.9985967 |
| 110 | late | 8 | 0.0305374 | february | 8 | 0.9984229 |
| 110 | october | 9 | 0.0281097 | key | 9 | 0.9984219 |
| 110 | press | 10 | 0.0227340 | april | 10 | 0.9983354 |
| 110 | april | 11 | 0.0220403 | en.html | 11 | 0.9982897 |
| 110 | february | 12 | 0.0201328 | press | 12 | 0.9982477 |
| 110 | november | 13 | 0.0177051 | meet | 13 | 0.9981592 |
| 110 | september | 14 | 0.0164912 | november | 14 | 0.9978097 |
| 110 | https | 15 | 0.0159710 | late | 15 | 0.9977210 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The process of economic, monetary and financial integration in Europe | Period_1 | 2006-12-04 | 0.081 | cappiello, l., p. hördahl, a. kadareja, and s. manganelli (2006), “the impact of the euro on financial markets,” ecb working paper no 598. de grauwe, p. and f. p. mongelli (2005), “endogeneities of optimum currency areas: what brings countries sharing a single currency closer together?”, ecb working paper no 468. de santis, r. and b. gérard (2006), “financial integration, international portfolio choice and the european monetary union”, ecb working paper no 626. dhyne, e. et al. (2005), “price setting in the euro area: some stylized facts from individual consumer price data”, ecb working paper no 524. duisenberg, w. “jean monnet memorial lecture” (2000) duval, r. and j. elmeskov (2006), “the effects of emu on structural reforms in labour and product markets,” ecb working paper no 596. ecb (2003), “inflation differentials in the euro area: potential causes and policy implications,” ecb report released on 16 september 2003. ecb (2004), “sectoral specialisation in the eu: a macroeconomic perspective”, ecb occasional paper no 19. ecb (2005), “monetary policy and inflation differentials in a heterogeneous currency area”, article in the ecb monthly bulletin of may 2005. eu commission (2006), “the eu economy 2006 review. adjustment dynamics in the euro area: experiences and challenges”, 22 november 2006. giannone, d. and l. reichlin (2006), “trends and cycles in the euro area: how much heterogeneity and should we worry about it?”, ecb working paper no 595. mckinnon, r. (2001), “op… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Hearing before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament | Period_1 | 2009-04-01 | 0.072 | economic and monetary developments let me begin with the economic situation and our recent monetary policy decisions. please note that, with only three days before our next monetary policy meeting this thursday, i am in the so-called “purdah” period and will therefore duly remain with what i said at my last press conference. since my appearance before the european parliament on 21 january the economic situation and outlook have weakened further. inflationary pressures have diminished further, as confirmed by monetary and credit trends. in february the inflation rate remained low, at 1.2%. as you know, the decline in inflation since last summer primarily reflects the sharp falls in global commodity prices over this period. looking ahead, we expect inflation rates well below 2% for this year and 2010. the risks to this outlook are broadly balanced, but surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty. following the substantial weakening of the world economy in the wake of the financial turmoil, real gdp growth in the euro area contracted markedly, by 1.5% on a quarterly basis, in the fourth quarter of 2008. the latest information suggests that economic activity has deteriorated further in the first quarter of 2009. looking ahead, we expect demand to remain very weak throughout 2009, both at the global level and in the euro area, before gradually recovering in the course of 2010. as is the case for inflation, this outlook remains surrounded by uncertainty. risks to this outlook see… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Economic management in a large currency zone like the euro area | Period_1 | 2007-10-08 | 0.071 | ecb (2005), “monetary policy and inflation differentials in a heterogeneous currency area”, article in the ecb monthly bulletin of may 2005. ecb (2007), “output growth differentials in the euro area: sources and implications” article in the ecb monthly bulletin of april 2007. eu commission (2006), “the eu economy 2006 review. adjustment dynamics in the euro area: experiences and challenges”, 22 november 2006. giannone, d. and l. reichlin (2006), “trends and cycles in the euro area: how much heterogeneity and should we worry about it?”, ecb working paper no 595. mckinnon, r. (2001), “optimum currency areas revisited,” stanford university, mimeo. mundell, r. (1973), “uncommon arguments for common currencies”, in h.g. johnson and a.k. swoboda, the economics of common currencies, allen and unwin, pp. 114-132. obstfeld, m., and giovanni peri (1998) “regional non-adjustment and fiscal policy,” economic policy, vol. 26 pp. 205-260. s. kalemli-ozcan, b. sorensen and o. yosha (2004) “asymmetric shocks and risk sharing in a monetary union: updated evidence and policy implications for europe”, cepr discussion paper no 4463. rose, a. (2001), “currency unions and trade: the effect is large”, economic policy, 33, pp. 449-461. trichet, j.-c. (2006a), “further integrating euro area economies: some reflections”, speech at the “57. jahresversammlung des ifo instituts für wirtschaftsforschung an der universität münchen“ in munich on 29 june 2006. http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2006/… |
| Presentation of the ECB Convergence Report 2000 (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 3 May 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-05-08 | 0.067 | greece’s public debt is falling only slowly, despite high primary surpluses and privatisation receipts. as a consequence, substantial primary surpluses and persistent, sizeable overall fiscal surpluses outperforming the targets of the updated greek convergence programme are crucial if the debt ratio is to be reduced to 60% within an appropriate period of time. tight fiscal policy will also be needed in order to contain the earlier-mentioned inflationary pressures. as regards the development of long-term interest rates, which constitute another key variable within the overall convergence assessment, their level reached 6.4% on average during the reference period from april 1999 to march 2000. as a result, they stood 0.8%-point below the reference value for the interest rate criterion of 7.2%. with regard to the fulfilment of the exchange rate criterion, it is noted that the greek drachma has been participating in erm and subsequently erm ii since 16 march 1998. during the two-year reference period (april 1998 to march 2000) the drachma traded significantly above its central rates. exchange rate volatility declined significantly during the reference period and the significant short-term interest rate differentials also displayed a gradual decrease from september 1998 onwards. after a gradual depreciation during most of 1999 and a revaluation of the central rate by 3.5% in january 2000, the drachma was traded on average 2.0% above its new central rate against the euro in marc… |
| Current economic developments and prospects in Europe, as well as other activities of the Eurosystem (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 20 Jun 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-06-26 | 0.063 |
|
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Interview with Deutschlandfunk | Period_2 | 2017-02-20 | 0.107 | address something. it is important to know what exactly that is. ms lautenschläger, inflation has returned. after a long period with no inflation, the latest estimate puts it at 1.8% for the euro area. the ecb has always said it aimed for an inflation rate of close to 2% – that is what we have now. when will you raise interest rates? returning your question, can we say that inflation has come back, having had such an inflation rate for one month? we have… it was 1.7% in december. no, the rate for the euro area in december… it was, nevertheless, 1.7% in germany and 1.1% in the euro area. exactly. in the euro area – and the ecb conducts monetary policy for the euro area – inflation was 1.1% in december and it is estimated at 1.8% in january. frankly, i am delighted about that: we are close to our objective of below, but close to, 2%. however, it’s important that this is not a temporary, short-lived spike. i can tell you that we don’t yet have an exact figure for january. for december, the increase in inflation was driven mainly by energy prices, specifically by what is known as the base effect. we had come to the end of a year in which prices were low – that has an impact, as do – believe it or not – package holidays, which the germans booked in december. unfortunately, that does not happen every month, even though we are the world champions when it comes to travelling. and therefore… ok, but let’s stay with… please let me finish: …therefore it is really important … |
| Mario Draghi: How domestic economic strength can prevail over global weakness | Period_2 | 2016-01-26 | 0.099 | 1 see speech by mario draghi at the european banking congress: monetary policy: past, present and future, frankfurt am main, 20 november 2015 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/ sp151120.en.html 2 bundesbank monthly report article: german households’ saving and investment behaviour in light of the low- interest-rate environment, october 2015: https://www.bundesbank.de/redaktion/en/downloads/publications/ monthly_report_articles/2015/2015_10_households.pdf?__blob=publicationfile |
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.098 | https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp200930~169abb1202.en.html 6/7 |
| Isabel Schnabel: COVID-19 and monetary policy - reinforcing prevailing challenges | Period_2 | 2020-11-24 | 0.098 | https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201124~bcaebee7c0.en.html 5/13 |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy in a pandemic - ensuring favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2020-12-01 | 0.087 | counterfactual analysis by ecb staff based on this approach suggests that, absent our monetary policy measures, euro area output would be 1.3 percentage points lower and the annual inflation rate would be 0.8 percentage points lower by 2022 in cumulative terms (chart 3).[6] https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201126~c5c1036327.en.html 3/19 |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.110 |
|
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.109 | today, | wish to frame the current monetary policy debate in the context of the monetary policy strategy of the ecb.” | will not dwell on the latest conjunctural developments or speculate on the evolution of the medium-term outlook for the economy and inflation. our monetary policy meeting next week will provide the best opportunity for a comprehensive assessment of economic and financial developments and the implications for near-term and medium-term inflation dynamics. in this respect, the schedule for the march staff projections exercise has been revised in order to take into account the implications of the russian invasion of ukraine. the revised schedule also means that today’s eurostat inflation release will be incorporated in the projections that will be considered at next week’s monetary policy meeting. |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.082 | inflation expectations in the survey of monetary analysts (left: pooled probability distribution; right: average probability) march 2022 survey of monetary analysts (sma) and february 2022 sma. notes: left side – maximum number of respondents is 23 for march 2022 sma and 22 for february 2022 sma. grey area denotes the median. right side – number of respondents for march 2022 sma is 21. |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.080 |
|
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy tightening and the green transition | Period_3 | 2023-01-11 | 0.062 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 111 | crisis | 1 | 0.0662483 | sovereign debt | 1 | 0.9996494 |
| 111 | bank | 2 | 0.0579538 | debt crisis | 2 | 0.9992990 |
| 111 | debt | 3 | 0.0494188 | sovereign debt crisis | 3 | 0.9992988 |
| 111 | sovereign | 4 | 0.0398019 | lehman | 4 | 0.9986852 |
| 111 | sovereign debt | 5 | 0.0238138 | sovereign | 5 | 0.9985097 |
| 111 | phase | 6 | 0.0221309 | collapse | 6 | 0.9983354 |
| 111 | debt crisis | 7 | 0.0199671 | lehman brother | 7 | 0.9976320 |
| 111 | sovereign debt crisis | 8 | 0.0162405 | brother | 8 | 0.9976320 |
| 111 | liquidity | 9 | 0.0132352 | debt | 9 | 0.9973664 |
| 111 | start | 10 | 0.0109512 | phase | 10 | 0.9971927 |
| 111 | collapse | 11 | 0.0099895 | outright monetary transaction | 11 | 0.9968415 |
| 111 | credit | 12 | 0.0098693 | monetary transaction | 12 | 0.9967543 |
| 111 | lehman | 13 | 0.0097491 | outright monetary | 13 | 0.9963591 |
| 111 | weak | 14 | 0.0096289 | fragmentation | 14 | 0.9960552 |
| 111 | fragmentation | 15 | 0.0089076 | outright | 15 | 0.9952682 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: One size fits all? | Period_1 | 2011-05-30 | 0.137 | recent years has been driven by differences in the impact and diffusion of a common shock, namely the financial crisis. the crisis has been a global shock that affected all countries in the euro area – and others, of course. it started with the emergence of market tensions in mid-2007 associated with uncertainty about the valuation of us mortgage-backed securities and escalated sharply in september 2008 with the bankruptcy of lehman brothers. the varying impact of this shock on financial conditions across countries has led to a potential for dramatically different transmission of the single monetary policy stance determined by the ecb’s governing council. this is especially the case in the most recent phase of the crisis, when sovereign debt concerns and their interaction with the strength of bank balance sheets have been central. in those euro area countries where government and banking sector balance sheets remain sound and access to external financing has been maintained, the transmission of monetary policy continues in line with historical regularities. but in those countries where the sovereign debt and bank funding markets have virtually seized up, its transmission is threatened. the interest rates on corporate loans and on mortgages, which ultimately affect real economic activity, will be higher in countries where banks are having funding problems. the increase in bond yield spreads experienced by the countries hardest hit by the sovereign debt crisis is likely to b… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Intervention at Sveriges Riksbank conference “Monetary policy in an era of fiscal stress” | Period_1 | 2011-06-21 | 0.100 | euro area average coming down to slightly above 4%. the euro area debt-to-gdp ratio is expected to stabilise in 2013 and come down thereafter. in the euro area three countries are facing severe problems regarding market access. overall these three countries account for about 6% of the euro area gdp. i will not elaborate on these three cases, and the fact that they have emerged in the midst of the worst economic and financial crisis since world war ii. the solution to these three cases entails a specific role to be played by the fiscal authority of the respective countries, the fiscal authorities of the other countries supporting the adjustment programme in those countries and the ecb. some commentators have said that in a crisis stronger coordination between monetary and fiscal policy is desirable, even if it comes at the expense of reducing the independence of monetary policy. the opposite is actually true. especially in a crisis the responsibilities for monetary policy and for fiscal policy have to remain quite separate. the reason is that it is precisely during a crisis that the fiscal authorities try to push the central bank towards solving the fiscal problem through the inflation tax. however, the central bank is protected from this pressure by its statutes and the rules it adopts for the conduct of monetary policy. in the case of the ecb, the rules specify that it can lend only to sound institutions and against appropriate collateral. the appropriateness of the colla… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Intervention at Sveriges Riksbank conference “Monetary policy in an era of fiscal stress” | Period_1 | 2011-06-21 | 0.093 | it is a pleasure for me to contribute to this sveriges riksbank conference entitled “monetary policy in an era of fiscal stress”. the subject is indeed a very topical – and global – one. not just in europe but around the world, the crisis has progressively acquired a fiscal dimension that may be with us for a number of years to come. against this background, it may be useful for me to briefly look back over the relationship between monetary policy and fiscal policies, stressing in particular the challenges that monetary policy may face in an environment of sharply rising fiscal deficits and debt. coming from the ecb, i will of course primarily focus on the euro area experience and lessons. if, in a simple one-country setting, sovereign debt becomes unsustainable, the central bank always retains the option – in theory and partly in practice – to monetise the debt. the short- term implication of such monetisation is that sovereign credit risk will be replaced by both an inflation and exchange rate risk. in other words, the currency of that country will no longer be considered as a good store of value, either domestically or externally. none of the above constitutes a feasible scenario for the euro area, which is characterised by a unique combination of centralised monetary policy-making and largely decentralised, albeit closely coordinated, fiscal policy-making. this one-monetary-policy-and-many- fiscal- policies approach is at the heart of the institutional arrangement whic… |
| Jürgen Stark: The economic crisis and the response of fiscal and monetary policy | Period_1 | 2009-06-15 | 0.088 | introduction following the default of lehman brothers in mid-september last year, the turmoil in financial markets which had started in august 2007 turned into a major financial crisis. liquidity dried up, and credit flows to the economy slowed down. problems in the financial system quickly spilled over to the real economy, and an adverse feedback loop between the real economy and the financial sector emerged. this has led to the most severe and synchronised global economic downturn for 80 years. the euro area has not been spared. economic activity has declined sharply, and inflation is at its lowest level since the launch of the euro. monetary and fiscal authorities across the globe have responded quickly and decisively to these extraordinary developments. in particular, against the background of rapidly receding inflationary pressures and risks, the eurosystem has taken monetary policy and liquidity management measures that were unprecedented in nature, scope and timing. since october last year we have reduced the interest rate on the main refinancing operations by 325 basis points. we have also provided unlimited liquidity support to the banking system in the euro area to maintain the flow of credit. likewise, governments in the euro area have reacted swiftly to stabilise the financial system and to counteract the adverse impact of the financial crisis on the real economy. looking ahead, both monetary and fiscal authorities will need to remain credible and effective, an… |
| Lucas Papademos: Tackling the financial crisis - policies for stability and recovery | Period_1 | 2009-02-17 | 0.072 | financial imbalances in the future and minimise the likelihood of another financial crisis in the long run? ii. policies to preserve stability, restore confidence and foster economic recovery over the past five months, since the financial turmoil intensified and economic conditions deteriorated substantially, central banks and governments have taken unprecedented measures to preserve stability and cushion the impact of the financial crisis on the economy: • unprecedented have been the measures taken by the major central banks since the eruption of the crisis, as judged (i) by the size and frequency of money market operations to provide liquidity; (ii) by the enlargement of the pool of eligible collateral and the expansion of their balance sheets; (iii) by the speed and magnitude of monetary policy easing since october 2008; and (iv) – in some cases – by the use of unconventional or non-standard policy tools; • unprecedented have been the measures taken or announced by governments (i) to support the banking sector through recapitalisations, government guarantees on bank debt, and asset-relief schemes; and (ii) to stimulate aggregate demand through fiscal packages. the policies implemented so far have helped to stabilise the banking system and to mitigate the effects of the financial turbulence on the economy. nevertheless, financial stresses remain and economic conditions are deteriorating in europe and throughout the world. according to the latest forecasts of the imf and … |
| Peter Praet: The role of the European Central Bank - pudence and responsibility in times of crisis | Period_2 | 2017-05-12 | 0.476 | without these operations, the financial system would have imploded and a far deeper contraction would have occurred. in arresting the meltdown in the money market we were able to avoid a chain of bank failures which would have precipitated a collapse in money and credit, with severe consequences for price stability. not acting would, in fact, have amounted to deflecting responsibility for our mandate and risked accepting the kind of economic disorder experienced during the great depression, as mentioned in my introduction. on that account, our balance sheet took on a more prominent role as a stabilising instrument. the novelty of deploying the central bank balance sheet as an instrument was immediately met with substantial scepticism. first, there was apprehension about moral hazard: after all, the ecb expanded credit to banks at a time when they were under scrutiny for having precipitated the crisis in the first place. second, there were also fears about grand-scale liquidity injections ultimately paving the way for inflation. we subsequently entered a second phase, starting in 2010, as a consequence of the loss of confidence in some sovereigns. it brought on the development of redenomination risk and thereby threatened the integrity of our currency. the sovereign debt crisis was triggered in some cases by a weak fiscal position and in others by a weak banking system. but irrespective of its initial impulse, it quickly became a two-way loop through the “bank-sovereign” ne… |
| Peter Praet: The European Central Bank’s monetary policy - past and present | Period_2 | 2017-03-17 | 0.395 | so when this reality finally bit in 2008, monetary policy was left facing a uniquely challenging set of conditions: an “expectations gap” which had left firms and households overleveraged and in urgent need of balance sheet repair, coupled with a “credit gap” as overextended banks began their necessary restructuring and deleveraging – in other words, a so-called balance sheet recession. these conditions laid the ground for the subsequent evolution of the crisis in the euro area, which has unfolded in three main phases, each of which has required a different monetary policy response. the first phase was the immediate liquidity crisis triggered by the turning of the global financial cycle and the subsequent collapse of lehman brothers. as in other advanced economies, euro area banks faced uncertainty about the scale of their exposure to subprime products, prompting a sudden stop in the availability of money market funding for many financial institutions and a systemic rush to cash. central banks faced an imminent risk of asset fire sales by credit institutions to meet maturing obligations, in the process depleting their balance sheets and initiating a steep contraction in credit. the ecb’s response was to lower its main refinancing rate to the then record low of 1% in may 2009 and to provide liquidity elastically to the banking sector, at both increasingly long durations and against a wider range of collateral. our balance sheet expanded as central bank liquidity substituted… |
| Peter Praet: Ensuring price stability | Period_2 | 2017-05-05 | 0.395 | the second phase of the crisis came as a consequence of the loss of confidence in some sovereigns. it brought on the development of redenomination risk and thereby threatened the integrity of our currency. the sovereign debt crisis found impulse in some cases from a weak fiscal position, whereas in others from a weak banking system. but irrespective of its initial impulse it quickly became a two-way interaction through the “bank-sovereign” nexus. banks remained dependent on fiscal authorities for solvency assistance, and the financial obligations vis-à-vis banks that this responsibility created on the side of some national fiscal authorities with weak fundamentals further undermined their credit standing. as the cost of borrowing for certain governments increased, banks with exposures to this debt came under intense market pressure, ultimately leading to entire national banking systems losing market access. this in turn resulted in financial fragmentation and a serious disruption to the monetary transmission mechanism. the ecb had not remained inactive in the face of such vicious feed-back loop, as it saw the implications that such dynamics could have for price stability. but, as the ecb lowered interest rates, these reductions were not being passed on to firms and households in a large part of the euro area, signalling an unusual disconnect between expanding central bank liquidity, exceptionally stimulative monetary policy interest rates and contractionary loan dynamics t… |
| Peter Praet: Monetary policy in a low interest rate environment | Period_2 | 2018-06-19 | 0.352 | had been slowing since the mid-1990s, agents overestimated future income growth and borrowed against it, accumulating excessive levels of debt. at the same time, poor risk management, low capital and liquidity, inadequate corporate governance, and weak supervision and regulation encouraged financial leverage, which led to the build-up of vulnerabilities. this was particularly acute in the united states, where there was a rapid expansion in the development of complex financial securities, which later proved to entail substantial risks. this oversight can to some extent be explained by the fact that, in the decade leading up to the crisis, the overall macroeconomic environment had been very stable, with some observers even concluding that monetary policy had tamed the business cycle once and for all. this was also the period when the perceived benefits of globalisation reached their high-water mark and, for euro area countries, when monetary union came into being, potentially paving the way for the macroeconomic and microeconomic benefits of the european single market to be fully unleashed. when the cycle finally turned in 2008, it set in train a turbulent decade of deleveraging and de- risking, consisting of a number of different phases. the first phase was similar across advanced economies. it was characterised by the financial panic and abrupt liquidity crisis triggered by the collapse of lehman brothers in september 2008. banks became uncertain about the underlying healt… |
| Peter Praet: Have unconventional policies overstretched central bank independence? Challenges for accountability and transparency in the wake of the crisis | Period_2 | 2017-03-30 | 0.334 | challenges for central bank communication and accountability in times of crisis we have been going through the biggest financial crisis in two generations, which has now lasted nearly a decade. prior to it, monetary policy operated predominantly through adjustments to short-term interest rates. but the crisis has upended traditional patterns in finance and economics, and monetary policy is no exception. in its response to the crisis, the ecb has deployed a novel and complex range of instruments. the novelty and complexity of these unconventional measures have created challenges for accountability and transparency. the financial crisis has evolved in three main phases, each of which has required different monetary policy responses and has brought about particular challenges for central bank communication and accountability. the first phase was the abrupt liquidity crisis triggered by the turning of the global financial cycle and the subsequent collapse of lehman brothers. it provoked a systemic failure of funding markets and prompted global central banks to step in with forceful and coordinated interventions to provide essential liquidity to the banking sector. without this response, the financial system would have collapsed and a far deeper recession would have ensued. owing to the funding freeze, the classical interest rate instrument ceased to be the main signalling device of the monetary policy stance. the deployment of the central bank balance sheet as a stabilising in… |
| Christine Lagarde: Challenges along Europe’s road | Period_3 | 2022-05-16 | 0.118 | christine lagarde: challenges along europe’s road speech by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at the international conference to mark the 30th anniversary of banka slovenije, ljubljana, 11 may 2022 * * * it is a pleasure to be in ljubljana today to discuss “the road already travelled and contemporary challenges”. europe can learn a great deal from the journey of slovenia in recent decades. the country has faced and overcome serious challenges over the years: its independence from yugoslavia; joining the eu; adopting the euro; overcoming the crisis that erupted in 2013; and now the pandemic overlayered with russian war against ukraine. but time and again, slovenia has risen to the challenge and excelled. it has become an integral part of european value chains, with intra-eu trade accounting for over two-thirds of slovenia’s exports. it has shown resilience in the face of difficulty: for instance, its economy bounced back from the 2013 crisis to post robust growth rates before the pandemic. what proved crucial was slovenia’s steadfast commitment to its goal, as well as its flexibility to travel the journey towards the heart of europe. commitment and flexibility are the two yardsticks that i will apply to two challenging episodes that the whole of europe, and particularly the euro area including slovenia, has faced in the last decade. in that period, europe has faced repeated shocks, each one different. in this respect, we can sympathise with the w… |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.117 | 2.1 a reality check: the financial and sovereign debt crises this weakness was laid bare by the financial crisis. the euro area adopted a flawed policy mix, causing an economic gap to emerge with other major economies. during the crisis, fiscal policies – after intervening for a short space of time to support the economy – procyclically turned towards fiscal consolidation, mainly through uncoordinated interventions inconsistent with the fiscal stance that would have been appropriate at european level. between 2011 and 2013 procyclical fiscal consolidation triggered contractionary forces that turned out to be self- defeating also in terms of debt sustainability. the onus of stabilising the european economy fell on the ecb’s monetary policy alone, forcing the euro area to undergo a slow and fragile recovery, with members of emu suffering economic and social losses. the severe tensions experienced during that phase led to the creation of a fiscal backstop to contain the sovereign debt crisis and to the launch of banking union to strengthen our financial system. but |
| Fabio Panetta: Europe’s shared destiny, economics and the law | Period_3 | 2022-04-22 | 0.087 | even these institutional innovations were initially insufficient to change the course of european policies. the financial assistance given to countries hit by the financial and sovereign debt crises was tied to strict policy conditionality. financial assistance programmes were conceived in partial equilibrium at the level of single countries, with insufficient efforts made to understand their implications for the euro area as a whole. the start of banking union was also not immune to policy errors. as a member of the ecb’s supervisory board at the time, i argued against the decision to accelerate the necessary increase in banks’ capital ratios in the midst of a crisis, especially in view of the incomplete nature of banking union.[8] the procyclical policies that characterised those years generated a political backlash. europe was unnecessarily divided into creditor and debtor countries, a core and a periphery, resulting in a deep economic, social and political divide. during those difficult years, the ecb showed, however, that another way was possible. with three words, ecb president mario draghi demonstrated that with the determination to act, the euro area could provide a strong crisis response.[9] and with his institutional counterparts, he initiated the reform of emu.[10] |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.086 | this outcome is largely attributable to the combined response of monetary and fiscal policy, which has preserved both demand and supply. for instance, real labour income fell by 3.6% in 2020, but household real disposable income dropped by only 0.2%, because government transfers filled the gap. this is in stark contrast with the sovereign debt crisis, when disposable income fell by 2% year-on- year. the atypical nature of the recovery is creating frictions in the economy, which can produce opposing effects on growth and inflation. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.078 | at the same time, investors are increasingly challenging the view that the euro area economy will fall back into the vicious circle of low growth and low inflation that characterised the pre-pandemic macroeconomic environment. current forward inflation swap rates indicate that inflation is expected to stabilise at, or close to, our two per cent target over the medium to long term, well above the level that was expected before the pandemic. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 112 | income | 1 | 0.1073493 | income | 1 | 1.0000000 |
| 112 | household | 2 | 0.0862700 | wealth | 2 | 0.9987734 |
| 112 | consumption | 3 | 0.0468271 | consumption | 3 | 0.9985971 |
| 112 | house | 4 | 0.0282049 | house | 4 | 0.9984219 |
| 112 | real | 5 | 0.0247132 | household | 5 | 0.9984210 |
| 112 | investment | 6 | 0.0231614 | inequality | 6 | 0.9982013 |
| 112 | affect | 7 | 0.0207043 | disposable income | 7 | 0.9980725 |
| 112 | wealth | 8 | 0.0199284 | disposable | 8 | 0.9978973 |
| 112 | consumer | 9 | 0.0177299 | real income | 9 | 0.9973701 |
| 112 | spend | 10 | 0.0155314 | save | 10 | 0.9965388 |
| 112 | saving | 11 | 0.0154021 | owner | 11 | 0.9965326 |
| 112 | cost | 12 | 0.0137210 | saving | 12 | 0.9964045 |
| 112 | disposable income | 13 | 0.0135916 | owner occupy | 13 | 0.9962651 |
| 112 | disposable | 14 | 0.0129450 | occupy | 14 | 0.9962253 |
| 112 | rise | 15 | 0.0122984 | occupy house | 15 | 0.9960458 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Retail sales from a euro area perspective | Period_1 | 2010-10-28 | 0.242 | it is a great pleasure for me to be here in berlin today at the world retail congress. retail sales constitute about 45 percent of private consumption, which in turn amounts to a share of almost 60% of gdp. thus, retail sales alone explain around 30 percent of aggregate demand in the euro area. these impressive figures are enough to underline the importance of the retail sector for the overall economy. as you know, the primary objective of the ecb’s monetary policy is to maintain price stability. the governing council of the ecb aims at keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. in order to reach this objective we must assess the inflation outlook continuously. we form our view on future inflation by closely following and monitoring a wide range of indicators that affect inflation and the economy’s output of goods and services. retail sales is one of those indicators and certainly – as the figures above show – an important one. in my presentation i would like to briefly touch on three questions: 1. how was the retail trade sector affected by the crisis? 2. how do – in general – financial variables and monetary policy affect private consumption and retail trade? 3. and, what is – in our view – the future outlook for the retail trade sector? let me turn to the first question on how sales in retail shops and stores were affected by the crisis. in chart 1 you see the annual rate of change in the volume of euro area retail sales alongside with private… |
| Mr Noyer considers the role of the central bank in encouraging and safeguarding savings (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 21 Jan 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-01-26 | 0.180 | in fact, in a situation where inflation rises unexpectedly a transfer of wealth occurs from the creditors to the debtors. this interferes with the optimal allocation of savings (i shall return to this issue) when the transfers of wealth do not correspond to the provision of a service or a real economic cost, but have all the characteristics of a “windfall profit” or an exceptional loss. it can also result in a reduction in the amount of savings in two ways: by discouraging agents’ propensity to save amounts subject to the monetary hazard; and (because of the bias resulting from the depreciation in the nominal value of debt and the fiscal distortion to which i referred) by transferring inflationary income from the private to the public sector, which has a lower saving ratio. second, inflation not only affects the system of measurement of prices for goods and services, it also affects the quality of indicators of profitability and of interest rates. by way of an example, the profits of a firm can be artificially affected by differences between the posting dates of payments and receipts or by the incorporation of inflation premia into flows of interest. of course, these profits could possibly include a real gain linked to the reduction in real interest charges, but this does not correspond to the intrinsic profitability of the firm. in the same way, the comparability and thus the best selection of different investments is affected by the inclusion of higher inflation premia i… |
| Juergen Stark: Contributions of central bank statistics in a global context | Period_1 | 2010-10-25 | 0.127 | ladies and gentlemen, the global crisis has demonstrated that high quality statistics are essential. the crisis underscored the need for statistics to keep pace with changes in the financial landscape. these changes can transform the nature of financial intermediation and the transmission of macro-financial shocks in the economy. let me give you a few flashlights of how the global harmonisation of statistical concepts would support higher quality analysis. global inflation rates have rebounded from their bottom, but they have remained subdued. however, these measures of inflation are not fully comparable. data for the euro area and the uk (as for the whole european union) refer to the harmonised indices of consumer prices (hicps) calculated according to a harmonised methodology and a single set of definitions. the us and japan headline rates of inflation refer to their national ways of compiling consumer price inflation. 1 both countries also compile a price index that comes closer to the european harmonised indices of consumer prices. one of the main differences between the two types of indices is the treatment of owner occupied housing costs. 2 the hicp does not cover the expenditure for buying a house or a flat, as it is methodologically very demanding to agree on one method given the different national circumstances. data collection is complex and some argue that buying a house is an investment rather than consumption. both the headline inflation measure in the us, as … |
| Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Retail sales from a euro area perspective | Period_1 | 2010-10-28 | 0.117 | allow me to elaborate a little bit more on this point. loan developments in the euro area can be explained by their main determinants, such as house prices, various interest rates and real income. in line with this, we saw that the annual growth rate of loans to households – after some months in negative territory – has turned positive towards the end of 2009 and since then has continued to increase steadily [ last observation: 2.9% in august 2010]. this positive annual growth of loans to households reflects mainly developments in lending for house purchase. loans for consumer credit are still contributing negatively to overall loan growth. these latest developments in loans to households confirm the broad consistency with business cycle regularities, which suggest that the turning point in the growth of loans to households takes place early in the economic cycle. the loan development needs to be seen in the context of the current low level of interest rates. indeed, bank lending rates for loans to households for house purchase declined further in the second quarter of 2010 – still to a lesser extent than in the previous quarters. the levels of lending rates for loans to households we are currently seeing are comparable to the levels observed in 2005. for shorter-term maturities, the interest rates are even lower than in 2005. still, at the same time, the net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards for loans to households remained unchanged in the se… |
| Mr Noyer considers the role of the central bank in encouraging and safeguarding savings (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 21 Jan 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-01-26 | 0.091 | ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to be taking part in this eurofonds colloquium on savings. i should like to take this opportunity to share with you some thoughts on the role of a central bank in encouraging and safeguarding savings. this is indeed a crucial matter, since the level of savings largely determines the long-term level of productive investment, which provides the basis for solid and stable growth. moreover, the level and structure of savings affects, in various ways, the cost and means of financing enterprises, the profitability of the financial sector and the distribution of income between generations in view of the central issue of financing retirement. i should like to focus my presentation, as i am sure you will understand, not on the central bank in theory but on the role of the eurosystem in this field, that is, the european central bank and the 11 national central banks of the euro area. in addition, i shall say a few words on the impact of the launch of the euro on the development and safeguarding of savings in europe. i shall therefore develop two points: • by safeguarding price stability, the eurosystem contributes to the safeguarding and consolidation of savings. • the creation of the euro is leading to larger and more integrated financial markets, improving the allocation of financial savings. |
| Peter Praet: Long-run saving and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2016-11-16 | 0.274 | other potential consequences of unconventional measures while our measures have been successful in their aim of stabilising output and inflation, they also carry risks in terms of allocation of resources and distribution of wealth and income. potential risks include blunting the creative destruction of the crisis by allowing unproductive, zombie firms to remain in business and permitting the inflation of asset bubbles. some have also raised concerns that low interest rates have reduced incentives for governments to carry out difficult fiscal and structural reforms. these topics are complex and deserve a greater depth of comment than i have time to cover today. given the audience here tonight, i wanted to focus on two particular potential consequences of our unconventional measures: the impact on the distribution of wealth and income, and the impact on bank profitability. to an extent, monetary policy always works through a redistribution of activity. lowering interest rates encourages households to bring forward to today some consumption planned for the future. some have argued that negative rates have the perverse effect of forcing savers, such as those with a fixed savings target for retirement, to save more. but such an argument is not borne out by the data. since the introduction of the negative rate on our deposit facility, saving rates across the euro area have remained broadly stable, or have fallen. the only major country to have some rise is germany. however, the … |
| Benoît Cœuré: What can monetary policy do about inequality? | Period_2 | 2012-10-18 | 0.274 | even poorer. in addition, monetary policy shocks and surprise inflation can have an impact on inequality through other sources of income. income from labour and the unemployment of less-skilled workers tend to be adversely affected to a disproportionate degree during recessions. all in all, recent studies suggest that a higher inflation rate is accompanied by greater income inequality.11 at the same time research on the us data finds that also contractionary monetary policy actions appear to increase inequality in earnings and total income.12 a stability-oriented monetary policy, which aims to smooth the cycle and reduce its amplitude, ought therefore to cushion the impact of negative shocks on poorer households. however, it is not only the extent of income and wealth shocks that affects consumers’ welfare, but also the fluctuation in their consumption expenditure. all households are not equal in this respect. some of them are able to insure against wealth shocks and can thus mitigate the adverse consequences of such shocks for their well-being. but poorer households have limited or no access to the financial system (let alone to financial markets) and do not have adequate buffers in the form of precautionary savings. consequently, their consumption and welfare are particularly vulnerable to adverse shocks. even if all households were hit by negative shocks to the same extent, poorer, less-insured households would suffer from more volatile consumption and lower welfare. st… |
| Benoît Cœuré: What can monetary policy do about inequality? | Period_2 | 2012-10-18 | 0.255 | can monetary policy affect inequality and poverty? but let me now return to the contribution that the central bank itself can make to reducing inequality and poverty. is there evidence that monetary policy affects inequality? i will discuss this question from two perspectives: first, the immediate distributive effects of monetary policy and inflation; and second, the benefits of macroeconomic stability for the more vulnerable. because monetary policy is transmitted through many channels, direct and indirect – interest rates both current and expected, credit extension, asset prices – and because households differ in many respects – with regard to socio-demographic factors, such as age and education, as well as economic variables, such as income, wealth, employment status and housing status – monetary policy does not affect all households in the same way. many channels through which monetary policy affects individuals in different ways may be at work, and it is a daunting task to disentangle and quantify these channels empirically. inflation has a direct effect on income inequality through changes in the real (i.e. consumer price-adjusted) valuation of financial and non-financial assets. clearly, an unexpected fall in interest rates and an increase in inflation tend to hurt savers and benefit borrowers – the mechanism john maynard keynes referred to as the “euthanasia of the rentier”.9 careful studies based on us data demonstrate that inflation hits in particular richer and … |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Monetary policy - end of history? | Period_2 | 2018-07-27 | 0.243 | distribution of wealth and income. and the important question is whether it makes this distribution more unequal. does it make the rich richer and the poor poorer? let’s look at wealth first. here, the most important item for many households is real estate, the home they live in and any other property they may own. real estate makes up about 80% of the total assets of households, almost irrespective of their level of prosperity. so, to answer our question, we need to think about how monetary policy affects house prices. the answer is that quantitative easing raises house prices and, on average, this boosts the net wealth of all households, rich and poor alike. in fact, poorer households might even benefit more because they are more highly leveraged. so their main asset – their house – gains in value, while the debt they used to finance it becomes cheaper. now, what about incomes? well, loose monetary policy props up the economy and thus raises employment. and again, this should mean that people with lower incomes benefit most. after all, unemployment is much higher among those with low incomes than among those with high incomes. so, it seems that loose monetary policy might also reduce income inequality. however, there are three things that we must keep in mind. first, the effect of monetary policy on inequality is quite small. in the end, inequality is driven by many things such as technological progress, globalisation and taxes. compared with these things, monetary polic… |
| Yves Mersch: Asset price inflation and monetary policy | Period_2 | 2020-01-28 | 0.193 | incorporating owner-occupied housing in the reference rate of inflation for monetary policy would provide a clearer signal for monetary policy to lean against housing price booms. indeed, the united states, japan, sweden and norway already integrate owner-occupied housing into their reference inflation indices. if it were to be included in the hicp, it could raise measured inflation rates in the euro area by around 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points in some periods.[21] taking that into consideration, core inflation would lift from its current 1.3% to its long-run trend, or even higher, thereby having a bearing on the monetary policy stance. the gap between perceptions and official measures of inflation can complicate the communication of policy decisions. if households believe that inflation is rampant then they will see little justification for unconventional measures, in particular negative interest rates. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.278 | expenditures price index which is the index used by the federal reserve system (frs) to set its target) that both include an owner-occupied housing cost component based on the rent equivalence approach. for an international comparison see “inflation measurement and its assessment in the ecb’s monetary policy strategy review”, occasional paper series, no 265, ecb, september 2021. 5. this general hicp principle implies that household purchases from a seller in another macroeconomic sector, for example, non-financial corporations, are included, while purchases between households (e.g. second-hand vehicles not sold by dealers and garages) are not. the reason for this is that transactions within the household sector, i.e. when one household is the buyer and another household is the seller, do not imply any change to the household sector as a whole. 6. this is why owner-occupied housing price indices are published quarterly, which is at odds with the timeliness of hicp, and with a three-month delay. 7. its reliance on transaction prices rather than imputed rents is likely to enhance the information content of the hicp and may better address the concerns of euro area citizens who want a stronger and more realistic representation of housing costs. 8. see article 3(7) of regulation (eu) 2016/792, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/en/txt/pdf/?uritcelex:32016ro0/792&from=en . 9. an assessment found that the current owner-occupied housing price index did not meet t… |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.265 | the second step, in line with the hicp regulation, is to derive a price index by looking only at transactions to, but not within, the household sector.=! sales of houses between households should be ignored, which means focusing mainly on new builds. this results in a relatively small number of transactions per month, which, for smaller countries, may make it impossible to calculate a monthly price index. in the strategy review we looked at all of these technical issues and how to solve them. as part of the review, the governing council decided in favour of including owner-occupied housing using the net acquisition approach._!4] however, the hicp is not compiled by the ecb but by eurostat and the national statistical institutes. the governing council thus proposed a roadmap that takes into account the role of the various eu institutions involved in this process. this roadmap foresees four main stages for moving to an hicp including owner-occupied housing. first, we are constructing an analytical index which includes owner-occupied housing for internal purposes. second, we would like eurostat to publish an experimental quarterly hicp including owner- occupied housing costs, possibly by 2023. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.177 | one challenge is that housing has a dual nature: at first, buying a house is an investment in an asset. but buyers may have different intentions: they could use the house only as an investment — by renting it out — or use it primarily for consumption — by occupying it as an owner. as the owner-occupier will also benefit from the increase in the house’s value over time, it will be used for both investment and consumption. |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.168 | this outcome is largely attributable to the combined response of monetary and fiscal policy, which has preserved both demand and supply. for instance, real labour income fell by 3.6% in 2020, but household real disposable income dropped by only 0.2%, because government transfers filled the gap. this is in stark contrast with the sovereign debt crisis, when disposable income fell by 2% year-on- year. the atypical nature of the recovery is creating frictions in the economy, which can produce opposing effects on growth and inflation. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.160 | in parallel, the necessary legal work will be started so that an official quarterly index can be made available, possibly in 2026. here, | am counting on the support of the european parliament, given that it already requested the integration of owner-occupied housing in 2016.8] the aim — and final stage — would be to include owner-occupied housing at a monthly frequency and in a timely manner, hence fully usable for monetary policy purposes. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 113 | evidence | 1 | 0.0686110 | empirical | 1 | 0.9998248 |
| 113 | empirical | 2 | 0.0447388 | study | 2 | 0.9995619 |
| 113 | research | 3 | 0.0404245 | empirical evidence | 3 | 0.9994741 |
| 113 | study | 4 | 0.0398493 | academic | 4 | 0.9992115 |
| 113 | time | 5 | 0.0248932 | research | 5 | 0.9987727 |
| 113 | academic | 6 | 0.0188533 | evidence | 6 | 0.9987719 |
| 113 | empirical evidence | 7 | 0.0185657 | theoretical | 7 | 0.9985105 |
| 113 | conduct | 8 | 0.0184218 | finding | 8 | 0.9983341 |
| 113 | theory | 9 | 0.0168400 | theory | 9 | 0.9981600 |
| 113 | result | 10 | 0.0154019 | science | 10 | 0.9975449 |
| 113 | theoretical | 11 | 0.0145390 | literature | 11 | 0.9972840 |
| 113 | link | 12 | 0.0143952 | knowledge | 12 | 0.9968021 |
| 113 | general | 13 | 0.0142514 | carry | 13 | 0.9955755 |
| 113 | numb | 14 | 0.0106562 | empirical study | 14 | 0.9951657 |
| 113 | reason | 15 | 0.0105124 | link | 15 | 0.9949967 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: The role of money in the conduct of monetary policy | Period_1 | 2006-11-16 | 0.242 |
|
| Lucas Papademos: The science of monetary policy ¿ past advances and future challenges | Period_1 | 2007-09-24 | 0.226 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Willem F Duisenberg Fellowship of the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study | Period_1 | 2008-03-05 | 0.212 | ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to be here today in amsterdam to inaugurate the willem f. duisenberg fellowship of the netherlands institute for advanced study. i am particularly delighted to be here for two reasons. first, this new fellowship was set up in honour of wim duisenberg, the first president of the european central bank (ecb), who successfully led us through the uncharted territory of introducing the euro as the new currency for the, by now, around 320 million fellow european citizens. second, the willem f. duisenberg fellowship establishes another european programme that will foster top-quality research in the field of applied monetary and macroeconomics. it will thereby contribute to the continuous upgrading of our knowledge in these areas of research, which is fundamental for the sound conduct of monetary policy and of economic policies in the euro area. let me also say now that we are in the purdah period as far as the governing council of the ecb is concerned. nothing in what i will say is intended to and should be interpreted in any respect in terms of future monetary policy. the ecb has, from the very beginning of its existence, attached great importance to establishing close ties with academic research, in order to ensure the constant exposure of our analyses and views to external ideas and expertise. we foster these close ties in various ways. we frequently co-organise conferences, workshops and seminars on topics relevant for policy… |
| Lucas Papademos: The science of monetary policy ¿ past advances and future challenges | Period_1 | 2007-09-24 | 0.200 | effective in ensuring price stability. for the ecb, the unambiguous commitment to price stability is reflected in the quantification of its policy objective and its communication, but most importantly in its determination and consistency in pursuing price stability (the nominal anchor). so far, i have fully agreed with the role and significance of seven, out of the nine, principles proposed by frederic for providing the scientific underpinning of monetary policy. there are two principles, however, that i do not consider as having been fully and widely accepted and reflected in the practice of monetary policy: the principle concerning the role and usefulness of monetary policy rules and the one pertaining to the role of financial frictions in business cycles. these two principles do not belong, at least not yet, to the core propositions underlying the science of central banking not because their content is not important but for other reasons. in the case of the policy rules, the simple reason is that they are not used – by most central banks – in the actual conduct of monetary policy, although they may be used for analytical purposes and as benchmarks for comparison of the policies implemented in practice. there are several reasons why such rules are not used in the practice of monetary policy. one such reason, which i will highlight later on, is related to the imperfect inflation available for estimating reliably key variables included in these rules, in real time. in the … |
| Why price stability? | Period_1 | 2000-11-03 | 0.171 | series of working papers and periodic bulletins. the close collaboration between the ecb and the academic world mirrors what is occurring more broadly between academia and the new knowledge-based industries. it facilitates the continuous elaboration and improvement of a large set of tools that are of utmost importance for decision-making at the ecb, ranging from models for forecasting and policy evaluation to analytical frameworks for monitoring monetary and credit developments. i wish to stress that such an exchange becomes particularly important and mutually beneficial in the context of the european system of central banks. this is because we at the ecb face considerable and historically unique challenges in carrying out our responsibilities. if, in general, a monetary policy strategy that is successful in maintaining price stability is, in the words of alan blinder, “the result of a wise combination of art and science”, then for us, in the context of the large-scale institutional innovation brought about by emu, both the art and the science of monetary policy have to perform at their best. over the past ten years, the single most important achievement of monetary policy has been the attainment of price stability. through an admirable and sustained effort of monetary discipline, central banks in both the united states and europe have overcome the regrettable “great inflation” of the 1970s and the early 1980s. but, at the present juncture, the question we should be asking… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy communication in turbulent times | Period_2 | 2014-04-24 | 0.109 | 1 see brunner (1981), cook and hahn (1989) and goodfriend (1986). 2 for an overview of the way central banks have been providing more information about their monetary policy making, see for example geraats (2014). for a survey of empirical evidence on the effects of communication, see blinder et al. (2008). 3 a body of empirical evidence supports the view that high transparency and good communication reinforce policy effectiveness and market efficiency. see, for example, levin, natalucci, and piger (2004); gürkaynak, levin, and swanson (2006); and castelnuovo, nicoletti-altimari, and rodriguez palenzuela (2003). |
| Peter Praet: The European Central Bank’s fight against low inflation - reasons and consequences | Period_2 | 2016-04-11 | 0.090 | conclusion let me conclude. decades of experience have confirmed the importance of price stability for macroeconomic stability and sustained economic growth. that is true both when inflation is too high and 10 eggertsson, g. and b. pugsley (2006), “the mistake of 1937: a general equilibrium analysis,” monetary and economic studies, institute for monetary and economic studies, bank of japan, vol. 24(s1), pages 151–190, december. 11 orphanides, a. and j. williams (2004), “imperfect knowledge, inflation expectations, and monetary policy,” nber chapters, in: the inflation-targeting debate, pages 201–246 national bureau of economic research, inc. |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Monetary policy in uncertain times - the European Central Bank and the crisis | Period_2 | 2016-09-15 | 0.084 | all beginnings are difficult. it’s true of monetary policy as well. let’s consider for a moment europe’s first central bank. in 1656 johan palmstruch founded stockholm banco, introduced paper money and triggered an economic crisis. what happened? at the outset stockholm banco conducted normal banking operations: it took deposits and made loans. the deposits at that time mainly consisted of copper coins, and the most common denomination weighed almost 20 kg. but in 1662 the swedish state issued new coins which contained less copper. the old coins stored at stockholm banco thus became more valuable and the depositors asked for them back. the bank then found itself with a serious liquidity problem because the desired coins had been issued as loans. faced with this situation, johan palmstruch had an idea – an idea with consequences. those who asked for their coins back received paper money instead. this paper money was backed by the copper coins, which had not disappeared but had simply been lent out. the people and the state accepted the paper money; the crisis was averted. at the same time, stockholm banco could now make loans in the form of paper money. it then did that, but somewhat too generously: it produced more paper money than were backed by the coins. the people lost trust in the value of the paper money and sweden experienced inflation. to control it, stockholm banco stopped issuing loans and paper money. this in turn led to an economic crisis. in 1667 the swedish s… |
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.084 | research suggests that these forces have affected inflation in the euro area in recent decades. a recent study finds that global factors, such as global commodity prices, global slack and producer price competition, can all significantly affect inflation.[11] ecb research also finds that digitalisation has been disinflationary in the euro area: since 2006, e-commerce has led to an average yearly decrease in non- energy industrial goods inflation of 0.06 percentage points.[12] and empirical evidence suggests that a shrinking working-age population may depress inflation.[13] https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp200930~169abb1202.en.html 3/7 |
| Vítor Constâncio: The future of monetary policy frameworks | Period_2 | 2017-06-13 | 0.084 | prior to the financial crisis, the performance of inflation targeting was in practice widely considered as a success.2 to recall that in the 70s and 80s, a period that now seems in the distant past, the key challenge for central banks was very high inflation, not too low. empirical evidence suggests that countries that adopted inflation targeting, beginning with new zealand in 1989, have experienced lower average inflation rates than they did before its adoption. for instance, in a prominent study, carl walsh identifies ten inflation‐targeting oecd countries and reports that the average inflation rate across countries declined from 9.2% prior to the adoption of inflation targeting to 3.2% after the adoption. importantly, the decline in the level of inflation was accompanied by a decline in the volatility of inflation and an improved anchoring of inflation expectations.3 |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox and the effective lower bound | Period_3 | 2021-11-16 | 0.109 | philip r lane: the monetary policy toolbox and the effective lower bound welcome address by mr philip r lane, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the ecb conference on monetary policy “bridging science and practice”, frankfurt am main, 11 october 2021. * * * it is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2021 edition of the annual ecb conference on monetary policy. as captured in the title of this year’s event, this conference series serves a vital role in bridging the science and practice of monetary policy. in particular, it is essential for the ecb to incorporate in our analytical framework the theoretical and empirical insights generated by the global academic community, and the conference format (albeit in webinar mode again this year) is very effective in providing us with a platform to discuss the latest developments. the breadth of academic research (in terms of both topics and research techniques) that is relevant for monetary policy is quite wide and this is reflected in the composition of the conference programme. the agenda includes research that exploits financial market data to examine the transmission of monetary policy, studies the impact of the pandemic on firms and banks using entity-level datasets, analyses the interactions between monetary policy and financial stability in a full-scale macroeconomic model, and explores the impact of monetary and fiscal policies on the formation of household expectations. in addition, the conference fe… |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.091 | arise upon a policy announcement (or in anticipation of the announcement) and are influenced by the expected future evolution of central banks’ asset holdings. empirical evidence suggests that stock effects account for the bulk of the impact of asset purchases and are likely to last longer (although assessing their duration is extremely difficult). conversely, within the academic literature, “flow effects” refer to those effects that emerge through the actual implementation of the purchases and generally reflect improvements in liquidity conditions and market functioning during periods of high financial stress. the evidence suggests that flow effects are typically contained and short-lived. it is notable, however, that the term “flow effects” has at times been used in relation to the high pace of asset purchase programmes carried out in response to the covid-19 crisis, for which only the envelope and duration were defined at the time they were announced. from this perspective, flow effects help to signal the central bank’s commitment to providing ample policy accommodation and reassure market participants about the presence of central banks as large and patient investors. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.089 | : household debt: united states versus euro area ecb, federal reserve board and bureau of economic analysis. the latest observation is for the first quarter of 2022. another factor to consider in relation to the transmission of our monetary policy is the causal relation between economy-wide slack and inflation as captured by the structural phillips curve.[29] a swathe of empirical evidence indicates that the structural connection between inflation and unemployment remains present both in the euro area and the us but evolves over time. in addition, while developments in economic slack can account for a significant share of inflation, it cannot fully explain inflation developments in more recent years due to the growing importance of factors beyond the business cycle.[30] looking to the future, this evidence overall suggests that further progress in bringing inflation towards our aim can be attained by ensuring the appropriate level of slack in the economy, provided inflation expectations remain sufficiently well-anchored. empirical evidence on transmission during 2022 let me now turn to the evidence on how the adjustments in our monetary policy since last december have been transmitted. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reconciling the macro and micro evidence on the effects of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-09-13 | 0.067 | early micro evidence on the effects of policy rates with the advent of more and more granular data, research shifted its focus to micro data on prices. researchers documented how individual firms set prices, aiming at building models that would be consistent with both the price-setting behaviour at the micro level and the effects of monetary policy in the macro data. meeting these two objectives simultaneously proved challenging. when economists studied the micro data underlying the consumer price index in the united states and other countries, they found that individual price changes are infrequent but typically large in absolute terms, in the order of 10%.[4] in their famous paper “menu costs and phillips curves”, mikhail golosov and robert lucas investigated the implications of this evidence for the effects of monetary policy in a dynamic equilibrium model with idiosyncratic shocks and a fixed cost of nominal price changes. when calibrated to match the average frequency and size of price changes in the micro data in a low- inflation environment, the model predicted monetary policy having a strong effect on inflation and a weak effect on output – that is a steep phillips curve, in contrast to the relationship found in the macro data.[5] the key reason behind this result was the “selection effect”. in a menu cost model, after a change in the policy rate, prices further away from their optimum adjust sooner than others. in the golosov-lucas model, this selection effect is … |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.055 | challenges this claim, finding no noticeable slowdown in the rate of price resets (chart 8). work in progress in the eurosystem shows that the rate of price changes may even have increased during the pandemic. chart 8 frequency of price changes: a comparison of ipn (data: 1996-2001) and prisma (data: 2011-2017) results (percentages) @ processed food @ services g non-energy industrial goods om 45° 0.50 0.45 ® £0.40 : @ 0.35 — 5 0.30 paar ee ® ; gp (0:25 * ; o * °, = 20 ° ® < 0.15 = a2. : e° q 0.10 e°.@ e° c #0005 | ome - 0.00 es 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 ipn (data: 1996-2001) source: gautier et al. (2021), “new facts on consumer price rigidity in the euro area’, working paper series, ecb (forthcoming). note: the chart shows the frequency of price changes documented by the eurosystem inflation persistence network (ipn) and the price-setting microdata analysis (prisma) network for a set of 50 product categories covered by both studies. from 2003, the ipn conducted an in-depth study of inflation persistence and price rigidity in the euro area by analysing a broad set of macro and micro data covering the period from 1996 until 2001. the ipn has concluded its work. the prisma network was set up in 2018 to deepen the understanding of price-setting behaviour and inflation dynamics in the eu by collecting and studying various types of microdata, including data underlying official price indices such as the consumer price index (cpi) and the producer price index … |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 114 | real | 1 | 0.1114104 | real interest | 1 | 0.9995617 |
| 114 | interest | 2 | 0.1033976 | real interest rate | 2 | 0.9993865 |
| 114 | interest rate | 3 | 0.0857028 | real rate | 3 | 0.9991236 |
| 114 | nominal | 4 | 0.0374039 | nominal interest | 4 | 0.9988609 |
| 114 | equilibrium | 5 | 0.0365136 | equilibrium | 5 | 0.9988609 |
| 114 | real interest | 6 | 0.0357346 | nominal interest rate | 6 | 0.9988607 |
| 114 | real interest rate | 7 | 0.0355120 | equilibrium real | 7 | 0.9983348 |
| 114 | natural | 8 | 0.0221574 | natural rate | 8 | 0.9981601 |
| 114 | real rate | 9 | 0.0189301 | natural | 9 | 0.9976332 |
| 114 | nominal interest | 10 | 0.0151463 | equilibrium interest | 10 | 0.9976330 |
| 114 | nominal interest rate | 11 | 0.0150350 | equilibrium interest rate | 11 | 0.9976330 |
| 114 | natural rate | 12 | 0.0135883 | nominal | 12 | 0.9974552 |
| 114 | fall | 13 | 0.0106948 | equilibrium rate | 13 | 0.9973701 |
| 114 | decline | 14 | 0.0105835 | secular | 14 | 0.9972840 |
| 114 | equilibrium real | 15 | 0.0089142 | real | 15 | 0.9969242 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean Claude Trichet: The ECB’s monetary policy strategy after the evaluation and clarification of May 2003 | Period_1 | 2003-12-02 | 0.203 | rationales for aiming for positive inflation (1): the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates the first argument is that maintaining a low positive rate of inflation reduces to very low levels the probability that nominal interest rates will approach their lower bound at zero. the event of nominal interest rates hitting the zero lower bound is linked to an increased uncertainty about the effectiveness of monetary policy. if this event were to coincide with a strong decline in demand, such a situation could complicate the central bank’s ability to avoid a deflationary episode. examples where countries reached the lower bound for nominal interest rates are rare. and even if this event were to materialise, a number of effective monetary policy actions are still possible at zero nominal interest rates and various plausible solutions for escaping from a liquidity trap have been proposed. this notwithstanding, prevention is better than cure and a safety margin for inflation rates above zero proves helpful to avoid that the effectiveness of these alternative policies has to be tested in reality. in order to calibrate the adequate safety margin for inflation rates in this respect, we took into account the studies which have tried to assess the likelihood of nominal interest rates hitting the zero lower |
| Lucas Papademos: Globalisation and central bank policies | Period_1 | 2008-01-25 | 0.169 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Real and nominal convergence ¿ policy challenges | Period_1 | 2007-11-21 | 0.164 |
|
| Jürgen Stark: Delivering price stability - benefits and challenges | Period_1 | 2007-12-04 | 0.160 | why should central banks tolerate small positive rates of inflation? this insight brings me to my first question to experts. inflation is a tax on nominal wealth, so if asked individually about whether that tax should be positive or zero – or even negative, thus becoming a subsidy – agents in the economy would tend to choose the lowest possible tax. but assuming that the economy faces various frictions, and that those frictions interact with zero or negative inflation in ways that might be costly for the economy as a whole, theory argues that a “benign optimizer” would not necessarily opt for a zero or negative inflation tax. how are we to weigh inflation costs to individual agents against the benefits of price stability – defined as low but positive inflation – as an insurance mechanism against various macroeconomic pathologies? this conference makes some progress on two families of such pathologies, those associated with the so-called lower bound to the nominal interest rate, and those possibly arising from downward nominal wage rigidities. the lower limit to the nominal interest rate is an area of investigation in which research is advanced and, i note in passing, converging to a consensus view. here, the argument in favour of a low but positive long term inflation rate is well known: it relates to the risk that the zero-floor to the setting of nominal interest rates might at times interfere with the ability of the central bank to stabilise inflation in the face of expe… |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Careful with (the D) words! | Period_1 | 2008-11-27 | 0.156 | scenario, expectations of price changes turn negative and induce agents to postpone consumption and investment decisions. it’s the negative inflation expectations that pushes the (ex-ante) real interest rate up, even when the nominal interest rate is brought down to zero, above its equilibrium level. it is not clear what could push agents to expect negative inflation, and thereby enter a deflation scenario, rather than a standard disinflation. one possibility is that agents are not fully rational and form adaptive expectations. as they observe the start of the disinflation, with a negative inflation rate necessary to achieve the new equilibrium, they may think that the negative price change is likely to persist for some time. negative inflation expectations might thus become entrenched. given the zero bound on interest rates, the negative inflation pushes real rates up, thereby adding recessionary forces to the economy, which might further fuel price declines. another hypothesis is that the disinflation process is not sufficiently quick to stabilise the economy at the new equilibrium. as in the case of asset markets that do not function properly, when the equilibrium price is not achieved rapidly enough and the adjustment process is slow, the price dynamics will take longer and might even overshoot, generating destabilising patterns. the same could occur for the real economy, as a lack of flexibility in markets delays the adjustment of the price level, which may take more … |
| Isabel Schnabel: Narratives about the ECB’s monetary policy - reality or fiction? | Period_2 | 2020-02-12 | 0.381 | if inflation needs to be pushed up, central banks need to bring the real interest rate – that is, the nominal interest rate adjusted for inflation – below what is called the “real equilibrium interest rate” – the rate at which all factors of production are at full capacity and inflation is stable. the level of the real equilibrium rate is determined by a number of structural factors, such as a country’s demographic situation or capacity to innovate.[5] the real equilibrium interest rate cannot be directly observed and instead has to be estimated. and almost all estimation methods show that the real equilibrium interest rate in the euro area has fallen markedly over the past 20 years (slide 10). indeed, many estimates have even been showing negative values in recent years. this suggests that the supply of capital is matched with relatively low demand – in other words that the desire to save is meeting with a comparatively low propensity to invest. germany offers a prime example of this savings surplus. the vast and enduring current account surplus means that in germany much more is being saved than invested. |
| Vítor Constâncio: The challenge of low real interest rates for monetary policy | Period_2 | 2016-06-16 | 0.343 | this decline in economic growth in advanced economies has led some scholars to bring back the concept of secular stagnation which was first introduced by alvin hansen in 1938 to portray the decline in u.s. economic growth he envisaged on account of the decline in innovation, population growth and investment opportunities. more recently, robert gordon (2016) and larry summers (2016) have reignited the debate on secular stagnation, with the former emphasising the role of supply-side factors and the latter on the chronic weakness of demand. both frameworks are not mutually exclusive as both supply and demand factors can interact and reinforce each other. for example, weak demand leads to unemployment and if this becomes prolonged, workers’ human capital can diminish, which in turn reduces the potential output of the economy (blanchard and summers, 1986 and blanchard, cerrutti and summers, 2015). the connection between the long-term real equilibrium rate and the potential growth rate of the economy is therefore widely used in methodologies to estimate the real equilibrium rate, such as the one developed by williams and laubach (2003). this connection is even accentuated in a normative sense as in a simple olg growth model with growing productivity, the so-called golden rule that ensures the dynamic efficiency of the economy, (i.e. that the economy does not over-invest or under-invest and maximizes consumption equally across generations), implies that the real rate of interest … |
| Vítor Constâncio: The challenge of low real interest rates for monetary policy | Period_2 | 2016-06-16 | 0.325 | the importance of the concept of a real equilibrium interest rate is that it provides a sort of anchor to a monetary economy. in reality, the concept defines an optimum to which the economy would move spontaneously in the long run if wrong policies would not disturb it. the concept was introduced in 1898 by knut wicksell as he became aware that in a credit- dominated economy, where banks create money, the traditional quantity theory of money could not explain inflation. he therefore introduced the theory of a natural real rate of interest, linked to the marginal productivity of capital that, in combination with market interest rates, would determine price dynamics. prices would increase if market rates were below the natural rate, and would decrease should the opposite be the case. as market rates are influenced by monetary policy and somehow related to monetary aggregates, he presented his theory as a reformulation of the quantity theory of money adapted to a credit/money economy. as he wrote in his book “interest and prices”: “there is a certain rate of interest on loans which is neutral in respect to commodity prices, and tends neither to raise or lower them. this is necessarily the same as the rate of interest which would be determined by supply and demand if no use were made of money and all lending were effected in the form of capital goods. it comes to much the same thing to describe it as the current value of the natural rate of interest on capital.”[1] the connect… |
| Vítor Constâncio: The challenge of low real interest rates for monetary policy | Period_2 | 2016-06-16 | 0.306 | return on investment. this would discourage investment and consumption and generate recessionary and deflationary pressures. monetary policy is therefore part of the solution and not part of the problem. by ensuring low interest rates, monetary policy is supporting and accelerating the recovery and with this, the return to a normalisation of inflation and subsequent normalisation of interest rates. this starts to be visible in the u.s. where interest rates have started to increase. to demonstrate that monetary policy did not create per se the environment of low interest rates but is rather responding to a declining real rate of equilibrium, we need to have some empirical idea about a concept that is unobservable. there exist, however, many different methods to try to estimate this unobservable rate. one approach can be based on the existing medium- to long-term market interest rates, assuming that the markets are influenced by the concept of a long-term equilibrium real rate. methodologies can then try to extract that wisdom of markets by using filters or models to decompose the actual interest rates. other methods are more theoretical and model-based, building on the possible determinants of a real equilibrium interest rate. i will present some estimates using both types of approaches. |
| Mario Draghi: Delivering a symmetric mandate with asymmetric tools - monetary policy in a context of low interest rates | Period_2 | 2016-06-08 | 0.298 | the need for such a buffer was explicitly acknowledged by the governing council in 2003 when we clarified our definition of price stability. 1 it has since helped countries to adjust competitiveness when required. initially, aiming at 2% allowed some core economies to lower relative prices in a fairly painless way, as other “catching up” economies had higher inflation rates and were pulling up the area average. today, the positions of those groups have reversed. but the rationale remains exactly the same. the second reason why a 2% objective helps absorb shocks is that it supports the implementation of monetary policy in adverse conditions. a small positive buffer creates more scope to support the economy through cutting nominal interest rates and reduces the likelihood of running up against the effective lower bound. this is because, for a given equilibrium real interest rate, a higher inflation objective implies higher nominal rates over the cycle. in line with the results from a larger research literature, ecb simulations made in 2003 suggested that a 2% objective would substantially decrease the probability of nominal rates reaching zero. 2 this was also recognised by the governing council as a reason for aiming closer to 2%. 3 what was true then has become even more relevant now. the studies in 2003 assumed an equilibrium real rate of around 2%, so with a 2% inflation objective the equilibrium nominal rate would be around 4%. evidence suggests, however, that demograph… |
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.245 | econometric estimates of the real equilibrium rate (percentages) mmm range of all natural rate estimates mum range of smoother estimates 6 ao 1-year real forward rate 9 years ahead 6 0 ro | y_n my 0 brand, c., bielecki, m. and penalver, a. (eds.) (2018), “the natural rate of interest: estimates, drivers, and challenges to monetary policy”, occasional paper series, no 217, ecb, december; brand, c., goy, g.; lemke, w. (2020), “natural rate chimera and bond pricing reality”, dnb working papers, no 666, de nederlandsche bank, january; ajevskis, viktors (2018): “the natural rate of interest: information derived from a shadow rate model,” latvijas banka working paper, (2/2018); brand, c. and mazelis, f. (2019) “taylor-rule consistent estimates of the natural rate of interest.” working paper series 2257, european central bank; fiorentini, g., galesi, a., perez-quirds, g. and sentana, e. (2018): “the rise and fall of the natural interest rate,” banco de espana, documentos de trabajo, (1822); geiger, f. and schupp, f. (2018), “with a little help from my friends: survey-based derivation of euro area short rate expectations at the effective lower bound”, bundesbank discussion paper, no 27; holston, k., laubach, t., and williams, j. c. (2017). measuring the natural rate of interest: international trends and determinants. journal of international economics, 108:59-—75.; jarocinski, marek (2017): “var-based estimation of the euro area natural rate of interest,” ecb draft paper, johannse… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.244 | headline and core inflation in the euro area (annual percentage changes) ome 1 | cp ewe hicp excluding energy and food (hicpx) eurostat and ecb. note: the latest observations are for february 2022 (flash release). chart 2 shows the dynamics since 1999 of the estimated equilibrium nominal interest rate, which is constructed as the sum of the two per cent inflation target and the equilibrium real interest rate, which is the real interest rate that is consistent with full utilisation of available resources and inflation steady at the target. the trend decline in equilibrium interest rates was a first-order issue in the strategy review exercise. in particular, a low equilibrium interest rate means that any robust monetary policy strategy must take into account the effective lower bound on policy rates. |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.209 | the natural rate of interest is the real interest rate level that contemporaneously brings output into line with its potential and stabilises inflation at the central bank’s target in the absence of transitory shocks or nominal rigidities. see brand, c., bielecki, m. and penalver, a. (eds.) (2018), “the natural rate of interest: estimates, drivers, and challenges to monetary policy”, occasional paper series, no 217, ecb, december. |
| Fabio Panetta: Normalising monetary policy in non-normal times | Period_3 | 2022-05-31 | 0.144 | normal does not mean theoretical second, the normalisation process should not be assessed against unobservable reference points, such as the natural (or neutral) rate of interest[3] and some optimal or “normal” size and composition of the central bank’s balance sheet in the long run. these concepts are only vague guideposts at the best of times, and they are particularly fraught with uncertainty in the current environment. before the pandemic, the real natural rate of interest for the euro area was estimated to range from just over 0% to less than -2%, depending on the model used.[4] in fact, proxies of real rates are already at the higher end of that range – for instance, the one-year forward real rate nine years ahead [5] recently increased significantly, reaching 0%. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.115 | our monetary policy decisions have also contributed to substantially raising real rates over most horizons beyond the very short term. for instance, the forward real rate at the 1yr1yr horizon has gone up by about 300 bps since december 2021 (chart 11). while this increase in the near term has primarily been driven by the real expectations component embedded in forward real rates, longer-term real forward rates increased mostly due to higher real term premia. furthermore, the 10-year real overnight index swap (ois) rate recently edged into positive territory – to levels not seen for over a decade.[34] these positive levels are particularly remarkable as the whole term structure of euro area real rates had been negative for many years reflecting a host of domestic and global factors. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 115 | speech | 1 | 0.0386297 | bulletin | 1 | 0.9992991 |
| 115 | series | 2 | 0.0355842 | economic bulletin | 2 | 0.9992111 |
| 115 | paper | 3 | 0.0347314 | bulletin issue | 3 | 0.9991231 |
| 115 | european | 4 | 0.0344878 | economic bulletin issue | 4 | 0.9988604 |
| 115 | bulletin | 5 | 0.0282749 | occasional paper | 5 | 0.9983780 |
| 115 | paper series | 6 | 0.0230365 | occasional | 6 | 0.9980725 |
| 115 | issue | 7 | 0.0218183 | paper series | 7 | 0.9976323 |
| 115 | frankfurt | 8 | 0.0201128 | box | 8 | 0.9970192 |
| 115 | economic bulletin | 9 | 0.0187728 | occasional paper series | 9 | 0.9967528 |
| 115 | main | 10 | 0.0185291 | op cit | 10 | 0.9964057 |
| 115 | bulletin issue | 11 | 0.0162145 | panetta | 11 | 0.9964023 |
| 115 | economic bulletin issue | 12 | 0.0159709 | series | 12 | 0.9961315 |
| 115 | occasional | 13 | 0.0124380 | lane p.r | 13 | 0.9960931 |
| 115 | european central bank | 14 | 0.0121944 | p.r | 14 | 0.9959189 |
| 115 | november | 15 | 0.0117071 | op | 15 | 0.9950058 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Economic policies on the two sides of the Atlantic (why) are they different? | Period_1 | 2008-11-11 | 0.283 | 5 for the euro area, see dhyne, e. et al. (2005), price-setting in the euro area: some stylised facts from individual consumer price data, ecb working paper no 524; for the united states, see bils, m. and p. j. klenow (2004), “some evidence on the importance of sticky prices”, journal of political economy, vol. 112, no 5, pp. 947-985. 6 see, for instance, sahuc and smets (op. cit.). 7 see sahuc and smets (op. cit.) as well as cristiano, motto and rostagno (op. cit.). 8 see the article entitled the “activism” of monetary policy published in the november 2006 issue of the ecb’s monthly bulletin. see also j.-c. trichet (2006), chairman’s speech delivered at the conference entitled “the ecb and its watchers ix”, held in frankfurt am main on 7 september 2007. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Further integrating euro area economies ¿ some reflections | Period_1 | 2006-07-14 | 0.257 | 6 see duval and elmeskov (2006) “the effects of emu on structural reforms in labour and product markets,” ecb working paper series no 557, and blanchard and giavazzi (2003) “macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets,” quarterly journal of economics, august, 118(3), pp. 879-907. 7 see giannone and reichlin (2006) “trends and cycles in the euro area: how much heterogeneity and should we worry about it?”, ecb working paper series no 555, benalal, diaz del hoyo, pierluigi and vidalis (2006), “output growth differentials across the euro area countries: some stylised facts”, ecb occasional paper series no 45, and ecb (2004) “sectoral specialisation in the eu: a macroeconomic perspective”, ecb occasional paper no 19. 8 see cappiello, hördahl, kadareja, and manganelli (2006) “the impact of the euro on financial markets,” ecb working paper series no 556, and baele, ferrando, hördahl, krylova, and monnet (2004) “measuring financial integration in the euro area”, ecb occasional paper no 14, april. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The governance of globalisation | Period_1 | 2008-05-13 | 0.232 | 3 for a detailed look at the macroeconomic impacts of trade globalisation, see the ecb monthly bulletin article entitled “globalisation, trade and the euro area macroeconomy”, january 2008). 4 see the box entitled “effects of the rising trade integration of low-cost countries on euro area import prices” in the august 2006 issue of the ecb’s monthly bulletin for further details. 5 see ecb (2008), op. cit. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the euro area and its future | Period_1 | 2008-07-15 | 0.202 | de santis, r., and b. gérard, “financial integration, international portfolio choice and the european monetary union”, ecb working paper no 626, 2006. dhyne, e., and l.j. alvarez, h. le bihan, g. veronese, j. hoffmann, n. jonker, p. lunnemann, f. rumler and j.vilmunen, (2006) “price changes in the euro area and the united states: some facts from individual consumer price data”, american economic association, journal of economic perspectives, vol. 20(2), spring, pp 171-192. duisenberg, w., “jean monnet memorial lecture”, 2000. duval, r., and j. elmeskov, “the effects of emu on structural reforms in labour and product markets”, ecb working paper no 596, 2006. ecb, “inflation differentials in the euro area: potential causes and policy implications”, ecb report released on 16 september 2003. ecb, “sectoral specialisation in the eu: a macroeconomic perspective”, ecb occasional paper no 19, july 2004. ecb, “monetary policy and inflation differentials in a heterogeneous currency area”, article in the ecb’s monthly bulletin, may 2005. ecb, “output growth differentials in the euro area: sources and implications”, article in the ecb’s monthly bulletin, april 2007. ecb, “10th anniversary of the ecb”, special edition of the ecb’s monthly bulletin, june 2008. ecb, “financial integration in europe”, april 2008. european commission, “the eu economy 2006 review. adjustment dynamics in the euro area: experiences and challenges”, 22 november 2006. european commission, “emu@10: success and c… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Economic integration and adjustment processes in the euro area | Period_1 | 2007-06-14 | 0.198 | border labour mobility within an enlarged eu”, ecb occasional paper no 52, 2006. see also “action plan for skills and mobility”, european commission, 2002. 7 the decline in inflation differentials has been impressive. at the beginning of the 1990s, the difference in inflation rates across the euro area countries was on average around 6 percentage points (standard deviation measured in unweighted terms). last year, the inflation differential was only 0.7 percentage point. moreover, the current degree of inflation dispersion among the euro area countries is practically the same as that seen in the united states. as to real gdp growth rates across the euro area countries, the difference has been fluctuating around a level of 2 percentage points over the past few decades, with no apparent upward or downward trend. since 1999, however, it has declined from 2.8 percentage points in that year to close to 1.5 percentage points last year. again, the growth dispersion within the euro area is virtually the same as across the eight us regions defined by the us bureau of economic analysis. 8 on output growth differentials see the article entitled “output growth differentials in the euro area: sources and implications”, in the april 2007 issue of the ecb’s monthly bulletin, and n. benalal, j. l. diaz del hoyo, b. pierluigi and n. vidalis, “output growth differentials across the euro area countries: some stylised facts”, ecb occasional paper no 45, 2006. on inflation differentials, see t… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy - lifting the veil of effectiveness | Period_2 | 2019-12-18 | 0.437 | european central bank directorate general communications sonnemannstrasse 20, 60314 frankfurt am main, germany tel.: +49 69 1344 7455, e-mail: media@ecb.europa.eu website: www.ecb.europa.eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. copyright 2019, european central bank european central bank directorate general communications sonnemannstrasse 20, 60314 frankfurt am main, germany tel.: +49 69 1344 7455, e-mail: media@ecb.europa.eu website: www.ecb.europa.eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. copyright 2019, european central bank |
| Fabio Panetta: Asymmetric risks, asymmetric reaction - monetary policy in the pandemic | Period_2 | 2020-09-22 | 0.346 | european central bank directorate general communications sonnemannstrasse 20, 60314 frankfurt am main, germany tel.: +49 69 1344 7455, email: media@ecb.europa.eu website: www.ecb.europa.eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. media contacts copyright 2020, european central bank |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox - evidence from the euro area | Period_2 | 2020-02-23 | 0.326 | [20] for a more detailed discussion of the channels of transmission of the app and its impact on the euro area yield curve, see lane, p. r. (2019), “the yield curve and monetary policy”, public lecture for the centre for finance and the department of economics at university college london, london, 25 november. [21] see bernanke, b., op. cit. [22] see eser, f., lemke, w., nyholm, k., radde, s. and vladu, a. l. (2019), “tracing the impact of the ecb’s asset purchase programme on the yield curve”, working paper series, no 2293, ecb. european central bank directorate general communications sonnemannstrasse 20, 60314 frankfurt am main, germany tel.: +49 69 1344 7455, e-mail: media@ecb.europa.eu website: www.ecb.europa.eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. copyright 2020, european central bank |
| Peter Praet: Maintaining price stability in the euro area | Period_2 | 2017-02-03 | 0.307 | 1 i would like to thank sören radde and fédéric holm-hadulla for their contributions to this speech. 2 see ciccarelli, m. and osbat, c. (eds.), “low inflation in the euro area: causes and consequences”, occasional paper series, no 181, european central bank, frankfurt am main, january 2017, and the references cited therein. 3 at the level of individual euro area countries, a large proportion of specifications also displays a significant phillips curve slope, albeit with the exception of some euro area countries, probably on account of confounding factors related to global exposures and persistent structural changes. however, the finding that domestic cyclical conditions were an important driver of the disinflationary period from 2012 to 2014 is common to all countries. 4 theoretically, the impact of population ageing on inflation may go both ways, but the bulk of the literature points to a negative effect. see e.g. bullard, j., garriga, c., and waller, c.j., “demographics, redistribution, and optimal inflation”, federal reserve bank of st. louis review, vol. 94, no 6, 2012; shirakawa, m., “demographic changes and macroeconomic performance: japanese experiences”, opening remark at boj-imes conference, bank of japan, 2012; carvalho, c., ferrero, a. and nechio, f., “demographics and real interest rates: inspecting the mechanism”, european economic review, north-holland, april 2016. 5 see bobeica, e and jarocinski, m., “missing disinflation and missing inflation: the puzzles t… |
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.287 | 30/09/2020 the monetary policy strategy review: some preliminary considerations [8] jarocinski, m. and lenza, m. (2018), “an inflation-predicting measure of the output gap in the euro area”, journal of money, credit and banking. [9] bobeica, e., ciccarelli, m. and vansteenkiste, i. (2019), “the link between labor cost and price inflation in the euro area,” working paper series, no 2235, european central bank, february; hahn, e. (2019), “how are wage developments passed through to prices in the euro area? evidence from a bvar model”, applied economics, preprint, published online on 1 november; nickel, c., bobeica, e., koester, g., lis, e. and porqueddu, m. (eds.) (2019), “understanding low wage growth in the euro area and european countries”, occasional paper series, no 232, ecb, frankfurt am main, september. [10] lis, e., nickel, c. and papetti, a. (2020), “demographics and inflation in the euro area: a two-sector new keynesian perspective”, working paper series, no 2382, ecb, frankfurt am main, march; bobeica, e. et al. (2017), “demographics and inflation”, working paper series, no 2006, ecb, frankfurt am main, january. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.462 | european central bank directorate general communications > 60314 frankfurt am main, germany > +49 69 1344 7455 > media@ecb.europa.eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. media contacts copyright 2021, european central bank directorate general communications > 60314 frankfurt am main, germany > +49 69 1344 7455 > media@ecb.europa.eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. media contacts copyright 2021, european central bank |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.415 | monetary policy instruments since 2014”, occasional paper series, no 278, ecb; and work stream on employment (2021), “employment and the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area”, occasional paper series, no 275, ecb. 11. lane, p.r. (2022), “bottlenecks and monetary policy”, the ecb blog, 10 february. 12. the rising prices of manufacturing exports have partly offset rising import prices. 13. lagarde, c. (2022), “monetary policy in an uncertain world”, speech at the “ecb and its watchers conference xxii” conference, 17 march. contact european central bank directorate general communications sonnemannstrasse 20 60314 frankfurt am main, germany +49 69 1344 7455 media@ecb.europa.eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. media contacts copyright 2022, european central bank |
| Isabel Schnabel: Prospects for inflation - sneezes and breezes | Period_3 | 2021-11-14 | 0.406 | with production networks and input-output linkages. see ghassibe, m. (2021), “endogenous production networks and non-linear monetary transmission”; rubbo, e. (2021), “aggregation and redistribution in new keynesian economies; papers presented at this conference. 21. lagarde, c. (2021), “monetary policy during an atypical recovery,” speech at the ecb forum on central banking “beyond the pandemic: the future of monetary policy”, september. 22. see also work stream on digitalisation (2021), “digitalisation: channels, impacts and implications for monetary policy in the euro area”, occasional paper series, no 266, ecb, september; work stream on globalisation (2021), “the implications of globalisation for the ecb monetary policy strategy”, occasional paper series, no 263, ecb, september. contact european central bank directorate general communications > sonnemannstrasse 20 > 60314 frankfurt am main, germany > +49 69 1344 7455 > media@ecb.europa.eu reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. media contacts copyright 2021, european central bank |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy during an atypical recovery | Period_3 | 2021-11-07 | 0.391 | margins increase. see gumiel, j. e., and hahn, e. (2018), “the role of wages in the pick-up of inflation’, economic bulletin, |ssue 5, ecb, frankfurt am main. 20. see malmendier, u. and sheng shen, l. (2018), “scarred consumption’, nber working paper, no 24696. 21. see lagarde, c. (2020), “monetary policy in a pandemic emergency“, keynote speech at the ecb forum on central banking, frankfurt am main, 11 november. 22. see mckinsey (2020), “how covid-19 has pushed companies over the technology tipping point— and transformed business forever’, october. 23. see basso, g., boeri, t., caiumi, a. and paccagnella, m. (2020), “the new hazardous jobs and worker reallocation”, oecd social, employment and migration working papers no. 246. 24. kouvavas, o., osbat, c., reinelt, t. and vansteenkiste, |. (2021), “markups and inflation cyclicality in the euro area’, mimeo. 25. see shingal, a. and agarwal, p. (2020), “how did trade in gvc-based products respond to previous health shocks? lessons for covid-19”, eu/ rscas working paper, no 2020/68, global governance programme 415. 26. anayi, l., barrero, j. m., bloom, n., bunn, p., davis, s., leather, j., meyer, b., oikonomou, m., mihaylov, e., mizen, p. and thwaites, g. (2021), “labour market reallocation in the wake of covid-19”, voxeu, 21 august. 2/. cengizdubelindnerzipperer, d., , a., , a. and , b. (2019), “the effect of minimum wages on low- wage jobs’, the quarterly journal of economics, vol. 134, issue 3, august, pp. 1405-1454. 28. ne… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.351 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 116 | growth | 1 | 0.1227032 | productivity | 1 | 0.9998248 |
| 116 | productivity | 2 | 0.0938277 | productivity growth | 2 | 0.9998247 |
| 116 | productivity growth | 3 | 0.0365481 | population | 3 | 0.9994743 |
| 116 | labour | 4 | 0.0304195 | age | 4 | 0.9985542 |
| 116 | population | 5 | 0.0194586 | labour productivity | 5 | 0.9984229 |
| 116 | age | 6 | 0.0187514 | technological | 6 | 0.9980725 |
| 116 | factor | 7 | 0.0187514 | technology | 7 | 0.9976336 |
| 116 | development | 8 | 0.0181621 | age population | 8 | 0.9970168 |
| 116 | technology | 9 | 0.0150978 | innovation | 9 | 0.9966696 |
| 116 | employment | 10 | 0.0145085 | factor productivity | 10 | 0.9961390 |
| 116 | technological | 11 | 0.0130942 | labour productivity growth | 11 | 0.9958800 |
| 116 | labour productivity | 12 | 0.0127406 | total factor | 12 | 0.9958693 |
| 116 | average | 13 | 0.0126227 | total factor productivity | 13 | 0.9957823 |
| 116 | innovation | 14 | 0.0115620 | technological progress | 14 | 0.9955675 |
| 116 | unite | 15 | 0.0108548 | performance | 15 | 0.9953532 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy in a changing world ¿ commitment, strategy and credibility | Period_1 | 2006-12-07 | 0.463 |
|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the euro area and its future | Period_1 | 2008-07-15 | 0.457 |
|
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Growth and inflation in the euro area - the importance of productivity in the services sector | Period_1 | 2008-10-30 | 0.447 | wholesale and retail trade sector, have been the main reasons for the gap, followed by finance and business services (excluding real estate). in the wholesale and retail trade sector, for instance, hourly labour productivity grew on average by 1.4% in the euro area, while it grew on average by 4.6% on the other side of the atlantic. what lies behind these labour productivity developments? specific policies aimed at increasing employment, particularly in the unskilled segment of the labour market, have certainly contributed to the slowdown in labour productivity growth, especially in services, which are usually more labour-intensive. however, developments in labour supply are only part of the story. to a large extent, the slowdown in labour productivity growth can be attributed to a marked slowdown in total factor productivity (tfp) growth, which is generally taken as a measure of technological progress and improvements in the organisation and overall efficiency of production. between 1980 and 1995, tfp for the whole economy grew on average by 1.5%, before declining to 0.8% between 1995 and 2007. 5 and private sector services significantly contributed to this decline. indeed, tfp growth in these services slowed down from 0.6% between 1980 and 1995 to -0.1% between 1995 and 2005. 6 several authors, such as oliner and sichel (2002), have already highlighted the major role of innovation and information and communications technology (ict) in the revival of labour productivity g… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Current challenges for the euro area | Period_1 | 2008-10-30 | 0.440 | euro area. 2 let me elaborate on the three main factors underlying trends in real gdp growth: working-age population growth, labour utilisation and labour productivity. 3 • working-age population growth remains one important factor explaining disparities in real gdp growth between the euro area and the fastest growing industrial economies. over the past 20 years, the average contribution to real gdp growth from growth of the working-age population has been approximately 0.8 percentage point higher in the united states than in the euro area. 4 looking ahead, the euro area faces the prospect of an ageing population, and the labour force could therefore become a strong constraint on the growth potential of the euro area. • as for labour utilisation, over the past ten years, and despite subdued growth in the population of working age, there has been a strong acceleration in the number of total hours worked in the euro area. this stands in contrast to developments in the united states, where a small deceleration has taken place. 5 much of the euro area acceleration can be explained by enhanced labour utilisation over this period, and the main drivers of this to date can clearly be identified as improvements in participation and employment rates. however, despite this visible progress, there is room for further improvement with regard to the way in which labour markets work in europe. first, the employment rate in the euro area remains low by international standards. 6 second, t… |
| Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Challenges for the Euro at ten | Period_1 | 2008-12-12 | 0.436 |
|
| Mario Draghi: On the importance of policy alignment to fulfil our economic potential | Period_2 | 2016-06-09 | 0.247 | spanish labour market reform in 2012 has been a factor supporting employment growth since then.[14] this should give encouragement to reforming countries to continue their efforts – and in particular those where high unemployment has persisted for so long that it has been allowed to become a social norm. but the challenge is not just moving people from unemployment into employment, it is also raising the size of the workforce – which is where participation comes in. though the euro area fares quite well in international comparisons, participation rates in some member states remain relatively low, with a roughly 15 percentage point difference between the best and worst performers. this implies that there is also a latent potential to raise employment on this margin with the right structural policies. for example, we have seen participation rates of older workers grow strongly during the crisis, due in part to pension reforms adopted in many euro area countries.[15] still, despite this untapped reserve for accelerating employment growth, we cannot avoid the fact that, over time, the inherent speed limits resulting from the euro area’s unfavourable demographics will start to bite. the euro area’s working age population is projected to start gradually decreasing in the next decade. in that context, employment growth is likely to start decelerating in the not-too-distant future, even with determined structural reforms, as a higher share of people in work will no longer be able … |
| Philip R Lane: Welcome address - “Challenges in the digital age” | Period_2 | 2019-07-15 | 0.184 | instance, a recent ecb survey of large euro area companies highlighted that firms see the potential for digital technologies to increase productivity growth, in particular by promoting knowledge sharing and enabling more efficient production processes.8 productivity growth plays an important role in the conduct of monetary policy. in principle, higher productivity growth spurs investment, and expectations of higher future income encourage consumers to spend more today. moreover, higher productivity growth increases the equilibrium real rate of interest, which is a central factor in calibrating monetary policy. in practice, however, despite the promise of increased efficiencies thanks to digital technologies, the productivity growth that we have seen in europe, and indeed most advanced economies, has been lacklustre for more than two decades. this weakness of productivity growth despite the substantial digital innovations remains a puzzle. how this puzzle will be resolved remains to be seen. what appears fairly clear, however, is that in the light of the overall disappointing productivity growth we have seen in recent years, the contribution that digitalisation is making to productivity appears, for the time being, relatively limited. there may also be interactions between technology and trade. digital technologies, together with trade liberalisation, have facilitated the growth of global value chains. this has been associated with both an increased synchronicity of global … |
| Vítor Constâncio: Monetary policy and the euro area problem | Period_2 | 2015-11-25 | 0.179 | crisis intensified in september 2008, the interest rate on the ecb’s main refinancing operations for banks stood at 4.25 percent. by may 2009, the ecb had reduced this rate to 1 percent, while simultaneously cutting the rate on the deposit facility to 25 basis points. the significant decline of inflation since the later part of 2013 led us to further reduce interest rates during last year and the interest rate on the main refinancing operations currently stands at 5 basis points, whereas the interest rate on the deposit facility is –20 basis points. why did the governing council reduce the policy rates to such low levels? policy rates are defined in nominal terms, they have a component related to inflation and another associated to real economic growth. monetary policy searches for a neutral rate that steers the economy to stable inflation around its target and consequentially, the market for goods and services in equilibrium at full employment. the interest rate in real terms, i.e., adjusted by inflation, is precisely the rate at which the economy’s growth rate is equal to the potential growth rate so that no demand pressure makes the inflation rate inconsistent with price stability in the medium-term. recent estimates for the u.s. indicate that such real rate can now be in negative territory and the same should apply to other advanced economies.2 the point that monetary policy cannot affect the equilibrium real rate is important. in addition to the propensity to save, th… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Narratives about the ECB’s monetary policy - reality or fiction? | Period_2 | 2020-02-12 | 0.178 | while annual productivity growth in the euro area in the 1980s was, on average, still around 2%, today it is somewhat less than half of that (slide 12, left-hand side). and the working-age population in the euro area has for some time even been in decline. demographic developments mean that this decline is highly likely to continue in the coming decades (slide 12, right-hand side). in addition, in recent decades, the leading industrial nations have undergone massive structural change, owing not least to digitalisation, and have been moving away from capital-intensive manufacturing industries towards less capital-intensive service industries. |
| Vítor Constâncio: Monetary policy and the European recovery | Period_2 | 2015-06-02 | 0.168 | concluding remarks let me conclude. the economic recovery in the euro area is now broader and it is firming itself but still in need of achieving higher investment to make it more self- sustained. ecb policies are working and making a significant contribution to the normalisation of economic conditions in the short term. let me add that they also help the medium-term as, by closing the negative output gap, they reduce the detrimental of effect of hysteresis on the labour supply and the capital stock. a prolonged recession contributes to reduce the qualification and employability of the unemployed, and the capital stock becomes less productive, as replacement investment subsides. on the back of the fall in capital accumulation and labour utilisation, euro area potential output growth declined from a level close to 2% in the years preceding the crisis to less than 1% on average between 2008 and 2012. unfortunately, since the start of the crisis, euro area total factor productivity growth has remained subdued, falling behind productivity growth in the u.s., where it rebounded after reaching a trough in 2009. to increase potential output growth against the background of a decreasing working age population, the euro area has to rely on more investment and capital deepening but, crucially, more so on total factor productivity growth which needs to resume growing at least at an annual growth pace around 1%, the rate prevailing at the beginning of the previous decade. this will no… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.097 | lower supply may limit impact of slowdown in aggregate demand on capacity utilisation the first reason relates to the implications of changes in the labour share for changes in capacity utilisation. whether, and by how much, a decline in aggregate demand will create conditions of excess capacity critically depends on the impact of current shocks on the supply side.[18] if, as is likely, both supply and demand weaken, the net impact on economic slack, and hence prices, will be more difficult to anticipate. the damage from the current crisis to the supply side is likely to be significant.[19] energy-related production cuts and energy-saving measures directly curb potential output, while the sharp increase in gas prices will render some energy-intensive activities unprofitable. insolvencies may rise, and parts of the capital stock may become obsolete. moreover, productivity growth may be slower than currently anticipated in our staff projections. lower productivity growth would directly dampen the decline in real unit labour costs from lower real wages, meaning that inflationary pressures could remain elevated at current rates of nominal wage growth. the september ecb staff projections have already seen a marked downward revision of labour productivity growth for 2023, mainly on account of lower expected growth. yet, two distinct features of the current cycle suggest that productivity growth may become structurally weaker.[20] one is the acute worker shortage, which may force… |
| Philip R Lane: The euro area outlook - some analytical considerations | Period_3 | 2022-05-06 | 0.097 | increases larger than 2023 increases) suggests that wage-setters understand that there is a temporary component to the currently high inflation rate. in assessing wage developments, it is also relevant that, under typical conditions and allowing for labour productivity growth at about one per cent, nominal wage growth at three per cent is consistent with the two per cent inflation target. although so far only a relatively small number of wage contracts have been renegotiated since inflation started to increase strongly in the second half of 2021, the outcomes from the latest wage settlements might provide a helpful guide to the likely outcomes of upcoming negotiations and contribute to a more accurate assessment of realised progress in underlying inflation.[5],[6],[7] |
| Isabel Schnabel: Finding the right mix - monetary-fiscal interaction at times of high inflation | Period_3 | 2022-11-24 | 0.085 | euro area firms continue to add new jobs, and unemployment rates remain at record low levels despite elevated risks of a technical recession in the winter. finally, there is increasing evidence that the pandemic and the energy crisis may have more permanent negative effects on current and future potential output, implying that inflationary pressures may persist if demand does not slow down accordingly.[5] potential output growth may be constrained through different channels. the first is labour scarcity. a significant share of euro area firms continue to identify labour shortages as a major factor limiting production in manufacturing and the services sector (slide 6, left-hand side). research shows that the pandemic has led to lower labour participation in sectors where it is hard to work from home[6], and that those sectors are likely to experience some scarring, facing a loss in their trend output (slide 6, right-hand side).[7] this development reinforces pre-existing trends, driven primarily by demographic change. the second channel works through the capital stock and productivity growth. the energy crisis is likely to have hit investment and total factor productivity, especially in energy-intensive sectors. higher energy prices devalue part of the existing capital stock, curbing production or raising the number of insolvencies due to higher costs and lower profitability. the car industry is a case in point. since the summer of 2021, the extraordinary increase in energy… |
| Christine Lagarde: Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-21 | 0.076 | renewables. and in the short term, reforming europe’s energy markets will be critical so as to avoid recurring volatility in energy prices while we diversify away from russian gas. second, europe’s “strategic autonomy” agenda will be pivotal in making growth more resilient to the changing nature of globalisation. in a world fragmenting into blocs, it will allow us to retain access to critical technologies and resources, both through reshoring strategic industries[6] and securing strategic alliances. and that will in turn underpin the energy transition, which is highly resource-intensive. electric vehicles, for example, use around six times more minerals than conventional cars.[7] third, to cope with shrinking global labour supply, as well as our own ageing societies, we will have to start producing more with less – that is, addressing europe’s chronically low productivity growth by boosting our rate of innovation. this will require the rapid digitalisation of the economy in terms of skills and technologies. consider that only around half of eu firms innovated or adopted new technologies in 2021, compared with close to two-thirds in the united states.[8] collectively, these transitions will require significant investment. the european commission has estimated that climate-related investment needs alone will amount to almost half a trillion euro on average per year until 2030.[9] and more than €100 billion per year will be needed to close the digital gap and upskill the labo… |
| Fabio Panetta: Mind the step - calibrating monetary policy in a volatile environment | Period_3 | 2022-11-03 | 0.066 | panetta, f. (2021), “patient monetary policy amid a rocky recovery”, speech at sciences po, 24 november. 8. in the euro area, the pick-up of wage growth has been more moderate and gradual than in the united states. the annual growth rate of compensation per employee is still distorted by the impact of the government measures to prevent job losses during the pandemic. negotiated wage growth, which is less affected by these measures, stood at 2.4% (including volatile one-off payments) in the second quarter of 2022. 9. to be consistent with the 2% inflation target under typical conditions, nominal wage growth should be equal to productivity growth plus 2%, which the september ecb staff projections expect to be the case in 2024. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 117 | analysis | 1 | 0.0635021 | policy decision | 1 | 0.9987732 |
| 117 | decision | 2 | 0.0425973 | inflation forecast | 2 | 0.9982447 |
| 117 | forecast | 3 | 0.0297627 | analytic | 3 | 0.9981145 |
| 117 | information | 4 | 0.0280125 | monetary policy decision | 4 | 0.9980724 |
| 117 | policy decision | 5 | 0.0261651 | forecast | 5 | 0.9979822 |
| 117 | strategy | 6 | 0.0233454 | analysis | 6 | 0.9978929 |
| 117 | assessment | 7 | 0.0207201 | judgement | 7 | 0.9973239 |
| 117 | approach | 8 | 0.0184838 | information | 8 | 0.9967510 |
| 117 | framework | 9 | 0.0170253 | rely | 9 | 0.9962323 |
| 117 | monetary policy decision | 10 | 0.0169281 | approach | 10 | 0.9960501 |
| 117 | assess | 11 | 0.0152751 | analytic framework | 11 | 0.9955133 |
| 117 | good | 12 | 0.0129416 | complexity | 12 | 0.9953901 |
| 117 | basis | 13 | 0.0123582 | decision | 13 | 0.9950713 |
| 117 | development | 14 | 0.0120665 | check | 14 | 0.9950496 |
| 117 | indicator | 15 | 0.0117748 | economic analysis | 15 | 0.9949174 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The current state of the European economy and the ECB’s monetary policy concept | Period_1 | 2004-07-20 | 0.447 | robustness of the framework the appropriateness of a monetary policy strategy cannot be evaluated by means of just one particular model or class of models. rather, a good candidate strategy needs to perform well across a variety of empirically plausible models, and it has to allow for the judgement of policy-making bodies. the ecb’s analyses and economic perspectives of the risks to price stability are founded on a two-pillar framework. the two-pillar approach permits us to convey to the public the notion of a diversified analysis and it ensures robust decision-making based on different analytical perspectives. these two perspectives are referred to as “economic analysis” and “monetary analysis”. the economic analysis focuses mainly on the assessment of current economic and financial developments, their likely future dynamics, and any implied short to medium-term risks to price stability. to fully assess the economic situation and the outlook for price stability, the governing council must be able to call on a variety of tools and models. however, judgement is also needed, particularly in assessing the likelihood of certain hypothetical scenarios eventually materialising. the ecb cannot and does not rely on a single model or a single set of equations. the eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections constitute one important input into the monetary policy decision as a way of organising a large amount of information and helping to create a consistent picture of possible futur… |
| Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_1 | 2000-10-05 | 0.404 |
|
| From the EMI to the ECB (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 30 May 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-05-31 | 0.377 | monetary phenomenon over the medium term, at shorter horizons it will be influenced by many other variables. changes in international commodity prices, such as the price of oil, will influence developments in consumer price inflation. demand and cost pressures can also influence price developments in the shorter term. moreover, policymakers will generally need to tailor their actions to the prevailing economic circumstances, since the impact of monetary policy on the future evolution of the price level at any specific time will depend on a host of factors which are not captured by monetary data. analysis under the second pillar is intended to reveal this information, giving policymakers greater insight into shorter-run price dynamics and their implications for monetary policy. monetary policymaking in the euro area has to reflect the complexities and uncertainties which surround the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in a wholly new economic entity. these uncertainties imply that no single approach is likely to be entirely reliable. the inherent uncertainty faced by the central bank cannot simply be wished away. reliance on a single indicator or forecast, or a single model of the economy or view of the world, would, in these circumstances, be extremely unwise. the strategy needs to incorporate the full range of relevant indicators and assess them in the context of a variety of different models. in this respect, the two pillars complement one another. they allow for … |
| Monetary policy in a new environment | Period_1 | 2000-10-05 | 0.354 | macroeconomic forecast. forecasts are only one - albeit important - input into the policy process. they are always evaluated in the context of other analyses and indicators. this is, by the way, true for all central banks. to my knowledge, there is no central bank in the world which bases its monetary policy decisions solely on a mechanical reaction to an inflation forecast. one reason for this is that macroeconomic forecasts suffer from a number of practical shortcomings which mean that they cannot constitute the only input into policy decisions. for example, in practice the information from monetary aggregates is not incorporated into conventional macroeconometric forecasting models. however, monetary analysis is an important piece of information for assessing risks to price stability from a different perspective. as the ecb’s macroeconomic forecasts rely on structural macroeconomic models, they should be seen as forming part of the second pillar of the ecb’s strategy. these forecasts have to be cross-checked against the information from monetary aggregates for future price developments. this is the essence of the two pillar strategy. both pillars, from different perspectives, analyse economic developments in a way which contributes to forming a judgement about risks to price stability and thus inform well-designed forward-looking monetary policy decisions. when looking at forecasts, other aspects also need to be kept in mind. for example, the latest developments of key … |
| Otmar Issing: The euro - a stable currency for Europe | Period_1 | 2001-02-22 | 0.354 | this tension was resolved - and in my view this is the optimal solution - by announcing a quantitative definition of price stability and by adopting an encompassing approach to analysing and assessing information relevant to detect risks to price stability. defining price stability as “a year-on-year increase in the harmonised index of consumer prices of below 2%”, along with the emphasis on the medium term, was designed to enhance clarity, to anchor expectations and to provide a yardstick against which the new independent institution could be held accountable. likewise, the eclectic but systematic approach to the processing of information relevant for assessing risks to price stability, which we call our two-pillar strategy of monetary policy, was intended to guarantee that no piece of evidence relevant to policy decision-making would be excluded from the governing council’s information set. the prominent role assigned to money, as the first pillar of our strategy, ensures that monetary developments are always part of the picture, and receive the attention that they deserve, given the monetary nature of inflation beyond the immediate horizon. in parallel, the second pillar of the strategy ensures that other forms of analysis, such as the investigation of the interplay between supply and demand and cost-push dynamics, are also incorporated into the policy process. together, the two pillars ensure that information and analysis produced on the basis of one methodological per… |
| Christine Lagarde: The monetary policy strategy review - some preliminary considerations | Period_2 | 2020-09-30 | 0.176 | we also need to reflect on our two pillar approach for assessing developments in the economy, which uses both economic and monetary analysis. cross-checking between the two helps determine the risks to price stability. the monetary pillar could in principle be enhanced to provide information on financial stability which – over longer time horizons – could be relevant for the inflation outlook. |
| Christine Lagarde: Press Conference | Period_2 | 2021-07-09 | 0.139 | assess the contribution of housing costs to inflation. our new strategy confirms the medium-term orientation of our monetary policy, which, since the inception of the ecb, has been an important principle of the strategy. it recognises that monetary policy cannot and should not attempt to fine-tune short-term developments in inflation. monetary policy affects the economy with variable time lags. the medium-term orientation allows us to be forward-looking and respond flexibly to fluctuations in output and inflation. flexibility is important, since the appropriate policy response depends on the circumstances as well as on the source, magnitude and persistence of the shocks affecting the economy. the medium-term orientation also allows us to cater for other considerations relevant to the pursuit of price stability. employment, financial stability risks and climate change are some of the areas that we looked into in greater depth during the strategy review. we have also carefully reviewed the appropriateness of the instruments in our monetary policy toolkit. it is clear that the set of ecb policy rates – the rate on our main refinancing operations, the deposit facility rate and the marginal lending rate – will remain our primary instrument. but, in a low interest rate environment in which the policy rates are more likely to encounter and remain constrained at the lower bound, the ecb will continue to employ other instruments when the need arises. forward guidance, asset purchas… |
| Vítor Constâncio: Past and future of the European Central Bank monetary policy | Period_2 | 2018-05-11 | 0.106 | the announcement of a reference value for the growth of a broad monetary aggregate; and (iii) a broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price developments and the risks to price stability in the euro area as a whole.” there was clearly a dominant first pillar with a reference value initially set at 4.5% growth rate for m3. the text further explained: “to signal the prominent role it has assigned to money, the governing council has announced a quantitative reference value for monetary growth as one pillar of the overall stability oriented strategy”. so, some trace of technical monetarism[2] was implicitly present. in 2006, explaining the origin of the “two pillars”, otmar issing quoted former president wim duisenberg’s reply to a question by a journalist in 1999: “it is not a coincidence that i have used the words that money will play a prominent role. so, if you call it the two pillars, one pillar is thicker than the other is or stronger than the other, but how much i couldn’t tell you”.[3] the reference value for the monetary aggregate m3 was considered a relevant variable for inflation assessment and was related to the theoretical approach of technical monetarism in that money predicts inflation and differs from credit or other aggregates. the reference value for m3 annual growth was calculated to be 4.5% and was used to produce a monetary overhang: the difference between actual m3 growth and the reference value, with higher numbers representing higher risks f… |
| Philip R Lane: The compass of monetary policy - favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2021-03-02 | 0.100 | 02/03/2021 the compass of monetary policy: favourable financing conditions in addition, as is evident from the public accounts, each monetary policy meeting is informed by comprehensive analyses of recent financial market developments and the latest macroeconomic and inflation indicators, while the contribution of our monetary policy measures to financing conditions is extensively analysed. accordingly, the quarterly macroeconomic projections exercise and the analyses discussed in our monetary policy meetings help to inform the governing council’s collective assessment |
| Vítor Constâncio: Developing models for policy analysis in central banks | Period_2 | 2017-09-28 | 0.098 | recessions. there is justification for rethinking a more active role for fiscal policy, following the recent papers by auerbach and gorodnichenko (2017)5. a reconsideration of the effectiveness of both macro policies has become even more necessary in view of the two major problems that central banks are now confronted with: first, the lingering low inflation associated with flatter phillips curves that impairs the policy transmission and, second, the need for policy instruments to deal with the next recession, even if a mild one. the various points i just listed are some of the relevant aspects of the on-going revision of macroeconomics and justify the point recently made by blanchard that we need different types of models to understand, forecast and analyse the economy and the policies necessary to address its shortcomings. in that spirit, i will concentrate my remaining remarks on some on-going developments in the specification of macroeconomic models at the ecb. desirable properties of policy models macroeconomic models can be used for a variety of purposes in central banks. they are helpful to articulate relationships between certain variables of interest in a systematic fashion, while ensuring that resource constraints are respected. they provide input to the complex process of macroeconomic forecasting. and they can be helpful to conduct scenario analyses and study policy counterfactuals. to perform these tasks effectively, a model should satisfy two simple criteria…. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.161 | over the medium term. the new monetary policy strategy also contains a general commitment to base monetary policy decisions, including the evaluation of the proportionality of its decisions and potential side effects, on an integrated assessment of all relevant factors. compared to the previous two-pillar analytical approach, there is an emphasis under the new integrated framework on taking into account the inherent macrofinancial links between the real economy, the monetary system and the financial system in terms of the underlying structures, shocks and adjustment processes. this framework reflects the importance of monitoring the transmission mechanism in calibrating monetary policy instruments and the recognition that financial stability is a precondition for price stability. |
| Frank Elderson: Proportioning policy action to the evidence - making the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank concrete | Period_3 | 2022-03-25 | 0.152 | police had exceeded their mandate. to put it simply: the ruling made it clear that the police were only responsible for public security, and not for safeguarding aesthetic interests. the verdict signified an important step in the development of modern societies. acknowledging that their actions intrude on the lives of citizens, public sector authorities began limiting their actions to what is strictly necessary to achieve the established objectives. since then, proportionality has evolved to become a fundamental principle in many legal systems. the proportionality principle is a cornerstone of the institutional structure of the european union, laid down in article 5 of the treaty on the european union. and all its institutions are bound by it in the pursuit of their respective mandates. it requires them to carefully assess the necessity and suitability of policy action to deliver on the mandate, while also considering whether this policy action is less intrusive compared with other options for achieving the same goal. needless to say, this requirement also applies to the ecb. proportionality in policy deliberations thus, systematically assessing the proportionality of our monetary policy actions is exactly what we set out to do – and made even more explicit in our new monetary policy strategy – when the ecb governing council meets to discuss monetary policy every six to seven weeks. it is important to note that the scope of the proportionality assessment of policy decision… |
| Christine Lagarde: Introductory statement - European Parliament plenary debate on the ECB Annual Report | Period_3 | 2022-02-17 | 0.130 | let me now turn to the topic of how we are making our monetary policy strategy fit for today, as well as future challenges. last year, the ecb and the eurosystem concluded their first strategy review in almost two decades. i would like to reiterate my gratitude to the econ committee for its valuable input, and i am very pleased to read in your report that you welcome the outcome. our new strategy will ensure we have a strong foundation to guide us in the conduct of monetary policy in the years to come. we are now working hard to put it into practice. i will briefly discuss three areas highlighted in your report in which the review is having an impact on our daily work. the first area is how we take our monetary policy decisions. in your report, you highlight the importance of ensuring the necessity, suitability and proportionality of all our monetary policy measures. indeed, before taking any decision the governing council conducts a careful evaluation of the effectiveness, efficiency and proportionality of its actions, including their potential side effects, based on an integrated assessment of all relevant factors. this assessment builds on a revised analytical framework which brings together the economic analysis and the monetary and financial analysis. our new strategy also recognises financial stability as a precondition for price stability and vice versa. in line with this, we undertook our first in-depth assessment of the interrelation between monetary policy and fi… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.100 | today, | wish to frame the current monetary policy debate in the context of the monetary policy strategy of the ecb.” | will not dwell on the latest conjunctural developments or speculate on the evolution of the medium-term outlook for the economy and inflation. our monetary policy meeting next week will provide the best opportunity for a comprehensive assessment of economic and financial developments and the implications for near-term and medium-term inflation dynamics. in this respect, the schedule for the march staff projections exercise has been revised in order to take into account the implications of the russian invasion of ukraine. the revised schedule also means that today’s eurostat inflation release will be incorporated in the projections that will be considered at next week’s monetary policy meeting. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.077 | econometric estimates of the euro area nominal natural rate of interest r° (percentage per annum) range of all natural rate estimates mmm range of smoother estimates 6 ex ©|s 1-year forward rate 9 years ahead wgem report “the natural rate of interest: estimates, drivers, and challenges to monetary policy”, occasional paper, no 217; ajevskis (2020); brand, goy, lemke (2020); brand, mazelis (2019); fiorentini, galesi, pérez-quirds, sentana (2018); geiger and schupp (2018); holston, laubach, williams (2017); jarocinski (2017); johannsen and mertens (2021), refinitiv. notes: the natural nominal rate estimates are constructed by adding the inflation target of 2% to all real values. ranges span point estimates across models to reflect model uncertainty and no other source of r* uncertainty. the dark shaded area highlights smoother r* estimates that are statistically less affected by cyclical movements in the real rate of interest than the other estimates depicted in the chart. last observation: 28 february 2022 for the ois 1-year forward rate 9 years ahead (reporting average values over the quarter). a monetary policy strategy serves two main purposes: first, it provides policymakers with a coherent analytical framework that maps actual or expected economic developments into policy decisions; and, second, it serves as a tool for communicating with the public. a strategic approach to monetary policy is especially valuable when confronted with possible shifts in the underlying for… |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 118 | interest | 1 | 0.3019364 | interest rate policy | 1 | 0.9993863 |
| 118 | interest rate | 2 | 0.2641302 | policy interest | 2 | 0.9991236 |
| 118 | cut | 3 | 0.0199085 | policy interest rate | 3 | 0.9989484 |
| 118 | key | 4 | 0.0151958 | interest rate environment | 4 | 0.9985967 |
| 118 | negative | 5 | 0.0148816 | rate policy | 5 | 0.9985102 |
| 118 | rate policy | 6 | 0.0123682 | rate cut | 6 | 0.9985102 |
| 118 | lower | 7 | 0.0115304 | interest rate | 7 | 0.9984210 |
| 118 | interest rate policy | 8 | 0.0114256 | interest | 8 | 0.9984205 |
| 118 | policy interest | 9 | 0.0111115 | key interest rate | 9 | 0.9982473 |
| 118 | policy interest rate | 10 | 0.0105878 | rate environment | 10 | 0.9982467 |
| 118 | negative interest | 11 | 0.0097500 | negative interest | 11 | 0.9978534 |
| 118 | negative interest rate | 12 | 0.0097500 | negative interest rate | 12 | 0.9977657 |
| 118 | rate cut | 13 | 0.0095406 | key interest | 13 | 0.9977216 |
| 118 | level | 14 | 0.0090169 | lower | 14 | 0.9977206 |
| 118 | key interest rate | 15 | 0.0088075 | cut | 15 | 0.9977184 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Claude Trichet: The ECB’s response to the crisis | Period_1 | 2011-05-30 | 0.126 | after the intensification of the crisis in mid-september 2008, as inflationary pressures receded, in full consistency with our mandate, we decided to reduce our policy interest rate rapidly between october 2008 and may 2009, from 4.25% to 1%. we reduced the interest rate to a level and at a pace that has not been experienced in the countries of the euro area at any time in recent history. with the benefit of hindsight, the interest rate decisions we took during the crisis have proved successful. over the past four years we have maintained a very solid anchoring of inflation expectations. our determination to preserve price stability in the medium term has allowed us to avoid the materialisation of the risk of inflation as well as of the risk of deflation. in most recent months, with the overall recovery more firmly established, we have witnessed the emergence of upside risks to the medium-term outlook for price stability. once more, strong increases in oil and other commodity prices have had a strong impact on headline inflation. once more, we have to avoid commodity price increases becoming entrenched in longer-term inflation expectations, which could have second-round effects on wages and prices. it is against this background that the governing council decided to raise interest rates in april. and i would like to emphasise that this decision was unanimous. the governing council is united by a common purpose. we are carefully monitoring the situation and we stand ready to… |
| Otmar Issing: The ECB and the euro - the first five years | Period_1 | 2004-05-21 | 0.122 | in addition, the construction and publication of central bank forecasts can raise a whole number of problems which severely limit the relevance of such forecasts for monetary policy. one of the main problems lies in constructing a forecast which is consistent with the underlying interest rate path. exogenous assumptions with regard to the interest rate path - such as assuming constant interest rates - typically lead to instabilities or indeterminacy.16 at the same time, bringing exogenous assumptions on the interest rate policy into line with the expectations of economic agents underlying these forecasts in a credible and convincing way constitutes a considerable challenge in practice. the aforementioned simulation of alternative interest rate paths is thus barely practicable. an alternative to this would be to use market interest rates, as opposed to a fixed interest rate. if the central bank’s reaction function is understood by the public and the markets and if its monetary policy enjoys credibility, the interest rate path expected by the market will mostly be consistent with the envisaged inflation target. however, if new economic shocks arise, it can be extremely difficult to communicate necessary deviations of the monetary policy stance from the interest rate path anticipated in this way. this can place an undue restriction on the ability of monetary policy to react in a timely manner to changes in economic conditions and in risks to price stability. last but not leas… |
| Mr Duisenberg reports at a press conference on the outcome of the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 8 Apr 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-04-13 | 0.121 | europe. in december, although i cannot quote you directly, you stated, much in the same way as today, that following the cut in interest rates the situation with regard to interest rates in europe would be settled. it is now the beginning of april and we see obviously a further cut in interest rates. is there not the danger, mr. duisenberg, that this process is about to begin again and that, after a certain period, owing to a lack of willingness in europe and in germany, in particular, to bring about structural reforms, the whole rigmarole will begin once more and you will be forced, yet again, to cut interest rates? duisenberg: well, we do not see that danger arising from the level which we now have reached. we hope that our call - as i expressed it today - to governments to pursue a reform-oriented policy, to adopt structural reform measures in all markets, that that policy will get a new incentive from the measures we have taken today. if they do not do that - and it will take time, i admit that before you can pursue and effect policies like i have in mind - if they do not do that, then indeed monetary policy is no alternative. |
| Mr. Duisenberg elucidates the European System of Central Banks’ stability-oriented monetary policy strategy (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 10 Nov 98) | Period_1 | 1998-11-20 | 0.120 | clearly, the governing council could have decided to announce some form of inflation forecast and justify policy decisions by reference to it. interest rate increases or decreases could then be explained on the basis that the inflation forecast pointed to threats to price stability. however, this presentation of monetary strategy to the public is likely to involve a circular argument. for example, interest rate increases would be justified on the basis that the inflation forecast pointed to an inflation rate higher than that consistent with price stability. however, critical observers might soon argue that the inflation forecast was above the target precisely because there was a perceived need to raise interest rates. simply publishing a forecast does not explain why interest rates need to be changed. moreover, as i have said, simply presenting a forecast to the public does not explain how the conclusion that a rate rise is required has been reached. on both grounds, publishing the forecast does not enhance the transparency and clarity of the strategy. |
| Mr Duisenberg reports at a press conference on the outcome of the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 8 Apr 1999) | Period_1 | 1999-04-13 | 0.115 | do you feel completely certain that this interest rate cut represents no danger of inflation to any part of the euro zone, i am thinking, in particular, of smaller, more dynamic economies, such as the irish one. and secondly, is it fair to conclude that the opposition to a rate cut came from the representatives of those countries? duisenberg: i will not allude to any opposition by anyone in the governing council. we do believe that this rate cut, otherwise we would not have done it, will not pose any additional threat of inflationary pressures arising either in small or in large countries. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox - evidence from the euro area | Period_2 | 2020-02-23 | 0.272 | by contrast, under a negative interest rate policy, where future rate cuts are possible, the distribution of rate expectations is more symmetric, putting downward pressure on longer-maturity interest rates. rate expectations can even be skewed downwards if the negative rate policy is flanked by communication that the interest rate might be reduced further. in this vein, the ecb’s forward guidance has reinforced the negative interest rate policy by stating that the governing council expects the ecb’s key interest rates “to remain at their present or lower levels for an extended period of time”. eonia forward curve and its risk-neutral density: before the negative interest rate policy (left side) and after its introduction (right side) |
| Philip R Lane: Interview in Handelsblatt | Period_2 | 2019-10-01 | 0.236 | but it can only help for governments to have a good understanding of how our monetary policy works. that’s why we’re very transparent on this. what do you mean by that? anyone in the finance ministry can see that euro area inflation is well below our objective. and that means that higher public spending will not dramatically affect financing conditions. let’s go back to monetary policy. which measure do you think is more significant, the interest rate cut or asset purchases? the important thing is that they work together. the rate cut allows us to steer interest rates of short and intermediate maturities, in particular, through the expectations component of these rates. asset purchases can complement this effect by containing the so-called term premium of longer-term interest rates. how much room for manoeuvre do you have left when it comes to cutting interest rates? the effect of a rate cut is stimulative because it fosters more favourable financing conditions. we need to see whether, at some point, there might be side effects that work in the opposite direction. we have to look at this again every time. our monetary policy has so far had a clearly positive impact on financing conditions for firms and households, and is thus supporting growth and inflation. how low can interest rates go before they start to have a constraining rather than a stimulative impact? the traditional view is that interest rates can continue to fall up to the point at which people withdraw their m… |
| Philip R Lane: Low inflation - macroeconomic risks and the monetary policy stance | Period_2 | 2020-02-12 | 0.196 | let me give the intuition with a stylised example: the nominal policy interest rate is the sum of inflation and the real interest rate. for simplicity, let us assume that the real interest rate is zero. if inflation is stable at 2 percent, then the nominal policy interest rate also stands at 2 percent. this means that the policy space for the central bank to cut the nominal policy interest rate to zero is 200 basis points. by the same logic, if inflation is stable at 1 percent, then the policy space for cuts of the nominal interest rate to zero is halved to only 100 basis points. |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy toolbox - evidence from the euro area | Period_2 | 2020-02-23 | 0.192 | negative interest rates within our forward guidance framework, the negative interest rate policy has played a key role in enhancing this automatic stabilisation by lowering the effective lower bound. there was no playbook to guide the 2014 decision to push the deposit facility rate – which the ecb pays on bank excess reserves – into negative territory. subsequent cuts, including the latest in september 2019, have brought the deposit facility rate to -0.5 percent. a corollary of relaxing the lower bound constraint has been that the propagation of negative interest rates through the term structure of interest rates is qualitatively different and more powerful than traditional interest rate cuts occurring in positive territory. the difference comes from two effects. |
| Sabine Lautenschläger: Stormy times - how is the ECB handling them? | Period_2 | 2015-11-30 | 0.171 | the reasons for the low interest rate policy ladies and gentlemen, let me now turn to the specific monetary policy decisions; decisions which have sometimes been poorly understood in germany and have given rise to concern. i will start with our current low interest rate policy. let me be clear straight away: low interest rates are not something that i am enthusiastic about – not least because of the associated risks and side-effects. however, the low interest rate at present is both necessary and justified. i understand the concerns of german savers, myself included, who view the yield on their savings book with very little enthusiasm. higher interest rates would permanently stall economic recovery, and bring about lasting low inflation, a persistent economic slowdown and rising unemployment – and this would curb the ability to |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.120 | interest rate and cash-flow channels interest rate changes affect households and firms through several channels. first, via the intertemporal substitution channel, higher interest rates provide incentives to households to save more now and postpone consumption from the present to the future. second, all else being equal, higher interest rates lower asset prices (bond values, equity values and property values), with the resulting decrease in wealth discouraging spending through the wealth channel and reducing the scope to pledge collateral in debt transactions. the role of equity markets is particularly important for firms with higher growth opportunities, whose risk profile is typically more suited to market financing instruments with the possibility of risk-sharing (including private equity or “alternative investment” funds) rather than conventional bank debt. recent studies suggest that there is a financing gap in europe for potential growth companies relative to other economies, which significant drops in equity valuations would tend to aggravate.[9] in parallel, the relevance of asset prices may have increased for households, following the significant growth in house prices. moreover, after a large fall of their investment in financial markets following the lehman crisis, the share of equity holdings in the aggregate financial wealth of households has been increasing. third, the cash-flow channel operates through the impact of higher interest rates on the income and ex… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.116 | composition of our balance sheet than it was in a phase when our asset purchase programmes resulted in a rapid increase in our securities holdings during a relatively short period. however, the signalling effects emanating from a given rate adjustment may well be larger than it is estimated to have been the case prior to the financial crisis. first, the exit from the negative interest rate policy may have strengthened the transmission of a rate hike throughout the term structure of interest rates. this would be the case if the unwinding of the outsized downward pressure on long- term yields that is estimated to have been associated with rate cuts in the negative territory was symmetric.[8] second, the retirement of rate forward guidance after years in which forward indications about the likely future path of interest rates had suppressed rate volatility almost entirely may invite markets to react to a rate increase by pulling back more sharply from longer-term securities as dealers and other providers of trading liquidity are less willing to put capital at risk to make two-sided markets in a context of perceived higher interest rate uncertainty. this may exert greater upward pressure on term premia and the level of long-term yields. the risk of snap-back in term premia and the sudden repricing of rate expectations warrant close monitoring from a market functioning and broader financial stability perspective. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.092 | : main energy importers from russia (percentage of total imports in 2019) trade data monitor and ecb calculations. notes: products considered are crude petroleum (2709), refined petroleum (2710), petroleum gas (2711) and coal (2701). latest observation is for 2019. turning to households, on the one hand, their indebtedness is generally lower in the euro area than in the united states. this implies a weaker response of consumption to monetary policy in the euro area (chart 7). this was even more the case before the great financial crisis, after which us households deleveraged to a great extent. euro area household debt stands at overall moderate levels, somewhat above the level at the start of the pandemic in 2019, but considerably lower than for us households. the low interest rate environment in recent years has meant a considerable reduction in the interest payments made by households. looking ahead, due to higher interest rates, gross interest payments in the euro area can be expected to rise by only a limited extent, in view of relatively contained household debt levels and the extent of fixed-rate contracts. however, compared to the us, this increase in interest payments may happen more quickly, in view of the importance of variable-rate mortgages in some parts of the euro area. furthermore, estimates of so called ‘wealthy-hand-to-mouth’ (i.e. households with significant illiquid wealth, limited liquid wealth and elevated debt) are consistently lower than in the us.[2… |
| Philip R Lane: The monetary policy strategy of the ECB - the playbook for monetary policy decisions | Period_3 | 2022-03-03 | 0.089 | the forward guidance provided by the ecb on asset purchases and interest rates reflects the instrument hierarchy outlined in the strategy review. in relation to net asset purchases under the asset purchase programme (app), the forward guidance is that these will be maintained for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of policy rates and that these are expected to end shortly before the key ecb interest rates are raised. this forward guidance clearly expresses that net asset purchases are designed to supplement the primary role of the set of policy rates (in recognition of the limitations associated with the effective lower bound) but that net asset purchases would cease if the inflation environment no longer required the accommodative impact of policy rates to be reinforced. moreover, this also implies a clear sequencing: the end date for net asset purchases is naturally earlier than the date at which it would be appropriate to raise the key policy rates. introduced in september 2019, the guidance that net asset purchases are expected to end only shortly before the key ecb interest rates are raised provides the reassurance that net asset purchases would not be prematurely terminated. in relation to interest rate forward guidance, three key conditions should be met before interest rates are raised: |
| Luis de Guindos: Outlook for the euro area economy and financial stability | Period_3 | 2022-11-15 | 0.075 | higher interest rates are supporting euro area banks’ profitability, with interest margins improving. bank profitability has in fact steadily strengthened throughout 2022 mainly due to lower operating expenses and higher operating income. the outlook is, however, clouded by a weaker macroeconomic backdrop which is not yet reflected in loan loss provisions and overall lending volumes. inflation is also pushing up operating expenses for banks, whose profitability was strongly supported by cost-cutting efforts over the past years. banks could face higher credit risk from their increased exposures in recent years to vulnerable sectors, notably residential real estate markets. the flipside of higher interest rates is that funding costs will ultimately rise too. furthermore, longer- term fragilities persist associated with low cost-efficiency, limited revenue diversification and remaining overcapacity in parts of the euro area banking sector. |
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 119 | oil | 1 | 0.1124147 | oil | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 119 | increase | 2 | 0.0760008 | oil price | 2 | 0.9995619 |
| 119 | oil price | 3 | 0.0726053 | price increase | 3 | 0.9992111 |
| 119 | commodity | 4 | 0.0420457 | commodity | 4 | 0.9990361 |
| 119 | impact | 5 | 0.0390015 | producer | 5 | 0.9985100 |
| 119 | rise | 6 | 0.0336155 | commodity price | 6 | 0.9983350 |
| 119 | commodity price | 7 | 0.0250682 | price shock | 7 | 0.9982473 |
| 119 | consumer | 8 | 0.0243657 | oil price shock | 8 | 0.9981568 |
| 119 | price increase | 9 | 0.0230777 | consumer price | 9 | 0.9976339 |
| 119 | consumer price | 10 | 0.0166380 | import | 10 | 0.9971957 |
| 119 | food | 11 | 0.0155842 | oil price increase | 11 | 0.9971949 |
| 119 | import | 12 | 0.0141792 | producer price | 12 | 0.9971927 |
| 119 | energy | 13 | 0.0139450 | price inflation | 13 | 0.9969335 |
| 119 | producer | 14 | 0.0130083 | consumer | 14 | 0.9966663 |
| 119 | price shock | 15 | 0.0128912 | food | 15 | 0.9965804 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: The economic outlook and the ECB’s monetary policy - some key issues | Period_1 | 2004-11-12 | 0.294 | economic effects and policy implications of higher oil prices in this presentation of our assessment of the economic outlook and of our decision on the monetary policy stance, one aspect stands out which is of particular interest to investors, consumers and the financial markets at large - the recent sizable rise in oil prices. this is an important issue, and one on which clear and convincing communication from the central bank is warranted. oil prices, which reached historical highs in nominal us dollar terms in the last week of october, are a key factor determining near-term prospects for economic activity and inflation, both globally and in the euro area. as i noted earlier, persistently high and rising oil prices have had a visible direct impact on consumer prices in the euro area, and inflation is likely to remain above the upper limit of our definition of price stability of 2% in the coming months. this is a worrisome development, although there is little indication that medium-term inflationary pressures are building up in the euro area. what would be the potential impact of a sustained rise in oil prices on key macroeconomic variables in quantitative terms? for purely illustrative purposes, and using a variety of macroeconomic models, ecb economists have estimated the potential impact of a hypothetical permanent oil price increase of 50% on both inflation and output. according to these calculations, such an increase would add 0.3 to 0.6 percentage points to overall… |
| Lucas Papademos: Globalisation and central bank policies | Period_1 | 2008-01-25 | 0.289 | curves. a reduced correlation – or even a lack of it – could simply be a consequence of the effective monetary policies of central banks which have succeeded in anchoring inflation expectations to price stability. 11 direct effect of globalisation on domestic inflation the two more direct effects of globalisation on world and domestic inflation dynamics have been more visible but have partly offset each other, and the relative impact may be changing over time. on the one hand, raw materials and basic commodities, notably oil and other sources of energy, have become scarcer relative to world demand, leading to substantial upward pressure on prices. [see chart 1] for example, brent crude oil prices have increased almost tenfold over the last nine years, reflecting to a very large extent the impact of rising demand, especially in emerging market economies [see chart 2], although supply-side factors have also played a role during some periods. on the other hand, the integration of a large reserve of low-cost, skilled labour in the international economy and the increasing production of manufactured goods in emerging market economies have put downward pressure on import prices of manufactured goods as well as on wage demands in industrial economies. as a consequence, the prices of a wide range of manufactured goods have been declining since 2000. this is reflected in the unit value of imports of manufactured products in the euro area, which in mid-2007 was virtually at the same … |
| Jürgen Stark: Adjusting monetary policy in a challenging environment | Period_1 | 2011-06-17 | 0.282 | is the fact that inflation is being driven mainly by commodity prices not a reason to be less concerned about inflation in the medium term, as these such developments are usually temporary only? theoretically, it is possible to look beyond the volatility in inflation triggered by first-round effects of commodity price changes if these are of a purely temporary nature. however, the central bank also needs to consider policy action in case sustained upward trends in commodity prices are seen as a risk to price stability over the medium term. we have already observed in the past that commodity prices tend to follow a secular “trend” reflecting amongst others things the fast growth in emerging economies. moreover, if transitory rises in commodity prices ran the risk of triggering second-round effects, they may also have a more lasting impact on consumer price developments and medium-term inflation expectations. monetary policy then needs to avert temporary inflation increases that lead to second-round effects in wage and price-setting behaviour, for instance due to the indexation of wages and prices to past inflation. today’s discussion on how to react to rising commodity prices reminds me of that prevailing in the 1970s. in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979, inflation in the oecd countries increased dramatically from already relatively high levels 5.7% in 1971 to double- digit numbers 14.8% in 1980. it seems evident that this evolution, which was later la… |
| Lucas Papademos: Interview with Il Sole 24 Ore | Period_1 | 2004-08-16 | 0.252 | the oil price has reached its peak for the last 20 years (in nominal terms at least). the price since the beginning of the year averages out at $37/barrel. some governments are already very concerned, talking in terms of an oil crisis, and many are recalling the recession in the 1970s. what is your assessment? the assessment of the magnitude of the problem and of the potential impact of the increase in oil prices is somewhat complex. it must be put in perspective. oil prices have been rising since the end of 1998. if we compare the recent increase in the price of oil with two similar episodes, we will note that, in percentage terms, the increase since 1998 is similar to the one recorded between december 1973 and january 1974 and exceeds the rise between the end of 1978 and the end of 1979. the same conclusion is reached regardless of whether oil prices are measured in dollars or in euro. so there are good grounds for fears of a repetition of the crisis that struck in the early 1970s? there are major differences from that period. first of all, the increase in oil prices in the early 1970s occurred over a limited, two-month period, whereas the current upward trend in the price of oil has lasted 67 months: it has already exerted much of its impact on inflation and growth. i would also add that, in real terms, the oil price is at a relatively low level and far lower today than it was in the late 1970s. moreover the reliance of many economies on oil has declined. in other words… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Globalisation, inflation and the ECB monetary policy | Period_1 | 2008-02-29 | 0.244 | overall impact on producer and consumer prices the recent euro area experience thus indicates that relative price impacts have been strong over the last decade, with disinflation in manufactured goods contrasting with a strong acceleration in prices for commodities, though a complete assessment of their importance relative to historical norms is hampered by limited past data. as shown in chart 6a, producer price inflation has shown strong relative price effects, with muted development in consumer goods excluding food and tobacco (-1.0 % on average over the period 1996-2006 compared with the overall index) along with capital goods (-1.3 % on average) relative to average producer prices contrasting with a relatively strong rise (+2.5 % on average) in the energy component (which also may have also affected prices further down the production chain). as shown in chart 6b, hicp subcomponents have also exhibited sizeable price differentials, in particular with three energy-related items displaying the highest increases over 1996-2006 (between +5.5 % and +7.5 %), while three ict-intensive internationally traded goods exhibit the lowest increases (between -5 % and -14 %) over the period. |
| Isabel Schnabel: How long is the medium term? Monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2020-03-02 | 0.270 | bloomberg, iea and ecb staff calculations. latest observation: jan-2020 (spot) and dec-2019 (inventories). oil inventories typically correlate closely, and negatively, with oil prices. one of the key factors behind the rise in inventories was the initial decision by traditional oil-producing economies to abandon production targets, and hence to put downward pressure on oil prices, in response to the unprecedented surge in shale oil production in the united states that took off at the beginning of the past decade. over this period, the united states has emerged as the largest oil producer in the world, and it now accounts for nearly one-fifth of total global oil output.[2] a shale oil break-even prices may anchor oil price expectations market share of major oil producers |
| Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy and climate change | Period_2 | 2018-11-09 | 0.264 | 14 see bundesbank (2018), “wage growth in germany: assessment and determinants of recent developments”, monthly report, april. 15 the international energy agency estimates that, by 2025, there will be a shortfall of more than 20 million barrels per day. recent marked oil price increases suggest that the advent of unconventional oil extraction technologies has not yet sufficiently changed supply dynamics to contain sharp increases in prices. one reason may be that the market share of shale producers, despite having expanded considerably in recent years, may still be too low to affect aggregate figures. see, for example, bjørnland, h., f. m. nordvik and m. rohrer (2017), “how flexible is us shale oil production? evidence from north dakota”, centre for applied macro – and petroleum economics (camp) working paper series, no 2/2017. 16 the pass-through of oil price shocks is one of the most well studied phenomena in monetary economics. google scholar currently shows around 28,800 academic papers containing the exact phrase “oil price shock”. of those, some 11,600 also contain the exact phrase “monetary policy”. 17 this is despite oil price shocks having had on average much less impact on the economy, largely thanks to the 8/9 |
| Isabel Schnabel: How long is the medium term? Monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2020-03-02 | 0.221 | energy inflation has so far been predominantly driven by the price of oil, which fluctuates in line with supply and demand. for monetary policy, the distinction between supply and demand matters much along the same lines i described before. falling oil prices, for example, are often a symptom of a broader weakness in global aggregate demand, in which case they send important signals for monetary policy in real time. since about 2014, however, model-based analysis has suggested that the predominant source of the decline in oil prices is likely to reflect supply-side factors. a overhang in oil inventories weighing on oil prices oil price decomposition (cumulative contributions to changes in oil price since january 2010; oil price in usd per barrel) |
| Isabel Schnabel: How long is the medium term? Monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2020-03-02 | 0.203 | bloomberg, haver analytics, iea and ecb staff calculations. notes: the decomposition is derived from a monthly structural bvar model with sign restrictions. the model decomposes the average brent spot oil price, global oil production and global economic activity and identifies three shocks: i) aggregate demand shocks are identified by an increase in prices, production and activity; ii) precautionary demand shocks are identified by an increase in prices and production and a decrease in activity; iii) supply shocks are identified by an increase in prices and a decrease in production and activity. another way to see this is to consider the strong surge in oil inventories among oecd countries. b overhang in oil inventories weighing on oil prices oecd oil inventories and oil price (lhs: billion barrels, rhs: usd per barrel, inverted) |
| Isabel Schnabel: How long is the medium term? Monetary policy in a low inflation environment | Period_2 | 2020-03-02 | 0.185 | iea and ecb staff calculations. latest observation: january 2020. there are signs that the rise of the united states as a major oil producer may have fundamentally changed market expectations of the long-run equilibrium price of oil. over recent years, we have observed an interesting correlation between future expected oil prices and the evolution of the break-even price of shale oil producers, i.e. the price above which it becomes profitable to exploit new sources of shale oil. all else being equal, market participants expect oil prices to converge towards the expected marginal cost of supply.[3] b shale oil break-even prices may anchor oil price expectations oil production break-evens and long-term oil price expectations |
| Isabel Schnabel: Reflation, not stagflation | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.180 | the implication is that there is a large potential for demand to sustain growth at elevated levels in the foreseeable future as supply capacity catches up with demand and bottlenecks are gradually resolved. the strong rise in oil prices is unlikely to change this picture fundamentally. to see this, it is worth looking back at the 1970s. when the first oil price shock hit the global economy in 1973, roughly one barrel of oil was required to generate usd 1,000 of gdp in 2010 prices (slide 6, left-hand chart). today, less than half that amount of oil is needed to generate the same level of output. in other words, changes in consumer preferences, improvements in energy efficiency as well as the decline in the growth contribution of energy-intensive industries all imply that rising oil prices hurt growth and the economy much less now than they did in the past./4! ecb analysis corroborates this view. it finds that the impact of an oil supply shock on global industrial production may be about half of what it was in the 1980s and 1990s (slide 6, right-hand chart). the ongoing green transition can be expected to further strengthen the economy’s resilience to oil price shocks. new research finds that green investments are not dampened by higher oil prices. in addition, many governments are currently imposing tax cuts, price caps or rebates to shield the most vulnerable households, which typically spend a substantial share of income on energy, from the sharp rise in gas, fuel and ele… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Looking through higher energy prices? Monetary policy and the green transition | Period_3 | 2022-01-11 | 0.138 | the other scenario in which policy would require adjustment is if the nature of the shock were to change. more than a decade ago, the seminal paper by lutz kilian established that not all oil price shocks are alike. their effects on the economy critically depend on the underlying source of the shock.!©! rising oil prices due to stronger aggregate demand, for example, are associated with an increase in real economic activity, calling for a different monetary policy response than if oil prices were to rise in response to supply disruptions in the oil market. |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy in a cost-of-living crisis | Period_3 | 2022-10-03 | 0.134 |
|
| Fabio Panetta: Small steps in a dark room - guiding policy on the path out of the pandemic | Period_3 | 2022-03-01 | 0.121 | strength of imported inflation contribution to hicp by import content energy dependence (annual percentage changes and percentage points) (left-hand scale: net energy imports as a percentage of gross available energy: right-hand scale: tonnes of oil equivalent/chained 2015 eur thousands) a teeta energy intensity (hs) overall dependence ——hicp «= dependence on oil == dependence on gas 90 0.14 . 3 80 0.12 ° | 70 any - 0.10 1 0 ivatnal yh mai nal | 60 - 0.08 2 50 0.06 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 1999 2006 2013 2020 sources: left panel: world input-output database, eurostat and ecb staff calculations; right panel: eurostat and ecb calculations. notes: energy intensity is measured as the ratio between gross available energy and real gdp. the latest observations are for december 2021 for the left panel, and 2020 for the right panel. chart 5 energy supply shocks in the euro area european oil and gas prices in oil equivalent oil drivers decomposition terms (daily cumulated percentage changes since january 2020) (usd/barrel) —_——erent oil spot price = =§ == oil equivalent gas price @emm risk gm supply @beconomic activity ——oil price 400 50 | 350 25 } 300 250 0 200 150 29 | 100 -50 - 50 0 -75 l 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 jan-20 may-20 sep-20 jan-21 may-21 sep-21 jan-22 sources: refinitiv and ecb staff calculations. notes: an energy equivalent price compares the price of two energy sources for the same energy content. structural shocks are estimated using the… |
| Isabel Schnabel: Monetary policy and the Great Volatility | Period_3 | 2022-08-30 | 0.114 |
|
The most representative speeches:
The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 120 | condition | 1 | 0.2227994 | finance condition | 1 | 0.9998247 |
| 120 | finance | 2 | 0.1534111 | favourable finance condition | 2 | 0.9995619 |
| 120 | finance condition | 3 | 0.1042877 | favourable finance | 3 | 0.9993866 |
| 120 | favourable | 4 | 0.0622186 | finance | 4 | 0.9990356 |
| 120 | favourable finance condition | 5 | 0.0351559 | favourable | 5 | 0.9985974 |
| 120 | favourable finance | 6 | 0.0332320 | condition | 6 | 0.9985962 |
| 120 | firm | 7 | 0.0218169 | preserve favourable | 7 | 0.9983348 |
| 120 | financial condition | 8 | 0.0204061 | ensure favourable | 8 | 0.9980706 |
| 120 | support | 9 | 0.0189952 | ensure favourable finance | 9 | 0.9978514 |
| 120 | ensure | 10 | 0.0168148 | base finance | 10 | 0.9976777 |
| 120 | tighten | 11 | 0.0124540 | compass | 11 | 0.9975467 |
| 120 | household | 12 | 0.0116844 | financial condition | 12 | 0.9975454 |
| 120 | preserve | 13 | 0.0110431 | monetary policy favourable | 13 | 0.9974570 |
| 120 | market condition | 14 | 0.0079649 | policy favourable finance | 14 | 0.9972379 |
| 120 | preserve favourable | 15 | 0.0059128 | policy favourable | 15 | 0.9971505 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: Policy-making in EMU - strategies, rules and discretion | Period_1 | 2004-04-23 | 0.079 | favourable financing conditions that have resulted from the transition to emu and from the ecb’s conduct of a stability-oriented monetary policy. i hope it has become clear from what i have explained - maybe somewhat too extensively - that i am not just praising spain’s monetary and economic policy achievements because i want to be a polite and complimentary guest. spain’s performance provides telling evidence that we can be confident in the ability of our policy framework - with its combination of strategies, rules and constrained discretion - to deliver stability and growth in europe. the challenges are manifold, but i believe that we are on the right track. on such an optimistic note, i should like to end and thank you very much for your attention. muchas gracias. |
| Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy and asset prices | Period_1 | 2009-10-19 | 0.058 | third, the recent financial crisis has confirmed that a central bank’s inability to identify in real time the precise mechanisms through which financial imbalances evolve and to anticipate the exact timing of their unwinding does not mean it is unable to identify the build-up of imbalances. in the run up to the crisis several policy makers did identify the under-pricing of risk as a major source of concern. in this context, let me mention that recent research – including research conducted at the ecb – has reviewed more systematically the implications for monetary policy of a more explicit role for financial factors in macroeconomic models. 14 this stream of research is still under development, but it does account for an endogenous interaction between macroeconomic conditions and the demand for and supply of credit. the main policy implication of this research continues to be that monetary policy should pursue price stability as a primary objective. at the same time, however, it is acknowledged that financial imbalances can generate sizable macroeconomic costs at times of crisis, when they can produce undesirable economic fluctuations. this justifies a very close monitoring of financial conditions. these new models also show that financial conditions have an impact on the notion of a natural rate of interest – the theoretical interest rate level which, if implemented by the central bank, would ensure that price stability is maintained. of course, the practical relevance of… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Current challenges for the ECB - sustainable non inflationary growth and financial stability | Period_1 | 2004-05-18 | 0.052 | how we have contributed and continue to contribute to sustainable non-inflationary growth the “magnetic north” of our compass is the maintenance of price stability over the medium term. since 1999, the medium to long-term inflation expectations, extracted either from the ecb survey of professional forecasters or from surveys conducted by private institutions such as consensus economics, have remained in line with our objective of price stability, fluctuating within a narrow band around 1.8%-1.9%. it is true that actual inflation has several times risen above the ceiling of 2% since 1999. but this occurred in a difficult environment with many adverse price shocks. however, this has not jeopardised our achievement in anchoring medium to long-term inflation expectations. moreover, anchoring long term inflation expectations at moderate levels has allowed to maintain short-term, medium-term and long-term market interest rates at low levels, thereby offering very favourable financing conditions to consumers, investors and companies. this low level of market interest rates is the result of the high level of credibility that the ecb and the euro immediately inherited from the national central banks and from the most stable national currencies that existed before 1999; contrary to what some observers were forecasting, the euro was not build as an average of the former national currencies, displaying a yield curve that would be the average of the yield curves prevailing in the count… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Adoption of the European Parliament resolution on the ECB’s 2009 Annual Report | Period_1 | 2010-11-29 | 0.050 | actions taken by the ecb during the crisis 2009 was a most challenging year for the ecb’s monetary policy. it started with a severe economic downturn worldwide, following the outbreak of the financial crisis in autumn 2008. in this environment of subdued inflationary pressures, we continued with our policy of lowering our key rates further. overall, within a period of only seven months (between october 2008 and may 2009) we lowered our main refinancing rate by 325 basis points. this brought our main refinancing rate to 1%. to ensure that households and firms in the euro area would benefit from these most favourable financing conditions, we also continued in 2009 with and even extended our enhanced credit support to euro area banks. we did this in response to dysfunctional money markets that had weakened the ability of monetary policy to influence the outlook for price stability by interest rate decisions alone. among those non-standard measures, as we use to call them, the most prominent one is the full allotment liquidity provision through our refinancing operations with euro area banks – against good collateral and at the main refinancing rate prevailing at the time for several maturities extending well beyond that of the weekly operations. in 2009 we also extended the maturity of our longer-term refinancing operations to up to one year. as rightly emphasised in your draft resolution on the ecb’s annual report, this “enhanced credit support” has been successful in avoidi… |
| Jürgen Stark: Economic recovery and exit strategies | Period_1 | 2010-03-17 | 0.047 | countries. overall, the governing council views the current low level of its key interest rates as appropriate. to foster financing conditions and facilitate the transmission of lower key ecb interest rates to money market and bank lending rates, the governing council also introduced a number of non-standard measures. notably, the eurosystem provided unlimited liquidity to banks at a fixed interest rate and at maturities of up to one year. it also provided liquidity in foreign currencies, extended the list of eligible collateral and purchased covered bonds outright. together, our non-standard measures have helped to improve financing conditions, especially in the money market, thus contributing to a better flow of credit to households and firms than would otherwise have been the case. however, it is important to ensure that the non-standard measures do not remain in place for longer than is necessary, as this would entail the danger of significantly distorting money market participants’ perceptions of actual liquidity risk and their related behaviour. therefore, in view of the improvements in financial market conditions seen since last spring, we decided in december to begin a gradual phasing-out of some of our non-standard measures. in particular, we conducted the last 12-month operations in december and decided that the six-month operation coming up in two weeks will be the last. in addition, on 4 march, we decided to return to variable rate tenders in the regular three-… |
| Philip R Lane: The compass of monetary policy - favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2021-03-02 | 0.294 | 02/03/2021 the compass of monetary policy: favourable financing conditions assessment provides the basic rationale that preserving favourable financing conditions is a necessary intermediate target for countering the negative pandemic shock to the projected inflation path, which in turn is a pre-condition for delivering the medium-term inflation aim of the ecb. the preservation of favourable financing conditions for an extended period of time helps to support inflation developments through multiple channels.[3] first, the commitment to preserving favourable |
| Philip R Lane: The compass of monetary policy - favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2021-03-02 | 0.293 | 02/03/2021 the compass of monetary policy: favourable financing conditions from a monetary policy perspective, in addition to supporting directly the downstream component of financing conditions through refinancing operations (especially tltros), preserving favourable market- based financing conditions also helps to safeguard favourable bank lending conditions for the real economy and thereby contain such adverse feedback dynamics. these upstream-downstream inter- connections underline the critical importance of market-based financing conditions for the entire economy, |
| Philip R Lane: The compass of monetary policy - favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2021-03-02 | 0.252 | 02/03/2021 the compass of monetary policy: favourable financing conditions of the speech, i summarise the overall theme of this speech and place the current pandemic challenge in the context of the overall campaign to deliver our inflation aim in the medium term. favourable financing conditions as the compass the phrase “favourable financing conditions” intentionally puts the spotlight on a pivotal section of the transmission mechanism that links the basic monetary policy instruments controlled by central banks |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy in a pandemic - ensuring favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2020-12-01 | 0.251 | 01/12/2020 monetary policy in a pandemic: ensuring favourable financing conditions monetary policy in a pandemic: ensuring favourable financing conditions speech by philip r. lane, member of the executive board of the ecb, at the economics department and im-tcd, trinity college dublin introduction my aim in this speech today is to explain the role of monetary policy in the pandemic, with a natural focus on the ecb and the euro area. [1],[2] i will first review the monetary policy measures that we have taken in response to the pandemic before highlighting some of the current economic and financial challenges that confront the euro area. i will then explain why the current priority for monetary policy is to ensure favourable financing conditions to support the economic recovery and counteract the negative impact of the pandemic on the projected inflation path. |
| Philip R Lane: The compass of monetary policy - favourable financing conditions | Period_2 | 2021-03-02 | 0.249 | financing conditions reduces financing uncertainty for banks, corporates, households and governments alike. second, the assurance to maintain favourable financing conditions will help to prevent an undue tightening of financing conditions in a situation of an improving macroeconomic landscape, as markets factor in the reaction of the ecb. keeping favourable financing conditions in this environment could even accelerate the dynamics of the recovery, since better economic prospects combined with attractive |
| Philip R Lane: Monetary policy during the pandemic - the role of the PEPP | Period_3 | 2022-04-20 | 0.130 | however, these calculations are based on elasticities of financial conditions to policy impulses that are estimated based on data observed in non-stressed market conditions. this implies, in turn, that the impact estimates are typically moderate in size. it follows that this first approach to quantifying the effects of our policies is likely to underestimate by a wide margin their true effect under the macro- financial conditions generated by the extraordinary pandemic shock. this approach likely also understates the overall impact of monetary policy during the pandemic, since it does not take into account that fiscal policy would likely have been less countercyclical in the absence of favourable financing conditions. more generally, in the macroeconomic models that central banks typically use for simulation and policy analysis, it is challenging to reflect the role of monetary policy measures in providing a credible backstop against adverse tail risks, such as an arrest in the flow of credit to the economy and acute financial instability. a more realistic assumption for constructing counterfactual financial conditions is to recognise that, in the event of policy inaction, financial markets – which were already highly destabilised – would have gone into a tailspin, sending the economy into a meltdown. building on recent advances in the macro-econometrics of estimating the impact of financial tail risks, preliminary results produced by ecb staff indicate that the ecb’s remo… |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.128 |
|
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.117 | meanwhile our asset purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme continue to safeguard favourable financing conditions for all sectors of the economy. at a time when purchasing power is already being squeezed by higher energy and fuel bills, an undue tightening of financing conditions is not desirable, and would represent an unwarranted headwind for the recovery. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.116 | as a result, we still see inflation moderating in the next year, but it will take longer to decline than originally expected. if energy prices keep rising or supply constraints persist, inflation may remain higher for longer than we currently anticipate. this could feed into higher wages and subsequently higher prices. but so far, we see no evidence of this in the data for negotiated wages. we do see wage growth next year potentially rising somewhat more than this year, but the risk of second-round effects remains limited. overall, we continue to foresee inflation in the medium term remaining below our new symmetric two per cent target. growth and medium-term inflation dynamics still depend on favourable financing conditions for all sectors of the economy. such conditions remain favourable and bank lending rates to firms and households remain at historically low levels. at our october meeting the governing council continued to judge that favourable financing conditions could be maintained with the stance endorsed in september. |
| Luis de Guindos: Challenges for monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-07-05 | 0.104 | the even transmission of monetary policy the smooth and even transmission of our monetary policy across the euro area is required to preserve the singleness of monetary policy and achieve our mandate of price stability. changes in financing conditions that go beyond the level merited by fundamental factors undermine the achievement of that objective. sovereign bond yields are an important reference point for assessing the transmission of our policy stance because they act as a benchmark for determining the financing conditions for firms and households. it is natural for sovereign yields to differ somewhat across euro area countries, owing to idiosyncratic factors, such as public debt-to-gdp ratios, budget deficits or long-run growth rates. however, at times yields can, and do, rapidly diverge from economic fundamentals. excessive divergence makes credit conditions inconsistent with the uniform transmission of monetary policy impulses and could cause financial instability. it is instead critical that financing conditions move broadly in sync across the euro area when we change our stance. for two equally sound firms in the euro area, a change in the monetary policy stance should lead to a similar reaction in their financing conditions, no matter in which country they are domiciled. should that not be the case, we will react to prevent fragmentation, with suitable safeguards to prevent moral hazard. preventing fragmentation allows us to adjust our monetary policy stance at t… |
The most representative speeches:
for(i in 99){
topic_stats <- data_year_subset %>%
filter(topic == i)
################ Beginning of the template ######################
cat("## ", paste0("**Topic ", topic_stats$topic, "**: ", topic_stats$topic_name), "\n")
cat("###", "Describing Topics in general \n\n")
cat("The most common terms according to different indicators:\n\n")
print(kable(filter(lda_words, topic == i)) %>%
kable_styling(bootstrap_options = c("striped", "condensed", full_width = F)))
cat("\n\n")
cat("###", "Describing Topics for the 3 periods \n\n")
cat("We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:\n\n")
print(kable(filter(top_speech_paragraphs_period, topic == i) %>% select(title_link, period, date, gamma, paragraphs)) %>%
kable_styling(bootstrap_options = c("striped", "condensed", full_width = F), font_size = 12))
cat("\n\n")
cat("The most representative speeches:\n\n")
print(kable(filter(top_speech_period, topic == topic_stats$topic) %>% select(title_link, period, date, gamma_speech)) %>%
kable_styling(bootstrap_options = c("striped", "condensed", full_width = F), font_size = 12))
cat("\n\n")
}The most common terms according to different indicators:
| topic | term_beta | rank_beta | beta | term_frex | rank_frex | frex |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 99 | decision | 1 | 0.0627836 | communication | 1 | 0.9997372 |
| 99 | communication | 2 | 0.0606229 | transparency | 2 | 0.9993867 |
| 99 | public | 3 | 0.0422007 | transparent | 3 | 0.9978095 |
| 99 | transparency | 4 | 0.0310563 | bank communication | 4 | 0.9977609 |
| 99 | policy decision | 5 | 0.0207080 | central bank communication | 5 | 0.9976737 |
| 99 | time | 6 | 0.0192297 | monetary policy decision | 6 | 0.9974580 |
| 99 | explain | 7 | 0.0185474 | publication | 7 | 0.9974570 |
| 99 | press | 8 | 0.0180925 | press conference | 8 | 0.9972834 |
| 99 | monetary policy decision | 9 | 0.0168416 | vote | 9 | 0.9969323 |
| 99 | publish | 10 | 0.0163867 | policy decision | 10 | 0.9967519 |
| 99 | transparent | 11 | 0.0132026 | predictability | 11 | 0.9967510 |
| 99 | press conference | 12 | 0.0128615 | publish | 12 | 0.9964918 |
| 99 | assessment | 13 | 0.0127478 | communicate | 13 | 0.9964075 |
| 99 | conference | 14 | 0.0127478 | minute | 14 | 0.9964031 |
| 99 | understand | 15 | 0.0122929 | deliberation | 15 | 0.9963143 |
We list the 5 most representative paragraphs for each period:
| title_link | period | date | gamma | paragraphs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucas Papademos: Monetary policy communication and effectiveness | Period_1 | 2008-01-16 | 0.417 | iii.4 minutes and voting records with these and other forms of communication in place, the ecb has achieved a high level of transparency over time. nevertheless, the ecb does not subscribe to the view that unlimited transparency is always beneficial. our position has at times triggered criticism of one aspect of our communication policy by some observers, mainly academics, which concerns the non- disclosure of the minutes and voting records of the governing council meetings. let me briefly comment on this issue. the introductory statement made by the president at the monthly press conference contains the key information about our outlook and risk assessment, as well as the rationale for the respective policy decision, in real time. the information conveyed in the introductory statement is, in essence, similar to that published by other central banks in “summary minutes” and this is further elaborated by the more comprehensive economic and monetary analysis contained in the ecb’s monthly bulletin, which is published in the week following the first governing council meeting of the month. moreover, the introductory statement is provided in a timely manner: the press conference takes place 45 minutes after the decision on the key interest rates for the euro area has been announced in a press release, while the minutes of the decision-making committees of other major central banks take, on average, two to six weeks to be published. and as i mentioned before, the press conferenc… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Communication, transparency and the ECB’s monetary policy | Period_1 | 2005-02-03 | 0.412 | ecb’s communication in practice some features of the ecb are bringing about major additional challenges for external communications. in particular, the ecb operates in a multicultural environment with 12 different cultures and 10 different languages in the euro area and 25 cultures and 20 languages within the scope of the european system of central banks. and, the ecb was given the very ambitious challenge to be fully credible from day one, without track record and to issue a currency which would be immediately as credible as the most credible legacy currencies. in the practical implementation of the communication policy we make use of a wide range of communication tools. i will mention only a few of them here: first, the monthly press conferences after the first governing council meeting in each month. the introductory statement at the press conference is a key element in our communication as it conveys the collective view of the ecb’s governing council on the monetary policy stance in real time. in fact, the decision to hold a press conference after each policy meeting was unheard of among major central banks prior to the euro. to use real time detailed communication and press conferences in this way was a logical decision, bearing in mind (i) the attention the ecb would receive as a major player in the world financial markets and the global economy, (ii) the necessity to “frontload” the public and the markets with information on the thinking of the new institution and (… |
| Mr Noyer: Monetary policymaking in the euro area (Central Bank Articles and Speeches, 23 Mar 2000) | Period_1 | 2000-03-01 | 0.353 | issues of communication policy it is widely acknowledged today that communication policies belong to the core tasks of any central bank. for some years now, transparency has been one of the catchwords of central banking. this is closely related to the fact that, with more and more central banks becoming independent, the issue of accountability has gained equal importance. accountability is in turn facilitated by a high degree of transparency. not only those institutions to which a central bank is formally accountable, but also market participants and the public at large can make an assessment of the situation more easily if a central bank pursues its primary objective in an appropriate way. hence, a high degree of transparency also facilitates the creation of credibility and, via its impact on the expectation-forming process, increases the efficiency of monetary policy. against this background, the governing council of the ecb has committed itself to being open, transparent and accountable for its decisions and its performance vis-à-vis the european public and the european parliament, the public’s elected representative. we are well aware of the fact that, because of both the complexity of the eurosystem’s monetary policy and the plurality of the audiences - which are accustomed to different communication forms - to which it is addressed, extraordinary efforts are required to explain the monetary policy considerations of the governing council on a regular basis in the most… |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Key issues for monetary policy - an ECB view | Period_1 | 2004-10-13 | 0.344 | communication with the public and the markets has also been facilitated by the fact that our assessment of the economic situation and the risks to price stability are published regularly and that monetary policy decisions are explained in a press conference held after each monthly meeting in which monetary policy is discussed. in this respect we have been bold. in 1999, central banking communication, with only very few exceptions, involved presenting the bank’s diagnosis by publishing the minutes with a delay of five or six weeks. the ecb was one of the first central banks to give a real-time detailed analysis and assessment and to organise regular press conferences. our commitment to transparency has been effective in making the ecb highly predictable in its decisions and actions. as a matter of fact the combination of the display of our monetary policy concept and of our definition of price stability together with a candid real time explanation of our successive diagnostic makes us at the highest level of predictability according to research. |
| Jean-Claude Trichet: Issues in monetary policy - views from the ECB | Period_1 | 2004-04-30 | 0.326 | transparency indeed, the third principle that we have adhered to since the inception the ecb is the importance of open and transparent communication with investors, savers, market participants and the public at large. this is a prerequisite for appropriate accountability and enhances the understanding among the markets of how the central bank conducts its monetary policy, thereby enhancing substantially policy effectiveness. this was especially important for a new institution such as the ecb which was lacking a track record. the announcement of our monetary policy strategy in october 1998, before the ecb actually started to be in charge of conducting the single monetary policy in the euro area, was a key element in our striving for transparency. it clearly stated the rules of the game and helped to reduce the uncertainty faced by market participants. communication with the public and the markets has also being facilitated by the fact that our assessment of the economic situation and the risks to price stability is regularly published and that monetary policy decisions are explained in the press conference that we give after each monthly meeting in which monetary policy is discussed. the ecb produces on a monthly basis a bulletin that provides a detailed economic assessment to the public. we have been told from time to time that we were not sufficiently transparent. i think this is not justified. as a matter of fact, we have been very imaginative and creative in this respec… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy communication in turbulent times | Period_2 | 2014-04-24 | 0.257 | some record or account of its policy deliberations. i would like to share with you my views on this matter today. a written account of our policy deliberations would provide a more detailed explanation of the reasoning behind the governing council’s decisions, and give a sense of the discussion and the main arguments. this would allow the public and markets to further improve their understanding of the governing council’s reaction function, our assessment of the economy and our policy responses in light of evolving conditions. for this reason, i am convinced that it would be useful. yet, we need also to be careful. we need to take proper account of the specific institutional setting of the euro area and the unique communication challenges in a multi-country monetary union. 7 this implies, first, that any modifications we introduce in reporting on our monetary policy deliberations must not put at risk or call into question the independence of the members of the governing council. they act in a personal capacity in the interest of the euro area, rather than as representatives of their countries of origin. to my mind this precludes the attribution of positions to individual council members, which could all too easily be misconstrued or misinterpreted through a national perspective and expose the members to external pressures, perceived or real. second, we need to ensure that any account of our proceedings preserves the collegiality of the governing council’s deliberations. fo… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy communication in turbulent times | Period_2 | 2014-04-24 | 0.249 | transparency and monetary policy effectiveness up until the early 1990s, central banks tended to be rather secretive institutions, inclined to lock away their thinking like the gold in their vaults 1. remember that it was only in 1994 that the federal reserve decided to make its interest rate decisions public. before that, markets had to guess whether or not the fomc had changed its federal funds rate target. today, however, central banks have realised they are more likely to fulfil their mandates if they inform the public and the markets about their strategies, assessments and policy decisions in an open, clear and timely manner. 2 also, the granting of more independence to central banks called for a commensurate increase in accountability to the wider public. central banks responded and opened up. the ecb has faced the same expectations of openness, not least given the particular challenges for democratic legitimacy in a multi-country monetary union. from the start, we have fully embraced the merits of being transparent and accountable. for example, we were the first major central bank to hold a regular press conference immediately after our monthly policy meetings to explain our decisions in real-time. we also report regularly to the european parliament. moreover, we have recognised that, in a market economy, transparency and communication are central to the effectiveness of our monetary policy. 3 first, having a clear objective supports credibility and helps anchor inf… |
| Mario Draghi: Monetary policy communication in turbulent times | Period_2 | 2014-04-24 | 0.247 | some record or account of its policy deliberations. i would like to share with you my views on this matter today. a written account of our policy deliberations would provide a more detailed explanation of the reasoning behind the governing council’s decisions, and give a sense of the discussion and the main arguments. this would allow the public and markets to further improve their understanding of the governing council’s reaction function, our assessment of the economy and our policy responses in light of evolving conditions. for this reason, i am convinced that it would be useful. yet, we need also to be careful. we need to take proper account of the specific institutional setting of the euro area and the unique communication challenges in a multi-country monetary union. 7 this implies, first, that any modifications we introduce in reporting on our monetary policy deliberations must not put at risk or call into question the independence of the members of the governing council. they act in a personal capacity in the interest of the euro area, rather than as representatives of their countries of origin. to my mind this precludes the attribution of positions to individual council members, which could all too easily be misconstrued or misinterpreted through a national perspective and expose the members to external pressures, perceived or real. second, we need to ensure that any account of our proceedings preserves the collegiality of the governing council’s deliberations. fo… |
| Mario Draghi: Plenary debate of the European Parliament on the ECB’s Annual Report 2013 | Period_2 | 2015-03-02 | 0.244 | the ecb’s commitment to accountability and transparency today’s session is also an opportunity to take a wider perspective on ecb policies. in that context, let me touch upon a topic that is of high relevance to you: the ecb’s accountability and transparency. accountability of the central bank is the essential counterpart to its independence. to this end, the ecb has an elaborate framework to discharge accountability to european citizens and your house, and today’s debate is a key element of this framework. taking up new tasks in the supervisory field required adding further elements to this framework, and i believe the first months of operation of the ssm have proven our commitment to accountability in this domain as well. but accountability would not be meaningful without an appropriate degree of transparency. from the start, due also to its unique institutional set-up, the ecb has strived to be transparent. for instance, we were the first major central bank to hold a regular press conference immediately after our policy meetings. the ecb also regularly publishes a variety of data on the execution of its monetary policy operations and the liquidity conditions of the eurosystem. more recently, we have decided to go one step further and to publish regular accounts of governing council monetary policy discussions, starting with the meeting on 21–22 january 2015, the account of which was published last thursday. through these accounts, we are enriching the communication of t… |
| Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Bloomberg | Period_2 | 2014-01-17 | 0.187 | on publication of minutes: “it’s an important discussion and there’s a clear commitment to take this discussion forward. so please be patient on that. it’s a very important discussion for us because it has to do with our monetary-policy framework, the communication of monetary policy. i have no doubt personally that publishing an account of the discussion would serve monetary policy and make it more effective by helping markets and the public to understand monetary policy better, understand better what are the options and the risks, and with that anticipate better what we can do and not do. it would make the transmission of monetary policy smoother in the sense that the information available to governing council members or changes in the thinking of governing council members would feed in a smoother way into market prices. i really think there would be a benefit.” “it is a complex discussion though. first, there are different models around us. the minutes published by the fed are not the same as the ones published by the bank of england or the bank of japan. we have to pick what’s most appropriate for us. then there is an element of discussion which is difficult. i’m not saying that it’s contentious, but there will be a substantial discussion about the publication of the individual votes. there’s a choice to be made and there are pros and cons. i personally stand on the side of those who think the individual votes should be published – but that’s just my personal view. gov… |
| Christine Lagarde: ECB press conference - introductory statement | Period_3 | 2022-07-21 | 0.116 | and all the rest of it. as seen by markets, it has also significantly adjusted in the last few weeks. so we will cross that bridge when we cross that bridge. do you think this is a historic moment? are you personally glad that the time with the negative interest rates is over now? i think it’s a rather historical moment for me, at least, for two reasons. one is it’s very good when a whole team – the whole governing council – 25 members around the table, actually are in complete alignment and support for a transmission protection instrument which we regard as critical in order to properly transmit our monetary policy going forward. so in that respect, at least from the president of the ecb point of view, yes, i think it’s quite a gratifying moment. it means that staff has done an enormous amount of work, that all members of the committees that are bringing together the expertise of the national central banks – bundesbank included, of course – have worked really hard, and that we have come to the same view without any reservation. so it is important in that respect. i think it’s the first time in over a decade that we raise interest rates. and moving out of negative interest rates, by all accounts, certainly to me, is going to facilitate a number of things that we can explain to european citizens in order to help them understand what we are trying to do in order to reduce inflation and in order to procure price stability. so in those two respects, yes, but, you know, i have … |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.098 | jx. english 1. you will find this document annexed to this speech. research indicates that accessible, visualised and relatable monetary policy communication improve public comprehension and also trust. see bholat, d., broughton, n., ter meer, j. and walczak, e. (2019), “enhancing central bank communications using simple and relatable information”, journal of monetary economics, pp. 1-15. 2. for more information, see [he ecb listens portal. 3. see european parliament resolution of 10 february 2021 on the european central bank - annual report 2020. |
| Philip R Lane: The transmission of monetary policy | Period_3 | 2022-10-12 | 0.087 | in the rest of the world); and the strength of self-reinforcing persistence dynamics (including pipeline pressures, second round effects, shifts in inflation expectations). in addition, as reviewed in this speech, there is also a feedback loop between our monetary policy decisions and monetary policy transmission mechanism. in particular, in calibrating our future monetary policy decisions, it will be essential to closely monitor the impact of our monetary policy decisions on the different stages of the transmission mechanism. in one direction, if we observe that transmission is weaker or slower than expected, this would require a further tightening of the monetary policy stance. in the other direction, if we observe that transmission is stronger or faster than expected, this would require a less-tight monetary policy stance. |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-11-23 | 0.074 | moreover, we have taken concrete measures to enhance the clarity and accessibility of our communication to the public, such as the new monetary policy statement following our governing council meetings. and we are also making “listening events” a structural feature, extending the principle of two-way communication that we have with you in the european parliament directly to citizens. but this direct communication with citizens can only complement our accountability relationship with the european parliament, which is prominently enshrined in the treaty. we need you, as the representatives of eu citizens, to channel their concerns to us and help explain our policies to them. delivering on the ecb’s treaty obligations is a challenge shared by both the ecb and the european parliament. over the past two years, | have answered around 300 questions in hearings and responded to more than 90 written letters from you. but we have also gone beyond the regular practices and taken several initiatives to enhance the scrutiny of the ecb’s actions. together, we have organised additional hearings and visits to the ecb on topical issues, such as the strategy review and the digital euro. as soon as the digital euro project was launched, my executive board colleague mr panetta clearly communicated our willingness to have additional regular exchanges following progress made in the investigation phase.” the next of these will take place on thursday of this week. the flexibility that has shaped … |
| Christine Lagarde: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament | Period_3 | 2021-09-27 | 0.073 | moreover, to further enhance our transparency and ensure that we are aware of citizens’ expectations and concerns in relation to our policies, we have modernised our communication policy and we will make outreach events a structural feature of our interaction with the public. but our efforts to ensure that we are accountable to european citizens do not stop there. this parliament will continue to be our main interlocutor and your role in making sure that the people’s voices are heard by the ecb and that the ecb’s voice is heard by the people remains crucial to foster understanding of and trust in our policies. finally, two years after my first appearance before this committee, i remain fully convinced of the need for an “open mind” to ensure that the ecb keeps delivering on its mandate in rapidly changing circumstances. we therefore intend to assess the appropriateness of our monetary policy strategy periodically, with the next assessment expected in 2025. thank you for your attention. i now stand ready to take your questions. |
The most representative speeches: